

**Government Defence
Integrity Index**



**COUNTRY
BRIEF**

MADAGASCAR

2025





MADAGASCAR

Madagascar's is undergoing a political transition following the October 2025 military coup in that ousted President Andry Rajoelina, sparked by widespread protests led by the youth and Malagasy population over power and water shortages, as well as corruption.¹ The army responded with severe repression using tear gas, live ammunition in some cases, excessive violence, including against people who were not involved in the demonstration.² An interim government led by new President Michael Randrianirina has taken over on October 17th and promised a return to constitutional rule and elections within two years.

Madagascar also faces major economic challenges, characterised by persistent high poverty, uneven economic growth and a predominantly informal economy. The country ranks among the poorest in the world with 69.2% of its population living in extreme poverty in 2021.³ Persistent inequality and limited formal employment opportunities have fuelled social frustrations, particularly among younger generations, who lack prospects for upward mobility.

Security conditions in Madagascar are uneven. While the island is not affected by large-scale insurgencies, it faces persistent rural banditry, livestock theft, and organised criminal activity, in remote areas where state presence and enforcement capacity are weak as well as in major cities since the coup. These security challenges are closely linked to broader governance shortcomings, notably entrenched corruption and limited accountability across state institutions.⁴ The 2025 Government Defence Integrity Index (GDI) found high corruption risks in the defence sector driven by weak parliamentary oversight, limited financial transparency, and ineffective audits. While anti-corruption policies, tender boards, and ethics codes exist, enforcement is inconsistent. Politicised appointments, ghost soldiers, opaque procurement, and minimal operational integrity safeguards continue to undermine accountability.

Member of Open Government Partnership	No
UN Convention Against Corruption	Ratified in 2008
Arms Trade Treaty	Ratified in 2013

EAST AFRICA

East Africa's security environment is shaped by overlapping conflicts, violent extremism, organised crime, and structural fragilities that cut across borders. Weak state presence in peripheral regions, porous borders, and the circulation of small arms continue to enable armed groups and criminal networks to operate across the region. Climate stress, food insecurity, and demographic pressures intensify competition over land and resources, fuelling intercommunal violence and displacement. While primarily active in Somalia, al-Shabaab remains the most significant transnational threat in the region, attacking neighbouring countries, particularly Kenya and Uganda, targeting civilians, security forces, and critical economic infrastructure.

Security dynamics vary across countries. South Sudan continues to face instability driven by communal violence and the fragile implementation of peace agreements, resulting in persistent humanitarian crises. While the Democratic Republic of the Congo is not part of East Africa, the conflict in its eastern provinces pose a significant external risk, with spillover effects through cross-border armed activity, displacement, and regional security involvement. Burundi experiences ongoing political repression, and violence from activities of armed groups and criminal networks linked to regional trafficking routes. Madagascar struggles with banditry, cattle rustling, and illicit natural resource exploitation, especially in remote areas with limited state control.

These overlapping threats have strained defence forces across East Africa. Weak coordination, uneven capacity, and governance shortcomings within defence institutions have limited the effectiveness of security responses. Across East Africa, defence sectors remain characterised by limited financial transparency, weak civilian oversight, opaque procurement processes and limited competition. Defence forces are thus often unaccountable to the public increasing corruption risks and abuses of power.



1 Foreign Policy, "Madagascar's 'Coupvolution' Is Following a Familiar Pattern", November 6, 2025.
 2 OHCHR, "Madagascar: UN Human Rights Chief shocked by violent response to electricity and water protests", September 29, 2025.
 3 World Bank, "Country Overview Madagascar", 2024.
 4 Freedom House, "Country Overview 2025 Madagascar", 2025.



MADAGASCAR







RISK COMPARISON

The Government Defence Integrity Index (GDI) assesses five key risk areas: political, financial, personnel, operational, and procurement. This section compares Madagascar's performance in each area with the regional average (Sub-Saharan Africa).

HIGH RISK

D

33





MADAGASCAR

PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT

Legislative oversight of budget (Open Budget Survey, 2023)	36/100
Military expenditure as a share of government spending (SIPRI, 2024)	4.2%
Committee members with defence expertise (%)	Data is not publicly available.
# of meetings/year	Data is not publicly available.
Last review of defence policy/strategy	Strategy is not publicly available.

The October 2025 military takeover in Madagascar, in which an elite army unit ousted President Andry Rajoelina and installed Colonel Michael Randrianirina as transitional leader, has intensified political uncertainty and underscored enduring governance challenges that bear directly on the high political risks of the defence sector.⁵ The Ministry of the Armed Forces has adopted a comprehensive anti-corruption policy and conducts regular corruption risk assessments, signalling a degree of institutional commitment to integrity. Parliament also holds constitutional authority to review defence policy and budgets, though not defence procurement.⁶ In practice, however, parliamentary influence is limited. The dominant role of the presidency within the political system significantly constrains legislative autonomy, reducing Parliament’s function largely to endorsing executive decisions rather than exercising effective oversight.⁷

The Defence Commission enjoys formal oversight powers, including the ability to issue recommendations, propose budget amendments, and summon experts.⁸ Yet these powers are rarely exercised. The Commission undertakes neither short- nor long-term oversight, largely due to limited technical expertise and restricted access to defence-related information.⁹ Oversight weaknesses extend to audit mechanisms. While the Ministry of the Armed Forces hosts an internal audit body—the Bureau of Control and Audit—publicly available information is insufficient to assess its independence, capacity, or effectiveness. Similarly, the Court of Auditors is legally mandated to conduct external audits of defence expenditure, but there is no evidence that such audits have been carried out, leaving significant gaps in accountability.¹¹

FINANCIAL TRANSPARENCY

Defence-related access to information response rates	1) % granted full or partial access: Data is not publicly available.
	2) # subject to backlog: Data is not publicly available.
Defence-related complaints to ombudsman/commissioner #	Data is not publicly available.
Does the commissioner have authority over the MoD?	Data is not publicly available.
Audit reports on defence (2020-2025) #	None
Open Budget Index (IBP,2023)	39/100
World Press Freedom Index (RSF, 2025)	113th out of 180.

Financial risks in Madagascar’s defence sector are very high, reflecting limited transparency despite some budget disclosure. The defence budget is published within the annual finance law and provides some disaggregation by functional area.¹² There is no transparency regarding procurement expenditure, non-governmental funding sources, secret budget items, or actual defence spending. Although off-budget expenditure is formally prohibited, it does occur sporadically and is not systematically recorded, undermining financial control.¹³

Defence institutions are not involved in commercial enterprises. Military personnel are legally permitted to engage in subsidiary income-generating activities provided these do not interfere with their duties or compromise independence.¹⁴ No evidence was found of unauthorised private activities by armed forces personnel, though the lack of disclosure limits comprehensive assessment.

Access to information remains a major weakness. Madagascar has no legislation regulating access to information in the defence sector, nor any transparency requirements specific to the armed forces. As a result, public access to defence-related information is extremely restricted, leaving the sector largely closed to external scrutiny.¹⁵

5 GIS report, "Madagascar after the coup", January 16, 2026.

6 Constitution of the Republic of Madagascar 2010.

7 Interview with a Member of Parliament, Antananarivo, May 27, 2024. Government Defence Integrity Index.

8 Republic of Madagascar, "Rules of Procedure of the National Assembly", July 2024

9 National Assembly of Madagascar, "Membres des Commissions" ["Committee members"].

10 Interview with a Member of Parliament, Antananarivo, May 27, 2024. Government Defence Integrity Index.

11 Cour des Comptes, "Rapport Publics" ["Public Reports"].

12 Ministry of Economy and Finances, Finance Laws section.

13 Interview with a Retired General, former Minister of Defence, Antananarivo, May 30, 2024. Government Defence Integrity Index.

14 Republic of Madagascar, "Law No. 96-029 of 14 November 1996 on the General Statute for Military Personnel".

15 Interview with a Political journalist for the daily L'Express de Madagascar, June 11, 2024. Government Defence Integrity Index.



PERSONNEL ETHICS FRAMEWORK

Whistleblowing legislation	None
# defence-sector whistleblower cases	None
# Code of conduct violations	Military: Data is not publicly available. Civilian: Data is not publicly available
Financial disclosure system	# submitted: None. # of violations: None.

Reports indicate that nearly 40,000 civil servants—including military personnel—may be fictitious, highlighting severe vulnerabilities in payroll systems and human resource management in Madagascar and contributing to the assessment that personnel risks are high.¹⁶ Although legal provisions exist to sanction bribery and corruption, cases involving defence personnel are rarely investigated or disciplined. In practice, Malagasy defence institutions rely primarily on education and awareness-raising, with little use of criminal prosecution, dismissal, or financial penalties.

Madagascar lacks whistleblower protection legislation, leaving civilian and military personnel reluctant to report misconduct for fear of retaliation.^{17 18 19} The total number of defence personnel is neither accurately known nor publicly disclosed, and appointments to senior positions remain highly centralised within the executive, with no external oversight and a lack of clear merit-based guidelines.²⁰

Some ethics frameworks exist and reference conflicts of interest, gifts, and bribery, but they offer limited practical guidance.^{21 22} While these codes are publicly available and included in military school curricula, related anti-corruption training remains irregular and largely focused on senior officers.²³

OPERATIONS

Total armed forces personnel (World Bank, 2020)	22,000
Troops deployed on operations #	3 (as of 31 May 2025)

Operational risks are critical. There is no military doctrine that considers corruption as a strategic issue during military operations. Only a few Malagasy officers participate in peacekeeping operations under the aegis of African organizations such as the African Union or the United Nations. For national operations, there is also nothing to indicate that corruption is considered in any prospective planning.^{24 25} No expert personnel are deployed to monitor corruption during the mission and no evidence of guidance on corruption risks associated with procurement during operations has been found. However, training on the fight against corruption is delivered in military academies in partnership with international organisations and national anti-corruption institutions. Training is aimed at the senior positions, especially for officers newly appointed to command positions. For military students, training is compulsory but for others, it is on demand, but no training prior to deployments for missions is provided.²⁶

16 Mandimbisoa R., "La chasse aux fonctionnaires fantômes sera intensifiée" ["The hunt for ghost officials will be intensified"], Tribune.com, February 26, 2022.

17 Ministry of National Defense, "Internal Anti-Corruption Policy", May 2002.

18 Interview with a Senior officer, Morondava, August 4, 2024. Government Defence Integrity Index.

19 Interview with a Member of the National Coordination of Civil Society Organizations, July 18, 2024. Government Defence Integrity Index.

20 Interview with a Retired General, former Minister of Defense, former Director of Military Intelligence, May 30, 2024.

21 Republic of Madagascar, "Order No. 20.404/2011 on the Code of Conduct of the Malagasy Army".

22 Republic of Madagascar, "Decree No. 2003-1158 relating to the Code of Ethics for the Administration and Good Conduct for State Agents", December 17, 2003.

23 Interview with a Lecturer at the University of Antananarivo and trainer at the Antsirabe Military Academy, May 30, 2024. Government Defence Integrity Index.

24 Bianco, "Education-Prevention: Mobilization of the Armed Forces in the Fight Against Corruption", October 30, 2017.

25 Interview with a Lecturer at the University of Antananarivo and trainer at the Antsirabe Military Academy, May 30, 2024. Government Defence Integrity Index.

26 Ibid.



MADAGASCAR

DEFENCE PROCUREMENT


Military expenditure (US\$ mil) (SIPRI, 2024)	\$121.63
Open competition in defence procurement (%)	Data is not publicly available.
Main defence exports – to (SIPRI, 2020-24)	NA
Main defence imports – from (SIPRI, 2020-24)	UAE (100%)

Although Madagascar’s military expenditure rose by 39% between 2020 and 2024, persistent procurement weaknesses and high corruption risks mean that additional resources are vulnerable to mismanagement.²⁷ Defence procurement is formally governed by laws which explicitly recognises corruption risks, including conflicts of interest and bribery.²⁸ ²⁹ However, defence procurement does not consistently follow these rules, and significant exemptions—particularly for large or sensitive purchases—undermine transparency and competition.

Defence acquisition planning is conducted annually, and anticipated purchases are reflected in the armed forces’ budget. However, these plans are not published, and the absence of a strategic defence review means procurement decisions are not clearly linked to long-term capability requirements.³⁰ While the procurement cycle is formally defined, several stages remain opaque when applied to defence-related contracts.

Competition in defence procurement is limited. The Ministry of Defence frequently relies on bilateral agreements or restricted tenders.³¹ Procurement patterns also reflect external influence, particularly from countries such as France, China, and Russia.^{32 33 34}

Defence procurement is subject to internal scrutiny by the Ministry of Defence’s Strategic Equipment and Materials Acquisition Monitoring Service, the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority, and the Court of Auditors.^{35 36} Nevertheless, their effectiveness is occasionally weakened by political interference, limiting the independence and consistency of oversight in practice.³⁷



GDI data collection for **Madagascar** was conducted from May 2024 to August 2025.

27 SIPRI, Military expenditure database: Madagascar”, 2024.
 28 Republic of Madagascar, “Law No. 2016-055 on the Public Procurement Code”.
 29 Republic Madagascar, “Decree No. 2006-343 establishing the Code of Ethics for Public Procurement”.
 30 Interview with a Political Journalist for the daily L’Express de Madagascar, June 11 2024. Government Defence Integrity Index.
 31 Interview with the General Programme Coordinator of the Ministry of Defense, Antananarivo, February 26, 2025. Government Defence Integrity Index.
 32 Interview with an University Professor at University of Antananarivo, Antananarivo, May 28, 2024. Government Defence Integrity Index.
 33 RFI, “Madagascar: the signing of a military cooperation agreement with Russia sparks controversy”, April 8, 2022.
 34 Midi Madagascar, “Military cooperation: Chinese Defense Attaché to the Minister of the Armed Forces”, January 24, 2024.
 35 Interview with a Retired General, former Minister of Defense, former Director of Military Intelligence, Antananarivo, May 30, 2024. Government Defence Integrity Index.
 36 Autorité de Régulation des Marchés Publics, “Organisation and operations”.
 37 L’Express de Madagascar, “Governance - The fight against corruption in danger”, July 6, 2023.

MADAGASCAR 2025 GDI SCORECARD

	Grade	Score
POLITICAL RISK	D	36
Q1 Legislative Scrutiny	E	25
Q2 Defence Committee	F	13
Q3 Defence Policy Debate	F	13
Q4 CSO Engagement	D	33
Q5 Conventions: UNCAC / OECD	C	63
Q6 Public Debate	F	13
Q7 Anticorruption Policy	A	88
Q8 Compliance and Ethics Units	C	50
Q9 Public Trust in Institutions	NS	
Q10 Risk Assessments	A	100
Q11 Acquisition Planning	D	33
Q12 Budget Transparency & Detail	C	63
Q13 Budget Scrutiny	D	38
Q14 Budget Availability	E	25
Q15 Defence Income	F	8
Q16 Internal Audit	NEI	
Q17 External Audit	E	25
Q18 Natural Resources	B	67
Q19 Organised Crime Links	F	13
Q20 Organised Crime Policing	E	25
Q21 Intelligence Services Oversight	F	13
Q22 Intelligence Services Recruitment	F	8
Q23 Export Controls (ATT)	A	88
Q76 Lobbying	F	0
FINANCIAL RISK	E	30
Q24 Asset Disposal Controls	E	17
Q25 Asset Disposal Scrutiny	F	8
Q26 Secret Spending	F	0
Q27 Legislative Access to Information	F	0
Q28 Secret Program Auditing	F	0
Q29 Off-budget Spending	C	58
Q30 Access to Information	F	0
Q31 Beneficial Ownership	A	100
Q32 Military-Owned Business Scrutiny	A	100
Q33 Unauthorised Private Enterprise	C	50
Q77 Defence Spending	F	0
PERSONNEL RISK	D	44
Q34 Public Commitment to Integrity	B	75
Q35 Disciplinary Measures for Personnel	C	63
Q36 Whistleblowing	F	8
Q37 High-risk Positions	D	42
Q38 Numbers of Personnel	F	8
Q39 Pay Rates and Allowances	F	0
Q40 Payment System	B	67
Q41 Objective Appointments	F	0
Q42 Objective Promotions	E	31
Q43 Bribery to Avoid Conscription	NA	
Q44 Bribery for Preferred Postings	B	75
Q45 Chains of Command and Payment	A	100
Q46 Military Code of Conduct	B	75
Q47 Civilian Code of Conduct	C	50
Q48 Anticorruption Training	C	50
Q49 Corruption Prosecutions	E	17
Q50 Facilitation Payments	D	42

**OVERALL
COUNTRY
SCORE**

HIGH RISK

D

33


RISK GRADE

A	83–100	VERY LOW RISK
B	67–82	LOW RISK
C	50–66	MODERATE RISK
D	33–49	HIGH RISK
E	17–32	VERY HIGH RISK
F	0–16	CRITICAL RISK

	Grade	Score
OPERATIONAL RISK	F	15
Q51 Military Doctrine	F	0
Q52 Operational Training	B	75
Q53 Forward Planning	F	0
Q54 Corruption Monitoring in Operations	F	0
Q55 Controls in Contracting	F	0
Q56 Private Military Contractors	NS	
PROCUREMENT RISK	D	38
Q57 Procurement Legislation	C	50
Q58 Procurement Cycle	D	42
Q59 Procurement Oversight Mechanisms	C	50
Q60 Potential Purchases Disclosed	F	13
Q61 Actual Purchases Disclosed	C	50
Q62 Business Compliance Standards	D	38
Q63 Procurement Requirements	E	25
Q64 Competition in Procurement	NEI	
Q65 Tender Board Controls	A	100
Q66 Anti-Collusion Controls	B	75
Q67 Contract Award / Delivery	C	50
Q68 Complaint Mechanisms	C	50
Q69 Supplier Sanctions	B	67
Q70 Offset Contracts	F	0
Q71 Offset Contract Monitoring	F	0
Q72 Offset Competition	F	0
Q73 Agents and Intermediaries	NEI	
Q74 Financing Packages	F	0
Q75 Political Pressure in Acquisitions	NS	

KEY

- NEI** Not enough information to score indicator
- NS** Indicator is not scored for any country
- NA** Not applicable



Government Defence Integrity Index



ti-defence.org/gdi
GDI@transparency.org

Transparency International UK
Registered charity number 1112842
Company number 2903386

Transparency International Defence and Security (TI-DS) is a global thematic network initiative of Transparency International. It is an independent entity and does not represent any national TI Chapters. TI-DS is solely responsible for the 2025 iteration of the Government Defence Integrity Index (GDI) and all associated products, including the GDI Country Briefs.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We would like to thank the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands for their generous financial support of the production of the Government Defence Integrity Index. Thanks are also extended to the many country assessors and peer reviewers who contributed the underlying data for this index.

Series editor: Michael Ofori-Mensah, *Head of Research*

Author: Lea Clamadiou, *Research Officer*

Project Manager: Patrick Kwasi Brobbey, *Research Manager*

Design: Colin Foo



Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Netherlands