



**Government Defence  
Integrity Index**



**2020**

Country Brief:


**INDONESIA**

# INDONESIA

Indonesia's demographics, its colonial past and sprawling archipelagic territory present a unique combination of security issues.<sup>1</sup> Though terrorism has plateaued in recent years, it remains a major threat to national security, and the defence and security forces are actively engaged in various operations to curb terrorist groups.<sup>2</sup> In parallel, separatism, ethnic and religious conflict, and piracy and organised crime, continue to pose particular challenges. Looking beyond national threats, Indonesia's location to the south of the South China Sea make it an important player in the region's geopolitical competition where it has historically sought to balance various interests.<sup>3</sup>

Member of Open Government Partnership	Yes
UN Convention Against Corruption	Ratified in 2006
Arms Trade Treaty	Has not signed.

However, mounting provocations are increasing tensions with Beijing and heightening the risk of major security incidents,<sup>4</sup> while developments in Indonesia's strategic environment and Australia's decision to procure nuclear-powered submarines have underlined the importance of Indonesian military modernisation.<sup>5</sup> At the same time, political polarisation is threatening Indonesia's democratic institutions and social fabric. Three contentious and divisive elections since 2014 have fractured the relative consensus that the country's patronage-driven politics helped to build.<sup>6</sup> Under populist President Joko Widodo, ethno-religious divides have been accentuated and risk further exacerbating Indonesia's long-standing security issues, while democratic backsliding has continued apace.<sup>7</sup> This could have severe implications for defence governance as the military takes on a more assertive role in internal security provision and becomes increasingly politicised.<sup>8</sup> As things stand, Indonesia already has to contend with gaps in oversight and transparency of military expenditure, particularly in relation to procurement, which remains largely exempt from standard disclosure and contracting requirements and highly vulnerable to corruption. Access to information remains limited, as does whistleblowing, and anti-corruption safeguards in terms of both personnel and military operations are lacking.



## Asia-Pacific

The Asia-Pacific region is home to some of the biggest military and economic powers in the world, as well as critical financial and trade hubs, natural resources and around 60 per cent of the world's population, and the region has become a major area of geopolitical rivalry. The continuing deterioration of Sino-American relations is having widespread implications for countries in the region. Security challenges presented by an increasingly assertive China, the continuing threat posed by North Korea and the protracted insurgencies in Thailand, the Philippines, Myanmar, Indonesia and Malaysia will also remain key concerns moving forward, as will emerging security threats related to cyberwarfare and the impact of climate change. However, Asia-Pacific has huge variations in the quality of defence governance mechanisms, which will determine how well defence institutions can respond to these challenges. It is home to both New Zealand, the highest scorer in the index, and Myanmar, one of the lowest. Though challenges are extremely varied across the sample, corruption risks are particularly pronounced in relation to financial management and procurement, where defence exceptionalism remains pervasive and exempts the sector from standard reporting and publishing standards. Operations too are highly vulnerable to corruption, while personnel management and policymaking are considered significantly more robust.

<sup>1</sup> Jarryd de Haan, 'Indonesia: Threats and Challenges to Domestic Security', *Future Directions*, 21 February 2019.

<sup>2</sup> De Haan, 'Indonesia'.

<sup>3</sup> Prashanth Parameswaran, 'What's With Indonesia's Big Military Exercise Near the South China Sea?', *The Diplomat*, 23 May 2017.

<sup>4</sup> Felix K. Chang, 'The Next Front: China, Indonesia and the South China Sea', *Foreign Policy Research Institute*, 27 January 2020.

<sup>5</sup> Tangguh Chairil, 'AUKUS Shows Indonesia Must Improve Defence Modernisation', *The Jakarta Post*, 30 September 2021.

<sup>6</sup> Eve Warburton, 'Deepening Polarisation and Democratic Decline in Indonesia', in Thomas Carothers and Andrew O'Donohue (eds.), *Political Polarisation in South and Southeast Asia: Old Divisions, New Dangers*, Carnegie Endowment, August 2020.

<sup>7</sup> Burhanuddin Muhtadi and Kennedy Muslim, 'Populism, Islamism and Democratic Decline in Indonesia', *Middle-East Institute*, 4 August 2020.

<sup>8</sup> Natalie Sambhi, 'Generals Gaining Ground: Civil-Military Relations and Democracy in Indonesia', *Brookings*, 22 January 2021.

# INDONESIA

## Overall scores

The size of the colour band corresponds to number of countries that fall into that category.

## INDONESIA SCORE HIGH RISK

D

47



A > 83-100 VERY LOW

B > 67-82 LOW


C > 50-66 MODERATE

D > 33-49 HIGH

E > 17-32 VERY HIGH

F > 0-16 CRITICAL

## Risk Comparison



# INDONESIA

## Parliamentary Oversight

Legislative oversight of budget (Open Budget Survey, 2019)	82/100
Military expenditure as share of government spending (SIPRI, 2020)	4.7%
Committee members with defence expertise (%)	25% (13 of 51)
# of meetings/year	Data is not publicly available.
Last review of defence policy/strategy	2015 (Defence White Paper)

Presidents in Indonesia have frequently formed oversized legislative coalitions to neutralise the controlling power of parliament and President Widodo's coalition is no exception, with a legislative supermajority of 69%.<sup>9</sup> This has limited the legislature's ability to hold the government to account, including on defence issues. Despite strong formal powers over the sector,<sup>10</sup> in practice the House of Representatives' (DPR) scrutiny is not entirely effective. Under the 2014-2019 parliament, the number of bills proposed and laws issued was markedly lower than other sessions and the DPR drew criticism for absenteeism and a lack of expertise.<sup>11</sup> Specifically, Commission 1 on Defence and Foreign Affairs is empowered to exercise oversight, legislative and budgetary functions in this field.<sup>12</sup> The Commission has proved relatively effective at holding the government to account over its implementation of defence policies.<sup>13</sup> In the past, for instance, the Commission has rejected budget proposals that it deemed incompatible with long-term national planning.<sup>14</sup> The Commission has been active in conducting inquiries into strategic issues, such as the involvement of the military in counter-terror operations.<sup>15</sup> Nevertheless, the commission's influence is undermined by weak subject matter expertise,<sup>16</sup> resulting in discussions on defence being deferred to members who are former military officers and creating a situation where the commission's position on defence issues echoes that of the Ministry of Defence (MOD). Equally, it should be noted that parliamentary involvement in the MOD's procurement spending has been limited, even in the face of conflicts of interest.<sup>17</sup> Parliamentary oversight is complemented and supported by audit institutions. Within the MOD, the Inspectorate General conducts internal auditing of defence expenditure. Its reports can be requested by Commission 1, however this is rarely done in practice.<sup>18</sup> For its part, the BPK is fully independent from the executive and is active in auditing military spending. There is also evidence that its findings are taken into account by the MOD, as seen in the noted improvement in financial management practices during the 2018 audit.<sup>19</sup>

## Financial Transparency

Defence-related access to information response rates	(1) % granted full or partial access: Data is not publicly available. (2) # subject to backlog: Data is not publicly available.
Defence-related complaints to ombudsman/commissioner #	Data is not publicly available.
Does the commissioner have authority over the MoD?	Yes
Audit reports on defence (2018-2020) #	Data is not publicly available.
Open Budget Index (IBP, 2019)	70/100
World Press Freedom Index (RSF, 2021)	113th out of 180

Government transparency remains limited in Indonesia.<sup>20</sup> Broad exemptions to the freedom of information law and the criminalisation of 'leaking' of vaguely defined state secrets are significant impediments to transparency.<sup>21</sup> In parallel, Indonesia's effective and independent Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) is being folded into the civil service, in what many see as an overt attempt by the government to limit the reach of its investigations.<sup>22</sup> These limitations are particularly evident in defence where the implementation of the law on Openness to Public Information<sup>23</sup> is hampered by the MOD's strict classification regulations.<sup>24</sup> Despite legislation stipulating that state secrets include only information relating to strategy and tactics of defence operations, classification has been used to substantially restrict the amount of non-sensitive information that is released. For instance, the MOD used state secrecy clauses to keep the final cost of the acquisition of AW-101 Helicopters confidential, despite the fact they were acquired with public funds and mired in corruption allegations.<sup>25</sup> Elsewhere, defence institutions do proactively release some financial information in the form of relatively comprehensive budgets and financial reports. The budget contains details of separate programmes and activities, however, it is not fully disaggregated. For example, planned procurement spending does not contain any details on technical specifications or the number of units, making it difficult to assess what funds are allocated for.<sup>26</sup> Financial transparency is also undermined by the opaque nature of off-budget revenue that the Armed Forces generate. Legislation has helped to curb the military's extensive economic interests<sup>27</sup> and reduced economic activity by up to 80%.<sup>28</sup> However it remains difficult to gain a complete picture of off-budget income generated by defence, especially in 'grey areas', such as business networks managed outside of military institutions.

<sup>9</sup> Bertelsmann Stiftung, *BTI Country Report 2020: Indonesia*, Bertelsmann Stiftung, Gutersloh, 2020, p. 10.

<sup>10</sup> Republic of Indonesia, *Law of the Republic of Indonesia No. 17 of 2014 concerning the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), the House of Representatives (DPR), the Regional Representative Council (DPD) and the Regional House of Representatives (DPRD)*, Jakarta, 2014.

<sup>11</sup> Restu Diantina Putri, 'The House of Representatives (DPR) 2014-2019: lazy to work but wasteful of budget', *Tirto.id*, 11 April 2019.

<sup>12</sup> House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia, 'About Commission I'.

<sup>13</sup> Ministry of Defence, 'Regulation of the Minister of Defence of the Republic of Indonesia No. 19/2015 regarding the National Defence Policy 2015-2019', Jakarta, 2015.

<sup>14</sup> Nabilla Tashandra, 'The Ministry of Defence budget for 2017 is 108 trillion rupiah, the highest in 12 years', *Kompas.com*, 21 October 2016.

<sup>15</sup> M. Ahsan Ridhoi, 'Commission I and Chief of TNI Coordinate the Koopsugab—Law on Terrorism', *Tirto.id*, 24 May 2018.

<sup>16</sup> House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia, 'About Commission I'.

<sup>17</sup> Marchio Irfan Gorbiano and Navan Iman Santosa, 'Defense Plans Raise Transparency Concerns', *The Jakarta Post*, 3 June 2021.

<sup>18</sup> Angga Indrawan, 'Audit Board (BPK) emphasises the importance of cooperation with Internal Government Supervisory Apparatus (APIP)', *Republika.co.id*, 12 January 2017.

<sup>19</sup> Lisye Sri Rahayu, 'BPK gives WTP opinion for Ministry of Defence financial report: this is historic', *Detik.com*, 17 June 2019.

<sup>20</sup> Freedom House, 'Indonesia – 2020 Country Report', C3.

<sup>21</sup> Republic of Indonesia, *Law No. 17 on State Intelligence*, 2011.

<sup>22</sup> The Economist, 'Indonesia's President Promised Reform. Yet it is He Who Has Changed', 19 August 2021.

<sup>23</sup> Republic of Indonesia, *Law of the Republic of Indonesia No. 14/2008 concerning Openness of Public Information*, Jakarta, 2008.

<sup>24</sup> Ministry of Defence, 'Regulation of the Minister of Defence of the Republic of Indonesia No. 2/2015 concerning Management of Information and Documentation in the Ministry of Defence', Jakarta, 2015.

<sup>25</sup> Husein Abdulsalam, 'Refusing to be transparent under the pretext of state secrecy', *Tirto.id*, 9 January 2018.

<sup>26</sup> Ministry of Finance, 'Details on State Budget 2020', Jakarta, 2020.

<sup>27</sup> Republic of Indonesia, *Law of the Republic of Indonesia No. 34/2004 concerning Indonesian National Defence Forces*, Jakarta, 2004.

<sup>28</sup> Xueying Li, 'Indonesian Military's Role in Economy "Set to Be Phased out"', *The Jakarta Post*, 23 May 2014.

# INDONESIA

## Personnel Ethics Framework

Whistleblowing legislation	Partial (Witness and Victim Protection Act 2006)
# defence-sector whistleblower cases	Data is not publicly available
# Code of conduct violations	Military: No code of conduct exists.
	Civilian: Data is not publicly available.
Financial disclosure system	# submitted: Disclosures not required.
	# of violations: Disclosures not required.

The military's influence over Indonesian politics and its increasing involvement in civilian affairs<sup>29</sup> and in the provision of internal security functions,<sup>30</sup> are raising pressing questions around accountability, and whether governance mechanisms are robust enough to mitigate corruption risks associated with this expanding remit. Already, evidence of extensive human rights violations in Papua and West Papua by defence forces points to a failure to guard against abuses of power by personnel.<sup>31</sup> For instance, the armed forces do not have a code of conduct in place to regulate behaviour. Instead, they have a code of ethics consisting of seven points, with no anti-corruption provisions.<sup>32</sup> There is also no evidence of any training being delivered on the code of ethics. Similarly, general anti-corruption training appears irregular. Training on corruption issues overwhelmingly focusses on military police and the bulk of military personnel receive only very limited training on such issues.<sup>33</sup> Though the military's Bureaucratic Reform programme has identified the need to enhance integrity-building measures in personnel management, it remains too early to assess what measures will be implemented to address this gap.<sup>34</sup> A significant obstacle to integrity-building and anti-corruption in defence is the weakness of whistleblowing protection systems. While whistleblowing systems have been integrated with the KPK and implemented in government departments and in line with the Witness and Victim Protection Act,<sup>35</sup> implementation has been slower in defence. This is partly due to the fact the legislation does not specifically focus on whistleblowing, but on witness protection more broadly. Defence institutions have also proved slow to prioritise this issue and the promotion of the practice has been limited to awareness-raising activities that are publicised to only a limited extent.<sup>36</sup>

## Operations

Total armed forces personnel (World Bank, 2018)	675,500
Troops deployed on operations #	1,212 in Lebanon (UNIFIL), 1,024 in DRC (MONUSCO), 200 in CAR (MINUSCA), 10 in Mali (MINUSMA), 3 in South Sudan (UNMISS), 3 in Western Sahara (MINURSO), 2 in Abyei (UNISFA)

As the eight largest troop contributor to UN Peace Operations, Indonesian troops are deployed as part of multilateral forces around the world.<sup>37</sup> Yet, in spite of this significant commitment to such operations, Indonesia currently lacks strong anti-corruption safeguards to ensure corruption risks are mitigated during deployments. Indonesia's military doctrine does not address corruption as a strategic issue for operations, with the only reference to corruption being as a socio-cultural issue.<sup>38</sup> The lack of a strategic conceptualisation of corruption has a knock-on effect in terms of training. At present, anti-corruption training delivered to personnel does not specifically address operations and commanders do not receive specific pre-deployment training on corruption issues. This includes training delivered at the Peace Maintenance Mission Centre that is used prior to deployment on UN missions. There is also little evidence of any practice of monitoring and reporting on corruption issues during deployments, and personnel are not equipped with M&E tools to detect and mitigate corruption risk in the operational environment. This is also true for personnel in sensitive positions, such as contracting, where there is no evidence of guidelines being available in order to contend with specific risks associated with this function.

<sup>29</sup> Sambhi, 'Generals Gaining Ground'.

<sup>30</sup> Adhi Priamarizki, 'Indonesia's Military Still Preoccupied With Internal Security', *East Asia Forum*, 4 June 2021.

<sup>31</sup> Amnesty International, 'Indonesia 2020', 2021.

<sup>32</sup> Indonesian Defence Forces, 'Sapta Marga'.

<sup>33</sup> Kompas, 'Chief of TNI sends 50 POM officers to join law enforcement training at Commission of Corruption Eradication', 27 April 2017.

<sup>34</sup> Indonesian Defence Forces, 'TNI AD implements eight areas of Bureaucratic Reform change at the IM Military Command'.

<sup>35</sup> Republic of Indonesia, 'Law of the Republic of Indonesia No. 13/2006 concerning Protection of Witnesses and Victims', Jakarta, 2006.

<sup>36</sup> Indonesian Defence Forces, 'Whistleblowing system socialisation', 9 February 2019.

<sup>37</sup> United Nations Peacekeeping, 'Troop and Police Contributors', 31 August 2021.

<sup>38</sup> Indonesian Defence Forces, 'Decree of the Chief of TNI Number Kep/555/VI/2018 concerning the Tri Eka Dharma (Tridek) doctrine', Jakarta, 2018.



# INDONESIA

## Defence Procurement

Military expenditure (US\$ mil) (SIPRI, 2020)	9,488
Open competition in defence procurement (%)	Data is not publicly available.
Main defence exports – to (SIPRI, 2016-20)	Philippines, Nepal, Senegal, Vietnam
Main defence imports – from (SIPRI, 2016-20)	United States, Netherlands, South Korea, France, Germany

Defence investment has been a key policy of President Widodo, with the goal of modernising the armed forces and establishing a self-reliant national defence industry.<sup>39</sup> To this end, in 2021, the government announced an ambitious military modernising plan costing US\$125 billion over the next 25 years.<sup>40</sup> However, as things stand, Indonesia has a number of key weaknesses in its acquisitions processes that increase the risk of corruption in procurement.<sup>41</sup> As a general rule, the bulk of arms procurement is exempt from public procurement regulations and is regulated instead by the Law on Defence Industry<sup>42</sup> and other MoD regulations, which create mandatory offset obligations for foreign suppliers to help Indonesia build its industrial

base.<sup>43</sup> However, the process has been highly non-transparent and there have been few assessments of the impact of individual procurement deals on national defence industry.<sup>44</sup> The vast majority of defence procurement is single-sourced and the procedure selection is conducted from the outset by the Directorate General of the Defence Forces when procurement requirements are elaborated.<sup>45</sup> This means that such decisions are not justified to external oversight bodies and can be made without scrutiny, increasing corruption risk in the process. Generally speaking, procurement transparency is poor. Contract details are not made available to the public and actual purchases themselves are frequently not disclosed either. Most acquisitions are not included in the Public Procurement Portal as they are carried out through direct awards or restricted tenders, and parliament exercises only extremely limited over the procurement process as a whole. This ensures that the process can be highly secretive and has led to numerous corruption cases coming to light in recent years, including in relation to AW 101 helicopters, GCI radar procurement, and the acquisition of F-16 aircraft.<sup>46</sup> Each of these cases was facilitated by poor transparency and extremely weak oversight throughout the process, which resulted in significant sums of public funds being siphoned off.

<sup>39</sup> Tangguh Chairil, 'What is Indonesia's US\$125Billion Arms Procurement Budget Plan About and What Does it Need to Do?', *The Conversation*, 23 June 2021.

<sup>40</sup> Jon Grevatt and Andrew MacDonald, 'Indonesia Reveals USD125 Billion Military Modernisation Plan', *Janes*, 1 June 2021.

<sup>41</sup> Anastasia Febiola Sumarouw and Cythnia Sipahutar, 'TNI Modernisation Should Encompass an Effective Offset Policy', *The Jakarta Post*, 16 September 2021.

<sup>42</sup> Republic of Indonesia, 'Law of the Republic of Indonesia No. 16/2012 concerning Defence Industry', Jakarta, 2012.

<sup>43</sup> MOD, 'Regulation of the Minister of Defence of the Republic of Indonesia No. 17/2014 concerning Implementation of Procurement of Main Equipment and Weapons Systems', 2014; MOD, 'Regulation of the Minister of Defence of the Republic of Indonesia No. 46/2016 concerning the Use of Main Equipment and Weapons Systems', 2016.

<sup>44</sup> Sumarouw and Sipahutar, 'TNI Modernisation'.

<sup>45</sup> MOD 'Regulation of the Minister of Defence of the Republic of Indonesia No. 35/2015'.

<sup>46</sup> Xiaodon Liand and Sam Perlo-Freeman, 'Corruption in Indonesian Arms Business: Tentative Steps Towards an End to Impunity', *World Peace Foundation*, December 2017.

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GDI data collection for **Indonesia** was conducted June 2019 to December 2020. The narrative discussion in this GDI brief was produced at a later time with the most recent information available for the country, which may not be reflected in the GDI country assessments or scores.

# INDONESIA

## 2020 GDI Scorecard

		Grade	Score
<b>Political Risk</b>		<b>D</b>	<b>49</b>
Q1	Legislative Scrutiny	B	75
Q2	Defence Committee	B	79
Q3	Defence Policy Debate	C	63
Q4	CSO Engagement	E	17
Q5	Conventions: UNCAC / OECD	C	63
Q6	Public Debate	C	63
Q7	Anticorruption Policy	C	50
Q8	Compliance and Ethics Units	D	42
Q9	Public Trust in Institutions	NS	
Q10	Risk Assessments	E	25
Q11	Acquisition Planning	D	42
Q12	Budget Transparency & Detail	A	88
Q13	Budget Scrutiny	B	75
Q14	Budget Availability	B	67
Q15	Defence Income	C	58
Q16	Internal Audit	C	56
Q17	External Audit	B	81
Q18	Natural Resources	D	35
Q19	Organised Crime Links	C	63
Q20	Organised Crime Policing	E	25
Q21	Intelligence Services Oversight	D	38
Q22	Intelligence Services Recruitment	E	25
Q23	Export Controls (ATT)	F	0
Q76	Lobbying	F	0
<b>Financial Risk</b>		<b>C</b>	<b>53</b>
Q24	Asset Disposal Controls	B	75
Q25	Asset Disposal Scrutiny	E	25
Q26	Secret Spending	NEI	
Q27	Legislative Access to Information	E	25
Q28	Secret Program Auditing	C	50
Q29	Off-budget Spending	A	100
Q30	Access to Information	C	50
Q31	Beneficial Ownership	C	63
Q32	Military-Owned Business Scrutiny	E	25
Q33	Unauthorised Private Enterprise	NEI	
Q77	Defence Spending	B	69
<b>Personnel Risk</b>		<b>C</b>	<b>61</b>
Q34	Public Commitment to Integrity	B	75
Q35	Disciplinary Measures for Personnel	B	75
Q36	Whistleblowing	D	42
Q37	High-risk Positions	D	33
Q38	Numbers of Personnel	B	67
Q39	Pay Rates and Allowances	A	88
Q40	Payment System	A	100
Q41	Objective Appointments	C	50
Q42	Objective Promotions	B	69
Q43	Bribery to Avoid Conscription	NA	
Q44	Bribery for Preferred Postings	A	92
Q45	Chains of Command and Payment	C	50
Q46	Military Code of Conduct	F	0

## OVERALL COUNTRY SCORE

**HIGH RISK**



### RISK GRADE

**A • 83-100** **VERY LOW**  
**B • 67-82** **LOW**  
**C • 50-66** **MODERATE**  
**D • 33-49** **HIGH**  
**E • 17-32** **VERY HIGH**  
**F • 0-16** **CRITICAL**



		Grade	Score
<b>Personnel Risk</b>		<b>C</b>	<b>61</b>
Q47	Civilian Code of Conduct	B	67
Q48	Anticorruption Training	E	25
Q49	Corruption Prosecutions	A	83
Q50	Facilitation Payments	B	67
<b>Operational Risk</b>		<b>F</b>	<b>16</b>
Q51	Military Doctrine	E	25
Q52	Operational Training	E	25
Q53	Forward Planning	NEI	
Q54	Corruption Monitoring in Operations	F	13
Q55	Controls in Contracting	F	0
Q56	Private Military Contractors	NS	
<b>Procurement Risk</b>		<b>C</b>	<b>56</b>
Q57	Procurement Legislation	C	50
Q58	Procurement Cycle	B	67
Q59	Procurement Oversight Mechanisms	D	42
Q60	Potential Purchases Disclosed	C	63
Q61	Actual Purchases Disclosed	F	13
Q62	Business Compliance Standards	B	75
Q63	Procurement Requirements	C	58
Q64	Competition in Procurement	NEI	
Q65	Tender Board Controls	D	33
Q66	Anti-Collusion Controls	B	69
Q67	Contract Award / Delivery	B	69
Q68	Complaint Mechanisms	A	100
Q69	Supplier Sanctions	A	83
Q70	Offset Contracts	E	25
Q71	Offset Contract Monitoring	C	50
Q72	Offset Competition	C	50
Q73	Agents and Intermediaries	C	50
Q74	Financing Packages	C	50
Q75	Political Pressure in Acquisitions	NS	

### KEY

**NEI** Not enough information to score indicator  
**NS** Indicator is not scored for any country  
**NA** Not applicable



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Foreign, Commonwealth  
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the  
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