Tanzania has experienced a period of deep and dramatic political change. Under late President John Magufuli, Tanzania saw a dramatic acceleration of the trend towards authoritarianism that became apparent after the president’s election in October 2015. After a first term characterised by assaults on the political opposition, civil society and the media, President Magufuli’s re-election in 2020, against a backdrop of voter suppression, looked set to further strengthen his grip on power. However, his death in March 2021 propelled Samia Suluhu Hassan to Tanzania’s Presidency and her less combative leadership style has raised hopes of a reopening of civic space and a policy change, away from the COVID scepticism and nationalist economic agenda of her predecessor.

Nonetheless, national security is another pressing issue for the new President to address. Escalating jihadist violence in northern Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province, where an Islamist insurgency has taken root since 2017, has begun spilling over into neighbouring countries including Tanzania. A number of Tanzanian nationals are reported to have joined Mozambican militant groups, raising the threat that the insurgency is spreading over the border, particularly in the light of recent attacks in the south of the country. While officials claim to have the situation under control, the significant threat posed by these groups will pile pressure on Tanzania’s defence and security forces. Moreover, despite rising military expenditure over the past decade, Tanzania’s defence sector contains significant governance gaps, which threaten to undermine the defence forces’ ability to respond to threats. Parliamentary oversight of defence is extremely weak, and external financial scrutiny is also limited. This has a negative impact on transparency and accountability, particularly in relation to financial and personnel management. Military acquisitions are secretive and largely exempt from standard reporting and tendering practices, while weaknesses in relation to access to information and whistleblowing significantly undermine anti-corruption standards.

Member of Open Government Partnership No
UN Convention Against Corruption Ratified in 2005
Arms Trade Treaty Signed in 2013

East & Southern Africa
Two of the most stable regions on the continent, the Eastern and Southern African regions have nevertheless had to contend with a series of significant challenges in recent years. Instability in the Horn of Africa continues to present protracted security challenges in the region, including the growth of Islamist movements, such as Al-Shabaab. Civil unrest and protests have increased dramatically in South Africa, Zimbabwe and Kenya amongst others, and have been fuelled by anger at police brutality and poverty, which have increased significantly during the COVID-19 pandemic. Recent elections in Tanzania and Uganda have been mired in violence, while the upcoming Kenyan elections in 2022 could lead to significant unrest. Elsewhere, Sudan’s democratic transition remains in danger of stalling and armed conflict and endemic corruption continue unabated in South Sudan. In response to these challenges, states have increasingly sought to deploy the military to respond. This has increased attention on weak governance standards within the defence sectors across East and Southern Africa, which continue to contend with very limited transparency, poor external oversight and limited anti-corruption controls for personnel. The result are defence forces that are frequently unaccountable to the public, whose financial management and acquisitions are largely hidden from scrutiny and where corruption vulnerabilities are pronounced, heightening the risk of abuses of power.

2 Marielle Harris, Unfinished Business: Magufuli’s Autocratic Rule in Tanzania, CSIS, 5 February 2021.
3 Fergus Kelly and Sammy Awami, Tanzania Sees Only Glimpse of Change by New President, Chatham House, 1 July 2021.
Overall scores

The size of the colour band corresponds to the number of countries that fall into that category.

Risk Comparison

TANZANIA

TANZANIA SCORE
VERY HIGH RISK
32

REGIONAL AGGREGATE
INDEX AGGREGATE

A • 83-100 VERY LOW
B • 67-82 LOW
C • 50-66 MODERATE
D • 33-49 HIGH
E • 17-32 VERY HIGH
F • 0-16 CRITICAL
In the 2020 elections, the ruling party Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) won 98.86% of the seats in parliament, giving the party complete control of the legislature. The party’s utter dominance is the result of a sustained campaign under President Magufuli of opposition suppression and co-opting of opposition figures into the CCM. This has cast a significant shadow over multi-party politics and raised questions as to Tanzania’s political future and a trend towards becoming a one-party state. The weakness of parliamentary control is also evident in the defence sector where its powers are extremely limited. For instance, the Standing Committee for Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security has been recommending a debate for a new Defence Policy since 2016, which has not occurred as it has no power to initiate such a debate itself. The difficulties parliament has encountered in merely trying to table a bill on defence issues perfectly encapsulates the limits to its powers. The Committee’s powers are not well articulated, making it easy to bypass the committee’s oversight. The Committee generally receives only highly aggregated budget figures and even when it submits recommendations or amendments, there is generally no significant response from the relevant ministries. There is also no evidence of the committee ever undertaking a long-term investigation into specific areas of defence and even key issues, such as the security issue at the Mozambican border has not been discussed in committee meetings. In parallel, financial scrutiny is carried out by the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG), which is empowered to scrutinise all government spending including defence. The CAG is active in carrying out audits of military expenditure and has recently raised concerns regarding contracting irregularities in the sector. However, it focuses on defence issues is relatively limited and restricted to mentions in annual financial audits, while it has never carried out a performance audit in the defence sector.

The Magufuli administration was characterised, in part, by attacks on government transparency, including attempts to manipulate public statistics on economic performance and COVID-19 for example. The defence sector, in particular, has long been extremely opaque with regard to financial information, which is released, at best, in a piecemeal fashion. The budget for instance lacks detail and budgeted figures are highly aggregated, making it extremely difficult to assess for exactly what purposes funds are allocated. There is no breakdown of expenditure by functions and no explanations provided, for either experts or non-experts. In a similar vein, information on actual spending during the financial year is published in only a highly aggregated manner and without substantial justifications for variations with the original budget. Financial transparency is also clouded by the prevalence of off-budget income that is opaque, poorly recorded and not subject to substantial oversight. Revenues generated by the military’s substantial business holdings is not included in the budget. The largest such conglomerate, SUMAJUK Corporation, does not publish annual reports and there is little transparency surrounding its activities, revenue or how this revenue is then re-invested. The only available financial information on these companies are fragments contained in the CAG consolidated audit reports, but the information is highly superficial. On top of this, Tanzania’s access to information framework is weak and ineffective, particularly in relation to defence. While an Access to Information Act was passed in 2016, it specifically exempts information related to “military doctrine, strategy, capability or deployment”, effectively allowing defence institutions to withhold information on an extremely broad range of areas. Equally, there is no independent appeals body and the appeals process is controlled by a government minister. As a result, it remains extremely difficult to request access to defence information and there is very little information available on how effective the process is.

20 SUMAJUK, About.
22 Republic of Tanzania, ‘Access to Information Act, Section 6(6)(a), 2016.’
Personnel Ethics Framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Whistleblowing legislation</th>
<th>Whistleblower and Witness Protection Act (2015)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td># defence-sector whistleblower cases</td>
<td>Data is not publicly available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Code of conduct violations</td>
<td>Military: Data is not publicly available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian: Data is not publicly available.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial disclosure system</td>
<td># submitted: Data is not publicly available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of violations: Data is not publicly available.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Personnel ethics frameworks and anti-corruption mechanisms for personnel management are relatively robust in defence, however there remain significant gaps in key areas. With regards to codes of conduct, military and civilian personnel are subject to the Code of Ethics in Public Service, which includes reference to corruption and corruption-related offences, although it stops short of providing substantial guidance to personnel on how to address such issues should they arise.23 Recent evidence also points to anti-corruption measures being enforced, at least in some instances, with personnel taken to court for bribery and corruption-related offences.24 However, it should be noted these cases are usually always fairly minor offences and there is no record of senior personnel being investigated or charged. It is also unclear to what extent anti-corruption training is provided to military personnel. While anti-corruption training is a key pillar of the implementation of the 2017-2022 National Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action, it is unclear specifically what is covered in the defence sector making it difficult to assess its effectiveness.25 Similarly, though Tanzania introduced a Whistleblower Protection Act in 2015 that applies to defence personnel,26 there is very little publicly available information on how the issue is being prioritised and how protections are implemented in the defence sector, due to a complete absence of reporting. Finally, it should be noted that structural issues with Tanzania’s payroll and accounting systems undermine the accuracy of official personnel statistics and significant increase the risk of ghost soldiers. Moreover, the government does not publish the official number of military personnel, making it easier for ghost soldiers to become embedded in defence. Previous cases of ghost military personnel highlight the issue,27 which could significantly hinder Tanzania’s ability to respond to security threats while draining defence funds.

Operations

| Total armed forces personnel (World Bank, 2018) | 28,000 |
| Troops deployed on operations | Data is not publicly available |

Tanzanian military personnel are actively engaged in operations along the border with Mozambique,28 and will be deployed as part of the Southern African Development Community’s (SADC) Standby Force, which will support Mozambique’s counter-terror operations in Cabo Delgado.29 However, the near-complete absence of anti-corruption standards and safeguards in Tanzania’s military operations significantly increases the risk of such interventions being undermined by corruption. At the strategic level, there is no evidence of a clearly articulated military doctrine in Tanzania and there is no reference to corruption as a strategic issue for operations in any of the military’s publicly available strategic documents. There is also no evidence of such issues being considered in the forward planning for military operations or of specific anti-corruption training being provided to commanders and personnel as part of pre-deployment. As a result, personnel are ill-equipped to identify and mitigate corruption risk in the field and there are no relevant and targeted anti-corruption strategies they can use to address these issues. This is compounded by the fact that Tanzania does not deploy any personnel for the purpose of corruption monitoring as part of deployments and there is no information in the public domain on a specific monitoring and evaluation policy for corruption risk on operations.

27 Vero Ignatus, ‘The Chief Accountant of the Police Force has been suspended for Air Payment Offenses’, 7 September 2016.
**Defence Procurement**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metric</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military expenditure (US$ mil) (SIPRI, 2020)</td>
<td>639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open competition in defence procurement (%)</td>
<td>Data is not publicly available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main defence exports – to (SIPRI, 2016-20)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main defence imports – from (SIPRI, 2016-20)</td>
<td>France, Netherlands, China</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Over the past decade, Tanzania’s military expenditure has shown consistent annual increases in real terms, underlining the government’s focus on modernising its defence apparatus. Recently agreed defence cooperation agreements with Russia and Turkey, with a focus on future acquisitions, also highlight the desire to expand Tanzania’s procurement of weapons and procurement as a key component of its modernisation strategy. Tanzania’s defence procurement process is regulated by the Public Procurement Act (PPA) and a series of Public Procurement Regulations, which outline the formal processes used for the acquisition of public goods and provide some insight into the cycle. However, Section 1(2-4) of the PPA allows for exemptions of dual-list goods for Security and Defence Organs. While these dual list items are required to be approved by the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority, they are never disclosed and it is impossible to assess what oversight the Authority provides and how it approves listed items. Procurement regulations allow defence institutions to engage in restricted tendering and single-sourcing to acquire goods, including ones that are not officially dual-list, such as garments, clothing and office supplies. This suggests that procurement procedures are not always followed and non-competitive tendering is regularly used, without justification, for goods that should fall within the remit of the PPA. Oversight of defence procurement is also extremely weak. Although the CAG does occasionally address defence issues, its capacity is limited, while the Public Procurement Authority makes no mention of defence procurement in its Annual Performance Evaluation Reports. Additionally, reports of the Standing Committee for Defence also make no reference to defence procurement. Finally, there appears to be a significant lack of strategic planning for defence procurement. The Defence Policy has not been updated since 2004 and is not publicly available. Given the lack of a public defence strategy or updated policy, individual acquisitions are not grounded in a clear strategy, increasing the likelihood of purchases being ad-hoc and opportunistic in nature.

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33 Republic of Tanzania, Public Procurement Act 2011.
TANZANIA 2020 GDI Scorecard

OVERALL COUNTRY SCORE

VERY HIGH RISK

Score: 32

Political Risk

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>40</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Q1 Legislative Scrutiny E 25
Q2 Defence Committee E 20
Q3 Defence Policy Debate F 6
Q4 CSO Engagement E 17
Q5 Conventions: UNCAC / OECD B 75
Q6 Public Debate E 25
Q7 Anticorruption Policy B 75
Q8 Compliance and Ethics Units D 38
Q9 Public Trust in Institutions NS
Q10 Risk Assessments A 92
Q11 Acquisition Planning F 8
Q12 Budget Transparency & Detail C 50
Q13 Scrutiny C 50
Q14 Budget Availability E 17
Q15 Defence Income D 33
Q16 Internal Audit C 56
Q17 External Audit B 69
Q18 Natural Resources D 45
Q19 Organised Crime Links B 75
Q20 Organised Crime Policing C 58
Q21 Intelligence Services Oversight NEI
Q22 Intelligence Services Recruitment F 0
Q23 Export Controls (ATT) C 50
Q24 Asset Disposal Controls E 29
Q25 Asset Disposal Scrutiny C 50
Q26 Secret Spending C 50
Q27 Legislative Access to Information C 50
Q28 Secret Program Auditing C 50
Q29 Off-budget Spending C 50
Q30 Access to Information C 50
Q31 Beneficial Ownership C 50
Q32 Military-Owned Business Scrutiny C 50
Q33 Unauthorised Private Enterprise C 50
Q34 Public Commitment to Integrity C 55
Q35 Disciplinary Measures for Personnel A 88
Q36 Whistleblowing C 50
Q37 High-risk Positions NEI
Q38 Numbers of Personnel C 50
Q39 Pay Rates and Allowances C 50
Q40 Payment System C 50
Q41 Objective Appointments C 50
Q42 Objective Promotions C 50
Q43 Bribery to Avoid Conscription NA
Q44 Bribery for Preferred Postings A 100
Q45 Chains of Command and Payment NEI
Q46 Military Code of Conduct C 63

Financial Risk

<table>
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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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</table>

Q024 Asset Disposal Controls C 50
Q025 Asset Disposal Scrutiny C 50
Q026 Secret Spending C 50
Q027 Legislative Access to Information C 50
Q028 Secret Program Auditing C 50
Q029 Off-budget Spending C 50
Q030 Access to Information C 50
Q031 Beneficial Ownership C 50
Q032 Military-Owned Business Scrutiny C 50
Q033 Unauthorised Private Enterprise E 25

Personnel Risk

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
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Q034 Public Commitment to Integrity C 55
Q035 Disciplinary Measures for Personnel A 88
Q036 Whistleblowing B 75
Q037 High-risk Positions NEI
Q038 Numbers of Personnel C 50
Q039 Pay Rates and Allowances C 50
Q040 Payment System C 50
Q041 Objective Appointments C 50
Q042 Objective Promotions C 50
Q043 Bribery to Avoid Conscription NA
Q044 Bribery for Preferred Postings A 100
Q045 Chains of Command and Payment NEI
Q046 Military Code of Conduct C 63

Procurement Risk

<table>
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<th>Grade</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>E</td>
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Q057 Procurement Legislation D 38
Q058 Procurement Cycle E 25
Q059 Procurement Oversight Mechanisms D 33
Q060 Potential Purchases Disclosed F 0
Q061 Actual Purchases Disclosed F 0
Q062 Business Compliance Standards C 50
Q063 Procurement Requirements F 8
Q064 Competition in Procurement NEI
Q065 Tender Board Controls E 19
Q066 Anti-Collusion Controls C 63
Q067 Contract Award / Delivery F 0
Q068 Complaint Mechanisms B 75
Q069 Supplier Sanctions D 42
Q070 Offset Contracts F 0
Q071 Offset Contract Monitoring F 0
Q072 Offset Competition NEI
Q073 Agents and Intermediaries E 25
Q074 Financing Packages C 50
Q075 Political Pressure in Acquisitions NS

KEY

NEI Not enough information to score indicator
NS Indicator is not scored for any country
NA Not applicable

Grade Score

LOW F   0-16 CRITICAL
MODERATE E   17-32 VERY HIGH
HIGH D   33-49 MODERATE
MEDIUM C   50-66 LOW
VERY LOW B   67-82 VERY LOW

RISK GRADE

A 83-100 VERY LOW
B 67-82 LOW
C 50-66 MODERATE
D 33-49 HIGH
E 17-32 VERY HIGH
F 0-16 CRITICAL

Personnel Risk

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<tbody>
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<td>C</td>
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Q057 Civilian Code of Conduct B 75
Q058 Anticorruption Training B 75
Q059 Corruption Prosecutions E 17
Q060 Facilitation Payments B 67

Operational Risk

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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</table>

Q051 Military Doctrine E 25
Q052 Operational Training F 0
Q053 Forward Planning F 0
Q054 Corruption Monitoring in Operations F 0
Q055 Controls in Contracting F 13
Q056 Private Military Contractors NS

Procurement Risk

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
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Q057 Procurement Legislation D 38
Q058 Procurement Cycle E 25
Q059 Procurement Oversight Mechanisms D 33
Q060 Potential Purchases Disclosed F 0
Q061 Actual Purchases Disclosed F 0
Q062 Business Compliance Standards C 50
Q063 Procurement Requirements F 8
Q064 Competition in Procurement NEI
Q065 Tender Board Controls E 19
Q066 Anti-Collusion Controls C 63
Q067 Contract Award / Delivery F 0
Q068 Complaint Mechanisms B 75
Q069 Supplier Sanctions D 42
Q070 Offset Contracts F 0
Q071 Offset Contract Monitoring F 0
Q072 Offset Competition NEI
Q073 Agents and Intermediaries E 25
Q074 Financing Packages C 50
Q075 Political Pressure in Acquisitions NS

KEY

NEI Not enough information to score indicator
NS Indicator is not scored for any country
NA Not applicable
We would like to thank the UK Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands for their generous financial support of the production of the Government Defence Integrity Index. Thanks are also extended to the many country assessors and peer reviewers who contributed the underlying data for this index.

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