

**Government Defence  
Integrity Index**



**COUNTRY  
BRIEF**

# MOZAMBIQUE

2025





# MOZAMBIQUE

Mozambique’s political landscape remains shaped by a combination of ongoing security pressures and highly centralised governance. The December 2024 general elections returned the ruling party, Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO), to power, reinforcing institutional continuity - but also reflecting persistent concerns around executive dominance, electoral credibility, and constraints on civic space.<sup>1</sup> At the same time, the insurgency in Cabo Delgado continues to pose a significant internal security challenge, despite territorial gains achieved through joint operations with Rwanda and the Southern African Development Community Mission in Mozambique. Displacement and sporadic attacks persist, sustaining pressure on state security forces.<sup>2 3</sup>

Mozambique continues to face structural fragility linked to governance weaknesses and debt vulnerability. The legacy of the “hidden debt” scandal still constrains relations with international partners and investor confidence, although partial macroeconomic stabilisation followed debt restructuring and the resumption of International Monetary Fund (IMF) support in 2022.<sup>4</sup> While the IMF forecasts a growth of 2.5 percent in

2025,<sup>5</sup> fiscal dependence on extractive revenues and external financing leaves little room for institutional investment or oversight capacity.

Against this backdrop of centralised governance, ongoing insecurity, and fiscal constraint, Mozambique’s defence sector shows a persistent gap between formal rules and practical implementation. While legal frameworks exist for budgeting, conduct, and anti-corruption, enforcement remains uneven, and secrecy heavily constrains oversight. Procurement is formally regulated but dominated by direct awards and minimal public disclosure. Although the defence budget is relatively comprehensive, extensive classification limits access to key financial information. The absence of corruption as a strategic operational risk further weakens accountability, sustaining high vulnerability to corruption.

Member of Open Government Partnership	No
UN Convention Against Corruption	Ratified in 2008
Arms Trade Treaty	Ratified in 2018

## SOUTHERN AFRICA

Southern Africa’s security landscape is shaped by a mix of transnational threats, institutional weaknesses, and evolving defence governance challenges. Organised crime, including arms, drug, and human trafficking, remains pervasive across the region due to porous borders, weak governance, and capacity deficits, undermining both public safety and state legitimacy. In Mozambique, longstanding Islamist insurgency in Cabo Delgado continues to drive insecurity. Zimbabwe’s security landscape remains dominated by a politicised security apparatus, where blurred civil–military boundaries and the use of coercive organs for regime preservation inhibit professionalisation and public trust. South Africa’s defence institutions are under strain: declining investment, ageing equipment, and manpower shortages have limited the South African National Defence Force’s (SANDF) operational capabilities.

Across the region, weaknesses in defence sector governance continue to limit states’ ability to respond effectively to evolving security challenges. While South Africa’s defence sector demonstrates comparatively stronger institutional resilience than its neighbours, parliamentary oversight of defence policy and expenditure remains frequently constrained by executive dominance—particularly in countries governed by entrenched ruling parties such as Mozambique and Zimbabwe—as well as by limited technical expertise. Defence budgeting and procurement processes remain opaque, heightening the risk of corruption and inefficiency, while integrity frameworks for military operations are underdeveloped. Financial transparency is generally limited across the region, with South Africa representing a partial exception. Despite the existence of formal personnel management and ethics frameworks, senior appointments continue to be shaped by political influence, undermining merit-based governance and accountability.



1 BTI Transformation Index, Mozambique Country Report 2024.  
 2 International Organization for Migration – Mobility Tracking Assessment (Northern Mozambique), July 2024.  
 3 International Crisis Group – Winning Peace in Mozambique’s Embattled North, 2024.  
 4 ISS Africa, “When Debt and Terrorism Intersect: The Case of Mozambique,” 2024.  
 5 International Monetary Fund, Republic of Mozambique.



# MOZAMBIQUE


## RISK COMPARISON

The Government Defence Integrity Index (GDI) assesses five key risk areas: political, financial, personnel, operational, and procurement. This section compares Mozambique's performance in each area with the regional average (Sub-Saharan Africa).


**HIGH RISK**

**D**


**35**




### POLITICAL




### FINANCIAL




### PERSONNEL



### OPERATIONAL



### PROCUREMENT





# MOZAMBIQUE

## PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT

Legislative oversight of budget (Open Budget Survey, 2023)	36/100
Military expenditure as a share of government spending (SIPRI, 2024)	6.13%
Committee members with defence expertise (%)	Data is not publicly available.
# of meetings/year	Data is not publicly available.
Last review of defence policy/strategy	2018

Defence and security legislation is largely driven by the Executive and passed with minimal amendment, as seen in the 2023 extension of military service and approval of the state budget despite opposition objections.<sup>6,7</sup> FRELIMO's parliamentary dominance and strict party discipline limit independent scrutiny, leaving defence policy primarily shaped by the Executive and security institutions.<sup>8</sup>

Within this context, the Government Defence Integrity Index (GDI) shows high corruption risks, despite strong formal provisions. Parliament has constitutional authority to legislate on defence and security policy and to approve the General State Budget. The Defence, Order and Public Security Committee holds formal rights to scrutinise defence legislation, summon experts, and inspect defence institutions. Defence budget documentation is relatively comprehensive and timely, and the Committee is formally empowered to examine any aspect of defence expenditure. In practice, however, strategic decisions, particularly on major acquisitions and operations, are taken at executive and joint-command level, with Parliament largely limited to agree to government proposals.<sup>9</sup> The dominance of FRELIMO and party discipline significantly restrict independent scrutiny, while informal party decision-making sidelines plenary debate.<sup>10</sup> The Defence Committee rarely conducts inspections due to resource constraints and does not undertake long-term investigations, including into private security actors in Cabo Delgado.<sup>11</sup> Internal audit remains highly classified and external auditing of military expenditure is extremely limited,<sup>12</sup> leaving oversight formally established but structurally weak in practice, sustaining high corruption risks in this area.

## FINANCIAL TRANSPARENCY

Defence-related access to information response rates	1) % granted full or partial access: Data is not publicly available.
	2) # subject to backlog: Data is not publicly available.
Defence-related complaints to ombudsman/commissioner #	Data is not publicly available.
Does the commissioner have authority over the MoD?	Data is not publicly available.
Audit reports on defence (2020-2025) #	None
Open Budget Index (IBP, 2023)	47/100
World Press Freedom Index (RSF, 2025)	101st out of 180.

Mozambique shows strong formal budget transparency practices on paper: the defence budget is presented with a relatively comprehensive and disaggregated breakdown. Budget submission timelines are regulated, and in most years, Parliament receives the draft budget with adequate time for review.<sup>13</sup> Actual defence expenditure is also proactively published through the General State Account, Budget Execution Reports, and the Economic and Social Plan Balance Sheet, with explanations for major variances provided.

Despite these efforts, financial transparency remains subject to very high corruption risks in practice. Large portions of defence and security spending are classified as State Secrets and excluded from public scrutiny.<sup>14</sup> Even where defence and security-linked commercial companies publish financial statements, no evidence was found that these entities are subject to independent scrutiny.<sup>15</sup> While off-budget expenditure is formally prohibited, secrecy still surrounds exceptional spending linked to counter-insurgency operations.<sup>16</sup> Although a Right to Information Law exists, its application to the defence sector is heavily restricted by the State Secrets framework and military legislation, and citizens are in practice unable to access defence-related financial information.

6 O País, "Just In: Mozambique parliament passes extension of military service with opposition votes against," Club Mozambique, December 14, 2023.

7 Lusa, "Mozambique: Ruling party passes budget bill," Club of Mozambique, December 13, 2023.

8 Article 90 of the Regulations of The Assembly of the Republic, Amended and Republished by Act No. 13/2014, of June 17 and Act No. 1/2015, of February 27, respectively.

9 Interview with a member of the Parliamentary Committee on Defence, Security and Public Order, June 2024, Maputo. Government Defence Integrity Index.

10 Edson Macuácu, "Riscos do Sistema Político Moçambicano" [Risks of the Mozambique Political System], Maputo: Escolar Editora, 2023, p. 63.

11 Emídio Beula, "Militarização de Cabo Delgado: Presidente da República não Tem Competência de Decidir Sobre a Entrada de Militares Estrangeiros Sem a Autorização da Assembleia da República" [Militarization of Cabo Delgado: President of the Republic Does Not Have the Power to Decide on the Entry of Foreign Military Personnel Without the Authorization of the Assembly of the Republic], CDD, Quarta-feira, 2021, 14 de Julho, Ano 03, nº 143, Maputo.

12 Interview with a Parliamentary staff member of the Defence, Security and Public Order Commission of the Assembly of the Republic of Mozambique, June 2024, Maputo. Government Defence Integrity Index.

13 Planning and Budgeting Economic and Social Plan, 2023.

14 Law No. 2/79, of December 12, State Secrecy Law. Maputo: National Press.

15 Ministerial Diploma by the Ministry of National Defence and the Ministry of Finance, creating the public limited company called Monte Binga, SA. Bulletin of the Republic of Mozambique No. 40, Series I - Number 2, 6 October 2011. Maputo: Imprensa Nacional.

16 Centro de Integridade Pública, "Revelando os Custos da Guerra em Cabo Delgado: Uma Análise Abrangente dos Impactos Fiscais e Desafios Multidimensionais" [Uncovering the Costs of War in Cabo Delgado: A Comprehensive Analysis of Fiscal Impacts and Multidimensional Challenges], Maputo: CIP, 2023, p. 9-13.



# MOZAMBIQUE

## PERSONNEL ETHICS FRAMEWORK

<b>Whistleblowing legislation</b>	Law No. 15/2012 creates the Central Office for the Protection of Victims.
<b># defence-sector whistleblower cases</b>	None
<b># Code of conduct violations</b>	Military: Data is not publicly available. Civilian: Data is not publicly available
<b>Financial disclosure system</b>	# submitted: None. # of violations: None.

Mozambique’s personnel integrity framework presents a mixed profile with overall moderate corruption risks. Formally, the system is well developed: bribery and misconduct are addressed through criminal and military justice mechanisms, military and civilian personnel are governed by Codes of Conduct, and civilian officials fall under the General Statute of State Employees, which covers bribery, conflicts of interest, and post-service restrictions. Whistleblower protection is also established in law, and reporting mechanisms formally apply to defence personnel.

Nevertheless, political interference weakens prosecution processes in defence-related corruption cases, with senior officers rarely held accountable. Whistleblower protection is undermined by the fact that the Central Office for Victim and Witness Protection is non-operational due to resource constraints.<sup>17</sup> Personnel numbers are treated as State Secrets, and the persistence of “ghost soldiers” shows payroll control weaknesses.<sup>18</sup> Appointment and promotion processes, especially at senior levels, remain relatively influenced by political trust rather than transparent and objective criteria.<sup>19</sup> While Codes of Conduct exist and sanctions have been applied in some cases, anti-corruption training is irregular and not systematically institutionalised.

## OPERATIONS

<b>Total armed forces personnel (World Bank, 2020)</b>	11,000
<b>Troops deployed on operations #</b>	N/A

Defence operations represent Mozambique’s lowest-scoring and highest-risk area for corruption. While the Armed Forces have a formal military doctrine and provide some corruption-related training through military education institutions, corruption is not treated as a strategic operational risk in doctrine, forward planning, or deployment design.<sup>20</sup> There is no evidence that commanders systematically apply anti-corruption measures in the field, and operational discipline remains weak, as reflected in persistent human rights abuses and limited accountability.<sup>21</sup> Although inspectors can be deployed to monitor risks, their findings are classified and inaccessible.<sup>22</sup> Contracting risks during deployments are governed only by general anti-corruption law, and the use of private military companies in Cabo Delgado has occurred with minimal transparency and no effective external scrutiny, leaving operational corruption risks critically unmanaged.<sup>23</sup>

17 Nelucia Manhica, “Moçambique: Escassez de recursos condiciona protecção dos denunciadores” [Mozambique: Conditional appeals scheme protects whistleblowers], Maputo: Agência de Informação de Moçambique – AIM, November 07, 2024.  
 18 William Mapote, “Moçambique: Polémica com Militares “Fantasmas” que Recebiam Salários,” [Mozambique: Controversy over “Ghost” Soldiers Receiving Salaries], VOA Publication, 2022.  
 19 Interview with an officer of the Armed Forces of Defence of Mozambique, June 2024, Maputo. Government Defence Integrity Index.  
 20 Academia Militar Marechal Samora Machel, Relatório do 1º Simpósio Sobre Doutrina Militar [Report of the 1st Symposium on Military Doctrine], Nampula: Academia Militar, 2022.  
 21 Human Rights Watch, Mozambique events of 2020.  
 22 “Em Defesa de Moçambique – Inspectores Desafiados a Colaborar de Forma Conjunta” [Inspectors Challenged to Collaborate Together], July 20, 2024.  
 23 Bande, Aldemiro e Constantino, Leila, “Controlo Externo da Despesa de Defesa e Segurança: Quanto e Como Gasta o Estado com a Guerra de Cabo Delgado? [External Control of Defence and Security Expenditure: How Much and How Does the State Spend on the Cabo Delgado War?], Maputo: CIP – Centro de Integridade Pública, 2021.




## DEFENCE PROCUREMENT

Military expenditure (US\$ mil) (SIPRI, 2024)	\$450.4
Open competition in defence procurement (%)	Data is not publicly available.
Main defence exports – to (SIPRI, 2020-24)	NA
Main defence imports – from (SIPRI, 2020-24)	South Africa (40%); UAE (3.8%); Canada (1.2%)

Defence procurement in Mozambique is a high-risk area for corruption, despite the existence of formal legal and planning frameworks. Acquisition is formally guided by Military Programming, the Defence Budget, and sector legislation, with links to the Government’s Five-Year Plan and international reporting obligations under the Arms Trade Treaty. However, actual acquisitions, and contracting details are classified under State Secrets legislation. Procurement laws apply in theory, but corruption risks are addressed only through general anti-corruption statutes rather than defence-specific safeguards, and broad emergency exemptions, especially since the start of the Cabo Delgado insurgency, allow widespread use of direct awards.

The procurement cycle is almost entirely opaque to the public, and competitive tendering is the exception rather than the rule. Most defence contracts are executed through single-sourcing and direct awards, with no public advertising, contract disclosure, or verifiable data on competition.<sup>24</sup> Oversight formally exists through the National Defence Inspectorate and Parliament, but both are constrained by limited capacity and restricted access to classified files.<sup>25</sup> Forward purchase plans are not published, and urgent security needs frequently override legal procurement requirements. While acquisitions could be linked to strategic planning, in practice they are often determined by crisis pressures.



GDI data collection for **Mozambique** was conducted from May 2024 to August 2025.

24 Aldemiro Bande, “Nova Lei de Contratação Pública Abre Espaço Para Mais Ajustes-Directos” [New Public Procurement Law Opens the Door to More Direct Contracts], CIP, Procurement Público, nº 2, 02 de Maio. Maputo: CIP – Centro de Integridade Pública, 2023.

25 Interview with a University Lecturer, Mozambique, February 20, 2025. Government Defence Integrity Index.



# MOZAMBIQUE 2025 GDI SCORECARD

	Grade	Score
<b>POLITICAL RISK</b>	<b>D</b>	<b>38</b>
Q1 Legislative Scrutiny	C	50
Q2 Defence Committee	D	33
Q3 Defence Policy Debate	F	6
Q4 CSO Engagement	D	33
Q5 Conventions: UNCAC / OECD	C	63
Q6 Public Debate	D	38
Q7 Anticorruption Policy	D	38
Q8 Compliance and Ethics Units	D	42
Q9 Public Trust in Institutions	NS	
Q10 Risk Assessments	F	0
Q11 Acquisition Planning	C	50
Q12 Budget Transparency & Detail	A	100
Q13 Budget Scrutiny	B	75
Q14 Budget Availability	D	42
Q15 Defence Income	D	33
Q16 Internal Audit	C	50
Q17 External Audit	F	0
Q18 Natural Resources	E	30
Q19 Organised Crime Links	C	50
Q20 Organised Crime Policing	C	50
Q21 Intelligence Services Oversight	F	13
Q22 Intelligence Services Recruitment	D	33
Q23 Export Controls (ATT)	C	50
Q76 Lobbying	F	0
<b>FINANCIAL RISK</b>	<b>E</b>	<b>27</b>
Q24 Asset Disposal Controls	C	50
Q25 Asset Disposal Scrutiny	E	25
Q26 Secret Spending	F	0
Q27 Legislative Access to Information	F	0
Q28 Secret Program Auditing	F	0
Q29 Off-budget Spending	C	58
Q30 Access to Information	E	25
Q31 Beneficial Ownership	F	13
Q32 Military-Owned Business Scrutiny	E	25
Q33 Unauthorised Private Enterprise	D	38
Q77 Defence Spending	C	63
<b>PERSONNEL RISK</b>	<b>C</b>	<b>60</b>
Q34 Public Commitment to Integrity	A	83
Q35 Disciplinary Measures for Personnel	B	75
Q36 Whistleblowing	B	67
Q37 High-risk Positions	B	67
Q38 Numbers of Personnel	F	0
Q39 Pay Rates and Allowances	A	88
Q40 Payment System	A	83
Q41 Objective Appointments	E	17
Q42 Objective Promotions	C	63
Q43 Bribery to Avoid Conscription	A	83
Q44 Bribery for Preferred Postings	A	83
Q45 Chains of Command and Payment	A	100
Q46 Military Code of Conduct	B	69
Q47 Civilian Code of Conduct	B	75
Q48 Anticorruption Training	F	0
Q49 Corruption Prosecutions	E	17
Q50 Facilitation Payments	C	50

**OVERALL  
COUNTRY  
SCORE**

**HIGH RISK**



## RISK GRADE

<b>A</b>	<b>83–100</b>	<b>VERY LOW RISK</b>
<b>B</b>	<b>67–82</b>	<b>LOW RISK</b>
<b>C</b>	<b>50–66</b>	<b>MODERATE RISK</b>
<b>D</b>	<b>33–49</b>	<b>HIGH RISK</b>
<b>E</b>	<b>17–32</b>	<b>VERY HIGH RISK</b>
<b>F</b>	<b>0–16</b>	<b>CRITICAL RISK</b>

	Grade	Score
<b>OPERATIONAL RISK</b>	<b>E</b>	<b>17</b>
Q51 Military Doctrine	F	0
Q52 Operational Training	C	50
Q53 Forward Planning	F	0
Q54 Corruption Monitoring in Operations	F	8
Q55 Controls in Contracting	E	25
Q56 Private Military Contractors	NS	

	Grade	Score
<b>PROCUREMENT RISK</b>	<b>D</b>	<b>33</b>
Q57 Procurement Legislation	C	50
Q58 Procurement Cycle	E	17
Q59 Procurement Oversight Mechanisms	D	42
Q60 Potential Purchases Disclosed	F	0
Q61 Actual Purchases Disclosed	F	0
Q62 Business Compliance Standards	NEI	
Q63 Procurement Requirements	C	58
Q64 Competition in Procurement	F	13
Q65 Tender Board Controls	D	38
Q66 Anti-Collusion Controls	B	69
Q67 Contract Award / Delivery	C	50
Q68 Complaint Mechanisms	C	50
Q69 Supplier Sanctions	B	75
Q70 Offset Contracts	E	25
Q71 Offset Contract Monitoring	F	0
Q72 Offset Competition	F	0
Q73 Agents and Intermediaries	B	75
Q74 Financing Packages	F	0
Q75 Political Pressure in Acquisitions	NS	

## KEY

- NEI** Not enough information to score indicator
- NS** Indicator is not scored for any country
- NA** Not applicable

# GDI

## Government Defence Integrity Index



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## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We would like to thank the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands for their generous financial support of the production of the Government Defence Integrity Index. Thanks are also extended to the many country assessors and peer reviewers who contributed the underlying data for this index.

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