
COUNTRY PROFILE: SAUDI ARABIA




Saudi Arabia faces critical corruption risk across its defence institutions, with almost no transparency or oversight in operations, finances and procurement. However, it does score well on sanctions for corrupt behaviour, and has some controls over private sector linkages to military and defence.

| OECD fragile state | No | Defence Budget as % of GDP* | 8.8% |
|--|-----------------------|----------------------------------|------------------|
| Significant defence exporter* | No | Total armed forces personnel# | 252,000 |
| Significant defence importer* | Yes | UN Convention Against Corruption | Ratified in 2013 |
| Volume of arms trade 2015-2018 (US\$ mil)* | 3, Rank: 57 out of 65 | Arms Trade Treaty | Not signed |
| Defence Budget (US\$ mil)* | 67555 | | |

*SIPRI, #World Bank



Middle East & North Africa: Regional Issues in Defence Integrity



Defence sectors across the Middle East & North Africa (MENA) region continue to face a high risk of corruption. At the same time, protracted armed conflicts in Syria, Libya, and Yemen persist, while public protests against corruption and authoritarianism continue in a number of countries – reflecting an overall context of insecurity and fragility. Although some governments have publically committed to stepping up anti-corruption efforts, there remains a gap between existing legislation and implementation in practice. Military institutions in the region are characterised by a high degree of defence exceptionalism, resulting in a lack of transparency that precludes oversight actors from effectively scrutinising defence budgets and policies at a time when defence spending and arms imports continue to surge. These concerns are further compounded by authoritarian governance systems seen in many MENA countries. Resurgent protests and uprisings in the region after the 2011 Arab Spring demonstrate that corruption is a central and persistent public grievance. Continuing to treat the defence sector as an exception and failing to meet public expectations of transparency and accountability could further fuel public distrust, result in a loss of legitimacy for defence institutions, and facilitate the recruitment efforts of non-state armed groups. It is therefore crucial that governments in the region disclose more information about defence spending and strategy, make decisions that serve the public interest, and rectify loopholes that allow for corruption to thrive, in turn bolstering national security and stability.

COUNTRY SCORECARD: SAUDI ARABIA

Overall Country Score

F

11

Critical Risk

| | Political Risk | F | 9 |
|-----|-----------------------------------|---|----|
| Q19 | Organised Crime Links | В | 75 |
| Q5 | Conventions: UNCAC / OECD | D | 38 |
| Q8 | Compliance and Ethics Units | E | 25 |
| Q12 | Budget Transparency & Detail | F | 13 |
| Q6 | Public Debate | F | 13 |
| Q7 | Anticorruption Policy | F | 13 |
| Q18 | Natural Resources | F | 10 |
| Q2 | Defence Committee | F | 8 |
| Q3 | Defence Policy Debate | F | 8 |
| Q16 | Internal Audit | F | 6 |
| Q1 | Legislative Scrutiny | F | 0 |
| Q10 | Risk Assessments | F | 0 |
| Q11 | Acquisition Planning | F | 0 |
| Q13 | Budget Scrutiny | F | 0 |
| Q14 | Budget Availability | F | 0 |
| Q15 | Defence Income | F | 0 |
| Q17 | External Audit F | | 0 |
| Q20 | Organised Crime Policing | F | 0 |
| Q21 | Intelligence Services Oversight | | 0 |
| Q22 | Intelligence Services Recruitment | | 0 |
| Q23 | Export Controls (ATT) | | 0 |
| Q4 | CSO Engagement | F | 0 |
| Q76 | Lobbying | F | 0 |
| Q9 | Public Trust in Institutions | | NS |

| | Financial Risk | F | 13 |
|-----|-----------------------------------|------------------------------|----|
| Q33 | Unauthorised Private Enterprise | В | 75 |
| Q31 | Beneficial Ownership | С | 50 |
| Q24 | Asset Disposal Controls | F | 8 |
| Q29 | Off-budget Spending | F | 8 |
| Q25 | Asset Disposal Scrutiny | F | 0 |
| Q26 | Secret Spending | F | 0 |
| Q27 | Legislative Access to Information | ve Access to Information F 0 | |
| Q28 | Secret Program Auditing | Secret Program Auditing F 0 | |
| Q30 | Access to Information F | | 0 |
| Q32 | Military-Owned Business Scrutiny | F | 0 |
| Q77 | Defence Spending | F | 0 |

| 22 | E | Personnel Risk | |
|------|---|-------------------------------------|-----|
| 63 | C | Disciplinary Measures for Personnel | Q35 |
| 58 | C | Payment System | Q40 |
| 50 | C | Bribery for Preferred Postings | Q44 |
| 38 | D | Civilian Code of Conduct | Q47 |
| 33 | D | Corruption Prosecutions | Q49 |
| 25 | E | Anticorruption Training | Q48 |
| E 19 | | Miltary Code of Conduct | Q46 |
| 17 | E | Public Commitment to Integrity | Q34 |
| E 17 | | Whistleblowing | Q36 |
| E 17 | | Facilitation Payments | Q50 |
| F 13 | | Pay Rates and Allowances | Q39 |
| 6 | F | Objective Promotions | Q42 |
| 0 | F | High-risk Positions | Q37 |
| 0 | F | Numbers of Personnel | Q38 |

| Q41 | Objective Appointments | F | 0 |
|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------|---|----|
| Q45 | Chains of Command and Payment | F | 0 |
| Q43 Bribery to Avoid Conscription | | | NA |

| | Operational Risk | F | 5 |
|-----|-------------------------------------|---|----|
| Q51 | Military Doctrine | E | 25 |
| Q52 | Operational Training | F | 0 |
| Q53 | Forward Planning | F | 0 |
| Q54 | Corruption Monitoring in Operations | F | 0 |
| Q55 | Controls in Contracting | F | 0 |
| Q56 | Private Military Contractors | | NS |

| | Procurement Risk | F | 6 |
|-----|------------------------------------|------------------------------|----|
| Q68 | Complaint Mechanisms | D | 33 |
| Q58 | Procurement Cycle | E | 25 |
| Q67 | Contract Award / Delivery | E | 25 |
| Q60 | Potential Purchases Disclosed | F | 13 |
| Q66 | Anti-Collusion Controls | F | 13 |
| Q65 | Tender Board Controls | F | 6 |
| Q57 | Procurement Legislation | F | 0 |
| Q59 | Procurement Oversight Mechanisms | nt Oversight Mechanisms F | |
| Q61 | Actual Purchases Disclosed | F | 0 |
| Q62 | Business Compliance Standards | F | 0 |
| Q63 | Procurement Requirements | F | 0 |
| Q64 | Competition in Procurement | Competition in Procurement F | |
| Q69 | Supplier Sanctions F | | 0 |
| Q70 | Offset Contracts | Offset Contracts F | |
| Q71 | Offset Contract Monitoring | F 0 | |
| Q72 | Offset Competition | F | 0 |
| Q73 | Agents and Intermediaries | F | 0 |
| Q74 | Financing Packages | F | 0 |
| Q75 | Political Pressure in Acquisitions | | NS |

| Legend | Range of Scores | Corruption Risk |
|--------|-----------------|------------------------|
| A | 83 - 100 | Very Low |
| В | 67 - 82 | Low |
| C | 50 - 66 | Moderate |
| D | 33 - 49 | High |
| E | 17 - 32 | Very High |
| F | 0 - 16 | Critical |

Kev

NEI - Not enough information to score indicator. NS - Indicator is not scored for any country

NA - Not applicable



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