



# COUNTRY OVERVIEW:



# GHANA


**2020 Government Defence Integrity Index**

# OVERVIEW: GHANA

The Ghanaian defence sector is underpinned by robust legislation, providing strong legal provisions against corruption on issues such as procurement, asset disposal and anti-bribery. There is also an open environment of debate and discussion on corruption, in which civil society can engage in public debate without fear of persecution, and where senior Ghanaian defence officials publicly commit to tackling corruption. Despite these conditions, the Ghanaian defence sector lacks a level of transparency and accountability necessary to effectively protect its institutions against corruption. There is a high level of secrecy and opacity within Ghanaian defence institutions, with the sector often utilising national security exemptions to bypass transparency requirements. While legal frameworks may be strong on paper, legislation is often not fully implemented. Additionally, anti-corruption expertise is lacking among defence personnel and members of oversight bodies, limiting their ability to effectively mitigate corruption risks. In terms of operational risk, corruption is not addressed as a strategic issue in military operations, leaving troops ill-prepared to counter corruption in key lines of activity, including contracting within areas of operations.




## West Africa: Ghana's position within the region



In West Africa, in recent years, state corruption and weak governance have fuelled popular grievances and diminished the effectiveness and legitimacy of national institutions. While the region has benefited from relative stability, a variety of threats are looming on the security horizon. Governments are struggling to respond to spikes in Islamic terrorism and intercommunal violence. There are also enduring issues with corruption and drug trafficking that pose severe threats to national stability as they continue unchecked; weak accountability mechanisms and opacity in defence sectors across the region contribute to these problems. Lack of transparency translates into governments releasing incomplete information on budgets, personnel management systems, policy planning, and acquisitions of military assets. This, in turn, often coupled with lack of expertise and resources, undermines civilian oversight. Defence sectors in the region benefit from a defence exceptionalism in which they are exempt from regulations such as procurement or freedom of information legislation. However, most states in the region have signed and/or ratified the UNCAC, showing some commitment towards the reduction of corruption risk within their borders.


While Ghana's defence sector shares similarities with other West African countries, including excessive secrecy, limited transparency, and weak democratic civilian oversight, the country has a strong anti-corruption legislative framework and is often seen as the good governance frontrunner in the region.

# RISK AREAS




## Political Risk

Ghana does not have a publicly available defence policy or security strategy. While a defence policy purportedly does exist, it is treated as a secret document and is not subject to appropriate oversight. The Parliamentary Select Committee on Defence and Interior is mandated to scrutinise defence, but its effectiveness is undermined by a lack of expertise, limited access to information, and a de facto culture of not challenging the defence establishment within parliament. Civil society and media are free to publicly debate on defence issues without fear of harassment, but defence institutions rarely engage openly with civil society.




## Financial Risk

The annual defence budget is publicly available in a disaggregated form, but lacks adequate detail and is often submitted to parliament with tight timeframes for scrutiny and approval. It is not clear what percentage of the budget is spent on classified items, and there is no evidence that parliament is given information on this. The Auditor General presents an audit report on public accounts, but it is vague and lacks detail regarding the defence sector. Despite a new Right to Information law passed in March 2019, defence institutions may still bypass transparency requirements by claiming “national security” concerns when the law comes into effect in 2020.




## Personnel Risk

Ghana’s legal framework specifically prohibits corruption and bribery, yet the implementation of this legislation is weak. Facilitation payments are a widespread practice. A Code of Ethics is available for defence personnel, however it is not publicly available and it is unclear whether it specifically addresses corruption. There is no evidence of anti-corruption training for civilian defence personnel and recruitment and promotion of personnel to high-risk positions is not afforded the appropriate levels of transparency and oversight.



## Operational Risk

Despite senior defence officials publicly recognising corruption as an issue to be addressed, there is little evidence that corruption is considered a strategic issue in military operations. There is no explicit doctrine addressing corruption in operations, and there is little evidence that corruption is afforded appropriate attention in the forward planning of operations. Trained anti-corruption professionals are not deployed to monitor operations. There is no evidence that the three main defence education institutions address corruption in their officer training or pre-deployment courses.



## Procurement Risk

Ghana has no public defence policy and only vague public information on forward purchase planning, making it unclear whether defence procurement is based on strategic needs or ad hoc, politically-influenced decisions. Ghana has a strong Public Procurement Act (PPA), which allows competitive tendering, restricted tendering and single-sourcing for sensitive purchases. Defence institutions, however, frequently use the latter mechanism (single-sourcing) in the name of national security, without detailed public justification. Companies are rarely required to have compliance programmes in place before bidding, and sanctions are not consistently applied in the event of misconduct. The procurement law fails to address contracts with suppliers’ agents and intermediaries.

# THEMATIC FOCUS

The following section presents discussion of the four main challenges facing Ghana, and suggests areas of reform that are possible, based on GDI findings.

## Implementation Gap

Laws can only effect so much change. Implementation is a crucial next step in achieving outcomes across government, yet it continues to be a critical failure point in reform efforts. Implementation is a function of political commitment, and includes not only policies and practices, but also plans, resources, and stable institutional arrangements. The gap between the quality of the legal framework and the effectiveness of implementation in the defence and security sector cuts across all areas of risk, affecting ministries and militaries in equal turn.

*The Ghanaian defence sector, while underpinned by strong legal protections against corruption, faces an implementation gap in areas such as the procurement law, the recently passed Right to Information law and Whistle-blower protections. The National Anti-Corruption Plan and the recently established Office of the Special Prosecutor are also valuable tools in the fight against corruption if adequately implemented and resourced.*

## Operations

Since many operations take place in fragile and (post)conflict states where corrupt practices can be widespread, operations need to contend with the risk that corruption can pose to them. Corruption in operations wastes resources, empowers criminal networks, and contributes to conflict and insecurity. It is crucial for defence and security officials to be able to address corruption as a strategic issue in the planning of operations. Military doctrines, pre-deployment training and monitoring in the field can all help prepare troops to counter these risks.

*Ghana is a strong contributor to international missions but does not address corruption as a strategic issue on military operations, making international forces vulnerable and ill-equipped to deal with corruption on deployment. Corruption should be addressed at the forefront of mission planning and personnel should be trained on anti-corruption issues. The responsibility to reduce corruption risk and investigate accusations and incidents of fraud and corruption should be embedded within the chain of command, especially in operational contexts. Those with distinct responsibility in this area should be identifiable, held accountable and supported by individuals trained to monitor and enforce anti-corruption and fraud defence.*

## Oversight

Oversight functions exist in the form of anti-corruption bodies, audit functions, and/or parliamentary committees, but defence institutions have historically been exempt from this degree of scrutiny. Oversight mechanisms instill confidence that systems are resilient against undue influence and efficient in the face of resource challenges. Well-functioning oversight mechanisms ensure that national defence decisions around operations, budgets, personnel management, and arms acquisitions are robust and aligned with strategic needs.

*Effective oversight in Ghana's defence sector is undermined by a lack of expertise amongst oversight bodies. Oversight personnel, particularly parliamentarians, would benefit from capacity building programmes aimed at enhancing understanding of their role in ensuring accountability in the defence sector, and increasing their expertise on defence corruption risks.*

## Transparency

Transparency facilitates more effective government, not only by allowing oversight mechanisms to function effectively, but also by creating opportunities to streamline processes for greater impact and efficiency. Its absence is marked by mistrust in government and insecure political power. A lack of transparency over military capability, defence budgets, and acquisitions can increase the risk of arms proliferation, which in turn creates the potential for instability and pressure to increase defence spending.

*Ghanaian defence institutions should publish key information to the public, especially national level defence and security policy. For information that is genuinely too sensitive for public release, parliamentary committees or other external bodies must be granted access in order to exercise oversight. In addition, the classification of sensitive information should be regulated by clearly defined and published criteria.*

# COUNTRY SCORECARD: GHANA

<b>Overall Country Score</b>	<b>E</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>Very High Risk</b>
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<b>Political Risk</b>		<b>E</b>	<b>32</b>
Q20	Organised Crime Policing	B	67
Q13	Budget Scrutiny	C	63
Q17	External Audit	C	58
Q18	Natural Resources	C	56
Q4	CSO Engagement	C	50
Q5	International Instruments	C	63
Q1	Legislative Scrutiny	D	33
Q12	Budget Transparency & Detail	D	38
Q14	Budget Availability	D	42
Q16	Internal Audit	D	38
Q6	Public Debate	D	38
Q7	Anticorruption Policy	D	38
Q11	Acquisition Planning	E	17
Q15	Defence Income	E	25
Q19	Organised Crime Links	E	25
Q2	Defence Committee	E	21
Q8	Anticorruption Institutions	E	25
Q10	Risk Assessments	F	0
Q21	Intelligence Services Oversight	F	0
Q22	Intelligence Services Recruitment	F	0
Q3	Defence Policy Debate	F	0
Q76	Lobbying	F	0
Q23	Export Controls	NEI	
Q9	Public Trust in Institutions	NS	

<b>Financial Risk</b>		<b>E</b>	<b>28</b>
Q24	Asset Disposal Controls	B	75
Q32	Military-Owned Business Scrutiny	C	50
Q33	Unauthorised Private Enterprise	C	50
Q30	Access to Information	D	38
Q76	Defence Spending	D	38
Q25	Asset Disposal Scrutiny	E	17
Q26	Secret Spending	E	0
Q29	Off-budget Spending	E	17
Q28	Secret Program Auditing	F	0
Q31	Beneficial Ownership	F	0
Q27	Legislative Access to Information	NEI	

<b>Personnel Risk</b>		<b>E</b>	<b>31</b>
Q44	Bribery for Preferred Postings	A	83
Q34	Public Commitment to Integrity	C	50
Q35	Disciplinary Measures for Personnel	C	63
Q40	Payment System	C	50
Q45	Chains of Command and Payment	C	50
Q46	Military Code of Conduct	C	50
Q50	Facilitation Payments	C	50
Q36	Whistleblowing	E	25
Q37	High-risk Positions	F	0
Q38	Numbers of Personnel	F	0
Q39	Pay Rates and Allowances	F	13
Q41	Objective Appointments	F	0
Q42	Objective Promotions	F	0
Q48	Anticorruption Training	F	0

Q43	Bribery to Avoid Conscription	NA	
Q47	Civilian Code of Conduct	NEI	
Q49	Corruption Prosecutions	NEI	

<b>Operational Risk</b>		<b>F</b>	<b>5</b>
Q51	Military Doctrine	E	25
Q52	Operational Training	F	0
Q53	Forward Planning	F	0
Q54	Corruption Monitoring in Operations	F	0
Q55	Controls in Contracting	F	0
Q56	Private Military Contractors	NS	

<b>Procurement Risk</b>		<b>E</b>	<b>20</b>
Q57	Procurement Legislation	C	50
Q61	Actual Purchases Disclosed	C	50
Q69	Supplier Sanctions	C	50
Q66	Anti-Collusion Controls	D	38
Q68	Complaint Mechanisms	D	33
Q59	Procurement Oversight Mechanisms	E	17
Q62	Business Compliance Standards	E	25
Q63	Procurement Requirements	E	17
Q65	Tender Board Controls	E	25
Q67	Contract Award / Delivery	E	31
Q60	Potential Purchases Disclosed	F	13
Q64	Open Competition v. Single Sourcing	F	0
Q70	Offset Contracts	F	0
Q71	Offset Contract Monitoring	F	0
Q72	Offset Competition	F	0
Q73	Agents and Intermediaries	F	0
Q74	Financing Packages	F	0
Q58	Procurement Cycle	NEI	
Q75	Political Pressure in Acquisitions	NS	

Legend	Range of Scores	Corruption Risk
A	83 - 100	Very Low
B	67 - 82	Low
C	50 - 66	Moderate
D	33 - 49	High
E	17 - 32	Very High
F	0 - 16	Critical

**Key**

NEI - Not enough information to score indicator.

NS - Indicator is not scored for any country

NA - Not applicable

**Transparency International Defence & Security**

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