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Q57.

Does the country have legislation covering defence and security procurement with clauses specific to corruption risks, and are any items exempt from these laws?

57a. Legal framework

Score

SCORE: NS/100

Assessor Explanation

Assessor Sources

57b. Corruption risks

Score

SCORE: 100/100

Assessor Explanation

Assessor Sources

57c. Effectiveness

Score

SCORE: 25/100

Assessor Explanation

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This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Defence procurements are conducted following the Law on Public Procurement (LPP) [1] and several bylaws such as government decisions, guidelines and manuals issued by the Public Procurement Agency (PPA), and guidelines and executive orders issued by the minister of defence [2, 3, 4]. There is no specific legislation covering the procurement in defence sector yet, besides the continuous proposal provided by the Supreme State Audit Institution (see, pg. 3 of the 2018 report) and EU (there is a specific EU directive on this) [5]. The LPP, which was adopted in 2006, over the last decade has been amended seven times to reflect improvement and implementation shortcomings. The LPP provides for seven public procurement procedures: Open procedure; Request for Proposals; Negotiated Procedure without prior publication; Negotiated Procedure with prior publication; Restricted Procedure; Design Competition; Consulting Services (LLP, Article 29). All these procedures apply to the defence and security procurements also.
However, the LPP provides for exemptions from the above procedures for procurements related to national defence and security (LPP, Articles 5 and 6). On procurements related to the national defence, the LPP provisions do not apply in cases when (a) there is a risk that the contracting authority may disclose information that is essential interests of national security, (b) for the purchase of arms, munitions and war material, or related services, and (c) in specific circumstances caused by natural disasters, armed conflicts, war operations, military training and participation in military missions outside the country (LLP, Article 5). The LPP provisions do not apply also to public contracts when their performance must be accompanied by special security measures following the laws, regulations or administrative provisions in force, or if such a thing is dictated by the essential interests of the state (LLP, Article 6).
For acquisitions conducted under Articles 5 and 6 in the defence sector, a Government Decision (Decision of Council of Ministers (DCM 1403) specifies the bodies, rules and procedures for conducting the procurements for which the LPP does not apply. The DCM provides for three procurement procedures: the limited procedure, the direct negotiation procedure, and the state-to-state procedure [6]. For the acquisitions conducted following Article 6, another DCM 17/2000 provides for the procurement for which the LPP law does not apply in the intelligence and security agencies [7, 8].

There is no specific legislation covering risks related to defence procurement specifically; however, it is generally covered in the law and guidance for public procurement. The LPP provides for the contracting authorities to disqualify from the procurement procedure companies or bidders that have been sentenced on corruption by courts or attempt to corrupt officials during the procurement process (LLP Articles 13, 26, 45). One of the measures undertaken to avoid corruption is the introduction of the mandatory electronic procurement procedure [1]. The Competition Authority has adopted guidelines and manuals to help the contracting authorities implement the anticorruption clauses provided in the LPP [2, 3]. However, there are no similar provisions on corruption risks for procurements related to national defence and security that are excluded from the overall rules of public procurement that are regulated by Decision of Council of Ministers 1403 [4].

Transparency of public procurements has been one of the main issues of concern in Albania, particularly due to the preferred use of the negotiated procedure by the contracting authorities. In 2013, 33.6% of all the procedures were conducted through negotiations [1]. This number fell to 31.2% (2121 procedures) in 2014 [1] and has fluctuated over the years, with 2706 procurements conducted through negotiation in 2015 [2], 2186 procedures in 2016 [3] and 2234 procedures in 2017 [4].
In 2017, the MoD planned ten procurements under the request for proposal procedure and 14 procurements under the open procedure. In 2018, the MoD planned six procurements under the request for proposal procedure and nine procurements under the open procedure [5]. The MoD does not publish the procurement annual plans, so there are no data available on the number of procurements and the procedures applied. The MoD has used the negotiated procedure for major procurements conducted throughout the last few years (ten negotiated procedures in 2015, eight procedures in 2016 and eight in 2017) [6]. However, defence purchases are generally procured in line with the existing legislation although specific legislation on defence procurements is lacking that would better regulate classified procurements [7].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

The country has a public procurement law that might cover defence and national security purchases which allows for exemptions. The 2016 Public Procurement Law does not make explicit reference to the defence and security sector (1). A Jane report, from 2014 mentioned that military procurement is exempt from wider public procurement rules (2). Another report notes that tenders related to defence and security are restricted (3). Since Art. 168 makes a clear exemption with regards to external control mechanisms for the Ministry of National Defence, there is some indication that the 2016 Public Procurement Law applies to the Ministry of Defence. The law generally regulates the determination of needs (chapter 2), public procurement (chapter 3), public contracts (chapter 4), controls of the procurement process (chapter 5), and the communication and exchange of information by electronic means (chapter 6). It makes exemptions for certain types of procurements. For example, public contracts of a specifics nature, which cannot be published, are exempted from being published in the Official Procurement Bulletin of the Public Operator (BOMOP) (Art. 158), (1). No further information of what defines a “specific nature” could be found in the law. It seems very likely that it includes sensitive defence and security items.

The country’s last assessment mentioned Executive Decree No. 95-396 (1995) that regulates the procedures for importing firearms on behalf of security companies (4), (5). Another inter-ministerial decree from 1996 referring to Decree 95-396 lays down the procedures for the acquisition and import of firearms and ammunition and the conditions for issuing the relevant authorisation on behalf of security and transport companies (6).

The country has public procurement legislation which refers to corruption risks, and it might cover defence and security procurement (see the answer to question 57A).

Section 8 of the 2016 Public Procurement Law addresses the fight against corruption it states that a code of ethics and professional conduct for officials involved in the control, award and performance of public contracts shall be written (Art. 88), (1). A published copy could be found on the ONPLC’s website. One of the main purposes of the code is to set out the main values that should govern the conduct of public officials responsible for procurement in the performance of their duties (2). A critical newspaper report stated, that “[e]ven if this code is adopted, if there is no real will to fight corruption, it will always persist” (3). The documents make no explicit reference to defence and security procurement.

This indicator has not been assigned a score due to insufficient information or evidence.

The Public Procurement Law mentions some exemptions. It is unclear if defence purchases are procured in line with legislation. For example, tenders in defence and security are restricted (1). According to Art. 12 of the Public Procurement Law, in case of a compelling emergency motivated by an imminent danger to an asset or investment, the minister, the wali or the president of the respective municipal popular assembly may authorize the commencement of performance of services before the conclusion of the public contract. The article only broadly states that an emergency is present when, for example, public order is threatened. No further information with regards to the defence and security sector was found in the law. Art. 45 of the Public Procurement Law does formally allow for restricted tenders and outlines the requirements for such a process (2). No information with regards to the defence sector was provided in Art. 45.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

The 2016 Public Procurement Law (Law 9/16 of June 16) governs all public contracts, including in defence and security (Art. 2,c) (1). Notably, however, the law exempts “contracts of acquisition of arms, military and police equipment related to the defence and security of the State”, that “shall be declared secret” (Art. 7, 1, b) (1). In 2014, based on the previous (2010) Public Procurement Law, specific regulations were enacted for military procurement contracts for administrative and logistics expenses (2). The regulations establish rules and procedures for necessity plans, its approval and execution, contracting methods and oversight by the inspector-general of the Defense and the Angolan Armed Forces, and determines the state-owned company Simportex as the exclusive handler of army procurement contracts. It’s unclear whether the regulations are still in force.

It also remains unclear which further areas of defence procurement are not covered by the 2016 Public Procurement Law. In the general state budgets, monitoring and execution of “special internal and external state protection expenses” continues to be under the direct control of the president, which has been repeatedly criticized by the opposition as an open door for corruption (3), (4).

Relevant legislation that covers defence and national security purchases include the Public Contracting Law (2016) and its implementing regulations, the Public Probity Law (2010) and the Law on Public Assets (2010). Both the public procurement law and law on public assets contain exemptions for secret items. The public procurement law and public probity law cover the defence and security sector and contain general anti-corruption provisions (1), (2), (3).

There are regular exceptions to procurement requirements outlined in legislation for the defence and security sector, but their significance in terms of number and scale cannot be assessed (1), (2).

Public audit court records such as opinions on pre-reviews of contracts, feature some, but not all known major defence procurement contracts of the last few years (3).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. The country does not have specific defence legislation that covers defence and national security purchases. The public procurement system is mainly framed under the Financial Administration Law [1] and the contracting regulations of the national administration (Delegated Decree No. 1.023 and Decree No. 1030). [2] These, together with the Law of Public Ethics and the Law of Fiscal Responsibility, constitute the normative frame of reference for transparency in the matter of contracting by the National State. [3] [4] [5] This regulatory framework has in turn been underpinned by the Law on Access to Public Information that resulted in the COMPR.AR and CONTRAT.AR web portals, where it is possible to access the contracting processes of all jurisdictions dependent on the National State. [6] There is no information in the ministerial resolutions on the INFOLEG portal or on the website of the Ministry of Defence with regard to specific clauses on corruption risks in purchases in defence and security. [7] [8]

The country does not have specific legislation that contemplates defence and security procurement and contracting. However, there is a broader national framework applicable to government contracting including defence with Decree 1023 of 2001. [1] Article 10 of the Decree specifically addresses the risk of corruption and establishes that any operations tainted by corruption, bribery, or coercion shall be anulled. It specifically addresses the risks of corruption.

There is Not Enough Information to score this indicator. The country does not have specific legislation on the risks of corruption that specifically look at procurement and contracting in defence and security. These are understood within the general framework applicable to government contracting. ACIJ points out that the development of electronic purchasing tools was an advance in the way in which the State contracts, which helps reduce bureaucratic costs and generates information available to civil society and companies. Likewise, the ACIJ notes that the COMPR.AR portal is not entirely efficient, as the information published in open formats only includes calls and awards and not the process in all its stages. [1] According to information published in the newspaper La Nación in 2016 [2] regarding the Multiannual Plan for the equipment of the Armed Forces, part of the financing would be through external credit. This implies that there are exceptions to the process regulated by law as long as it is included in the exceptions of the law. [3] There is no available information which allows for an assessment as to whether defence purchases are made in line with the legislation.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Defence budget planning and procurement occur under the Law on Procurement that has been amended and approved by the National Assembly, it was changed due to WTO and EEU procedures [1]. All defence and security-related spending are regulated by the law, in the same way as it does with other sectors of public procurement. To decentralize the procurement process, Clause 1 of Article 16 of the law provides that the procurement authorized body which coordinates procurement cannot be a party to a procurement agreement. All the procurement is conducted according to the general legislation on procurement, there is no separate legislation that regulates the defence procurement. The Law on Procurement provides for four types of procedure on procurement: electronic auction, competition, request on the quotation and single source. Point 5 of Clause 1 of Article 18 provides that the preferred type of procurement is competition, if not otherwise provided by the Point 15 of Article 5 of the law concerning the procurement subject. Any other type of procurement must be strictly within the confines of the law.

You may not find a direct application of the term “corruption” in the Law on Procurement [1], but it has a very detailed outline and description of types of competitions, specific clauses on the description of the purchase with technical specificities to avoid corruptive behaviour to the extent possible. Thus, the www.procurement.am web portal is designated to be an official bulletin where all the procurement transactions and related documents are requested to be posted by the law within a certain period (Clause 14 of Article 2).
As procurement specialists from the Ministry of Finance (MoF) outlined, the mechanisms launched to coordinate and implement procurement are made as transparent as possible to any type of procurement unless otherwise specified by the law (secret procurement). All the procurement is conducted through an electronic platform that aims at eliminating cases of corruption at the stages of the application, review, and signing of the contract [2].

Public and open competitions seem to be the main type of procurement within the defence sector. However, closed targeted framework contracts and single source purchases seem to put a shade on the overall procurement in the defence sector. As the Corruption Risk Assessment of the Defence Sector conducted by TIAC states [1], and this study also comes to prove, that the defence sector expenditures and budgets should be as open and transparent as possible considering the sensitivity of the subject. Thus, spending that is not qualified as a secret should be made publicly available. This may require time and efforts to revisit the procedures, but will greatly add to the openness of the procurement process.
Consultations with procurement experts from the MoF assure that there is no single procurement case that is not regulated through the legislation. The introduction of the electronic procurement system (www.armeps.am ) does not provide space for hiding any type of information on the procurement unless specified as secret by law [2].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Following a 2014 overhaul of procurement rules and principles, all defence and national security purchases made by Australian public servants and government departments are subject to a set of legislation and associated instruments, policies and regulations. The relevant Act is the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (PGPA Act), which applies to Commonwealth entities [1]. These entities are defined as including Departments of State, which include the Department of Defence, Australian Secret Intelligence Service, Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, Australian Signals Directorate, and other government departments that form the the Australian defence and security community. The Office of National Intelligence Act 2018 also establishes the Office of National Intelligence, the overarching intelligence organisation that gathers and analyses intelligence and national security options for the Prime Minister, as a Commonwealth entity in the meaning of PGPA [2]. Under section 105B(1) of PGPA Act, the Australian Finance Minister issues the Commonwealth Procurement Rules (CPRs) [3]. The CPRs are a legislative instrument, binding on public officials, that provide comprehensive rules and principles by which all public procurement must be carried out. The Department of Defence issues a separate set of policies pertaining specifically to defence procurement, the Defence Procurement Policy Manual (DPPM) [4]. The DPPM is informed by the Defence Procurement Policy Directives and CPRs, and the DPPM are not a form of legislation themselves. However, most of the DPPM is a restatement of the CPRs – which is a legislative instrument – and Defence officials are “responsible and accountable for the consequences of” departure from the DPPM [4, paragraph 31(c)]. In the CPRs and reflected in the DPPM, there are two tiers of rules covering public procurement, Division 1 and Division 2. Division 1 rules apply to all procurements, whereas Division 2 rules additionally apply to procurements above a certain financial threshold. Though certain types of procurement are excepted from Division 2 rules, all public procurements, including defence procurements, must legally follow Division 1 rules at all times [3, paragraph 3.5].

The relevant legislation, legislative instruments and policies do not directly use the word “corruption” or any derivatives thereof. However, there are several references to corruption-related issues. Most directly, the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (PGPA Act) includes as a section: “An official of a Commonwealth entity must not improperly use his or her position: (a) to gain, or seek to gain, a benefit or an advantage for himself or herself or any other person; or (b) to cause, or seek to cause, detriment to the entity, the Commonwealth or any other person” [1]. This prohibition hems closely with Transparency International’s definition of corruption as “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain” [2]. Additionally, the PGPA Act highlights that officials must discharge their duties “honestly, in good faith and for a proper purpose” [1, s. 26], must manage and procure public resources in an efficient, effective, economical and ethical manner [1, s. 8, 15], and must disclose interests in relation to the performance of their duties [1, s. 29]. The Commonwealth Procurement Rules (CPRs), a legislative instrument which draws its authority from Section 105B of the PGPA Act, provides more detail about specific ethical behaviours officials undertaking procurement must comply with, including risk mitigation strategies such as not accepting inappropriate gifts, being cognisant of potential conflict of interest issues and seeking expert advice on ethical issues when they arise. The CPRs state: “Ethical behaviour identifies and manages conflicts of interests, and does not make improper use of an individual’s position” [3], again closely following the Transparency International definition of corruption above. The CPRs also point to the Department of Finance’s procurement policy website for “further information and guidance on applying the CPRs” [3, paragraph 3.3], which include a page outlining the principles guiding ethics and probity in procurement [4]. This page outlines that officials must not engage in several types of corrupt practices and elaborates several corruption risk mitigation practices. However, these principles and references to corruption issues in the legislation are at times vague. The Defence Procurement Policy Manual contains a section on ethical behaviour in procurement, which goes into essentially the same level of detail as the CPRs [5].

There is some indication through media, parliamentary inquiries or audit reports that the legislation on defence procurement is not thoroughly implemented and followed. It took a few years for the Commonwealth Procurement Rules and Defence Procurement Policy Manual to be fully mainstreamed from when they were introduced in 2014 [1]; however, the changes should now have been fully implemented. Reporting in 2017 revealed that an internal Defence audit by its Audit and Fraud Control Division showed large-scale non-compliance with defence procurement legislation and policy [2]. Also in 2017, a whistleblower revealed an alleged scheme in which defence personnel corruptly engaged contractors to gain lucrative private sector employment. An internal audit “identified breaches of government procurement policy”, but the allegations were not referred to an external agency and did not lead to prosecutions [3]. A 2017 Australian National Audit Office report indicated that there were issues with procurement reporting processes, some of which may have violated the letter or spirit of legislation covering public and defence procurement [4]. The Parliamentary Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit opened an inquiry as a result of the report, but closed it without filing a report, indicating that there were no serious shortcomings revealed by the inquiry [5].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Azerbaijan has no special legislation on defence and security procurement; the main law governing public procurement in Azerbaijan is the Law on Public Procurement (2001) (1). The existing law has shortcomings, and its modernization is very important (2). Article 19 of the law is, “Limited participation and closed tender” and notes that (19.3), the procurement agency uses a closed tender when goods (works and services) are intended for defence and national security needs. Procurement for clothing, food, inventory, medical equipment, pharmaceuticals, service vehicles, repair and construction works for these needs is carried out through open tender.
The main procurement agency in Azerbaijan was the State Procurement Agency (1997-2016). Under a decree signed by the President of Azerbaijan in 2016, the State Procurement Agency has been abolished, and its functions and state-owned property were transferred to the State Service for Antimonopoly Policy and Consumer Rights Protection under the Ministry of Economy (3). According to several studies, the main reason for this change was related to the problems with the procurement agency. The activity of this agency was not open to the public and there were always corruption claims against it. Experts believe that most of the winning bids in the tenders were owned by officials, and this is still happening. The agency was involved in hiding these cases (4).
There is a State Defence Order Program designed to meet the needs of the armed forces. The program itself is not available, but according to the Military Doctrine (Article 65), the State Defence Order Program reflects the short-term and medium-term needs of the customers of defence products to strengthen their defence capabilities in line with the threats and risks posed by the National Security Concept and the Military Doctrine (5).
Information about corruption risks in this program is not available. According to the Order on the Establishment of Ministry of Defence Industry (Article 8.9), it organizes in compliance with the current legislation on procurement of defence products, placing of orders (implementation of works, services, R&D, development, manufacture and control of production), completes agreements (6).
In 1999 Azerbaijan signed the Vienna Document. The Vienna Document requires participating states to provide each other with information about their military forces annually, including about manpower and major conventional weapon- and equipment systems, as well as deployment plans and budgets, notify each other ahead of time about major military activities such as exercises, accept up to three inspections of their military sites per year (some sensitive areas are excluded), invite other States to observe certain activities (it also encourages States to permit journalists from all participating States to cover the activities), to consult and co-operate in case of unusual military activity or increasing tensions. The Vienna Document encourages participating States, for example, to voluntarily host military visits to dispel concerns (7, 8, 9).

There is no defence specific legislation that covers defence and national security procurement. There are some documents (Concept of National Security, Military Doctrine, State Defence Order Program, Vienna Document 1999) cover defence and national security procurement. Only the Concept of National Security mentions corruption. Article 4.3.1 of the Concept of National Security notes that the government will continue its efforts on the following issues: democratic and civilian control over all security structures, their transparency, effective fight against corruption, increasing the responsibility of senior officials, informing the public, members of parliament, mass media about the activities of high-ranking officials (1). The lack of law in defence and security procurement increases the likelihood of corruption in procurement (2). According to the Transparent Public Procurement Rating (TPPR) the state procurement system in Azerbaijan lacks transparency and efficiency, the legislative framework leaves space for collusive and corrupt practices and public oversight over the procurement system is not ensured by the law. Azerbaijan received 49% of the total score, which makes it the least compliant country with the TPPR standard among the target states (3). After the amendments made in April 2012, the names of companies and founders participating in the tender are not disclosed as commercial secrets. This creates the possibility of serious corruption (2).

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable. Azerbaijan has no special legislation covering defence and security procurement, the main law governing public procurement in Azerbaijan is the Law on Public Procurement (2001) (1). Because there is no special law, there may be regular exceptions to procurement requirements and they may be significant either in terms of number or scale (2).
There is a State Defence Order Program designed to meet the needs of the armed forces. The program itself is not available. But according to the Military Doctrine (Article 65), the State Defence Order Program reflects the short-term and medium-term needs of the customers of defence products to strengthen their defence capabilities in line with the threats and risks posed by the National Security Concept and the Military Doctrine (3).
It is not clear if the program contains any requirements about responsibility or sanctions. According to the Order on the Establishment of the Ministry of Defence Industry (Article 8.9), it is organized in compliance with the current legislation on procurement of defence products, placing of orders (implementation of works, services, R&D, development, manufacture and control of production), completes agreements (4).
There is some information about serious corruption in procurement due to the lack of a special law regulating procurement in Azerbaijan, as well as lack of serious parliamentary and public oversight of the process. Many officials offered to name a few companies close to them, formally creating a competitive image. However, it is widely known that these companies are actually owned by the same person, and the company that won the tender will also be a company owned by a close relative of that officer or minister (5).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

There is no procurement law applied to the defence sector. The civilian sector, however, has a legal framework, but it is not applied to the military [1, 2]. The procurement laws are published on the official tender board [3]; and it is clear that the defence sector is excluded. Following a search of the website of the Parliament, the Ministry of Defence (MoD), and other government and media sources, and then verified by interviews, there is no more information on this topic.

As outlined in 57A, there is no legal framework for procurement in the defence sector, and therefore this indicator has been marked ‘Not Applicable’ [1, 2].

As outlined in 57A, there is no legal framework for procurement in the defence sector, and therefore this indicator has been marked ‘Not Applicable’ [1, 2].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

The Public Procurement Act of 2006 (PPA) and the Public Procurement Regulations of 2008 govern whole aspects of public procurement in Bangladesh. Ideally, these should also be applicable to defence forces. However, Section 68(2) of the PPA provides exceptions in the interest of national security and national defence [1]. For defence services, Defence Purchase-35 of 1961 is still used, with some amendments on financial aspects. The Procurement Policy of 2010 provides a broad perspective on defence procurement [2]. It does not include any specific clauses on corruption risks.

Section 63(3) of the Public Procurement Act addresses violations in the form of misconduct or corruption, for which it recommends departmental action [1]. However, the Armed Forces Procurement Policy of 2010 does not include any provisions on corruption risks [2].

There is not enough evidence to score this indicator. It is alleged that both the PPA and DP-35 are adjusted/adapted, or exceptions granted, for defence requisitions made by those with influence [1,2]. However, there is not sufficient evidence to support this claim.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Requirements regarding government procurement are stipulated in the law on government procurement (‘Wet inzake overheidsopdrachten’) [1]. On defence and national security purchases, the law on defence and security procurement applies specifically to the defence and security sector [2]. Article 15 defines which procurements fall under this category and does not outline any exemptions.

Articles 9 and 10 of the law of 13 August 2011 on defence and security procurement explicitly forbid corruption, bribery, conflict of interest etc. [1]. Additionally, the Law on the sanctioning of corruption stipulates corruption risks and the associated sanctions, and the Circular on public procurement, deontology and conflict of interest stipulates a framework within which corruption risks in procurement are taken into account [2, 3]. Moreover, economic operators who have been convicted of corruption also have to be excluded from all defence and security procurement (article 20 of the law of 13 August 2011 and article 63 of the royal decree of 23 January 2012) [4]. While the law leaves a loophole in very limited cases and when in the public interest, in practice this has not been the case [5].

A review of parliamentary documents and media articles does not reveal evidence of issues with the implementation of the legislation of defence procurement [1, 2].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

The Public Procurement Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina (PPL) regulates public procurement rules and procedures for all public institutions, including defence and security bodies[1]. However, Article 8, titled ‘Award of Contracts Pursuant to Special Regime’, paragraph 3, states that a Rulebook adopted by the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina (CoM) will regulate procedures, conditions, requirements, definitions, exemptions and other material issues regarding the award of contracts in the field of defence and security [1]. The subsequent paragraph specifies to which procurements are the contracts in question-related to (military equipment, security-sensitive equipment, security-sensitive works, supplies and services). Article 10 states exemptions to the application of the law, such as “public procurement contract declared as a state secret by laws in Bosnia and Herzegovina” and “public procurement contract the execution of which must be accompanied by special security measures in accordance with laws in Bosnia and Herzegovina”. Further exemptions exist in regards to the application of the rulebook where the rulebook is not applicable in case the application of the rulebook would oblige the contracting authority to reveal information classified as “top secret” and “secret”, as well as contracts in cases of research and development cooperation, contracting in third countries for the needs of deployed military, police and intelligence personnel and contracting with other countries related to intelligence-security systems and activities. The rulebook specifies the conditions that need to be met to use procedures such as restricted procedure, negotiated procedure with publication of the notice, the negotiation procedure without publication of a notice, competitive dialogue and electronic procurement techniques[2]. Additionally, the Law on the Protection of Secret Data defines the term ‘secret data’ and enumerates persons authorized to assign the different levels of classification, where the minister of defence is authorized to classify secret data in all four classifications. The legislation contains some anti-corruption provisions, including a prohibition on contracting with companies convicted of corruption and a requirement to exclude a bidder who has either offered or accepted a bribe during the procurement process, or if a conflict of interest exists [3].

According to the government reviewer, The Ministry of Defence has made all the procurement plans publicly available on its website as evidence of transparency, despite not being obliged under the PPL to publish these. In addition to the specifics of tasks and tasks, this ministry did not need or conduct procurement procedures that were exempted from the PPL itself (Please note that the MoD issued the Procurement Instruction exempted from the Law on JN in September 2018, but there were no procurement items under the same in 2019). As evidence of support for a systematic approach to data processing at the request of non-governmental organizations, the MoH provided procurement reviews, which could provide insight into more data in procurement processes than defined in the PPL. All procurement procedures are carried out transparently, in accordance with the Law on Public Procurement No. 39/14, the Rulebook on the procedure of awarding contracts in the field of defence and security No. 60/15, as well as the Rulebook on the Planning, Organization and Execution of Logistic Needs in MoD and AFBiH No: 11-02-3-3759-58/16 dated 19.02.2018.

Article 13 of the Rulebook on Procedure on Awarding Contracts in the field of Defence and Security is directly related to the disqualification based on conflict of interest and corruption and obliges contracting authority to reject the bid per Article 52 of the Law [1]. Chapters VI and VII of the Defence Law, the chapter on discipline in the Law on Service in AFBiH, the Rules of military discipline and disciplinary procedure, and the Military Code of the AFBiH define standards of conduct and professionalism as an important preventive factor in reducing the risk of corruption [2]. The MoD’s Integrity and Anti-corruption Policy, the Rules on the corruption risk assessment for jobs in the MoD, and the MoD’s 2015-2019 Integrity and Anti-corruption Plan address the issues of corruption, corruption risks and activities aimed at countering corruption. When it comes to ethics and professionalism, the Guidelines for Defence Planning, No. 06-03-8-5-5/18 dated 8 January 2018, define continued efforts aimed at prevention of and fight against corruption, strengthening integrity in defence institutions, developing and improving inspectorial capacity in defence institutions, and identifying and eliminating practices that damage the morale, efficiency and reputation of defence institutions as an activity important for the defence of the country [3].

According to the government reviewer, in order to reduce the risk of any kind of corrupt practices, the procurement procedure has been separated into several stages for a long time in the MoD. The person who performs the planning, contracting and implementation of a specific procurement cannot be on the selection committee for the same procurement case. That is, the same person cannot be engaged in planning, contracting, commissions for selection of tenderers and the actual procurement of a specific item. Moreover, transparency in the public procurement process is ensured through the publication of the PPP, amendments to the PPP and reports on signed contracts, which give complete insight into the use of budget funds, first through the full publication of planned procurement, and after contracting and through the publication of all signed contracts and the degree of their implementation.

Defence purchases are procured in line with legislation. Yearly audits of the MoD are conducted and the audit reports for the years 2016 [1], 2017 [2] and 2018 [3] show shortcomings in the application of the law in regards of respecting the set timeframe, technical specification or adequate estimate of the contract value, which demanded redistribution of resources (in 2018) or even resulting in the cancellation of the procurements (in 2017).

According to the government reviewer, in comparison with the report for 2017, there has been evident progress in the Ministry of Defence, and the Audit Office of the Institutions of BiH gave a positive opinion on the compliance of financial transactions and information in all material aspects in accordance with the law and other regulations. The purposeful and lawful use of available funds is ensured for the realization of the established program objectives of the defense institutions, which ensures the economical, efficient and effective functioning of the financial management and control system. Given that MoD is the largest budget beneficiary, it is difficult to compare these procurements with other institutions. In principle, procurement is primarily done transparently and legally, and any difficulties and possible omissions are not always caused by a failure of the contracting authority but also by market movements, as well as by limited supply on the market, and supplier actions through constant complaints, which is often brought by the contracting authority into the situation depends on the decisions of the PRB or the PPA. In principle, the MA always works in accordance with the law and works on continuous improvement of the preparation for the tender documentation through better preparation of technical specifications and market research. It should be noted here that a coordination meeting was also introduced at which a team of people works to check the TD and all its aspects in the form of technical conditions, quality control, etc.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. The PPADB and the PADB Regulations are the principal legislation on procurement, and they equally apply to defence procurement. There is no exclusive defence legislation on procurement separate from general procurement. The national legal framework against corruption includes, principally, the Corruption and Economic Crime Act (as amended) (CECA), Proceeds and Instruments of Crime Act (as amended) (PICA), Financial Intelligence Act (FI Act), Public Service Act, Electoral Act, Public Finance Management Act (PFMA), Penal Code, Whistleblowing Act, Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act (MACMA), and related government regulations, orders, circulars and instructions [1,2]. There is no express provision on defence procurement and corruption. The general legal framework on corruption equally applies to defence and security procurement. There are no controls publicly available that are in place to deal with sensitive or highly classified defence and security procurement.

Section128 of the PPADB Act provides that:
(1) Any person who contravenes the provisions of this Act shall be guilty of an offence.
(2) Where an offence under this Act, committed by a contractor or by a person purporting to act on behalf of a contractor, is proved to have been so committed with the consent, or connivance of, or to be attributable to, or to have been facilitated by, any neglect on the part of any officer or employee of that contractor, that person shall also be guilty of an offence.
(3) A person guilty of an offence under subsection (1) or (2) shall be liable to a fine not less than P10 000 but not exceeding P100 000 or, in the case of an individual, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 years or to both, such fines and imprisonment [1,2]. Defence procurement is done following procurement legislation as identified in 57A. This is readily available on the PPADB website.

Section 63 of the PPADB is titled. Special Procurement Committee and states that:
(1) The Board shall establish a Special Procurement and Asset Disposal Procurement Committee and delegate authority in writing to it, to manage the-
(a) procurement of highly-sensitive works, supplies, services and properties, or any combination thereof, however, classified for the disciplined services in respect of which confidentiality and utmost secrecy may be required for a fixed duration;
(b) items that shall be subject to procurement through this Committee shall be listed in a Schedule to the Regulations [1,2]. PPADB Regulation 3 provides that any items that may be required for exemption for purposes of national security may apply to the PPADB. If the PPADB is convinced that such an exemption is justified, that application for exemption will be granted.

Overall, the country has legislation covering defence and security procurement with clauses specific to corruption risks. There are some items exempt from these laws especially those that are classisifed in security in nature. This happens in practice as posted on the PPAD website. For example, the 2018-2019 Procurement Plans are available on the PPADB website (3).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

As previous assessments showed, most of the defence acquisitions occur under the same acquisitions law (Law 8.666/1993) [1], which is complex legislation that imposes many bureaucratic mechanisms (and burdens) to governmental institutions. This law determines a set of acquisition modes – from long and manual processes in the case of complex, expensive or international acquisitions, bidding (electronic or not) and invitation (in cases where there is only one provider with recognizable authority in the service or product). The government has been making policies to foster electronic bidding as the standard acquisition mode, leaving the other modes to be applied for, as exceptions. This standardization of electronic bidding is extended to Brazil’s Armed Forces, according to a military interviewee [2]. Regarding defence, in Article 24 of Law 8.666/93, establishes the possible exemption from public bids when: (a) there is the possibility of harming national security, in cases established by a presidential decree, with the approval of the National Defence Council (OBS1); and when (b) for the contracting of high technology related to national defence [1]. Decree 2295/97 [4], establishes bidding exemptions for warfare assets, technology development and services related to intelligence. Law 12598/2012 establishes special norms for defence acquisitions, defining important concepts such as Defence Product (Prode), Defence Strategic Product (PED), Defence Systems (SD) and Defence Strategic Company (EED) [4]. According to a military interviewee [5], the Brazilian Armed Forces have acquisition planning for many basic items, including parachutes, food and uniforms. The acquisition planning of specific and strategic projects of the Brazilian Armed Forces is generally present in the long-term contracts made with the companies that won the acquisition process.

Legislation might not explicitly mention the need to assess corruption risks, but the whole bureaucratic acquisition process in Brazil has this aim [1]. For non-defence related companies to sell to the government, they are subject to a long list of documents and certifications and previous registration [1]. Of course, in the middle of so much bureaucracy, corruption can occur; for larger acquisitions that can impact the Defence Budget, there is the need of legislative approval [2]; and there is the external control of the Court of Auditors (TCU) [3, 4].

All public procurements must be legally and publicly registered – even those which are exempt from public bidding [1]. The Submarine Development Program (PROSUB) website shows a list of exempted procurements along with their justifications [2], which can be audited by the TCU. Other defence programs also follow those rules, but the level of ‘active’ transparency varies from program to program and force to force [3]. The procurement processes are, in general, followed correctly at the federal level of government, an assertion which is not true for other levels of government [4].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

According to Article 6 of Law N° 039 (2016), this Act does not apply to contracts for works, supplies and services and public service delegations, where they relate to the needs of defence and national security that require secrecy or for which protection essential interests of the State is incompatible with publicity measures. A decree issued by the Council of Ministers specifies the rules that govern the acquisition of goods and services (1).

According to Article 6 of Law N° 039 (2016), this Act does not apply to contracts for works, supplies and services and public service delegations, where they relate to the needs of defence and national security that require secrecy or for which protection essential interests of the State is incompatible with publicity measures. A decree issued by the Council of Ministers specifies the rules that govern the acquisition of goods and services (1).

According to Article 6 of Law N° 039 (2016), this Act does not apply to contracts for works, supplies and services and public service delegations, where they relate to the needs of defence and national security that require secrecy or for which protection essential interests of the State is incompatible with publicity measures. A decree issued by the Council of Ministers specifies the rules that govern the acquisition of goods and services (1).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

The Cameroon Public Procurement Code (2018) governs procurement in Cameroon. Under Article 71, procurement relating to national defence and security are considered special contracts and not subject to the consideration of any public procurement commission [1]. There is no evidence that separate legislation exists to govern defence and security procurement, and given the lack of transparency around procurement in general [2] and defence and security specifically (owing to the Constitution), it is unlikely that such legislation exists.

Legislation that covers procurement in Cameroon exempts defence and security contracts (‘Special Contracts’) as per Article 71 of the Public Procurement Code (2018) [1].

Legislation that covers procurement in Cameroon exempts defence and security contracts (‘Special Contracts’) as per Article 71 of the Public Procurement Code (2018) [1].Therefore, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. Defence procurement is governed by four separate acts of parliament and requires the consent of four different ministers of the Crown. [1] On the topic of corruption, the Financial Administration Act [2] defers to the Criminal Code of Canada sections pertaining to ‘Frauds on the Government,’ ‘Selling defective stores to Her Majesty,’ and ‘Selling or purchasing office’. [3] [4] [5] The potential for corruption with international partners is also broadly covered by the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act. [6] These all apply broadly to the complex nature of defence procurement in Canada and provide a framework for legal action. The application to defence procurement is indirect, but still comprehensive. It also falls under the jurisdiction of section 4.2.15 of the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat’s Contracting Policy. [7]

The Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act [1] is the primary metric used to mitigate and punish potential instances of corruption. The Code of Conduct for Procurement in Canada [2] provides all those involved in the procurement process, public servants and vendors, a consolidation of GoC measures on conflict of interest and anti-corruption, and other legislative and policy requirements relating to procurements. The code also describes vendor complaints and procedural safegaurds. The Code of Service Discipline [3] makes clear that the Criminal Code which prohibits any of the elements of bribery or corruption applies to military personnel.

The Procurement Ombudsman regularly reviews practices, complaints, and facilitates dispute resolution should conflicts arise within the procurement process. [1] Investigation reports by the Office of the Procurement Ombudsman are published. [2] Exceptions to legislation on defence procurement may be infrequent, however they can occur, as with the case of Vice-Admiral Mark Norman that led to his financial settlement with National Defence prior to the Fall 2019 election, the details of which have not been made public. [3] [4] [5]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

The Chilean legal framework for the system of acquisitions and contracting in the defence and security sector has been characterised by a plurality of norms [1]. Several different mechanisms and procedures are referring to acquisitions and contracting, but there isn’t a specific legal framework addressing this. The acquisition of goods and services is regulated in accordance with its source of funding and there is much normative ambiguity on what is the applicable normative to regulate public purchases related to defence. The matter is further complicated due to a lack of regulations on the purchasing of copper, the profits of which are largely used to fund the military [2, 3, 4, 5].

The law for acquisitions or “Ley de Compras” establishes a general framework with a flexible normative body and basic rules and procedures for acquisitions and contracts in public agencies, including the Ministry of National Defence (MDN) and the armed forces [1]. Although this legislative body does not explicitly identify corruption risks in procurement, it does create mechanisms to enhance transparency and efficiency through establishing objective criteria for the procedures for contracting and adjudication as well as the basis for bidding, both public and private, and direct contract. However, this framework presents exceptions for the armed and security forces in the procurement of war materials and the contracting of services related to national and public security [2]. Likewise, for the armed and security forces, information about acquisitions and contracts considered secret, reserved or confidential will not be published in the systems of public procurement (Art. 20).

The multiplicity and dispersion of the legislation relative to acquisitions and contract in the defence sector have somewhat hindered their effective implementation. In August 2018, the Chamber of Deputies established a special commission to investigate alleged irregularities in the procurement process in the Army. The commission signalled the difficulty of specifying with exactitude the normative frame corresponding to different types of acquisitions and contracts. It was observed that not only two processes for acquisitions exist in accordance with the source of funding (i.e., the National Budget and Restricted Law of Copper), but also that there were two different processes of acquisitions within the Nation’s budget, one regulated by the Budget Law of “Ley de Compra” [1], and another by the Law on Acquisitions and Disposals in the Armed Forces [2]. In practice, this complex legislation “does not have adequate levels of systematisation that allow its correct understanding and, therefore, application” [3]. Moreover, Decree 95 [4] has given the armed forces the capacity to create internal norms and procedures which, though they cannot contradict laws (Ley 18.928, 19.886), might create spaces of opacity and discretion. Finally, the process of acquisition of war materials through the Restricted Law of Copper (Ley 13.196) has been characterised by its opacity and low accountability. The process involves multiple organisms, in which the MDN authorise and audit budget items whose acquisition process are the responsibility of the Army. The norms of the execution of the Law-Decree 124 is reserved, which constitute a risk for irregularities, as those in which individuals in the army have been involved.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

The legal framework for military procurement consists of the following set of regulations and laws: People’s Liberation Army Equipment Procurement Regulations (中国人民解放军装备采购条例), referred to as CMC Equipment Procurement Regulations), Regulations on the Management of the People’s Liberation Army Equipment Procurement Methods and Procedures (中国人民解放军装备采购方式与程序管理规定), Regulations on the Management of Competitive Equipment Purchase of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, Measures for the Administration of Confidentiality Qualification Examination and Certification of Weaponry Scientific Research and Production Units (武器装备科研生产单位保密资格审查认证管理办法, 中国人民解放军竞争性装备采购管理规定), Law of the People’s Republic of China on Tendering and Bidding (中华人民共和国招标投标法), Regulations for the Implementation of the Tendering and Bidding Law of the People’s Republic of China (中华人民共和国招标投标法实施条例) Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China (中华人民共和国合同法). The most important of these documents, the “CMC Equipment Procurement Regulations,” includes vague exceptions on confidentiality grounds which undermine transparency (articles 23 and 24). The National Military Secrecy Qualification Certification Committee is responsible for classifying procurement in terms of confidentiality but this is an internal organ without any oversight (parliamentary or judicial) as a result the process involves a high degree of discretion. [1,2,3]

The CMC Equipment Procurement Regulations make reference to conducting procurement with honesty (article 6) and to a commitment to punishing abuse of power, collusion, embezzlement of procurement funds, and falsification of reports on the quality of the equipment (Article 62). [1,2] There is little emphasis on preventing or mitigating risks.

There is no transparency in this regard. However, the fact that there was extensive corruption in the former General Logistics Department, [1,2,3] which was in charge of procurement until 2016, demonstrates that despite the existence of regulations and relevant laws, the military operates under very limited external scrutiny, which increases the likelihood of corruption. There are various online notices by companies and research institutions announcing that they passed the audit requirements of the SASTIND to participate in procurement, [4,5,6] which provides some evidence of effectiveness.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. In Colombia, there is extensive legislation related to the State contracting process, including Law 80 of 1993 or General Statute for Public Procurement and Law 1150 of 2007, which introduces measures for efficiency and transparency in contracting processes with public resources. [1, 2] These are complemented or expanded with other Laws and Decrees, including: Decree 4881 of 2008, Decree 931 of 2009, Decree 2474 of 2008, Decree 327 of 2002, Decree 2170 of 2002, Decree 4170 of 2011, Decree 1082 of 2015, Decree 1083 of 2015, and Law 598 of 2000. [3, 4] According to the OECD, despite having extensive regulations for state contracting, flaws persist around said system in Colombia. Improvements include a) the need to simplify and unify the regulations, due to the existence of an extensive regulatory body dispersed in several laws, which prevents a simple and adequate understanding of the parameters of state contracting for both public buyers and suppliers; b) evaluation and selection criteria for contracts, conflict resolution in the pre-contractual stage, and elimination of conflicts of interest; and c) reformulation and analysis of the economic aspects of the state contract, especially regarding the materialisation of the economic balance. [5] According to Interviewee 5, [6] there is regulatory fragmentation around hiring, transparency, and anti-corruption, which makes it difficult for public officials to act. The National Agency for Public Procurement, ‘Colombia Buys Efficiently,’ has assumed the codification of goods and services related to defence and national security in accordance with the standard code of products and services of the United Nations. [7] These assets are classified based on segment, family, class, and product. Defence sector assets are classified in the end-use products group; segment includes equipment and supplies for defence, public order, protection, surveillance and security; and family includes light weapons and ammunition, conventional weapons of war, missiles, rockets and subsystems, launchers, etc. [8, 9] The country has legislation that covers the state contracting process and that recognizes purchases from the defence and national security sector, but there are flaws in its implementation, such as regulatory fragmentation and continuous complaints regarding corruption in acquisitions by the Armed Forces and the Police. [10, 11, 12, 13]

Colombian law recognizes the risks of corruption that may arise in the contracting and procurement processes and has implemented regulations dealing with and mitigating such risks. Law 80 of 1993, [1] Law 1150 of 2007, [2] and Decree 734 of 2012 [3] outline foreseeable risks, such as circumstances that arise during the development and execution of the contract and that alter the economic balance of the contract. [4] Law 1150 of 2007 works to mitigate these risks by creating the SECOP or Electronic System for Public Procurement. Law 1474 of 2011 or the Anti-Corruption Statute, [5] defines the provisions to prevent and combat corruption in public procurement. Decree Law 19 of 2012 or the Anti-Process Act, [6] develops a series of provisions for the verification of the conditions of the bidders who aspire to enter into contracts with state entities. Decree 1510 of 2013 regulates the contracting and procurement system. [7] In addition, there are other regulations related to morality and corruption in the public administration, including Law 190 of 1995 [8] and Law 734 of 2002 [9] among others. For the identification of the risks of corruption and its mitigation, the Anti-Corruption Statute clearly states that all public entities must create an Anti-Corruption and Citizen Care Plan, which include a corruption risk map and outline concrete measures to mitigate them. [5]

There is Not Enough Information to score this indicator. Purchases in the defence sector and in the respective forces are made in accordance with the current regulations Law 80 of 1993, [1] Decree 1510 of 2013, [2] and Decree 1082 of 2015. [3] By law, these entities carry out and publish a purchase or acquisition plan annually. [2] The purchase plan is evident on the websites of the Ministry and the Military Forces and the Police. The entities of the defence sector also produces a contracting manual, and the Ministry of Defence has a procurement manual which defines contractual management and establishes the tasks of said process. [4] While regulations exist, it is difficult to assess whether they are followed in practice.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

On the website of the National Procurement Regulatory Authority (Autorité Nationale de Régulation des Marchés Publics, ANRMP), there are 15 different decrees from June 10, 2014, to November 7, 2018, covering different aspects of public procurement, as well as ANRMP oversight. None of the decrees are specific to the defence and security sector (1). The ANRMP website also has a page dedicated to laws and executive orders regulating aspects of public procurement and ANRMP oversight. These documents date from December 31, 1959, to June 27, 2018. However, there are no laws or executive orders specific to regulating defence and security procurement. The only legislation cited that is related to corruption is Order No. 2013-650 (Relative à la prévention et la lutte contre la corruption) (2).

The 2009 Code of Public Procurement (Décret No. 2009-259, Portant Code des Marchés Publics) incorporates WAEMU Directives on the awarding, executing, monitoring and regulating of public procurement. But it is not specific to purchases for the defence and security sector. Article 8 of the Code exempts purchases covering confidential or secret items (3):

“Art. 8 – Exclusions
This Code does not apply to supplies and services contracts related to national defence and security requirements that require secrecy or for which the protection of essential State interests is incompatible with public dissemination” (3).

Finally, the 2009 Code of Public Procurement also fails to include clauses specific to corruption risks. Based on the evidence on the ANRMP website, Côte d’Ivoire has no defence-specific legislation covering this type of purchases.

Côte d’Ivoire has no defence-specific legislation covering this type of public procurement, as shown in 57A.

Côte d’Ivoire has no legislation regulating defence and security procurement. Therefore this indicator is marked Not Applicable.

Since there is no defence-specific legislation and Art. 8 in the Code of Public Procurement exempts all secret/confidential items related to national security from ANRMP oversight, the State’s actual defence purchases do not conform to any decrees, laws or executive orders.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Procurement within the defence sector is subject to both EU and national legislation on public tenders. The EU Directive on public procurement [1] is implemented via Danish legislation on public tenders (“Udbudsloven”) [2]. The Danish legislation includes a detailed description of its scope of application, where e.g. services and material procurements under a certain value are subject to different regulations, and how these correspond to EU directives. Generally, and according to the law, defence purchases are made as either public tenders, so-called limited tenders (“begrænset udbud”) and tenders with negotiation (“udbud med forhandling”) [3] (see Q64 on more information on the three different types of tenders). Exceptions in national law refers to the EU legal act on public tenders and to Directive 2009/81/EC on the coordination of procedures for the award of certain works contracts, supply contracts and service contracts within the fields of defence and security [4]. This means that the law on public tenders does not apply to procurement of military equipment as defined by Directive 2009/81/ECk while contracts that do not fall under this category can be exempted when they concern national security [5]. A range of related EU and national regulations oblige e.g. tenders of public construction tasks [6] to put operations and construction tasks out to regular competition [7] and regulations on concession contracts [8]. These appear less directly relevant to the defence and national security purchases, but enter into the collective legislation on public procurement. All in all this is highly comprehensive legislation. The Ministry of Defence Acquisition and Logistics Organisation (DALO) report that, while the EU legislation does make room for avoiding both public, limitied and negotiated tenders on some national security purchases, DALO will use this exception only after restrictive and close interpretation of the law [9]. There is evidence that considerations of national security have been invoked to avoid the rules stipulated by the EU, but this remains exceptional and is usually justified with reference to urgent operational requirements or national security. A recent example was the decision to grant a contract for operating the readiness search and rescue (SAR) helicopters in Greenland without offering it in a public tender [10].

Legislation only superficially recognises the risk of corruption. National law makes reference to “conflict of interests” by stating that a tender has to make appropriate arrangements to identify, prevent and remedy conflict of interests [1]. It further states that no differential treatment must be made between bidders from Denmark and EU member states [2]. Further, the law introduces a requirement that all communication has to be in writing or documented properly when oral [3]. The EU Directive on contracting in the fields of defence and security and the EU Directive on public tenders state that member states shall avoid giving contracts to persons/economic operators who have participated in a criminal organisation or have been found guilty of corruption or fraud to the detriment of the financial interests of the European communities [4, 5]. In sum, there is no specific articulation of bribery risks neither in general nor in relation to defence and security tenders and bidders. However, collectively the EU and national law build on principles of equal treatment, fair competition and transparency. Measures foreseen in the legal framework mitigate corruption risks, including risk of bribery, conflict of interests and collusion.

As stated in Q57A, the EU Directive on public procurement is implemented through Danish legislation on public tenders (“Udbudsloven”) [1]. DALO states that some procurements are planned years in advance while others appear acutely, but collective for all procurements is the fact that they all have to strictly follow current national and EU legislation [2]. Research did not find any indications that legislation is bypassed [3]. As reported in Q57A, there is evidence that considerations of national security have been invoked to avoid the rules stipulated by the EU [4], but this remains exceptional and is usually justified with reference to urgent operational requirements or national security, which complies with the regulations

This is indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

According to our sources, no procurement law specifically targets the military and defence sector. However, there are procedural tools within the MoD, but it does not amount to the level of a legal framework. All the present procurement laws are not applied to the defence sector, as the MoD and the army have several economic areas that cover almost every procurement aspect (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7).

There no legal framework for defense and military procurement,.

As there is no legal framework for defense and military procurement, this sub-indicator is marked Not Applicable.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

The Public Procurement Act covers procurement in the national defence and security sector. It stipulates that the contracting authority establishes internal procurement rules if the estimated total value of the proposed acquisition of supplies and proposed provision of services in a budgetary year exceeds 80,000 euros or the estimated total value of proposed works exceeds 500,000 euros. [1]

In the case of defence procurement, there are also the Defence Minstry’s Procurement Rules. They explain how the procurement is planned, the documentation and technical descriptions, how the procurement is arranged, analysed and processed, the contract terms. There is also a section that describes exemptions stating that the procurer in those cases do not need to follow the rules stated in the document. It states that the decision on the exemption in the procurement procedure is made by the head of the ministry, institution or a person authorised by them. The Defence Investment Center coordinates the exemption with the appropriate legislature. [2]

In 2014 the European Parliament and the Council of Europe approved directives in the area of public procurement, which made multiple changes to the defence procurement procedure in Estonia. [3] The aim of those directives was to make defence and national security procurement procedures clearer and more transparent. For example, it included that the only exemption the governments can make use of when explaining the reasons for secrecy in the defence sector is Article 346(1)(b). It allows “any member state to take such measures as it considers necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its security.” [4]

The Ministry of Finance exercises state and administrative supervision over compliance under the Public Procurement Act. [1] The new legislation elaborates on the Ministry of Finance’s activities in case of corruption and suspicion of an offence. The Ministry of Finance has the right to give recommendations and guidelines to prevent breaches of the act. As public procurement is one of the most corruption sensitive areas due to the amount of public money involved and the discretion of decision-makers, it has the right to closely cooperate with an investigative body, the Prosecutor’s Office and other governmental and local authorities to prevent corruption cases. [2]

The Defence Ministry’s Procurement Rules serve as the main procurement principals, but don’t include anything about corruption or ethics. [3]

The Public Procurement Act includes corruption in paragraphs about procurement procedures in general. For example, ‘unacceptable or irregular tender’ means a tender that has been submitted as a result of a prohibited agreement, a concerted practice or a decision of an association to undertake a restriction of competition, or corruption. [4]

To prevent corruption cases, the Ministry of Finance may cooperate with an investigative body, the Prosecutor’s Office, other governmental authorities and local authorities within the limits of its duties, tasks, functions and authority. The substance of cooperation lies in, above all, communication and exchange of information between authorities and in coordination of activities, the Public Procurement Act stipulates. [5]

Therefore, even though the legislation acknowledges the corruption risks, clear and comprehensive risk mitigation procedures are missing.

A Centre for Defence Investments was established at the beginning of 2017. [1] It accumulated all defence-related procurements into a single organisation. The National Defence Committee of the Riigikogu cooperates with the centre. The head of the committee has stated that the centre makes public procurement in the defence sector more corruption free. [2] Overall, the procurement procedure is followed, although there may be exceptions, as assessed by an expert interviewed. [3] The procurement procedure became more “organised”, as assessed by the interviewee. There are more institutions and people who scrutinise the procedure. The reason for creating the Centre for Defence Investiments was to separate procurement from the Defence Forces’ institutions to avoid instances where the contracting authority is also the tenderer (which sometimes used to be the case). People wouldn’t even realise that it was problematic. It doesn’t happen anymore after the establishment of the centre. One of the critical points, however, is that they both fall under the same ministry, the Ministry of Defence. According to an interviewee, they both have different responsibilities and “registry codes”, which creates a physical framework for avoiding the same people being responsible for two different tasks that would lead to a conflict of interest. At the same time, the interviewee does admit that none of the rules can be followed correctly down to the last detail. “Mistakes do happen,” he concludes. Overall, the system functions. The National Audit Office scrutinises procurement annually.
There is a thorough auditing process in place and there is no evidence that breaches of legislation have happened, at least not that is publicly available, as pointed out by the National Audit Office. [4]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

The Act on Public Defence and Security Procurement (and EU Directives) covers most of defence and security procurement. However, according to chapter 2, section 6: If procurement contracts cover multiple functions, under certain conditions the contracting unit may decide to apply the Act on Public Procurement and User Agreements [1]. Instead of this Act; Chpt 2, section 7 states: This Act is not applied to secret procurement or to procurement in situations in which applying this Act would obligate the contracting unit to release information against national interest, to procurement between authorities, and to procurement between the state of Finland and at least one state outside the European Economic Area (EEA) that is covered by the prodecural rules of an international agreement or of another arrangement, to procurement covered by the procedural rules of an international agreement or of another arrangement concerning troop placement, to procurement carried out by an international organization for its own purposes and covered by its own procedural rules, to procurement covered by the procedural rules of an international organization when the contracting unit is obligated to follow those rules, to procurement that relates to a shared R&D project (to create a new product) that involves at least two EEA member states or to procurement that relates to the later stages of the lifecycle of this product, and to procurement carried out when sending troops outside the EEA zone and when for operational reasons the agreement has to be done with an actor operating in the target area.

Furthermore, this Act is not applied to procurement carried out by a contracting unit that does not cross the European Union value threshold, specified by section 12 of this Act (= 400 000 euros in the procurement of goods and services, 5 000 000 euros in construction projects); to procurement for carrying out a function which according to the Act on Procurement and User Agreements with regard to Contracting Units Operating in the Fields of Water and Energy Supply, Traffic and Postal Services [2] (and confirmed by the European Commission) open to free competition. Chpt 2, Section 8: This Act is neither applied to intelligence-related procurement, nor to procurement that relates to the acquisition or renting of land, buildings or other real estate regardless of the form of financing (including services related to the rights of using these real estate), to arbitration or mediation services, to financing services (excluding insurance services), to employment contract, and to R&D services unless the benefit generated by those services is gained solely by the contracting unit and is fully financed by it. [3]

According to Act on Public Defence and Security Procureement, chpt 2, section 9: Procurement from a unit tied to the contracting unit. This Act is not applied to defence and security procurement carried out by a contracting unit from a unit that is formally separate and independent in its decision making, if the contracting unit – alone or in cooperation with other contracting units – monitors this unit in the same manner as it monitors its own branches and if this unit mainly operates with the contracting unit(s) under which control it is.

Act on Public Defence and Security Procurement regulates the procurement process from the inital value estimations of the contract to the final selection of the supplier(s), the possible dispute procedure and the consequences when the procurement process fails. It also regulates on the conditions under which a tenderer may or must be excluded from the process:

Chpt 8, section 46: a candidate or a tendered must be excluded from the bid, the adequacy of candidates and tenderers otherwise evaluated, and the tenderers compared with one another according to the following sections (47-56) before evaluating the offers;

Chpt 8, Section 47: A contracting unit must exclude a candidate or a tenderer from the bid, if it is aware that the candidate or tenderer or a person in its management/a representative/a decision maker/a supervisor has been convicted for any of the following offences (marking in the national crime register) (specified in the Criminal Code of Finland [1]): participation in the activities of an organised crime organization; bribery; tax evasion, subsidy fraud, misuse of a subsidy; terrorism motivated crime or preparing for such a crime, running a terrorist organization, facilitation of the operations of a terrorist group, giving training for a terrorism motivated crime / recruitment for it / incitement for it / assising in it / attepting any of the aforementioned terrorism related crimes; money laundering or funding of terrorism; extortion type of occupational discrimination.

The contracting unit must also exclude a candidate or a tenderer who in another country has been convicted for crimes similar to the aforementioned; in EU member states the similar crimes are stated in EU law. An exemption to this exclusion obligation may be done for a compelling reason related to the common interest or because the convicted person no longer has a position with responsibility in the company that has done the offer. Chpt 8, section 48: A contracting unit may exclude a candidate or a tenderer from the bid because of its bankcruptcy, dismantlement or halting of its business operations or because its debts have been settled in a law enabled process; because its bankcruptcy or dismantlement or other arrangement is pending; because it has been convicted for a wrongful act in carrying out its business e.g. breaking the law on export control; because it has committed a grave mistake in its business operations such as breaking the obligations related to information security or security of supply or a similar violation of contract terms earlier that can be proven by the contracting unit; because its trustworthiness and accountability has been evaluated as insufficient to the extent that it cannot be concluded that this would not be a risk to national security; because it has failed its obligations to pay taxes or social security payments; or because it has given significantly wrong or misleading information when providing information on the aforementioned topics to the contracting unit or it has neglected the duty to provide such information. Further sections of the act regulate the process and the sources of information of carrying out an evaluation of the adequacy of the candidate or the tenderer, information security requirements that the candidates and tenderers must fulfil, and the conditions for candidate and/or tenderer grouping. [2]

Beyond the aforementioned,t he legislation does not include reference to corruption risks. However, it works on the assumption that other legislation is duly followed, such that acts of corruption do not take place.

Defence and security procurement generally follows the law. What has occasionally been considered problematic is the so called “direct procurement” which, nonetheless, takes place according to the law. [1] Direct procurement with its justifications (i.e. reasons why direct procurement takes place in this particular case instead of an open competition) are listed in the Hilma-portal. [2] It may also be justifiable from the military security of supply perspective. [3] However, occasionally the decisions to carry out direct procurement instead of an open competition have been questioned, for example, in the media. [4,5]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

European Union Directive 2009/81/EC modified national laws on the markets of the various member States. In fact, the Defence Security Directive plans the establishment of a system of appeal for illegal markets or contracts concluded in breach of the Directive. In order to ensure compliance with the transparency and competitive bidding requirements, “in particular, provision should be made for the possibility of challenging the award procedure before the contract is signed and the guarantees necessary for the effectiveness of the remedy, such as suspension (…) direct or indirect contracts concluded in breach of this Directive”. [1]
But these latter measures must be put into perspective and must take into account “the protection of the defence and security interests of member States as regards the functioning of appeal bodies, the choice of interim measures or the penalties for repressing violations of transparency and competitive bidding requirements”.
In practice, national law dominates, and in France secrecy applies to Defence and Security procurements, despite the EU directive of 2009.

Defence and security procurements are treated with a certain delicacy, particularly for national interest motives. At this level, documents or information are subject to a high level of classification in which are generally included only the State and public institutions referring to it and evolving in a sphere neither commercial nor industrial. This is supported by Order n°2015-899 of July 23, 2015 dealing with public procurement, [2] and enhanced by a 2016 specific decree applying to defence and security procurements. [3] In this sense, local authorities and other public institutions are therefore outside this circle. To another extent, it is common for a security contract to be awarded without advertising or competitive bidding. If there is to be publicity, it must not be prejudicial to the confidential nature of the contract. It is therefore not exceptional for this kind of tendering to be done through a negotiated procedure without publicity.

France does have legislation that covers Defence and security procurement with a superficial mention of corruption risks:
Article 45 of Order n°2015-899 of July 23, 2015 on public procurements [1] states that people/companies guilty of the following crimes – sale and trafficking of drugs, money laundering, forgery and use of forgery, criminal conspiracy, terrorist acts, corruption, embezzlement – are excluded from public procurements.
Article 46 addresses Defence and Security Procurements in particular: are excluded from public procurement all people/companies who have been found guilty of violating professional secrecy, endangering the State’s security (including by breaking the national defence secret), or have been sentenced for the manufacture and trade in weapons.

But because of the rule of “secret défense” and the exception to procurement rules, markets can be allocated by the Ministry of the Armed Forces without competition between bidders. [2] This allows scandals such as the ICS case to happen: [3] the subcontractor was allocated big contracts without proper competition in the bidding process, and overcharged for its services to the Ministry.

With secrecy applying to defence and security procurements, it is hard to say whether exceptions are a few or numerous. We can however say that independent institutions such as the PNF do keep an eye on procurements, and can prosecute cases, like the ICS case, [1] and that after thorough research, examples of corruption cases were scarce.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Germany has clear, comprehensive, detailed and strict legislation that covers all defence and national security purchases. Article 87b of the German Basic Law assigns the task of directly fulfilling the procurement needs of the Armed Forces to the Federal Defence Administration [1]. The contracts required for providing the necessary equipment to the Armed Forces are awarded to industry, trade and commerce by the designated civilian authorities of the Federal Defence Administration, in compliance with the following awarding regulations and directives: the Act against Restraints of Competition (GWB) [2]; the Ordinance on the Award of Public Contracts (VgV) [3]; the Public Procurement Ordinance for Contracts in the Field of Defence and Security (VSVgV) [4]. These are the foundations on which central procurement under the responsibility of the Federal Office of Bundeswehr Equipment, Information Technology and In-Service Support (BAAINBw) is based. Central procurement means that the entire demand of the armed services is jointly determined and procured [4].

The basic procurement rules for defence and security contracts above the EU thresholds are set forth in Part IV of the German Act Against Restraints for Competition (GWB). Details of procedure are provided by the Public Procurement Regulation for Contracts in the Field of Defence and Security and, in the case of construction works, Section 3 of the Procurement Rules for Public Works (VOB/A) [5]. These rules implement EU Directive 2009/81/EC into German law. Procurement contracts in the field of defence and security that exceed the EU thresholds and are not covered by the Public Procurement Regulation for Contracts in the Field of Defence and Security shall be regulated by the Ordinance on the Award of Public Contracts (VgV) [6]. The award of defence and security contracts below the EU thresholds is governed by federal or state budgetary law, the Procurement Rules for Contracts Below the EU Thresholds and, in the case of construction works, Section 1 of the VOB/A. In the case of state procurement, state procurement laws and regulations may also be applicable. Procurement of armaments within the framework of the European Defence Agency (EDA) is subject to the EDA procurement rules, in particular Council Decision (EU) 2016/1353 [4].

The procurement needs of the Armed Forces are organised by the ‘Bundesamt für Ausrüstung, Informationstechnik und Nutzung’ (Federal Office of Bundeswehr Equipment, Information Technology and In-Service Support – BAAINBw) [1] in accordance with Article 87b of the German Basic Law [2].

The Federal Government Directive Concerning the Prevention of Corruption in the Federal Administration and the implementing provision of the Ministry of Defence also apply to this federal office and therefore to all procurement issues [3,4].

For example, this Directive requests the identification of areas of corruption risk. The law, which is based on international regulations such as the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Government Procurement (WTO GPA) and the EU’s Directive 2009/81/EC, allows certain exceptions in the field of security and defence, for example: the Act against Restraints of Competition (GWB) does not apply to certain defence procurements, but according to Section 145 of the GWB, this does not exclude the procurement from the Directive [5]. Additionally, there is an array of specific regulations for defence procurement that include anti-corruption measures within the Customer Product Management regulation (CPM).

Germany has legislation that covers defence and security procurement with mentions of corruption risks. Corruption risks are recognised and comprehensive provisions are made clear to mitigate these risks. For instance, according to Article 8 of the Regulation on the Award of Public Contracts, which applies to the open procedure, if a procurement procedure other than the standard procedure is used, the reasons for selecting the respective type of procedure must also be documented [6]. Processes and regulations are set up in a very clear, professional and transparent way, so that corruption risks are extensively minimised – anti-corruption regulations are inherent in procurement laws and corruption risks are taken into consideration. Furthermore, Germany has committed to ‘zero Tolerance of corruption, wherever it exists’, which also refers to public procurement [7].

However, these regulations only refer to procurement within the country. In general, it is assumed that corruption is not very common in Germany and that it is more of an issue in other countries. There is not enough pressure against corruption, either within Germany or in relation to other countries [8]. ‘Germany has a strong anti-corruption system relying on adequate administrative capacity, effective oversight mechanisms and law enforcement. The success of this anti-corruption approach also covers public procurement. The perception of corruption in public procurement is low, even though some weaknesses persist notably in the area of major construction works. The 2004 Guidelines for the Prevention of Corruption introduced several preventive measures in public procurement that apply to federal bodies. These include the separation of the three phases of the procurement process, i.e. the preparation and planning phase, the actual purchasing, and the billing and settlement phase. Also the ‘four-eyes principle’ and the regular rotation of personnel were implemented. If the contracting authority opts for any procedure other than the open procedure, the decision has to be documented. In addition, some federal states keep track of bidders that have been excluded from procurement procedures. While public procurement remains an area of vulnerability according to the 2013 Report on the Prevention of Corruption in the Federal Administration, no actual cases of procurement-related corruption were reported in that year. In fact, many efforts are made at the federal level to prevent corruption. For instance, a corruption risk monitoring tool is used to assess corruption risks of a given activity, notably procurement. If an activity qualifies as vulnerable, risk mitigation measures are adopted, e.g. background checks of newly hired employees. Moreover, the Ministry of the Interior regularly performs checks of on-going tender procedures both at random and based on tip-offs from whistle-blowers. In order to maximise the effectiveness of oversight, it is empowered to directly access procurement records without having to notify, and indeed without being detected by, the contracting authority’ [9, 10].

Defence purchases are procured in line with legislation, although there are a few minor exceptions. Sometimes rules are bypassed, including because the contracts are genuinely incomplete between seeker and provider or because flexibility is needed (in contracts). In fact, legal frameworks are heavily shaped by complaints from private entrepreneurship [1]. ‘Germany is bound by EU and GPA procurement rules. Following the implementation of EU Directive 2009/81/EC on contracts in the fields of defence and security into German law, German contracting authorities generally apply these rules to military and nonmilitary security procurement. However, in a significant number of cases, in particular in the field of armament procurement, the national security exemption and the exemption for armament pursuant to Article 346 TFEU are still used. In light of strict court review, and due to a change of political climate, the use of these exemptions is declining. For example, in 2015 the German military started the procurement of four newly developed battleships (MKS 180s) using an EU-wide negotiated procedure with publication of a contract notice’ [2]. However, the continued presence of exceptions to the EU Directive allows tenders to be restricted to national providers and contracts to be directly awarded when it is deemed in the interest of national security by the government to do so [3].

In general, public procurement remains a major challenge to integrity in Germany; the so-called ‘consultant-scandal’ (‘Berateraffäre’) is one of several scandals that have affected trust in institutions such as Parliament and the Ministry of Defence in recent months, especially concerning the Ministry of Defence’s practices of hiring external consultants. One important step towards improving integrity in procurement is the introduction of a Competition Register and the increased focus on a shift towards eProcurement.

In July 2017, the Competition Register Act (‘Gesetz zur Einführung eines Wettbewerbsregisters’) was approved, which stipulates the development of a digital, pan-German debarment register. This register will allow procuring agencies to monitor and potentially ban critical firms charged with offences (bribery, money laundering or terrorism financing) from bidding for public contracts [4]. The Bundeskartellamt (Federal Cartel Office) is currently engaged in the process of building such a register, which is expected to be operational in 2020 and supported by a staff of 30 FTE. It will ultimately replace the registers maintained at Länder level [5].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Public procurement in Ghana is regulated by the Public Procurement Act (2003) (1). The legislation covers all MDAs, including the Ministry of Defence and GAF. Additionally, the MOD established the Defence Tender Committee, which is mandated to review and approve all procurement activity in the MOD.

There are significant exemptions, in so far as the legislation (Sections 35- 40 of the Act) provides that two procurement methods can be used; (i) tendering (competitive, two-stage, restricted) and (ii) single-source procurement. The single-source procurement can be used by any procurement entity for exceptional reasons (2).

The Public Procurement Act recognises the risks of corruption. Section 93 of the Act states that “entities and participants in a procurement process shall, in undertaking procurement activities, abide by the provisions of article 284 of the Constitution. An act amounts to a corrupt practice if so construed within the meaning of corruption as defined in the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29)” (1).

Article 284 of the Constitution of Ghana states that “a public officer shall not put himself in a position where his personal interest conflicts or is likely to conflict with the performance of the functions of his office”; while the definition of corruption incorporated in the Criminal Code is broad and consistent (see question 44).

The Public Procurement Authority is the institution mandated with ensuring efficiency and transparency in public procurement, including in the GAF (1).

However, the exception provided by the Procurement Act, “national security concerns”, which allows the GAF to procure directly from a single-source is broad (2). There are also gaps between the stated strategic need of the GAF and the actual procurements practice. The lack of competitive tendering has resulted in numerous reports of losses of funds (3).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. The country has clear and comprehensive legislation covering defence and security procurement. Article 72 of Law 3433/2006 on armed forces defence material procurement set up the General Directorate for Defence Investments and Armaments (GDDIA). The GDDIA is responsible for the planning and implementation of defence programmes. Executive Order 73/2006 describes the structure, responsibilities, and staffing of the GDDIA [1, 2]. With respect to public procurement, it should be noted that the legal framework varies depending on whether it is military or non-military procurement. Military procurements from 2011 onwards are regulated by Law 3978/2011 as amended by Law 4407/2016. Law 3978/2011 transposes Directive 81/2009/EC into the national legal framework [3].
Further, Ministerial Decision No 249748/19-10-08 regulates General and Special Terms of Procurement of Defence Material [4]

The existing legislation only superficially recognises the risks of corruption in the Armed Forces and the security services as it does not explicitly describe the relevant risks. The GDDIA as an agency has attracted more attention due to major scandals happening in the early 2000s [1, 2].

In general, defence equipment is procured according to the existing legislation [1, 2]. There are only minor exceptions to the processes described by law regarding procurements of minor importance. These exceptions are permitted only for certain purposes (e.g. managing a security emergency) and take place occasionally. Procurement is often funded by the so-called secret funds of the ministry. For example, in March 2018, the Director of the GDDIA’s Directorate of Defence Programmes and Principal Contracts Brigadier Michail Papadakis was discharged by the Council of the Chiefs of the General Staff (SAGE). Papadakis tried to stop the sale of Greek defence equipment to Saudi Arabia because a middleman was involved [3]. Additionally, In February 2017, the Greek newspaper Efimerida ton Sintakton revealed a scandal involving active and retired officers who supplied the Armed Forces with clothing and footwear. Some of them were serving in the Hellenic Army’s Ordnance Corps [2, 4].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

The country has clear and comprehensive legislation that covers all defence and national security purchases – in line with the European Directive – but there are exemptions, mainly related to confidentiality or secrecy – however, these exemptions are also in line with the European Directive [1]. The Law on Public Procurement [2] includes paragraph (9. §) on possibility exclude procurements from the subject on this law based on security reasons The process on how to exclude a procurement from open tenders is described in the 492/2015 (XII. 30.) Governmental Decree on the conditions and process of excluding selected procurements by the parliament [3]. Based on the law on military procurements [4] government also issued a governmental decree referring to the EU legislation (and in line with that) on the exact list of military equipment subject to procurement according to the law [5].

In the country’s legislation, corruption risks are tackled in line with the European Directives [1]. However, it is very broad. As the law provides an opportunity to exclude procurement, the government is using it in all cases when important procurements are taking place. Legislators recognize several potential risks [2] not covered by the law, many of them used in procurements in other fields (like unrealistically low prices without an objective description of how to measure that).

Generally, the enforcement of public procurement rules in Hungary has been weak, despite the relatively strong/good laws. The XXX/2016 law [1] is used as an opportunity to run every defence-related procurement in full secrecy with the lack of transparency. However, as the procurement of civilian aeroplanes for military transport proved, the government is capable to misuse existing legislation [2]. The controlling function would be in the hand of the Defence Committee; however, the government’s majority renders the process superficial. A detailed article covers how the government misuses legislation [3].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

As part of the implementation of the report of the Group of Ministers on reforming the National Security System, new Defence Procurement Management Structures and Systems were set up in the MoD in 2001. In order to implement the provisions laid out in the new Defence Procurement Management Structures and Systems, the Defence Procurement Procedure – 2002 (DPP-2002) came into effect from December 2002 and was applicable for procurements flowing out of ‘Buy’ decision of Defence Acquisition Council (DAC). The scope was enlarged in June 2003 to include procurements flowing out of ‘Buy and Make’ through Imported Transfer of Technology (ToT) decision. The DPP has since been revised in 2005, 2006, 2008, 2009, 2011 and 2013, enhancing the scope to include ‘Make’, ‘Buy and Make (Indian)’ categories, Offsets and Ship Building procedure. This DPP was revised once more in March 2016, and the Ministry of Defence (MoD) is determined to treat DPP 2016 as a dynamic and an evolving document and is committed to making improvements based on emerging data and anecdotal evidence, to realise the vision of ‘Make in India’ in the defence sector [1][2].

Defence procurement in Indian is governed by policy and not legislation. The Constitution of India does not contain provisions for public procurement despite its importance. There exists some State-wise legislature such as Karnataka and its Karnataka Transparency in Public Procurement Act, 1999 but Parliament has yet to pass central legislation [3].

Despite this absence of legislation, there are General Financial Rules (GFR) 2017, manuals and a strong focus on Integrity Pacts [4][5][6]. Public Procurement must conform to the Canons of Financial Propriety under Rule 21 of the GFR. The Code of Integrity for Public Procurement (CIPP) must be followed by the procuring authorities, bidders, suppliers, contractors and consultants. Prohibited practices in the CIPP comprehensively cover corrupt practice, fraudulent practice, anti-competitive practice, coercive practice, obstructive practice and conflict of interest. Indulgence in any of the aforementioned can lead to punitive measures such as cancellation of contracts in parallel to legal provisions that are applicable [7]. The provisions of Integrity Pacts are covered by central legislation such as the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act, 2018 and the Indian Penal Code 1860 [8].

In order to mitigate corruption risks, ensure transparency, accountability and probity in defence procurement, the following steps have been taken in the DPP-2016:

The DPP-2016 envisages signing of an Integrity Pact between Government and the bidders for all capital procurement / schemes of Rs. 20 crores and above as against the earlier provision of signing of such a pact only in cases involving Rs. 100 cores and above. DPP-2016 provides that all vendors including foreign vendors disclose full details of any such person, party, firm or institution engaged by them for marketing of their equipment in India, either on a country specific basis or as a part of a global or regional arrangement. DPP 2016 further requires that the Seller confirms and declares to the Buyer that it is the original manufacturer of the stores contracted and that no agent has been engaged to influence or manipulate award of the contract, or indulge in corrupt and unethical practices. Penal provisions are included in Standard Clauses of Contract. Submission of Integrity Pact Bank Guarantee (IPBG) is also essential. Violation of Pre-Contract Integrity Pact (PCIP) may result in calling off negotiations, cancellation of contract, encashment of the bank guarantee and debarment from future procurement. Ascertaining vigilance status of L1 vendor before seeking Competent Financial Authority (CFA) approval is also prescribed in DPP-2016 [1][2]. The provisions of Integrity Pacts are covered by central legislation such as the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act, 2018 and the Indian Penal Code 1860.

As alluded to earlier, prohibited practices in the CIPP comprehensively cover corrupt practice, fraudulent practice, anti-competitive practice, coercive practice, obstructive practice and conflict of interest. Indulgence in any of the aforementioned can lead to punitive measures such as cancellation of contracts in parallel to legal provisions that are applicable [3].

In September 2018, DAC discussed and approved several amendments to DPP-16, to further streamline the procurement process and reduce timelines [4][5].

Defence purchases are generally to be procured in accordance with the DPP-2016 [1]. Procurement must conform to the Canons of Financial Propriety under Rule 21 of the GFR and the CIPP must be followed by the procuring authorities, bidders, suppliers, contractors and consultants [2][3].

There is evidence to suggest that the policy guidelines are usually followed but there can be discrepancies. At the end of 2017, India cancelled a $500 million deal to develop Spike anti-tank guided missiles with an Israeli defence firm. The apparent reason for cancellation was that the Israeli firm expressed reservations in ensuring full Transfer of Technology (ToT) as per the ‘Make in India’ initiative requirements [4]. It was reported in 2018 that the deal was ‘back on’ [5].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

As a basic rule, arms procurement is exempt from general procurement regulations [1] and is regulated separately by Law No. 16/2012 on Defence Industry [2]. This law stipulates a) the prioritisation of national procurement and b) the mandatory countertrade, offset and local content in cases of procurement from abroad. It does not broach the subject of corruption risk. The mechanism for arms procurement is further regulated by ministry-level regulations, namely Minister of Defence Regulations (Permenhan) No. 17/2014 and No. 46/2016 [3,4] for the Ministry of Defence and TNI and Chief of Police Regulation No. 10/2015 [5] for the police. None of these regulations address the issue of confidential/secret items.

Law No.16/2012 on Defence Industry, the highest-level piece of legislation that regulates arms procurement, does not mention the risk of corruption at all. Risk of corruption is only mentioned once in Articles 1 and 66 of Minister of Defence Regulation No. 17/2014 in the context of the definition of the Integrity Pact and sanctions for violations or fraud [1]. The Integrity Pact, whereby signatories pledge to prevent and not to engage in collusion, corruption or nepotism (KKN) in arms procurement, must be signed by both procurement officials and suppliers. The term ‘procurement officials’ here refers to the Procurement Committee (ULP), Commitment Making Officer (PPK) and Recipients of Work Results (PPHK). The PPK is the official appointed to carry out procurement. The ULP is a small organisation tasked with preparing the procurement supplier plan, establishing procurement documents, stipulating the nominal of performance bonds, assessing the qualifications of the supplier, carrying out administrative valuations, technical details and the price of the offer, determining suppliers for procurement valued at a maximum of 100 billion rupiahs and delivering accountability reports to the PA/KPA. The Integrity Pact is one of of six qualification documents for starting the procurement process (see Article 37 of Minister of Defence Regulation No. 17/2014), one of 15 qualification documents for domestic suppliers (see Article 38 of Minister of Defence Regulation No. 17/2014), one of 10 qualification documents for suppliers from abroad (see Article 39 of Minister of Defence Regulation No. 17/2014) and one of seven qualification documents for market representatives of overseas suppliers (see Article 41 of Minister of Defence Regulation No. 17/2014) [1]. This pact is somehow excluded from the TEP, i.e. a forum for determining arms procurement valued at more than 100 billion rupiahs, or equivalent to 7.1 million USD at current price (see Article 21 in Minister of Defence Regulation No. 17/2014) [1]. Minister of Defence Regulation No.17/2014 also stipulates sanctions for procurement officers found to have committed violations and/or fraud in the procurement process. These sanctions include administrative sanctions, compensation claims and criminal reporting. In the security sector, the police for example, there is Chief of Police Regulation No. 10/2015, which requires an integrity pact to be signed by all five government committees (the Main Committee, the ULP Committee, the Committee for Technical Specification Evaluation, the Committee of Procurement and the Committee for Contract Formulation). Unlike arms procurement in the military, police procurement does not require prospective suppliers to sign the integrity pact [2].

Not all basic rules for arms procurement are implemented. Although offset is compulsory in cases of procurement from abroad, not all cases of procurement applied this clause, as in the case of the AW-101 procurement, which later proved to be problematic [1]. There was also the case of the GCI radar procurement, in which the technical specifications were locked to benefit one supplier only. When the preferred supplier failed to win the bid, the procurement process was halted and forced to start over again [2]. Other cases of corruption in defence procurement have called into question the effectiveness of relevant legislation, such as the purchase of F-16 aircraft [3]. Though these cases are few in number, they show that defence procurement is not always conducted in accordance with the relevant regulations.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

The armed forces have their own tender legislation, but it allows for exemptions. Article 29 provides clarification for cases when no tender is required. For example, no tender is required when the procuring body is the General Staff of the Armed Forces, the Army, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the Ministry of Defence, the Police Force, and all units and affiliated organizations, including universities, foundations. So almost all security and defence institutions are exempt raising serious questions about the purpose of the law [1].

Legislation covering defence and security procurement does not make reference to corruption risks [1].

The effectiveness of the legislation is doubtful. The exceptions which the legislation allows for are high in number, therefore in practice may well be higher again. While some procurement needs, such as for food might be advertised, a lot of procurement for military-related items takes place on an illicit basis [1, 2].

Existing legislation offers no explicit reference of laws governing Iraq’s defence procurement needs (1) which at best, appears scattered and vague. Public Contracts Law No. 87 (2007) is used to guide military procurement decisions, although it does not distinguish between civilian and defence projects, or foreign from locally-struck deals (2). Exemptions apply in specific cases (3) where a request for procurement needs to be sped-up is pre-negotiated and agreed to. As a Baghdad based law firm confirms, contracts at or below 50mn IQD are exempt from the procedures, methods of contracting that Law No. 87 (2007) stipulates (3). Power and decision-making are then bestowed to an acquisition committee that assumes responsibility for the respective service/equipment that defence forces need to purchase or lease. Due to the lack of a specifically tailored procurement framework specific to security actors, gaps in the system are exploited by institutions of security and defence. Guides exist for the implementation of general and government contracts, but no independent body is authorised to oversee adherence/implementation.

Corruption risks associated with defence procurement are loosely addressed and defined under Iraq’s Civil (1) and Military Penal Code (2). Despite that, the prevalence of corruption risks and failure to upgrade antiquated legal frameworks can be observed across public procurement (3), (4). Similar trends in defence procurement have made it to Iraqi press headlines (5), which further indicates the failure of procurement-regulating bodies to minimise corruption risks. Iraqi MP Fadhil Al Fatlawi recently warned that “corruption across state departments and bureaus has taken a dangerous turn” pointing to the misappropriation of state funds (6). Though no central regulatory authority exists, anti-corruption regulators are tasked with oversight functions as Federal Law No. 30 (an extension of CPA order 55) prescribes. No clauses, specific to corruption, across procurement legislation, could be unearthed. Implementation of the abovementioned legal frameworks rests on the ability of disparate agencies, the COI above others, in Baghdad and elsewhere, to facilitate cooperation, coordinate and synergise efforts. Awareness of these matters at the government level is rising but wastes of public funds remain rife.

As mentioned in Q57A, there is no legislation which explicitly regulates defence procurement within Iraq.

Press coverage offers an adequate account of what can only be described as the ineffectiveness of Iraqi anti-corruption measures given the “institutionalised nature” of unethical behaviour in the procurement cycle (1), (2), (3). As one report summarises “corruption is widespread … political, administrative and financial .. among other things such as patronage, bribery, embezzlement and tax evasion to the extent that these practices have become institutionalized”. Enforcement of bribery law is undermined by discretionary leadership whereby as PR01 notes “in which legislation is enforced for political reasons” often to hold sway or as an extension of electioneering efforts. Bribery laws, while they exist, unactionable in the face of discretionary rule and the surging popularity of bribes across state institutions, which also impacts the judiciary and impedes its ability to execute the rule of law (4).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. Israel has legislation that covers defence and national security purchases but it is vague or there are exemptions, for example covering confidential/secret items. They have special regulations for defense (2).There is a set of tenders laws related to the budget (tendures law, article 5) (1) (2) (3). There are also some special arrangements (mechas zagur) for certain contenders. In general contenders have to registered in advance; they are monitored and asssed before (e.g. related to military equipment) and have to fill out many forms for their assessement (3) (4).

There is no special regulation that covers corruption risks during the procurement process, however the procurement process is very strict and effective, so that corruption can be restricted from the start of the process. For every product, companies need to go through the complex procurement process (1) (2) (3) (4). An offence can regularly result in a range of sanctions, including prosecution, exclusion from current and future competitions, or other sanctions, including heavy fines or imprisonment. The only reference to corruption in the Mandatory Tenders Regulations is under Regulation 10(c) which stipulates the criteria for including suppliers on the list, among these – the supplier’s agreement to a criminal registry check, which includes corruption offences (5). However, aside from this, the legislation does not clearly recognise general corruption risks or take steps to mitigate them.

Procurement is required to be conducted in accordance with the Mandatory Tender Law, however, broad exemptions exist for national security purposes that enable acqusitions to be made without recourse to a public tender (1). According to some interviews with laywers who work in the field, the procurement process is very regulated and strict, however there are many exceptions and loopholes in the legislation that covers defence and national security procurment. There are three main industries in Israel that are more or less specialised in certain areas such as drones, aircrafts, missiles and other smaller industries. The authorized MOD committee allows a tender exemption on the grounds of a sole source supplier (regulation 3(2)) only if the relevant supplier is indeed the only one in Israel who supplies the supplies or services needed, or the only one with the required technical capabilities/ scientific capabilities/ infrastructure, and only in accordance with a written opinion of an MOD professional that the supplier is indeed a sole source supplier and that is not appropriate to hold a tender with foreign suppliers (2). For these areas there are in most of the cases only sole suppliers who are very specialised and the government buys from. That’s why they do not have any competitors (1) (2) (3) (4).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Defence procurement is governed according to the type of procurement to be done. In the case of military procurement, Legislative decree 208/2011 [1] — in implementation of Directive 2009/81/CE [2] — and its implementing regulation Decree of the President of the Republic 49/2013 [3] are applied. In case of civil procurement for the Ministry of Defence, the Public procurement code of 2016 [4] and law 55 of 14 June 2019 [5] apply. Nonetheless, if not differently specified, the legislation regarding civil procurement applies also to military procurement. According to artt. 6 and 7 of legislative decree 208/2011, some items can be exempted from the current legislation if compliance of the law endangers security interests of the state [6].

The risk of corruption is recognised by the national legislation governing defence and security procurement. Article 80 of the Public procurement code of 2016 identifies causes of exclusions, among which there are crimes of corruption [1]. In addition, the same code (artt. 40, 44 and 52) establishes the obligation to use electronic means of communication in order to reduce the risk of corruption. It also provides for more stringent requirements than those identified by the 2014 EU Directives, particularly on controls over economic operators and discretionary choices of the public administration, in order to better address the risk of corruption and misconduct in the performance of public procurement. In this regard, art 77 of the code requires to have external commissioners, to be selected from the national register of experts. Please note that even though the presence of an external commissioner remains in force, their selection from the national register is temporarily suspended until 12/31/2020, according to law n. 55/2019 [2]. Moreover, in order to increase legality, Decree-law 1/2012 [3] foresees a reward scheme for companies to which a high “rating of legality” is granted.

The application of national legislation is ensured by the external controls performed from the Court of Auditors and the National Anticorruption Authority, which occurs both ex-ante and ex-post decisions involving contracts [1] [2].There is no evidence of cases of procurement not following the legislation appropriately.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. Procurement is administered by the Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency (ATLA) (防衛装備庁), established on October 1, 2015. [1] The Defence Ministry Establishment Act was revised to incorporate articles that regulate ATLA. Article 36 states that ATLA’s tasks are to work to strengthen the foundation for developing and producing equipment and to work for the suitable and efficient execution of R&D, procurement, supply and management, and international cooperation regarding equipment. [2] The Antimonopoly Law [3] and the Act on Elimination and Prevention of Involvement in Bid Rigging, etc. and Punishments for Acts by Employees that Harm apply to such procurement. [4] The Japan Fair Trade Commission (FTC) has authority to scrutinise defence and national security purchases [5]. The FTC can take disciplinary measures when defence procurement is in breach of the law. One example is found in a press release from 2017. [6] The Public Accounting Act (会計法) also applies to procurement of defence equipment, [7] as explained in an article. [8] The purchase of military equipment from the United States through Foreign Military Sales is handled by bilateral negotiations. [9]

The Antimonopoly Law and the Act on Elimination and Prevention of Involvement in Bid Rigging, etc. and Punishments for Acts by Employees that Harm have provisions against bid rigging. According to the Public Accounting Act, state contracts should be determined by competition. [1] The word corruption is not used in the Antimonopoly Act or the Act on Elimination, but both are critical of private monopolies and see them as, implicitly, conducive to bid rigging and corruption.

There is evidence that the legislation has been thoroughly implemented and followed for all defence procurement during the years covered by this research. According to Article 29 of the Public Accounting Act, the state’s contracts are to be determined by open competition in principle. The same article specifies certain conditions under which the government may award discretionary contracts [1] (esee Q64B). Lists of discretionary contracts including written justifications for the selection of this type of contract are found on the website of ATLA [2] (for central procurement) and of institutions such as the 4th air depot [3] (for regional procurement). The government has followed legislation in requesting that companies with discretionary contracts based on cost prices that have submitted inflated invoices repay the excess money they have received and pay fines in addition (see Q73B). The Anti-Monopoly Act bans collusion between enterprises, and the Bid-Rigging Act [4] bans bid rigging by an official (see Q66A). No recent reports concerning bid rigging by an official in the defence sector were found in the mainstream newspapers Asahi Shimbun [5] and Yomiuri Shimbun. [6] Only one report on collusive bidding was found in the mainstream national press in the same timeframe. After the Japan Fair Trade Commission in 2017 issued a cease and desist order against two bidders for a defence textile product ordered by ATLA that were found to have colluded, the MOD issued a nomination stop for them. According to reports in the Japanese press, the concerned agencies followed due procedure in this case (see Q66C). Foreign Military Sales from the US to Japan are based on a bilateral agreement formulated in a Letter of Offer and Acceptance and on the US Arms Control and Export Act. According to a report from the US Congress, a notification procedure is regularly followed to acquire approval of such exports to Japan, [7] and the Japanese Board of Audit does not raise any issues regarding the approval of arms export by the US to Japan in its report on FMS from 2019. [8] One issue that the Board of Audit has raised in one of its reports on FMS is the handling of complaints about inadequacies following receipt inspections. Such issues were raised in bilateral consultations with the US counterpart (see Q67A).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Military Supplies Law No. 3 of the year 1995 is the only law available in relation to defence and security procurement [1]. The law defines a procurement cycle, however, it also allows for exceptions, such as those listed in Article 12, paragraph B, which allows the Prime Minister to make purchases outside of this cycle, when the need arises. The law also stipulates the formation of a central tenders committee, within the General Command of the Armed Forces (Article 15). However, the law does not include any clauses specific to corruption risks. Despite the existence of a legal framework that governs defence and security purchases, this law is missing important aspects such as corruption, misuse and some aspects of the procurement process for instance checking the quality of the goods and purchased assets.

It has become clear so far that Jordan has a legal framework that covers defence procurement, namely for the Armed Forces. However, a close look into Military Supplies Law No. 3 of the year 1995 shows that it makes reference to corruption risks in a superficial way [1]. In the law, corruption is not mentioned, but measures to avoid corruption are taken and specified: members of procurement committees must not serve in the committee for more than two years, and they cannot be members of quality control, as well as stocktaking. In fact, corruption is not treated as a strategic issue within defence [2]. The only piece of legislation that prohibits corrupt activities, such as bribery and facilitation payments is Law No. 35 of the year 1966, Officers Service Law of the Armed Forces [3].

In light of available information and evidence, it is impossible to assess the effectiveness of Military Supplies Law No. 3 of the year 1995 [1], as there is no evidence of defence purchases scrutiny. There is, for example, no evidence that the armed forces have ever been audited by the Audit Bureau [2]. There is also little information available online about defence operations and purchases in general. In 2016, the Jordanian Armed Forces prohibited publishing news or information about the force, except for official statements by the media spokesperson for the armed forces [3]. There is also no evidence that major arms deals follow these policies, and there is no evidence to support whether this policy is being implemented at all levels or not. According to other sources, the law procedures are followed superficially, but the majority of purchases are treated as exceptional, which allow the Commander-in-Chief to disregard the law [4].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. The Public Procurement and Disposal Act No.33 of 2015 (PPADA) is the formal legislation used by the all public entities including Ministry of Defence for all procurement activities. [1] Therefore procurement activities of the Kenya Defence Forces fall under under the authority of the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (PPRA). In April 2020, the PPADA was updated with additional regulations for various procurement methods by new regulations under the Kenya Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Regulations, 2020, which now includes additional regulations for national security institutions, particularly those that use Classified Procurement Methods under Section 90. [2] In the Defence ministry, the Supply Chain Management Services Division of the ministry is responsible for procurement and is guided by this Act as well as regulations of the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority. In regard to corruption, PPADA has a ‘Declaration not to engage in Corruption’ clause in section 62. [3] The clause states that any person who submits a tender, proposal or quotation shall make a declaration against engaging in corrupt activities, and a declaration that the person is not prohibited from engaging in procurement activities.

The PPRA has the mandate to enforce the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act. Section 63 of the Act addresses the requirement for declaration that a person undertaking procurement activities shall not engage in corruption, or shall declare if barred from engaging in procurement activites. The Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act, however, does not provide comprehensive details on corruption risks in the procurement activites within the defence ministry. Besides, the Act does not stipulate any means of mitigating the risks. [1] In the past, national security agencies (Kenya Defence Forces, the National Intelligence Service, and the National Police Service) have been exempt from disclosing their tenders, particularly the restricted tender processes for oversight. Restricted tendering has posed significant corruption risks in national security organs. However, the new regulations under the Kenya Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Regulations, 2020 has introduced additional frameworks that regulate these limitations, such as the creation of a special committee that will be responsible for monitoring classified procurement processes. [2]

There have been major cases of corruption, some of which have been linked to the Ministry of Defence (MOD). One such recent incident involved the procurement of seven defective military aircrafts at a cost of Ksh1.5 billion. [1] In 2019, the MOD again came under scrutiny for an inflated tender cost of Ksh 150 million, in the acquisition of a business process management software. [2] These cases indicate that any legislation requiring that procurement activities be free of corruption is not adhered to.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

The Law No. 05/L-068 on Amending and Supplementing the Law No. 04/L-042 on Public Procurement of the Republic of Kosovo (supplemented by the Law No. 04/L-237) allows for procurement exemptions in the defence and security sectors [1]. The following contracts are exempt: i) supply of military equipment, including any spares or components; ii) supply of sensitive equipment, including any spares or components; iii) works, supplies and services directly linked to military or sensitive equipment at any stage of their lifecycle; iv) works and services for specific military purposes; and v) sensitive cases of work and service [1]. The Regulation No. 03/2019 on Procurement for Defence and Security Purposes was approved by the Kosovo Government in February 2019. This regulation lays out rules, conditions, and procedures for procurement in the defence and security sectors, as well as outlining the supplies, services and work that are exempt from the relevant Law on Public Procurement in Kosovo [2]. There is also the Guideline on Procurement for Defence and Security Purposes No. 72/01/2019 dated 03.04.2019.

The current legislation in Kosovo does not make direct references to the corruption risks within procurement process in Kosovo. However, the Law No. 05/L-068 on Amending and Supplementing the Law No. 04/L-042 on Public Procurement of the Republic of Kosovo (amended and supplemented by the Law No. 04/L-237) strictly prohibits the conflict of interest in the procurement procedures in Kosovo [1]. A conflict of interest is defined here as any situation where staff members of either a contracting authority or procurement service provider acting on behalf of the contracting authority, are involved in a procurement procedure, whether directly or indirectly, where any kind of personal financial benefit or other interest could compromise their impartiality and independence in the context of the procurement procedure [1]. In addition to the defence and security procurements, the regulation stipulates that all procurement activities should be conducted following the principles of competition, efficiency and effectiveness, non-discrimination, objectivity, integrity, and professionalism [2].

The respective legislation is implemented for defence procurements; however some breaches by both parties (contracting authorities and economic operators) during procurement procedures have been evidenced by the National Audit Office [1]. Following this, the National Audit Office recommended that the Minister of Defence undertake all necessary measures for implementing procurement activities in line with the provisions of the legal framework on public procurement [1].

This sub-indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Kuwait has legislation that explicitly covers all defence and national security purchases and agreements and, as discussed in Q23 B, pre-procurement approval is required from Parliament. But Kuwaiti laws allow for secret spending.

Article 2 and 3 of Law no. 25 of 1996, which is concerned with the agreements in which the state is part, say that procurement deals and any kind of agreement that the defence and security agencies enter must give an explicit breakdown that shows what exactly has been given to the state and how much for (1). Article 5 says that parties that fail to report, or misreport, any payment or favour they received in relation to the deal (within 30 days of receiving it) could be sentenced to up to three years in prison and given a fine that is in equal in value to whatever they received. They also have to give the state whatever they recieved.

The problem is this law only applies to agreements worth 330,000 USD or more, and the law casually mentions that the parties involved could avoid prosecution so long as they report kickbacks they recieved to the SAB.

Another problem is these institutions are exempt from the scrutiny of the Public Tenders Authority, according to article 3 of its law (2), which allows them to form their own special committees to oversee these operations.

Secret spending is also allowed and Kuwait has no laws (that are publicly available at least) which limits or sets clear critrea for when secrecy is justified or how to audit secret agreements. Article 80 of the SAB’s law simply says that ministries with secret projects must deliver a report to the SAB every three months, written by the Minister himself, which should say how much money has been spent on these projects and the Minister must sign a statement vowing that the funds were spent on approved matters only (3).

This means, however, that auditors do not have access to the actual agreements between these ministries, defence contractors and other companies, auditors said (4, 5 and 6).

The country has no legislation covering defence and security procurement that makes reference to corruption risks.

It is difficult to assess how thoroughly these laws are implemented because officials refused to speak about these deals, and defence contractors are also equally tight-lipped, but it would not be unreasonable to assume that implementation is weak because state auditors say these institutions constantly flout the law (1,2,3).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Latvia has clear and comprehensive legislation that covers all defence and national security purchases with no exemptions. The legal framework is defined in the Law on public procurements [1] and a specific Law on defence and security procurements. [2] At the same time, the latter envisages a closed competition in which all interested contenders can propose their participation but only those selected by the contractor can submit their offers. [2] Though necessary for national security reasons, such norms leave space for uncertainty in the public space.

The general and defence and security related procurement legislation does not mention coruption risks explicitly, though measures included in the legislation clearly aim to reduce the risks of coruption, for example the transparency of the entire process except closed competitions, including the vetting process, contents of the agreements and process of dispute resolution. [1] [2]

There is a clear order for vetting the application of the legislation by the internal auditing units of the defence and security sector, as well as the State Audit Office and the Procurement Monitoring Bureau (in case of public procurements [1]). Recently, there has been an extensive audit regardig acquisition planning and procurements, which found no breach of law in procurements analysed. [2] At the same time, while the State Audit Office has access to all informatin necessary, the methods at the disposal of the State Audit Office are not sufficient to discover potential concealed breaches of law. [3]

This sub-indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Lebanon requires a public tender for all goods and services above $535. The Public Procurement Directorate approves contracts higher than $50,000 and supervises the procurement process (1). However, the ISF and the LAF are exempted from that procedure and are subject for special procurement procedure (1). Decrees no. 11573 and 11574 from 1968 layout the procurement procedures for LAF’s works and goods, respectively (2). The LAF’s General Directorate for Administration is responsible for facilitating the procurement process and issuing licenses to participants (3).

The research found no specific legislation related to corruption risks in defence and security procurement. Furthermore, only those registered and listed can access military procurement contracts (1).

No concrete evidence was found that showed defence procurement legislation was thoroughly implemented and followed for all defence procurement contracts (1). However, a source indicated that rules are strictly applied in the military (2).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Lithuania has a Law on Public Procurement that covers the defence sector and includes the methods and procedures required to purchase any services or goods. It also contains thirteen exemptions of cases in which the law may not apply. These exemptions include when purchases are subject to international agreements, directed towards international organisations, for national security and national interests, or related to intelligence services. Moreover, certain financial services, academic research and employment contracts are exempt from the Law.

The Law on Public Procurement in the defence sector does not mention specific corruption risks. It only gives the right to the Public Procurement Office to forward investigations to law enforcement authorities or to the Competition Council of the Republic of Lithuania in case of corruption allegations. However, it is not specified what these allegations might be.
Moreover, the Corruption Prevention Law obliges all state bodies to perform self-assessments of corruption risks and prepare anti-corruption programs based on identified risks. Either on the basis of self-assessments or through its own initiative, the Special Investigation Service can perform corruption risk analyses [1]. In 2017, a corruption risk assessment in the Ministry of Defence procurement sector was carried out by the Special Investigation Service [2]. In addition, a corruption risk assessment was also carried out for the Weaponry Fund [3].

According to the government reviewer, the list of the most actual corruption risks in public procurement and recommendations how to navigate them are prepared by the Special Investigation Service [4]. The Ministry of Defence has prepared an anti-corruption plan [5]. In this plan there are some actions on corruption risk management in public procurement. In the aqusition process, the Defence Material Agency implements a quality management standard ISO 9001:2015. This standard requires the identification and management of risks, including corruption risks [6].

Not all defence purchases are procured in line with legislation, meaning that the Public Procurement Office issues administrative penalties or warnings for lack of compliance with the Law on Public Procurement. For example, in 2018, the Public Procurement Office cancelled the purchase of body armours due to infringement of public procurement principles and technical specification, which monopolised the market [1]. In addition, a new reform undertaken by the Ministry of Defence to change the approach toward defence procurement involved the establishment on 1 January 2018 of a new centralised body, the Defence Resource Agency a new centralised body, to deal with almost all defence procurement matters. This reform aims to centralise defence procurements, makes the process more effective by linking it to long-term plans, increases the share of open tenders, decreases to the minimum the number of tenders when there is only one bidder, and helps to terminate contracts which exceeded their tenders [2].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Any government procurement is subject to a number of laws. The Financial Procedure Act 1957 [1] governs Malaysia’s public finances management. The Contracts Act 1950 [2] governs entering into contracts on behalf of the government. Section 5 of the Delegations of Power Act 1956 [3] outlines the delegation of power from the central government to Ministers. On top of the aforementioned laws, government procurement must also abide by Treasury Instructions and Treasury Circulars. Treasury Instruction 192 further outlines authority in matters of tenders consideration and approval. [4] Furthermore, the Malaysia Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) Act also prohibits corruption in public procurement. Secret items, however, are protected under the Official Secrets Act and are therefore exempt in a limited sense. Procurements of secret items are required to be reported to the higher division of the Treasury, although certain details and specifics may be excluded. [5]

The legislation that regulates any government procurement in Malaysia, including defence and national security procurements, recognises the risks of corruption and provides detailed provisions to mitigate such risks. The Financial Procedure Act 1957 [1] outlines the delegation of authority in the management of public finances as well as financial and accounting procedures, including the procedure for the collection, custody and payment of public monies and the procedure for the procurement, custody and disposal of public properties. Section 18 explicitly refers to the human risk factor in corruption. The Contract Acts 1950 [2] specifically regulates government procurement and provides provisions for contract-making and contract-termination. The risk of corruption by appointed agents and its effects is outlined in Chapter 10 of the Act. In addition, the MACC Act also prohibits corruption and bribery.[3] A new addition to the Act has been introduced and came into force in June 2020 stating that a commercial organisation can be prosecuted if a person associated with the organisation commits a corrupt act to enable the organisation to acquire or retain a contract or interest. [4]

Defence and national security procurements are subject to an open tender system. There are, however, cases in which the government pursues direct negotiations outside of the open tender system. These are limited to procurements relating directly to national security. [1] The Treasury must approve of such procurements, although specific details regarding the procurement may not be fully disclosed to the Treasury. Nonetheless, there is often a requirement for companies to provide customised items that ensure equipment purchased is compatible with the existing active inventory. Furthermore, there also seem to be cases where companies linked to proxies of political leaders or an influential figure outside the government administration seek out contracts for particular services. In one case of a company allegedly linked to an influential figure, the contract was for uniforms. Additionally, there is currently no regulation which stipulates that there must be a cooling off period before ex-military personnel are able to join defence contractors. This is a situation that has allowed for them to leverage their relationships in the military to sway contract issuance decisions. The biggest domestic defence company is DRB-HICOM Defence Technologies (DEFTECH). It has a good network with other defence contractors around the world. If, for instance, the Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) requires a domestic contractor to produce military vehicles, it is very likely that, irrespective of the nature of the tender, DEFTECH will receive it. This does not mean there is corruption or a lack of transparency, but that the nature of the industry means that particular companies will repeatedly get contracts. The fact that DEFTECH has former high-ranking military personnel in its management is likely to allow it to maintain a strong working relationship with MINDEF. However, high-ranking officials in DEFTECH have been arrested for corruption. Finally, DEFTECH’s majority shareholder is Syed Mokhtar Albukhary, a Malaysian business tycoon who is known to be close to Mahathir. This is a relationship that will likely continue to benefit DEFTECH. [2] There also seems to be indications of a mixed tender system. For instance, MINDEF may issue a contract to a foreign contractor to produce particular hardware. That may be an open tender. However, a local tender which does not seem to be open will then be issued for customisation requirements. In part for security reasons, the second tender may be closed because MINDEF may not want to divulge its security considerations to too many defence operators. An example of this was a collaboration between Chaiseri Defence of Thailand and DEFTECH. [3] [4] [5]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

The government introduced a new public procurement code (Code des Marchés Publics et des Délégations de Service Public) in September 2015, replacing the 2008 code. However, article 8 of the Code remains unchanged, meaning that certain defence purchases are exempt from standard procurement requirements: “This decree does not apply to contracts for works, supplies or services when they relate to the needs of national defence or security, which require secrecy or for which the protection of essential national interests is incompatible with the publication of such contracts. The system under which these contracts operate is fixed by decree of the Council of Ministers”.¹ In 2014, the BVG determined that the former Minister of Defence, Soumeylou Boubeye Maïga, and the Minister of the Economy had effectively broken the law by incorrectly interpreting this clause, which existed in the previous version of the Code² (see Q28 and Q29). There is no alternate legislation for procurements that are exempt under Article 8.

The legislation new public procurement code (Code des Marchés Publics et des Délégations de Service Public) directs procurement authorities to be aware of corruption related risks and outlines various procedures and conditions to mitigate these risks. The legislation recognises the risks of corruption and makes clear and comprehensive provisions to mitigate these risks. Yet Mali has no specific legislation that covers defence and national security procurement.
Article 3 of the code sets out the fundamental principles of public procurement processes. Among them are:
– free access to competition for public contracts
– the equal treatment of candidates
– transparency of procedures, and through that, the rationality, modernity and traceability of procedures.¹
Moreover, article 29 is dedicated to mitigating the risks of corruption.
Entitled, “De l’engagement de la lutte contre la corruption” (Concerning the commitment to fight against corruption), the article stipulates that:
“Offers and submissions must contain a commitment by the candidate or tenderer to:
– neither grant nor promise to grant to any person involved in the process of awarding a contract an improper advantage, financial or otherwise, directly or via an intermediary, with the intention of securing the contract.
– inform the contracting authority of any payment, advantage or privilege accorded to the benefit of any person, acting as an intermediary or an agent, to recompense them for any service provided.
– to respect, in general, legal provisions, notably those outlawing acts of passive corruption or trading of favours or any constituting offences of this nature”.¹

The assessor found evidence that numerous military expenditures are not subject to legal procurement requirements and that violations of procurement processes are widespread within the MDAC.
When the IMF, the World Bank and the EU suspended their aid programmes to Mali following reports of the off-budget purchase of a new presidential jet in 2014, it was the BVG that audited the account (see Q16C). The BVG determined that the former Minister of Defence, Soumeylou Boubeye Maïga, and the Minister of the Economy incorrectly interpreted a legal clause that allows for certain acquisitions to be off-budget (see Q29A) .⁸
The audit found that the government had spent 87.77 billion CFA (USD 163.44 million) on defence items that were not declared in the official budget.⁸ In addition to the presidential jet, which grabbed all the headlines, the audit also looked at the purchasing of equipment for the armed forces. The report found that 18.59 billion CFA went towards the presidential jet, while a further 69.18 billion CFA was spent on other military equipment, primarily transport vehicles.⁸ The BVG found that the MDAC had failed to respect the 2014 Finance Law requiring it to register these contracts and submit them as part of the annual budget. Moreover, many of the contracts were found to be heavily overpriced, strongly suggesting that these acquisitions involved substantial illicit activity.¹¹
– Lorries that can transport up to 5 tonnes of goods that normally cost 28.5 million CFA were priced at 78 million CFA in the contract.
– Lorries that can transport up to 10 tonnes that normally cost 34 million CFA were priced at 115 million CFA.
– Petrol-tankers that can carry up to 6 cubic metres of fuel, normally costing 29 million CFA were billed at 120 million CFA.
– And petrol-tankers that can carry up to 18 cubic metres of fuel, normally worth 38.5 million CFA were billed at 210 million CFA.¹¹
As of April 2018, it has yet to be determined what happened to the money overspent on these contracts, which would have amounted to 393 million CFA had the government not subsequently cancelled them. But the Defence Minister responsible for signing these contracts has since returned to government as Prime Minister.
Substantial sums of military expenditures are routinely spent off-budget and are thus highly unlikely to be subject to the standard procurement requirements. The published budget of the armed and security forces does not include the intelligence service, whose annual spend is kept entirely secret and thus is not subject to auditing.¹ There have been no mentions of intelligence spending in recent annual budgets or defence plans,² ³ ⁴ leaving a large chunk of spending entirely opaque. Neither the BVG nor any other public body has the power to oversee DGSE operations, organisation, budget or activities.⁵
Moreover, the World Bank’s 2013 study notes that the maintenance of a special account for operations in the country’s “Northern Zone” is a major source of vulnerability.⁹ This spending similarly does not appear in the government’s annual budget. The account has no de facto spending ceiling, the purpose and operating conditions of the special account are not adhered to, budget charges display anomalies and lack transparency, and the controls performed on expenditures from the special account are less rigorous than the country’s normal budget procedures.⁹
Finally, there are reports in the Malian media, based on sources within the defence sector, alleging that fraudulent practices are commonplace at the Directorate of Finance and Equipment (DFM).¹³ Defence contracts are not subject to open and competitive tenders: instead they are often awarded to family members or close associates of defence officials.¹³ The acquisitions and sales of fixed assets are not supported by any justification or assessment of needs.¹³

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

The Law on Acquisitions, Leases, and Services to the Public Sector regulates the acquisitions, leases of movable property, and provision of services of any nature, from public bodies. [1] The law provides for exceptions such as contracting without being subject to the public bidding procedure when they are carried out exclusively for military or military purposes, or their contracting through public bidding puts national security or public safety at risk, in the terms of the applicable laws. [2]

SEDENA, in accordance with the provisions of this law and others, issues its “Policies, Bases, and Guidelines regarding acquisitions, leases, and services.” [3] [4]

The Law on Acquisitions, Leases and Services to the Public Sector includes superficial mentions of the risks of corruption, in this regard it states that the agencies and entities must abstain from receiving proposals or award contracts in cases in which the public servant who intervenes at any stage of the contracting procedure has any personal, family or business interest; those that by themselves or through companies that are part of the same business group intend to be hired to prepare opinions, expert opinions, and appraisals; those who have used privileged information, improperly provided by public servants or their relatives by blood relationship and, by affinity to the fourth degree, or civil, etc. [1]

The agencies and entities, under their responsibility, may contract acquisitions, leases, and services, without being subject to the public bidding procedure, through the invitation procedures of at least three people or direct award, when: they are carried out for military purposes, or for the Navy, or its contracting through public bidding puts national security or public security at risk, in the terms of the applicable laws. [1] The regulations also mention the figure of the social witnesses (citizens who will strengthen transparency, impartiality, and the legal provisions regarding acquisitions, leases, and services) but their participation may be excepted in those cases in which the contracting procedures contain information classified as reserved, that could jeopardise national security, public security, or national defence under the terms of the applicable legal provisions. [2]

Journalistic investigations find that the ASF has found irregularities in the administrative processes regarding acquisitions by SEDENA. [3] For example, in 2016 it did not notify the SFP about the acquisition of aircraft and also did not justify why it opted for closed processes in the acquisition of goods and services for a medical centre. [4] [5]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

The Law on Public procurements covers defence and national security purchases. [1] However, the Law and bylaws are not in compliance with the Defence and Security Directive: they are vague and include exemptions in which contracting authorities are free to regulate the awarding of contracts. [2] For example, so called urgent procurements and small value procurements are regulated by the institutions themselves, [3] while the Law includes a list of various other exceptions. [4] The Law obliges the Government to adopt bylaws regulating secret procurements, [5] but this was never adopted. [6][7]

According to the MoD reviewer, the Amendment to the Law on Public Procurement from 2017 prescribes adoption of the bylaw that regulates public procurement in the defence and security sector and according to the Article 116a of the Law on Public Procurement for procuremnt related to defence and national security purchases, representatives of the Government made draft version on bylaw that regulates this kind of procurement. This draft bylaw is in compliance with Defence and Security EU Directives, but its adoption is postponed having in mind that the new Law on Public Procurement is at the moment in process of adoption and its implementation will start in 2020. Until the Public Procurement Regulation in the field of defence and security is adopted (2020), the Ministry of Defence will conduct procurement procedures of defence and security matters in accordance with the Law on Public Procurement, through open procedures. Applying the legal principles of competition protection, transparency and equal treatment in procedures does not limit the number of participants in the procedure. Also, Ministry of Defence has adopted a bylaw on procurement process that is excluded from the Law according to the Article 116b of the Law on Public Procurement. This bylaw consists of internal procedures for this kind of procurement. [8]

Moreover, the Proposal of the Public Procurement Regulation in the field of Defence and Security has been prepared in accordance with the new Law on Public Procurement (“Official Gazette of Montenegro”, No. 074/19 of December 30, 2019). This Regulation will be published in the “Official Gazette of Montenegro”, and will enter into force on July 9, 2020, having in mind that the new Law has not yet entered into force (scheduled from July 2020). Activity Plan for the Technical Assistance Project in the Ministry of Defence of Montenegro for 2020 contains assistance of Centre for Integrity in the Security Sector (CIDS) in development of the internal procedures (1. Procurement) such as above mentioned Regulation.

The legal basis for the adoption of the Public Procurement Regulation in the field of Defence and Security is contained in Article 177 of the new Law on Public Procurement, which stipulates that the implementation, reporting and keeping records on procurement referred to in Art. 175 and 176 of this Law shall be performed in the manner and according to the procedure determined by the Regulation, issued by the Government, as well as in Article 175 paragraph 2 of this Law which prescribes that the list of military equipment and products referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article is prescribed by the Government. [9,10,11]

The Law on Public procurements, covering defence and security procurement, regulates corruption and conflicts of interest. [1] International organisations estimate that the law establishes conditions for increasing transparency and for reducing corruption. [2] However, relevant bylaws have not yet been adopted, and exceptions to the implementation of the law leave a large space for corruption. [3] This is especially the case for secret procurements in defence, where basic legal procedures do not exist. [3][4]

Important information about the procurements of the Ministry of Defence are not publicly available. [1] For example, all data on secret procurements, government to government contracts and even items procured through publicly announced tenders are considered confidential. [2] Civil society organisations and activists believe that the Ministry avoids implementing the law by launching public tenders while hiding information on the goods that are requested, due to widespread corruption. [1][3]

According to the MoD reviewer, all procurement procedures related to defence and security are conducted according to the Law on Public Procurement and related documentation is publicly available on the Public Procurement Portal. Exceptionally, for procurements that include confidential data which, if revealed, would threaten national security, technical specifications of the procurement are clasiffied and conducted by provisions of the Law on Public Procurement. This confirms provisions of the bylaw of Ministry of Defence on the procurement process related to defence and national security purchases that are exempted from the Law. Information considering Gov-to-Gov contracts are also publicly available. Additionally, the Law on Public Procurement and bylaws do not contain the obligation of public notice of procurements excluded from the Law.

This sub-indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Morocco has legislation covering procurement, which consists of the « Décret n° 2-13-656 modifiant le décret n° 2-12-349 relatif aux marchés publics » (Decree modifying the decree relating to public markets, last updated in 2013) (1).

However defence and security procurements are exempt from most of the transparency requirements, either by not being included in the list of sectors concerned, or through explicit exemptions. Examples of exemptions include:

– Article 86: Procurement contracts for the Armed Forces can be agreed without prior publicity and bidding for tenders.

– Article 129: Procurement contracts for architectural consultancy can be agreed without prior publicity and bidding for tenders.

– Article 171: The National Defence Administration is exempt from the following conditions: budget restraints (Article 6), opening of the offers in public (Articles 17, 36, 46, 63, 104 and 121), publication of the estimated programme, market achievement report and a number of other documents (Article 147), use of electronic exchange procedures for documents and reverse electronic bids (Articles 148, 149 and 151), market audits and controls (Article 165), control over military equipment, weaponry and ammunition procurement contracts (Article 156).

Moreover, a number of military procurement contracts can benefit from the following conditions that usually do not apply: restricted bidding for tenders, no budget limit, no need for an administrative certificate.

This significant lack of transparency and important exceptions made to procurement contracts for the Armed Forces specifically imply corruption risks (2)(3)(4). Yet, no NGO reports concrete cases of corruption in this situation, but one interviewee (5) implied that the complete lack of access to information concerning the armed forces -including for NGOs- and not the absence of potential corruption explained this absence of reports on the subject.

Morocco has no procurement legislation that maes reference to corruption risks.

There are significant exceptions to the procurement law as applied to the defence sector.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

There is no public procurement law in Myanmar. In 2014, the Deputy Attorney General said, in response to a question asked by MP Tin Maung Oo in Parliament, that Myanmar is in urgent need of a public procurement law to ensure transparency, competitiveness and freedom from corruption [1]. There was a workshop held on the drafting of the public procurement law, with the Ministry of National Planning and Economic Development, the Ministry of Finance and US Aid [2]. A Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assests Bill was posted to the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw in 2019 [3], but such a law is still lacking in Myanmar. If there was a procurement law in Myanmar, it would not govern the defence sector because of Article 20(b) of the Constitution, which states that the military can administer its own affairs independently [4].

There is no defence-specific legislation that covers defence and national security procurement. No public procurement legislation at all could be identified in Myanmar.

There is no defence-specific legislation that covers defence and national security procurement. As such, this indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

A number of regulations shape the legal framework for anti-corruption in defence and security procurement: the EU directives Public Procurement 2004/18/EC and Defence Procurement 2009/81/EC, the Defence and Security Procurement Act, the Procurement Act and, finally, the provisions of the Public Administration (Probity Screening) Act (Bibob) [1,2,3,4,5]. The Defence and Security Procurement Act defines a number of exemptions from its provisions, namely in Articles 2.16, 2.17 and 2.127 [3]. These articles make certain categories of spending exempt: national intelligence and security procurement processes, government-to-government procurement, multinational R&D projects and procurement for international operations [3].

National legislation includes laws on corruption. The Procurement Act 2012 states that ‘a contracting authority or a special-sector company shall take appropriate measures to effectively prevent, identify and resolve fraud, favouritism, corruption and conflicts of interest during a procurement procedure…’ [1]. Bribery, fraud, corruption and organised crime are designated as bases on which to exclude a contracting party or tender [1]. Bidding actors can also report the Ministry of Defence for corruption through the Central Defence Integrity Organisation (COID) [2].

Rules on corruption within procurement legislation are generally adhered to. However, there are strong grey areas that may draw that conclusion into question (e.g. parliamentarians can disagree over what constitutes corruption in procurement for large projects with preferred Dutch industry partners (e.g. Damen shipyards) [1]). Additionally, in certain circumstances, the Dutch Ministry of Defence (MoD) has knowingly continued contracts with companies known to be corrupt. For example, food catering in Iraq is offered by the Supreme company, despite the company pleading guilty to deliberate fraud during the American Public Prosecution Service’s case against them and a report made to COID that the company was defrauding the Dutch MoD.[2]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

New Zealand does not have specific legislation covering defence purchases, although it is specified that the Secretary of Defence is ultimately responsible for procurements [1]. Defence procurement falls under the regular legislation as the New Zealand Government Procurement states that anyone involved in procurement must be aware of the legislative frameworks surrounding contracting and buying goods and services [2]. It provides the following examples of commercial and public law legislation: Contract and Commercial Law Act 2017; Commerce Act 1986; Fair Trading Act 1986; Construction Contracts Act 2002; Public Service Act 2020; Public Finance Act 1989; Public Finance (Departmental Guarantees and Indemnities) Regulations 2007; Public Audit Act 2001; Public Records Act 2005 Official Information Act 1982; Ombudsmen Act 1975; Privacy Act 1993; Human Rights Act 1993; New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990; Public Bodies Contracts Act 1959.

These statutes comprise only a part of the Government procurement measures, and some, though not all government agencies must adhere to Government-established Principles, Rules, and a Charter [3, 4, 5]. The NZDF, GCSB, and NZSIS are all required to comply with the rules, though their reporting of these may differ (GCSB and NZSIS are permitted some exclusions in expenditure reporting) [6]. No legislative exemptions for major defence purchases were found.

In 2018, the Review of Defence Procurement Policies and Practices was released [1]. This review clearly identifies the steps and processes which defence procurements must meet, and the areas which are of most concern. If a vector for corruption existed at any point along the procurement process this would have been identified in the review. Moreover, while not a piece of legislation, a failure to follow the procedures and policies recommended by the review, and subsequently adopted by Defence, would lead to an inquiry as such an act would be in breach of many government policies, rules, and values [2, 3, 4] .The Ministry of Justice provides an understandable delineation of how each relevant piece of anti-bribery and corruption legislation is implemented and interpreted, which includes, for example, Public Sector Corruption within the Cimres Act 1961 and Income Tax Act 2007. New Zealand has also signed the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, UNCAC, APEC’s Santiago Commitment to Fight Corruption and Ensure Transparency, which cover corruption risks and encourage states to develop and strengthen existing anti-bribery and corruption measures. [5]

Although possessing no specific Defence procurement legislation, a follow-up to an independent review conducted by Sir Brian Roche and PricewaterhouseCoopers, found New Zealand’s Defence Capability Management System to contain a suitable level of risk mitigation which continues to build trust and confidence for decision makers [1, 2]. In the OAG’s Briefing to the FADTC on Vote Defence and Vote Defence Force 2020/21, the following projects were included: Future Air Mobility; Network Enabled Army Programme; Garrison and Training Support; Fixed High Frequency Radio Refresh; and Frigate Sustainment [3]. The OAG did not raise any concerns or queries relating to a failure to implement relevant legislation. Likewise, in the OAG’s 2019/20 Estimates briefing to the FADTC, the following projects were mentioned: Future Air Surveillance; Dive Hydrographic Vessel; and Frigate Systems upgrade (among others) [4] – no indication of a failure to implement relative legislation was found. Defence procurements must comply with all relevant legislation, which are listed in 57A and 57B. As all defence procurements must follow national law, and as mitigation measures exist and as those laws contain anti-bribery and corruption measures, the evidence suggests that the level of effectiveness satisfies the requirements. Moreover, the assessor could find no evidence of defence procurement in breach of the relevant laws.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

The Ministry of Defence includes the Department for Public Procurement, responsible for covering the defence and security needs of the Ministry. All purchases for the MoD fall under the 2016 Code for Public Procurement (1) or under the 2013 Decree (2) regulating security and defence acquisitions. The 2016 Code provides guidelines on the tendering process, the execution of procurements, implementation, control, and regulation (1). However, Article 7.1 excludes purchases related to national security and defence for “the sake of the protection of the State interests”. Therefore, sensitive or secret items are exempt from the 2016 Code for Public Procurement (Decree No. 2016/641/PRN/PM). To cover these type of purchases there is a 2013 Decree regarding “infrastructure, equipment, items and services for the defence and security needs of the State” (2). The Decree covers all defence and national security purchases, including those that are “declared secret” (2). It includes 77 articles that cover different phases of the acquisition process. It also provides article clauses that are specific to corruption risks, such as Article 29 (conflicts of interest), Article 30 (code of ethics), and Article 72 (description of corruption risks).

Niger passed legislation that covers defence and security procurement with particular attention to corruption risks. Article 8 of the 2016 Code defines corruption as “the action of the one offering, giving, receiving or soliciting, directly or indirectly, anything of value to influence improperly the actions of another person or entity” (1). The first article of the 2013 Decree regarding defence and security acquisitions repeats this definition of corruption (2). It also identifies specific corruption risks in its Chapter XIII, Article 72 through the following points:

“1) acts of corruption, coercive, collusive, fraudulent and occlusive practices regarding the preparation, awarding, control, regulation and execution of contracts;
2) Usurpations of the official function during the procurement process; 3) False bidding and fictitious competition;
4) Illegal use of confidential information;
5) False invoices and false attestations of delivered services;
6) Payment orders, after the issuance of a certificate on delivered services, which does not correspond to goods or services actually provided or where the work has not been completed or has been unsatisfactory” (2).

Without prejudice to the penal code, Articles 73, 74 and 75 of the Decree provide for different sanctions regarding “contractor, supplier, service provider, candidate or holder of a public contract author, co-author and/or accomplice of the infringements” (2). Scoring for this indicator is based on both the 2016 Code and 2013 Decree, provided that only “secret” items are regulated by 2013 Decree. Furthermore, 2013 Decree (as developed in the explanation) provides for an important legislative framework on corruption risks as well as provisions on how to mitigate them (through, for example, Art. 30 on the code of ethics).

It is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness both of the 2016 (1) and 2013 Decrees (2). However, some indirect evidence shows that the procurement process may have improved since the State Inspectorate General audited the Ministry of Defence expenditures in 2016 (3). According to an interviewee, procedures are closely followed and purchases of items that do not fall under “classified” security and defence category (for instance spoons, pencils, but also government fleet vehicles) are not covered by the 2013 Decree, but by the general 2016 Code for Public Procurement (3). Moreover, Art. 2 of the 2013 Decree specifically states that the defence and security procurement process requires confidentiality and is not compatible with publicity for the sake of protection of state interests (2). Therefore, given the confidentiality of the procurement procedures, corruption risks remain high. Hence, there may be exceptions to defence purchases. The assessor found no evidence of how significant these may be.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Nigeria has a Public Procurement Act (PPA) which governs all procurements by public entities. However, the military and security establishments and institutions are expressly excluded from the scope of the legislation subject to the discretion of the president. There is no clarity on how that discretion is to be exercised in practice. “The provisions of this Act shall apply to all procurement of goods, works, and services carried out by: The Federal Government of Nigeria and all procurement entities” (1), (2).

The Public Procurement Act of 2007 expressly excludes the defence sector and is subject to the president’s discretion (1). In practice, this suggests that some aspects of the legislation may be followed while other aspects are not followed. Therefore, no general procurement rules exist in the defence sector. However, there is no express reference to corruption risks in the issues dealt with by the Procurement Department of the MOD (2).

The case of the NIA Director and the IKOYI money suggests that there are regular exceptions to the procurement requirements in legislation and that they are significant in terms of the number and scale (1). “In relation to the procurement of defense-related goods, it must be noted that the exclusion for national defense appears to be related only to what is often referred to as “hard [defense] material” or weapons and ammunition; the PPA will apply to procurements by the MOD and the armed forces when the procurement is not for special goods involving national defense or security” (2, p.69). In other words, the PPA regulates the purchase of civil or commercial items by the MOD and the armed forces. Weapons acquisitions are treated differently.

Furthermore, where the approval of the president has been sought and obtained, a procuring authority is required to use the appropriate procurement procedure under the PPA (2).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. Defence and national security purchases are made in accordance with the Law on Public Procurement (LPP). This Law outlines the country’s public acquisition processes including the defence ones and offers guidelines for thorough and elaborated public procurement systems and procedures [1]. Exemptions with regards confidential items in defence procurement are covered in Articles 6-11 of the Law. Generally, these exemption cases are linked to:
Protecting the disclosure of sensitive information which would be contrary to the basic security interests of the country (Article 6);
Contracts classified as a “State secret” by a competent authority in accordance with the regulations on classified information (Article 7);
Contracts for the needs of the Army in humanitarian or peace operations and collective defence operations outside the territory of the Republic (Article 9).
These exceptions notably introduce differentiated procurement legislation in the field of defence which which leaves many decisions to the discretion of the Ministry of Defence as a contracting authority [2]. Discretional powers are underlined in Article 6/1 of the Law on Public Procurement. This Article states that all procurements (including confidential ones) are to be planned annually by the Ministry of Defence and submitted to the government by June each year. Additionally, Article 6/2 states that it is the Government’s responsibility to determine the procurements according to Article 6/1. The Government thus has the final say on confidential procurements and decides which will be exempt from the Law in order to protect national security interests.
In 2019 the national legal framework has been updated by a new Law on Public Procurement [3], which increases transparency of the process and by a new Law on Public Procurement in the Defence and Security, harmonized with the EU defence procurement directives. [4]

The 2012 Law on Public Procurement is strict, although does not specifically address corruption risks [1]. Article 146 demands exclusion of the bidding party when the latter has been involved in corruption activities within the last 5 years. Article 147 expands on this and demands the exclusion of the bidding party if it fails to submit a statement proving the party has not been prosecuted or sentenced for corruption activities; has unpaid taxes and other public duties; has a minor sentence and a ban on participation in public procurement procedures, awarding public procurement contracts and contracts for public private partnership; has a sanction for misconduct and a temporary ban on performing a public activity; has given false data or has failed to provide the data required by the contracting authority. To negate all these corrupt activities and to prove its legal and financial standing, the bidding party has to submit appropriate and legally verified statements. These statements must be no more than 6 months old. In addition to this, Articles 148 to 151 require the reviewing of the overall economic and financial standing of the bidding party. Finally, Article 175 stipulates the need for a total lack of conflicts of interest.
In 2019 the national legal framework has been updated by a new Law on Public Procurement [3], which increases transparency of the process and by a new Law on Public Procurement in the Defence and Security, harmonized with the EU defence procurement directives. [4]
The 2012 and 2019 Laws on Public Procurement as well as the Law on Public Procurement in the Defence and Security recognise the risk of direct corruption in a very narrow range, eliminating bidding parties sanctioned for corrutpion activities. They do contain many transparency and fair competition measures, which reduces the risk of corruption, too.

The procurement legislation in the defence sector is actively followed. The 2012 Law on Public Procurement produced a comprehensive public procurement system, the implementation of which is hard to avoid [1]. Procurement processes in the defence and security sectors was announced using the Electronic System for Public Procurement. The use of this electronic system is mandatory for all published listings [2]. In addition to this Law, the Ministry of Defence followed a Rulebook on Procurement, updated in February 2018, which further specifies the necessary procurement procedures [3]. However, there were rather striking disparity of the requirements when it comes to confidential defence procurements, and the vague definition and subsequent interpretation of ‘confidential’ brought into question these defence procurement procedures. As noted by the Difi report in 2015, “the wrongful interpretation of Articles 6-11 of the Law on Public Procurement that provide for substantial exceptions is so widespread that even non-sensitive procurement in the field of defence is often wrongly excluded from public procurement rules” [4].
In February 2019 a new Law on Public Procurement was adopted, increasing significantly transparency in public procurements. As part of the procurement procedure, now in addition to the contract award notice the electronic procurement system shall also include the contents of the contract, the technical specification and the financial bid of the bidders. The value of the contract executed shall be also published. If the value is lower than the total value of the contract, an explanation shall also be published. The objects of procurement are declassified. All procurement notices are publicly available, and only the technical specification can be classified. Procurements above a certain value threshold are also published in the European Public Procurement Gazette. [5]
Additionally, in September 2019 a new Law on Public Procurement in the Defence and Security, harmonized with the European Law was adopted. [6] To facilitate the implementation of both laws, New Guidance on Public Procurement was adopted in September 2019. [8]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. Procurement in the defence sector is regulated by the Norwegian Public Procurement Act of 16 July 1999 (LOA), with the corresponding Public Procurement Regulation (FOA) and Defence and Security Procurement Regulation (FOSA) [1, 2, 3]. FOSA represents an implementation of the EU Defence Procurement Directive and applies to the procurement of specific defence and security material, and construction work or services in direct relation to such, unless Article 123 of the European Economic Area Agreement provides for an exemption [3, 4]. Article 123 applies to procurements that are exempt due to essential security interests. Such procurements are regulated by the Acquisition Regulations for the Defence Sector Defence (ARF), an internal instruction for the Ministry of Defence and its agencies [5]. In addition, the National Security Act applies where the procurement procedure requires a security classification [3].

The Public Procurement Regulation (§9-5), [1] Defence and Security Procurement Regulation (§11-12), [2] and the Acquisition Regulations for the Defence Sector (§38-8) [3] all contain anti-corruption provisions. They stipulate that offers from companies convicted of corruption shall be rejected. In addition, the Acquisition Regulations for the Defence Sector (§2-13) states that defence sector employees who commit corruption are subject to §387, §388 and §389 of the Penal Code, which specify punishments for corruption, aggravated corruption and trading in influence. The Acquisition Regulations for the Defence Sector (§2-18) also refers to the Working Environment Act and states that any attempt at corruption or extortion shall be reported to the head of unit. It commits the defence sector to take measures to prevent corruption (§3-2). The preventive measures may include internal controls, ethical guidelines and reporting channels.

A review of parliamentary documents, the Office of the Auditor General’s reports and media articles shows that there is no indication that the existing legislation is not implemented and followed for all defence procurements.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Oman has no legislation within the country that covers defence and national security purchases. However, there is an internal policy of defence purchases that covers some part of logistics and small weapons, but no major purchases (1), (2), (3). There is no legislation concerning defence spending; no information is available on defence and national security spending (4), (5), (6). The independent tender board overseeing procurement and contracts does not apply to the Ministry of Defence or the Royal Oman Police, which have separate tender boards (7). Within the office of secretary-general of the Ministry of Defence, there is a Directorate-General Procurement and Contracts which includes a Directorate of Purchasing, however, no information regarding the legal mandate of this directorate is available (8).

Oman has no defence specific legislation that covers defence and national security procurement; therefore assessing its comprehensiveness is irrelevant in this context.

This sub-indicator has been marked as Not Applicable, as Oman has no legislation that covers defence and national security procurement.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Palestine has no military or defence legislation that covers defence and national forces purchases. Instead (since 2006), there is the general supplies and procurement law within MoF, which manages defence purchases within the national forces and other PA institutions (2). As the there is no Ministry of Defence, and no stand-alone military budget, the budget of the military and security agencies are included within MoF’s PA budget and falls under the law of the MoF of the PA. The only security agency that has a separate law is the intelligence agency, which has legislation No. 4 (2007) and No. 5 (2007). The rest of the security apparatuses follow the general regulations. None of the laws mentions corruption explicitly as a risk; instead, they have articles that focus on procedural issues such as conflict of interest (1).

Palestine has no legislation covering the security and national forces apparatuses (except the intelligence agency), which refers to corruption risks. The general law of the PA does not mention corruption explicitly as a severe risk (1).

Security sector and national forces purchases are procured in line with the legislation of the MoF (2). However, there are a few exceptions that are procured apart from this legislation. Such as acquiring materials that are less than a specific amount of money (not identified and changeable based on a PM decree). Additionally, the intelligence agencies have their own decree that covers procurement and the financial management of the agency. It was issued by presidential order in 2007 (1).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. Legislation exists and is clear and comprehensive in nature. See for example the Republic Act No. 9184 (Government Procurement Reform Act), revised IRR and Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft And Corrupt Practices Act) [1, 2, 3].

Corruption risks are identified in legislation and are also specified in bidding documents [1]. Legislation has introduced two measures to ensue transparency and accountability. The first measure was to create an electronic portal that serves as the primary and definitive source of information on government procurement (PhilGEPS, Philippine Government Electronic Procurement System) and enables suppliers, contractors, manufacturers, distributors, and consultants to register in the conduct of procurement business [2,3]. The second measure was to establish the Government Procurement Policy Board (GPPB), an inter-agency body that formulates and amends public procurement policies [4]. The procuring entity has also established a monitoring and evaluation system for contract implementation [5].

Audit reports reveal there have been instances where the Defence Department has not conducted procurements in line with legislation [1, 2]. In some of his speeches, the President has supported the bypassing of government bidding rules [3]. In 2017, the Duterte administration issued Executive Order No. 18 repealing EO 235 of 2003 that gave the defense chief the authority to sign defense contracts below P50 million [4]. The defense department explained that EO18 allows the armed forces to approve its own procurement, even for projects worth more P50 million or more [5].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

The issues of awarding public contracts in the defence and security are generally regulated by the provisions of the Act of 29 January 2004 on Public Procurement Law and Chapter 4a (Section III) of this act [1]. Exemptions from these provisions are based on the provisions of Directive 2009/81/WE of the European Parliament and the European Council [2, 3].
Both the directive, based on the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 346 and others, as well as the Polish Public Procurement Law (Article 4 point 5), give the opportunity – under some restrictions – to exclude from the scope of their application some classified, security or arms procurements.

Legislation on defence procurements is part of the Public Procurement Act, based on EU procurement directives. It covers some direct and indirect anti-corruption issues, such as the need to make a declaration of absence of conflict of interest, the need for written and procedural reporting, the principle of “many eyes” (approval by or participation of at least one more staff) in the public procurement procedures (tender commission). Additionally, the act impose several formal obligations on the contractor, which must show, among other things that the representatives of the contractor’s management and supervisory bodies have not been convicted of corruption offences, which determines further participation in the proceedings [1].
However, there are some weaknesses of the implementation of the EU procurement directive to the Polish legislation. One of them is the absence of the directive’s provision stated in articles 26(4) and 35(5), which allows exclude tender if there is an evidence of corruption, even without court verdict. [2].

It is worth adding that significant part (see 57C) of defence procurements is excluded from the Public Procurement Law and is subject of internal MoD legislation, namely Decision No. 367/MON. [3] In this case some direct and indirect anti-corrutpion measures are included to the procurement rules, as declarations on conflict of interests, exlusion of companies with board members convicted of corruption and anti-corrutpion clauses to be included in contracts. [3,4]

Legislation on defence procurements is part of the Public Procurement Act. It specifies a set of cases when the provisions of the act do not apply. One of them is the case of protection of the essential interests of state security, as it is provided in Article 336 of the Treaty on Functioning of the EU [1] and EU procurement directives. In that case, Decision No. 367/MON of the defence minister applies to the procurement procedures [2, 3].
Analysis of the Public Procurement Office report on 2017 indicates that 54% procurements (by volume) were awarded in line with the Public Procurement Act The rest (46%) were excluded, most of them due to protection of the essential interests of state security (31% of the total volume) [4]. According to MoD anti-corruption unit the volume of purchases excluded from the Public Procurement Act is 38%. [5]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. The Public Procurement Code provides a clear framework for all procurement procedures [1]. Defence procurement is regulated under Decree-Law 104/2011, which resulted from EU Directive 2009/81/CE [2] and applies to the defence and security sector.

Decree-Law 104/2011, which established the concrete framework of defence procurement in Portugal, makes no mention of corruption or assorted procurement risks [1].

There is no extensive monitoring of defence and security procurement. Public procurement in Portugal is reviewed ex-ante and audited ex-post by the Court of Accounts [1, 2]. There is evidence of some irregularities in procurement in the defence and security sector [3, 4], but their extent is unclear, and current systems prevent a full-scale diagnosis.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Qatar has no defence legislation that covers defence and national security purchases [1,2]. The defence and military sectors are excluded from state Law Governing and Auctions (The Tender Law) Law No. 24 (2015), and defence institutions report directly to the Emir [3,4,5]. Article 1 of the law states that: ’the provisions of the annexed Law regulating tenders and auctions shall come to force and shall apply to all ministries, other prospective governmental bodies, and all public institutions and authorities, provided that these provisions do not conflict with the laws and decisions establishing thereof. The following shall be excluded from the scope of the application thereof: ‘(1) the Armed Forces and the Police, in respect of procurement of materials and contracts deemed to be of a confidential nature, for their identification and regulations of conditions of tenders and contracts thereof a decision from the Emir, and (2) Qatar Petroleum’ [4]. There is also no evidence of an independent defence legislation governing defence and security procurement. There are internal guidelines within the MoD and the armed forces, but not legislation [1,2].

Qatar has no procurement legislation that covers defence and national security procurement [1,2,3,4,5].

This sub-indicator has been marked as Not Applicable, as Qatar has no procurement legislation that covers defence and national security procurement [1,2,3,4,5], and thus assessing its effectiveness is irrelevant in this context.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Federal Law No. 44 ‘On the Contract System for the Procurement of Goods, Work and Services to Meet State and Municipal Needs’ covers all public procurement [1]. Article 1 states that the law aims to provide transparency and openness for procurement process and to prevent corruption and other abusive practices when planning purchases, contracting suppliers, etc. [1]. Section 3, Articles 84-92, stipulates the rules for closed procedures of determining suppliers in accordance with rules on state secrets [1]. Since the amendment of December 31, 2017, Section 3 also refers to procurement by federal institutions in the defence sector [1].

Similarly, contract purchases for federal services, including the defence sector, are covered by Federal Law No. 223 ‘On the Procurement of Goods and Services by Legal Entities’ [2]. Article 3.5 ‘On requirements for closed competitive procurement procedures’ describes procurement procedures involving information that is either deemed a state secret or for which a close procedure is deemed necessary by the Russian Government [2].

Finally, Federal Law No. 275 ‘On State Defence Orders’ [3] focuses specifically on defence procurement, covering items that are classified under Federal Law No. 5485-1 ‘On State Secrets’ [4].

Federal Law No. 44 ‘On the Contract System for the Procurement of Goods, Work and Services to Meet State and Municipal Needs’ states that it aims to provide transparency and openness for procurement process and to prevent corruption and other abusive practices when planning purchases, contracting suppliers, etc. [1]. Similarly, Article 1, Clause 1 of Federal Law No. 223 ‘On the Procurement of Goods and Services by Legal Entities’ claims that the law’s goals include promoting effective money management, developing bona fide competition, providing openness and transparency for procurement processes and preventing corruption and other abuses [2].

However, the main law on defence and security procurement, the Federal Law No. 275 ‘On State Defence Orders’ makes no reference to corruption risks [3].

On the one hand, the legislation seems to be implemented, regardless of its flaws. For example, since the new anti-corruption amendments to Federal Law No. 275 came into effect on September 1, 2015, there have been several journalist reports on how the new legislation has confused procurement order procedures [1,2]. In particular, there were reports on the inability of suppliers to open accounts in one of the shortlisted banks chosen for participation in GOZ [3]. Also, journalists and the Federal Antimonopoly Service have reported a continuing tendency to carry out procurement tenders with a single supplier [4,5]. Such findings have given rise to discussions about additional amendments to the law [6,7].

On the other hand, the implementation of legislation on the procurement of secret items, covered by the law on State Defence Order, is impossible to control. All information about secret items is disclosed under the federal law ‘On State Secrets’ [8]. There is a significant number of secret items in the defence sector.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Saudi Arabia has legislation that addresses defence procurement, in its Government Tenders and Procurement Law (1), (2), which was issued by royal decree in 2006 (3). The country also became a party to the WTO’s Government Procurement Agreement in 2007, which establishes rules requiring free and transparent competition in government procurement bidding practices (4). However, Article 47 of the Government Tenders and Procurement Law exempts weapons and military equipment sales, stating that,
“Weapons and military equipment and their spare parts by direct purchase from manufacturers. The best offer serving public interest shall be selected by a ministerial committee formed for this purpose by a royal decree of at least three members in addition to its chairman. It shall then bring its recommendations before the President of the Council of Ministers for approval.” (3)
Our sources confirm that this law covers all purchases, except weapons and military equipment, but in many cases, the process which the law defines is also used when buying weapons (2). There is also legislation prohibiting the use of intermediaries in defence procurements. Specifically, Council of Ministers Resolution No. 1275 (1975) bans the use of agents or any kind of broker in sales of armaments or military equipment, regardless of whether the contract has been concluded between the foreign entity and the Saudi Arabian government directly or via a third-party State (5), (6).

There is no mention of corruption risks in Saudi-based legislation that covers defence and national security procurement. According to our sources, there are mentions of corruption and corruption risks in the legislation (1), (2), (3).

According to our sources, there are consistent and common exceptions within defence procurements in the defence sector. This includes strategic purchases, and the more usual logistical, and routine purchases such as food and clothes. The exceptions are issued by senior commanders, crown prince and head of brigades and operations, especially in the field in Yemen and the borders of Yemen (1), (2), (3). There have been regular exceptions to the requirements outlined in Saudi legislation covering defence and security procurement. As laws governing military and defence procurement are incomprehensive, disaggregated, and contain significant exemptions. In reality, most Saudi defence procurement is not subject to general procurement decrees and regulations. Most procurement deals are negotiated on a case-by-case basis (4). As referenced in the 2015 report, a notable example is the case of Prince Khalid bin Sultan (then-deputy defence minister), who made a large purchase of missiles from China in 2013, apparently without the knowledge of other officials in the Ministry of Defence (5). This eventually led to his resignation but demonstrates the degree to which major decisions are often made autonomously and are not part of a formal process (6).

Furthermore, in practice, the use of intermediaries in defence procurement has historically been widespread in Saudi Arabia, contrary to what is stipulated in the Council of Ministers resolution No 1275. Prominent examples include high-profile former intermediaries who were close to power brokers in Saudi Arabia, such as Adnan Khashoggi and Wafic Said, and more recently Salah Fustok (7), (8), (9). Nonetheless, there is evidence that Crown Prince, Minister of Defence and de facto ruler Mohammed bin Salman has actively been side-lining some of these erstwhile key figures and intermediaries that were responsible for negotiating major contracts between the Saudi military and foreign companies. This is in line with his overall efforts to both consolidate power while overhauling and streamline key government ministries, sectors and processes as part of his Vision 2030 reform program. As part of this, he is seeking to streamline procurement processes by establishing two new military industry bodies: Saudi Arabian Military Industries (SAMI) in May 2017, and the General Authority for Military Industries in August the same year (10), (11). In theory, GAMI will be a one-stop-shop for procurement, and all deals will have to go through that body. It is unclear if there is any legislation governing GAMI’s powers, or to what extent it will supersede the use of intermediaries in military procurement.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

The defence and security procurement legislation is fairly comprehensive and in line with the relevant EU directives. The Serbian Public Procurement Law (PPL), in force since 2013, recognizes two categories of procurement in defence and security: 1) Public procurement in defence and security, and 2) Procurement in defence and security exempted from the PPL [1]. Public procurement in defence and security are further regulated by a regulation enacted in 2014 and amended in 2015 [2] that lists all goods, works and services that are to be procured by this specific, semi-confidential procedure. The regulation also stipulates how secret data is handled, procedures to be used and the form of reporting on these procurements.
The second type of confidential procurements recognized in PPL are the procurements in defence and security exempted from the PPL. The PPL lists the exemptions that justify the fully secret procedure. These exemptions concern procurements a) via international agreements, b) exclusively for intelligence activities, c) implemented abroad for security purposes, d) for international R&D programme, e) by approval of the government for cases when the use of open procedures would reveal information critically important for the security [1]. This last exemption can be misused by the government. What is particularly concerning, is that the draft new law on public procurement drastically relaxes conditions under which contracting can be exempt from the law. Namely, it contains an article vaguely defining possibility for exemptions in cases when ʻcrucialʼ national security interests would be harmed by implementing the law [3]. However, it is not expressed who decides about exemptions (e.g. government/National Assembly/etc.) and which criteria are used for decisions that are made, which could open a vast space for abuse.

The law recognizes corruption risks in this field only superficially but has some provisions that can be used to address the risk of corruption. The PPL prescribes that, in the case of public procurements in defence and security, the contracting authority is obligated to prevent the conflict of interest, ensure the competition (when possible) and for the contracted price be same or lower than the comparable market price. The procurement in defence and security exempted from the PPL is not regulated against corruption risks, except by the mechanism of the parliamentary oversight covering both types of procurement. The PPL mandates that the contracting authority submits the report on implemented procurements for the previous year to the competent parliamentary committee [1]. This report should contain the information on the object of procurement, type of procedure used, submitted bids, criteria for selection, selected contract and recommendations for improving the system. Unfortunately, there are no anti-corruption clauses that can prevent the government from misusing the exemption clause in Article 128. Furthermore, the proposed legislative changes described in 57A could open up a vast space for abuse.

The State Audit Institution performed an audit of the Security Information Agency in 2017. Some conclusions on the state of the implementation practice of the procurements in security and defence can be drawn from this report. In the report, the SAI explicitly mentions the problematic formulation of the government conclusion, that enables the usage of the procurement exception solely based on a general definition “other goods and services appropriate to the function of the Agency” [1]. This “catch-all” definition of the exception is against the specific regulation in the PPL and presents a threat to the integrity of the security and defence procurement process. Until proven otherwise, there is a danger that this approach to the exceptions is also applied in defence and interior affairs.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Defence procurement is clearly legislated, well organised and based on rigorous technical evaluations. The procurement system is ISO‐9000 certified and is underpinned by legislation, including the Defence Science and Technology Agency (DSTA) Act 2000 [1]. Although defence procurement procedures are not wholly transparent not generally a matter for public debate, MINDEF has in place an elaborate system of checks and balances to ensure a high level of accountability. For example, contractors, are required to adhere to the Competition Act, which guards against collusive bidding, abuse of position, and other anti‐competitive conduct [2]. It has punished defence procurement officers found to have breached confidentiality and/or involved in corruption. A robust system of rotation is in place whereby procurement officers change positions and are subject to security vetting regularly [3]. Independent audits on defence procurement processes are also regularly conducted by internal and external agencies [4].

DSTA legislation does not make reference to corruption and there is no specific legislation that governs corruption in defence procurement activities risks. However, the Prevention of Corruption Act (PCA) clearly states the risks of corruption to the country’s economic wellbeing and geopolitical standing, as well as governs and defines the primary offences of corruption in Singapore and their penalties while laying out the powers granted to the principal enforcement agency, the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) [1], Internal and external audits by the Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) and the DSTA acknowledge corruption risks and clearly state their respective policies to mitigate such occurrences [2, 3].

There is historical and recent evidence to suggest that the MINDEF and the DSTA have consistently delivered major acquisition programmes in line with stated policies and outlined strategic requirements while adhering to relevant legislation such as the PCA [1, 2]. There have nevertheless been instances of malpractice and corruption, but these have been isolated cases and have been publicly reported [3].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

According to Interviewee 2, defence and security procurement is split into two overarching categories. Procurement: which pertains to regular non-strategic items (eg catering, fuel, etc) is largely governed by regular government procurement legislation. This takes the form of the Public Finance Management Act 1999 (PFMA) [1]. PFMA stipulates a requirement for all corruption risks to be reported in full to the relevant board or committee [2]. It should be noted that the Defence Acquisition Handbook (DAHB) 1000, according to interviewee 2, is a primary guidance tool for acquisitions of armaments [3].

The second legislative form of procurement is termed ‘acquisitions” and details larger strategically-vital purchases of major systems, such as naval vessels, armaments, aircraft and so on. This is detailed in the Defence Acquisitions Handbook 1000 (DAHB 1000) [4] which, according to interviewee 2, is the contemporary legislative guidebook on managing these acquisitions as well as regulating corruption risks [2].

According to interviewee 2, the DAHB 1000 and general acquisitions process is an improvement over previous acquisitions policies in terms of corruption enforcement. The DAHB 1000 contains a section on “risk management” that outlines a multi-point plan aimed at identifying and eliminating risks related to acquisitions. It should be noted, however, that at no point is the word “corruption” specifically mentioned in the handbook, but is largely covered by the above-mentioned risk mitigation process [1].

The DAHB 1000 and the overarching acquisitions process is a new policy and thus has not had many significant tests in terms of its resilience. Large scale under-funding of the SDA and the Department of Defence, in general, has significantly reduced any new acquisitions. Procurement, however, has had several breaches of the PFMA and general openness requirements for the tender process in South Africa [1, 2]. There is no known exemption to the requirements of the PFMA. However, S3 of the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act does allow the minister to exempt a supplier from its requirements in the case of ‘national security’ [3].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
In South Korea, all defence and national security purchases are subject to the Defence Acquisition Programme Act. Therefore, there are no exemptions under the terms of the Act. [1]

The Act addresses corruption risks in procurement and recognises potential corruption issues involving suppliers and intermediaries. Article 26-2 of Enforcement Decree of the Defence Acquisition Program Act states that international defence suppliers and contractors should work together with intermediaries formally registered in DAPA, avoiding potential corruption risks related to intermediaries. Also, Article 68-5 of the Act requires all defence intermediaries to disclose commissions that receive from their clients when importing defence arms from abroad. If corrupt activities of suppliers are detected, they will be restricted from participating in bidding for up to 5 years, based on Article 70 of the Act. [1] According to DAPA, these clauses were amended to ensure transparency of the procurement process and prevent corruption from colluding with suppliers and intermediaries to inflate the cost of defence arms. [2]

A review of media sources, analyses of the legislation and interviews with multiple defence experts indicate that the measure is effective in the defence procurement sector. The strong punishment of restriction from bidding participation in the long-term may discourage people from engaging in corrupt activities in terms of defence contractors. [1] [2] According to Article 59 of the Act, a defence contractor who breaches the law will be prohibited from participating in bidding for up to 5 years, which is a very strong sanction. [3]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

A procurement law was passed in 2018 and covers the security and defence sector comprehensively. [1] It outlines steps on how government departments should undertake contracting.

The legislation outlines policies for procuring and disposing of assets. It establishes the South Sudan Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets Authority, [2] which is yet to become operational. Nevertheless, the Act obliges the Defence Ministry to have an accounting officer, a procurement committee, a verification and acceptance committee, a procurement unit and an evaluation committee. [3]

Corruption is not discussed as the main premise for enacting the Act. In other words, the Act does not originate from the premise that corruption is a cancer in South Sudanese society that needs to be addressed. In this manner, although it alludes to the need for “transparency” and “accountability,” its raison d’etre is not the prolific corruption in the country. [1] The Act’s authors do not even state that corruption is a problem. The preamble of the Act is silent on the problem of corruption in the country. As such, the Act is more concerned with tackling effects, rather than the root cause. [2]

The Procurement Act was signed into law on April 26, 2019. A key stipulation in the Act is the establishment of the South Sudan Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets Authority. [1] The objectives of this key institution are to regulate the processes for the procurement and disposal of assets, to advise government departments, to ensure a transparent and fair process, to harmonise procurement and disposal of assets processes, and to ensure adequate staffing for procuring entities. [2]

With regard to the effectiveness of the legislation, one major concern comes up: since President Salva Kiir signed the act on April 26, 2019, the South Sudan Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets Authority is yet to be established. [2] Given the major supervisory role of the Authority over procurement units in government, which entails the establishment of standards, its absence is a major dent in the effectiveness of the Act. [3]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Law 24/2011, of 1 August, regulates contracts in the public domain in the areas of defence and security. It was last updated on 31 December 2019 [1]. There are also several laws [2], Royal Decrees [3, 4, 5] and Defence Orders [6] that regulate procurement. However, Article 7 of Law 24/2011 excludes a number of contracts, including contracts that have a specific award procedure regulated in any of the following regulatory bodies such as international agreements, conventions, or treaties, among others. Contracts that require the revealing of information contrary to the essential interests of security, or in accordance with Article 346 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which includes: contracts for intelligence and counterintelligence activities; contracts awarded within the framework of a cooperation programme based on the research and development of a new product and, where appropriate, also related to its life cycle or parts of the said cycle, provided that at least two member states of the EU participate in the programme; contracts awarded where the armed forces are deployed outside of the EU; contracts to acquire or lease land, existing buildings, or other real estate; contracts between governments on sensitive equipment, works, and services; arbitration and conciliation services; financial services, except insurance services; employment contracts; and certain research and development services [1]. It should be noted that to resort to Article 346 may be significant as evidenced by the contract in economic terms regarding the Wheeled Combat Vehicle (VRC) 8×8 [7]. Resorting to this article as a means to avoid information disclosure is considered contrary to the “essential interests of security”.

Neither Law 24/2011 (the main legal framework) [1] nor the Royal Decrees 1011/2013 [2], 945/2001 [3], 1120/1977 [4], or Order DEF/2021/2011 [5] include a single mention of the words “corrupción” (corruption), “integridad” (integrity, in the sense of corruption), “soborno” (bribe), “fraude” (fraud), “regalo”/”dádiva” (gift), “compensación” (compensation), or any words that are derived from them. Organic Law 8/2014 (on the disciplinary regime for the armed forces) also deals with the behaviour of the military regarding procurement and states in Article 8.16 “very serious offense” (“falta muy grave”): “The infringement or improper application of the rules that regulate the administrative contracting procedures, committed intentionally or due to gross negligence in any kind of contract that affects the military administration, provided that damage to the public interest or damage to individuals is caused” [6]. Some contracts include anti-collusion clauses.

A significant number of cases of corruption in defence purchases have been reported by the media in the last decade. Whilst there is no reason to challenge that defence purchases are generally procured in line with legislation, some of the cases of corruption are extremely relevant and significant. Moreover, Law 24/2011 does not apply to a significant economic volume of defence procurement (see Art. 7 on exclusions detailed previously). Many other relevant recent cases of corruption include Defex [1, 2], Gómez Ulla military hospital [3, 4], and the Spanish Air Force base in Getafe [5].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. Sudan does not have any sector-specific procurement laws that cover defence and security procurement, but Parliament did pass the Sudan Public Procurement, Contracting and Disposal of Public Assets Act of 2010, which, according to Article 2(d), shall be applied to ‘purchases of defence and national security agencies’. Article 2 also refers to the possible existence of a ‘list of restricted procurements’ that could be identified in the legislation or in regulations following on from the legislation [1]. The content of the Act includes articles covering the powers and structure of the General Administration and its state-level units, the role of procurement committees, principles of procurement and procurement processes (including qualifying and pre-qualifications for suppliers and contractors, announcements of tenders and contents of bid documents, determination of the validity of bids and the evaluation criteria to assess them, award of contract, banning of contractors, equipment source selection, advisory services source selection, international procurement and monitoring contracts).

The titles of these articles are as follows:
42 – Instructions for bidders and general conditions.
43 – Contracting with advisory bodies.
44 – Selection of advisors.
45 – Methods for implementing advisory services.
46 – Stages of selecting advisory services.
Chapter 10: Other Procurement Methods
47- Limited International Competition.
48 – Local competitive offers.
49 – International purchase.
50 – Local purchase.
51 – Direct work.
52 – Direct purchase.
53 – Cancellation of the contract.
54 – Fraud and Corruption.
55 – Actions affecting the public servant.
56 – Employee behaviour and interest disclosure.
57 – Establishment of criminal procedures.
58 – Right of review and appeal.
59 – Review and appeal with the mediation of the purchasing or certifying authority.
60 – The Supreme Appeals Committee.
61- Procedures for hearing the appeal.
62 – Suspension of procurement procedures.
63 – Financial Penalties.
64 – Compensation.
65 – Fines.
66 – Exemption from fines.
67 – Determination of demurrage rates.
68 – Extending the contract period in cases of delay.
69 – Delay in supplying or rejecting equipment without harming the administrative body.
70 – The whole supply contracts are indivisible.
71 – How to apply the partial fines for cleaning, maintenance and other operations.
72 – Delay penalty in public works contracts.
Technical Unit
73 – The Technical Unit for Inventorying Governmental Assets.
74 – Tasks of the technical unit.
75- The technical unit authorities.
76 – The organisational structure of the technical unit.
77 – Cases of disposal of assets.
78 – Sale procedures.
79 – Announcing the sale.
80 – Methods of sale.
81- Principles and Codes of Ethical Conduct.
82 – Crimes and penalties.
83 – Power to issue regulations, orders and rules [1].

Note: the transitional government that was established in 2019 has not yet appointed a legislature capable of making or amending laws and the transitional Constitution does not require the popular election of a new legislature until at least late 2022 [2].

Although the Public Procurement, Contracting and Disposal of Public Assets Act mentions articles entitled ‘Fraud and Corruption (Article 54), ‘Actions affecting the public servant’ (Article 55), ‘Employee behaviour and interest disclosure (Article 56), ‘Establishment of criminal procedures’ (Article 57), ‘Principles and Codes of Ethical Conduct (Article 81) and ‘Crimes and penalties’ (Article 81), the actual Arabic text of the legislation available online only expands upon Articles 1-43 [1]. It is not clear whether or not the text was ever adapted to expand on the articles following Article 43. Sudan’s Criminal Code identifies and covers corruption in the form of active and passive bribery of public officials, alongside major forms of corrupt activity, including extortion, criminal breach of trust, embezzlement and any other wrongdoing for personal enrichment regarding public property with which they are entrusted, which are criminalised in the public sector [2].

Sudan’s defence procurement activites are highly secretive. Historically, Sudan’s defence sector institutions and informal affiliates have obtained revenue via transactions – formal and informal, licit and illicit – conducted directly or via businesses that they own; thus, individual military elements are often able to conduct their own procurement activities without the involvement of the Ministries of Defence or Finance. With respect to former President Bashir’s regime, GAN Integrity noted that Sudan’s Criminal Code identifies and covers corruption in the form of active and passive bribery of public officials, alongside major forms of corrupt activity, including extortion, criminal breach of trust, embezzlement and any other wrongdoing for personal enrichment regarding public property with which they are entrusted, which are criminalised in the public sector [1]. Two experts on Sudan’s post-Bashir defence sector explained that the revenue, expenditure and procurement activities of the defence sector’s military elements are totally opaque, often not only to the Ministry of Finance but also to the Ministry of Defence, and there is no transparency in the procurement processes that are actually used by the Ministry of Defence or the individual military elements that run their own budgets [2,3]. Information about Sudan’s defence procurement processes could not be found on the websites of the Ministry of Defence [4] (which is no longer in operation), the Ministry of Interior [5] or the Ministry of Finance [6].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Sweden has clear and comprehensive legislation that covers all defence and national security purchases. Contracts that are subject to confidentiality with regard to national security are procured in accordance with the Law on Public Procurement in the Defence and Security Area, adopted in 2011 [1]. All other procurements not subject to confidentiality are governed by the general Law on Public Procurement, last amended in 2016 [2].

The Law on Public Procurement in the Defence and Security Area [1] includes a section on ‘Conditions that shall result in the exclusion of suppliers’. However, this section only superficially recognises risks of corruption by making reference to the European Council Framework Decision 2003/568/RIF [2] from 2003 on combating corruption in the private sector, and does not in itself offer any clear provisions on how to mitigate corruption-related risks.

The legislation on defence procurement appears to be thoroughly implemented and followed for all defence procurement, as Swedish National Audit Office (NAO) has reported no errors in their audits inthe defence sector during the studied period [1] (see also Q63).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. Until the end of 2020, legislation was in place to exempt the “procurement of weapons, ammunition or other war materiel”, as well as other procurements with a military purpose (Article 3e) [1]. However, as of 1 January 2021, a revised version of the Federal Act of Public Procurement (BöB) include provisions for defence procurement to some extent by stipulating certain award procedures for such circumstances [2, 3]. The new law does exempt public contracts in situations where it “is deemed necessary for the protection and maintenance of external or internal security or public order” (Art. 10.4) [2].

Under revised legislation that came into force on 1 January 2021, certain provisions are in place to cover the “procurement of weapons, ammunition, war material” (Art. 20) [1]. The legislation (BöB) makes a clear reference to promoting “measures against corruption” (Art. 2, Art. 11) within the procurement process and defines criteria for exclusion in cases of corruption (Art. 45) [1, 2]. However, the BöB does not describe any specific measures to mitigate corruption risks beyond exclusion. Civil and military penal law has clear provisions concerning corruption, and it does also apply to public procurement. Anti-corruption legislation was updated in 2016 with more stringent rules (after previous revisions in 2000 and 2006 [3].

There is not enough information to score this indicator. Under revised legislation that came into force on 1 January 2021, certain provisions are in place to cover the “procurement of weapons, ammunition, war material” (Art. 20) [1]. However, there is a lack of data to assess effectivenesss due to the short timeframe since the law came into force.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Taiwan’s legal framework of government procurement falls under the umbrella of the “Government Procurement Act” [1]. The “Enforcement Rules of the Government Procurement Act” and “Regulations for Invitation to Tender and Award of Contract in Special Procurement” provide general mechanisms for preventative and corrective measures for corruption and bribery [2, 3]. All of these laws and regulations are applicable to personnel of the Ministry of National Defence and Taiwan’s armed forces with no exceptions. The armament procurement procedure conducted between Taiwan and the US is unique since the US has more administrative authority over Taiwan concerning processes, transactions, and deliveries. However, all armament procurements still follow the legal framework of Taiwan’s “Government Procurement Act”, “Enforcement Rules of the Government Procurement Act”, and “Regulations for Invitation to Tender and Award of Contract in Special Procurement” [1, 2, 3].

Risks of corruption and bribery are generally regulated by the legal framework of the “Government Procurement Act”, “Enforcement Rules of the Government Procurement Act”, and “Regulations for Invitation to Tender and Award of Contract in Special Procurement”. Although the term corruption appears only once, the general rules for improving fair competition decreases the risk of corruption simultaneously [1, 2]. However, risks of corruption and bribery are not considered within the “Regulations for Coverage and Handling of Special Military Procurement” [3].

There were 28,721 defence procurement cases from 2016 to 2019. Those cases were all implemented under the “Government Procurement Act” and sub-laws. [1, 2, 3].
The procurement information of public solicitation (a notice of open tender, award, effective assessment of special or large procurement, and debarred suppliers) is published on the “Government e-procurement System”. [4,5].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

The country has clear and comprehensive legislation that covers all public procurement, including defence and national security. However, under the Public Procurement Act 2004 including the Public Procurement Act 2011, Section 1(2-4) allows for approved exemptions for ‘National Security and Defence Organs’. [1]

Exemptions from public procurement procedures are granted for ‘dual lists’ for open and restricted procurement. It is not clear if there are explicit anti-corruption mechanisms in place for restricted procurement, other than over-arching anti-corruption legislation. [1] However, this legislation does superficially recognise corruption risk otherwise.

While a dual list has to be agreed with the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority, such lists are not disclosed and it is not possible to assess the actual oversight that the regulatory body has on this process. A military source says that use of that option is ‘minor’, [1] however public procurement regulations allow “Defence and Security Organs” to engage in restricted tendering, single source tendering, and competitive negotiation. [2] The Controller and Auditor General reports state that even for ‘open’ list items, procedures are not always followed. For example, in the year ending June 30, 2020, procurement of ‘garments, clothing, office furniture and other office supplies’ valued at over $240,000 was completed without competition,while a similar amount was spent on ‘building materials, spare parts and pump accessories’ without Tender Board approval, suggesting considerable weaknesses in basic procurement practice. [3] This suggests that procurement requirements are not always followed.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. In 2017, the Thai government passed a new law entitled ‘Public Procurement and Supplies Administration Act B.E.2560’, in addition to the existing Regulations of the Office of the Prime Minister on Procurement B.E.2535 (1992) and Regulation of the Office of the Prime Minister on Electronic Procurement B.E.2549 (2006), in an attempt to reduce the occurrence of public procurement fraud [1]. The Public Procurement and Supplies Administration Act 2017, Section 6, states that all state agencies, including the Ministry of Defence, must comply with the instructions and regulations under this Act in order to prevent corruption. The Act includes specific chapters focussing on anti-corruption measures, such as Chapter 1 (General Provisions), Chapter 2 (Participation by the Public and Business Operators in Anti-Corruption) and Chapter 3 Part 4 (Anti-Corruption Co-operation Committee) [2].

However, Section 7 states that this Act shall not apply to the procurement of armories and services related to national security by a government-to-government method or by procurement from a foreign country, meaning these items are entirely unregulated by any procurement law in Thailand [3].

According to the Public Procurement and Supplies Administration Act 2017, Section 6, all state agencies, including the Ministry of Defence, must comply with the instructions and regulations under this Act in order to prevent corruption. There are specific chapters focussing on anti-corruption measures, such as Chapter 1 (General Provisions), Chapter 2 (Participation by the Public and Business Operators in Anti-Corruption) and Chapter 3 Part 4 (Anti-Corruption Co-operation Committee) [1]. Even though the legislation does not stipulate clear provisions on corruption risk management, major sections of the Public Procurement Act are dedicated to details of how construction and supply contracts are made and managed; a form of contract prescribed by the policy committee plays an important role in the Act [2].

According to the Public Procurement and Supplies Administration Act 2017, Section 6, all state agencies, including the Ministry of Defence, must comply with the instructions and regulations under this Act in order to prevent corruption [1]. However, as reported by Watcharothai (2018), regarding the prevalence of gaps in the law entitled Public Procurement and Supplies Administration Act B.E. 2560, there are multiple gaps in the Act that could lead to public procurement corruption, including the exemption of certain procurement methods from compliance with the Public Procurement Act in [2]. This is illustrated by Section 7 of the Act, which states that this Act shall not apply to the procurement of armories and services related to national security by a government-to-government method or by procurement from a foreign country, for which the law provides otherwise.

Section 11 also exempts the issue of an annual procurement plan in the case of consultancy work related to national security [1]. For example, the purchase of Chinese submarines in 2017 was not accountable or subject to external audit under this Act [3].

Moreover, according to the interviews with the public procurement officer from the Ordnance Department, Royal Thai Army, despite the existence of the law, there is systematic crime pattern of bid rigging in public procurement to falsify public procurement practices, by which all documents and evidence related to corrupted public procurement operations could be correct under the requirements of the government framework [2]. More recently, in June 2020, the Anti-Corruption Committee for Public Procurement allowed the military to exempt several projects from the Integrity Pact generally required by the law (Article 17, 18 and 19) by claiming that the contracts with the vendors were in conflict with the law, leading to the Committee’s decision to exempt these projects, which was questioned by the general public [4].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

According to our sources, there is a legislation that clearly provides mandates for the purchase of military equipment. However, this legislation can be vague and unclear in cases when purchases need equipment or weapons (1,2). General legislation covers general defence and security procurement. Decree n°1039-2014, dated 13 March 2014, organising public procurement, applies to most defence and security procurement (3). Article 49 of this decree provides that procurement can be made by direct negotiation for public security and national defence reasons. Some purchases within defence and security procurements are governed by Decree n° 88-36, dated 12 January 1988, on the special procedure of control of expenditure of the Ministries of Defence and Interior (4). This decree established a specific procedure, namely a Special Committee, in each of those two ministries, chaired by the concerned minister or his representative. This committee is responsible for multiple phases of exempt procurement, which relates to sensitive equipment and supplies. These, for security reasons, do not follow the general defence procurement protocols but appear only on a secure list established by the President of Government.

According to our sources, the legislations mentioned in 57A recognise the risk of corruption and provide a path for handling these corruption risks (1,2). Decree n°1039-2014, dated 13 March 2014, organising public procurement, which is applicable to most defence and security procurement, clearly directs procurement authorities to be cognisant of corruption-related issues. Article 144 states that the National Council of public procurement (Conseil National de la Commande Publique) present all proposals relating to the prevention and fight against corruption in the field of public procurement in consultation with the authority in charge of the fight against corruption. Article 173 of the same decree provides that all parties involved in public procurement are subject to the laws and regulations relating to the fight against corruption and conflicts of interest in public procurement. Title IV of this decree provides for sanctions in case of corruption (3). Decree n° 88-36, dated 12 January 1988, on the special procedure of control of expenditure of the Ministries of Defence and Interior, does not make reference to corruption risks (4).

According to the Ministry of Defence, there are no items exempt from the control of the different procurement committees, no expenses can be executed without the approval of the different procurement committees and the services of public expenditure and the Ministry of Finance (1). No evidence of exceptions made to the legislation could be found through media stories (2). According to our sources, there is a strict following of the legislation and its annex(3).

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

The Turkish Public Procurement Law (the Law) is the principal document regulating defence procurement in Turkey.
Article 3(b) of the Law refers to:
– goods, services and works procurement that the relevant ministry decides is related to defence, security or intelligence, or should be treated confidentially; and
– procurement requiring special security measures during the performance of the contract pursuant to relevant legislation, or those concerning cases in which the basic interests of the state’s security need to be protected [1].

In terms of defence procurement, Law No. 1324 of 1970 provides the basis for the current defence planning and procurement system [2]. This law prescribes the responsibilities of the Turkish General Staff (TGS) in defence planning and procurement management [3]. Similarly, Law No. 1324 of 1971 sets out the responsibilities of the Ministry of National Defence regarding coordination and cooperation with the Turkish General Staff in the procurement processes [4]. Law No. 1325 clearly states that the Ministry of Defence is responsible for procuring the required hardware, products and services, as well as managing national arms industry activities. The legal framework that makes the TGS responsible for defining, planning and conducting policy-making activities as regards requirements includes sub-procedures [5].

According to Interviewee 6:
* The first phase of the aforementioned activities is the TUMAS (Turkiye’nin Milli Askeri Stratejisi – National Military Strategy of Turkey) document, which defines the general framework for the military strategic planning and threat perception of Turkey. The TUMAS is considered the basis for the military’s requirements and forecasts for capability building. The Concept-Based Requirements System (CBRS) defines requirements accordingly.
* The subsequent planning phase is the preparation of the Strategic Targets Plan (SHP) document, based on the TUMAS document and the Operational Requirements Plan (ORP). The SHP is the principal guideline for the OYTEP (On Yillik Tedarik Plani – the 10-Year Procurement Plan). The preparation, prioritisation and budgeting of programmes is carried out pursuant to the OYTEP. This process is concluded with the preparation of the Project Definition Document (PDD). A PDD defines what type of product or service is going to be procured, as well as the general requirements, timeframe and expectations.
* The release of the PDD effectively starts the procurement project through two main channels: the Ministry of Defence and the Presidency of Defence Industries (SSB). The project is mostly administered by the SSB if the procurement programme involves contributions from local industry in terms of research and development (R&D) or is envisaged as a production under license or joint development.
Interviewee 6 suggested that the entire process detailed above has ‘top secret’-level security clearance and that the main product of it, the PDD, is a classified document. Military bureaucracy undertakes the preparation of all documents and plans from the TUMAS to the PDD. At least in theory, government oversight is required at each step, although there is a lack of feedback, communication or coordination mechanisms during the preparation of these plans and strategic documents [6].

Law No. 5201 on Control of Private Industrial Enterprises Producing War Weapons, Equipment, Vehicles and Ammunitions and Explosives [7] and the Defence Industry Security Law (Law No. 5202) [8] are the principal documents that regulate the Turkish defence industry and make all defence-related procurement from Turkish and foreign companies secret. These documents set forth the legal framework for all classified military agreements, information, documentation, projects, purchases, sales, manufacturing, research and development, storage of material and services, and allow facilities to conduct activities related to the defence industry, excluding the personnel and facilities of the Turkish Armed Forces.

Then we come to Law No. 3238, which was enacted in 1985 and brought new principles to the Turkish defence procurement process. Until this law was enacted, Turkey’s defence needs were only satisfied by state-dominated firms. Through this law, the SSB (the Defense Industry Executive Presidency) and the Defense Industry Support Fund were established. Law No. 3238 enables private firms to take part in meeting the defence needs of Turkey. Law No. 3238 defines the government mechanism for defence and security procurement as it delegates the following responsibilities [9]:
– the Defence Industry High Coordination Council, chaired by the President: planning and coordination;
– the Defence Industry Executive Committee, chaired by the President: decision-making;
– the Presidency for Defence Industries (SSB) and the Defence Industry Support Fund: execution.
Once the decisions are made, following the planning and coordination of the Defence Industry High Coordination Council, they are implemented by the SSB on the basis of procurement legislation.

According to Article 11 of Law No. 3238, the incomes generated by the Turkish Armed Forces Foundation should only be spent in the field of defence/security and any revenue generated in this fund cannot be transferred to other fields of the government’s budget. However, according to Interviewee 3, there is some solid evidence that, following the foundation’s attachment to the presidential palace, the revenue generated there has been transferred to other areas, contrary to Article 11 [10].

Among the laws listed above, all of which constitute the legislative framework for defence procurement in Turkey:
– Law No. 4734 on Public Procurement
– Law No. 3238
– Law No. 1324
– Law No. 5201
– Law No. 5202, only Article 17 of the Public Procurement Law contains clauses that specifically address corruption risks and set out prohibited acts and conduct during procurement processes [1]. The rest of the laws do not contain any specific articles/sections mentioning anti-corruption or integrity-related issues.

However, it should be noted that all procurement processes in the defence/security sector are obliged to adhere to Article 67 of the Public Financial Management and Control Law No. 5018 [2].

Article 75 of this law notes that: ‘the financial management and control system is completely vulnerable in cases where signs of corruption or public harm are emerging; Upon request by the relevant minister or directly upon the President’s approval, the Minister of Finance shall inspect the competent supervisory staff, all financial management and control systems of public administrations, financial decisions and transactions in accordance with the legislation. A copy of the reports to be issued as a result of these inspections is sent to the Internal Audit Coordination Board and a copy of the necessary actions is sent to the relevant minister’ [2].

As we can see, this very detailed law does not contain any specific articles regulating how state institutions should fight corruption and bribery or pressuring state institutions to behave accordingly. So, as seen above, Law. No 5018 regulates anti-corruption and integrity-related issues in defence procurement processes.

Interviewee 3 emphasised that, as demonstrated by major and therefore highly political procurements, such as the procurement of S-400 systems from Russia, the general procurement legislation is upheld and all routine procedures are implemented, however, the system cannot prevent the technical process of procurement from being spoiled by political and, to a certain extent, personal preferences [1]. Interviewee 1 agrees with Interviewee 3, suggesting that, if it had not been for President Erdogan, Turkey would never have procured the S-400s from Russia [2].

Put simply, as demonstrated by the cases of the procurement of S-400s from Russia, the Altay tank from pro-Erdogan firm BMC, the armed drones from Bayraktar, a firm owned by the family of Erdogan’s son-in-law, and the inclusion of BMC in Turkey’s domestic TFX fighter jet project, the legislative framework is upheld, but this framework cannot prevent clientelism within the defence/security sector. Metin Gurcan’s piece provides important insights about this trend [3]. Bahadir Ozgur’s piece is also important here [4].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. The Ministry of Defence and Veteran Affairs’ (MoDVA) procurement legal framework is derived from the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act, Act No. 1 of 2003 (PPDA). According to the PPDA, collectively, “Defence and National Security organs” means Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces, Uganda Police Force, Uganda Prisons Service, Intelligence Services and National Security Council” [1]. Article 48 (1 and 2) of the Uganda People’s Defence Force Act [2] also talks about procurement processes by the MoDVA but also refers to the PPDA Act.

The PPDA Act (2003) allows the Defence and National Security Organs to manage their procurement and disposal on the basis of a dual list [1]. It also requires these institutions to comply with the PPDA Act by following all the laid out procedures in public procurement and disposal of public assets. [2] However, this legislation superficially recognises the risks of corruption and/or has vague provisions without providing specific measures on how these risks can be mitigated.

According to the PPDA:
“The Defence and National Security Organs shall agree annually with the Authority (PPDA) on the category of restricted items to be included on the restricted list and on which restricted procurement or disposal methods, set out in Part VI, shall apply to each category of item on the restricted list. (4) The restricted list of items shall be subjected to classified audit and laid before Parliament in the Annual Performance Evaluation Report. (5) The Defence and National Security Organs shall appoint Contracts Committees to handle the procurement and disposal of their classified items. (6) The members of the Contracts Committees of the Defence and National Security Organs shall be nominated by the respective accounting officers and approved by the Secretary to the Treasury” [1].

However, despite the above provisions, there are numerious cases where procurement processes have been grossly abused by the minsitry of Defence [2]. Cases of corruption in military procurements have continued to trouble the defence sector. For instance, recent reports have highlighted specific instances of collusion and outright plunder in contracts involving two companies––J2E Investment Corporation Limited and Roester Construction Corporation, owned by a Kampala businessman, Eria Mubiru. The army’s own investigations committee accused the two companies of causing a financial loss worth Uganda Shillings 72 billion (7m USD) to the Ministry of Defence. In one revelation, the committee found that J2E Investment Corporation Limited was given a – Shs2.2 billion Ugandan shillings contract in 2010 to upgrade infrastructure at Bihanga military Training School in western Uganda but instead the contractor chose to upgrade facilities at Kaweweta Recruit Training School in central Uganda. The investigative committee failed to establish who authorised the contractor to switch the projects[3]

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

Generally, Ukraine has a broad legal framework on public procurement. It consists of:
1. The Law of Ukraine “On public procurement” under No. 922-VIII dated 25.12.2015.
2. The Cabinet of Ministers Decrees:
• “On approving the Procedure for the functioning of the electronic system of procurement and performing authorization on electronic platforms” under No.166 dated 24.02.2016.
• “On advance payment for goods, works and services acquired for budget funds” under No.117 dated 23.04.2014.
• “On the margin expense amounts for acquiring vehicles, furnishing, other equipment and appliances, mobile phones, PCs by government authorities, and establishments and organizations, which are maintained out of the state budget” under No.332 dated 04.04.2001.
• “On the efficient use of state funds” under No.710 dated 11.10.2016.
• “On establishing the fee for filing a complaint” under No. 291 dated 23.03.2016.
3. Orders, explanations of the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade in the sphere of procurement, orders of the National Bank of Ukraine.
The MoD, in particular, conducts two types of procurement: open and classified. If the information on a particular good or service is classified (battle tanks, ammunition, etc.), the particular good or service is procured using procedures for classified procurement, the State Defence Order [1]. If the information for a particular good or service is not classified (food, fuel, uniform, etc.), the particular good or service is to be procured using open procurement according to the Law On Public Procurement [1]. Thus the acquisition planning process for both types of procurement differs and is provided for by different pieces of legislation. Both legislative frameworks that define these types of procedures are clear, comprehensive and cover all the procurements made in the defence and security sector.

Legislation on open procurement (conducted according to the Law On Public Procurement) refers to corruption as one of the potential challenges and states that the law aims at creating a competitive environment in the field of public procurement, preventing corruption in this area, and developing fair competition [1]. Legislation on classified procurement does not refer to corruption at all [2]. However, the Anti-corruption Strategy for 2014-2017 states that “…corruption in public procurement remains extremely serious. According to the Security Service of Ukraine, corruption in public procurement causes losses amounting 10-15 per cent of the contract price” [3]. It is worth noting that none of the laws specify mechanisms of how to mitigate corruption risks in procurement since they are covered by different pieces of legislation. The Law of Ukraine On Prevention of Corruption [4] defines the legal principles of the system of corruption prevention, application of preventive anti-corruption mechanisms and rules for elimination of the consequences of corruption offences. Other pieces of legislation provide the legal framework for the functioning of investigative bodies, prosecution, judiciary, etc.

Though there are cases of corruption in defence procurement [1, 2], there is no evidence that defence procurement generally violates legislation on defence procurement or that legislation is not followed for all procurement because of exceptions. Some parts of defence procurement are conducted through the State Defence Orders (procurement of classified items) which makes these purchases opaque. However, there is no hard evidence that illegal exemptions are applied.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

The UAE has Federal Procurement Resolution No. 32 of 2014, amended in resolution No. 43 of 2016, which is the country’s legislation concerning procurement across all governmental departments. The legislation covers all aspects of procurement including purchases, supplies, and services provided. However, Resolution No. 43 of 2016 explicitly excludes the Ministry of Defence, the Supreme Council for National Security and the Ministry of Interior (1), (2). Sources indicate there are internal guidelines concerning procurement within the armed forces (3), (4).

No evidence shows that the UAE has legislation covering defence and security procurement with clauses specific to corruption risks. Defence institutions are generally exempt from federal laws governing procurement and contracting (1), (2). For this reason, this sub-indicator has been marked as Not Applicable, as an assessment of the legislation covering corruption risks is irrelevant in this context.

This sub-indicator is marked Not Applicable because no evidence shows that the UAE has legislation covering defence and security procurement. Defence institutions are generally exempt from federal laws governing procurement and contracting (1), (2). For this reason, this sub-indicator has been marked as Not Applicable, as an assessment of the legislation covering corruption risks is irrelevant in this context.

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

The Defence and Security Public Contract Regulations (DSPCR) 2011 implemented the EU Defence and Security Procurement Directive into UK law and covers all defence and national security purchases [1]. Amendments made to the regulations in preparation for exiting the EU have been made, but are mostly in reference to removing references to EU matters. The legal framework largely remains the same [2].

Additionally, the Single Source Contract Regulations (SSCR) 2014 covers both qualifying Single Source contracts and Subcontracts. The SSCR requires considerable transparency of financial data from suppliers by law – setting out a legal framework for pricing, record keeping and reporting in uncompleted contracts for goods, works and services above £5M placed by the MOD [3].

The DSPCR makes brief reference to corruption as a risk in procurement in chapters 8, 15 and 16 but refers to the HM Treasury publication ‘Managing Public Money’ for provisions to mitigate corruption risk (which can be found in annex 4.6) [1, 2].

The Single Source Contract Regulations 2014 (SSCR) includes a set formula approach to establish the price for all qualifying contracts and amendments, which acts to mitigate corruption risks in pricing [3]. SSCR also made it a criminal offence to disclose specified information. Further, there is an on-line web-enabled system (Defence Contract Analysis and Reporting System – DefCARS) to facilitate the the submission of the statutory reports by suppliers to the Single Source Regulations Office and MOD [4].

Although not specific to procurement, the UK also has the Bribery Act 2010 which is very specific about actions of companies and Contractors etc., and does therefore have relevance in so much as it does require adherence to ensure the law isn’t broken through conduct [5].

The NAO frequently identifies issues with defence procurement and Contracting, as outlined in the examples provided [1, 2]. These may not constitute legislative breaches but they are detailed investigations of practice and should be considered. In one of their reports, the NAO states: ‘[o]ver many years the NAO has reported on delays and cost overruns across significant Ministry of Defence (MoD) equipment procurement programmes, such as boats 4-7 of the Astute attack submarine (£1 billion over budget) and the Queen Elizabeth aircraft carriers (£2.75 billion over budget)’ [3].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) [1] and the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) [2] apply to purchases and contracts made by the DoD. The defence procurement cycle is governed by the military law in the U.S. Code, Title 10, Chapter 137 [3], with further details on the defence acquisition system provided in Chapter 149 [4]. There are also lower-level supplements for specific acquisitions, e.g. the Air Force Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement [5,6].

The DoD can enter into a contract called an ‘other transaction’ (OT) agreement, which is exempt from federal procurement laws and regulations. In general, OT agreements are used for three purposes: conducting research; developing prototypes; contracting for follow-on production of a successful prototype [7]. With regard to prototype projects, the OT can only be used if at least one non-traditional defence contractor is participating or if the senior procurement acquisition official provides an explanation of exceptional circumstances. Given that OT agreements provide government officials with the flexibility to include/amend/exclude contract clauses and requirements that are mandatory via DFARS procurement, there are concerns over reliance on the OT agreement as a mechanism to bypass regulations. OT agreements, for example, are exempt from the Procurement Integrity Act, which prohibits gift-taking and promotes ethical standards with contractors. There is diminished oversight and transparency around the OT agreements, which has raised concerns from Congress and civil society [8,9].

Beyond OT agreements, it is not clear whether there are additional exemptions to the legal framework for special procurement, sensitive items or secret acquisitions.

The DFARS does not explicitly mention risks of corruption by name however, there are some provisions which cover corruption risks [1]. Part 203 of the DFARS addresses ‘Improper Business Practices and Personal Conflicts of Interest’ and includes details on integrity, minimising conflicts of interest via revolving door practices, as well as kickbacks [2]. Section 203.070 mandates that violations relating to integrity, antitrust, kickbacks or debarred persons must be reported in accordance with DoD Instruction 7050.5 ‘Coordination of Remedies for Fraud and Corruption Related to Procurement Activities’ [2,3].

In general, acquisitions are undertaken in accordance with DFARS and FAR as applicable. However, DoD Contract Management is on the Government Accountability Office’s (GAO) ‘High Risk’ list, and has been on this list since 1992 [1]. The list identifies government operations with the greatest vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. There are also instances of acquisitions being undertaken through alternative mechanisms in order to avoid going through more lengthy formal acquisition processes; for example officials have tried to ensure that the Air Force’s B-21 Raider programme alongside the Block 4 modernisation phase of the F-35 programme are wrongly classified such that they avoid the oversight and regulation of the Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP), under which they should fall under [1].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. Venezuela has no specific legislation governing security and defence procurement. Acquisitions and contracts more generally are governed by the Public Procurement Law (LCP), the Administrative Procedures Law (LPA), the Orgrnic Law of Public Goods (LOBP), and the Constituent National Assembly (ANC) recently published the “Constitutional Law against the economic war, for rationality and uniformity in the acquisition of goods, services, and other public works”. These regulatory instruments do not contain specific provisions on the risks of corruption.

According to the LCP, the different public bodies must appoint procurement commissions to ensure compliance with acquisitions and procurement processes [1]. In the case of the defence sector, the Defence Sector Procurement Committee (CCSD) carries out these functions. Although this entity has made its procedures manual public, outlining in detail the processes and requirements for procurement and contracting in accordance with the provisions of the LCP and the LPA, it does not include other specific regulations governing procurement and contracting for this sector [2].

The legislation has no explicit controls to mitigate corruption risks. However, it does include controls for monitoring the implementation and evaluation of procurement by the contracting unit, supervised by the respective contracting commission – in turn supervised by internal and external audit bodies. Given that the Office of the Comptroller General of the National Bolivarian Armed Forces (CONGEFANB) does not make information about their auditing and control actions public, it is not possible to assess whether these procurement control procedures are followed. Overall, the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (CGR) has recognised the high levels of corruption in public procurement without taking any action or modifying regulations and controls [3].

Unlike the LCP and the LPA, the “Constitutional Law against the economic war, for rationality and uniformity in the acquisition of goods, services, and other public works” was approved by the ANC and not by the National Assembly (AN), so its legitimacy is disputed. However, the Ministry fof the People’s Power for Defence (MPPD) recognises it as part of the applicable legal framework for Defence Procurement [4]. The decrees regulating the application of this law acknowledge “strict control in the mechanisms prescribed in the anti-corruption legal system”, but beyond this recognition do not address concrete measures to mitigate the risks of corruption in procurement and acquisitions processes [5].

In Venezuela, there is no specific law regulating the procurement and contracting by the defence and security sector, and there are no regulations issued by the CCSD that incorporate specific requirements for this sector. The general legal framework applicable to these procedures includes no clauses that explicitly address risks of corruption, beyond stating the responsibility of contracting commissions to ensure transparency and the competitiveness within procedures [1]. The documents issued by the CCSD include no regulations that take specific measures to mitigate corruption risks. Implementation monitoring controls apply to all types of procurement, excepting cases of direct contracting for a “proven emergency” involving specific controls such as the justification of the emergency, the delimitation of time and object of the contract, and the submission of monthly reports to the internal control body. However, there is no evidence of audits or other documents to verify that these controls are required [2, 3].

Academics have criticised the deterioration of controls to mitigate corruption risks over recent years; due to the state of economic emergency decreed by the executive, laws and decrees have been issued to simplify procurement procedures in the public sector [4], modifying the obligatory nature of certain requirements established in the LCP. Although the “Constitutional Law against the economic war, for rationality and uniformity in the acquisition of goods, services, and other public works” and the decrees regulating it mention a commitment to making procurement processes more ‘transparent’, academic analyses have found that the exclusion of certain registers and procurement procedures for acquisitions prevent these processes from being more transparent, increasing the risk of corruption [5].

Given that there is no specific legislation regulating the procurement and contracting in the defence sector – and due to the opacity in public sector procurement processes, denounced by different civil society groups [1, 2] – it is impossible to assess with any precision whether these procedures comply with the requirements set out in the LCP, the LPA, and other laws governing public procurement and contracting.

An institutional duplication in which constitutional procedures and institutions coexist alongside new regulations and entities created by the ANC has generated national political crisis, and this situation has affected public procurement and contracting processes. Firstly, these procedures have deviated from constitutional control mechanisms. The resources for public procurement must initially be justified before and approved by the AN. However, the AN has been bypassed by the current administration since 2016, so all procurement and contracting processes, including those conducted by the defence sector, do not comply with the minimum general regulations established by the constitution [3].

Secondly, there is also no evidence that laws at a lower constitutional level that regulate these processes are being applied by government entities. Based on evidence collected by civil society organisations, requirements such as the registration of contractor companies in the National Register of Contractors (RNC) are not fulfilled for about 70% of public procurement and contracting [4]. Regarding the defence sector, the opacity of weapons acquisitions has been specifically criticised [5].

This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.

General procurement laws and regulations apply to the Ministry of Defence and the Zimbabwe Defence Forces. However, there are exceptions in the State Privileges Law, the Official Secrets Act, the country’s international relations and geostrategic interests and general protection of national security interests, which can justify deviations from stipulated regulations. Exceptions are allowed when the defence of the country is compromised, but the president must issue an executive order to activate the exemption [1, 2]. Though these are necessary security considerations, they create opportunities for commanders and officers to engage in corrupt activities without being held accountable under the guise of protecting national security interests.

There is no explicit reference to corruption risks within the legislation; however, the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act provides rules that may prevent corruption without necessarily referring to corruption risk. Provisions in the legislation include compliance issues, including tax clearance, the ethical background of bidders and a clear bidding procedure that is meant to be competitive, companies that are in violation can be blacklisted [1, 2].

There is no specific legislation for defence procurement. Defence procurement is covered by general procurement laws and regulations [1]. Defence purchases are generally procured in line with legislation [2]. However, there are exceptions covered by the State Privileges Law and the Official Secrets Act. Further, there is no clarity on whether all procurement is done centrally by the Procurement Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe (PRAZ) since major procurement deals are handled by senior military officers with minimal involvement of procurement staff in the Ministry of Defence [2].

Country Sort by Country 57a. Legal framework Sort By Subindicator 57b. Corruption risks Sort By Subindicator 57c. Effectiveness Sort By Subindicator
Albania NS 25 / 100 50 / 100
Algeria NS 25 / 100 NEI
Angola NS 50 / 100 0 / 100
Argentina NS 50 / 100 NEI
Armenia NS 25 / 100 75 / 100
Australia NS 75 / 100 50 / 100
Azerbaijan NS 0 / 100 NA
Bahrain NS NA NA
Bangladesh NS 0 / 100 NEI
Belgium NS 100 / 100 100 / 100
Bosnia and Herzegovina NS 75 / 100 50 / 100
Botswana NS 100 / 100 50 / 100
Brazil NS 50 / 100 75 / 100
Burkina Faso NS 0 / 100 0 / 100
Cameroon NS 0 / 100 NA
Canada NS 100 / 100 50 / 100
Chile NS 25 / 100 0 / 100
China NS 50 / 100 25 / 100
Colombia NS 50 / 100 NEI
Cote d'Ivoire NS 0 / 100 NA
Denmark NS 50 / 100 100 / 100
Egypt NS 0 / 100 NA
Estonia NS 25 / 100 75 / 100
Finland NS 50 / 100 75 / 100
France NS 50 / 100 75 / 100
Germany NS 100 / 100 50 / 100
Ghana NS 50 / 100 50 / 100
Greece NS 50 / 100 50 / 100
Hungary NS 50 / 100 0 / 100
India NS 50 / 100 75 / 100
Indonesia NS 50 / 100 50 / 100
Iran NS 0 / 100 0 / 100
Iraq NS 0 / 100 0 / 100
Israel NS 25 / 100 25 / 100
Italy NS 75 / 100 100 / 100
Japan NS 50 / 100 100 / 100
Jordan NS 0 / 100 0 / 100
Kenya NS 25 / 100 0 / 100
Kosovo NS 25 / 100 50 / 100
Kuwait NS 0 / 100 0 / 100
Latvia NS 25 / 100 75 / 100
Lebanon NS 0 / 100 0 / 100
Lithuania NS 50 / 100 25 / 100
Malaysia NS 100 / 100 50 / 100
Mali NS 0 / 100 0 / 100
Mexico NS 50 / 100 0 / 100
Montenegro NS 50 / 100 50 / 100
Morocco NS 0 / 100 0 / 100
Myanmar NS 0 / 100 NA
Netherlands NS 100 / 100 50 / 100
New Zealand NS 100 / 100 100 / 100
Niger NS 100 / 100 50 / 100
Nigeria NS 0 / 100 0 / 100
North Macedonia NS 75 / 100 50 / 100
Norway NS 100 / 100 100 / 100
Oman NS 0 / 100 NA
Palestine NS 0 / 100 50 / 100
Philippines NS 100 / 100 25 / 100
Poland NS 50 / 100 50 / 100
Portugal NS 0 / 100 50 / 100
Qatar NS 0 / 100 NA
Russia NS 50 / 100 50 / 100
Saudi Arabia NS 0 / 100 0 / 100
Serbia NS 50 / 100 50 / 100
Singapore NS 100 / 100 100 / 100
South Africa NS 50 / 100 25 / 100
South Korea NS 100 / 100 100 / 100
South Sudan NS 0 / 100 0 / 100
Spain NS 0 / 100 50 / 100
Sudan NS 25 / 100 0 / 100
Sweden NS 50 / 100 100 / 100
Switzerland NS 50 / 100 NEI
Taiwan NS 50 / 100 100 / 100
Tanzania NS 50 / 100 25 / 100
Thailand NS 75 / 100 0 / 100
Tunisia NS 100 / 100 100 / 100
Turkey NS 25 / 100 0 / 100
Uganda NS 50 / 100 25 / 100
Ukraine NS 50 / 100 75 / 100
United Arab Emirates NS 0 / 100 NA
United Kingdom NS 75 / 100 25 / 100
United States NS 50 / 100 50 / 100
Venezuela NS 0 / 100 0 / 100
Zimbabwe NS 25 / 100 25 / 100

With thanks for support from the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs who have contributed to the Government Defence Integrity Index.

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