ARRESTING CORRUPTION IN THE POLICE

The global experience of police corruption reform efforts
Transparency International (TI) is the civil society organisation leading the global fight against corruption. Through more than 90 chapters worldwide and an international secretariat in Berlin, Germany, TI raises awareness of the damaging effects of corruption, and works with partners in government, business and civil society to develop and implement effective measures to tackle it. For more information about TI, please visit www.transparency.org.

The Defence and Security Programme works with governments, defence companies, multilateral organisations and civil society to build integrity and reduce corruption in defence establishments worldwide. The London-based Defence and Security Programme is led by Transparency International UK (TI-UK). Information on Transparency International’s work in the defence and security sector to date, including background, overviews of current and past projects, and publications, is available at the TI-UK Defence and Security Programme’s website: www.ti-defence.org.

While acknowledging the debt TI-UK owes to all those who have contributed to and collaborated in the preparation of this publication, we wish to make it clear that Transparency International UK alone is responsible for its content. Although believed to be accurate at this time, this publication should not be relied on as a full or detailed statement of the subject matter.

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ARRESTING CORRUPTION IN THE POLICE

The global experience of police corruption reform efforts
Around the world, honest police officers find themselves discredited by the actions of corrupt fellow colleagues. Their ability to properly serve their citizens is degraded by corrupted policing systems. In countries where democratic principles and the rule of law are weak, corrupt practices such as racketeering, bribes and collusion between the police and organised crime are far more prolific. Even in countries that have a strong rule of law, the reality is that corruption continues to occur in the police services.

There are debates as to what lies at the root of corruption, but whatever the cause, corruption is utterly unacceptable in the police, an institution that exists to protect its public and is the enforcer of the rule of law. The public needs to know that the police, as a service provider to citizens, are transparent and accountible; and when cases of police corruption are discovered it is also vital that the public see corrupt police officers being investigated and prosecuted.

It is important that independent organisations, like Transparency International, are there to monitor the police, but the police themselves need to ensure that they energetically root out corruption within their own service. That is why I am pleased that this report highlights actions that both civil society and the police themselves can take in tackling police corruption, and how they can work together. These lines of dialogue and actions help keep a healthy relationship between the police and the public.

This report is a good starting point for those citizens, those police, and those decision makers who want to make change - independently or together—towards addressing and combating police corruption.

William F. Hughes, CBE QPM
Former Director General
UK Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA)
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A poll released by the BBC in 2011 ranked corruption as the most frequently discussed global problem, surpassing climate change, extreme poverty and hunger.

What gets much less the attention is that corruption is often entangled with the police—exactly the organisation that is meant to protect us from it. In many countries, criminal networks make extensive use of the police to carry out criminal activity, avoid investigation and escape prosecution. Criminal factions who abuse international borders in order to conduct their business put pressure on public services, local communities and legitimate enterprises—and an easy way to achieve this is through corruption.

Even the most sophisticated countries have had and continue to have serious corruption issues with their police forces, as the experiences of Australia, the USA and the UK attest.

Yet counter-corruption police reforms are often kept out of the public eye, usually do not get much attention, and have a mostly poor track record of success.

Transparency International UK’s Defence and Security Programme has been working on constructive ways to address defence and security corruption since 2004. We hope that this report will open a debate in every part of the world about how civil society can and should play a much stronger role in police reform.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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Mark Pyman

Defence and Security Programme
Transparency International UK
London, November 2012
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Corruption is a dangerous phenomenon in society, but the danger is hugely amplified when it is the police themselves that are corrupt. It is they who should be the guardians of the rules and norms that we agree to live by.

This report is the result of a survey of global experience of police anti-corruption reforms. It analyses police corruption and looks at reforms that were undertaken to tackle it. The report offers a way to analyse police corruption more systematically through a ‘police typology’, and looks at examples of police reform in ten countries around the globe.

There are four major findings from this study:

1. **Citizens rate police corruption as the top concern in dozens of countries.**
   
   This finding comes from a global survey, reported in Transparency International’s ‘Global Corruption Barometer’ 2010/2011. It shows that citizens rated the police as the most corrupt national institution in dozens of countries around the world, in comparison with corruption in other sectors of society, such as politicians, the criminal justice system, and the media. Latin America and Africa are the two most affected continents (see Figure 1).

2. **Reform efforts are often limited and incomplete if undertaken without strong, independent external monitoring.**

   This finding comes from looking at 10 case studies in Australia, Afghanistan, China, Georgia, Honduras, Jamaica, Kenya, Serbia, Singapore, and Venezuela.

3. **There has been very little involvement of civilian groups or civil society organisations in police corruption reform.**

4. **This led to the most unexpected and important conclusion of this report:**

   **There is a major, urgent need for civil society to find more effective ways of contributing to, stimulating and monitoring police anti-corruption efforts.**
We share the belief of many that effective change management and institutional improvement absolutely need external bodies, both to engage with the reforming institution and to monitor progress. Without this, most change efforts lose momentum and are ‘captured’ by the very institutions they are supposed to reform.

The aim of this study is to look at lessons on how such reforms could be more successful in the future. Clearly, for reforms to have a significant effect they must be sustainable, planned over a long-term timeframe, and based on the meticulous observation of the realities of police corruption. Efforts must be made to balance firm restrictions with transparent, honest communication between all ranks of a police service.

Reforms need to be tailored closely to the myriad peculiarities of the country and police service they are targeted at. Several of the commissions that we reviewed had sought to do this by developing a framework that identified the different forms that police corruption can take. We have taken this concept and updated it based on our own discussions and experience with police reformers. We hope that the typology in the next page will serve police leadership groups and civil society as a tool for stimulating debate on police corruption and priorities for reform.

**FIGURE 1: HOW CORRUPT DO CITIZENS PERCEIVE THE POLICE TO BE IN THEIR COUNTRIES? TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL’S GLOBAL CORRUPTION BAROMETER 2010/11**

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### FIGURE 2: TYPOLOGY OF POLICE CORRUPTION RISKS

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* See pages 26 and 27 for definitions of each corruption risk.
1. INTRODUCTION

Transparency International’s ‘Global Corruption Barometer’ report shows that citizens in a wide variety of countries perceive corruption and criminality in the police as one of the principal corruption problems in their societies.

The chart below demonstrates this with 28 countries ranking the police sector as their main concern (ranked within the top four of institutions considered corrupt).

It places police corruption in relation to 10 other social, economic, and political actors. As is clear from the chart, those with communities most concerned about the police make up the largest group of countries. What the data presented here also shows is that corruption in police forces is a global concern and is not restricted to particular regions.

The structure of this report is as follows: The first section comprises a review of publicly available

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writing on the nature of corruption and corruption risks in police forces, and various approaches to reform.

The second section reviews different efforts to collate the different forms of police corruption into one ‘typology’. We have then amplified this with our own experience from engaging with police forces and police reformers in a number of countries.

The third section consists of case studies of police reform efforts in ten different countries: Afghanistan, Australia, China, Georgia, Honduras, Jamaica, Kenya, Serbia, Singapore, and Venezuela. They represent a wide geographical spread, and varying levels of stability and forms of government. For example, the police force of a conflict country such as Afghanistan faces different corruption risks from that of a strongly governed country like China.

Due to the international focus of this report it does not include the UK as a case study, because corruption in the country’s police sector was addressed in a separate report from Transparency International UK in 2011.1

A concluding chapter summarises the range of tools used in the reform process in order to understand what levers, at least according to the literature, have proven successful and why.

1.1 DEFINING POLICE CORRUPTION

The perennial problem of definition also complicates police corruption. How can we examine the damage that corruption causes and go about fixing it, if we are not clear on what it consists of?

Estimating the extent of police corruption also has some specific measurement problems. For instance, a ‘code of silence’ in many police forces conceals evidence in surveys or interviews. This problem increases as an officer becomes more accustomed to the ‘culture’ of a force: a study showed that officers with less than one year of experience are more likely than veterans to admit seeing another officer accept free tea or coffee within the last year.2 Limited access to evidence can present a significant problem: allegations of corruption tend to remain internal and confidential unless leaked or released to the public. Even when investigative commissions are external to the police or government, they rarely enjoy absolute independence from the police administrators or political elites that commission them, which can restrict the objectivity of findings. However, this does not mean that it is impossible to gain an accurate picture of corruption. Ivkovic (2003) suggests that a process of ‘triangulation’ (the use of multiple different evidence sources to produce a figure) increases the likelihood of properly representative information.

James Q. Wilson (1963) made a clear distinction between criminal actions, such as theft, and corrupt actions which constitute an abuse of authority, such as bribe-taking. Roebuck and Barker’s (1974) definition, favoured by Jon Quah (2007), labels it more broadly as ‘any type of proscribed behaviour engaged in by a law enforcement officer who receives or expects to receive, by virtue of his official position, an actual or potential unauthorised material reward or gain’.3

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Ivkovic interprets an action that involves abuse of authority for personal gain as corrupt, while Kleinig (1996) extends it to abuse for departmental or divisional advantage. It is the act of corruption itself, not the personal gain of the officer that harms society. However, it is personal gain that drives the officer to commit the harmful act of corruption, and to continue doing so. Transparency International's definition of corruption as 'the abuse of entrusted power for private gain' provides a similar but condensed version of Roebuck and Barker's (1974) definition.

Punch (1985) notes that a corrupt action can involve the use of illegal means to achieve a legitimate or 'approved' goal: the falsifying of evidence to convict a criminal presumed guilty in 'noble cause corruption', for example. Kleinig (1996) prioritises intention above actual result in determining corruption: 'Police officers act corruptly when, in exercising or failing to exercise their authority, they act with the primary intention of furthering private or departmental/divisional advantage'. For the purposes of this report, however, the results of corruption are more reliably measurable, and while the intention behind an act is important, it is better examined in a study focusing on the ethics of policing.

The hunt for a steadfast definition of corruption presents difficulties because of the topic's subjectivity. A police officer's acceptance of a USD 200 bribe for waiving an arrest would represent corruption to almost everyone. But the same officer's acceptance of a free coffee from a grateful café owner who might be offended if he/she refused, particularly in countries where gift-giving is an inherent part of the culture, is less clear-cut. Interestingly, after citing Interpol’s description of corruption as the acceptance ‘whether directly or indirectly...of any money, article of value, gift, favour, promise, reward or advantage...in return for any act or omission’, an OSCE report acknowledges the complication of ethical dilemmas: ‘Gifts whose purpose and outcomes are the cementing of good relationships in the community and whose net value is trifling may well be appropriate’. Because police officers are frequently confronted with morally-ambiguous dilemmas in the course of their work, cultural considerations must be taken into account in any study of police corruption. This issue of moral subjectivity also applies to defence corruption more broadly: A Transparency International report warns that officials should only be permitted to accept gifts in ‘very clearly defined conditions’ under which gifts must be of ‘low value’ and ‘received infrequently’.

Transparency International’s definition of corruption—‘the abuse of entrusted power for private gain’—will be used, with its general emphasis on actions committed for real or potential gain that involve an abuse of authority.

Newburn (1999) highlights the difficulty in creating a good definition of corruption because its nature is anything but concrete. Arguably, whittling down the discourse to a single definition for all cases is neither possible nor useful. Because corruption in the police will take many forms and occur in many different cultures, it is more pragmatic to accept a broad definition that permits further, healthy discussion.

9 OSCE, Guidebook on Democratic Policing (2008), p.16, III.1.27.
Therefore, for the purposes of this report, Transparency International’s definition of corruption—“the abuse of entrusted power for private gain” will be used, with its general emphasis on actions committed for real or potential gain that involve an abuse of authority.

1.2 TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL AND POLICE CORRUPTION

According to the Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer, the police is the institution most often reported as being the recipient of bribes. A particularly concerning recent development has been the doubling of reported bribes paid to police between 2006 and 2010. Research conducted by Transparency International in South America indicated that one in five had experienced paying a bribe to the police.

However, the effects of corruption within the police are not restricted to the transfer of money between individuals. Perception of corruption in a police force can damage public confidence and trust in the police force as institutions, as well as exacerbating other issues such as organised crime.

More generally, when basic functions of law and order are compromised by corrupt practices within a police force, the state cannot legitimately prevent and punish violations of the law or protect human rights.

Transparency International’s Defence and Security Programme (TI-DSP) has been working with the Afghan Ministry of Interior and their police forces to advise on tackling corruption. Several training courses on integrity building have been delivered to senior officials as part of a joint initiative with NATO. In addition, TI-DSP facilitated a ‘Leadership Day’ with senior members of the Afghan Interior Ministry. This allowed officials to openly discuss the issue of corruption, identify key security corruption risks, and explore effective ways to tackle issues of corruption.

Transparency International National Chapters and related organisations around the world also have experience of working on police corruption. In countries as diverse as Russia, Sri Lanka, Jamaica, the UK and Venezuela, Transparency International National Chapters have been advocating for domestic law enforce institutions to become more transparent and accountable.

Senior Afghan Officials in one of the modules of our Building Integrity course in Kabul. Credit: Transparency International defence and Security Programme

12 Transparency International, Global Corruption Barometer Report 2010-2011
2. ANALYSIS OF POLICE CORRUPTION AND REFORMS

2.1 ANALYSING POLICE CORRUPTION: A TYPOLOGY SHIFT

Originally, most knowledge about police corruption was derived from occasional commissions of inquiry. In the early 20th century these commissions tended to be under-equipped, wielded insufficient legal powers, and were incapable of forcing long-lasting reforms.14 Claims of corruption within forces were generally dismissed as the bad deeds of ‘rotten apples’, whose removal would leave the rest of the department clean. Whilst this argument may hold credence, some analysts have argued that it prevented practical and meaningful reform in the long-term.

By the 1970s, however, political developments and public pressure, generally voiced through the media, contributed to the creation of strong commissions with the power to enact change. The first of these, and perhaps the most famous, was the ‘Knapp Commission’ in New York City between 1970 and 1972. It quickly became apparent, not just to the investigators and the commissioners, but to the world’s public (particularly through mass-distributed films like Serpico (Maas 1973)), that the NYPD contained widespread corruption. Networks of corrupt and criminal activity permeated the department: ‘protection rackets’ systematically extorted bribes from businesses, officers actively sought corruptible assignments in ‘vice’ areas like prostitution and gambling, and law enforcement was almost universally discriminatory.

A well-proclaimed holistic approach can encourage department leaders in the police to participate in reform programmes because it avoids the impression that a personal witch-hunt is the aim.

The Knapp Report (1972) undermined the customary ‘rotten apple’ explanation for corruption, arguing that, as was apparent in New York City, corruption could become systemic and involve many more officers than could plausibly be labelled as naturally ‘bad’ individuals. Subsequent commissions such as the Mollen Commission (1992-94, New York City) and the Wood Commission (1995-97, New South Wales) have found further evidence of systemic rather than isolated or individual corruption. Punch (2009) suggests that whole ‘orchards’ rather than individual apples are to blame, pointing at a holistic, institutional failure as being responsible for corruption.15 This recognition of a systemic problem can actually be a great motivator for professionalisation, as a well-proclaimed holistic approach can encourage department leaders in the police to participate in reform programmes because it avoids the impression that a personal witch-hunt is the aim.

With the realisation that corruption needed to be combated on a large scale, some way of conceptualising the problem became necessary.

15 M. Punch, Police Corruption (2009).
The Knapp Report presented a much-discussed typology dividing corrupt officers into three general categories: ‘grass-eaters’, who opportunistically accept offers of bribery and free gifts, ‘meat-eaters’, who actively and aggressively pursue corrupt activities for personal or departmental gain, and ‘birds’, who ‘fly above’ corruption, choosing to shelter in high administrative positions, but who can later play a key role in the reform process if granted senior management positions.16

Ivkovic’s (2005) comparison of the perceptions of police supervisors across three countries (Croatia, Finland and the USA) showed that while the most serious (‘meat-eating’) cases of corruption drew largely homogeneous responses, the least serious (‘grass-eating’), such as acceptance of gifts or off-duty employment, drew wide-ranging, heterogeneous opinions.17 This finding suggests that the problem of petty corruption, which is not just harmful in individual instances but because it can become widely accepted and even institutionalised, is exacerbated by differences in opinion over how serious it is.

It has been argued that there is a progressive relationship between ‘grass-eating’ and ‘meat-eating’ corruption. The former is dangerous not only because it can become institutionalised, but also because it can lead on to more serious acts of misconduct. Sherman (1985) suggests that officers accepting a minor ‘grass-eating’ bribe, such as a free coffee, embark on a gradual redefinition of character that will lead to more major, ‘meat-eating’ corruption later on in their career. This psychological journey to ‘becoming bent’ is the archetype of the ‘slippery slope’ theory of corruption argued by Kleinig (1996)—although he remains critical of Sherman’s implication that the acceptance of a minor gratuity (such as free coffee) is not intrinsically unacceptable, and only harmful in its potential progression to more serious acts of corruption.18

A 2002 report finds similarly that ‘police corruption starts with a series of small acts and in most cases escalates from there’,19 and that these acts provide crucial early indicators (found in complaints records) of officers vulnerable to becoming ‘meat-eaters’—especially when they are working in ‘victimless’ crime like gambling, drug trafficking and prostitution. Cerrah (2009) agrees that a ‘slippery slope’ argument is likely to be true in practice, but that while nearly all ‘meat-eaters’ began as ‘grass-eaters’, it is important to note that not all ‘grass-eaters’ become ‘meat-eaters.’20 This supports Sherman’s original qualification that there is a theoretical point along the path of corruption at which most officers will stop.21

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2.2 APPROACHES TO TACKLING CORRUPTION

Assuming that nearly all perpetrators of serious, ‘meat-eating’ corruption begin by committing petty, ‘grass-eating’ corruption, it can be argued that the best route to tackling high-level corruption in a force is by preventive action: thorough recruitment and education processes targeted to stop officers from corruption at the outset, rather than halfway through their career. It is also vital to continue to educate officials on anti-corruption measures as their career progresses. The ongoing education of both low-level officers and senior officials within the police would benefit from a similar programme.

Holmes (2010) proposes that many officers enter the ‘slippery slope’ to corruption not through the acceptance of gifts and petty corruption for personal gain, but through ‘noble cause corruption’. In this case, evidence might be falsified to convict a suspected criminal, resulting from disillusionment with the judiciary's ability to pass justice.22 This was particularly prevalent in the New South Wales Police Service during the 1990s. Under the assumption that ‘noble cause’ corruption derives from police mistrust in the justice system, Holmes argues that there is a need for ‘greater dialogue’ between the police and the judiciary. This can be facilitated through ‘seminars, workshops and other fora that involve direct interaction between the two.’23

It is Sherman’s theory—exemplified by the title of his 1978 work—‘Scandal and Reform’, that effective reform is most often deemed necessary after a public scandal.24 For example, scandals based around narcotics corruption prompted the creation of anti-corruption agencies independent of the police in Hong Kong, New South Wales and Singapore. Similarly, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (1977) of the USA was enacted after a scandal involving companies from various sectors, including defence. Civil society has played a key role in raising awareness of scandals and forcing reform. Examples range from international human rights groups such as Human Rights Watch, whose 1998 report ‘Shielded from Justice’ exposed police misconduct in the USA, to the Support Network for Justice and Peace in Latin America.25

However, while Sherman is undoubtedly correct that scandal frequently prompts reform, the panic it induces in authority figures can lead to a hoop-jumping situation in which reforms are designed to placate the public rather than ensuring sustainable change. In a broader strain of the ‘rotten apple’ approach, governments or police administrators can deflect attention from an inherent structural corruption by placing blame on one aspect of the police structure: for instance, by firing an entire department.27 Stapenhurst et al (2006) point out

| BOX 1: EDUCATING YOUNG LEADERS |

Transparency International UK, in partnership with NATO, runs a one-week education course for senior officials and defence officers. The Building Integrity Course aims to strengthen the foundation for leadership, integrity, good governance and change management in the approach to countering corruption within the defence and security sector.

that this problem is intensified when the politicians ordering reform have entrenched interests in limiting it: either by deliberately under-resourcing commissions or by investing in superficial education programmes without a necessary punitive aspect.28

Several caveats must be borne in mind in any discussion of police corruption. Firstly, the fluid nature of corruption makes it unpredictable and far from universal: some police departments are capable of operating for long stretches of time with relatively little scandal.29 Secondly, the exposure of police corruption, while frequently necessary to urge reform, can have the undesirable effect of destroying the morale of the police force as a whole: although this is a far lesser problem than the continuation of corruption.30 Thirdly, while the motivations behind corruption might be similar in vastly different environments, local traditions and structures mean that effective reforms need to be tailored to the targeted locations.

30 In the UK in 2011, the scandal of a minority of high-level officers’ involvement in corrupt dealings with the private media has fuelled demoralising fears throughout the Metropolitan Police that corruption would be viewed as systemic. BBC, “Peter Fahy: hacking row has “lowered police morale”” (22 July 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-manchester-14249505.
Theoretical models help to conceptualise the purposes behind police operation. Understanding the internal purpose of policing in a given country gives clues as to the nature of its corruption. The ‘functionalist’ model sees police enforce order in the interests of the general public. Weitzer points out that this model is generally found in stable, democratic countries. This model does not preclude corruption, but it is less likely to become institutionalised because it implies a basic level of ethical professionalism. In a ‘divided society’ model, the police enforce order in the interests of a dominant elite: for example by suppressing minorities or members of the political opposition. A third model, proposed by Geber and Mendelson (2008), consists of ‘predatory policing’: was the police enforce order according to their own self-interest. Gerber and Mendelson (2008) have pointed out that, left to its own devices, the police force can disrupt the democratic transition of a country entirely through its own self-interest. Within ‘predatory policing’, police activities are mainly (not to say exclusively) devoted to the personal enrichment and self-preservation of the police themselves rather than the protection of the public or even the systematic repression of subordinate groups. In this situation, the police are not dangerous as a tool of an overbearing government, but as a force in themselves. In Russia, predatory policing has hindered the democratic transition of the entire country because the police ‘directly hurt’ the security and trust of citizens.

2.3 MEANS OF REFORM

Newburn (1999) stresses that there is no possibility of a single solution to corruption. He stipulates firstly that such a complex problem needs a similarly multi-faceted solution, and secondly that no absolute solution is likely to be possible—although a huge reduction in the quantity of cases is. Commissions of inquiry almost always prescribe a long list of recommendations for reform, but since it is rarely possible to enact every proposed reform with full commitment (at least immediately), it is necessary to investigate which methods of reform are most effective in the long-term.

Institutional Reform

While police structures between countries, and even within countries, will be different, there is a general consensus on the need for the political will to carry out reforms. Because of the highly

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political nature of the police, statements on professionalisation and reform from ministers of interior and chiefs of police are important for driving forward reforms, as expressed by Bayley (2011). The author maintains that the momentum and responsibility for reform moves down through the ranks.37

Police administrators are the closest agents to the source of corruption, and therefore play a vital role in its solution—though academics disagree on whether it is possible to combine increased restraint with open dialogue. Sherman (1978) states that corruption must be controlled firmly by city mayors and police administrators despite the inevitable ‘costs’ to individual officers, such as a reduction in operational freedom.38 Sherman writes that ‘the internal control required for reforming corrupt police departments may become impossible to achieve, given the continuing erosion of the police executive and the increasing power of the police unions.’39 McCormack (1996) agrees that strong internal controls are necessary, but that this must be combined with the internalisation of ‘new ethical standards’ for real change.40


38 L.W. Sherman, Scandal and Reform (1978), pp.244-56.


However, Punch (1994) argues that a tough regime is not the solution, and that tougher top-down control can lead to resentment among low-level officers and a paradoxical weakening of administrative control.41

Experience in the defence sector suggests that if change is enacted from the top, is well-targeted, and accompanied by the honest communication of the benefits of fighting corruption, then resentment can be avoided.42

Ivkovic (2005) concludes that by actively questioning and learning about their officers’ views on the seriousness of different forms of misconduct, police administrators have a better chance of identifying genuine risk areas.43 Karp (2008) praises the benefits of open dialogue within a police force: only by breaking down strict hierarchies and allowing ordinary officers to voice their opinions can corruption be effectively tackled.44

Involving low-level officers in the anti-corruption process can be done best by emphasising ethics in the training of recruits. There is, according to Newburn (1999), a growing realisation on the part of police managers that officers need proper preparation to face the ethical dilemmas that they are inevitably confronted with on an everyday basis.45 Such attempts work best if programmes are based around realistic case studies rather than abstract discussions unrelated to officers’ everyday experiences. Attempts to instill values in public service include the principles of the Nolan Committee in 1998 aimed at public officials,46 the 1985 Policing Principles of the Metropolitan Police,47 and the 2001 European Code of Police Ethics.48

One potential method of preventing police corruption is by predicting its occurrence in advance. Based on the implication of Schur (1965) that corruption is generally found in areas of police operation dealing with ‘victimless’ crime such as prostitution, gambling and illicit drugs, Newburn (1999) concludes that it should be possible, at least theoretically, to target anti-corruption strategies ‘in those areas where organised corruption is most likely to develop’.49

Alternatively, and perhaps more practically, some services operate a policy of rotation in which officers are only permitted to operate in vulnerable fields for a certain period of time.50 A similar practice is used to combat corruption in the defence sector: for example, procurement officers are regularly rotated in a majority of countries to avoid individuals remaining in vulnerable positions for too long.

The police also need the tools to help self-guard the institution from corruption. One effective tool is checking mechanisms, which help the police ensure that there are processes in place to make procedures accountable and that there are systems for complaints. Areas which can use checklists include: procurement, promotions, information handling, conflicts of interest, handling of informants, income disclosure, substance abuse, inventory management, and information handling.

50 In Singapore, for example, officers are reassigned once they have been working in field investigation or anti-vice areas for three years. J. Quah, Preventing Police Corruption in Singapore (2006), p.63.
Anti-corruption reform can come from sources other than the police administration. Governments can help by ensuring that an adequate budget is given to the police force, and that the law properly reinforces its legitimate activity. The legalisation and official regulation of parts of illegal trades, such as in narcotics or prostitution, can hinder organised crime and its role in police corruption.

As a last resort, government policy can forcibly eliminate situations in which corruption occurs: for example by limiting the number of roadblocks in a region. By working closely with the police force but avoiding its politicisation, a government can create a force that is independent, capable, and conscious of the risks and impact of corruption.

Community Policing

The theory of ‘community policing’ represents a widely-attempted anti-corruption method designed to better align the police with local communities in order to prevent crime and corruption. Bracey (1992) highlights the method as an effective way to combat the likelihood of corruption, as was witnessed in New South Wales after the Lusher Inquiry of 1981.52

Mobekk (2003) agrees that community policing can overcome obstructive mistrust of the police service among the public, but stipulates that community-oriented projects must be combined with education of both the society and the police force, and must be a model of policing tailored closely to its environment rather than a template or model imposed by an external or international organisation, as is the case with a reform or development project.53

However, the model runs into some challenges. Notably, there are multiple models of community policing and not all practitioners agree as to its appropriate definition. Thus, if a community policing programme is being championed, all stakeholders involved must first be consulted and agree upon what they mean by the term. Second, it needs to be re-emphasised that the public as well as the police need to be educated as to what community policing implies and what their roles are in the model. For some populations emerging out of a totalitarian state, the notion of community policing can imply neighbours spying on each other for the state.


Finally, Newburn (1999) highlights the risk that encouraging a greater intimacy between the police and the public could increase the frequency of corruption as officers identify and fraternise more closely with citizens who might have interest in gaining illegitimate influence over them.54

It is vital that a formal system of accountability is created that gives sufficient power to the Police and Crime Panel.55 Care should be taken that expectations placed on community-oriented policing by either the police or the public are not too demanding on a short-term basis: as a 1994 US report phrased it, community policing is a ‘long-term commitment’, ‘not a quick fix’.56

**The Role of Civil Society**

Civil society organisations (CSOs) can also be an important actor in reform efforts. CSOs enjoy the political freedom to actively intervene: for example, they can set up legal advice centres.

Transparency International has established over 60 national Advocacy and Legal Advice Centres (ALACs), which provide legal advice and help

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identify key corruption trends. Further, in Venezuela, the Red de Apoyo por la Justicia y la Paz is an organisation which advocates for victims of corruption and plays a crucial role in providing justice to the local community. The access to information which CSOs can obtain through research and dialogue with citizens makes them a useful tool in channelling advocacy and aiding parliamentarians to balance the symmetry of knowledge in dialogue with police.

An important area of information gathering in which CSOs can play a constructive role, despite it perhaps not being their raison d’être, is investigative journalism. Using open data sources and utilising access to information legislation, CSOs and journalists can create momentum for reform—typically by breaking scandals. MANS, which is based in Macedonia, is an example of an organisation using such investigative journalism and open-source data.

Both public scandal and external intervention are necessary for true reform. The former relies on the frank exposition of corruption by the media, and the latter on the government or police administration.

CSOs can also help build consensus on what reforms need to take place and in what context. In Romania, CSOs played a crucial role in reaching out to the wider community and gathering disparate points of view. Their efforts resulted in the formation of a multi-stakeholder Transparency Advisory Forum (TAF), which advised senior politicians on policing issues. The Forum was instrumental in both developing an appropriate code of conduct, which outlined basic values the public expected officials to adhere to, and enshrining these codes in secondary legislation.

Sherman (1978) suggests that both public scandal and external intervention are necessary for true reform. The former relies on the frank exposition of corruption by the media, and the latter on the government or police administration. Scandal certainly provides the forceful incentive for an administration to enact reform, and serves as a useful entry point in this sense. However, if the process of reform is reliant on public exposure then it becomes vulnerable to a lack of commitment once initial interest has faded, especially if the government or police administration directing it is primarily concerned with placating public outrage and not addressing the issue. When the initial scandal has passed, the media and civil society organisations have proven themselves useful in keeping up momentum for change. As stated above, negative public exposure damages the morale of the police service if the positive aspects of policing are not simultaneously publicised. When morale is dented significantly, a service becomes susceptible to the moral cynicism that Goldstein (1975) warns can fuel endemic corruption. However, a decrease in morale is not a reason to refrain from a total attack on corruption.

60 L.W. Sherman, Scandal and Reform (1978), pp.244-55.
61 In Brazil, newspapers have maintained a critical stance against the government since the 1990s, when the reporting on Fernando Collor helped lead to his eventual impeachment by Congress in 1992. F.C. Matei, T. Bruneau, Intelligence Reform in New Democracies: Factors Supporting or Arresting Progress (2011) pp.620-21.
62 In Romania, the media supported the rights of Romanians to access intelligence files and expose public authorities who previously colluded with corrupt intelligence agencies. F.C. Matei, T. Bruneau, Intelligence Reform in New Democracies: Factors Supporting or Arresting Progress (2011) pp.620-21.
The solution is to revitalise police confidence by involving officers of all ranks in a transparent process of reform.

Another consequence of initiating reform through scandal is that the public discourse can be captured by populist sentiment and leaders who are not genuinely interested in improving state stability, but rather seeking divisive partisan goals. This taps into a critical problem with the professionalisation of the police in post-conflict and transitioning countries. In many, the police are simply seen as an enemy by CSOs and the general public—a tool of a former repressive state. Whilst there are no doubt segments of the population in industrialised nations who feel the same way, there is greater public knowledge of how a democratically adherent police culture ‘should’ work. In transitioning and post-conflict states there is often an inability for CSOs and the public to articulate the kind of police service they want.

Thus, police professionalisation requires also working with the general population to improve understanding of the police and security issues. In this context it is important to re-emphasise that the police may not necessarily be the root of all the problems. In certain countries, the general public can also be the catalyst for corruption by offering bribes to officials who did not ask for it. Public awareness of codes of conduct that police officials are obliged to adhere to can thus help in reducing this and other similar practices.

Whilst CSOs, journalists, parliament, and other oversight bodies and actors such as ombudsman offices are important for creating demand for police professionalisation—and even the removal of some specific actors in the police—it is vital that it is the police themselves who undertake investigations and arrests. Although a systemic problem of corruption and criminalisation may evolve, the public must still see ‘good cops arresting bad cops’. This helps in establishing the good name of the institution. Likewise, if a body other than the police is seen to be purging the institution of its ‘rotten apples’, this will further establish the police as an enemy not to be trusted in the mind of the public.

Public awareness of codes of conduct that police officials are obliged to adhere to can thus help in reducing corruption and other similar practices. Photo credit: Christopher Herwing, UN
2.4 POST-CONFLICT COUNTRIES

The challenge presented by post-conflict countries in need of police sector reform is even greater than in countries unaffected by conflict. During wars, dramatic increases in corrupt activity—sometimes involving human rights abuses—destroy public confidence in the police force, either because it failed to prevent them or, more problematically, because its members perpetrated them. Efforts must be made to clearly separate the powers of the police and military, perhaps through distinct training programmes, because unclear boundaries of jurisdiction are rife with opportunities for corruption. It must also be considered that deaths during war reduce the pool of potential new recruits, which can exacerbate discriminatory, corrupt recruitment on the basis of ethnicity or political connections. Most fundamentally, as Rose-Ackerman (2008) acknowledges, any policies aimed to combat police corruption will fail in the long-term if underlying structural weaknesses remain, weaknesses that are often evident in a post-conflict society.

Rose-Ackerman (2008) posits that post-conflict countries are the most susceptible to ‘grand’ corruption. It is particularly dangerous if top police officials coordinate with organised crime groups, as it is extremely difficult to stop them, especially in the absence of an independent monitoring body. A recent Transparency International report recommended that the capture of a state by organised criminals could only be prevented by ensuring the sustainability and accountability of public institutions in formal peace settlements, and that civil security bodies like the police need to be given an enhanced role in preventing patrimonial crime networks. Certainly, the police represent a prime target for powerful organised crime groups looking to hamstring effective law enforcement.

However, Rose-Ackerman adds that a focus on grand corruption should not eclipse low-level corruption, which can become destructively endemic if unchallenged. For example, in Egypt ‘the mandate of law enforcement agencies in general includes fighting grand corruption, though increased incidents of petty corruption are evident among policemen on the streets, without any action taken to address this worsening phenomenon.’

In transitional democracies the reform of the police service alone is not sufficient for long-term change. The judiciary must be strengthened in such a way that it can effectively punish police corruption and help prevent its recurrence.

In transitional democracies the reform of the police service alone is not sufficient for long-term change. The judiciary must be strengthened in such a way that it can effectively punish police corruption and help prevent its recurrence. An OECD report (2007) found that corruption is best tackled when there is meaningful cooperation between all the components of a fully-functioning criminal justice system: the police, the prosecution service, the judiciary, and traditional or local court systems. However, one positive effect that conflict can have on reform is that the total destruction of structures and institutions allows for more total reform than would otherwise be possible.

66 Based on June 2009 Cairo focus group.
Helping national leadership to have a common view of what constitutes police corruption is a good starting point for facilitating change and reform. A useful tool for facilitating this discussion is a one-page picture that shows the different sorts of police corruption. Such a ‘typology’ has been put forward by a number of experts and academics over the past twenty years. Transparency International’s Defence and Security Programme has also used this approach with both defence and police organisations.

3. POLICE CORRUPTION TYPOLOGIES


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>DIMENSIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corruption of authority</td>
<td>When an officer receives some form of material gain by virtue of their position as a police officer without violating the law per se (e.g. free drinks, meals, services).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Kickbacks’</td>
<td>Receipt of goods, service or money for referring business to particular individuals or companies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opportunistic theft</td>
<td>Stealing from arrestees (sometimes referred to as ‘rolling’), from traffic accident victims, crime victims and the bodies or property of dead citizens.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Shakedowns’</td>
<td>Acceptance of a bribe for not following through a criminal violation (e.g. not making an arrest, filing a complaint or impounding property).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Protection of illegal activities</td>
<td>Police protection of those engaged in illegal activities (e.g. prostitution, drugs, pornography) enabling the business to continue operating.</td>
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<tr>
<td>‘The fix’</td>
<td>Undermining of criminal investigations or proceedings, or the ‘loss’ of traffic tickets.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Direct criminal activities</td>
<td>A police officer commits a crime against person or property for personal gain ‘in clear violation of both departmental and criminal norms’.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Internal payoffs</td>
<td>Prerogatives available to police officers (e.g. holidays, shift allocations, promotion) are bought, bartered and sold.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Flaking’ or ‘padding’</td>
<td>Planting of or adding to evidence (argued by Punch to be particularly evident in drugs cases).</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Newburn (1999)
2. BARKER (1983) TYPOLOGY OF ‘POLICE OCCUPATIONAL DEVIANCE’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CORRUPTION (INVOLVES A MATERIAL REWARD OR GAIN)</th>
<th>MISCONDUCT (NO MATERIAL REWARD OR GAIN)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corruption of authority</td>
<td>Police perjury</td>
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<tr>
<td>Opportunistic thefts</td>
<td>Police brutality</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shakedowns</td>
<td>Sex on duty</td>
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<tr>
<td>Protection of illegal activities</td>
<td>Drinking on duty</td>
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<td>Traffic fix</td>
<td>Sleeping on duty</td>
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<tr>
<td>Misdemeanour fix</td>
<td>Other violations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kickbacks</td>
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<td>Felony fix</td>
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<td>Direct criminal activities</td>
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<td>Internal payoffs</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>DIMENSIONS</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Classic corruption</td>
<td>‘Bribery’ or ‘graft’—involves an office receiving a personal benefit for not doing their duty. This may be organised (e.g. a ‘protection racket’) or opportunistic (e.g. accepting a bribe to waive a speeding ticket).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process corruption</td>
<td>Involves the fabrication of evidence and other forms of perverting the course of justice (e.g. planting drugs or lying in court).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brutality</td>
<td>Covers the full range of forms of unjustified violence related to a police officer’s work (e.g. violent threats or assault).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous conduct</td>
<td>Covers remaining types of deviance (e.g. harassment, discriminatory law enforcement, drug abuse, racist slurs, neglect of detainees). It could also include criminal offences and unethical behaviour committed off-duty but deemed to reflect adversely on the officer’s work (e.g. abusive language, drunk driving).</td>
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## TYPOLOGY OF POLICE CORRUPTION RISKS

### POLITICAL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domestic Policing Strategy</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Allocation &amp; Distribution of Funds</td>
<td>Allocation &amp; Distribution of Funds</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political Interference</td>
<td>Political Interference</td>
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<tr>
<td>Influence of Interest Groups</td>
<td>Influence of Interest Groups</td>
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<tr>
<td>Organised Crime</td>
<td>Organised Crime</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reaching Performance Targets</td>
<td>Reaching Performance Targets</td>
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<tr>
<td>Weak Independent Oversight</td>
<td>Weak Independent Oversight</td>
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<td>Asset Disposals</td>
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<td>Private Security</td>
<td>Private Security</td>
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<td>Facilitation Payments</td>
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### PERSONNEL

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<td>Payroll, Promotions, Appointments, Rewards</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Salary Chain</td>
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<tr>
<td>Values &amp; Standards</td>
<td>Values &amp; Standards</td>
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<tr>
<td>Criminal Activities</td>
<td>Criminal Activities</td>
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<td>Personal Problems (E.g. Drugs, Gambling)</td>
<td>Personal Problems (E.g. Drugs, Gambling)</td>
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<td>Personal Asset Declaration</td>
<td>Personal Asset Declaration</td>
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### BEHAVIOUR & OPERATIONS

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<tr>
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<th>Evidence Tampering &amp; Theft</th>
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<tr>
<td>Degree of Operation Independence</td>
<td>Degree of Operation Independence</td>
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<tr>
<td>‘Noble Cause’</td>
<td>‘Noble Cause’</td>
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<tr>
<td>Illegal Finances</td>
<td>Illegal Finances</td>
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<tr>
<td>Disclosure of Privileged Information</td>
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<tr>
<td>Informants</td>
<td>Informants</td>
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<td>Discriminating Behaviour</td>
<td>Discriminating Behaviour</td>
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<td>Extortion</td>
<td>Extortion</td>
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<td>Officer Identification</td>
<td>Officer Identification</td>
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<tr>
<td>‘Bonds of Loyalty’</td>
<td>‘Bonds of Loyalty’</td>
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### EXPLANATION OF POLICE CORRUPTION RISKS

**Political**

- **Domestic Policing Strategy**: Such a document can serve as the entry point for high-level corruption: a vague or unpublished policy not only sets the wrong ‘tone from the top’ but can encourage individual divisions within the establishment to be opaque in their dealings.

- **Allocation & Distribution of Funds**: The process through which money is allocated must be transparent, accountable and through. Funds should be earmarked and distributed according to public and institutional needs.

- **Political Interference**: Politicisation of a force violates the necessary independence required for effective rule of law. Such interference can lead to high level government officials influencing key decisions taken by those on the ground.

- **Influence of Interest Groups**: A portion of the population may control the police for their own group’s interests therefore undermining the police’s role as a service provider for all.

- **Organised Crime**: Organised crime penetrates police establishments through various means such as facilitating protection from prosecution, turning a blind eye to illegal activities, or, in the worst cases, active involvement of officers.

- **Reaching Performance Targets**: Political requirement to attain unrealistic targets in policing may encourage officers to alter statistics in order to make them appear more favourable.

- **Weak Independent Oversight**: Weak and partial oversight can reduce public confidence in the police if corruption allegations are inadequately investigated and improperly punished. Inadequate monitoring can lead to greater willingness to participate in corrupt activities.

**Finance**

- **Asset Disposals**: Assets often outlive the use for which they were initially intended. However, they may remain extremely valuable in monetary terms. Therefore, the process through which the police force disposes of assets must be transparent and open to scrutiny.

- **Internal Audit Control**: A body with full and independent investigative oversight of police conduct. It can serve to highlight areas where policies are not being adhered to and recommend areas for improvement in both policy and practice.

- **Private Security**: Police force operating for profit by providing private protection for groups or individuals, as opposed to providing service for all citizens based on public funds.

- **Facilitation Payments**: A payment made to secure or expedite the performance of a routine action to which the payer has legal or other entitlement.
Due to the inherent hierarchical command structures of the police force, it is important that attitudes towards corruption and professional integrity are communicated from the most senior positions. The ‘Tone from the Top’ needs to be of a zero tolerance to corruption.

Internal functioning of the police must be transparent and auditable to ensure individuals do not take advantage of human resource corruption risk. Such practices can severely hamper the effectiveness of a police force by undermining the importance of performance.

Money often changes hands several times before reaching its intended recipient. Lack of transparency and oversight compounds issues of ‘skimming’ and delayed payments to police forces. Since poor or reduced payments are often cited as a cause for personal level bribery and corruption from low ranking front line officers, chains of command must be separate from salary chains.

Doctrine to guide the police on the moral and ethical conduct expected of them.

As well as facilitation of illegal activities, officers themselves can directly undertake such activities.

The existence of personal issues, such as finance and addiction, may increase the vulnerability of police officers to corruption. Officers can find themselves in difficult and extortive positions.

An effective check to increase transparency and the trust of citizens in the police force.

Lack of rotation across different roles and locations, especially those prone to higher risk, can allow corruption opportunities to develop.

The process by which contracts are initially awarded and the mechanism through which they are eventually delivered to the end user must be transparent and open to scrutiny.

The existence of personal issues, such as finance and addiction, may increase the vulnerability of police officers to corruption. Officers can find themselves in difficult and extortive positions.

An effective check to increase transparency and the trust of citizens in the police force.

Lack of rotation across different roles and locations, especially those prone to higher risk, can allow corruption opportunities to develop.

Refers to the use of corrupt or illegal means to achieve goals which may be perceived legitimate.

Abuse of power in carrying out an official police function for personal profit.

Risk of relationship between informant and police officer—often handled at the discretion of individual officers—being abused for one person’s gain. Additionally, due to low oversight, officers may add ‘ghost informants’ to misallocate police funds.

Socio-cultural factors may lead to unfair and biased treatment of certain individuals. Apart from fostering tension between social groups, such behaviour can undermine trust in the police force.

Abuse of a privileged position to enforce the rule of law in order to extract personal gain through intimidation and reprisals.

Clearly identifiable name and police numbers reduce the risk of officers abusing their position and operational independence.

Within organisations such as police forces camaraderie often prevent whistle-blowers from exposing incidents of corruption. Those who bring to light the malpractice of their fellow officers must enjoy protection from retribution.
It is clear that there are innumerable options for the reform of a police service. However, not all of these options are effective or appropriate in every environment. Experimental and frequently innovative theoretical models are invaluable to the process of tackling corruption, but it is only possible to see where, when, and if ever, these theories of change can be effective by studying their application in real situations. The most satisfactory way that this report can examine the efficacy of reforms is to analyse case studies in various countries around the world:

- AFGHANISTAN
- AUSTRALIA (NEW SOUTH WALES)
- CHINA
- GEORGIA
- JAMAICA
- KENYA
- HONDURAS
- SERBIA
- SINGAPORE
- VENEZUELA

Although sporadic comparisons will be made, this report is not intended as a comparative study. Case studies of reform are presented independently and in no particular order. The countries were chosen with the intention of reflecting a regional balance, as well as highlighting a spectrum of good and bad practice in police reform and tackling corruption.
4.1 AFGHANISTAN

Background:

The problem of police corruption is intensified in post-conflict situations. It is difficult enough to address the phenomenon when the structures of government and law enforcement are intact; significantly more so when international hostilities and civil war have destroyed them. In the case of Afghanistan, the 2001 NATO-led invasion to hunt down Al Qaeda and remove the Taliban from the country left the new Ministry of Interior in Kabul with limited control over provincial police forces. The Afghanistan National Police (ANP) was typified by a ‘top-heavy’ management structure and rife with corrupt activity.

After the installation of the Karzai government, donor countries agreed to finance and oversee the rebuilding of the Afghan security service, with each of five departments directed by a particular country. Germany was in charge of police reform, and one of its main aims was to combat the corruption that gave Afghans an inherent, and inhibiting, mistrust of the force. In 2007, EUPOL (the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan) was created to assist the German Police Project Office, which by then had been deemed ‘not capable of reaching the goals it had been set’. However, the EU mission, with a planned size of only 400 officers and a real number of roughly half of that, was never likely to significantly reform the police force, due primarily to a lack of resources and political will.

On top of the trials of ordinary policing, officers face exceptional problems that are not present in more stable states. Officers are routinely targeted by the Taliban, and must operate under the constant fear of attack. On average, eight officers are killed every day. A dramatic expansion in the narcotics trade has fuelled corruption and drug abuse within the police, besides acting as a major source of funding for the Taliban. An unclear separation of powers means that police are often forced to act in a military capacity, increasing their danger from the Taliban and their susceptibility to corruption.

Moreover, substantial illiteracy among the police service reduces its officers’ abilities to police effectively because they cannot record witness statements, read laws, or detect the financial corruption of colleagues.77 Whilst both the police and the military in Afghanistan operate in an intensely difficult environment, the military is viewed by citizens as generally less corrupt.78

This perception has two potential explanations. Firstly, the police have more frequent interaction with the public, therefore offering more opportunities for corrupt practice. Secondly, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan has heavily concentrated its efforts in reforming practices in the military. Recently, however, international forces have espoused reforming the police as one of their main goals, giving cause for optimism that a similar result could be achieved.

Reform Efforts

In the decade since the invasion of Afghanistan, programmes to reform the ANP have been coordinated by the international community. Elements of the police force identified as particularly corrupt were reformed almost from scratch. A US report from 2006 stated that “the coalition concluded, with the concurrence of the MoI [Ministry of the Interior], that the highway police are so poorly organised and corrupt that the best solution is to draw that organisation down while retraining and reassigning its manpower to other police organisations, chiefly the uniformed and border police.”79

The recruitment and training of police officers was reformed to minimise the risk of corruption. Training programmes, directed by EU and US police officials, have included a focus on avoiding misconduct. For example, the week-long Level One course instructs in personal and vehicle searches, weapons safety, defensive tactics and

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78 UNODC, Corruption in Afghanistan (Jan 2010), p.5.
the ethics of policing: including anti-corruption measures.80 A national, centralised programme of recruitment was devised to avoid graduates of the Regional Training Centres returning to the province they were recruited from: a process that was seen to create systemic corruption ‘related to tribal relationships and local or provincial loyalties’.81

However, posting new recruits to other regions presents a problem when they do not speak the local language: for example, new officers from Bamiyan province speak only a language unique to their area (a problem complicated by high illiteracy amongst trainees).82

An emphasis on the operational methods of the police have also featured in reforms. A US military officer insisted on the importance of policemen spending more time on patrol, getting to know the local community rather than ‘sitting inside that police precinct’ – although this strategy seems to have been aimed more at gathering intelligence than tackling corruption: “That’s where you’re going to get of your information on where the Taliban are”.83 An internal affairs unit was established to monitor and evaluate police performance as well as scrutinise it for potential corruption.84

Structural adjustments were implemented to reduce corruption. Pay and rank reform initiated in late 2005 forced a reduction in the number of high-ranking officers by 44% (to reduce a ‘top-heavy and poorly organized ANP force) and levelled wages to create consistency between pay in the ANP and the ANA (Afghan National Army).

It was hoped that this would reduce corruption because it would cut down ‘salary skimming’ of low-level officers by senior management, and the temptation to accept bribery as a result.85 However, the Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) has found that amongst the ANP a greater problem is not low income per se, but rather excessive expectations for income, exacerbated by almost constant contact with international organisations whose employees and consultants are inevitably paid higher than the Afghan government can afford to.86

Obstacles to Reform

Unfortunately, efforts to reform the Afghan police have not succeeded in stemming the tide of corruption. According to a United Nations Office for Drugs and Organised Crime report in 2010, approximately 25% of Afghan citizens had to pay at least one bribe, which averaged between USD 100 to 200,87 to police and local officials over the past year.88 Obstacles to reform have been manifold, and can be divided into international and domestic obstacles.
INTERNATIONAL OBSTACLES

Police reform in Afghanistan has been led largely by international powers. Various problems have made internationally-directed reform unsustainable, at least in its current form. It should also be noted that international powers themselves are as much part of the problem as the solution.

Firstly, international reform programmes are unsustainable because of the immense expense incurred by donor countries. Although leaders estimate that another five to ten years are necessary, the EUPOL programme is scheduled to end in 2013 and is unlikely to be extended because NATO troops will withdraw in 2014. A trust fund for police salaries administered by the UN Development Program requires USD 1.5 billion. The EUPOL mission costs EUR 50 million a year. The United States is planning to build 200 police stations at a cost of USD 600 million, and has spent USD 29 billion on training and equipping the Afghan army and police since 2002. This perception of foreign influence as a negative force is frequently reinforced by inflexible donor instructions that set unrealistic or inappropriate targets at odds with the reality of local needs. In this way, both citizens and officers in the localities can come to see financially-driven reform as a threat to local police forces.

Secondly, differing priorities can lead to political clashes between donor powers, which in turn lead to inconsistencies in reform. For example, the lack of a formal agreement between the EU and NATO over the process of police reform has hindered the work of the former. A report by the UK’s House of Lords criticises the emphasis of the NATO-led training programme on the quantity of Afghan police rather than quality, and on military security and counter insurgency rather than the ‘civilian policing capacity’ aimed at by the EUPOL mission.

For example, the NATO programme’s NTM-A training course covered mainly the use of firearms and was reduced from eight to six weeks in length because it was taking too long to get ‘feet on the ground’. Dr Ronja Kempin has criticised training conducted by military personnel with no experience in policing, and has blamed EUPOL’s failure on the absence of a coherent, universal training strategy, and their inability to secure the support of the United States government.

Thirdly, international priorities have focused on securing peace more than creating strong state institutions. The reform of the Afghan state was given much lower priority than the peacemaking process; as a result the strategic reform of high-ranking police officers was not begun until mid-2004, according to Integrity Watch Afghanistan.

International aid donors must put the consolidation of an accountable police structure at the forefront of reform and make the process of change sufficiently transparent to restore public confidence in the police.

93 DCAF, Police Reform Backgrounder, (2009), pp.5-6.
A recent report\(^98\) concludes that despite the huge sums of money invested in the police since 2007, it remains the general perception amongst citizens that the police are intrinsically corrupt: a view reinforced by frequent, negative dealings with them in person. It is even suggested that this is driving citizens to support the Taliban, who are able to portray themselves as a better alternative to a corrupt police force influenced by the international community.

While there are undoubtedly positive aspects to the internationally-led reform process in Afghanistan, it has been too rigidly fixed to fiscal targets and has taken too little account of the needs and priorities of Afghan civilians. International aid donors must put the consolidation of an accountable police structure at the forefront of reform and make the process of change sufficiently transparent to restore public confidence in the police.

DOMESTIC OBSTACLES

The continued control of the Taliban over large parts of the country has made reform extremely difficult. Norwegian police have reported that reforms are marred by links between many officers and former field marshals who are involved with the Taliban. Even more directly, there was one incident of an officer trained by the international task force defecting to a local Taliban leader with nine colleagues and two police cars.\(^99\) The active influence on recruits by local warlords and Taliban leaders has made inherent corruption difficult to break even with new recruits.\(^100\) Afghan officers have continued to set free detainees arrested on narcotics charges in return for bribes. A 2008 report suggests that it is common practice for police officers of the National Directorate of Security to release Taliban detainees for bribes of up to USD 10,000.\(^101\)


\(^100\) DCAF, Police Reform Backgrounder, (2009), pp.6-7.

Further, a British police report suggests that training centres resemble drug rehabilitation centres, with up to 95 per cent of recruits testing positive for cannabis or amphetamines.\(^{102}\) Not only is continued corruption hindering police reform, but it is also significantly reducing the efficacy of the government’s war on the Taliban.

Accounts from Afghans suggest that corrupt activities are present in senior management as well as low-level recruits.\(^{103}\) The defence sector faces similar problems, as high-ranking officials installed by international bodies are viewed as corrupt.

The extortion of high-level officers affects the lower orders, increasing the temptation to supplement reduced wages with illegitimate, grass-eating corruption.\(^{104}\) Delays in the payment of salaries have been used to justify petty corruption at various levels of the police structure.\(^{105}\)

**Conclusion**

According to a recent UN report, corruption is the single greatest concern of the Afghan people.\(^{106}\) While it could be argued that the day-to-day concerns of most Afghans are more likely their security than corruption within the state, evidence suggests that corruption within the Afghan National Police remains prevalent. Reform efforts have been undermined by the continuing instability of the country and the influence of Taliban elites, who are able to portray themselves as non-corrupt in contrast to a corrupt police, but also by the differing and conflicting strategies of the international powers trying to enact them.

It is unlikely that internationally-led efforts can succeed in the long-term while the states in charge follow their own agendas. Arguably, the Afghan National Police will only manage true anti-corruption reform if it is given full ownership over the changes. Although it will, in its current state, require financial and technical support, the aid and reform processes must be conducted with full transparency to the Afghan public, who are only likely to feel confidence in a new police service if they are aware of the full extent of its reform.

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4.2 AUSTRALIA (NEW SOUTH WALES)

Background

Investigating corruption in the police service of New South Wales between 1995 and 1997, the Wood Royal Commission exposed acts of bribery, drug trafficking, money laundering and instances of evidence fabrication numbering in the hundreds. The detective division of Kings Cross, in Sydney, was found to be guilty of corruption at virtually all ranks, refusing to attend crime scenes while essentially commandeering the local drug trade. Trevor Haken, then head of the Kings Cross Drug Unit, oversaw the corrupt extraction of payments from strip clubs and drug dealers for a significant period of time, probably remaining unnoticed because the volume of cases was high and the turnover of officers in the department was low.

At the time, the then Police Commissioner Tony Lauer defended the force as a whole, dismissing corruption as the fault of a few individuals rather than a systemic failing. However, since the Wood Commission uncovered a huge network of corrupt incidents, Lauer’s ‘rotten apple’ approach looked untenable and he was forced to resign. The British police officer Peter James Ryan was recruited to join the New South Wales service because its senior ranks were too closely linked to corrupt officers. The Wood Report prompted a huge scandal, and growing public awareness of the extent of corruption within the force led to a significant programme of reform.

Reform Efforts

During the late 1990s, the New South Wales police administration tried to implement the recommendations of the Wood Commission, which were designed to combat the cyclical nature of corruption. An ‘early warning system’ was developed to alert managers to officers who were the subject of recurring public complaints, and who should therefore be monitored closely for signs of misconduct that might develop into ‘meat-eating’ forms of corruption. However, the progress of this systems has been limited somewhat by a lack of funding. Wood recommended the ‘flattening’ of the hierarchical structure to give greater management responsibility to operational patrols, which was enacted to a certain degree.

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There were also concerted efforts to integrate ‘ethics and integrity’ into a new training programme, developed jointly by the Employee Management Branch and the Special Crime and Internal Affairs, that included innovative guidance on internal grievances policies, conflicts of interest, and the process of internal investigations.\(^{114}\)

New internal disciplinary powers allowed for more effective and discreet handling of minor, grass-eating corruption cases than was previously possible. Less severe penalties for minor misconduct included managerial counselling and loss of pay increment, while the ‘Commissioner’s Confidence’ permitted the Police Commissioner to suspend from duty any officer deemed too unethical or incompetent to complete his/her work.\(^{115}\) As for external discipline, Wood denounced the existing joint investigative structures of the Office of Professional Responsibility, the Independent Commission against Corruption, and the Office of the Ombudsman as ineffective. Instead, he suggested the establishment of a single agency to monitor police conduct, which should be independent of the police force and hold sufficient coercive powers to investigate corruption. The Police Integrity Commission was established in 1996 on the basis of this suggestion, and continues to operate today.\(^{116}\)

**Obstacles to Reform**

Ten years after the Wood Report, the 2005-6 report of the Police Integrity Commission, which detailed 21 major investigations, suggested that corruption remained rife in the New South Wales Police. An audit of the reform process over a three-year period accepted the police executive’s use of ‘reform contractors to agree appropriate measures of reform performance’, but criticised its focus on a business-like approach, stating that if ‘the Executive continues to divert attention from reform towards continuous business improvement, it will defeat the purpose of securing this Reform Contract’.\(^{117}\) Dr Michael Kennedy, a former

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policeman and now university lecturer, has similarly blamed an inappropriate ‘business model’ applied to policing, with an emphasis on productivity that is at odds with the proper aim of policing.\textsuperscript{118}

Karp (2008) argues that the failure of reforms to halt the cyclical nature of police corruption stems from the inadequate response given to the recommendations of inquiries like the Wood Commission.\textsuperscript{119} The police executive generally works to satisfy the specific recommendations of a report, instead of holistically and creatively tackling its wider implications: an approach which would enable them to strike at the roots of the problem rather than superficially allay community fears.\textsuperscript{120} For example, evidence for the introduction of ethical education into an employee training course, as recommended by the Wood Report, could easily be produced without any genuine indication as to its effectiveness.

Moreover, even when the recommendations of the Wood Commission were implemented, their sustainability was not guaranteed. Reforms generally only succeed during the ‘reaction’ phase of what can be termed a corruption cycle, and dissipate once the immediate memory of the reason for change diminishes.\textsuperscript{121} For instance, the criticised ‘taskforce’ organisational structures, removed in favour of a simpler structure, were re-implemented in the years afterward.\textsuperscript{122}

It has been suggested that the heavy-handed reforms taken after the Wood Commission marred their success in the long term. The ‘puritanical’ reaction that came out of the Woods Commission meant investigators ‘jumped on anything they could’. For instance, senior detectives only distantly involved in a case of improper mace usage (in the ‘Kereela Cat Burglar’ case), dismissed from duty 12 years after the incident. Some were even driven to commit suicide due to their association with the incident.\textsuperscript{123} Some have suggested that the heightened scrutiny that detective departments came under afterwards led to a serious morale problem within the force and a reluctance for officers to go ‘plain-clothes’ as a result.\textsuperscript{124}

Punch (1994) has warned that an iron-fisted regime is not the answer to corruption in the police.\textsuperscript{125} Karp (2008) states that only ‘open dialogue’ can stem the occurrence of corruption that still appears somewhat endemic in the forces by ‘removing the rigidity inherent in this necessarily hierarchical structure’. This should, she suggests, create an atmosphere in which officers are not merely discouraged from corruption, but also from concealing the malpractice of their colleagues.\textsuperscript{126}

New South Wales Commissioner Ken Moroney stated in 2007 that there had already been some successes: a decade before only five to ten per cent of informants were police officers, but in 2006 it had risen to 49 per cent.\textsuperscript{127}

\textsuperscript{120} J.E, Karp, Corruption and Control: the Nature of the Game (2008), p.5.
\textsuperscript{121} P. Neyroud & A. Beckley, Policing, Ethics and Human Rights (2001), p.10.
\textsuperscript{122} Committee on the Office of the Ombudsman and the Police Integrity Commission, Research Report on Trends in Police Corruption, New South Wales, Australia (Dec 2002), p.68.
Holmes blames flaws in the judicial system itself for ‘disillusionment’ amongst the police force leading to ‘noble cause’ corruption: a widespread perception of magistrates being too ‘soft’ on criminals can lead to an ‘if you can’t beat ‘em, join ‘em’ attitude among officers. Holmes also states that ‘greater dialogue’ is needed between the police and the judiciary to align their attitudes more closely, and reduce the possibility of disillusionment leading to corruption – this can be done through direct interaction in workshops and seminars. Any attempt to change the processes of a law enforcement body should also examine the processes of its colleagues.

Conclusion

Holmes (2010) argues that reforms following the Wood Commission of the late 1990s have been unsuccessful in the long-term. Scandals continue to dog the Australian police; in May 2011, a judge presiding over a case of illegal entry by officers seeking evidence to convict a suspected thief referred to the Wood Commission’s finding that ‘noble cause corruption’ could easily lead to corruption for personal, financial gain. The same judge considered that there might be an inherent ‘culture that justifies illegal practices when those involved [the suspects] are believed to be guilty’.

There has also been a tendency for reforms to cater to the specific terms of the recommendations rather than a more holistic approach, which could result in greater impact on reducing corruption in the long-term. For instance, Commissioner Ryan’s reforms did not have the long-lasting effectiveness to prevent police involvement in the heroin trade in the 2000s.

However, steps forward have been taken. The Police Integrity Commission’s Annual Report for 2008-9 stated that there has been ‘a dramatic improvement in the ethical health of the New South Wales Police Force’. Efforts to reduce corruption have been formalised in the Integrity Commission’s second Key Goal: to reduce police misconduct by ‘oversighting’, or monitoring investigations where ‘deficiencies are identified’, and by providing improvement in the ethical health of the New South Wales Police Force since the Woods Commission. It is positive that a body such as the Police Integrity Commission (PIC), independent of the police, has been mandated to systematically monitor corruption.

The New South Wales Police Force Customer Service Programme (CSP) represents a promising attempt to improve police effectiveness in direct relation to the satisfaction of the public. Pointing to a similar perception gap problem in the UK, Burn

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notes that the same discipline and investment must be given to improving relations with the public as to capabilities for solving serious crime. Considerable emphasis has been placed on the monitoring of success through the systematic measurement of response times and complaints data, and a ‘3 year Mystery Shopper programme’ using members of the public to secretly test police performance in given scenarios.

If Karp’s pleas for ‘open dialogue’ within the police hierarchy, and Holmes’ for greater dialogue between police and judiciary, as well as the significant reform of the latter are heeded, it might be possible to prevent the ‘noble cause’ corruption that drives officers to abuse their authority to get the results that an inappropriate ‘business model’ pressures them to. The eclipse of a solely results-driven business model by holistic reforms focusing on increasing both the confidence of the public in the police and the confidence of the police themselves will encourage positive change. Bodies such as the PIC, which constantly monitor police conduct, should prevent the need for heavy-handed, one-off commissions of inquiry that can seriously damage morale.

Background

During the 1990s, corruption was rife in the Chinese police force under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). A scarcity of government funding, which could only cover one third of the total costs of many departments, meant officers were given personal quotas of up to RMB 50,000 (£5,000) per annum to make up the shortfall. Although between 1993 and 1997 an average of 8,000 officers were punished every year for corruption offenses—and monitoring became stronger with the introduction of the Police Law in 1995—considerable abuses of authority continued, which Sun and Wu (2010) link with a notable deterioration of ‘community relations’ by 2000.

In 2003, Zhou Yongkang, the new Minister of Public Security, ordered a crackdown on corruption that was systemic amongst the Chinese police force. His campaign was driven by a series of high-profile scandals like the starvation of house-bound three-year-old Li Siyi, whom officers refused to return after arresting her mother on charges of drug addiction.

However, although Yongkang’s determined action—based on a ‘rotten apple’ interpretation of corruption—looked impressive to the disillusioned public, it failed to engender long-term change. Hualing (2005) has blamed this fact on the general poor quality of policing in China, and argued for a more structural reform effort. Yongkang’s top-down programme of change over the next five years garnered much-needed funds and greatly strengthened the police's position with the CCP, but the increasing politicisation of the institution arguably did little to combat intrinsic corruption.

Reform Efforts

Yongkang’s reforms were numerous, beginning with the enforcement of the ‘Five Prohibitions’ campaign that took punitive action against the apparent incompetence and poor quality of individual officers. 387 policemen were dismissed from duty as a result. A re-education campaign subjected every single officer in the Chinese police to a period of off-duty physical and legal training. To eliminate informal influence by provincial elites over employment, and therefore reduce the potential for bribery, Yongkang transferred responsibility for recruitment from provincial

139 F. Hualing, Zhou Yongkang and the Recent Police Reform in China (2005), p.244.
councils to the central agency.\textsuperscript{142} Even the structure of operational patrols was made subject to strict criteria imposed from on high, and departments in urban areas were made to divide their jurisdictions into districts categorised according to the complexity of the policing situation.\textsuperscript{143}

In late 2003, Yongkang issued the ‘Procedural Regulations for Public Security Organs Handling Administrative Cases’, which spelled out strict guidelines against evidence fabrication, the coercion of confessions, and detainment beyond the proper time limit.\textsuperscript{144} However, Sun and Wu (2010) doubt the efficacy of these restrictions, and it is Punch’s (1995) belief that heavily punitive restrictions on officers do not represent the best means of tackling corruption.\textsuperscript{145} Certainly, the Procedural Regulations constituted restrictions on police behaviour rather than a code of ethics as applied two years before in the EU.\textsuperscript{146} Yongkang’s reforms were ambitious and appeared effective in the short-term, but they were imposed top-down by his administration and did not encourage the open dialogue recommended by Karp (2008).\textsuperscript{147}

Since 2002, the Chinese police force underwent a Ministry of Public Security (MPS)-led shift from ‘strike-hard’ policing to ‘community policing’. The idea was to raise community trust in the police, with initiatives such as the attempted involvement of community members and building ‘superintendents’. However, the trial of the ‘Building Little Safe and Civilized Communities’ project in the city of Shenzhen proved it unsuitable for a society characterised increasingly by a market economy and a migrant population, with citizens uninterested in voluntary participation in enforcement. In January 2008, MPS eliminated ‘social order joint protection’ teams formed of community volunteers on the grounds that they were substandard officers.\textsuperscript{148} Zhong has doubted the authenticity of ‘community policing’ as a whole, likening old habits repackaged as community policing to pouring ‘old wine into new bottles’.\textsuperscript{149} Arguably, the ideological shift to community policing was insufficiently planned around practical needs to find success in the long-term.

While the central police headquarters wield considerable spheres of influence, the non-adherence to its directives by local forces suggests that this control, and its reforming potential, is neither effective nor far-reaching.

Obstacles to Reform

Firstly, the vast geographical spread of the country marred Yongkang’s attempts at centralisation to decrease corruption. His deliberate shift from oversight by local Chinese Communist Party (CCP) committees to a ‘vertical’ hierarchical, national structure has remained incomplete. Tanner and Green (2007) point out that while the central police headquarters wield considerable spheres of influence, the non-adherence to its directives by local forces suggests that this control, and its reforming potential, is neither effective nor far-reaching.\textsuperscript{150}

\textsuperscript{142} F. Hualing, Zhou Yongkang and the Recent Police Reform in China (2005), p.250.
The tight grip on occupational rewards such as salaries and promotions held by elite party members, often in the CCP committees that Yongkang challenged, encourages a perverse prioritisation of ‘Party principles’ over ethical policing principles. The obstructive force of this ‘variety of local patterns’ is not just symptomatic of ineffective central control, but of a deeper vein of politicisation running through the Chinese police force, choking significant reform.

The police force enjoys something of a ‘special relationship’ with the ruling CCP, and in return acts as something of a political instrument. Yongkang’s reforms were widespread and somewhat effective, although his conscious ‘empowerment’ of the police was notably based on the personal influence of the Minister of Public Security ex officio, and he declared that the chief of police should be a core member of any CCP government.152

Similarly, although a 2004 Transparency International report on China acknowledged the CCP’s creation of ‘political and legal committees’ to help monitor instances of corruption, it also stated that ‘the head of the political and legal committee is usually also the deputy CCP secretary’.153

Reform efforts are unlikely to yield significant results as long the institutional supervision of police forces remains under political control. Sherman (1978) argued that high-level and widely-publicized scandal is often a necessary catalyst for meaningful reform within the police service.154 Arguably, this is unlikely to happen in China because as Sun and Wu (2010) point out, not only is the CCP reluctant to expose any high-level scandal within the police force, it also maintains the stranglehold over the nation’s media to prevent anybody else doing so.155

Although the scandal of the three-year-old Li Siyi case threw weight behind Yongkang’s campaign, the scapegoats were low-level officers and a ‘rotten apple’ implication avoided reputational damage to the ruling party. If the Chinese government continues to view demands for police accountability within the milieu of wider social demands that threaten its total authority, it seems likely that police corruption will persist as a major problem.156

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Conclusion

Despite Yongkang’s reforms, a lack of transparency and political independence continues to characterise the Chinese police force. In 2009, a 24-year old named Li Quiaoming died in police custody in Yunnan Province. Police claims that Quiaoming died while taking part in a game of ‘hide and seek’ with other prisoners were met with incredulity by the internet-using public, who called for an investigation into what was seen as obvious police corruption.157 The CCP responded with what appeared to be an innovative attempt to increase police transparency by inviting 15 members of the public to try and solve the crime. However, not only was the committee forbidden from interviewing the prime suspect or police officers, it was composed almost entirely of former or current employees of the state media.158 The Quiaoming incident led to a crackdown on prisoner abuse by the Ministry of Public Security, but a full investigation did not occur.

Yongkang’s reforms in the early 2000s did not secure long-lasting change because they were focused on superficial punitive measures against individual officers. The case of the Chinese police demonstrates the necessity of treating and dealing with corruption as a systemic problem through careful structural change—although the dispersed nature of its national police structure has made this difficult to effect. It also highlights the importance of making the reform process truly transparent, particularly when the police force is seen by the public, however accurately, as a tool for political interests.

However, a recent declaration by incumbent Minister of Public Security, Meng Jiangzhu, gives cause for hope. He has proposed reforms in police education, vetting, supervision and transparency, which could, if followed through sincerely, improve the integrity and accountability of the Chinese police in the long-term. In the near future, it is unlikely that the Chinese police will be able to avoid substantial political influence from the CCP, but at the very least reforms can instil low-level operational officers with the ethical training to avoid corruption in the field.

Background

Under the regime of Eduard Shevardnadze before 2003, the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Georgia was composed of 50,000 officers—constituting a significant 1.5 per cent of the country’s population. Although these officers fulfilled civilian law enforcement roles, they did so armed and in a military capacity. The Ministry’s de facto mandate was to defend government authority. Not only was corruption rife, but it was institutionalised: it was widely known that traffic fines collected at the road side were routinely passed on to superior officers. Particularly problematic were the multiple links between organised criminals and officials in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, especially involving the narcotics trade.

In November 2003, Shevardnadze was ousted in the ‘Rose Revolution’, and a new government under Mikheil Saakashvili prioritised the reform of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, including the police. Still reigning as of 2011, Saakashvili’s government has been labelled a ‘competitive authoritarian’ regime (democratic in structure but authoritarian in essence), and while his police reforms have been widely praised, Georgia ranked 64th out of 183 countries in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index.

Reform Efforts

Saakashvili’s first waves of reforms in 2003 and 2004 were swift and decisive (see Figure 5). 16,000 police officers were dismissed in retribution for widespread inefficiency and corruption. Officers’ salaries were increased significantly, from an average of 80 to 90 Georgian Laris (GEL, equivalent to £30 to £35) to GEL 350 to 500 (£136 to £195), a strategy also recommended by Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) as a way of reducing the temptation for corruption. Moreover, a thorough ‘rebranding’ exercise was undertaken that gave the police force a new name, new cars, and new uniforms in order to create a ‘clean slate’ effect.

164 CMI, Crime, Poverty, Police Corruption in Developing Countries (2008), p.27.
Efforts were made to redefine the police force as an entirely civilian body, distinguishing it clearly from the military, and directing it more exclusively to protect citizens and enforce the rule of law. An OECD report has stressed the imperative that military and civil powers are distinctly separated, especially in an unstable post-conflict situation such as Georgia. In this way, considerable structural alterations brought departments under central control: for example, placing the Border Protection Department under the command of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and making it a civilian rather than a militarised defence unit.

A second wave of reforms came between 2005 and 2007 in the form of international assistance projects: OSCE’s STAP (Short-Term Police Assistance) in 2005 and 2006 and PAP (Police Assistance Programme) in 2006 and 2007. In 2008, the OSCE attempted a ‘community policing’ project, but this was marred by a “lack of interest” from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, perhaps because it was inefficiently tailored to the situation in Georgia. Internationally-led reforms are perhaps less vital in Georgia than in countries suffering from more recent conflict, but have still aided the process considerably.

Punitive investigations targeted the traffic police as a notable source of corruption within the service. Newburn’s (1999) argument that corruption is predictable and therefore easily preventable focuses on fields of ‘victimless’ crime such as prostitution and narcotics.

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**FIGURE 5: GEORGIA POLICE REFORMS 2003-2008**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incorporate Interior Ministry troops into MoD – 2005</th>
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<tr>
<td>Border protection forces integrated into Ministry of Internal Affairs – 2008</td>
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<tr>
<td>Integration of Interior Ministry and Security Ministry – 2004</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Police Directorates – 2005</td>
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<tr>
<td>Establishment of Financial Police – 2005</td>
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<tr>
<td>Legislation on salary of judges</td>
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<tr>
<td>Traffic police disbanded and creation of Patrol Police – 2005</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reduction in police staff – 2004</td>
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<td>Increasing wages – 2004</td>
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<td>Reform of Police Academy – 2007</td>
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<td>Human right monitoring departments in the OSP and MIA – 2008</td>
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<td>Neighbourhood police programme – 2008</td>
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<td>Targeting of Impunity – 2007</td>
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<tr>
<td>Amendments to Criminal Procedure Code – 2005</td>
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<td>Police code of ethics – 2007</td>
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<td>Suspension of law ‘On the technical inspection of cars’ – 2005</td>
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However, it is arguable that traffic police are also vulnerable to corruption because of their constant operation in a situation in which the citizens they approach are highly mobile and more anonymous than in a static ‘local’ environment. It has been suggested that one way to limit traffic extortion amongst the police is to reduce the number of traffic police officers.\textsuperscript{170}

In 2005, Saakashvili ordered the dismissal of the entire traffic force (approximately 30,000),\textsuperscript{171} and replaced it with a new one. This new service, named ‘Patruli’,\textsuperscript{172} was trained in part by the US Bureau of Customs and Border Protection and the US State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law-Enforcement Affairs.

The Saakashvili reform process has placed significant emphasis on starting from scratch; but while the strategy of mass dismissals might be effective against corruption, it should also be taken into account that many of the 30,000 whose careers were interrupted were probably not involved in corrupt activities. Such ruthless action might not be necessary to instigate lasting reform.

**Obstacles to Reform**

However, while police reform seems to have been largely successful, some limitations remain. While low-level corruption such as bribery has been significantly reduced, reforms have been ‘less successful’ against human rights abuses and high-level corruption.\textsuperscript{173} Although there is a promising emphasis on transparency within the new Georgian National Police, symbolised neatly by the glass facades of newly-built police stations, a lack of accountability continues within the Ministry of Internal Affairs. This was because the merger of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of

Security in late 2004 did not consist of an adequately clear division of legal powers between the police and intelligence service: leading, for example, to cases of illegitimate phone-tapping in crime solving.\textsuperscript{174}

The perceived politicisation of the police force remains a major problem. Ultimate responsibility for the Georgian National Police remains with the Minister of Internal Affairs rather than a professional police official.\textsuperscript{175} In an attempt to reduce corruption intrinsic in provincial informal power centres, the government has centralised the police force more closely in Tbilisi. However, in practice this has aided political influence over the police that has only been intensified by the withdrawal of autonomy from

\textsuperscript{170} CMI, Crime, Poverty, Police Corruption in Developing Countries (2008), p.23.
\textsuperscript{173} CMI, U4 Practice Insight: Police Reform in Georgia (2010), p.4.
\textsuperscript{174} CMI, U4 Practice Insight: Police Reform in Georgia (2010), p.4.
\textsuperscript{175} Interview with expert on police reform (Sept 2009) in CMI, U4 Practice Insight: Police Reform in Georgia (2010), p.3.
individual departments: for example, the aforementioned change in the management of the Border Police Department has hindered reform work attempted by the OSCE.\(^\text{176}\)

A CMI working paper (2008) warns that when the police are aware of an implicit or explicit duty to defend a political elite, then not only might officers abuse their powers to protect government authority, they may also become involved in political corruption: either actively or by tacitly protecting elites from persecution.\(^\text{177}\) Politicisation is by no means a problem specific to Georgia: Sherman (1978) found that the influence of political elites over police services in 1970s USA was prolific, and created a pervading climate of corruption.\(^\text{178}\) In May 2011, there was a widely-publicised, heavy-handed response by police to anti-government protests in Tbilisi. Even in well-established Western democracies this is not an uncommon occurrence, but arguably it does provide support for the perception amongst the Georgian public that the police primarily exist to protect the government rather than the people.\(^\text{179}\)

As in the case of Afghanistan, reforms in the police have proved less than effective in the absence of widespread judicial reforms. In July 2011, four photographers were arrested in Georgia over accusations that they were Russian spies. They were only released several weeks later after signing a plea-bargain agreement in which they confessed to the crime and paid a secret fine in return for a lighter or waived sentence.\(^\text{180}\) A report by the Council of Europe stating that 80 per cent of criminal cases in 2010 were settled by plea-bargains\(^\text{181}\) perhaps suggests that wider judicial reform is required to support positive changes within the service.

Conclusion

Certainly, impressive reform efforts have been made within the Georgian National Police. CMI reports that the reform of traffic police was immediate and noticeable to the general population, whose lives were ‘greatly improved’.\(^\text{182}\) Less than six per cent of respondents to the Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer reported paying a bribe to any public service in that year,\(^\text{183}\) probably helped by the introduction of fines to anybody offering a bribe. In the same survey 70 per cent of respondents believed Georgian corruption to have decreased in the past three years.\(^\text{184}\) Georgians also perceived the police as less corrupt than political parties, the media, the private sector, and non-government organisations.\(^\text{185}\)

The reforms in Georgia are positive and should be commended. The speed and immediate efficacy of early efforts increased public confidence in the country’s law enforcement. However, further reforms are necessary to reduce institutional corruption and maintain the public’s trust in the Georgian National Police. To be truly effective, these reforms must be aimed at increasing genuine transparency and accountability within the police service: not to reinforce the authority of the government but to guarantee the comfort and safety of the country’s citizens. Increased transparency will permit the investigation of high-level corruption that could otherwise continue to undermine the whole police service. In order to counter the perceived politicisation of the police service, the Minister for Internal Affairs should hand over holistic responsibility for law enforcement to a professional police officer.

\(^\text{176}\) CMI, U4 Practice Insight: Police Reform in Georgia (2010), p.4.
\(^\text{182}\) CMI, U4 Practice Insight: Police Reform in Georgia (2010), p.4.
\(^\text{185}\) Transparency International, Global Corruption Barometer Report 2010/2011, p.44.
Background

Police corruption in Honduras has worryingly moved far beyond taking bribes, destroying evidence, and tipping off criminal elements. In some cases, Honduran police officers threaten the very communities they are charged with protecting as perpetrators of homicide, intimidation, extortion, armed robbery, and other forms of violent crime.

Efforts to reform this troubled institution have historically had the least success in the region. A primary reason of failed attempts to address police corruption is the lingering effects of the transition from a military dictatorship. While no longer considered a ‘post-conflict state’, Honduras still embodies many of the characteristics, such as weak and factionalised national institutions.

Moreover, police reform has also been highly militarised due to security-heavy partnerships with the U.S. during both the Cold War and currently as part of the War on Drugs. Consequently, public dialogue on the subject is often oversimplified in terms of being “strong” or “weak” on crime: time, resources, and strategy are often lost to corruption and inefficiency to the neglect of strengthening police institutions and practices. This tendency towards forceful crime prevention approaches that ignore strengthening police capacity and training is exemplified in legislation that mandates that the military fulfill police duties (such as military street patrols and presence on public transportation).

A second reason is Honduras’ location between the major drug-producing nations of South America and a large U.S. consumer market. This makes Honduras an ideal stopover point for smugglers transporting illicit narcotics. With an estimated 36,000 members, it harbors the largest criminal gang presence in Central America. This influence of organised crime breeds corruption within the security sector: for example, drug trafficking organisations will often offer up to one month’s salary to a police officer for only one or two nights of work.

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Reform Efforts

Following a transition to democracy in the 1980’s, Honduras began to address its long-neglected public security institutions. In 1993, the Organic Law of the Public Ministry was approved, creating the Public Ministry (or Public Prosecutor’s Office), which housed the investigative unit of the police. It was only in 1998 that the armed forces relinquished their control over the police force through the creation of the Secretariat for Public Security, thereby guaranteeing a civil police force. Prior to this, the military, key politicians, and the economic elite blocked such a transition out of fear for losing their traditional influence and for reduced effectiveness in combatting crime. In a separate step later that year, the investigative police were also transferred to civilian authority. While this move is seen by experts to be largely beneficial, in Honduras’s case it was motivated by a desire to punish the Public Ministry for carrying out politically sensitive investigations.

Honduran police reform is typically understood to require two separate, but interconnected processes: the purging of corrupt officers and the introduction of broader institutional reform. The former has always been a politically charged process, as public officials who attempt to purge “bad apples” from the police force have historically been fired or pressured to resign. The most well-known previous incident, from 2000, occurred when then-Minister of Security Gautama Fonseca was undermined in an attempt to fire several police officers. After appealing to the Honduran Supreme Court, the officers he fired were quickly reinstated and back paid. Many of them continue to hold their post today. Additionally, former Minister of Security Oscar Alvarez and former Police Commissioner Maria Luisa Borjas were both sacked in separate instances after they attempted similar mass firings of corrupt officers.

Honduras’ 2009 political crisis, which ousted then president Manuel Zelaya and launched two years of subsequent political turmoil, shifted the attention and resources of the security sector away from addressing organised crime and toward internal institutional battles.


Consequently, corruption and drug trafficking increased. Subsequent complications over the international recognition of Honduras’ new government discouraged the international aid and cooperation needed to address the worsening domestic security situation.192

But with growing international awareness of Honduras’s struggles, more money is increasingly being made available. In particular, the U.S.-funded Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) programme designated USD 50 million to Honduras between 2010 and 2011, a portion of which goes to supporting community patrols, training, professionalisation, and research.193 However, past U.S. sponsored government reform programmes have failed to provide sufficient financial backing for its anti-corruption initiatives to succeed.194

The current wave of police reform was spurred in 2011 by three high profile events that brought an abrupt spotlight to the way that police corruption had enabled endemic violence. First, the release a UNODC report on homicide shocked Hondurans, as it announced that the country was now home to the world’s highest homicide rate (91.6 for every 100,000 people as of 2011).194 Then, in October of 2011, the son of Juliesta Castellanos, the President of the National Autonomous University, was murdered along with his best friend by eight police officers attempting to steal his car.195 Four of the eight police officers arrested for the crime were quickly released, and several went into hiding. Later that same year, Alfredo Landaverde, an advisor to the Ministry of Security and vocal critic of organised crime’s infiltration in the government, was assassinated by two gunmen196 rumored to be connected to the police.197

Shortly after these murders, President Porfirio Lobo fired his top police commanders and dismantled the police unit to which those involved in the Castellanos case belonged.198 In January 2012, the government also created DIECP, a body tasked with investigating police affairs. In June, DIECP began to carry psychological assessments, toxicology tests, and polygraph tests. This initially resulted in 235 officers being investigated and an additional 70 referred to the Secretary of Public Security Reform, passed in February 2012, includes the review of the entire police structure, sanctions the firing of corrupt individuals, and mandates investigation into the assets of police officers and their immediate families over the last ten years. Photo credit: Transparency International Honduras

Security for potential dismissal." Additionally, the Law of Public Security Reform, passed in February 2012, includes the review of the entire police structure, sanctions the firing of corrupt individuals, and mandates investigation into the assets of police officers and their immediate families over the last ten years.

In May, the Congress passed the Special Law for Police Purging that grants the Chief of the National Police, Juan Carlos Bonilla, the ability to subject all police officers to mandatory confidence and performance assessments. The law also grants him with a six-month window to fire officers in an effort to facilitate a rapid cleanup of the institution. The effectiveness of this program remains to be seen, not least of all because Bonilla himself has been accused of running a death squad in the late 1990s and early 2000s. DIECP has refrained from investigating this issue, an example of its broader lack of willingness to address corruption among the upper echelons of police authority. More broadly Honduras’ long precedent of backlash against mass firings will make enforcement of this new initiative challenging.

Another key element of the reform law was the establishment of an independent Commission for the Reform of Public Security (CRSP) that is tasked with designing and planning of institutional reform and with the certifying of purging of the police.

The Commission is also charged with playing a role supporting research to DIECP in technical, scientific, and financial matters. In October 2012, the CRSP took its first major step in the process of reform, introducing new laws regarding the police and public prosecutor’s office to the president, who signaled his support for the passage of these encouraging new measures that would increase training and require merit-based advancement.

Initiatives for police reform in Honduras have not been limited to the government. To support the work of the CRSP, a broad umbrella organisation called the Alliance for Peace and Justice was formed in February 2012 and includes representatives from civil society, religious institutions, and the National Autonomous University. The Alliance has sought to promote and constructively critique Honduran public security reform in a variety of ways, including events to raise awareness about the need for security reform and by playing an ongoing role in critiquing the work of the CRSP and the government in regards to police reform. For instance, the Alliance successfully halted the creation of an elite military squad called “The Tigers.” The Alliance has also criticised the Honduran government for disbursing only 20 per cent of the funds needed to run the CRSP and has challenged the CRSP to organise itself and create a strategic, long-term plan.

Obstacles

Political interference and politicisation in security sector reform is a major challenge in Honduras and inhibits meaningful progress in police reform. For example, numerous reforms have been derailed by potential losers, such as political parties or the economic elite, by blocking passage, manipulating content, or hindering implementation. Further, Honduras’ oligarchy has traditionally used security forces as weapons of repression; as a result, politicians have little interest in constraining police through the constitution or legal system, revealing the role inequality and power plays in slowing reform efforts.

Trust in public institutions, and in particular the police force, is a further obstacle to reform across the board. In a recent survey by Latinobarómetro, 79 per cent of Hondurans said that they had little to no trust in the police force. Only seven per cent stated that they would report a crime to the police after it occurred. With such weak levels of trust, members of the public are also less likely to stand as witnesses in criminal cases or cooperate with public prosecutors. This deficit of trust extends to the relations between the police force and other institutions; for instance, the police are often resistant to efforts by prosecutors to direct their work, while prosecutors frequently mistrust investigations undertaken by the police.

Honduras’ limited financial resources and their inefficient use also play a role in hampering reform. Since 2007, Honduran police have been unable to act on over 13,000 issued arrest warrants. According to the Public Ministry, the Honduran police investigated only 21 per cent of the cases passed to them between 2010 and 2011, allegedly due to lack of funds to undertake investigations. A police spokesperson noted that Honduras’ investigative police body, the National Directorate of Criminal Investigation (DNIC) has so few technological and financial resources that it doesn’t even own its own offices and operates out of a rented space. Furthermore, weaknesses in the internal structure and division of labor within the police have inhibited an efficient use of funds.

Most shocking is the low number of police officers employed; at 148 officers per 100,000 inhabitants, Honduras deploys just half the regional average for the ratio of police to population.

The same economic and political forces worsening corruption among the police also actively weaken the rest of the justice sector, including the judiciary, the jails, and the public prosecutor’s office.
Conclusions

The problem of police reform in Honduras is an inseparable piece of the larger puzzle of security sector reform and rule of law. The same economic and political forces worsening corruption among the police also actively weaken the rest of the justice sector, including the judiciary, the jails, and the public prosecutor’s office. Together with Mexican drug cartels and national and international gangs, these institutions form a complex system of corruption that has made Honduras among the most volatile countries on the planet.

As a result, Honduran police reform must acknowledge the varying sources of corruption and weakness and the need for both international and domestic cooperation to effectively address these problems.

The recent attention brought to the issue of police reform by the UNODC report and growing public outrage against violence perpetrated by the police is encouraging. Both the international community and the Honduran government have claimed to strongly support the CRSP and the latest attempt to purge the police of “bad apples”, though it remains to be seen whether these intentions are followed by the appropriate financial and political resources.

The underlying issue of police reform in Honduras is political will. Police reform inherently challenges the existing power structures by questioning the ability of both police officers and political officials to act with impunity. Corruption in the police force is therefore unlikely to change as long as key political players, such as high-level politicians and the economic elite, continue to intervene to prevent or derail reform. Such politicisation has cast police reform as an issue for political gain rather than public benefit, preventing any meaningful progress. Piecemeal reforms, commissions, and purges are unlikely to yield substantial results unless this political calculus changes.
Background

The Jamaican Constabulary Force (JCF) has been widely perceived, both from within Jamaica and outside, as an institution suffering from endemic corruption. This has seriously hindered the ability of the JCF to tackle crime in Jamaica, especially organized crime and gang violence. However, recent reform efforts have begun to tackle the systemic and widespread issues experienced by the JCF.

Though the process of reform is far from complete and the success so far seems marginal relative to the scale of the problem, recent advances in tackling corruption represents significant progress. By far the most outstanding reason why these improvements should be recognised is that it has been done from a starting point where corruption was rife, seemingly uncontrollable, and seriously undermining the police.

The case of Jamaica, therefore, serves as an important point of reference on the prospects of reform in two ways: firstly, that reform to tackle police corruption is possible, even in the most challenging of circumstances; and secondly, as a reminder that the process is inevitably a long-term one, requiring a consolidated and widely supported effort for quite some time in order to make the gains often desired at the outset of reform.

Reform efforts

The JCF’s prioritisation of public order over citizen-protective models of policing, widespread corruption and incompetency resulted in a crisis of public confidence and trust in the JCF by the early 1990s. It was against this background that the first outsider was appointed Police Commissioner in 1993—Trevor Macmillan, a former Military Colonel. Harriot (2007) suggests that this first phase of reform, resulting from two earlier enquiries, led to an improvement in discipline at


both a superficial level, with simple enforcement of uniform adherence, and at a more substantive level, with lower levels of corrupt activity. However, issues of corruption, and limited transparency and accountability persisted, to impeding the work of the JCF.

In 2004, Mark Shields, a senior officer from the Metropolitan Police in the UK, was despatched to work with the JCF for two months. His success during this period led to his appointment as Deputy Police Commissioner of the JCF in 2005, along with a number of UK police officers employed by the JCF to take up senior positions and advice on reform of the service.\(^{217}\) In March of 2012, Les Green, then Assistant Police Commissioner and the last remaining of British police officers employed by the JCF, announced he would be retiring from his post in Jamaica.

The problems faced by the Force were clear to Shields on arrival: he observed an institution that exhibited “a very inward-looking, nepotistic culture…. hated by most of the public in Jamaica”, at which “corruption was out of control”.\(^{218}\)

Research by Resig and Lloyd (2009) indicates two problematic outcomes from JCF’s prolonged decline of legitimacy in the eyes of the Jamaican public.\(^{219}\) Firstly, public cooperation with the police on all matters was low, with minimal public trust in the JCF to handle information properly. The second has been the increasing reliance of local communities on local leaders (locally known as ‘Dons’ — the colloquial term used for the leader of a gang) and identifying them as the primary source of security. These developments not only reduced ability of the JCF to police effectively, but also magnified the major challenge posed by organised crime and criminal gangs. In 2007, the Ministry of Justice ordered a review of the JCF chaired by Dr Herbet Thompson.\(^{220}\) The publication of the 2008 Strategic Review marks a significant watershed in the reformation process of the JCF and an important change in momentum on reform. The report made 163 recommendations for reform, labelled all three of the oversight committees at the time as ineffective, and identified five areas that have profoundly hindered the functioning of the JCF:

- the culture of the organisation
- failure of internal and external accountability
- failure of leadership and management
- lack of professional development
- significant corruption and disregard for human rights

The case of Jamaica serves as an important point of reference on the prospects of reform in two ways: firstly, that reform to tackle police corruption is possible, even in the most challenging of circumstances; and secondly, as a reminder that the process is inevitably a long-term one.


Since the 2008 review, there have been a number of reforms to the structure of the JCF and relevant external bodies. These include the formation of the Anti-Corruption Branch (ACB) of the JCF, a reinvigoration of community policing efforts to rebuild trust between the public and police, and the establishment of an Independent Commission for Investigators (INDECOM) in 2010 to improve accountability of the security services.

The Jamaican Government has also received considerable funding from DFID to assist with reform and accountability mechanisms of the JCF. Between 2008 and 2011, DFID funded a £3.7 million project to promote community-police interaction, improve conviction rates and enhance accountability mechanisms. In 2012, a further £7.5 million four-year project was approved to support the Anti-Corruption Branch (ACB) Cleansing Programme, tackling serious and organised crime, internal accountability, and strengthening of oversight and external accountability.

A significant point of progress has been the JCF moving from a culture that would accept “that’s how we did it” instead of undertaking serious reform, to a police force that contains “a critical mass of people in the organisation [who] now have integrity”.

Measuring Progress

A major coup for the police force since 2005 has been the extradition of the most wanted ‘Don’, Christopher ‘Dudus’ Coke, to face charges in the US. Former Deputy Police Commissioner Mark Shields has suggested that this high profile sort of arrest would never have happened, were it not for the reforms that have taken place in the JFC.

In addressing the problematic culture within the force, Mark Shields identified a significant point of progress as the JCF moving from a culture that would accept “that’s how we did it” instead of undertaking serious reform, to a police force that contains “a critical mass of people in the organisation [who] now have integrity”. Shields’ comments are backed up by the steady growth the anti-corruption efforts within the force since 2008.

The number of proactive corruption cases being worked on by the The Anti-Corruption Branch (ACB) has gone from a total of 41 in 2008 to 195 in 2011. The ACB has also had success in carrying these out effectively, with 41 officers being criminally charged and 85 removed from the force between 2010 and 2011. The establishment of an anti-corruption hotline, “1-800-CORRUPT”, has also been a successful addition to the ACB’s work. Ten investigations into corruption were launched as a result of calls to the hotline in only the first month of its operation. Since its inception, the hotline has proved an increasing success, with the number of cases received from the hotline increasing 193 times.
per cent from 2010 to 2011. A further significant recent development has been the establishment of the Major Organised Crime and Anti-Corruption Task Force (MOCA) in June 2012. This unit is led by senior members of the JCF, but will be a multi-agency task force, with staff contributions from across government.

Conclusion

Though there has been progress in reform of the JCF, issues of corruption and obstacles to reform still persist. Corruption within the force, and how to tackle it, is still very much a major problem within Jamaica’s police forces. Amnesty International’s Annual Report points that one of the recommended improvements on police oversight, the Independent Commission of Investigators (INDECOM), still has an unclear mandate, with debate ongoing in Jamaica over whether INDECOM actually has the power to charge officers. Furthermore, problems seemingly exist in building sustainably on progress made in the effectiveness of the JCF: It has recently emerged that ‘Operation Kingfish’—the high profile and successful JCF operation to tackle the ‘Dons’ and their organised crime networks, with which the British officers were heavily involved—had been systematically dismantled in 2007, with no senior officer or minister willing to explain the reasons behind this move.

These last two examples may be symptomatic of the reform process as a whole in Jamaica: although there has clearly been growing momentum for reform, as well as a great deal of external support, the process is far from complete and will take some time.

4.7 KENYA

Background

Although Kenya established the Prevention of Corruption Act in 1956, police corruption in the country has not been as systematically or consistently targeted as in Singapore, for example, which established a similar act only four years after, and is also analysed later in this report. The first Kenya Anti-Corruption Authority (KACA) was set up in 1997, but disbanded only three years later as government officials felt it ‘overlapped with the duties of the Attorney General and the Commissioner of Police’. In 2003, the Kenya Anti-Corruption Authority was reestablished as the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission (KACC) under the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act.

Since his election in 2002, Mwai Kibaki has been promising to combat corruption in both the government and the police force. A ‘Strategic Plan for the Police’ was developed to expound ongoing reforms, but the success was limited. For instance, it has been reported that a police constable shot and killed an unarmed demonstrator during the post-election violence of 2007 and 2008. The Kenya Television Network aired footage of the incident, but a police spokesperson announced that no action would be taken because ‘for all he knew the video had been doctored [sic] to paint a poor image of the police’. The image portrayed by Transparency International’s 2012 East African Bribery Index is not much better: it found the Kenyan Police to be the third most corruption in East Africa.
However, limited success so far does not preclude the success of more recent reforms. The website of the Kenyan Police states that ‘The Commissioner of Police is committed to a Police Force whose members are motivated, people-friendly, open, relaxed and honest with one another and the public’. The reality of this statement will be proven, one way or the other, over the next few years.

Reform Efforts

In 2009, new Police Commissioner Mathew Iteere began the redeployment of 600 officers with the specific remit of combating police corruption. This was one of the recommendations proposed by a government-commissioned investigation into police corruption headed by Justice Philip Ransley. The commission recommended the vetting of all police officers holding the rank of Assistant Police Commissioner and above. The Ransley Report, released in 2009, recommended an extensive programme of reform over 3 years that would cost KSh81.4 billion. The implementation of the 200 reforms was begun in 2010 by a taskforce headed by Titus Naikuni, the managing director of Kenya Airways.

In a bid to make the force more accountable, the inspector general of the Kenya Police Service now has to report to three separate bodies: the PSC, the Independent Policing Oversight Authority and the newly-established National Policing Council. However, efforts to form the National Police Service Commission have been hindered by disagreement over appointments from within the coalition government and with senior police leadership.

The Ransley Report criticised the rigid hierarchy of the Kenya Police Service, which left departments ‘vulnerable to both political and hierarchical misuse’. As well as greater operational devolution to lower levels of the force, the report proposed a more efficient separation of powers: for example, the structural re-allocation of the Anti-Stock Theft Unit to the Administration Police, which was ‘more visible in the rural areas’ and therefore better suited to crimes involving livestock. While some of these measures might not directly target police corruption, their purpose was to clarify the overlapping organisation of police departments and therefore limit opportunities for hidden corruption.

Kenya Police Service has taken a holistic approach that incorporates the ideas and opinions of the low-level officers most at risk from ‘grass-eating’, petty corruption. The ‘Strategic Plan for the Police’ was developed in open workshops with a ‘wide cross-section of officers’, and it has been credited with ‘opening up a more consultative and non-hierarchical way of working’.

Crucially, a holistic approach has been taken that incorporates the ideas and opinions of the low-level officers most at risk from ‘grass-eating’, petty corruption. The ‘Strategic Plan for the Police’ was developed in open workshops with a ‘wide cross-section of officers’, and it has been credited with ‘opening up a more consultative and non-hierarchical way of working’.

Karp (2008) has argued that the only way to break free from ‘cyclical’ corruption is to encourage ‘open dialogue’ with officers in all levels of hierarchy, which credits the Strategic Plan from the outset.

In order to formalise ethical conduct within the police, the training curriculum was revised to include ‘gender, human rights, cyber-crime, counter-terrorism, forensic-science, organised crime and governance’, in a shift away from a previous emphasis on ‘paramilitary training and drills’ that reinforced the idea that ‘policing is combative and confrontational’.

Tougher vetting procedures—such as making a mean ‘D’ grade at KCSE (Kenya Certificate of Secondary Education) level a recruitment prerequisite—were promised in 2011 but these are on hold until new laws establishing changes in the police service are finalised.

As in several other countries, a focus on community-oriented policing has been promoted to tackle the problem of public mistrust of the force police. Such mistrust is not only fermented by frequent corruption, but also creates a culture so used to corruption that the latter becomes reluctantly accepted. Early attempts were made to engage the general public with the Strategic Plan: a widely-distributed questionnaire offered the response alternative of ‘Display low integrity (dishonesty and corruption)’ for respondents who were dissatisfied with police activity.

As recommended by the Ransley Report, community policing was introduced in ‘nearly all’ police stations, supported by a policy and handbook ‘developed to enhance security and the rule of law’. As of 2011, a new level of community involvement sees civilians invited to form independent commissions to monitor the recruitment of police officers.

It is one victory for the police to maintain order and avoid a repeat of the 2007 and 2008 post-election violence, but quite another to reduce corruption within the institution of the Kenya Police to such an extent that citizens feel genuinely confident in it.

The Future

To date, Kenya has a terrible track record for police corruption. Citizens expect to pay bribes as a matter of routine, and the abuse of authority for personal gain is intrinsic to much of the police force. But there is hope: current and promised reforms to the police are significant, and undoubtedly represent steps in the right direction.
After 15 months of a new training programme, hundreds of new police recruits are due to graduate in time to ‘supplement the police population ahead of the 2012 General Election’. However, both time and research are needed before a conclusion can be reached on whether these reforms will have a lasting and positive impact. It is one victory for the police to maintain order and avoid a repeat of the 2007 and 2008 post-election violence, but quite another to reduce corruption within the institution of the Kenya Police to such an extent that citizens feel genuinely confident in it. The present government and its successors must maintain their commitment to the reforms recommended by the Ransley Report if Kenya is to avoid the cyclical corruption warned against by both the Wood Royal Commission (1997) and Karp (2008)—in which the recommendations of independent commissions are briefly adhered to but forgotten after a few years.

It does not bode well that the government of Mwai Kibaki passed a law dismantling the KACC and firing senior staff, including Director Patrick Lumumba, in August 2011. However, it remains to be seen whether the new Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC) will continue its work with the same effectiveness. With sustained and determined reforms, the Kenyan Police could become a truly protective force. Yet for this to happen, reforms must be backed up with total commitment by the next Kenyan government—due to come into power at the start of 2013.

Background

As a post-conflict country, Serbia’s path to reducing police corruption has been fraught with difficulty. The fall of the Milošević regime in 2000 led to a hurried division of state security (intelligence) and internal security (police), which left the latter unstable and vulnerable to corruption. Poor planning left only the intelligence service with an overlapping field of operation with the police that created confusion and the potential for corruption. There was also inadequate protocol for monitoring and dealing with police misconduct. A 2001 Transparency International report found that ‘there exist no special means at the disposal of the police to be used in the course of investigating and fighting corruption’. Particularly in the south of the country, ethnographic divisions have marred fair policing. There has remained a general perception that the police are ‘corrupt, disrespectful and inextricably associated with the authoritarian regime’. Notable differences in attitudes towards the police arguably reveal the presence of corruption based around discrimination in southern Serbia: Ryan (2007) found that while ethnic Serbs believed themselves to be ‘protected’ by the police, Albanians in the area felt self-consciously ‘policed’.

Reform Efforts

In the years after Milošević’s deposition, well-intentioned reform efforts were implemented (see Chart 1). The ‘Vision Document’ of 2003 laid out ideas of change, but Bakick (2006) states that a failure to implement any clear timeframe of action in this document weakened holistic reform from the outset.263 This has become a perennial problem because although the 2005 Law on Police demanded a strategic plan for police reform,264 ‘neither of the post-Milošević administrations had an overall reform strategy. The absence of an organisational framework led to a “lack of internal capacity and precise time-frames” that hindered efficient progress’.265

The Office of the Inspector General was established in 2003 to observe and act on cases of police corruption. At least initially, however, its effect was limited since its members retained senior posts within the police service. The OSCE has advised that an internal affairs unit such as the Office of the Inspector General can only effectively tackle corruption if it is awarded independence from the command structure.266

In order to address the intra-ethnic tensions within the police force, in April 2001 the OSCE sponsored the creation of a Multi-Ethnic Police Element (MEPE), complete with a dedicated academy to train 375 initial cadets. The MEPE represented a conscious decision to incorporate officers of all racial groups (and genders) into the police service. Further, training encouraged the active involvement of the community in crime prevention. Essentially, the MEPE programme was an attempt at community-oriented policing with an ethnic basis.

Obstacles to Reform

The OSCE recommended that semi-independent provincial councils be created to monitor police forces, but although the idea was put into practice, the councils were hampered by severely limited powers. They had some authority to question police officers but not to force them to attend meetings, hindering attempts to increase police accountability.267

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266 OSCE, Police Reform in Serbia: Towards the Creation of a Modern and Accountable Police Service (Jan 2004), p.52.
With the creation of an effective internal affairs unit, however, anti-corruption measures are proving effective. According to a UNHCR report, in the first half of 2010 the internal control unit of the police helped bring 307 criminal charges and 2,600 administrative proceedings against officers, ‘compared with only 262 and 103 respectively, brought during the five years from 2003 to 2008’.

Regional reform efforts have focused too heavily on strengthening already-reformed police forces, and not enough on reforming existing structures. Internationally-funded joint reform efforts were attempted across the whole of south-east Europe under the Stability Pact (1999-2008). While regional cooperation and the sharing of expertise was naturally a positive step, Mobekk (2003) has criticised aspects of the programme that stunted its efficacy.

Training courses aimed at ‘training the trainers’ would have been more effective if combined with courses targeted at low-level officers (those most at risk from the petty corruption that, according to Kleinig’s model, leads down a ‘slippery slope’ to ‘meat-eating’ acts). Perhaps most crucially, internal corruption was played down in favour of a focus on organised and trans-border crime.

Ethnic tensions in post-conflict Serbia have hampered the effectiveness of the MEPE. The threat of militant Serbian separatists necessitated the deployment of an armed gendarmerie to protect the MEPE officers, significantly undermining their authority. Moreover, the multi-ethnic element was poorly equipped and insufficiently trained. Ryan (2007) states that the international community must realise that community-oriented policing is unsuitable to challenge ethnic tensions within police and security sector reform. In 2010, an assessment that the ‘police force in southern Serbia was composed primarily of Serbs, although there were a small number of ethnic Albanian officers’ suggests that there is still much progress to be made in achieving an ethnic balance in the police force.

Discriminatory corruption among the police in Serbia is unlikely to disappear while intra-ethnic tensions remain.

Discriminatory corruption among the police in Serbia is unlikely to disappear while intra-ethnic tensions remain.

Despite innovative efforts to combat the ethnic tensions that exacerbate police corruption (for example, discrimination by police extorting bribes from a member of another ethnic group), serious underlying bitterness remains. In July 2011, ethnically-motivated hostilities involving both Serbian and Albanian police officers on the border with Kosovo highlighted the continuation of tensions that hinder non-discriminatory policing, both internally and externally.

Conclusion

Evidently, there have been some successes within the Serbian police. Even if its implementation was flawed, the MEPE project was an important step demonstrating a willingness, at least in methodology, to combat the ethnic discrimination inherent in the police force. The Serbian government needs more time, but it also needs to plan that time carefully. The Vision Document of 2003 and the Police Law of 2005 show an understanding of the need to organise police reformation on a strategic basis, but in neither case were timeframes followed through with sustained action.

Looking to the future, the Stockholm Programme could become a useful entry point to holistic police reform in Serbia. The five-year strategic plan, which presents guidelines on tackling corruption in justice and home affairs for EU member states, has been suggested as the prompt for a vital ‘step forward’ for Serbian police. The programme’s emphasis on ethics and human rights represents a ‘key point’ in Serbian reform. The country’s recent visa liberalisation process has already necessitated anti-corruption training for border police officers.

Agreements of regional cooperation on a smaller scale than the Stability Pact (1999-2008) are one way to bolster the fight against police corruption: in March 2011 the interior ministers of Serbia and Montenegro signed a joint pact agreeing legal cooperation against trans-border crime and corruption.

To effectively reduce corruption in the Serbian police force, a clear and realistic schedule of implementation must be drawn up and kept to – possibly with the Stockholm Programme as a template. Regional cooperation in south-east Europe is a positive tool in the fight against corruption, and the exchange of information and expertise between Serbia and its neighbours should be encouraged. The difficulties inherent in a post-conflict, multi-ethnic environment like Serbia mean that positive discrimination within the police force might be necessary to prevent a concentration of minority or majority interests in the service of a particular region.

Moreover, a concerted effort must be made to retain a clear distinction between the police and other, more militarised, units of enforcement. Above all, as suggested by a recent Transparency International report on Post-Conflict Countries, Serbia’s popular culture must be altered to build an intolerance of corruption among its people if anti-corruption reforms are to be sustained.

Background

Singapore was under the colonial rule of the British Empire until 1963, during which time the Singaporean Police Force (SPF) was rife with corruption. Measures to tackle corruption in the police force were introduced as early as 1952, when the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) was established. Since then, a myriad of reforms have reduced corruption within the SPF and given it a role model status for change. The CPIB was granted extensive legal powers, the salaries of police officers were considerably improved, and the recruitment and training process redesigned to focus comprehensively on ethics and integrity in policing. The city-state has long been admired as a prime example of reforms that can extinguish corruption within the police force, and there is considerable evidence of its successes.

Reform Efforts

Anti-corruption measures in Singapore have found considerable praise, and the reasons for success are numerous. Firstly, successive governments have shown a strong political will to tackle the issue. This is best represented by the fact that the main Singaporean anti-corruption agency has been established for much longer than its counterparts in other states. Operating for decades, the CPIB has grown in both efficacy and reputation, and enjoys a striking amount of independence from police and political influence. Committed investment by the Singapore government has strengthened the CPIB’s anti-corruption abilities: in 1995, polygraph testing was introduced and in 1998, one-way mirrors were added to identification parades.

Both Holmes (2010) and Ali (2000) give credit for the success of Singaporean police reform to the


determined commitment of successive
governments.285 286

Secondly, the CPIB enjoys extensive legal powers
beyond those found in other countries. The powers
awarded by the Prevention of Corruption Act in
1960 allow a CPIB detective to arrest any person
under ‘reasonable suspicion’ without warrant, enter ‘any place by force if necessary’, and to
do so without a search warrant on ‘reasonable
grounds to believe that any delay in obtaining the
search warrant is likely to frustrate the object of
the search’.287 CPIB officers can also propose
legislative reforms, seize passports, and freeze
assets.288 With its motto ‘Swift and Sure’,289 the
CPIB symbolises a zero tolerance attitude to
corruption, and it could be argued that the powers
awarded to its officers risk potential abuses of
authority. However, like Hong Kong’s Independent
Commission against Corruption (ICAC), the
CPIB has no power to prosecute directly, and
is prudently integrated within the wider judicial
system.

Thirdly, high wages have for a long time reduced
the temptation of officers to turn to petty
corruption. In 1972, for example, the government
implemented the recommendations of the Lee Soo
Ann Salary Review Committee that junior police
officers should receive a 20 to 25 per cent pay rise
and free medical aid.290 Not only did this move—
and subsequent wage increases since—decrease

 Discriminatory corruption among the
police in Serbia is unlikely to disappear
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the temptation to resort to ‘grass-eating’
corruption, but it also allowed the government to stipulate that officers could no longer have any
other employment.291 Under colonial rule, officers

had often held secondary jobs, and mixed loyalties
increased the likelihood of corruption: for example,
an officer might struggle to remain impartial while investigating a rival businessman. By paying
officers more and banning secondary employment,
police administrators greatly reduced the chance
that their officers might face a conflict of interest
during operations.

Fourthly, the recruitment and monitoring process
focuses on preventing corruption amongst
officers. The training programmes of the
Singapore Police Academy (established in 1969)
have been periodically updated. In 1999, the
‘Ah Long San’ scandal, which saw 17 officers
charged for corruption, prompted the creation of
a values-focused training course.292 The 40-hour
programme was based around authentic case
studies to increase its relevance to participants,
and was described by a Commissioner of Police
as ‘integrity-based lessons… to build resilience
to corruption’.293 Holmes (2010) has praised the
course’s ‘naming and shaming’ approach, seeing it
as an effective way to instil integrity.294

287 CPIB, Powers of Investigation in Prevention of Corruption Act (PCA), Sections a.1 and c (year) retrieved
293 B.H. Khoo, ‘Speech at the World Ethics and Integrity Forum 2005’ at the Integrity Institute of Malaysia in Kuala
Officers are closely monitored in the field as well: those in ‘vulnerable’ posts such as anti-vice and gambling suppression are rotated to other departments every three years. The private assets of officers are also inspected regularly by the Consumer Credit Bureau to ‘prevent indebted officers from turning to bribes’.295

Singapore—a Paragon?

Quah (2006) is a prominent spokesman for the resounding success of Singapore. Arguably, however, Singapore needs further investigation before it is tentatively held up as a role model for the rest of the world. For instance, Quah juxtaposes, somewhat hyperbolically, a totally corrupt colonial police service with a police force that has been incorruptible since the People’s Action Party of 1960.296 While there is truth in the comparison, it is unhelpfully caricatured. He also draws bold conclusions from occasionally limited evidence. For example, a passage in the 1976 Police Life newsletter of the SPF urging its members to ‘show the public that corruption does not pay’ is used to prove that ‘unlike the British colonial period, corruption is now no longer tolerated or condoned by both the PAP government and the population’.297 Quah’s work is meticulous and extremely valuable, but it should not be taken as decisive evidence that the Singaporean Police Force has cultivated a culture of anti-corruption. The situation is complicated because, unlike Hong Kong’s ICAC which publically discloses raw data of its cases as well as its prosecution and conviction rates, the CPIB produces no formal reports or quantifiable evidence by which its success can easily be studied.298

Although these reservations do not tarnish Singapore’s impressive anti-corruption efforts, more research is needed to support Quah’s conclusions.
Conclusion

It is important to remember that while Singapore’s performance in police corruption reform is exceptional, so are its base circumstances. It is neither a developing nor a post-conflict country; it has enjoyed decades of political stability and benefited from a considerable head start in the development of an independent anti-corruption body: a benefit of long-term stability not available to most developing countries. Its small size means it must contend with few of the problems encountered by geographically sparse countries like China, but it could also be argued that its high population density (7,257/sq. mi) presents its own difficulties.\(^{299}\) Essentially, however, a city-state like Singapore or Hong Kong (at least until 1997) is subject to exceptional circumstances that can make an anti-corruption body like the CPIB or ICAC appear disproportionately more effective than its counterparts in larger countries.\(^{300}\)

This does nothing to detract from Singapore’s success, but suggests that countries requiring police reform might need a considerable period of time before truly positive results can be expected. Of course, a long period of reform can only work if it is driven by a committed and pro-active government, as has been witnessed in Singapore.


Background

The 2006 Conarepol (National Commission on Police Reform) report on Venezuela’s police force revealed an extensive network of corruption infiltrating the police force at many different levels. Criminal networks bribed officers for information and successfully sought active influence within forces. Officers were poorly trained, unaware of the ethical issues surrounding policing, and operated a ‘trigger-happy’ approach to policing in poorer areas—there are an estimated 900 shootings by police every year in the slums around large cities like Caracas.\(^\text{301}\) Notably, impunity has stopped many corrupt officers from facing penalty: in a report to the National Assembly in August 2008 it was acknowledged that only 204 of 6,300 police officials investigated between 2000 and 2007 were charged.\(^\text{302}\) An inherent mistrust of the police has spread throughout Venezuela’s communities; and with it a reluctance to report instances of police corruption because of fears of retribution.

Reform Efforts

In 2008, the ‘Organic Law of Police Service and National Police’ (Ley Orgánica del Servicio de Policía Nacional) was passed, implementing many of Conarepol’s proposed reforms. The National Experimental University for Security was created to run a five-year training programme with a strong emphasis on the ethics of policing, which is noted by Newburn as a particularly important tool against corruption.\(^\text{303}\) Blanco has stressed that the police must be taught effective tools of dissuasion beyond violence, noting an intrinsic ‘culture’ (although this term was dismissed as misleading by Chan (1997))\(^\text{304}\) in which police officers are powerless to act if they need to quell citizen violence because they are forbidden from using violence but have inadequate knowledge of alternatives.\(^\text{305}\) The curriculum includes specialist training by advisors

from Cuba and Nicaragua (both with homicide rates among the lowest in Latin America) in ethics and community-based policing, although its first recruits are only now entering the field and it is too early to tell how effective the training is.

‘Community policing’ has been one of the key ideas behind Chávez’s reforms. By creating local councils with the power to monitor and direct police activity, it is hoped that not only will community members be able to contribute useful local knowledge to aid police, but will also be able to monitor the police. The idea is similar to the creation of ‘Pacification Police Units’ in the favelas of the state of Rio de Janeiro in Brazil, which are supposed to maintain a consistent police presence in areas of high crime, rather than previous, occasional violent raids. More broadly, the project is intended to engineer greater day-to-day involvement of the police in local communities and aim at preventive, rather than reactive, policing as a result.

However, Blanco points out that inadequately managed or explained attempts at community policing have been interpreted as commands for vigilante justice, and that in some areas civilians patrol neighbourhoods with pistols and shotguns.

The Organic Law focused particularly on police accountability, a topic which had been pressed on the government for years by NGOs like the Justice and Peace Support Network (Red de Apoyo por la Justicia y la Paz), from whose ranks the technical secretary for Conarepol, Soraya El Achkar, was chosen. To increase transparency within the force, a new office called the Police Rector was established within the Ministry of Interior to constantly monitor the performance of all police departments and watch closely for signs of corruption or human rights abuses. The law also commanded all forces to create both internal affairs and external discipline units: the latter of which must be independent of the force.

By creating local councils with the power to monitor and direct police activity, it is hoped that not only will community members be able to contribute useful local knowledge to aid police, but will also be able to monitor the police.

Set up in 2009 also in response to the Conarepol reform suggestions, the Policía Nacional Bolivariana (PNB) constitutes a new national police service designed to work in closer collaboration with the community, through local communal councils overseeing units of up to 400 families. The new force has also been granted a 318 per cent wage increase over the previous force. At least in theory, it is plausible that better working conditions for police officers would encourage greater service and limit the temptation to accept bribery or become involved in criminal activity. However, the former head of the investigative police’s anti-kidnapping division has stated that corrupt police are involved in 8 out of 10 kidnappings and since money is the principal lure behind these activities it seems unlikely that the wage increase has drastically reduced corruption; at least for the time being.

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310 Organic Law of Police Service and National Police, Art. 79.
A 2010 report by Transparency International suggests that public trust in the police has not changed immediately, with the police widely believed to be the most corrupt institution in the country. Arguably, however, it will take longer than a couple of years to change the opinions of a public accustomed to a negative view of the police.313

Any changes to the police force must be accompanied by judicial reforms, because only once cases of police corruption are dealt with properly in the courts will reform have any lasting effect.

**Obstacles to Reform**

Political interference could be a barrier to a long-term reduction in police corruption. Chávez has called for a ‘revolutionary police’ that will be composed of members of his government’s social missions.314 This has aroused serious concerns that the reform of the Venezuelan police might result in a more politicised force, rather than an independent one. Not only could this transform the police into an instrument of governmental authority (and potentially repression), it could also result in stricter control over police data by the government, which in turn might limit the capacity of NGOs and the wider community to accurately monitor corruption. In his study of US police departments, Sherman (1978) found that influence by high-level politicians could ‘capture’ a service and turn it for political ends.315 If a local culture accepts corruption as part of the ‘way of things’, and therefore lends implicit acceptance to corrupt practice within a service, it can become endemic—particularly where community policing gives local councils sway over management, as is the case in Venezuela.

Blanco insists that any changes to the police force must be accompanied by judicial reforms, because only once cases of police corruption are dealt with properly in the courts will reform have any lasting effect.316 The judicial system prior to 2007 was lacking in resources and suffered a dearth of permanent judges and state prosecutors, which made effective resolution of corruption cases difficult. A study of judicial reform in Venezuela would be extremely useful, but lies outside the remit of this report.

**Conclusion**

It is difficult to know yet whether reforms in Venezuela have been a success because so little time has passed: the new PNB (National Bolivarian Police) was first deployed last year. The head of the PNB has publicised that violent crime has reduced by 52.78 per cent since it started operations.317 However, violent crime is not the sole determinant of an improvement in service. Drug trafficking is an increasing problem in Venezuela, especially as organised criminal networks move to the country following security improvements in Colombia.

The police force remains an integral component in these networks.318 Similarly, Chávez’s insistence that the new PNB will be a ‘friend’ rather than a repressive enemy of the people has been shaken by reports of brutal repression of peaceful protests in November 2010.319

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313 Transparency International, Global Corruption Barometer 2010/2011, p.44.
Arguably, official figures must be taken with a proverbial pinch of salt, and although there is significant cause for optimism in the country’s changes under Chávez—with violent crime in Caracas dropping notably—continuing reforms must be monitored closely to ensure they do not engender an attempt to harness the police for political means. Given the customary mistrust of law enforcement in Venezuela, we can see the importance of placing transparency at the heart of any reforms in order to increase vital public confidence.

On a lighter note, the Transparency International Chapter in Venezuela has been engaged in mobilising support for reform in prisons. They have been setting up stalls outside major prisons like Tocuyito and hearing the corruption experiences of the families of the inmates. Small initiatives like these can have a major impact in mobilising public opinion for change.
5. CONCLUSIONS

The countries examined in this report represent a complex spectrum of attempts to reform police corruption, and an even broader spectrum of obstacles hindering those attempts. Given that corruption is easier to notice than its absence, there have been considerable successes. However, the vital importance of a fair, trustworthy and clean police service, which is valued as such by both the public and the police officers themselves, cannot be overestimated in the fight for a free and safe society.

Police forces are not isolated arenas of corruption. Useful lessons can be gained from anti-corruption measures in other parts of the defence and security sectors. Firstly, as with the police, corruption in the military is harmful not just because it reduces public confidence—although this is more of an issue with law enforcement bodies dealing intimately with the public than with a distant and frequently revered military—but because it reduces operational effectiveness and drains scarce resources. Secondly, corruption is often tackled only when it is exposed, but exposure through public scandal also reduces the public’s confidence in the police, which must then be restored through the reform process. With any kind of anti-corruption reform in the defence sector, the high expectations of an outraged public necessitate a clearly detailed timeframe of change. Thirdly, programmes of reform targeting any institution in the defence and security sectors must accommodate low-key but sustainable preventative measures in conjunction with the headline-making punitive measures that public scandal inevitably calls for.

All of the countries presented have had some success in reforming corruption within their respective police services. Broadly speaking, the reform efforts fall into the following categories:

Structural change
- Separation of powers—e.g. Georgia
- Flattening of hierarchy—e.g. New South Wales
- Rebranding—e.g. Georgia
- Wage increases—e.g. Venezuela, Georgia

Recruitment and training
- More rigorous recruitment processes—e.g. Kenya, Singapore
- Ethics and integrity incorporated in training—e.g. Afghanistan, New South Wales, Singapore, Venezuela

Internal monitoring
- Early warning systems—e.g. Kenya, New South Wales
- Subtler disciplinary powers—e.g. New South Wales
- Establishing a dedicated unit investigating internal corruption e.g. Jamaica

External monitoring
- Independent monitoring commissions—e.g. Kenya, Serbia, Singapore

Transparency
- Internal—‘open dialogues’ within the police (Karp 2008)—e.g. Venezuela
- External—‘community policing’ with the public—e.g. China, Venezuela

Wider reforms
- Judicial reforms (Holmes 2010)—e.g. Serbia

Structural changes can combat systemic corruption by widening the hierarchy to limit a superior officer’s capacity to establish a patrimonial chain of corruption. In post-conflict countries such as Georgia, a structural separation of powers might need to be enforced to prevent those responsible for civil law enforcement wielding military powers, or serving a particular power faction. Changes to the recruitment and training processes are especially vital in post-conflict countries such as Afghanistan and Serbia. Prejudices resulting from hostilities between factions or ethnic groups in these kind of states can contribute to discriminatory corruption in law enforcement if firm values are not instilled in officers from the start of their careers.

Internal monitoring systems, such as the ones recently implemented in New South Wales, should be put in place in all police services to facilitate the early detection and prevention of grass-eating corruption before it progresses to meat-eating proportions. Even more crucially, external investigative bodies must ensure that a police force is accountable to an agent beyond itself, and are instrumental in limiting the development of high-level corruption. However, this is only true if they are independent both from the police force and the state government.

Transparency should be at the core of any reform process and the long-term structures it establishes and implements. Internal transparency in the form of open consultation and clear communication between all ranks of a police force not only makes corruption more difficult to conceal, but has the additional benefit of restoring the confidence and morale of a service suffering from a public scandal—such as the case of Li Siyi in China. External transparency, in the form of community-oriented policing or at least frequent reports to the public, is vital in restoring public trust in a police force after it has been shaken by widespread corruption—as in Venezuela and Kenya.

But, as has been shown, anti-corruption reforms will usually remain ineffective against certain obstacles, which can either be reactionary, operational and/or political (see figure 6).
The first three obstacles represent inadequate action in the reaction phase of a corruption cycle.\textsuperscript{323} Faced with recommendations for dramatic structural changes by a state-commissioned inquiry that cannot be ignored, police commissioners might try to enact superficial reforms to distract from more fundamental changes—as was the case in New South Wales following the Wood report. Heavy-handed, overly punitive reactions to a public scandal can satisfy the anger of a population, but have the adverse effect of damaging police morale irreversibly if not combined with significant positive change. The firing of 30,000 traffic police by Saakashvili in Georgia risked alienating all those officers who had not been involved in corruption. Moreover, reforms are most effective if they are meticulously planned to a long-term timeframe with incremental rather than dramatic changes. In Serbia, for instance, the Vision Document of 2003 and the Police Law of 2005 failed to achieve real change because they were not followed through with sustained action.

At the operational level, obstacles arise within police and external investigative bodies when realistic expectations and adequate powers are not allowed by administrators. In New South Wales, a ‘business-like’ expectation put officers under pressure to meet conviction targets rather than conduct their public service duties. Independent external agencies can only fulfil their monitoring role if they are given sufficient powers to do so: the provincial councils set up in Serbia were not able to coerce police officers to attend meetings in order to make themselves accountable, rendering the councils useless in the face of uncooperative officers.

Finally, obstacles at the political level are often the most difficult to overcome because their causes stretch far beyond the institution of the police. The interference in police conduct and structures by high-ranking or provincial politicians can result in corrupt individuals buying their way into police management, or politicians perverting the course of justice for their own ends. In Venezuela, Chávez’s ‘revolutionary police’ consist of individuals loyal to the government. In China, the CCP’s involvement in the high ranks of the Chinese police creates a conflict of interest in the transparent exposure of corruption. Post-conflict countries suffer many of the least surmountable obstacles against comprehensive police reform. Slow processes of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), low public confidence in a police that was ineffective or abusive during hostilities, and weak or ill-defined police structures, all contribute to breeding corruption within forces that are frequently unaccountable. For example, the fragmented political landscape of Afghanistan has made it extremely difficult to reform a public service forced to act in a near-military capacity because of continuing domestic belligerence.

The most crucial point to remember is that since no country experiences the same difficulties in preventing police corruption, programmes of reform cannot be moulded to a ‘catch-all’ template.

Although different geo-political contexts require substantially different approaches, some universal points of best practice can be drawn from the analysis of the chosen case studies:

- Reforms must involve multiple parties: the police administration, ground-level police officers, government ministers, independent monitoring agencies and, to a certain extent, the general public.

- Reforms should combine punitive measures with coherent structural changes and reinforce police confidence after a scandal.

- Reforms must be planned and sustained over a long period of time to guarantee lasting effect: a long-term timeframe involving incremental changes will have greater sustainability than an immediate but overwhelming series of changes.

- While high-level corruption is the most obviously damaging form of corruption, targeting low-level, ‘grass-eating’ corruption seems necessary for long-term reform because:
  - Without proper attention, low-level corruption can become institutionalised;
  - Since nearly all perpetrators of high-level corruption begin as ‘grass-eaters’, all levels of corruption are best targeted in the long term by preventative reforms in recruitment, monitoring and training. 324

- Any programme of reform must be tailored directly to the police service it is aimed at.

- The recommendations of government-sponsored inquiries into police corruption should be acted upon with full commitment rather than superficial lip service.

- An independent agency should be set up to investigate claims of police corruption and to monitor the progress of reform. It must also enjoy sufficient coercive powers in order to be effective.

- International efforts must be co-ordinated and co-operative from the beginning to avoid a conflict of aims that might hinder reform.

- Reforms to the police will be most successful if their aim is to improve transparency and service to the public, and not the strength of the police force itself or its ability to protect political elites.

For a better understanding of the best course to tackle police corruption, further primary research is necessary. Comparative studies between countries, such as Holmes (2010), arguably represent the best chance of understanding how theories of reform can apply to the reality of disparate contexts. 325 Similarly, policy documents and reports produced by non-government organisations represent an invaluable body of knowledge into the situation on the ground.

As well as the necessary roles of police administrators, governments, external agencies, and international bodies, civil society organisations play, and should continue to play, a key role in the reform process. Anti-corruption reforms will have a much greater chance of success if the ability to monitor them is opened out to the wider public for it is through transparency that the opportunity and temptation for corruption diminishes.

This leads to the most unexpected and important conclusion of this report: that there has been much less engagement of civil society in police reform than we expected. For reforms to be lasting and effective, they need active public engagement and support. Whilst there will undoubtedly be many local efforts that have not been reported in the international literature, we believe that such external involvement needs to be more extensive, and that there is a major, urgent need for civil society to find more effective ways of contributing to and stimulating, police anti-corruption efforts.
### ANNEX 1 | GLOBAL CORRUPTION BAROMETER 2010 - 2011 RESULTS TABLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Territory</th>
<th>Political parties</th>
<th>Parliament/Legislature</th>
<th>Police</th>
<th>Business/Private Sector</th>
<th>Media</th>
<th>Public officials/Civil Servants</th>
<th>Judiciary</th>
<th>NGOs (non-governmental organizations)</th>
<th>Religious bodies</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Education system</th>
<th>Police Rank</th>
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<td>3.2</td>
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<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.7</td>
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