



**Government Defence
Integrity Index**



2020



Country Brief:

COTE D'IVOIRE

CÔTE D'IVOIRE


Côte d'Ivoire's recent political history has been turbulent, marked by almost a decade of civil war and a post-electoral crisis in 2011 that plunged the country into chaos and seriously undermined democratic consolidation.¹ It took military interventions by the French and a UN-NATO peacekeeping mission (UNOCI) to resolve the conflict and validate the election results, forcing out incumbent President Gbagbo for his opponent Alassane Ouattara.² However, political transformation has not followed, with politics still dominated by strongmen and the same elites that have sought power for decades.

Member of Open Government Partnership	Yes
UN Convention Against Corruption	Ratified in 2012.
Arms Trade Treaty	Ratified in 2015

Pressing issues related to democratisation and constitutional and security sector reform (SSR) have been only partially addressed. In November 2020, Ouattara won a third term in elections that were boycotted by the opposition and mired in allegations of fraud and the suppression of key opposition figures.³ The defence sector is a key priority for Côte d'Ivoire in this context. Efforts to improve governance and civilian democratic control over forces have failed to translate into tangible improvements and the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants from the civil war represent a considerable challenge.⁴ Corruption risks across the defence sector remain very high with a lack of political will and weak institutional safeguards facilitating abuses. Parliamentary oversight is extremely poor with the executive exerting significant influence over the defence committee, and audit bodies ineffective in applying systematic controls to defence. Defence procurement is highly secretive and largely shielded from scrutiny, with financial transparency almost non-existent. Access to information too is poor, as are whistleblowing protections which compound personnel management issues.

West Africa

In recent years, corruption and weak governance have fuelled popular grievances and diminished the legitimacy of national institutions across West Africa. For some states, including Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and Nigeria, corruption has underpinned armed conflict and the proliferation of violent extremist groups that have gained a foothold in the region. These groups are now beginning to threaten West Africa's coastal states, who themselves are confronted with rising piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. In turn, these conflicts are fuelling a rise in intercommunal violence and exacerbating tensions linked to climate change and resource scarcity. Meanwhile, trafficking and smuggling in small arms, drugs, natural resources, and human beings continue to pose a significant threats to regional stability. Poorly governed national defence forces have struggled to contend with this array of security challenges and their vulnerability to corruption has undermined state responses to insecurity. Extremely limited transparency translates into governments releasing incomplete information on budgets, personnel management processes, policy planning, and acquisitions of military assets. This, in turn, often coupled with lack of expertise and resources, undermines civilian oversight. Defence sectors in the region continue to benefit from a defence exceptionalism in which they are exempted from regulations, including in terms of procurement or freedom of information legislation. However, most states in the region have signed and/or ratified the UNCAC, showing some commitment towards the reduction of corruption risk within their borders.



¹ Bertelsmann Stiftung, *BTI 2020 Country Report – Côte d'Ivoire*, Gutersloh, Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020, pp. 3-4.

² Benjamin Dodman, 'Ivory Coast's Laurent Gbagbo, the Strongman who Refused to Let Go', 15 January 2019.

³ Florence Richard, 'Côte d'Ivoire: Alassane Ouattara re-Elected for a 3rd Term with 94.27%', *The Africa Report*, 3 November 2020; Human Rights Watch, 'Côte d'Ivoire: Post-Election Violence, Repression', 2 December 2020.

⁴ Aline Leboeuf, 'La Réforme du Secteur de Sécurité A l'Ivoirienne', *IFRI*, March 2016.

COTE D'IVOIRE

Overall scores


The size of the colour band corresponds to number of countries that fall into that category.

COTE D'IVOIRE SCORE

VERY HIGH RISK

E

22



A > 83-100 VERY LOW

B > 67-82 LOW

C > 50-66 MODERATE


D > 33-49 HIGH

E > 17-32 VERY HIGH


F > 0-16 CRITICAL

Risk Comparison


POLITICAL




FINANCIAL




PERSONNEL



OPERATIONAL



PROCUREMENT



COTE D'IVOIRE

Parliamentary Oversight

Legislative oversight of budget (Open Budget Survey, 2019)	37/100
Military expenditure as a share of government spending (SIPRI, 2020)	5%
Committee members with defence expertise (%)	Data is not publicly available.
# of meetings/year	Data is not publicly available.
Last review of defence policy/strategy	Data is not publicly available.

Côte d'Ivoire has a long history of presidential control over the policymaking process. Since the 1990s, decision-making has been the preserve of narrow groups of allies of the President, stifling the political empowerment of the parliament.⁵ In the defence sector, this pattern is even more evident. The National Assembly lacks formal rights to reject or amend defence policy, as well as to review military budgets and arms procurements. In practice, oversight is exercised by the parliamentary defence and security commission (CSD), however its role as an independent body is undermined by presidential party domination of the legislature. The chair of the commission for the 2016-2021 cycle, Sidi Konaté, is a close ally of the President who is also the constitutionally-mandated head of the commission. This allows for high levels of executive influence over its functioning and activity and seriously undermines its capacity to exercise effective oversight.⁶ There is no evidence of the commission conducting any long-term investigations and no record of it submitting any budget amendments or recommendations to the executive. The commission appears to have very small role in influencing policy formulation and acts more like a rubberstamp for executive-driven legislation. The commission's oversight work is also hampered by deficiencies in the internal and external auditing mechanisms that restrict the availability of key financial information. Within the Ministry of Defence, the Comptroller General monitors expenditure along with the Inspector General of the Army.⁷ However, both are chronically underfunded and neglected, with the Inspector General not even having a named director for nearly a decade.⁸ Neither body is required to provide reports to other oversight bodies, nor are they subject to external scrutiny, making it almost impossible to assess their effectiveness. The Court of Accounts is nominally responsible for external auditing, although it is highly ineffective and rarely ever publishes annual reports, with no evidence of defence expenditure being scrutinised since 2017. Moreover, its reports are handed directly to the President and there is very little transparency about its activities, raising significant questions concerning its independence.

Financial Transparency

Defence-related access to information response rates	(1) % granted full or partial access: Data is not publicly available. (2) # subject to backlog: Data is not publicly available.
Defence-related complaints to ombudsman/commissioner #	Data is not publicly available.
Does the commissioner have authority over the MoD?	Yes (Médiateur de la République)
Audit reports on defence (2015-2020) #	1 in 2017.
Open Budget Index (IBP, 2019)	34/100
World Press Freedom Index (RSF, 2021)	66th out of 180

The Ivorian defence sector is highly opaque, especially with regards to financial management processes. The budget is not comprehensive, with figures highly aggregated into broad categories that obscure the true purpose of expenditure. The Military Programming Law (LPM) too, does not provide a detailed breakdown of spending across functions and maintains a high level of secrecy around the sector's finances. The defence budget as a whole is devoid of oversight. The parliamentary defence commission is not provided with a budget proposal for review and budget oversight is not a function of the legislature, granting the executive a free hand to determine budget allocations. The lack of published budgetary information is compounded by the weakness of access to information mechanisms. There are no specific regulations clarifying procedures for accessing defence information. On top of this, classification is very broadly defined, allowing defence institutions to arbitrarily classify most data and keeping it out of reach of the public. The Ministry of Defence also does not have a designated unit to deal with such requests, underlining how little attention is given to this function. The financial picture is further clouded by the involvement of some soldiers in the informal economy, especially amongst former rebel soldiers, known as 'comzones'. These soldiers and their allies maintain control over commodities trading in their former rebel strongholds, generating profits from natural resource trafficking.⁹ These sources of income are undisclosed and not subject to any controls or oversight, representing a significant corruption risk. Additionally, extra budgetary expenditures are also commonplace. This expenditure is even referenced in an aggregated fashion on the budget itself and the executive frequently labels expenditure as off-budget, meaning it has discretion for spending beyond external controls.¹⁰

⁵ Bertelsmann Stiftung, *Côte d'Ivoire*, p. 9.

⁶ V. Duhem, 'Côte d'Ivoire: la forteresse de Guillaume Soro' (Côte d'Ivoire: Guillaume Soro's fortress), *Jeune Afrique*, 13 November 2017.

⁷ Ministry of Defence, 'Role, Mission and Organisation of the Ministry of Defence'.

⁸ Ivorian Press Agency, 'Côte d'Ivoire/Brigadier General Detoh Lehto officially takes the helm of the Office of the Inspector General of the Armed Forces', 26 July 2016.

⁹ Aline Leboeuf, 'La Réforme du Secteur de la Sécurité à l'Ivoirienne', *IFRI*, March 2016, p. 5 and 34.

¹⁰ République de Côte d'Ivoire, 'Loi no.2016-886 du 8 novembre 2016 portant Constitution de la République de Côte d'Ivoire', 8 November 2016, Abidjan.

COTE D'IVOIRE

Personnel Ethics Framework

Whistleblowing legislation	Partial
# defence-sector whistleblower cases	None.
# Code of conduct violations	Military: Data is not publicly available. Civilian: Data is not publicly available.
Financial disclosure system	# submitted: None # of violations: None

The 2017 mutinies in Bouaké over unpaid bonuses¹¹ and repeated allegations of human rights abuses during the civil war and post-electoral crisis,¹² have shone a light on weaknesses in the army's personnel management systems. Whilst both civilian and military personnel are subjected to codes of conduct, they are of varying quality. The civilian code is fairly extensive, covering bribery, gifts and conflicts of interest, issues that are noticeably absent from the military code.¹³ Enforcement of both codes is also patchy, and investigations only occur in cases of egregious violations, such as for mutinies, while enforcement of corruption-related offences, punishable under a 2013 order,¹⁴ is extremely weak. These investigations are also held back by a lack of whistleblower protections. Côte d'Ivoire has no unified whistleblower act, with loose protections only granted under a single article of a 2013 order, which does not explicitly apply to defence personnel.¹⁵ The practice is not encouraged by the government, with no evidence of trainings or campaigns to encourage personnel to come forward. The absence of an independent unit within the Ministry of Defence to process any claims and the weakness of legal protections also mean that there is little trust amongst personnel that the system will provide them protection. Integrity-building efforts are also undermined by the circumvention of standard recruitment and promotion procedures. Whilst there are formal processes in place, appointments are influenced by political considerations, especially at middle and senior commander levels. There is also no evidence of scrutiny of these appointments, which are heavily executive dominated, and very little information is published about these nominations, opening the door for personnel to be promoted through political allegiances rather than their quality and experience as soldiers.

Operations

Total armed forces personnel (World Bank, 2018)	27,000
Troops deployed on operations #	799 in Mali (MINUSMA)

The DDR process in Côte d'Ivoire was intended to help integrate former rebel combatants into the national army and to strengthen the armed force's operational capacities. However, the process has been implemented as a way to buy the rebels' peace and co-opt them, resulting in a bloated army. Some estimates now put the size of the military at around 50,000 even though only about 25,000 troops are budgeted for.¹⁶ This uncertainty around the number of troops significantly increases the risk of ghost soldiers. Côte d'Ivoire also does not have a doctrine that addresses corruption as a strategic issue for the success of operations, leading to a complete absence of corruption risk mitigation being included in the forward planning of operations. There is also a dearth of anti-corruption training for commanders, with the highly selective trainings conducted by UNOCI (UN Observer Mission in Côte d'Ivoire) one of the only examples of this. Côte d'Ivoire also lacks policies and programmes to monitor corruption risk during deployments and does not provide its troops with guidelines on how to identify and address corruption in the field of operations.

¹¹ France 24, 'Côte d'Ivoire: Face à la Mutinerie, l'Armée Envoyée à Bouaké', 14 May 2017.

¹² Human Rights Watch, 'Côte d'Ivoire: New Spate of Abuses by Military', 19 November 2012.

¹³ République de Côte d'Ivoire, 'Loi no.2016-1109 Portant Code de la Fonction Militaire', Official Journal, 16 February 2016.

¹⁴ République de Côte d'Ivoire, 'Ordonnance no.2013-660'

¹⁵ République de Côte d'Ivoire, 'Ordonnance no.2013-660', Article 67.

¹⁶ Leboeuf, 'Reforme du Secteur'.

COTE D'IVOIRE

Defence Procurement

Military expenditure (US\$ mil) (SIPRI, 2020)	589
Open competition in defence procurement (%)	Data is not publicly available.
Main defence exports – to (SIPRI, 2016-20)	France*
Main defence imports – from (SIPRI, 2016-20)	Bulgaria, Spain, France, China, Canada

*One export in 2018.

Between 2016 and 2020, Côte d'Ivoire initiated a significant modernisation plan for the armed forces under the Military Programming Law (LPM).¹⁷ The LPM is essentially a military expenditure roadmap designed to revamp Côte d'Ivoire's military and provide for €3.4 billion in military spending with the acquisition of new military equipment alone representing some €1.2 billion.¹⁸ This significant investment, however, is highly vulnerable to corruption due to deficiencies in the procurement system. Acquisition planning has been done through the LPM, however it does not include a breakdown of planned acquisitions, and the plan includes only aggregated expenditure figures.¹⁹ With itemised procurement plans excluded from publication, the plan fails to provide much clarity and transparency on procurement priorities and requirements over the last five years. The overall legal framework

around defence procurement is also insufficient. The National Procurement Regulatory Authority (ANRMP) published fifteen decrees between 2014 and 2018 regulating public procurement, none of which applied specifically to the defence sector.²⁰ There is still no specific legislation covering defence procurement, a significant issue, especially as article 8 of the Public Procurement Code exempts all "secret" items from standard procurement regulations.²¹ As things stand, oversight bodies are highly ineffective in scrutinising defence procurement. The Inspector General of the Army and the Comptroller General of Defence Finances and Administration (CGAFD) are key oversight bodies, but their scrutiny of procurement is questionable. The CGAFD for instance is non-transparent, making its effectiveness impossible to ascertain. There is also extensive evidence that the executive disburses special funds to procure military equipment, bypassing the IGA and CGAFD and resulting in acquisitions that are not subjected to any scrutiny.²² Moreover, the vast majority of defence procurement is single-sourced and these procedures are not subject to any external oversight by the ANRMP, which itself has no power to control single-sourced contracts.

¹⁷ Government of Côte d'Ivoire, 'Military Programming Law, 2 November 2018.

¹⁸ Vivianna Forson, 'Côte d'Ivoire – Mutinerie: Ce Qu'il Faut Retenir en Trois Questions', Le Point, 8 February 2017.

¹⁹ Government of Côte d'Ivoire, 'Military Programming Law'.

²⁰ National Procurement Regulatory Authority, 'Decrees'.

²¹ République de Côte d'Ivoire, 'Decree no.2009-259 of 6 August 2009, on Public Procurement', Article no 8, Abidjan, 6 August 2009.

²² Laurent Touchard, 'The Ivorian Armed Forces Today', *IFRI*, excerpt from book titled *African Armed Forces*, 2016-2017, 2017.

Version 1.0, October 2021

GDI data collection for **Cote d'Ivoire** was conducted February 2018 to March 2019. The narrative discussion in this GDI brief was produced at a later time with the most recent information available for the country, which may not be reflected in the GDI country assessments or scores.

COTE D'IVOIRE 2020 GDI Scorecard

		Grade	Score
Political Risk		E	27
Q1	Legislative Scrutiny	E	25
Q2	Defence Committee	F	13
Q3	Defence Policy Debate	F	8
Q4	CSO Engagement	D	33
Q5	Conventions: UNCAC / OECD	C	63
Q6	Public Debate	C	50
Q7	Anticorruption Policy	C	50
Q8	Compliance and Ethics Units	D	33
Q9	Public Trust in Institutions	NS	
Q10	Risk Assessments	F	0
Q11	Acquisition Planning	D	33
Q12	Budget Transparency & Detail	E	25
Q13	Budget Scrutiny	C	50
Q14	Budget Availability	F	8
Q15	Defence Income	E	17
Q16	Internal Audit	F	6
Q17	External Audit	F	13
Q18	Natural Resources	E	30
Q19	Organised Crime Links	C	50
Q20	Organised Crime Policing	C	50
Q21	Intelligence Services Oversight	F	0
Q22	Intelligence Services Recruitment	F	0
Q23	Export Controls (ATT)	C	63
Q76	Lobbying	F	0

Financial Risk		E	27
Q24	Asset Disposal Controls	E	25
Q25	Asset Disposal Scrutiny	F	0
Q26	Secret Spending	F	0
Q27	Legislative Access to Information	F	0
Q28	Secret Program Auditing	F	0
Q29	Off-budget Spending	E	25
Q30	Access to Information	E	25
Q31	Beneficial Ownership	D	38
Q32	Military-Owned Business Scrutiny	A	100
Q33	Unauthorised Private Enterprise	F	13
Q77	Defence Spending	B	67

Personnel Risk		D	34
Q34	Public Commitment to Integrity	F	8
Q35	Disciplinary Measures for Personnel	C	50
Q36	Whistleblowing	F	8
Q37	High-risk Positions	F	0
Q38	Numbers of Personnel	F	8
Q39	Pay Rates and Allowances	F	0
Q40	Payment System	C	50
Q41	Objective Appointments	E	25
Q42	Objective Promotions	C	63
Q43	Bribery to Avoid Conscription	NA	
Q44	Bribery for Preferred Postings	B	67
Q45	Chains of Command and Payment	C	50
Q46	Military Code of Conduct	D	44

OVERALL COUNTRY SCORE

VERY HIGH RISK

22

RISK GRADE

A • 83-100 VERY LOW

B • 67-82 LOW

C • 50-66 MODERATE

D • 33-49 HIGH

E • 17-32 VERY HIGH

F • 0-16 CRITICAL



Personnel Risk		D	34
Q47	Civilian Code of Conduct	C	56
Q48	Anticorruption Training	F	8
Q49	Corruption Prosecutions	C	58
Q50	Facilitation Payments	C	50

Operational Risk		F	0
Q51	Military Doctrine	F	0
Q52	Operational Training	F	0
Q53	Forward Planning	F	0
Q54	Corruption Monitoring in Operations	F	0
Q55	Controls in Contracting	F	0
Q56	Private Military Contractors	NS	

Procurement Risk		E	21
Q57	Procurement Legislation	F	0
Q58	Procurement Cycle	F	13
Q59	Procurement Oversight Mechanisms	F	8
Q60	Potential Purchases Disclosed	D	38
Q61	Actual Purchases Disclosed	F	0
Q62	Business Compliance Standards	C	50
Q63	Procurement Requirements	F	0
Q64	Competition in Procurement	F	0
Q65	Tender Board Controls	E	31
Q66	Anti-Collusion Controls	E	19
Q67	Contract Award / Delivery	F	13
Q68	Complaint Mechanisms	B	75
Q69	Supplier Sanctions	A	100
Q70	Offset Contracts	F	0
Q71	Offset Contract Monitoring	F	0
Q72	Offset Competition	F	0
Q73	Agents and Intermediaries	D	38
Q74	Financing Packages	F	0
Q75	Political Pressure in Acquisitions	NS	

KEY

NEI Not enough information to score indicator
NS Indicator is not scored for any country
NA Not applicable



ti-defence.org/gdi

GDI@transparency.org

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Series editor: **Stephanie Trapnell**, *Senior Advisor*

Author: **Matthew Steadman**, *Research Officer*

Project Manager: **Michael Ofori-Mensah**, *Head of Research*

Design: **Arnold and Pearn**



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