

**Government Defence  
Integrity Index**



**COUNTRY  
BRIEF**

**NIGER**

**2025**





# NIGER

Niger, a vast landlocked country at the heart of the Sahel, faces entrenched political, economic, and security challenges that continue to shape its fragile governance and development trajectory. Since the coup d'état of 26 July 2023, the country has been governed by a transitional administration led by General Abdourahmane Tiani, who was sworn in for a five-year term under a new charter adopted in March 2025, replacing the national constitution. Moreover, despite considerable natural resources, Niger remains one of the poorest countries globally, with an estimated 50.1% of the population living in extreme poverty in 2025.<sup>1</sup> Economic opportunities remain limited, and widespread insecurity continues to hinder investment, service delivery, and development.


In February 2024, Niger, alongside Mali and Burkina Faso, withdrew from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), marking a decisive geopolitical shift. The government has since reoriented its foreign and security partnerships—reducing reliance on traditional Western allies and strengthening cooperation with new partners, mainly Russia and Turkey.<sup>2</sup> At the same time, Niger has deepened regional integration with Mali and Burkina Faso through the *Alliance of Sahel States*, a mutual defence pact aimed at addressing shared security threats.

The country faces overlapping and intensifying security crises. The Tillaberi region, bordering Mali and Burkina Faso, remains a hotspot of violence linked to Islamic State and al-Qaeda affiliates, while the Diffa region in the southeast continues to suffer attacks from Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). These conflicts have displaced nearly one million people as of 2025 and severely eroded state authority in large parts of the territory.<sup>3</sup> The withdrawal of foreign forces, including French and U.S. troops, following the 2023 coup has further weakened Niger's counterinsurgency capacity and exposed persistent gaps in defence governance and coordination. The 2025 Government Defence Integrity Index (GDI) found critical corruption risks in the defence sector. Democratic oversight has collapsed since the 2023 coup, audits are non-functional, and financial transparency is almost non-existent, with extensive off-budget spending and restrictive information controls. Personnel systems are politicised and weakly enforced, while operational and procurement processes lack corruption safeguards, transparency, and competitive procedures.

Member of Open Government Partnership	No
UN Convention Against Corruption	Accessed in 2008
Arms Trade Treaty	Ratified in 2015

## WEST AFRICA

The security environment in West Africa has deteriorated markedly over the past decade, driven by the expansion of jihadist insurgencies, political instability, and transnational organised crime. Armed groups such as Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) have generated unprecedented violence, with the Sahel now accounting for nearly half of global terrorism-related deaths. These violent extremist groups have expanded southward, placing increasing pressure on coastal states including Benin, Togo, Côte d'Ivoire, and Ghana. Insecurity is further compounded by piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, trafficking in arms, drugs, and natural resources, and climate-related competition over resources. The cumulative effect has worsened the humanitarian crisis and widespread displacement across the region. These security challenges have unfolded alongside military coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Guinea between 2020 and 2023, which have further weakened civilian control and democratic oversight.



Weak defence sector governance has significantly undermined states' ability to respond effectively to these threats. Defence institutions across West Africa remain characterised by limited transparency, weak accountability, and entrenched defence exceptionalism. Parliamentary oversight is constrained by executive dominance, and limited technical capacity, reducing civilian control over defence policy, budgets, and procurement. Limited budget transparency has weakened accountability and fuelled public mistrust. Simultaneously, non-transparent and discretionary procurement systems have increased corruption risks, distorted capability development, and diverted resources away from operational needs. While most states in the sub-region have ratified the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), uneven implementation has arguably continued to expose defence sectors to corruption (risks), undermining the effectiveness and sustainability of security responses.

1 World Bank, "Country Overview: Niger", 2024.

2 BBC News, "Russian troops arrive in Niger as military agreement begins", April 12, 2024 Reuters "Turkey, Niger agree to enhance energy, defence cooperation", Reuters, July 18, 2024.







3 UNCHR, "Niger Country Overview".



## RISK COMPARISON

The Government Defence Integrity Index (GDI) assesses five key risk areas: political, financial, personnel, operational, and procurement. This section compares Niger's performance in each area with the regional average (Sub-Saharan Africa).

### CRITICAL RISK





## PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT

<b>Legislative oversight of budget (Open Budget Survey, 2023)</b>	50/100
<b>Military expenditure as a share of government spending (SIPRI, 2024)</b>	2.2%
<b>Committee members with defence expertise (%)</b>	Data is not publicly available.
<b># of meetings/year</b>	Data is not publicly available.
<b>Last review of defence policy/strategy</b>	Strategy is not publicly available.

Niger’s defence governance has been profoundly reshaped by the country’s political trajectory and the collapse of civilian oversight following the July 2023 military coup. Prior to the takeover, Niger operated under a semi-presidential system in which the National Assembly played a meaningful—if imperfect—role in defence governance. Political risks in Niger’s defence sector are now critical, marked by the absence of democratic oversight, the lack of public debate, and the periodic involvement of defence institutions and personnel in activities tied to natural resource exploitation and organised crime.

Since the July 26 2023 coup, all national institutions — including the National Assembly — have been dissolved, leaving no body responsible for reviewing defence policy, budgets, or procurement decisions.<sup>4</sup> The country currently operates without a security or defence committee, effectively removing all legislative scrutiny from the sector. Before the coup, the Parliament, at least formally, was reviewing the defence budget and approving defence procurement.<sup>5</sup>

Oversight and accountability mechanisms are also non-functional. There is no evidence of effective internal or external audits. The Inspector General of the Armed Forces has responsibility for internal audits within the Ministry of Defence, but its capacity to conduct credible, transparent, and independent audits remains unclear. Externally, the Court of Accounts previously carried out audits of defence expenditure, yet no trace of its work has been recorded since 2019, leaving the sector without any independent financial oversight.<sup>6 7</sup>

## FINANCIAL TRANSPARENCY

<b>Defence-related access to information response rates</b>	1) % granted full or partial access: Data is not publicly available.
	2) # subject to backlog: Data is not publicly available.
<b>Defence-related complaints to ombudsman/commissioner #</b>	Data is not publicly available.
<b>Does the commissioner have authority over the MoD?</b>	Data is not publicly available.
<b>Audit reports on defence (2020-2025) #</b>	None
<b>Open Budget Index (IBP,2023)</b>	33/100
<b>World Press Freedom Index (RSF, 2025)</b>	83th out of 180.

Despite an 83% increase in defence spending since 2020,<sup>8</sup> Niger’s defence sector remains characterised by extreme financial opacity and critical corruption risks. Only a top-line figure of the defence budget is available and no information on sources of incomes or secret expenditure are released.<sup>9</sup> Off-budget expenditure is not prohibited by law and there is substantial evidence of off-budget military expenditures in the country. The 2024 decree effectively removed all financial oversight over defence spending, allowing unrestricted off-budget expenditures without institutional control.<sup>10</sup>

Access to information is regulated but there is no framework for classifying administrative documents and no active oversight body.<sup>11</sup> In practice, the public’s access to information is very limited, with military authorities maintaining tight control over public discourse and defence officials using statements as political messaging purposes.<sup>12</sup>

There is no clear legal framework explicitly restricting military ownership of commercial enterprises and implication of military personnel in private enterprises. There is also limited evidence to assess the prevalence of unauthorised private enterprise, but recent investigations revealed smuggling of gold and illicit financial flows facilitated by state security forces.<sup>13 14</sup>

4 Republic of Niger, "Order no. 2023-01 of 28 July 2023, suspending the Constitution of November 25, 2010 and creating the National Council for Safeguarding the Homeland (CNSP)".

5 Republic of Niger, "Constitution of the VIIe Republic", November 29, 2010.

6 Republic of Niger, "Law No. 2020-035 (July 30, 2020)".

7 Primature du Niger, "Government press release on the audit of the Ministry of Defence: The government has decided to make repayment of amounts wrongly received either as a result of overbilling or in respect of payments for services and deliveries not carried out or partially carried out", October 16, 2020.

8 SIPRI, "Military Expenditure Data, Niger", 2024.

9 Republic of Niger, "Ordinance no. 2024-001 of 4 January 2024 on the Finance Act for the financial year", 2024.

10 Republic of Niger, "Ordinance 2024-05 of 23 February 2024".

11 Republic of Niger, "Ordinance No. 2011-22 of 23 February 2011 on the Charter of access to public information and administrative documents".

12 Disinfo Africa, "What lies behind networks supporting the Niger coup?", 2024.

13 Republic of Niger, "Law 2020-65 of 3 December 2020 governing the status of personnel in Niger's armed forces".

14 Transparency International Niger, "Statement by the Association Nigérienne de Lutte contre la Corruption on illicit gold trafficking in Niger", January 24, 2024.



## PERSONNEL ETHICS FRAMEWORK

Whistleblowing legislation	None
# defence-sector whistleblower cases	None
# Code of conduct violations	Military: Data is not publicly available. Civilian: Data is not publicly available
Financial disclosure system	# submitted: None. # of violations: None.

Personnel risks in are very high in the sector. Although sanctions for bribery and corruption exist in law, enforcement remains inconsistent: investigations occur, but disciplinary measures are often superficial and influenced by political or institutional interests.

Niger has no dedicated whistleblower protection law, and there are no confidential channels for defence personnel to report wrongdoing. Existing legislation provides only indirect and inadequate protections, leaving informants highly vulnerable to reprisals.<sup>15</sup> Moreover, only aggregated figures for military and civilian personnel are publicly available, and promotions and senior appointments are heavily shaped by political loyalty rather than merit.<sup>16</sup>

A Code of Conduct exists for military personnel, but little information is available regarding its scope, dissemination, or enforcement. A new Code of Ethics and Deontology for civilian personnel was adopted in February 2025, but it does not clearly address key corruption risks.<sup>17</sup>

Even before the 2023 coup, anti-corruption training for defence personnel was scarce and reliant on international partners.<sup>18</sup> With their withdrawal, remaining training opportunities have further diminished, leaving the sector with minimal capacity to identify, prevent, or mitigate corruption risks.

## OPERATIONS

Total armed forces personnel (World Bank, 2020)	10,000
Troops deployed on operations #	75 (as of 31 May 2025)

Since the July 2023 coup, Niger’s defence and security policy has pivoted sharply away from Western partners toward deeper military cooperation with fellow junta-led Mali and Burkina Faso, including the formation of a 5,000-strong joint force under the Alliance of Sahel States to address shared security threats.<sup>19</sup> However, operational risks in the defence sector are assessed as critical, driven by the complete absence of procedures to integrate corruption and integrity considerations into the planning and conduct of military operations. Corruption risks are not reflected in any national defence doctrine, and there is no structured anti-corruption training for commanders or deployed personnel. These gaps have widened since the withdrawal of international training partners significantly reducing available capacity-building programmes.<sup>20 21</sup> No evidence shows that corruption is systematically assessed during operational planning, that specialised personnel are deployed to monitor integrity risks in the field, nor that guidance exists to manage corruption in operational contracting.

15 Republic of Niger, "Order no. 92-024 of 18 June 1992 on the repression of unlawful enrichment Act no. 2003-25 of 13 June 2003 amending Act no. 61-27 of 15 July 1961, establishing the Criminal Code".  
 16 Interview with a magistrate, January 14, 2025. Government Defence Integrity Index.  
 17 Tamtaminfo, "Niger's civil service has a code of ethics and professional conduct", February 15, 2025.  
 18 European External Action Service (EEAS), "EUCAP Sahel Niger: European Union capacity-building civilian mission", 2020.  
 19 Anadolu Agency, "Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso agree to form joint force to combat terrorism in region", April 3, 2025.  
 20 European External Action Service (EEAS), "EUCAP Sahel Niger: European Union capacity-building civilian mission", 2020.  
 21 The Intercept, "Niger Coup Raises Questions About U.S. Military Training and Influence", 2023.



## DEFENCE PROCUREMENT


Military expenditure (US\$ mil) (SIPRI, 2024)	\$435.88
Open competition in defence procurement (%)	Data is not publicly available.
Main defence exports – to (SIPRI, 2020-2024)	N/A
Main defence imports – from (SIPRI, 2020-2024)	United States (36%) Turkey (29%) Russia (17%) Italy (4.8%) Egypt (4.8%)

Niger defence's expenditure has significantly increase since 2020, but critical risks threaten to waste significant amounts of these resources. Niger experienced a total rollback of transparency and oversight in defence procurement with the adoption of Ordinance No. 2024-05 which exempts defence acquisitions from all public procurement regulations including transparency and oversight mechanisms.<sup>22</sup> This ordinance marked a complete reversal of the 2022 modest reforms which repealed the 2016 exemptions and reintroduced defence procurement into the public procurement framework under a “derogatory regime.”<sup>23</sup>

Moreover, there are now no clear acquisitions planning and procurement processes. Most purchases seem opportunistic rather than relying on established procurement requirement and there is no information published on defence purchases.

Defence acquisitions have also increasingly reflected geopolitical alignments. Since the coup, the country shifted its defence procurement strategy away from traditional Western partners and toward non-Western suppliers such as Russia, Turkey, China, Iran, and Egypt, each playing a distinct role in Niger's military acquisitions.<sup>24 25</sup>

Defence procurement is predominantly conducted through restricted competition or single sourcing with minimal transparency. The 2024 ordinance granted authorities broad discretionary powers to award public contracts without competitive bidding or prior oversight. Despite the existence of formal oversight mechanisms for defence procurement in Niger, there is no evidence that these mechanisms are active or functioning at all in practice.<sup>26</sup>



GDI data collection for **Niger** was conducted from December 2024 to August 2025.

22 Republic of Niger, “Ordinance 2024-05 du 23 February 2024”.

23 Republic of Niger, “Decree No. 2022-743/PRN/PM”.

24 CNN, “Russian weapons and trainers arrive in Niger as junta strengthens ties with Moscow”, April 12, 2024.

25 Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, “The US strategy in West Africa under Trump”, June 12, 2025.

26 Republic of Niger, “Decree n°2013-570/PPN/PM du 20 December, 2013, Containing specific provisions for the award of contracts for works, equipment, supplies and services relating to national defence and security requirements”.




# NIGER 2025 GDI SCORECARD

	Grade	Score
<b>POLITICAL RISK</b>	<b>F</b>	<b>12</b>
Q1 Legislative Scrutiny	F	0
Q2 Defence Committee	F	0
Q3 Defence Policy Debate	E	19
Q4 CSO Engagement	E	17
Q5 Conventions: UNCAC / OECD	C	63
Q6 Public Debate	F	0
Q7 Anticorruption Policy	F	0
Q8 Compliance and Ethics Units	E	25
Q9 Public Trust in Institutions	NS	
Q10 Risk Assessments	F	0
Q11 Acquisition Planning	F	8
Q12 Budget Transparency & Detail	F	13
Q13 Budget Scrutiny	F	0
Q14 Budget Availability	E	17
Q15 Defence Income	F	0
Q16 Internal Audit	F	0
Q17 External Audit	F	0
Q18 Natural Resources	F	10
Q19 Organised Crime Links	E	25
Q20 Organised Crime Policing	F	0
Q21 Intelligence Services Oversight	F	0
Q22 Intelligence Services Recruitment	NEI	
Q23 Export Controls (ATT)	C	63
Q76 Lobbying	F	0
<b>FINANCIAL RISK</b>	<b>F</b>	<b>10</b>
Q24 Asset Disposal Controls	F	0
Q25 Asset Disposal Scrutiny	F	0
Q26 Secret Spending	F	0
Q27 Legislative Access to Information	F	0
Q28 Secret Program Auditing	F	0
Q29 Off-budget Spending	F	0
Q30 Access to Information	E	25
Q31 Beneficial Ownership	C	50
Q32 Military-Owned Business Scrutiny	F	0
Q33 Unauthorised Private Enterprise	D	38
Q77 Defence Spending	F	0
<b>PERSONNEL RISK</b>	<b>E</b>	<b>21</b>
Q34 Public Commitment to Integrity	E	17
Q35 Disciplinary Measures for Personnel	C	50
Q36 Whistleblowing	F	0
Q37 High-risk Positions	F	0
Q38 Numbers of Personnel	D	33
Q39 Pay Rates and Allowances	C	50
Q40 Payment System	D	33
Q41 Objective Appointments	F	8
Q42 Objective Promotions	E	31
Q43 Bribery to Avoid Conscription	E	25
Q44 Bribery for Preferred Postings	D	33
Q45 Chains of Command and Payment	F	0
Q46 Military Code of Conduct	E	25
Q47 Civilian Code of Conduct	E	31
Q48 Anticorruption Training	F	0
Q49 Corruption Prosecutions	F	0
Q50 Facilitation Payments	E	17

**OVERALL  
COUNTRY  
SCORE**

**CRITICAL  
RISK**



## RISK GRADE

<b>A</b>	<b>83–100</b>	<b>VERY LOW RISK</b>
<b>B</b>	<b>67–82</b>	<b>LOW RISK</b>
<b>C</b>	<b>50–66</b>	<b>MODERATE RISK</b>
<b>D</b>	<b>33–49</b>	<b>HIGH RISK</b>
<b>E</b>	<b>17–32</b>	<b>VERY HIGH RISK</b>
<b>F</b>	<b>0–16</b>	<b>CRITICAL RISK</b>

	Grade	Score
<b>OPERATIONAL RISK</b>	<b>F</b>	<b>0</b>
Q51 Military Doctrine	F	0
Q52 Operational Training	F	0
Q53 Forward Planning	F	0
Q54 Corruption Monitoring in Operations	F	0
Q55 Controls in Contracting	F	0
Q56 Private Military Contractors	NS	

<b>PROCUREMENT RISK</b>	<b>F</b>	<b>4</b>
Q57 Procurement Legislation	F	0
Q58 Procurement Cycle	E	17
Q59 Procurement Oversight Mechanisms	F	8
Q60 Potential Purchases Disclosed	F	0
Q61 Actual Purchases Disclosed	F	13
Q62 Business Compliance Standards	F	13
Q63 Procurement Requirements	F	0
Q64 Competition in Procurement	F	0
Q65 Tender Board Controls	F	0
Q66 Anti-Collusion Controls	F	8
Q67 Contract Award / Delivery	F	6
Q68 Complaint Mechanisms	F	0
Q69 Supplier Sanctions	F	8
Q70 Offset Contracts	F	0
Q71 Offset Contract Monitoring	F	0
Q72 Offset Competition	F	0
Q73 Agents and Intermediaries	F	0
Q74 Financing Packages	F	0
Q75 Political Pressure in Acquisitions	NS	

## KEY

- NEI** Not enough information to score indicator
- NS** Indicator is not scored for any country
- NA** Not applicable

# GDI

## Government Defence Integrity Index



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