




# COUNTRY OVERVIEW:

  **CÔTE D'IVOIRE**


 2020 Government Defence Integrity Index

## OVERVIEW: CÔTE D'IVOIRE

Corruption risks across Côte d'Ivoire's defence and security sector remain critically high, with a lack of political will and weak institutional safeguards allowing abuses to flourish unchecked. Côte d'Ivoire has witnessed some positive developments with the implementation of a five-year Military Programming Act 2016–2020 (LPM) and the lifting of the partial UN arms embargo in 2016, which reflects progress in political stabilization. However, little has been done in the way of improving the transparency and integrity of the defence and security sector in a country faced with lingering instability. The LPM brought a degree of stability through enabling the integration of former rebel groups into the armed forces. Yet, the rebellion (mutinerie) of more than 8,400 soldiers in Bouaké in January and May 2017 reminded the government of the existence of internal mistrust in the defence establishment and of the fragility of national security. In the next years, it is crucial that Côte d'Ivoire leverage its efforts to modernize the armed forces by setting in place strong accountability standards and effective institutional oversight mechanisms. In its own self-interest, the Côte d'Ivoire government cannot afford to let corruption in the armed forces thrive if it wishes to uphold the role of the army as a protector of the civilian population and secure deep-rooted stability.




### West Africa: Côte d'Ivoire's position within the region



In recent years, the region of West Africa has seen state corruption and weak governance fuel popular grievances and diminish the effectiveness and legitimacy of national institutions. While the region has benefited from relative stability, a variety of threats are looming on the security horizon. Governments are struggling to respond to spikes in Islamic terrorism and intercommunal violence. There are also enduring issues with corruption and drug trafficking that pose severe threats to national stability as they continue unchecked; weak accountability mechanisms and opacity in defence sectors across the region contribute to these problems. Lack of transparency translates into governments releasing incomplete information on budgets, personnel management systems, policy planning, and acquisitions of military assets. This, in turn, often coupled with lack of expertise and resources, undermines civilian oversight. Defence sectors in the region benefit from a defence exceptionalism in which they are exempt from regulations such as procurement or freedom of information legislation. However, most states in the region have signed and/or ratified the UNCAC, showing some commitment towards the reduction of corruption risk within their borders.


Côte d'Ivoire is no exception in this regard. Amidst general efforts to revamp the country's armed forces, much remains to be done to build integrity in defence. The lack of effective external oversight is mirrored in the seeming limited awareness of the risk corruption poses to the effectiveness of military operations and its role in incentivising military abuse for private gain. Long-term domestic stability in Côte d'Ivoire depends on establishing clear standards for the way the security sector is governed. Mitigating corruption risks in defence will require a robust, disciplined and integrated approach on the part of the Côte d'Ivoire government.

# RISK AREAS




## Political Risk

The main risk lies in the gap between existing legislation, implementation in practice and the effectiveness of independent oversight. Although there is a defence & security committee (Commission Sécurité et Défense) within the National Assembly, it lacks explicit formal rights to reject or amend policies and to scrutinise any aspect of defence in terms of personnel management or procurement in particular. The meagre representation of the opposition within the National Assembly itself questions the overall independence of the legislative function. As a result, the concentration of powers with the executive means that institutional safeguards to corruption are virtually non-existent. Equally, although public access to information is enshrined in the 2016 Constitution and the media has been reporting on defence and security issues to some extent, there is very limited evidence of openness towards the general public and civil society on defence matters.




## Financial Risk

Côte d'Ivoire has made a few changes to improve transparency over defence assets disposals: information on assets disposals is now regularly shared with the media and indicative defence expenditure figures have been available on an annual basis since 2016. However, no justification for projected expenditures or breakdowns across different functions are provided, while actual defence expenditures are still kept secret. There is also no evidence of the Supreme Audit Court (Cour des Comptes) or the National Assembly being able to effectively exercise oversight of asset disposals.




## Personnel Risk

Since the end of the UN Peacekeeping mission in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) in 2017, government statements on anti-corruption have been scarce. The culture of impunity for corrupt officials is salient. Ample evidence points to the involvement of military commanders in illicit tracking of commodities and natural resources, in particular at artisanal gold-mining sites. Political patronage seems to prevail over merit in the appointment of certain high-ranking positions in military personnel. When corruption is addressed by the Ministry of Defence, it is focused on petty bribery rather than investigating the misbehaviour of high-ranking officials. Despite some efforts to bring integrity in personnel management, protection for whistle-blowers is also weak and facilitation payments are commonplace.



## Operational Risk

The Côte d'Ivoire military has yet to frame an institutionalised doctrine, covering anti-corruption as a strategic issue for the success of military operations and offering practical guidance for addressing corruption risks. Corruption is currently not taken into account in the forward planning of operations. There is also no evidence that Côte d'Ivoire's armed forces deploy trained professionals to monitor corruption in the field. Besides, anti-corruption is not mainstreamed in trainings for military personnel and when trainings do occur, they are boosted by external partners.



## Procurement Risk

While public procurement regulations are clearly spelled out in law, Côte d'Ivoire's defence procurement system remains highly opaque, exacerbating the risk of misuse of state funds. Single-sourcing remains the norm, which points to the opportunistic nature of some contracts while there is evidence of political influence by seller nations, primarily France. Unlike other ministries in Côte d'Ivoire, the Ministry of Defence is not required to publish a national strategic plan for procurement. Defence-related acquisitions remain therefore shrouded in secrecy as they do not conform to any decrees, laws, nor any legal requirement for public disclosure, and do not seem to be subject to independent audit as there is no evidence of published audits by any oversight mechanisms.

## THEMATIC FOCUS

The following section presents discussion of the four main challenges facing Côte d'Ivoire, and suggests areas of reform that are possible, based on GDI findings.

### Operations

Since many military operations, both domestic and international, take place in fragile and (post)-conflict states where corrupt practices can be widespread, planners and leaders need to contend with the risk that corruption can pose. Corruption in operations wastes resources, empowers criminal networks, and contributes to conflict and insecurity. Equally, inserting missions – which come with financial resources and can grant political support to local stakeholders – can exacerbate corruption risks as much as it can diminish them. Military doctrines, pre-deployment training and monitoring in the field can all help prepare troops to counter these risks.

*It is essential that the Côte d'Ivoire's armed forces fully grasp the intrinsic link between corruption and operational efficiency, as corruption can empower criminal networks and constitute an internal threat to stability. Corruption should be addressed at the forefront of mission planning and personnel should be trained on anti-corruption issues. The responsibility to reduce corruption risk and investigate accusations and incidents of fraud and corruption should be embedded within the chain of command, especially in operational contexts.*

### Oversight

Oversight functions exist in the form of anti-corruption bodies, audit functions, and/or parliamentary committees, but defence institutions have historically been exempt from this degree of scrutiny. Oversight mechanisms instil confidence that systems are resilient against undue influence and efficient in the face of resource challenges. Well-functioning oversight mechanisms ensure that national defence decisions around operations, budgets, personnel management, and arms acquisitions are robust and aligned with strategic needs, and can note problems at an early stage, before they threaten to hollow out defence and security institutions.

*A heavier degree of parliamentary oversight is also needed to ensure that secret items and expenditures related to military intelligence are effectively scrutinised, where evidence shows it is currently missing. Defence and Security Committee's mandate should include vetting candidates for senior military and security posts, overseeing the activities of the intelligence services, and overseeing details of any off-budget purchases before contracts are signed.*

### Personnel

Staff with trust in the establishment they work for, and operating with a clear understanding of expectations, are key to the functioning of the armed forces and defence and security establishments. Effective recruitment, promotions and pay systems help ensure the presence of an effective, motivated and capable force. Conversely, a lack of standards and standard operating procedures, established by leadership and through codes of conduct, can sap the efficiency of operations and incentivise military abuse for private gain.

*Defence officials should be prohibited from operating unauthorized commercial businesses. This constitutes a high risk for the effective functioning of the armed forces, given the integration in the military of former rebel leaders involved in illicit trafficking rings. Ministry of Defence should also work with the individual services to separate chains of command from chains of payment in each institution, as well as with the Ministry of Economy and Finance to restore financial accountability to central government.*

### Transparency

Transparency facilitates more effective government, not only by allowing oversight mechanisms to function effectively, but also by creating opportunities to streamline processes for greater impact and efficiency. Its absence is marked by mistrust in government and insecure political power. A lack of transparency over military capability, defence budgets, and acquisitions can increase the risk of arms proliferation, which in turn creates the potential for instability and pressure to increase defence spending. While some items may need to remain classified, opacity should be a well-founded exception, not a rule.

*Excessive levels of secrecy and a lack of independent oversight have led to serious financial corruption risks. The government of Cote d'Ivoire should consider releasing all defence expenditures, with breakdowns across different functions, including training, salaries, acquisitions, disposal of assets, maintenance and personnel expenditure. Justifications for projected expenditures should also be provided.*

# COUNTRY SCORECARD: CÔTE D'IVOIRE

<b>Overall Country Score</b>	<b>E</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>Very High Risk</b>
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<b>Political Risk</b>		<b>E</b>	<b>27</b>
Q23	Export Controls	C	63
Q5	International Instruments	C	63
Q13	Budget Scrutiny	C	50
Q19	Organised Crime Links	C	50
Q20	Organised Crime Policing	C	50
Q6	Public Debate	C	50
Q7	Anticorruption Policy	C	50
Q11	Acquisition Planning	D	33
Q4	CSO Engagement	D	33
Q8	Anticorruption Institutions	D	33
Q18	Natural Resources	E	30
Q1	Legislative Scrutiny	E	25
Q12	Budget Transparency & Detail	E	25
Q15	Defence Income	E	17
Q17	External Audit	F	13
Q2	Defence Committee	F	13
Q14	Budget Availability	F	8
Q3	Defence Policy Debate	F	8
Q16	Internal Audit	F	6
Q10	Risk Assessments	F	0
Q21	Intelligence Services Oversight	F	0
Q22	Intelligence Services Recruitment	F	0
Q76	Lobbying	F	0
Q9	Public Trust in Institutions	NS	

<b>Financial Risk</b>		<b>E</b>	<b>27</b>
Q32	Military-Owned Business Scrutiny	A	100
Q77	Defence Spending	B	67
Q31	Beneficial Ownership	D	38
Q24	Asset Disposal Controls	E	25
Q29	Off-budget Spending	E	25
Q30	Access to Information	E	25
Q33	Unauthorised Private Enterprise	F	13
Q25	Asset Disposal Scrutiny	F	0
Q26	Secret Spending	F	0
Q27	Legislative Access to Information	F	0
Q28	Secret Program Auditing	F	0

<b>Personnel Risk</b>		<b>D</b>	<b>34</b>
Q44	Bribery for Preferred Postings	B	67
Q42	Objective Promotions	C	63
Q49	Corruption Prosecutions	C	58
Q47	Civilian Code of Conduct	C	56
Q35	Disciplinary Measures for Personnel	C	50
Q40	Payment System	C	50
Q45	Chains of Command and Payment	C	50
Q50	Facilitation Payments	C	50
Q46	Military Code of Conduct	D	44
Q41	Objective Appointments	E	25
Q34	Public Commitment to Integrity	F	8
Q36	Whistleblowing	F	8
Q38	Numbers of Personnel	F	8
Q48	Anticorruption Training	F	8

Q37	High-risk Positions	F	0
Q39	Pay Rates and Allowances	F	0
Q43	Bribery to Avoid Conscription	NA	

<b>Operational Risk</b>		<b>F</b>	<b>0</b>
Q51	Military Doctrine	F	0
Q52	Operational Training	F	0
Q53	Forward Planning	F	0
Q54	Corruption Monitoring in Operations	F	0
Q55	Controls in Contracting	F	0
Q56	Private Military Contractors	NS	

<b>Procurement Risk</b>		<b>E</b>	<b>21</b>
Q69	Supplier Sanctions	A	100
Q68	Complaint Mechanisms	B	75
Q62	Business Compliance Standards	C	50
Q60	Potential Purchases Disclosed	D	38
Q73	Agents and Intermediaries	D	38
Q65	Tender Board Controls	E	31
Q66	Anti-Collusion Controls	E	19
Q58	Procurement Cycle	F	13
Q67	Contract Award / Delivery	F	13
Q59	Procurement Oversight Mechanisms	F	8
Q57	Procurement Legislation	F	0
Q61	Actual Purchases Disclosed	F	0
Q63	Procurement Requirements	F	0
Q64	Open Competition v. Single Sourcing	F	0
Q70	Offset Contracts	F	0
Q71	Offset Contract Monitoring	F	0
Q72	Offset Competition	F	0
Q74	Financing Packages	F	0
Q75	Political Pressure in Acquisitions	NS	

Legend	Range of Scores	Corruption Risk
A	83 - 100	Very Low
B	67 - 82	Low
C	50 - 66	Moderate
D	33 - 49	High
E	17 - 32	Very High
F	0 - 16	Critical

## Key

NEI - Not enough information to score indicator.

NS - Indicator is not scored for any country

NA - Not applicable

**Transparency International Defence & Security**

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