




Government Defence  
Integrity Index



2020



Country Brief:

**BOTSWANA**

# BOTSWANA


Botswana is widely regarded as one of Africa's most stable countries and is the continent's longest continuous multi-party democracy. Significant mineral wealth, robust governance, prudent economic management and a relatively small population have helped Botswana's development since independence in 1966 and reduced poverty.<sup>1</sup> Botswana's transformation agenda also aims to turn it into a high-income country by 2036, underpinned by economic diversification and continuing political stability.<sup>2</sup> While the country is widely perceived as a development success story, challenges persist. Economic transformation in particular has been sluggish and the economy still relies heavily on the diamond trade.<sup>3</sup>

Member of Open Government Partnership	No
UN Convention Against Corruption	Accession in 2011
Arms Trade Treaty	Accession in 2019

Unemployment, particularly amongst the youth is a persistent and pressing issue, as is social inequality and the HIV/AIDS epidemic, which has had a significant impact on Botswana.<sup>4</sup> These issues are also likely to be further exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic and adverse climate events, which are likely to increase as a result of climate change, in Botswana's drought and flood-prone plains.<sup>5</sup> While Botswana is generally considered a peaceful country, not currently affected by armed conflict or high-levels of insecurity, successive governments have increased investment in the defence sector. Botswana's Defence Forces' (BDF) budget has increased significantly since 2015 and the Ministry of Defence, Justice and Security received the second largest budget allocation in 2020.<sup>6</sup> However, it is vital that increases in spending are accompanied by a corresponding strengthening of defence governance processes to avoid waste, corruption and abuses of power. As things stand, external control and scrutiny of the defence is extremely limited, public engagement in the sector is low and parliament's role is restricted. Financial and budgetary transparency have decreased in recent years and arms procurement is particularly secretive. On the other hand, the passing of a whistleblower law in 2016 is a positive step but needs to be backed up by effective implementation in the defence sector.

## East & Southern Africa

Two of the most stable regions on the continent, the Eastern and Southern African regions have nevertheless had to contend with a series of significant challenges in recent years. Instability in the Horn of Africa continues to present protracted security challenges in the region, including the growth of Islamist movements, such as Al-Shabaab. Civil unrest and protests have increased dramatically in South Africa, Zimbabwe and Kenya amongst others, and have been fuelled by anger at police brutality and poverty, which have increased significantly during the COVID-19 pandemic. Recent elections in Tanzania and Uganda have been mired in violence, while the upcoming Kenyan elections in 2022 could lead to significant unrest. Elsewhere, Sudan's democratic transition remains in danger of stalling and armed conflict and endemic corruption continue unabated in South Sudan. In response to these challenges, states have increasingly sought to deploy the military to respond. This has increased attention on weak governance standards within the defence sectors across East and Southern Africa, which continue to contend with very limited transparency, poor external oversight and limited anti-corruption controls for personnel. The result are defence forces that are frequently unaccountable to the public, whose financial management and acquisitions are largely hidden from scrutiny and where corruption vulnerabilities are pronounced, heightening the risk of abuses of power.



<sup>1</sup> The World Bank, 'Botswana', 2021.

<sup>2</sup> Botswana Vision 2036, 'Vision 2036'.

<sup>3</sup> Bertelsmann Stiftung, *BTI 2020 Country Report: Botswana*, Gütersloh, Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020, p. 3.

<sup>4</sup> The South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), *The Big Governance Issues in Botswana: A Civil Society Submission to the African Peer Review Mechanism*, March 2021, p. 99.

<sup>5</sup> SSAIIA, *The Big Governance Issues*, p. 99.

<sup>6</sup> Republic of Botswana, '2020 Budget Speech by Honourable Dr. Thapelo Matsheka', Section 103, p. 25.

# BOTSWANA


## Overall scores

The size of the colour band corresponds to number of countries that fall into that category.

**BOTSWANA SCORE**  
**HIGH RISK**

**D**

**39**



**A > 83-100** VERY LOW

**B > 67-82** LOW

**C > 50-66** MODERATE


**D > 33-49** HIGH

**E > 17-32** VERY HIGH


**F > 0-16** CRITICAL

## Risk Comparison


### POLITICAL




### FINANCIAL




### PERSONNEL



### OPERATIONAL



### PROCUREMENT



# BOTSWANA

## Parliamentary Oversight

Legislative oversight of budget (Open Budget Survey, 2019)	52/100
Military expenditure as share of government spending (SIPRI, 2020)	9.5%
Committee members with defence expertise (%)	0%
# of meetings/year	Data is not publicly available.
Last review of defence policy/strategy	No defence policy

Botswana's constitution makes a clear delineation between the three main branches of government, ensuring de jure strong separation of powers.<sup>7</sup> In practice, while this separation is relatively clear, the executive remains dominant and its functions can overlap with the legislature in particular, which can influence the system of checks and balances.<sup>8</sup> One of the areas where legislative oversight is particularly limited is defence, where a combination of restricted formal rights and poor effectiveness mean that parliamentary control over defence issues is piecemeal. The National Assembly is empowered to legislate on matters of defence and security and to approve the budget,<sup>9</sup> but beyond this its powers are limited, particularly as Botswana does not have a defence policy. At the committee level, the Foreign Affairs, Defence, Justice and Security Committee is empowered to oversee defence matters, although its powers are somewhat unclear. For instance, there is no clarity on the committee's role in relation to personnel and policy planning, and its power to call witnesses is undermined by the fact that it is not clearly stipulated and can only be inferred.<sup>10</sup> In practice, the committee is generally limited to merely reviewing the budget and related matters, and there is no evidence of the committee conducting long term investigations into specific areas of defence despite it having the formal right to do so.<sup>11</sup> In parallel, financial oversight is also undertaken by internal and external auditing bodies. The BDF has an internal audit unit, however its reports are not made public and there is little available information on its functioning or effectiveness. Similarly, the Auditor General conducts annual external audits of defence, but there is little evidence of it conducting defence audits and its assessments rarely cover defence issues. Even where the Auditor General makes recommendations, it is not clear if the Ministry of Defence takes any appropriate remedial action as there is no clear follow-up mechanism.<sup>12</sup>

## Financial Transparency

Defence-related access to information response rates	(1) % granted full or partial access: Data is not publicly available. (2) # subject to backlog: Data is not publicly available.
Defence-related complaints to ombudsman/commissioner #	No such institution.
Does the commissioner have authority over the MoD?	No such institution.
Audit reports on defence (2018-2020) #	1 (2018); 1 (2019); 1 (2020)
Open Budget Index (IBP, 2019)	38/100
World Press Freedom Index (RSF, 2021)	38th out of 180

While Botswana has long been among the top-ranking African countries in terms of good governance and transparency, in recent years, its military transparency has diminished. Official budgetary reports have become increasingly difficult to obtain and little to no information has been divulged on arms procurement or defence policy.<sup>13</sup> With regards to the defence budget specifically, the published document is highly aggregated and does not contain a breakdown of expenditure by functions nor does it include substantial explanations. In fact, in recent years, the only publicly available budget document has been the budget speech, with other government issued budget documents not available.<sup>14</sup> Information on military expenditure is also reported inconsistently, with discrepancies between the official allocation and the information contained in budget tables, raising questions as to the accuracy of official documents.<sup>15</sup> Moreover, no reports on actual spending during the financial year are published by the Ministry of Justice, Security and Defence or the Ministry of Finance. As such, there is no clarity surrounding how budget funds are utilised and how this compared to the original allocations as outlined in the budget. A key issue remains the weakness of access to information mechanisms for the defence sector. While the right to access government information is enshrined in the constitution,<sup>16</sup> there is no overarching FOI law and gaining access to financial information in defence remains extremely limited. This increases reliance on government-issued data, which in a context of reduced financial transparency, means citizens and external oversight bodies have less information to make decisions on. Nevertheless, Botswana does have effective controls over off-budget spending. Such expenditure is prohibited under the terms of the Finance and Audit Act,<sup>17</sup> and there is no record or evidence of defence spending being conducted through off-budget funds as a result. Equally, there is no evidence that the BDF or the Directorate of Intelligence Services have beneficial ownership of commercial businesses, including businesses associated with natural resource exploitation.

<sup>7</sup> Republic of Botswana, *Constitution of the Republic of Botswana*, 1996.

<sup>8</sup> Bertelsmann Stiftung, *Botswana*, p. 11.

<sup>9</sup> Republic of Botswana, *Constitution*, Articles 86-88.

<sup>10</sup> Parliament of Botswana, 'Foreign Affairs, Defence, Justice and Security Committee'.

<sup>11</sup> Parliament of Botswana, 'Parliamentary Committees'.

<sup>12</sup> Auditor General, *Report of the Auditor General on the Accounts of the Botswana Government 2018*, March 2019.

<sup>13</sup> Nan Tian, Pieter Wezeman and Youngju Yun, 'Military Expenditure Transparency in Sub-Saharan Africa', *SIPRI Policy Paper*, No. 48, November 2018, pp. 27-28.

<sup>14</sup> Republic of Botswana, '2020 Budget Speech by Honourable Dr. Thapelo Matsheka'.

<sup>15</sup> Nan Tian et al, 'Military Expenditure Transparency', p. 29.

<sup>16</sup> Republic of Botswana, *Constitution*, Section 12(1).

<sup>17</sup> Republic of Botswana, *Finance and Audit Act*, Chap 54:01, 1970.

# BOTSWANA

## Personnel Ethics Framework

Whistleblowing legislation	Whistleblower Protection Act (2016)
# defence-sector whistleblower cases	Data is not publicly available.
# Code of conduct violations	Military: No code of conduct
	Civilian: Data is not publicly available.
Financial disclosure system	# submitted: Data is not publicly available.
	# of violations: Data is not publicly available.

Ethics standards and anti-corruption frameworks for personnel in Botswana's defence sector are relatively robust, helping to mitigate corruption risk to a certain extent although there remain areas where significant improvement is needed. For instance, military personnel are not subject to a clear code of conduct. Values are instead loosely outlined in other documents,<sup>18</sup> but with very little focus on anti-corruption. Civilian personnel on the other hand are subject to the General Public Service Principles and the Public Service Code of Conduct, which outline the behaviour expected with regards to bribery, conflicts of interest and corruption. However, neither of these documents is available to the public and it should be noted that the code of conduct does not apply to the security services.<sup>19</sup> There is also a significant gap in relation to anti-corruption training for personnel. While some training is provided for civilian personnel by the Directorate of Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC),<sup>20</sup> there is no evidence of any such training being delivered to military personnel.<sup>21</sup> In relation to whistleblowing, Botswana passed the Whistleblower Protection Act in 2016. The law is applicable to defence personnel and provides legal protections for those reporting corruption and wrongdoing, including protection of identity, against retribution, reversed burden of proof and waiver of liability.<sup>22</sup> While the law itself is relatively robust, its implementation in defence remains a work in progress. There is still no unit within the Ministry of Justice, Security and Defence that deals with whistleblower protection and which processes reports. Training also remains piecemeal and inadequate and there is no evidence of any awareness raising campaigns within the defence sector to help educate personnel on their rights.

## Operations

Total armed forces personnel (World Bank, 2018)	9,000
Troops deployed on operations #	3 in DRC (MONUSCO)

Though Botswana rarely contributes to peacekeeping missions and is not engaged in any foreign military operations, strong anti-corruption safeguards for operations are still key to ensuring the BDF's effectiveness across a range of deployments. Yet, these safeguards are virtually non-existent, exposing Botswana's military operations to significant corruption risk. At the strategic level, corruption is not considered a strategic issue for the success of military operations. The BDF, for instance, does not have a clear military doctrine that includes corruption. As a result, corruption issues are not included in forward planning processes for military operations, meaning that appropriate mitigation strategies are not developed and deployed should corruption issues be identified. There are also no provisions for pre-deployment anti-corruption training for commanders and the only anti-corruption training is delivered by the DCEC, a civilian agency without the expertise to advise on operational risks. The BDF also does not deploy expert personnel for corruption monitoring purposes, nor does it have a monitoring and evaluation policy for corruption risk on operations, meaning personnel are ill-equipped to identify and address such issues when they arise.

<sup>18</sup> Botswana Defence Force, 'BDF Areas of Responsibility'.

<sup>19</sup> Republic of Botswana, *Public Service Act*, Chapter 26:01.

<sup>20</sup> Centre for Public Impact, 'Fighting Corruption in Botswana', 2018.

<sup>21</sup> UNODC, *Country Review Report of the Republic of Botswana*, 2019.

<sup>22</sup> Republic of Botswana, *Whistleblower Protection Act*, Part IV.



# BOTSWANA

## Defence Procurement

Military expenditure (US\$ mil) (SIPRI, 2020)	571
Open competition in defence procurement (%)	Data is not publicly available
Main defence exports – to (SIPRI, 2016-20)	N/A
Main defence imports – from (SIPRI, 2016-20)	France, Switzerland, Italy, Spain, United States

Botswana's increased military spending in recent years is designed, in part, to help modernise the BDF's ageing capabilities, including its fighter jets.<sup>23</sup> This modernisation relies heavily on the procurement of significant quantities of assets and new capabilities. However, gaps in Botswana's defence procurement process significantly heighten the process' vulnerability to corruption and could threaten the effective use of defence funds. Defence procurement is formalised through the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Board (PPADB) and Regulations, which apply to all public procurement including defence.<sup>24</sup> However, not all BDF procurement is conducted through the PPADB as 'sensitive' acquisitions are exempt under the Act's broad exemption clauses for security-related goods.<sup>25</sup> As such, significant amounts of defence acquisitions are not regulated by the PPADB and are instead deferred to special Procurement Committees, although it

is unclear how these committees scrutinise such procedures. Moreover, the BDF's procurement cycle is not fully disclosed and, aside from the information contained in the PPADB, no further information is provided on the subject of needs assessments, contract implementation or sign off for defence contracts. With regards to the decision on procurement requirements in particular, the absence of a defence strategy makes it difficult to link individual purchases to strategic requirements. This increases the likelihood of purchases being ad-hoc and opportunistic in nature, potentially leading to unnecessary or inefficient procurement.<sup>26</sup> There are also issues with the oversight architecture for defence acquisitions. The PPADB does not publish reports on its activities and parliament does not have the expertise or capacity to exercise substantial scrutiny of procurement. As such, the vast majority of defence procurement is not subject to any external oversight and there is little publicly available information on the specificities of most acquisitions.

<sup>23</sup> Before Flight, 'Botswana Gives Boost to New Fighter Jet Procurement', 26 March 2021.

<sup>24</sup> Republic of Botswana, *PPADB Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act*, 2001.

<sup>25</sup> Republic of Botswana, *PPADB Act*, Section 63.

<sup>26</sup> Sunday Standard, 'Inside the BDF Billion Pula Armsgate', 15 March 2015.

Version 1.0, October 2021

GDI data collection for **Botswana** was conducted April 2020 to May 2021. The narrative discussion in this GDI brief was produced at a later time with the most recent information available for the country, which may not be reflected in the GDI country assessments or scores.

# BOTSWANA

## 2020 GDI Scorecard

		Grade	Score
<b>Political Risk</b>		<b>D</b>	<b>39</b>
Q1	Legislative Scrutiny	C	50
Q2	Defence Committee	D	40
Q3	Defence Policy Debate	F	0
Q4	CSO Engagement	E	17
Q5	Conventions: UNCAC / OECD	B	75
Q6	Public Debate	E	25
Q7	Anticorruption Policy	F	0
Q8	Compliance and Ethics Units	D	42
Q9	Public Trust in Institutions	NS	
Q10	Risk Assessments	F	13
Q11	Acquisition Planning	B	67
Q12	Budget Transparency & Detail	C	50
Q13	Budget Scrutiny	E	25
Q14	Budget Availability	C	50
Q15	Defence Income	NEI	
Q16	Internal Audit	D	38
Q17	External Audit	C	56
Q18	Natural Resources	B	67
Q19	Organised Crime Links	B	75
Q20	Organised Crime Policing	B	75
Q21	Intelligence Services Oversight	D	38
Q22	Intelligence Services Recruitment	F	8
Q23	Export Controls (ATT)	NEI	
Q76	Lobbying	F	0
<b>Financial Risk</b>		<b>C</b>	<b>58</b>
Q24	Asset Disposal Controls	A	83
Q25	Asset Disposal Scrutiny	A	92
Q26	Secret Spending	F	0
Q27	Legislative Access to Information	E	25
Q28	Secret Program Auditing	C	50
Q29	Off-budget Spending	A	100
Q30	Access to Information	E	25
Q31	Beneficial Ownership	A	100
Q32	Military-Owned Business Scrutiny	A	100
Q33	Unauthorised Private Enterprise	NEI	
Q77	Defence Spending	F	0
<b>Personnel Risk</b>		<b>C</b>	<b>53</b>
Q34	Public Commitment to Integrity	D	42
Q35	Disciplinary Measures for Personnel	A	100
Q36	Whistleblowing	B	75
Q37	High-risk Positions	NEI	
Q38	Numbers of Personnel	D	42
Q39	Pay Rates and Allowances	C	63
Q40	Payment System	A	92
Q41	Objective Appointments	E	17
Q42	Objective Promotions	E	17
Q43	Bribery to Avoid Conscription	NA	
Q44	Bribery for Preferred Postings	A	100
Q45	Chains of Command and Payment	A	100
Q46	Military Code of Conduct	E	31

## OVERALL COUNTRY SCORE

**HIGH RISK**



### RISK GRADE

**A • 83-100 VERY LOW**  
**B • 67-82 LOW**  
**C • 50-66 MODERATE**  
**D • 33-49 HIGH**  
**E • 17-32 VERY HIGH**  
**F • 0-16 CRITICAL**



		Grade	Score
<b>Personnel Risk</b>		<b>C</b>	<b>53</b>
Q47	Civilian Code of Conduct	C	50
Q48	Anticorruption Training	E	17
Q49	Corruption Prosecutions	F	0
Q50	Facilitation Payments	NEI	
<b>Operational Risk</b>		<b>F</b>	<b>8</b>
Q51	Military Doctrine	F	0
Q52	Operational Training	F	0
Q53	Forward Planning	F	0
Q54	Corruption Monitoring in Operations	F	0
Q55	Controls in Contracting	D	38
Q56	Private Military Contractors	NS	
<b>Procurement Risk</b>		<b>D</b>	<b>38</b>
Q57	Procurement Legislation	B	75
Q58	Procurement Cycle	E	25
Q59	Procurement Oversight Mechanisms	D	33
Q60	Potential Purchases Disclosed	C	50
Q61	Actual Purchases Disclosed	B	75
Q62	Business Compliance Standards	F	0
Q63	Procurement Requirements	E	17
Q64	Competition in Procurement	C	50
Q65	Tender Board Controls	C	58
Q66	Anti-Collusion Controls	B	75
Q67	Contract Award / Delivery	D	44
Q68	Complaint Mechanisms	B	75
Q69	Supplier Sanctions	B	75
Q70	Offset Contracts	F	0
Q71	Offset Contract Monitoring	F	0
Q72	Offset Competition	F	0
Q73	Agents and Intermediaries	D	38
Q74	Financing Packages	F	0
Q75	Political Pressure in Acquisitions	NS	

### KEY

**NEI** Not enough information to score indicator  
**NS** Indicator is not scored for any country  
**NA** Not applicable



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Foreign, Commonwealth  
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the  
Netherlands