



Government Defence  
Integrity Index



2020

Country Brief:

**ANGOLA**





# ANGOLA


The 2017 election of President João Lourenço, after José Eduardo dos Santos of the ruling MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) had held power for 38 years, was a seismic moment in Angola's political history. Though an MPLA stalwart and hand-picked by dos Santos as his successor, Lourenço has overseen a relative opening of the state, the inclusion of civil society and opposition groups in political life, loosening of government control over the media, and moves against the economic interests and corruption of the former ruling elite.<sup>1</sup>

Member of Open Government Partnership	No
UN Convention Against Corruption	Ratified in 2006.
Arms Trade Treaty	Has not ratified

However, this has also been counterbalanced by efforts to undermine electoral transparency<sup>2</sup> and accusations that his anti-corruption agenda is mainly concerned with settling political scores.<sup>3</sup> Besides, deeper structural reforms are needed to transform Angola's oil-fuelled, rentier economy that has brought about poverty, underdevelopment, and a deep economic crisis. Defence spending has been progressively dropping since the early 2000s and the end of the civil war,<sup>4</sup> however it remains a key policy area of the government and the armed forces are engaged in a low-intensity conflict with insurgents in the northern province of Cabinda.<sup>5</sup> Angola has also signalled its intent to become an important regional security and peacekeeping player,<sup>6</sup> however these ambitions are threatened by critical corruption vulnerabilities throughout the defence sector. The activities and finances of defence institutions and the military remain highly opaque, especially with regards to defence procurement. Oversight bodies such as the parliament and audit institutions are weak and unable to provide substantial scrutiny, while further weaknesses persist with regards to personnel management and operations that increase the risk of abuses and corruption by Angolan forces.

## West Africa

In recent years, corruption and weak governance have fuelled popular grievances and diminished the legitimacy of national institutions across West Africa. For some states, including Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and Nigeria, corruption has underpinned armed conflict and the proliferation of violent extremist groups that have gained a foothold in the region. These groups are now beginning to threaten West Africa's coastal states, who themselves are confronted with rising piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. In turn, these conflicts are fuelling a rise in intercommunal violence and exacerbating tensions linked to climate change and resource scarcity. Meanwhile, trafficking and smuggling in small arms, drugs, natural resources, and human beings continue to pose a significant threats to regional stability. Poorly governed national defence forces have struggled to contend with this array of security challenges and their vulnerability to corruption has undermined state responses to insecurity. Extremely limited transparency translates into governments releasing incomplete information on budgets, personnel management processes, policy planning, and acquisitions of military assets. This, in turn, often coupled with lack of expertise and resources, undermines civilian oversight. Defence sectors in the region continue to benefit from a defence exceptionalism in which they are exempted from regulations, including in terms of procurement or freedom of information legislation. However, most states in the region have signed and/or ratified the UNCAC, showing some commitment towards the reduction of corruption risk within their borders.



<sup>1</sup> Bertelsmann Stiftung, *BTI Country Report – Angola*, Gutersloh, Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020, p. 3.  
<sup>2</sup> Africa News, 'Angola: Opposition Supporters Protest Electoral Law Change', 12 September 2021.  
<sup>3</sup> Estelle Maussion, 'Angola: Is Lourenço using his anti-corruption fight to settle scores?', *The Africa Report*, 12 May 2021.  
<sup>4</sup> SIPRI, 'Military Expenditure by Country in constant 2018 (US\$ m), 1988-2019', SIPRI 2020.  
<sup>5</sup> TRT World, 'Cabinda – a Little Known Oil-rich Region – Seeks Independence from Angola', 20 May 2019.  
<sup>6</sup> United States State Department, 'Integrated Country Strategy: Angola', 6 September 2018.



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
## Overall scores

The size of the colour band corresponds to number of countries that fall into that category.

## ANGOLA SCORE CRITICAL RISK

F

14



A > 83-100 VERY LOW

B > 67-82 LOW

C > 50-66 MODERATE


D > 33-49 HIGH

E > 17-32 VERY HIGH


F > 0-16 CRITICAL

## Risk Comparison


### POLITICAL




### FINANCIAL




### PERSONNEL



### OPERATIONAL



### PROCUREMENT





# ANGOLA

## Parliamentary Oversight

Legislative oversight of budget (Open Budget Survey, 2019)	33/100
Military expenditure as a share of government spending (SIPRI, 2020)	7.8%
Committee members with defence expertise (%)	30% (6 of 20)
# of meetings/year	Data is not publicly available.
Last review of defence policy/strategy	Defence strategy is not publicly available.

Despite some improvements under Lourenço, political power remains executive-controlled, with a subordinated legislature incapable of acting as a counterweight. The MPLA controls 150 of the 220 seats in the National Assembly, enough to pass any law and constitutional changes without opposition support.<sup>7</sup> House rules also give the opposition very limited time to voice their opinions and there is little incentive for the ruling party to engage in dialogue. Furthermore, a 2013 constitutional court ruling imposed severe limits on parliament's oversight powers.<sup>8</sup> It declared key parliamentary provisions for oversight as unconstitutional, including those allowing MPs to question members of the government and to conduct inquiries.<sup>9</sup> The result is a legislature that is side-lined in the policy-making process and used to rubber-stamp legislation, a pattern that is especially visible with regards to defence. There is no room for real debate on these issues and the MPLA restricts discussions to the passing of bills, which is done with expediency. The MPLA-dominated 2nd parliamentary commission is mandated to scrutinise the defence sector, however it lacks formal powers and independence. The commission only sits when the executive summons it and is more of a consultative working group than an oversight body. It is limited to elaborating private recommendations and it cannot conduct investigations or summon witnesses to appear before it. Oversight is further impeded by the absence of effective audit institutions. There is no evidence of an internal audit unit within the Ministry of Defence. The Audit Court is nominally responsible for external auditing, however it has only ever published two reports on the Ministry of Defence and it lacks independence from the executive, which appoints all nine court justices that form its leadership. Generally, there is a striking power asymmetry between the Ministry of Defence and Audit Court. Even when the Court does flag issues with contracts, the Ministry is not bound to cancel them and is free to sign off on them regardless.

## Financial Transparency

Defence-related access to information response rates	(1) % granted full or partial access: Data is not publicly available. (2) # subject to backlog: Data is not publicly available.
Defence-related complaints to ombudsman/commissioner #	Data is not publicly available.
Does the ombudsman/commissioner have authority over the MoD?	Yes
Audit reports on defence (2015-2020) #	0
Open Budget Index (IBP, 2019)	36/100
World Press Freedom Index (RSF, 2021)	103rd out of 180.

Government transparency was very poor under President dos Santos, although the signing of a new Extended Fund Facility (EFF) with the IMF in 2018 could lead to improvements in transparency.<sup>10</sup> It remains to be seen to what extent reforms are implemented though, given how previous commitments were quickly abandoned.<sup>11</sup> As things stand, financial transparency is particularly weak in the defence sector. Whilst an annual defence budget is published, it is highly aggregated and essentially only a summary. The government has repeatedly refused to provide further details and there are frequent delays in submitting the proposal to parliament. The defence budget also includes unspecified lines of expenditure under the heading "non-specified services", increasing the risk that such funds are vulnerable to corruption. Furthermore, even though Angola does have legislation that regulates the public's access to non-classified documents,<sup>12</sup> the law allows for significant over-classification of defence information that puts it beyond the purview of access to information procedures. As a result, defence information is extremely difficult to gain access to with a deeply entrenched culture of secrecy pervading the sector. Angola's defence sector also generates income that is completely off-budget. This income is not included in any public document and is entirely secretive. It is beyond the remit of the Audit Court and Inspector General's investigative powers. Off-budget expenditure is also prevalent, with so-called 'special security funds' providing for extra-budgetary expenses. The President is in charge of managing these funds, exempting them from oversight, as no legislation has ever been passed to regulate their use.

<sup>7</sup> Bertelsmann Stiftung, *Angola*, p. 3.

<sup>8</sup> Republic of Angola, 'Law No. 13/17 "Lei orgânica que aprova o regimento da Assembleia Nacional"', 6 July 2013, Acórdão do Tribunal Constitucional 319/2013.

<sup>9</sup> Rafael Marques de Morais, 'O Tribunal Constitucional e o golpe contra o MPLA', *Maka Angola*, 4 November 2013.

<sup>10</sup> International Monetary Fund, 'IMF Executive Board Approves US\$3.7 Billion Extended Arrangement Under the Extended Fund Facility for Angola', Press Release No. 18/463, 7 December 2018.

<sup>11</sup> Bertelsmann Stiftung, *Angola*, p. 32.

<sup>12</sup> Republic of Angola, Law No. 11/02 'Lei do acesso a documentos administrativos', 16 August 2002.



# ANGOLA

## Personnel Ethics Framework

Whistleblowing legislation	None.
# defence-sector whistleblower cases	None.
# Code of conduct violations	Military: Data is not publicly available. Civilian: Data is not publicly available.
Financial disclosure system	# submitted: Data is not collected. # of violations: Data is not collected.

The Armed Forces' deployments in the provinces of Cabinda and Lunda Norte have resulted in serious allegations of human rights abuses, including extrajudicial killings and arbitrary detentions.<sup>13</sup> Such issues are manifestations of serious failings within Angola's personnel management systems in the military that facilitate corruption and abuses of power. There is no evidence of a code of conduct for military or civilian personnel, with only loosely defined general guidelines regulating behaviour, making sanctions harder to impose. The reporting of abuses is also obstructed by the lack of protection for whistleblowers. Angola has no legislation around whistleblowing. In fact, the government has a track record of actively repressing those reporting abuses. There have also been numerous high-profile cases of journalists and civil society activists being persecuted and imprisoned for reporting on corruption,<sup>14</sup> including when implicating defence officials. Deficiencies also exist in the military's recruitment and payment procedures. Though a 2018 Law on Military careers established rules for careers in the sector,<sup>15</sup> appointments remain subject to political influence, especially for senior positions which are decided by the secretive National Security Council. The law also contains no provisions for external scrutiny of appointments, ensuring they remain highly secretive. In terms of salaries, payments are supposed to be made via the electronic SIGFE system,<sup>16</sup> created in 2008. However, there is little evidence it has been fully rolled out in the defence sector, where ghost soldiers and public servants remains a recurring issue and where cases of illegal cash payments to soldiers continue to be reported.

## Operations

Total armed forces personnel (World Bank, 2018)	117,000
Troops deployed on operations #	Data is not publicly available.

Angola's armed forces are relatively experienced operationally, given the protracted civil war and continuing low-intensity conflicts in the provinces of Cabinda and Lunda Norte. However, institutional safeguards to corruption remain strikingly weak throughout the planning and execution of military operations. Angola still does not have a military doctrine that recognises corruption as a strategic threat for the success of operations and there is no evidence of corruption being considered in forward planning. In fact, military involvement in the diamond-mining business in the Eastern regions, where the military has a strong presence, indicates an opportunity for corrupt practices during military deployments.<sup>17</sup> There is also no evidence of any anti-corruption training for commanders or troops prior to deployments, or even as part of basic military education. There are no guidelines for troops on how to identify and address corruption risks during deployments and there is no evidence that such risks are recognised and monitored in any respect. On top of this, the use of private military security contractors (PMSCs) has continued, despite Angola being a founding drafter of the Montreux Document that established guidelines on their use. Angola has passed legislation on the subject in 2014<sup>18</sup> and 2017<sup>19</sup> but neither law has corruption-specific provisions and enforcement has been virtually non-existent. Human rights abuses by PMSCs have continued in areas of military activity, particularly in the diamond-mining region of Lunda Norte and there is no evidence of any oversight of these contractors.

<sup>13</sup> United States State Department, 'Angola 2019 Human Rights Report', 2019, p. 1.

<sup>14</sup> See for instance, Kerry Dolan, 'Journalist Rafael Marques Given Two Year Suspended Sentence In Angolan Defamation Trial', Forbes, 28 May 2015.

<sup>15</sup> Republic of Angola, 'Lei das Carreiras Militares Finalmente Aprovada', 7 July 2018.

<sup>16</sup> Angop, 'Angola: Desactivados mais de 55 mil funcionários no SIGFE', 1 July 2016.

<sup>17</sup> Maka Angola, 'Inteligência militar no garimpo de diamantes', 31 October 2017.

<sup>18</sup> Republic of Angola, 'Law No. 10/14, Lei das empresas privadas de segurança', 30 July 2014.

<sup>19</sup> Presidency of the Republic of Angola, Presidential Decree No. 225/17, 'Regulamento da lei das empresas privadas de segurança', 27 September 2017.





# ANGOLA

## Defence Procurement

Military expenditure (US\$ mil) (SIPRI, 2020)	1301
Open competition in defence procurement (%)	Data is not publicly available.
Main defence exports – to (SIPRI, 2016-20)	N/A
Main defence imports – from (SIPRI, 2016-20)	Russia, Lithuania, Belarus, China, Italy

Though Angola's defence spending has declined in recent years, it still represents close to ten percent of the government's entire expenditure, far outstripping that of its neighbours and putting it on a par with states in the Sahel that are actively confronting a variety of complex security threats.<sup>20</sup> Angola's continuing investment in defence has seen it import significant amounts of equipment from an array of different partners, including Russia, Belarus and China. However, with such investment, comes assorted corruption risks that threaten to waste significant public funds if appropriate checks are not in place. In Angola's case, procurement corruption risk levels are critically high due a complete absence of controls. At the planning level, Angola's acquisition plan is confidential and the state-owned enterprise Simportex is responsible for all investments in defence. Though nominally under the control of the Ministry of Defence, there are allegations that it is in fact controlled by the President's Security Bureau Chief.<sup>21</sup>

The company's staff are bound by confidentiality clauses and there is very little information available on its operations and finances as it has not been subject to audit. On top of this, in 2016, a new public procurement law was passed which exempts the acquisitions of arms and military equipment from public procurement regulations and nominates Simportex as the exclusive handler of all defence procurement contracts.<sup>22</sup> This exclusion of defence procurement from public procurement law also means that it is exempted from the scrutiny of the Audit Court, Inspector General and Public Contracting Service, guaranteeing that defence acquisitions are effectively state secrets. Equally, the vast majority of procurement is single-sourced through direct award of contracts to preferred suppliers who enjoy good relationships with the political and military elite. Despite the Audit Court having the power to scrutinise restricted procurement procedures, it rarely does so and signs off contracts even when there are strong allegations of corruption.

<sup>20</sup> SIPRI, 'Military Expenditure by Country as a Percentage of Government Spending, 1988-2019'.

<sup>21</sup> Correio Angolense, 'PCA da Simportex acusado de 'cabritismo'', 25 October 2017.

<sup>22</sup> Republic of Angola, Law No. 9/16 'Public Procurement Law', 16 June 2016.

Version 1.0, October 2021

GDI data collection for **Angola** was conducted February 2018 to March 2019. The narrative discussion in this GDI brief was produced at a later time with the most recent information available for the country, which may not be reflected in the GDI country assessments or scores.



# ANGOLA 2020 GDI Scorecard

Grade Score

Political Risk		F	15
Q1	Legislative Scrutiny	E	25
Q2	Defence Committee	F	13
Q3	Defence Policy Debate	F	8
Q4	CSO Engagement	E	17
Q5	Conventions: UNCAC / OECD	C	50
Q6	Public Debate	F	13
Q7	Anticorruption Policy	F	0
Q8	Compliance and Ethics Units	F	0
Q9	Public Trust in Institutions	NS	
Q10	Risk Assessments	F	0
Q11	Acquisition Planning	F	8
Q12	Budget Transparency & Detail	C	50
Q13	Budget Scrutiny	F	13
Q14	Budget Availability	D	33
Q15	Defence Income	F	0
Q16	Internal Audit	F	0
Q17	External Audit	F	0
Q18	Natural Resources	F	15
Q19	Organised Crime Links	D	38
Q20	Organised Crime Policing	D	33
Q21	Intelligence Services Oversight	F	0
Q22	Intelligence Services Recruitment	F	0
Q23	Export Controls (ATT)	D	38
Q76	Lobbying	F	0

Financial Risk		F	13
Q24	Asset Disposal Controls	F	8
Q25	Asset Disposal Scrutiny	F	0
Q26	Secret Spending	F	0
Q27	Legislative Access to Information	NEI	
Q28	Secret Program Auditing	F	0
Q29	Off-budget Spending	F	8
Q30	Access to Information	E	25
Q31	Beneficial Ownership	F	13
Q32	Military-Owned Business Scrutiny	E	25
Q33	Unauthorised Private Enterprise	E	25
Q77	Defence Spending	E	25

Personnel Risk		E	20
Q34	Public Commitment to Integrity	F	8
Q35	Disciplinary Measures for Personnel	A	88
Q36	Whistleblowing	F	0
Q37	High-risk Positions	F	0
Q38	Numbers of Personnel	F	0
Q39	Pay Rates and Allowances	D	38
Q40	Payment System	E	25
Q41	Objective Appointments	F	8
Q42	Objective Promotions	F	13
Q43	Bribery to Avoid Conscription	E	25
Q44	Bribery for Preferred Postings	B	67
Q45	Chains of Command and Payment	F	0
Q46	Military Code of Conduct	F	0

## OVERALL COUNTRY SCORE

**CRITICAL RISK**



### RISK GRADE

- A • 83-100 **VERY LOW**
- B • 67-82 **LOW**
- C • 50-66 **MODERATE**
- D • 33-49 **HIGH**
- E • 17-32 **VERY HIGH**
- F • 0-16 **CRITICAL**



Grade Score

Personnel Risk		E	20
Q47	Civilian Code of Conduct	F	13
Q48	Anticorruption Training	F	8
Q49	Corruption Prosecutions	E	17
Q50	Facilitation Payments	D	33

Operational Risk		F	0
Q51	Military Doctrine	F	0
Q52	Operational Training	F	0
Q53	Forward Planning	F	0
Q54	Corruption Monitoring in Operations	F	0
Q55	Controls in Contracting	F	0
Q56	Private Military Contractors	NS	

Procurement Risk		E	22
Q57	Procurement Legislation	E	25
Q58	Procurement Cycle	D	38
Q59	Procurement Oversight Mechanisms	D	33
Q60	Potential Purchases Disclosed	E	25
Q61	Actual Purchases Disclosed	F	13
Q62	Business Compliance Standards	F	0
Q63	Procurement Requirements	E	25
Q64	Competition in Procurement	F	13
Q65	Tender Board Controls	F	13
Q66	Anti-Collusion Controls	F	0
Q67	Contract Award / Delivery	E	19
Q68	Complaint Mechanisms	C	50
Q69	Supplier Sanctions	C	50
Q70	Offset Contracts	E	25
Q71	Offset Contract Monitoring	E	25
Q72	Offset Competition	NEI	
Q73	Agents and Intermediaries	E	25
Q74	Financing Packages	F	0
Q75	Political Pressure in Acquisitions	NS	

### KEY

- NEI Not enough information to score indicator
- NS Indicator is not scored for any country
- NA Not applicable



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