



# COUNTRY OVERVIEW:




# NIGER


2020 Government Defence Integrity Index

## OVERVIEW: NIGER

The Nigerien government has recently undertaken a series of initiatives designed to fight corruption and improve the governance of the defence sector, including the residential Renaissance Programme (2016-2021), the 2016 Anti-Corruption bill, and the 2018 National Strategy to Fight Corruption. Whilst this legislative effort is promising, there remains a serious implementation gap, with these reforms so far struggling to reduce corruption risks in Niger's defence sector. The low level of information made available to audit bodies and Parliament tends to undermine the oversight of the sector. Defence exceptionalism tends to exacerbate this limitation and hamper armed forces scrutiny, in particular as it relates to the procurement of military assets. Despite reform efforts, public trust in defence and security institutions remains low on corruption-related issues.




### West Africa: Niger's position within the region



In West Africa, in recent years, state corruption and weak governance have fuelled popular grievances and diminished the effectiveness and legitimacy of national institutions. While the region has benefited from relative stability, a variety of threats are looming on the security horizon. Governments are struggling to respond to spikes in Islamic terrorism and intercommunal violence. There are also enduring issues with corruption and drug trafficking that pose severe threats to national stability as they continue unchecked; weak accountability mechanisms and opacity in defence sectors across the region contribute to these problems. Lack of transparency translates into governments releasing incomplete information on budgets, personnel management systems, policy planning, and acquisitions of military assets. This, in turn, often coupled with lack of expertise and resources, undermines civilian oversight. Defence sectors in the region benefit from a defence exceptionalism in which they are exempt from regulations such as procurement or freedom of information legislation. However, most states in the region have signed and/or ratified the UNCAC, showing some commitment towards the reduction of corruption risk within their borders.


Despite recent promising initiatives at national level, efforts designed to fight corruption and improve defence governance in Niger are hindered by a high level of secrecy. At a time of growing regional instability, the Nigerien government should consider heightening efforts to improve the civilian democratic oversight of the defence sector and strengthen the integrity of its armed forces, to enable it to better confront the multiple security challenges with which it is faced.

# RISK AREAS




## Political Risk

Political oversight of the military is well-established in the constitution and legislature. The National Assembly debates defence and security policy and has formal powers to review the defence budget. However, its capacity is hampered by a lack of technical expertise among parliamentarians and difficulties in accessing certain financial information, such as intelligence services expenditure. There is also a general lack of engagement between the defence establishment and civil society.




## Financial Risk

A key financial risk for the defence sector in Niger is the lack of a detailed defence budget made available to the legislature, greatly hindering its ability to provide scrutiny. The Security and Defence Committee is presented with abbreviated information on secret items related to national security and military intelligence, and the disposal of military assets is subject to no oversight whatsoever. The Committee has received no accounts of the intelligence services for the past three years. Internal audit bodies are severely limited and their reports are irregular and confidential. External audit organisations are ineffective and depend on the executive for funding.




## Personnel Risk

Weak public commitments of senior defence officials to anti-corruption and integrity measures is mirrored by the absence of a Code of Conduct for military personnel, suggesting a rather limited political will. Specific anti-corruption training is dependent on external partners and is delivered in piecemeal fashion, and whistle-blowers are afforded little to no protection. Sanctions are in place to penalise corrupt behaviour, but prosecutions of personnel are exceedingly rare. There is very limited scrutiny of appointments at middle and top-level positions, with most of these relying on personal connections and political support.



## Operational Risk

Niger's defence sector scores very poorly in terms of operational corruption risk. Corruption is not approached in a systemic or comprehensive manner, neither is it considered a strategic issue during deployment. Trained anti-corruption professionals are not deployed to monitor operations. There is no pre-deployment corruption-specific training for personnel and no guidelines on addressing corruption risks during operations.



## Procurement Risk

There is very limited information on defence procurement in Niger. The military's acquisition plan is highly classified and not published, and the 2016 Code of Public Procurements omits goods, equipment, supplies and services related to defence and security. Though there is a formalized oversight mechanism, with audits carried out by the Inspector General, these are irregular and reports are strictly confidential, delivered directly to the President and Prime Minister. It is unlikely that military procurement is subject to any independent legislative oversight.

## THEMATIC FOCUS

The following section presents discussion of the four main challenges facing Niger, and suggests areas of reform that are possible, based on GDI findings.

### Implementation Gap

Passing laws, even excellent ones, can only effect so much change. It is their implementation that is crucial in achieving outcomes across government, yet it continues to be a critical failure point in reform efforts. Implementation is a function of political commitment, expertise, and availability of resources, and includes not only policies and practices, but also plans and stable institutional arrangements. The gap between the quality of the legal framework and the effectiveness of implementation cuts across all areas of risk, affecting ministries and militaries in equal measure.

*Despite, the impressive reform efforts of the past few years, including the 2016-2021 Renaissance Programme, the 2016 Anti-Corruption bill, and the 2018 National Strategy to Fight Corruption, Niger is struggling to ensure their effective implementation. Adequate resourcing and planning is key to achieving results. The government should also consider revising relevant legislation so that it applies to defence procurement and is thoroughly implemented for all defence acquisitions, with no exceptions.*

### Operations

Since many military operations, both domestic and international, take place in fragile and (post)-conflict states where corrupt practices can be widespread, planners and leaders need to contend with the risk that corruption can pose. Corruption in operations wastes resources, empowers criminal networks, and contributes to conflict and insecurity. Equally, inserting missions – which come with financial resources and can grant political support to local stakeholders – can exacerbate corruption risks as much as it can diminish them. It is crucial for defence and security officials to be able to address corruption as a strategic issue in the planning of operations. Military doctrines, pre-deployment training and monitoring in the field can all help prepare troops to counter these risks.

*Niger would benefit from a re-assessment of corruption as a strategic issue during operations which demands a specific response, including tailor-made guidelines and training programs on dealing with corruption risks during deployment, including in peacekeeping operations. Armed Forces should consider undertaking comprehensive training in corruption-related issues for commanders at all levels, and deliver these both as part of military education as well as during pre-deployment training for specific missions.*

### Oversight

Oversight functions exist in the form of anti-corruption bodies, audit functions, and/or parliamentary committees, but defence institutions have historically been exempt from this degree of scrutiny. Oversight mechanisms instil confidence that systems are resilient against undue influence and efficient in the face of resource challenges. Well-functioning oversight mechanisms ensure that national defence decisions around operations, budgets, personnel management, and arms acquisitions are robust and aligned with strategic needs, and can note problems at an early stage, before they threaten to hollow out defence and security institutions.

*Evidence suggests that the Nigerien legislature provides limited oversight during budget planning and weak oversight during the implementation phase of the budget cycle. The availability of information is crucial to the performance of these functions. The Ministry of Defence should also provide audit mechanisms with sufficient resources to fulfil their mandates in monitoring risks of corruption and developing recommendations on building the integrity of the armed forces.*

### Civil Society Engagement

Civilian involvement in defence affairs requires an engaged, informed civil society, and an open defence sector prepared to interact with CSOs. Effective involvement of civil society enhances the planning capacity of defence sectors and improves military performance by generating external accountability and monitoring, and by offering relevant expertise that is not always readily available within military institutions. Public trust in institutions is bolstered by engagement with civil society groups and openness to public debate of defence policy and strategy.

*The Nigerian government should ensure that the views of civil society are considered in the development and enactment of defence policy as an essential first step toward ensuring the long-term integrity and transparency of the sector. This can be achieved through public consultation and information-sharing.*

# COUNTRY SCORECARD: NIGER

<b>Overall Country Score</b>	<b>E</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>Very High Risk</b>
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<b>Political Risk</b>		<b>E</b>	<b>31</b>
Q5	International Instruments	B	75
Q12	Budget Transparency & Detail	C	63
Q7	Anticorruption Policy	C	63
Q18	Natural Resources	C	58
Q19	Organised Crime Links	C	50
Q6	Public Debate	C	50
Q3	Defence Policy Debate	D	44
Q1	Legislative Scrutiny	D	42
Q20	Organised Crime Policing	D	42
Q8	Anticorruption Institutions	D	42
Q14	Budget Availability	D	33
Q13	Budget Scrutiny	E	25
Q4	CSO Engagement	E	25
Q17	External Audit	E	17
Q2	Defence Committee	E	17
Q11	Acquisition Planning	F	8
Q15	Defence Income	F	8
Q10	Risk Assessments	F	0
Q16	Internal Audit	F	0
Q21	Intelligence Services Oversight	F	0
Q76	Lobbying	F	0
Q9	Public Trust in Institutions	NS	
Q22	Intelligence Services Recruitment	NEI	
Q23	Export Controls	NEI	

<b>Financial Risk</b>		<b>D</b>	<b>38</b>
Q31	Beneficial Ownership	A	100
Q32	Military-Owned Business Scrutiny	A	100
Q33	Unauthorised Private Enterprise	A	100
Q30	Access to Information	C	50
Q27	Legislative Access to Information	E	25
Q77	Defence Spending	F	6
Q24	Asset Disposal Controls	F	0
Q25	Asset Disposal Scrutiny	F	0
Q26	Secret Spending	F	0
Q28	Secret Program Auditing	F	0
Q29	Off-budget Spending	NEI	

<b>Personnel Risk</b>		<b>E</b>	<b>24</b>
Q39	Pay Rates and Allowances	A	88
Q44	Bribery for Preferred Postings	B	67
Q35	Disciplinary Measures for Personnel	C	50
Q40	Payment System	C	50
Q46	Military Code of Conduct	C	50
Q38	Numbers of Personnel	D	33
Q41	Objective Appointments	E	25
Q48	Anticorruption Training	E	17
Q42	Objective Promotions	F	13
Q34	Public Commitment to Integrity	F	8
Q36	Whistleblowing	F	8
Q37	High-risk Positions	F	0
Q43	Bribery to Avoid Conscription	F	0
Q45	Chains of Command and Payment	F	0

Q47	Civilian Code of Conduct	F	0
Q49	Corruption Prosecutions	F	0
Q50	Facilitation Payments	F	0

<b>Operational Risk</b>		<b>F</b>	<b>2</b>
Q54	Corruption Monitoring in Operations	F	8
Q51	Military Doctrine	F	0
Q52	Operational Training	F	0
Q53	Forward Planning	F	0
Q55	Controls in Contracting	F	0
Q56	Private Military Contractors	NS	

<b>Procurement Risk</b>		<b>E</b>	<b>17</b>
Q57	Procurement Legislation	B	75
Q58	Procurement Cycle	C	50
Q69	Supplier Sanctions	D	33
Q65	Tender Board Controls	E	31
Q62	Business Compliance Standards	E	25
Q66	Anti-Collusion Controls	E	25
Q63	Procurement Requirements	E	17
Q64	Open Competition v. Single Sourcing	F	13
Q67	Contract Award / Delivery	F	13
Q59	Procurement Oversight Mechanisms	F	8
Q60	Potential Purchases Disclosed	F	0
Q61	Actual Purchases Disclosed	F	0
Q70	Offset Contracts	F	0
Q71	Offset Contract Monitoring	F	0
Q72	Offset Competition	F	0
Q73	Agents and Intermediaries	F	0
Q74	Financing Packages	F	0
Q75	Political Pressure in Acquisitions	NS	
Q68	Complaint Mechanisms	NEI	

Legend	Range of Scores	Corruption Risk
A	83 - 100	Very Low
B	67 - 82	Low
C	50 - 66	Moderate
D	33 - 49	High
E	17 - 32	Very High
F	0 - 16	Critical

## Key

NEI - Not enough information to score indicator.

NS - Indicator is not scored for any country

NA - Not applicable

**Transparency International Defence & Security**

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