



**Government Defence
Integrity Index**



**COUNTRY
BRIEF**

SENEGAL

2025





SENEGAL

Senegal has long been regarded as one of West Africa’s most stable democracies., However, recent years have seen growing public concern over transparency, adherence to the rule of law and elite accountability.¹ The last presidential elections were held in March 2024 and the opposition candidate Bassirou Diomaye Faye won in the first round, leading to a peaceful transition of power.² The country has experienced strong economic growth in recent years, driven by new hydrocarbon and major infrastructure projects. However, structural vulnerabilities persist - agriculture is heavily weather-dependent, nearly half the population is at risk of multidimensional poverty, and climate shocks are an increasing issue. Emerging oil and gas revenues provide opportunities but also amplify the necessity of strong institutions to manage them without exacerbating governance vulnerabilities.³

On the security front, Senegal is relatively insulated compared to its Sahel neighbours. Nonetheless, persistent risks include maritime threats such as piracy and smuggling, long-running unrest in the Casamance region, and the potential spill-over from jihadist violence across the border persist. A peace agreement between the government of Senegal and separatist rebels in Casamance was signed


in February 2025 leading to the end of a four-decades-long conflict which killed 5,000 people and displaced more than 60,000.⁴ The new government also announced the withdrawal of French troops stationed in Dakar, shifting from historic ties in terms of defence cooperation. The country is now seeking to diversify its military relations with countries like Russia, China or Turkey.

Within this context, defence governance in Senegal faces high corruption risks. The 2025 Government Defence Integrity Index (GDI) found that the defence sector shows constructive governance practices such as merit-based promotions, active tender boards controls, and public debate on defence issues. Yet major vulnerabilities persist. This includes weak parliamentary and audit oversight, opaque budgeting and procurement exemptions, limited access to information, and the absence of sector-specific integrity training and whistleblower protections.

Member of Open Government Partnership	Yes
UN Convention Against Corruption	Ratified in 2005
Arms Trade Treaty	Ratified in 2014

WEST AFRICA

The security environment in West Africa has deteriorated markedly over the past decade, driven by the expansion of jihadist insurgencies, political instability, and transnational organised crime. Armed groups such as Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) have generated unprecedented violence, with the Sahel now accounting for nearly half of global terrorism-related deaths. These violent extremist groups have expanded southward, placing increasing pressure on coastal states including Benin, Togo, Côte d’Ivoire, and Ghana. Insecurity is further compounded by piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, trafficking in arms, drugs, and natural resources, and climate-related competition over resources. The cumulative effect has worsened the humanitarian crisis and widespread displacement across the region. These security challenges have unfolded alongside military coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, Senegal, and Guinea between 2020 and 2023, which have further weakened civilian control and democratic oversight.



Weak defence sector governance has significantly undermined states’ ability to respond effectively to these threats. Defence institutions across West Africa remain characterised by limited transparency, weak accountability, and entrenched defence exceptionalism. Parliamentary oversight is constrained by executive dominance, and limited technical capacity, reducing civilian control over defence policy, budgets, and procurement. Limited budget transparency has weakened accountability and fuelled public mistrust. Simultaneously, non-transparent and discretionary procurement systems have increased corruption risks, distorted capability development, and diverted resources away from operational needs. While most states in the sub-region have ratified the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), uneven implementation has arguably continued to expose defence sectors to corruption (risks), undermining the effectiveness and sustainability of security responses.

1 Freedom House, "Freedom in the world Country Overview Senegal", 2025.
 2 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "Senegal: From Constitutional Crisis to Democratic Restoration", April 1, 2024.
 3 World Bank, "Country Overview Senegal", 2024.
 4 Africa Defence Forum, "Peace Agreement Offers Hope in Senegal's Casamance Region", March 18, 2025.



SENEGAL







RISK COMPARISON

The Government Defence Integrity Index (GDI) assesses five key risk areas: political, financial, personnel, operational, and procurement. This section compares Senegal's performance in each area with the regional average (Sub-Saharan Africa).

HIGH RISK

D

39





PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT

Legislative oversight of budget (Open Budget Survey, 2023)	33/100
Military expenditure as a share of government spending (SIPRI, 2024)	5.4%
Committee members with defence expertise (%)	Data is not publicly available.
# of meetings/year	Data is not publicly available.
Last review of defence policy/strategy	Strategy is not publicly available.

Senegal's constitution establishes formal checks and balances, but the executive remains the dominant branch of government, with the effectiveness of National Assembly's scrutiny largely dependent on its partisan composition.⁵ Political risks in Senegal's defence sector governance are high. Senegal benefits from a strong adherence to international anti-corruption instruments and an active public debate on defence issues. However, major weaknesses persist, particularly the absence of systematic corruption-risk assessments and weak scrutiny mechanisms across the sector.

Parliament has formal constitutional authority to review defence decisions, spending, and acquisitions, yet its practical influence remains narrow due to the strong dominance of the executive.⁶ Although it routinely debates the defence budget — and, for the first time since independence, held a full debate on the Armed Forces Minister's 2022 budget — its capacity to shape outcomes is limited.⁸

The Defence Committee also holds formal powers to scrutinise defence policy and budgets, but it rarely exercises them. Members often lack technical expertise and face significant constraints linked to limited access to information. The Committee does submit budget amendments and occasionally issues recommendations, though these are rarely considered by the executive.⁹ Finally, internal and external audit mechanisms remain weak and subject to political influence. There is no evidence of effective, independent audits of defence spending or procurement, leaving significant gaps in accountability and oversight.¹¹ ¹² ¹³

FINANCIAL TRANSPARENCY

Defence-related access to information response rates	1) % granted full or partial access: Data is not publicly available.
	2) # subject to backlog: Data is not publicly available.
Defence-related complaints to ombudsman/commissioner #	Data is not publicly available.
Does the commissioner have authority over the MoD?	Data is not publicly available.
Audit reports on defence (2020-2025) #	None
Open Budget Index (IBP, 2023)	42/100
World Press Freedom Index (RSF, 2025)	74th out of 180.

Financial risks in Senegal's defence sector remain high. Although the country has established robust asset-disposal controls and defence institutions are legally barred from commercial activity, financial transparency is extremely limited. The approved defence budget is published only in aggregated form, with no detail on spending lines, extra-budgetary resources, or actual expenditures.¹⁴ Secret spending is neither disclosed nor audited, and off-budget expenditure—though occasional—is not recorded.

Access to information remains severely restricted. Senegal has no law guaranteeing public access to defence-related information and plans for a general access-to-information law initiated in 2021 have yet to be adopted.¹⁵ As a result, the public can only access information selectively released by the Ministry of Armed Forces, rather than through systematic disclosure or citizen demand.

While defence and security institutions are prohibited from owning commercial enterprises, insufficient information prevents determining whether individual personnel engage in unauthorised private business, leaving gaps in the sector's financial integrity framework.¹⁶

5 BTI, "Country Report: Senegal", 2024.

6 Constitution of the Republic of Senegal, January 22, 2001.

7 Freedom House, "Freedom in the World Country Report: Senegal", 2025.

8 SENEPLUS, "Plenary Debates for the Army Budget Review", December 9, 2022.

9 Assemblée Nationale du Senegal, "Commission de la Defense et de la Securite" [Security and Defence Committee].

10 Interview with a former MP and member of the defence and security commission (2018 - 2022), October 10, 2024. Government Defence Integrity Index.

11 Republic of Senegal, "Loi n° 2012-23 du 27 décembre 2012 portant organisation et fonctionnement de la Cour des comptes", [Act No. 2012-23 of December 27, 2012 on the organisation and functioning of the Court of Auditors].

12 Cour des Comptes, "Budgetary Execution reports".

13 TV5 Monde, "Senegal: Faye calls for publication of reports on public accounts", April 19, 2024.

14 Republic of Senegal, "Finance Law 2025".

15 Ministry of Justice, "Adoption of a general law on access to information".

16 Republic of Senegal, "Law n° 62-37 of May 18th 1962 on the general status of armed forces officers, modified by law ° 65-10 on February 4, 1965".



PERSONNEL ETHICS FRAMEWORK

Whistleblowing legislation	None
# defence-sector whistleblower cases	None
# Code of conduct violations	Military: Data is not publicly available.
	Civilian: Data is not publicly available
Financial disclosure system	# submitted: None.
	# of violations: None.

Personnel risks in Senegal's defence sector are moderate. Senegal benefits from reliable payment mechanisms, established frameworks for managing high-risk positions, and merit-based promotion procedures. However, key weaknesses remain, including the absence of published pay scales, in-existent whistleblower protections, and limited enforcement of disciplinary measures against corruption.

Whistleblowing is neither protected nor encouraged. Although a whistleblower protection law was adopted in May 2024, no evidence of its implementation has yet emerged.¹⁷ Cases of bribery or misconduct are reportedly investigated but seldom result in consistent sanctions.

Basic transparency challenges also persist as the overall number of defence personnel is not publicly disclosed, though no indication of ghost soldiers has surfaced. Appointment and promotion processes for senior-level officers follow formal criteria, but available information remains partial and external oversight is minimal. The executive continues to wield significant influence over senior postings.^{18 19}

Integrity frameworks are also incomplete. Senegal lacks dedicated codes of conduct for military and civilian defence personnel, and no systematic anti-corruption training exists for the sector. While the national anti-corruption authority provides general public-service integrity training, this does not extend to defence, leaving personnel without structured guidance on corruption prevention.^{20 21}

OPERATIONS

Total armed forces personnel (World Bank, 2020)	19,000
Troops deployed on operations #	1,294 (as of 31 May 2025)

During his new year national address, President Bassirou Diomaye Faye announced that all foreign military forces will withdraw from Senegal by 2025, underscoring the government's commitment to reasserting national sovereignty and control over defence and security policy.²² Operational risks in Senegal's defence and security sector remain very high. Corruption is not explicitly addressed in military doctrine, and no structured framework exists to manage integrity risks during operations. Anti-corruption training for operational commanders is ad hoc, inconsistent, and largely driven by external partners rather than national policy. While some internationally supported operations—particularly peacekeeping missions—integrate corruption safeguards due to partner requirements, these measures are rarely applied in domestic operations.²³ Senegal also deploys operational experts who report annually, but their assessments focus broadly on mission shortcomings and do not systematically evaluate corruption risks, limiting their impact on operational integrity.²⁴

17 Senepius, "The long road towards an anti-corruption law", April 13, 2024.

18 African Intelligence, "Senegal Macky Sall's last waltz of generals", April 2023.

19 Jeune Afrique, "In Senegal, why the posting of General Souleymane Kandé is causing controversy", June 2024.

20 OFNAC, "National Anti-Corruption Strategy, 2020 - 2024".

21 Interview with a Colonel of the Gendarmerie, International Security Consultant, Expert in Security, Investigations, SSR and Humanitarian Operations, December 23, 2024. Government Defence Integrity Index.

22 Le Monde, "Senegal president says no more 'foreign military presence from 2025'", January 1, 2025.

23 Interview with a former colonel of the Senegalese army, international consultant in peace and security, December 6th, 2024. Government Defence Integrity Index.

24 Ibid.



DEFENCE PROCUREMENT

Military expenditure (US\$ mil) (SIPRI, 2024)	\$514.94
Open competition in defence procurement (%)	Data is not publicly available.
Main defence exports – to (SIPRI 2020-24)	N/A
Main defence imports – from (SIPRI 2020-24)	France (58%) Spain (7.8%) Italy (5.7%) Denmark (5.6%) Indonesia (5.3%)


While Senegal’s defence budget has increased by nearly 50% between 2020 and 2024, the persistent weaknesses in procurement transparency and accountability mean that the additional resources risk being mismanaged or diverted, heightening exposure to waste and corruption in the sector, specifically since corruption risks are high in the procurement processes. Despite some positive practices, such as active tender boards controls, anti-collusion safeguards, and accessible complaint mechanisms, transparency over defence purchases and procurement procedures is still limited, and sanctions against corrupt suppliers are rarely enforced.

Although defence procurement falls under the 2022 Public Procurement Code, broad secrecy exemptions allow most defence contracts to bypass standard rules.²⁵ Oversight bodies, including the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority and the Court of Auditors, do conduct reviews,

though their effectiveness can be constrained by political influence. Parliamentary control is technically authorised but rarely exercised.

The process for acquisition planning remains unclear. Procurement needs are nominally planned over a three-year cycle but are rarely published, and there is no systematic framework linking capability assessments to procurement requirements.²⁶ Decisions are thus shaped by immediate operational pressures or external partnerships rather than long-term strategic planning. Historically reliant on France, Senegal has diversified its sources of equipment in recent years, towards partners such as the United States and South Africa.²⁷

Roughly half of defence purchases occur through open competition, with the Ministry of Defence deciding on a case-by-case basis whether to rely on single source contract or not.²⁸



GDI data collection for **Senegal** was conducted from September 2024 to August 2025.

25 Republique of Senegal, “Public Procurement Decree no. 2022-2295 of December 28, 2022”.

26 General Budget Directory, “Multiyear Ministry of Defence Expenditure Document 2020-2022”.

27 US Army, “Senegal capability bolstered through Foreign Military Sales”, March 2, 2022.

28 Ministry of Armed Forces, “Call for tenders for the Armed Forces on the procurement of military vehicles for the gendarmerie, n° F_CTGN_012, N°2942/MFA/CAB/CPMP”.



SENEGAL 2025 GDI SCORECARD

	Grade	Score
POLITICAL RISK	D	42
Q1 Legislative Scrutiny	B	67
Q2 Defence Committee	E	29
Q3 Defence Policy Debate	E	31
Q4 CSO Engagement	D	42
Q5 Conventions: UNCAC / OECD	B	75
Q6 Public Debate	C	63
Q7 Anticorruption Policy	C	50
Q8 Compliance and Ethics Units	C	50
Q9 Public Trust in Institutions	NS	
Q10 Risk Assessments	F	0
Q11 Acquisition Planning	E	25
Q12 Budget Transparency & Detail	C	50
Q13 Budget Scrutiny	C	50
Q14 Budget Availability	F	8
Q15 Defence Income	F	0
Q16 Internal Audit	E	19
Q17 External Audit	E	25
Q18 Natural Resources	A	100
Q19 Organised Crime Links	C	50
Q20 Organised Crime Policing	B	67
Q21 Intelligence Services Oversight	F	0
Q22 Intelligence Services Recruitment	C	58
Q23 Export Controls (ATT)	A	100
Q76 Lobbying	F	0
FINANCIAL RISK	D	33
Q24 Asset Disposal Controls	E	25
Q25 Asset Disposal Scrutiny	B	67
Q26 Secret Spending	F	0
Q27 Legislative Access to Information	F	0
Q28 Secret Program Auditing	F	0
Q29 Off-budget Spending	D	33
Q30 Access to Information	F	0
Q31 Beneficial Ownership	A	100
Q32 Military-Owned Business Scrutiny	A	100
Q33 Unauthorised Private Enterprise	NEI	
Q77 Defence Spending	F	0
PERSONNEL RISK	C	50
Q34 Public Commitment to Integrity	B	67
Q35 Disciplinary Measures for Personnel	B	75
Q36 Whistleblowing	F	8
Q37 High-risk Positions	B	67
Q38 Numbers of Personnel	D	33
Q39 Pay Rates and Allowances	F	13
Q40 Payment System	A	83
Q41 Objective Appointments	C	50
Q42 Objective Promotions	B	69
Q43 Bribery to Avoid Conscription	B	67
Q44 Bribery for Preferred Postings	A	100
Q45 Chains of Command and Payment	A	100
Q46 Military Code of Conduct	F	0
Q47 Civilian Code of Conduct	F	0
Q48 Anticorruption Training	F	0
Q49 Corruption Prosecutions	E	25
Q50 Facilitation Payments	A	100

**OVERALL
COUNTRY
SCORE**

HIGH RISK



RISK GRADE

A	83–100	VERY LOW RISK
B	67–82	LOW RISK
C	50–66	MODERATE RISK
D	33–49	HIGH RISK
E	17–32	VERY HIGH RISK
F	0–16	CRITICAL RISK

	Grade	Score
OPERATIONAL RISK	E	27
Q51 Military Doctrine	E	25
Q52 Operational Training	E	25
Q53 Forward Planning	D	38
Q54 Corruption Monitoring in Operations	D	33
Q55 Controls in Contracting	F	13
Q56 Private Military Contractors	NS	
PROCUREMENT RISK	D	45
Q57 Procurement Legislation	D	38
Q58 Procurement Cycle	E	25
Q59 Procurement Oversight Mechanisms	C	58
Q60 Potential Purchases Disclosed	E	25
Q61 Actual Purchases Disclosed	D	38
Q62 Business Compliance Standards	C	63
Q63 Procurement Requirements	E	25
Q64 Competition in Procurement	D	38
Q65 Tender Board Controls	C	63
Q66 Anti-Collusion Controls	B	75
Q67 Contract Award / Delivery	C	56
Q68 Complaint Mechanisms	B	67
Q69 Supplier Sanctions	C	50
Q70 Offset Contracts	A	100
Q71 Offset Contract Monitoring	NA	
Q72 Offset Competition	NA	
Q73 Agents and Intermediaries	F	0
Q74 Financing Packages	F	0
Q75 Political Pressure in Acquisitions	NS	

KEY

- NEI** Not enough information to score indicator
- NS** Indicator is not scored for any country
- NA** Not applicable



Government Defence Integrity Index



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