Corruption Threats & International Missions
Practical guidance for leaders
"Corruption threatens international missions, and countering it is a strategic necessity—it’s hard-nosed common sense and militaries need to know how to do it."

Rear Admiral Bruce Williams
Deputy Director General and Chief of Staff
European Union Military Staff
Foreword

Corruption is a feature of all conflicts, playing a key role in the power-struggle between competing groups for resources and power.

This places mission leaders in a challenging situation because it means engagement with corrupt entities is frequently inevitable. The choice is often whether to deal with one corrupt entity, or another even more corrupt entity.

In places such as Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Iraq, and Mali, we have seen how corruption can threaten mission success and long-term stability. Yet mission leaders, national officials and their civilian and military staffs charged with leading, planning, and implementing international missions often lack the understanding and skills to tackle the corruption issues that can have such a devastating impact on operational goals.

This handbook is directed at military and civilian leadership and their staff involved in planning and carrying out operations. It seeks to provide practical guidance that can be used in daily work.

The considerations in this handbook will be relevant to almost all international operations and missions.

Corruption undermines credibility. We have no doubt that, with the right understanding and guidance, mission leaders and their staffs can limit the threat corruption poses, and have a greater chance of achieving stability and security for citizens.

We hope that this handbook is helpful to you. We welcome all feedback and comments on how it can be improved in future editions.

Mark Pyman
Programme Director
Defence & Security Programme
Transparency International UK
September 2014
## Contents

1. Why is corruption a threat to mission success?  
   - What is corruption?  
   - Corruption, unrest, and conflict  
   - Transparency, accountability, and counter-corruption (TACC)  

2. Understanding corruption risks in operations  
   - The ten main corruption pathways  
   - Corrupt networks  
   - Corruption risks within mission forces  
   - Leadership and strategy  

3. Specific preparatory actions  
   - Threat assessment  
   - Intelligence  
   - Force structure & personnel  
   - Contracting & logistics  
   - Training  
   - Civil-military coordination  
   - Data & metrics  
   - Legal  

4. Capacity building of host nation security forces
5. Existing guidance on anti-corruption from other sources

NATO JALLC recommendations
Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis Report
UK Land Warfare Centre: Corruption on operations guidance
Current doctrinal guidance
ISAF contracting guidance
Embassy of Denmark: Anti-corruption guidance note

6. The ten main corruption pathways

1. Criminal patronage networks
2. Factionalism
3. Elections
4. Organised crime
5. Narcotics
6. Exploitation of natural assets
7. Land title and expropriation
8. Borders
9. Foreign aid
10. Military, police, and militias
Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANP</td>
<td>Afghan National Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANA</td>
<td>Afghan National Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANSF</td>
<td>Afghan National Security Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CERP</td>
<td>Commander’s Emergency Response Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil-Military Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJIA TF</td>
<td>Combined Joint Inter-Agency Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN CM Coord</td>
<td>United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMI</td>
<td>Civil-Military Interaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COIN</td>
<td>Counter-Insurgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COPD</td>
<td>Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPN</td>
<td>Criminal Patronage Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTF</td>
<td>Counter-Threat Finance Cell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTO</td>
<td>Drug Trafficking Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EULEX</td>
<td>EU Rule of Law Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPOL</td>
<td>European Police Mission in Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOB</td>
<td>Forward Operating Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEMAP</td>
<td>Governance and Economic Management Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIRo A</td>
<td>Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GONGO</td>
<td>Government Organised Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KLE</td>
<td>Key Leader Engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEC</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUSMA</td>
<td>United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Mali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOI</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO IS</td>
<td>NATO International Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NNE</td>
<td>Non-NATO Entity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDT</td>
<td>Pre-deployment Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSM</td>
<td>Resolute Support Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGAR</td>
<td>Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGIR</td>
<td>Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SME</td>
<td>Subject Matter Expert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACC</td>
<td>Transparency, Accountability, Counter-Corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOWA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for West Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
'Corruption can impact achievement of mission objectives, but also the military force can contribute, largely unwittingly, to the rise and prevalence of corruption.'

NATO Joint Advance Lessons Learned Centre†
Why is corruption a threat to mission success?

Corruption undermines the proper functioning of governments by eroding their credibility, legitimacy, and accountability. A government that becomes paralysed by corruption is unable to provide basic services to its people, to pursue justice and maintain the rule of law and, at its worst, fails to maintain a safe and secure environment for its citizens. It becomes a potential target for takeover by other interests such as organised crime.

Corruption matters in several vital ways to international missions:

**Corruption can perpetuate conflict and instability.**

Corruption is often portrayed as an endemic and therefore unavoidable aspect of the cultural fabric. It is treated as a constraint to, but not as a key inhibitor of, stability. This perspective, however, fails to account for the devastating impact that corruption has on security overall. International missions have a greater chance of success if mission leaders understand that corruption is often a key cause of conflict. It hampers development, prevents the growth of a strong licit economy, and fuels grievances between citizens, powerbrokers, and groups that are exploiting the country’s assets. Corruption therefore undermines societal unity and increases poverty and income inequality. Corruption also prolongs conflict as those groups who benefit from conflict seek to enrich themselves further by entrenching corrupt behaviour and maintaining an unstable environment in which their activities are more likely to prosper, e.g. protection payments or drug smuggling.

High levels of corruption can also incentivise frustrated citizens to join terrorist organisations. More directly, corruption can enable acts of terrorism. For example, in 2013 Al Shabab terrorists were able to bribe their way into the Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi, where their attack claimed more than 60 lives.

**Corruption can deter international donors and waste funds.**

All international missions inject substantial funding into a country, which can be vulnerable to appropriation by local and national powerbrokers. This fuels instability and can significantly damage the legitimacy of the mission both in-country and with the publics of donor nations. Funds may also be leaked to hostile actors. Moreover, bribery can make a difference to national economies. In Afghanistan, the sum of daily bribes was estimated in 2013 to be close to US$4 billion.¹
Corruption damages the mission’s operational effectiveness and credibility.

Public perception is critical to mission success, and those involved in international operations must avoid colluding, or appearing to collude, with corrupt powerbrokers. This might include, for example, contracting with corrupt groups or individuals, or turning a blind eye to corruption amongst allies. Corruption may also mean that host nation forces receive sub-standard equipment, soldiers remain unpaid, and that senior law enforcement officers enrich themselves instead of doing their job.

Fighting corruption brings greater progress as citizens feel improvement in their lives.

Citizens of the host nation want their daily lives to improve as a result of the international mission. When citizens experience less corruption on a daily basis, it is an indication that the rule of law is improving. Conversely, discontent and abuses of power can pose a major challenge for political systems and can drive people to support criminal or armed groups.

Corruption fosters a culture of impunity rather than lawfulness.

Corruption empowers those who cheat the system, weakens responsible actors, and can foster a culture of impunity rather than culture of lawfulness.

There have been positive movements in addressing corruption in post-conflict environments around the world. Countries as diverse as Colombia, Liberia, Mozambique, and Serbia have made significant progress. They still rank low on a global scale, but the progress they have made post-conflict provides a reason for optimism that the problem of corruption can be tackled successfully over time.

WHAT IS CORRUPTION?

Corruption has been gaining more attention in the context of international missions and more generally. But what is corruption? Transparency International defines corruption as “the abuse of entrusted power for personal gain”. A fuller explanation is needed, however, if the concept is to be understood in the context of international missions and operations.

Need, greed, and opportunity

Distinguishing between corruption for need and corruption for greed can be very helpful. A lowly bureaucrat may feel he or she needs to supplement their meagre income by asking for extra contributions to his salary. Similarly, parents who have to pay a bribe to get a doctor to see their child may feel they have no other choice. While these kinds of bribes are not generally liked, most people would do the same thing in similar circumstances. Strong condemnation is
generally reserved for those who exploit the system on a grand scale and secret large sums of money overseas for their personal fortunes.

Corruption occurs when those who have this need or greed have an opportunity to partake in such activities with minimal repercussions. A weak police force that does not enforce the law allows bribery to persist. Similarly, the existence of financial safe havens in places like Dubai enables elites to hide illicit funds.

In conflict situations, other factors compound the incentives for corruption, such as sectarian loyalties or lack of employment opportunities.

**It thrives with political patronage**

In a conflict or fragile state, corruption is not only about personal enrichment. It is also about powerbrokers who exploit the weaknesses of the political and economic systems to provide backing (or “patronage”) for political, territorial, or factional purposes. This makes it difficult to assess the initial success of a mission, as removing one corrupt actor may simply make way for another more corrupt one. Political patronage often turns into criminal patronage, where a powerbroker controls a criminal enterprise rather than building up representative political power.

**Corruption comes in many forms**

Corruption can prosper at all levels, from the local to the national, in the public, private, or charity sectors, and in the international community. For those on international missions, defence corruption comes in many forms, and may fall under the following five headings:

- Political corruption
- Financial corruption
- Personnel corruption
- Corruption on operations; and
- Procurement corruption

As described later in this guide, the leaders of any future international missions will need to incorporate mitigation of these corruption risks into their conflict analysis and planning process.

Though not untameable, there are no quick fixes to corruption. Abuses of power will remain, sometimes at an endemic level, for years to come. The best that missions can do is set sensible objectives that are based on local context and integrate international best practice.

**CORRUPTION, UNREST, AND CONFLICT**

Corruption is a major source of social unrest around the world, from Egypt to Ukraine. A Transparency International policy paper notes that corruption can fuel regional conflict and act as a key source of instability. An overlay of indices tracking linkages between corruption, violence, and instability, compiled by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (see Figure 1), clearly illustrates this correlation. Twelve of the fifteen lowest ranked countries on Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index are shown to be the scene of insurgencies, extremist activity, or other threats to international security. Yet, despite
this remarkable correlation, the role of corruption within international security is often overlooked and insufficiently addressed by policy makers.

**Fragile and failed states**

Some civil society groups have argued that the more corrupt a regime is, the more likely the country is to become a failed state.³ International missions frequently take place in fragile, failing, or failed states – those lacking adequate physical security, legitimate political institutions, effective economic management, or basic social welfare,⁴ and experiencing varying levels of conflict. While there is no one agreed definition of state failure, the Fund for Peace defines a failing or failed state as one with the following attributes:

- loss of physical territorial control or the monopoly on the legitimate use of force
- erosion of legitimate authority to make collective decisions

**FIGURE 1 | Corruption-related violence and unrest**

- **Sudden regime change or war due to anti-kleptocracy protests**
  - Egypt, Kyrgyzstan, Libya, Syria, Tunisia, Ukraine, Yemen
- **Serious violence due to corrupt alliances with trafficking networks**
  - Colombia, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay
- **Insurgency or coup traceable in part to outrage at corruption**
  - Afghanistan, Burundi, Indonesia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Somalia, Tajikistan, Thailand
- **Severe electoral violence sparked by corruption/corrupt state institutions**
  - Bangladesh, Burundi, Cameroon, Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Indonesia, Kenya, Nepal, Nigeria, Philippines, Sierra Leone, Zimbabwe
- **Widespread, serious popular protest or coup attempts against corruption**
  - Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Equatorial Guinea, Iceland, India, Morocco, Romania, Slovenia, South Africa, Thailand, Venezuela

- inability to provide public services
- the host government is struggling to gain, or regain, its legitimacy
- extensive corruption and criminal behaviour
- inability to collect taxes or otherwise draw on citizen support
- inability to interact with other states as a full member of the international community

Both fragile and failed states are characterised by ineffective governance structures that make them particularly vulnerable to large scale violence, transnational organised crime, illicit trade flows, and general regional instability, including being a source of refugees and internally displaced persons.

International missions

Fragile, failing, and failed states usually have some degree of international involvement in the security sector. This may be through bilateral security assistance, usually in the form of training, or through large-scale civilian and/or military operations under organisations such as the UN, the African Union, or NATO. Large-scale missions in such environments – now commonly referred to as "Stability Operations" – are extraordinarily complicated. These missions typically include the application of hard power to tackle enemy forces and criminal elements, in combination with softer elements such as reconstruction efforts and coordination with civilian organisations. Corruption is also highly relevant in counter insurgency, peace support, humanitarian, development and policing operations, and security force assistance and security cooperation missions.

Regardless of the size of the mission or its mandate, there are numerous ways that a mission staff can plan to prevent, avoid, and reduce the impact of corruption. A greater understanding will improve risk analysis and help identify countries where upheaval is likely, and in turn allow planners to better decide what type of intervention to use once crises erupt, for example diplomatic negotiations, military operations or cooperation, or development assistance.

TRANSPARENCY, ACCOUNTABILITY AND COUNTER-CORRUPTION (TACC)

This handbook focuses mainly on how to recognise and limit the corruption threat to international missions. Fragile and failed states, however, frequently lack many of the elements that constitute the “good governance” needed to tackle corruption. The UN defines governance to be “good” when it is participatory, consensus-orientated, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive, and follows the rule of law. Corruption obstructs some or all of these characteristic in fragile and failed states, making it an area international missions must address. The three most important elements that help reduce corruption are transparency, accountability, and counter-corruption. This three part approach is referenced by the acronym TACC and is used extensively throughout this report.
'Corrupt ruling elites may deliberately cultivate conflict because of the diverse opportunities for profiteering and wealth transfer that fighting affords.'

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace ‡
International missions must integrate TACC measures not only into doctrine, policy, and plans, but also in a practical way by revising procedures, including corruption in training, exercises, tactical guidance, field guides and manuals, and by creating follow-up mechanisms to ensure responsiveness. It is vital that citizens of the host nation see that the international mission will not behave in the way corrupt powerbrokers have, and that it holds itself to higher standards. It should emphasise values like fairness and equality, and provide equal access to resources and positions.

**Transparency**

Transparency exists to hold public officials to account. Transparent practices include holding meetings that are open to the public and the press, providing budgets that can be publicly reviewed by anyone, and making laws open to discussion. As information becomes increasingly available, people within mission-contributing countries and the host nation itself can see progress.

**Accountability**

Organisations and institutions are perceived to be more legitimate and respectable if they hold the corrupt to account. Accountability includes identification, arrest, criminal prosecution, and sentencing. All personnel must be seen to be accountable to the law regardless of rank. This allows the population to see that the mission staff and leadership is corruption free and taking a different and fairer approach than those responsible for the current instability.

**Counter-Corruption**

Both transparency and accountability mechanisms are effective ways to reduce corruption but are often not enough on their own. Measures directly intended to limit corruption are likely to be a key part of any international mission in fragile environments. Counter-corruption measures can include preventative actions that reduce the incentives and opportunities for corruption to occur. Pro-active enforcement generally includes investigation into potentially corrupt activities and individuals, and the prosecution of those entities by a legal authority. Counter-corruption relies on an effective legal system and an independent judiciary, which can be problematic in fragile environments. This makes the work of institutions that support the development of the rule of law – such as courts, the training of judges, prosecution, and legal codes – critical.

TACC initiatives also depend heavily on the active involvement of other actors, such as government, business, and civil society, to ensure that checks and balances are in place and adhered to.
Understanding corruption risks on missions

Corruption is an inherently political issue. It can be addressed with technical measures, but to do so effectively requires an understanding of the political and social dynamics that underpin and fuel it.

A difficulty for mission leadership and staff is that most of the handbooks, doctrine, and tactical guidance implicitly assume that host governments, both national and local, have the overall national interest at heart: they want to implement the reforms that are needed, and could do so if they had the technical assistance, additional resources, and other capacity building measures to assist them. Unfortunately, in many countries that find themselves captured in constant cycles of violence, those running the government do not seek to legitimise themselves beyond what is necessary. The result is that those in government may benefit far more from an insecure environment, and indeed, may lose power, money, or other resources if they were to aggressively commit to a sustainable and inclusive peace process.

As the rule of law and the justice system are perverted for corrupt purposes, citizens’ faith and trust in the government steadily declines. Citizens of the host nation understand that corruption creates economic inequality. These factors, when combined with a lack of an avenue for redress, can inspire the conditions for disaffection, rebellion, or even terrorism. Ideological insurgents capitalise on grievances and sell their struggle as one for justice. In Afghanistan, for example, analysts have consistently identified causal links between predatory governance and the expansions of insurgency. According to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, every country that harbours an extremist insurgency today suffers from corruption to an advanced degree. At the same time, the lack of other employment opportunities due to a faltering economy means that the costs of joining an armed rebellion may be low and may even be the best paying job available to many.

THE TEN MAIN CORRUPTION PATHWAYS

The following are pathways that can enable and facilitate corruption in international operations.

1. Criminal patronage networks

The most destabilising forms of corruption are carried out systematically by criminal patronage networks (CPNs). These networks operate along ethnic, religious or tribal lines and are frequently under political protection. They are engaged in the capture of critical state functions and institutions whereby they may divert customs revenues,
steal international assistance funds, profit from the trade in narcotics, and abuse public and private financial institutions at the expense of the nation’s economic stability. CPNs operate with impunity by exerting influence within law enforcement, investigative, and judicial institutions across the government.\textsuperscript{11}

2. Factionalism
Patronage networks are often structured around partisan or sectarian affiliations. In such situations, corruption quickly takes on ethnic, tribal or even religious overtones so that powerbrokers supply jobs, humanitarian aid, and other benefits to their respective groups and exclude others. With powerbrokers running their own militias, tensions over resources can easily escalate into sectarian violence. As faction leaders may be tied to various powerbrokers for financial support and protection, they may find themselves in a symbiotic relationship, requiring an unstable environment in order to survive and prosper.

3. Elections
Elections are designed to bring about a legitimate government with a popular mandate to act in the national interest.

In fragile or failed states, however, politics and elections, both at the national and local level, often involve a series of political settlements created by backroom deals to deliver election results that entrench the current powerbrokers rather than reflect a true mandate of the people. Politics and elections in such conditions are a pathway to further corruption, or predation on the population. Mission forces and staff should not necessarily assume that just because someone new has taken office, the old political settlement is broken. Instead, these settlements often involve cosmetic changes in which the same powerbrokers or their protégées circulate amongst a variety of senior posts.

4. Organised crime
Organised crime, though usually considered a law enforcement problem rather than a military one, is now increasingly a major concern in complex operations. This is because, while terrorists and insurgents have always relied upon criminal activity for financing, close links between insurgencies, terrorists and organised crime groups have intensified over the last 40 years. These linkages provide a steady stream of financing for these groups, making conflicts even more intractable. Criminal and insurgent groups may morph into one another. In some places, such as Columbia and Iraq, insurgent groups that had engaged in illicit activities initially as a means of financing their operations became increasingly profit-focused, at the expense of their original ideological or political aims.\textsuperscript{12} Criminal groups can take on ideological or ethnic overtones, or insurgent groups “lose” much of their former political ideology and become essentially criminal. When this is the case, conflict resolution becomes more difficult as new actors and interests evolve, many of which have an incentive for instability, not peace.

5. Narcotics
Drug trafficking supply chains are complicated. A lengthy chain of middlemen extends between the farmers producing the raw materials and the ultimate consumer.
Each step in this chain offers fertile ground for corruption, as government officials may be paid a lifetime’s wages simply to look the other way on shipments. Drug production and trafficking are important for financing insurgencies, as has been the case with the Colombian insurgent group FARC and the Taliban in Afghanistan. The most extreme form is state capture, where the senior levels of the state act on behalf of the interests of the narcotics industry. The leadership in the country may even take part; one example is the former head of the Guinea-Bissau Navy, who was arrested in April 2013.13

6. Exploitation of natural assets
Corruption is intimately tied to natural resources in two ways. First, individuals and groups may compete to garner the revenues from natural resources for themselves and their social, ethnic, or tribal group at the expense of the overall population. In such environments, mission forces find themselves in a difficult position and may be tempted to take part in such activities themselves. Especially if new natural resources are found, this “rent-seeking” behaviour may bring violence to places previously considered stable. Secondly, corrupt management within the natural resource industry itself leads to poor development and challenges aid effectiveness.14

7. Land title and expropriation
Land disputes are often a major source of violence, instability and corruption. Even if the host government ever had reasonably complete land records, they may have been lost or destroyed. This can allow a corrupt government to empower one or more “land mafias” as a means of paying off powerbrokers or passing on the spoils of governing. In turn, this creates new grievances and violence, and can even displace people as tenants and owners are forced from their lands.

As a result of poor state institutions, bribery becomes the means to secure land or keep it, even if one is not the rightful owner. In Afghanistan, land disputes are often the main reason for local acts of violence. At the same time, the Taliban took advantage of a weak, delegitimised formal justice system, and co-opted much local support through informal land dispute mechanisms.15 Corruption may complicate basing for mission forces, as local or national powerbrokers may evict the original tenants of a given piece of land so they can offer that plot for lease to international forces, often at a very inflated price.16 In such circumstances, the international mission may be seen as complicit in the land grab, making them a target of violence.
8. Borders

Borders are likely to be vital ground in any political settlement. Where there is disagreement between two or more nations on border delineation, warlords and powerbrokers often seek to take advantage of that vacuum. Warlords and key powerbrokers can finance their patronage networks with the proceeds from controlling border crossings, smuggling routes, ports, and airports. A border security force rife with corruption can threaten the mission’s logistical supply lines and may allow transnational criminal activity to function efficiently, as well as enable insurgent and other forces to bring in weapons, improvised explosive devices, and manpower across borders. While biometric entry points can help temper this activity, it is usually costly. In addition, it is important to understand the perceptions at play; mission forces, in working closely with certain groups may be seen by other parties to be granting territorial integrity to that particular group.

9. Foreign aid

Military and civilian personnel assigned to international missions have to deal with both short-term humanitarian aid and long-term development aid (for the purposes of this section, “foreign aid” refers to both types of aid unless otherwise specified). Aid inflows are another source of funds with the potential to be captured and diverted. Militants, criminals, warlords and indeed ordinary citizens can pilfer, skim, or outright steal foreign aid. At the national level, jobs in ministries to which developmental aid flows may be in high demand due to the ability to skim funds, divert aid projects to allies, and hire favoured private companies as contractors in major projects. At the local level, predatory powerbrokers may use allocated aid to influence a malign actor for their own purposes, further delegitimise the government, and push the population further towards some form of rebellion rather than creating a more secure environment. At the same time, host nation governments may demand that the assistance be channelled directly through budgets, “exploiting donor countries’ sensitivity to sovereignty issues, or development practitioners’ desire to encourage local ownership and avoid creating parallel structures”. In May 2013, EU representatives repeatedly said €3.25 billion in aid must be tied to the Malian authorities’ adherence to the political stabilisation roadmap that included measures for transparency and good governance.

10. Military, police, and militias

In fragile, failing or failed states, the government does not have a monopoly on the use of force. Major powerbrokers generally have access to some sort of armed force that is capable of challenging the government. While military units may formally pledge allegiance to the state, they may in reality act on behalf of their local leadership, tribe, or ethnic group. A prime example is the M23 rebel group in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Though officially subordinate to the government after a peace deal, M23 later split again from the DRC military. In response, the UN engaged in one of its most robust peacekeeping mission mandates ever in June 2013 to halt their attacks on the local population.

It is the police who interact with both the populace and criminals on a day-to-day
basis, and who are also usually the first responders to attacks, revolts, or other instability. Local police tend to be the least professional, have the lowest level of pay, the least training, and may be no more than proxies acting on behalf of a local powerbroker or criminal. And what may start as low level corruption (e.g. illegal fines) to supplement meagre incomes, can quickly become a systemic problem. Additional corruption concerns involve local and international private security companies, who may be merely a militia by another name. At the same time, in fragile or failed states, the military and police forces are frequently poorly trained and equipped, which can incentivise forces to acts of corruption such as selling materiel (including to enemy forces).

These corruption pathways are discussed in more detail in Section 6.

**CORRUPT NETWORKS**

In a corrupt environment, access to opportunities is often under the control of a core of elite of powerbrokers who compete amongst themselves for position and dominance. Networks may be highly structured, with a central core group providing access to opportunities, posts, and physical and legal protection. These networks can include traditional elites, heads of political parties, or other powerful leaders in government and business (including illicit trades), senior military leaders, warlords, reputable professionals, and tribal elders. Those who are part of poor and marginalised groups, such as certain ethnic groups or women, are often side-lined because they do not have the power to influence this inner circle.

At the international and regional level, it is important to note the varying positive and negative influence of regional actors. Neighbouring countries will undoubtedly have an interest in seeing certain groups in power over others and may use corrupt methods in order to achieve their goals within the neighbour’s power structure.

In order to identify corruption threats to the mission, key players must be mapped. An easy place to start is to sort key players into reformers, preservers and spoilers (see Table 1).

A pact is often created when different actors conflict, negotiate, and compromise as they vie for power and influence. Various networks can shift rapidly from alliances to rivalries and engage in open, violent competition as distributions of political and economic power shift. Opportunities for enrichment for the new and already wealthy abound. Political power is personal and can often be used with impunity. Civil society, which should normally help monitor and moderate the pact, is almost always weak or non-existent.

To increase chances of mission success, mission planners need to conduct a thorough analysis not only of institutions and individuals, but also of the societal consequences of these types of corruption. There are a number of areas that are important to track in order to determine the level of host government capture. In order to ascertain the level of corruption, it helps to examine five institutions that are vulnerable
REFORMERS
Influential figures that seek reforms to drive the country towards more stable and inclusive government.

Reformers emphasise the need for consensus building and are usually positioned within government or other influential institutions, such as reform-minded businesses or educational associations.

It is useful to identify which interests may lead towards reform. For instance, the business community may have an interest in establishing better contract enforcement to increase profit.

PRESERVERS
Focused on the status quo, preservers benefit from the existing system and enjoy the privileges, power, and income that come from it.

Preservers may not see change as inherently bad, but see that such changes involve risk to their hard-won positions. Preservers may benefit financially from the presence of foreign actors. These actors tend to wait out or block changes in order to maintain their positions. By understanding preservers’ interests, one may be able to devise strategies to move the risk averse into a reform category, or at least prevent them from blocking reforms.

SPOILERS
Spoilers are closely linked to the elites running formal and informal institutions of government. Spoilers often have power to halt reforms.

Terms used to describe these actors include “kleptocrats”, “warlords”, “criminal patronage networks”, and “powerbrokers”. Their status and power is usually linked to conflict and they usually have formal or informal military backing such as a militia, making them very difficult to marginalise. Understanding these actors, the main spoiler institutions, and their interests is key to understanding the dynamics of the environment and in establishing reforms.

TABLE 1 | Key figures in the operating environment

1. Government institutions
Corrupt government ministries and agencies usually reflect a pact by powerbrokers rather than the interests of the population at large. Because the powerbroker elite do not want the institutions to become too strong and independent, those institutions will usually be very weak, highly unstable, and often compete with one another. They will often pass policies that they have little or no intent to implement. Asset disclosure among politicians, for example, may be the law, but no one ensures that declarations are made or are accurate. Moreover, it is rare that so-called independent institutions, such as human rights bodies, election bodies, media
oversight groups, or business associations, are free from government influence and control. Public officials “sell” public services by demanding bribes for everything from getting a passport to enrolling a child in school or to seeking medical care. The result is that the poorest cannot afford the bribes to get the services to which they are entitled.

2. Legislative bodies & processes
Parliaments and legislatures have a vital role in checking the powers of the state and ensuring transparency and accountability within the defence sector. Yet according to TI-UK DSP’s report *Watchdogs?*, which assesses the quality of legislative oversight of defence in 82 countries, most legislative bodies are underperforming. In corruption-ridden states, powerbrokers may seek to create new legislation simply to provide technical or legal cover for corrupt activities, as was the case in Tunisia under Ben Ali. In 2012, media sources reported that Azerbaijan’s executive branch and the New Azerbaijan Party’s control over the legislature facilitates corruption, and limitations on disclosure can mask the elite’s irregular income.

3. Economic organisations
Powerbrokers control economic access. They decide, for instance, who gets business licenses, what the rules of banking and business will be, and whether cash crops are licit or illicit. They may own banks or extensive land, or work in the ministries of finance or revenue. They may use their positions to import raw materials or other goods while paying few or no customs fees or taxes, especially compared to other merchants. In states suffering from endemic corruption, networks of powerbrokers capture the highest proportion of national resources and their associated revenues. Land may be taken by powerbrokers from its rightful owners, creating significant local grievances. Contract enforcement becomes difficult as judgments go to the highest bidder rather than to whoever has a rightful claim.

4. Security forces
Powerbrokers and key political elites can formally or informally legitimise security organisations. They decide who commands the police and military units, who is recruited, where they will be stationed, and their budgets. They often determine the extent of their legal authority. For instance, it is common to have various security forces, each under a different set of powerbrokers, who spend as much time competing with each other as they do fighting insurgents or criminals. Security forces decide when to look the other way at illicit activities by illegal militias controlled by powerbrokers. Even in countries that appear relatively stable on the surface, patronage networks may exert close to complete control over the use of force and violence, and exploit this control for their benefit. This can be seen, for example, in Algeria, Saudi Arabia and Cameroon.

5. Courts and justice
Powerbrokers may control the rule of law process. Their control can be so extensive that those with the highest levels of influence may be given immunity even for the worst crimes. Judges and legal staff that have particular agendas may be appointed or recruited. When corruption takes hold, international and domestic law are flouted
without consequence. To ensure impunity, corrupt power networks typically control the judicial services. This has been noted in countries as diverse as Afghanistan and Cameroon. Both of these countries receive some form of military security assistance and training.

Narcotics traffickers may also operate with impunity, and may even be high-level members of the government and of the security forces. Gross human rights abuses may occur with no risk of exposure or punishment. The legal system may completely break down because 'it's easier to bribe a judge than to hire a lawyer'. In these situations, an insurgent force may easily be able to 'out-govern' the government.

In highly corrupt environments, there can be significant vertical integration of corrupt activities (see graphic opposite) In this sense, corruption at the lowest levels is connected to the highest level powerbrokers.

**CORRUPTION RISKS WITHIN MISSION FORCES**

This handbook is primarily concerned with operating within the corruption environment in the host nation. However, commanders need to be alert to corruption within the mission set.

Whether directly perpetrated by or facilitated by mission forces through negligence or inaction, corrupt activity has the potential to significantly erode the legitimacy and efficacy of an international mission.
The police officer or commander who sold the officer the post takes a cut from their subordinates' salaries.

Key powerbrokers collect vast sums of money from hundreds of police officers, commanders, and chiefs.

New recruits buy their positions from existing police officers. Sometimes they must borrow money to do so.

Once in the police force, these new officers extract bribes from ordinary citizens to supplement their income. Sometimes they must pay back the loans they took out to buy their position.
Contingents whose personnel become engaged in corruption, or who are seen tacitly to condone it, undermine their own credibility and that of the mission itself. Corrupt practices by local and international mission staff can also reduce the ability of the mission to achieve success.

A key element of the commander’s corruption assessment is to minimise any adverse impact the mission’s own activities may have, and to establish a mechanism to monitor continuing risks.

**Corruption risks**

**Procurement**

Contract managers are aware of the various routes to procurement fraud. However, controls are often weak or insufficient in an operational environment. The most common frauds are in relation to contract staff, food, fuel, and non-military equipment. The more serious corruption occurs in relation to abuse of call-off contracts, large international contracts and multiple sub-contracting of the work.

A useful measure developed to track such fraud in US operations has been the use of a “Special Inspector General” regime. The presence of such groups for both Iraq (SIGIR) and Afghanistan (SIGAR) has done much to track corruption and waste, and to identify remedial measures. Other nations and organisations should consider following this US example. Afghanistan was also the focus for the specialist US Task Force 2010, which focused on fraud in US contracting for Afghanistan.

---

**BOX 1 | Foreign military training: The case of Mali**

Military assistance in the form of training can equip host nation military with technical and professional skills. If this training is not coupled with training on integrity, civilian oversight, and accountability, however, those transferred skills can be used as a means to subversive ends. In Mali, the US and France had spent a significant amount of time and money training the military. Captain Amadou Sanogo, the senior leader who led the coup that ousted the democratically elected government in early 2012, had completed six training activities in the US from 1989 to 2010.

Subsequent instability led to a protracted conflict that solicited external intervention from ECOWAS, UN and EU forces, and national militaries from France and other nations. The former head of US Africa Command also told a forum in Washington that the US focused training almost exclusively on tactical or technical matters and that the US “didn’t spend probably the requisite time focusing on values, ethics and a military ethos”. More specifically, the general said that not enough was done to convince Malian recruits that "when you put on the uniform of your nation, you accept the responsibility to defend and protect that nation, to abide by the legitimate civilian authority that has been established, to conduct yourselves according to the rule of law".

Bribery
There have been numerous instances of bribery reported in international missions. The large influx of resources that comes with international missions increases this risk. There are major opportunities for the offering or soliciting of bribes for favourable consideration in bidding processes and recruitment of local staff. Whether the mission forces are demanding or being asked for a bribe, it will affect the local population’s perception of the mission.

Theft
Many cases of theft from within international missions involve saleable commodities, particularly food and fuel. Local and/or international mission staff may collude with nationals to steal and subsequently sell such materials, sometimes even weapons, on a local or black market.

Exploitation of local staff
Management of the recruitment and payment of local staff is a significant risk in international missions. Corruption can take the form of discrimination, with local staff paying “kickbacks” to secure employment.

Withdrawal of mission
There is a danger, especially with large-scale stabilisation missions, that a rapid withdrawal of mission forces can precipitate the sale of materials to local organisations in a way that empowers corrupt individuals.

Asset disposal
In both the military and civilian environment, assets are economic resources and include both intangible (capital/financial) and tangible assets (e.g. buildings, land, equipment). Besides personnel and expertise, equipment and buildings are often the most precious assets a defence or security base possesses. There is a significant danger of a mission perpetuating corruption if assets are not disposed of properly once a mission comes to an end.

LEADERSHIP AND STRATEGY
International missions are increasingly authorised by international mandates that include an obligation on the political leadership of the host country to counter corruption. Forging political solutions is not normally the preserve of a security assistance force. It is clear, however, that mission staff need to be on their guard against fuelling corruption. Failure to do so will both threaten the success of the mission and the future sustainability of the state.

International missions must set an example
Leadership is imperative in mitigating corruption as a potential threat to the mission. Leaders at all levels must understand the mandate, rules of engagement, and other tools available.

Set the tone
Leaders must set the tone by prioritizing and managing anti-corruption activities, and must do so in a transparent and open way that supports the mission.
Numerous examples exist of how a lack of clear leadership within an operation has allowed corruption and other malign activities to flourish to the detriment of the overall mission. According to estimates of US military officials in Kabul, at least ten per cent of the Pentagon’s logistics contracts, amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars, constituted de facto payments to insurgents.24 This is largely attributable to a lack of knowledge and training on the impact of corruption among military, police, and political leadership. It is essential, therefore, for leaders to consider what should be done when suspected corruption is detected.

Accountability for own forces

A culture of transparency, accountability, and monitoring by the military and civilian leadership is important in a complex mission environment. There are a number of areas where corruption can become prevalent within a mission’s own ranks, and monitoring can be difficult where troops are deployed in multiple locations.

One of the most difficult aspects of accountability is in procurement, especially at the local level. Appropriate and full vetting of local vendors can be almost impossible where there are few records, no formal banking system or credit reports to review, and where bribes or payments for contracts are considered normal. The use of bribery to influence the outcome of tendering of contracts must be eliminated where possible and strong oversight maintained.

It is important to ensure that there is no exploitation of, theft from, or abuse of the local staff, either by mission forces or by their contractors. Theft of mission stocks can also be a risk, especially when equipment and supplies can be sold for profit on either the local or black markets. It is also highly important that sound administrative systems are in place to prevent troops taking their frustrations out on the local population, as was the case with Chadian MINUSMA troops who abandoned their base after a dispute over receiving no pay for nine months.25

Prepare early

Corruption must be taken into account from the start. Anti-corruption measures should be integrated into international policies, mission strategies, reporting mechanisms, and the revision of operational requirements. In addition to codes of conduct and anti-corruption policies, policymakers should create an independent oversight mechanism to evaluate programmes and operations before, during, and after deployment.

BOX 2 | Task Force 2010

Task Force 2010 was established to ensure that money spent by the coalition in Afghanistan served the intended purpose and that contract efforts were linked to implementing the counterinsurgency strategy. Utilising intelligence gathering, extensive investigations and forensic auditing on contracts, the Task Force reportedly reviewed about 1,200 contracts valued at approximately US$27 billion, vetted 1,000 contractors and debarred or suspended more than 125 American, Afghan and international workers and companies.

Revise policies and mandates

Corruption risk must be incorporated into the strategic frameworks and international policies (e.g. Tokyo Conference, Chicago Summit) that authorise and oversee international missions. To increase transparency and accountability of development assistance, policymakers must be willing to make such development assistance conditional on corruption reform benchmarks which are clearly overseen and measurable. At the national level, policymakers should consider developing legislation for counter-corruption. The transnational dimension of illicit financial flows emanating from corrupt sources into places such as Dubai and London must also be tackled.

Develop an anti-corruption strategy

Organisations involved in international missions should establish and enforce codes of conduct and develop internal anti-corruption strategies. Such a strategy should also assist in coordination by defining the roles of the organisations that sign up to it. In Afghanistan, where corruption taskforces were established, there was a lack of unity of effort and a lack of political will. An anti-corruption strategy will therefore require an in-theatre lead to manage inputs and to instil a sense of ownership of the problem by a multitude of organisations. The strategy should also set out coordination and independent oversight mechanisms and reporting structures.

Revise planning and operational requirements

Corruption risk should be incorporated into doctrine, training and education structures and integrated into operational planning and procedures. Policymakers, planners and commanders should all require more rigorous analysis of corruption prior to and during an international mission. This may require anti-corruption experts (e.g. auditors or forensic financial specialists) ready to be deployed in support of a mission. Checks and balances are also required to ensure compliance by subordinate staff.

BOX 3 | Good practice: Connecting to local markets

Building Markets (formerly Peace Dividend Trust), strives to make humanitarian aid more effective, efficient, and equitable, by cutting out the middlemen while permitting the funds to flow from international procurement officers to local vendors. Building Markets was established to encourage local resources to rebuild their economies rather than relying on expensive international aid workers and supplies.

In Afghanistan, Building Markets have trained local businessmen on how to find and bid on international contracts; translating and distributing international tenders locally; matchmaking procurement needs; and creating a database of local entrepreneurs who are vetted and trusted. It is estimated that the organisation has verified 16,261 local businesses in Liberia, Haiti, Timor Leste and Afghanistan and helped local businesses win US$1 billion in contracts since its founding.

Acknowledge the gaps

Leaders should acknowledge any gaps in corruption planning capacity and capability, and seek to address them in a realistic manner. For instance, when fighting corruption, there must be an awareness of the degree to which the host nation’s judicial structure can act out its role as a fair arbiter. If the rule of law is considered to be weak, this assessment could be shared with organisations such as UNDP who are traditionally tasked with capacity building in that sector. Similarly, leadership should realise if the mission is dependent on contracting logistics, and should account for language and cultural barriers when investigating subcontractors.

Relations with host nation

Difficult political and strategic choices

Security and development efforts follow different timelines. This creates challenges in the adoption of an integrated approach to crisis management as the need to make rapid security gains often overshadows the need for a sustainable, host nation led development. Leaders will therefore often be forced to make key decisions to meet a time imperative. As a result, there may be an attempt to try to ‘spend’ one’s way out of conflict, where short-term projects to win support in a particular area are inappropriately equated to improvements in governance. Such projects, however, should be carefully thought through as they may undermine longer term stabilisation efforts, including sustainable governance reform.

‘Conflicts in recent decades have revealed that states engaged in or emerging from insurgencies and civil wars are particularly susceptible to the proliferation of corruption.’

T Sullivan and C Forsberg

Incorporate corruption risk into political engagements

When making decisions during a crisis, the tendency in bilateral interactions is to try to preserve good relationships with the host nation government. Short-term decision-making can lead a mission to partner with individuals in a host nation who are easily accessible, but may also be corrupt. The relationship that develops between the international mission and the host government can become focused on leaders as opposed to populations. Leaders should moderate their imperative to preserve good relationships and balance it with long-term costs.

Ensure consistent messaging

All leaders should work towards a shared understanding of the problem of corruption and what can be done about it. A long silence on the issue by key decision-makers can undermine the mission’s legitimacy, as it did in Afghanistan. When corruption did become more discussable, efforts in battling it were undermined by policymakers setting deadlines, which made Afghan politicians feel insecure and more inclined to move money overseas. Consistent messaging also means that leaders should seek to make accountability a key issue when interacting with the host nation.

Develop trust and be clear on accountability

In order to make real gains in corruption reform, an international mission will need to build trust at the ministerial level by meeting and engaging with key leaders, and by building capacity through training and mentorship programmes. Therefore, the international mission has to take a firm stand on what kind of behaviour is considered unacceptable. While leaders may be inclined to preserve relationships with existing partners, ensuring accountability of all government officials is crucial to maintaining legitimacy in the eyes of both home and host nation populations.

Build on your understanding of the impact of corruption

Mission leaders should establish a strong understanding of forms of corruption, how to identify it, how it is manifested and how to fight it. Improved understanding of corruption will have significant implications for diplomacy, military cooperation, development efforts, and assistance to civil society anti-corruption actors, membership requirements for multilateral regimes, and business investments. Responses to corruption and organised crime need to be multifaceted, addressing all the complex reasons that make populations turn to illegality, including law enforcement deficiencies and physical insecurity, poor rule of law, suppression of human rights, economic poverty, and social marginalisation.

The impact of a mission’s presence

An improved understanding of the ways in which international government actions enable corrupt networks is important, especially when developing and implementing entry and exit strategies for major operations. Mission leadership will need to understand the impact of the mission’s spending and to communicate this understanding down to subordinate levels.
The regional and local context
Policymakers, commanders, and planners should have a mission plan with a broad understanding of the regional political dynamics and the local context, including local forms of governance, local power structures and cultural traditions, and historic rivalries that may facilitate or compound corruption.

In countries such as Colombia, Honduras, and Montenegro, public officials have been accused of links with transnational criminal organisations that weaken the rule of law and subvert stability. In some cases, military or counter-terrorism assistance provided to unstable countries provides a perverse incentive to ensure the persistence or appearance of terrorist activity, in order to maintain external financial and material support.

Ascertain the way in which corruption can compound existing issues
Any response to corruption should be built upon an understanding of the many facilitators of corruption such as insecurity, poor rule of law, poverty, and social strife. Separatist movements or sectarian rifts based on religion, ethnicity, or national identity may be another risk factor. Such rifts can magnify the scale and impact of corruption, and the instability associated with it. Severe economic disparities between groups can have a similar effect.

SHAPE INCENTIVES TO DETER SPOILERS AND EMPOWER REFORMERS
In the initial stage of an operation, commanders and other mission personnel may find they have no other option but to deal with local warlords and powerbrokers to gain access and information in a chaotic environment. Local powerbrokers may be the only people able to deliver on logistics, security, and intelligence, and they frequently also control access to vital land, buildings, airfields, and key terrain. However, there should be a plan and timeline for moving the mission away from powerbrokers, as well as plans to marginalise or incentivise them towards reform. Otherwise, malign actors will be embedded in any new political pact or settlement.

Slow, steady pressure for small but continuous reforms is the most likely way lasting results will be achieved. This may initially be difficult for military leaders and planners as the fight against corruption does not have the same tactical timelines as military activity. But, by making counter-corruption an integral part of planning and operations, fragile countries can become more stable and secure over time. These activities need to be taken against the backdrop of an overall plan for the mission as it evolves.

Understanding the dynamics of a particular political settlement can enable the international community to help marginalise or re-incentivise some of the malign actors while helping bolster the more reform-minded actors. It is about understanding the regime that the international community is
working with and harnessing reform-minded elements for the reduction of corruption and creation of stability.

**Act early and anticipate counter-moves**

Be prepared to put in place mechanisms to mitigate and monitor corruption in the earliest stages of the mission, whilst at the same time articulating expectations for TACC in the supported government. Before supporting reforms, it is important for the international mission to be sure they are genuine and will have a lasting and beneficial effect. It is therefore important for the mission to analyse statements and actions by the host government regarding reforms.

Targeted corrupt officials may push back in ways that threaten the mission such as disrupting lines of communication, obstructing intelligence sharing, or foregoing the adoption of key international treaties or other diplomatic escalation. In Afghanistan, criminal patronage networks within the Afghan government “thwarted many of the structural and administrative anti-corruption reforms that the international community had advocated since the early years of the conflict, including merit-based hiring, pay and grade reform, and asset declaration policies for senior government officials.” In order to mitigate spoiler activity, contingency plans should be developed and put in place to address emergent issues.

**Incentivise reform and disincentivise spoiler activity**

One way to contribute to mission success is to disincentivise preserver and spoiler activity and incentivise reform activity towards legitimate governance mechanisms. The way to understand the incentive structures is to map the actors, institutions, and interests of all key players (see Figure 2). Tools for shaping incentives may include targeted coercive financial actions or leveraging the brand identity of a group, or by restricting membership of international organisations such as the World Trade Organanisation.

One way to reduce spoiler activity and incentivise reform is to increase the number of actors with competing interests who can influence the government. For instance, it is easy for the government to accept bribes and other corruption if there are only a few foreign companies working in the natural resource extraction sector, but it becomes nearly impossible to manage individual deals if there are multiple companies forcing the government to treat them equally. At the same time, there are frequently many who are willing to speak out against corruption and other abuses of authority but are afraid to do so. The mission leadership should do all it can, within their mandate, to protect reformers, whistleblowers, and those actively seeking change for the better.
Focus on the mid and senior levels of leadership

Eventually, leadership elites move on, whether due to death, peaceful transition, or a violent overthrow. The second and third tier of potential leaders will be waiting in the wings. Not only can they push for limited reform from lower level positions, but they may also form a future generation of leaders willing to engage in change. Focusing on this level and imbuing concepts of anti-corruption and integrity will pay dividends in the long run.

Use strategic messaging to shape incentives

International forces and civilian partners can use information operations and strategic messaging to focus attention on illicit activity and mobilise and empower host-nation law enforcement through evidence-based operations against criminal activities.32 The mission should consistently send a message that it is committed to counter-corruption at the strategic and tactical levels to assure reformers that they have international support.

Create space for civil society

As has been observed in Colombia, Georgia and Mexico, civil society groups can play a significant role in reversing the influence of corrupt networks and the institutional corruption they encourage and enable.33 International forces and their civilian counterparts can create the space for these groups to mobilise in support of a less corrupt society.

Establish realistic goals

It is unrealistic to expect significant change in corruption during a short-term military mission. Nor is this something military or police forces can, or should, attempt to undertake alone. Counter-corruption goals and expectations must be set in a realistic and pragmatic manner to be delivered over time. A country may take many years to transition from a very fragile or failed to 'functioning' state. Many post-conflict states have made major improvements in levels of corruption in the past decade. Patronage networks, especially, cannot change overnight; and are often long established facets of certain societies.34

DEVELOP A UNIFIED RESPONSE TO CORRUPTION

Mission leaders will determine how best to engage with external, partner nation and host nation forces, officials, institutions, and the population at large. In post-conflict environments there are often significant differences between the security and development agendas, which can make implementing an integrated approach challenging.35 Traditionally, military forces focus on the need to secure rapid security gains and stabilise the conflict, promoting a strategy of quick wins and visible impact. On the other hand, long-term political stability and development centred around human rights and the rule of law requires a commitment of resources and engagement over a significantly longer timeframe. Coordination is therefore very important, as competing priorities of different organisations can be at odds with one another.
Developing a unified, coordinated approach helps policy-makers, commanders, and planners in choosing the appropriate way to exert pressure. Coordination with actors who focus on the rule of law is critical since the host nation’s ability to prosecute the corrupt may be impeded by corruption or capacity limits. Coordination bodies should be set up to assist in streamlining efforts and agendas and should facilitate communication between the mission force, relevant UN and regional bodies such as the AU, anti-corruption organisations, civil society actors, and other NGOs.

**BOX 4 | Good practice: Taskforce Shafafiyat**

One of the key tools of the international military in Afghanistan became its Combined Joint Interagency Task Force Shafafiyat (which means transparency in Dari). The Task Force grew out of the realisation among international military and civilian leaders that corruption was a major operational factor in the campaign, but one that ISAF was not well set up to understand or address. Shafafiyat comprised some 50 personnel at its peak, with a broad mandate to build ISAF awareness of the corruption issues in the country and to lead ISAF’s counter-corruption work in Afghanistan.

According to task force members Sullivan and Forsberg, Shafafiyat sought “consistently to illustrate the comparative long-term risk of inaction, so as to persuade senior leaders that it is in their ultimate interests—and the interest of the Afghan state and its people—to address the problem with a degree of urgency.” Shafafiyat and NTM-A “worked closely with senior officials from the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Ministry of Interior (MOI) in a sustained manner through several joint, Afghan-led, working groups and commissions to develop detailed anti-corruption recommendations and implementation plans, including the creation of insulated investigative, oversight, and adjudicative bodies within the security ministries so as to ensure that the ANSF can enforce internal accountability while avoiding political interference and intimidation.”

Transparency International UK reviewed Shafafiyat’s performance twice, in 2012 and 2013. It had been well received among Afghan civil society groups, especially as part of its mission was to assist in making the Afghan MOD and MOI more open to outside scrutiny. On the other hand, at a certain point its mission had broadened beyond the defence and police sectors, to a point where it was becoming indistinguishable from non military projects on corruption. Although Vanda Felbab Brown of the Brookings Institution said the Task Force was “ultimately hamstrung by both political complexities in Afghanistan and the significant drop-off of ISAF’s focus on corruption and governance a year later”, its establishment was a step in the right direction.
Empower and protect civil society and an open media

To address corruption in a sustainable way, civil society must feel sufficiently empowered to act as a check on governmental power. This does not mean that international governments should move responsibility for anti-corruption efforts onto organisations that are frequently under-resourced and more vulnerable to intimidation. Governments with high levels of corruption have been known to target civil society groups (especially those that obtain funding and technical assistance from abroad) through closures, forced registration, and arrests. External support is very important in these contexts but must be provided in smart ways, with more attention to potential impacts on civil society organizations and actors, especially their physical safety. Mission staff should encourage civil society partners to argue for stronger and cleaner institutions, and support them where appropriate. For example, USAID has suggested raising awareness of, and helping civil society to put pressure on the government to address, organised crime.\(^{36}\) It is important to ensure that they represent legitimate societal interests and are not proxies for various national or local powerbrokers.\(^{37}\)
Military operations increasingly take place in environments where crises are political, not military. The military is not traditionally the leading agent for countering corruption, but it should be on guard against fuelling it and take measures to prevent its occurrence. Failure to do so will threaten both the success of the mission and the future sustainability of the state.

**THREAT ASSESSMENT**

Meaningful military action requires a proper understanding of how political dynamics and corruption can harm mission objectives. Providing senior decision-makers with a baseline corruption threat assessment of the environment will give them a greater understanding of the issues within their control. Subsequently, an education and communications campaign must be completed prior to deployment to ensure that all troops and civilians actively engaged in theatre are equipped with a basic understanding of corruption and its effects.

Threat assessments should be conducted by a mixture of staffs, often a combination of specialists, intelligence and planning staffs. Such an assessment begins with gathering and processing quite generic information, such as national and international corruption assessments, and police and military force corruption assessments, together with available intelligence on political dynamics and financial flows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONSIDERATION</th>
<th>POTENTIAL SOLUTION/OPTIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Strategic assessment of corruption threats and risks | • Planning staffs should develop a strategic corruption assessment. It can usefully be framed around a list of the principal corruption issues relevant to the host nation.  
• Validate the assessment through consultation with experts on the country in question. |
| Spectrum of corruption risks that may have an impact on mission success | • Planning staffs need to understand and appreciate the impact of corruption on operations.  
• Planning staffs should collate reports on corruption issues in the host nation. Sources can include classified intelligence, foreign affairs ministry briefings, open source material from organisations such as |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONSIDERATION</th>
<th>POTENTIAL SOLUTION/OPTIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Planning staffs should identify corruption surveys that include the host nation. Development agencies often have accurate and quantitative information on such issues.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overview of elite actors</td>
<td>This strategic assessment should include both who the elite powerbrokers are, e.g. traditional elites, heads of political parties, business elites, senior military leaders, and warlords, and how they are structured, e.g. tribes or ethnicity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It should identify the nature of the relationships between elites and the influencing factors, e.g. families, and map them in terms of reformers, preservers, and spoilers. Who has to pay off whom?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identify elites that control government institutions, individuals, and factions who are marginalised under the existing power structure:</td>
<td>» Which elites control access to economic organisations? These elites will determine the rules of banking, business, who gets business licenses, etc. These can range from Ministers to local officials who may “sell” public services through bribes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>» Which elites have geographic control? This can be based on ethnic, tribal, political, partisan, or sectarian affiliation. Who are the local powerbrokers, what are their interests and what relationship do they have with the central government and other elites?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>» Which elites control security organisations and access to justice (armed forces, police, prosecution, formal and informal justice systems)? Is any group dominant or marginalised within particular organisations?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influential figures and institutions within civil society and the business community</td>
<td>Identify leaders within civil society and the business community and analyse their background and potential interests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are there opportunities for reform?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Draw upon national and international organisations for information on these actors.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External expertise</td>
<td>Planning staffs should expect to access a rapidly-deployable cadre of expertise in organised crime, economic development, forensic...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONSIDERATION  POTENTIAL SOLUTION/OPTIONS

Accounting, policing and justice capacity building. It is important that capacity is built using host nation and/or diaspora personnel wherever possible to allow better training and a smoother transition.

Assessing the extent and nature of organised crime and key criminal groups

- Planning staffs should commission a criminal group threat assessment drawing on both national and international agencies operating with a regional remit, e.g. UNOWA, ECOWAS. A common analytical framework is essential.
- Planning staffs should develop or commission a detailed assessment of organised crime issues in the host nation. Training on how to identify, understand, and deal with organised crime is an essential requirement for key military and law enforcement personnel, mediators, development experts, and senior management.

INTELLIGENCE

Military intelligence collection, processing, exploitation, dissemination, and analysis is generally enemy and operationally focused, in that it seeks to understand the opposing army, insurgent forces, terrorist groups, and external supporters. While clearly important to operations, it normally provides limited assistance to a military leader seeking to understand the corruption environment he or she faces and how it can affect strategic, operational, and tactical planning. If the right questions are asked, intelligence collection can provide vital indicators of corrupt activity.

CONSIDERATION  POTENTIAL SOLUTION/OPTIONS

Intelligence collection should focus on information required to understand the roots of the systems of corruption and patronage.

- Little may initially be understood about host government personalities, patronage networks, ties to criminality, and the unwritten 'rules of the game'. This should be rectified through the corruption threats assessment. In order to understand the unwritten rules of the game in which corruption usually operates, commanders must first understand the formal rules of the game: What does the law say? What are ministries or security forces tasked to do? Is the law easily changed?
- Expect to focus intelligence as much on host government and other friendly groups as on the enemy. This is because government legitimacy is the key to successfully meeting mission objectives.
- Intelligence analysis should also be extended to include potential civil society members/groups who can assist rebuilding and procurement oversight.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONSIDERATION</th>
<th>POTENTIAL SOLUTION/OPTIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Relevant information may exist, but within very different networks. | • Staffs will need to expand information collection to include embassy personnel, non-governmental organisations, and employees of key ministries.  
• It may be necessary to create formal or informal sharing agreements with law enforcement, financial, regulatory, and media bodies, as well as other actors who have important and relevant information.  
• It is necessary to have dedicated personnel and resources to translate local media broadcasts or government media statements, web pages, or other foreign language sources.  
• Where there is no dedicated staff for engaging with civil society, there should be more engagement with entities that do, such as UN bodies, embassies, etc. |
| Gather data on financial transactions. | • Create an entity within intelligence services that tracks financial systems, processes, and transactions.  
• Create a database early on that takes financial information obtained from target areas and make it searchable, so that it is possible to identify key actors that may be illegally profiting from conflict. This database should include information like bank and financial intelligence and hawala records.  
• Utilise the World Bank Public Expenditure Review. |
| Use alternative open sources of information. | • There may be a need to conduct in-depth analysis of alternative information sources, to understand their strengths, weaknesses, and biases in a society.  
• Cross-check facts to improve verification of sources. |
| The theatre of operations will have incompatible information sharing IT. | • Where possible, distribution networks (mission IT systems) should be interoperable and harmonised.  
• Liaison between agencies will be key.  
• Ensure that a sufficient number of unclassified computers are available to staff to access open sources. |
| Collection requirements for corruption-centric | • Assess collection requirements in the pre-deployment phase.  
• Insert new requirements into the national intelligence process.  
• Ensure that After Action Reports include a line item for corruption |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONSIDERATION</th>
<th>POTENTIAL SOLUTION/OPTIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>intelligence may have to be introduced.</td>
<td>reporting, and that this is also a searchable category for intelligence analysts in databases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• If part of a larger coalition effort (AU, ECOWAS or NATO, etc.), assess others' intelligence requirements and seek to use or modify their requirements.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Use pre-existing intelligence sharing agreements, or request permission to develop new ones in order to collect information from all sources.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence collection and analysis requirements for understanding corruption should receive appropriate priority.</td>
<td>• Information gathering on corruption-related issues will allow for more focused operations, greater economy of force, and greater force protection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Focus some intelligence analysis on open source material.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Many corruption linkages can be understood and enhanced by using social network analysis.</td>
<td>• Software packages like Analyst Notebook can significantly assist analysts in conducting network analysis. In its simplest forms, whiteboards and other low-tech means can be effective.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Network analysis will have to include powerbrokers themselves, but also their families, protégées, and economic interests, such as front companies, etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Analysts should also utilise existing capabilities to ensure that the social and political dynamics are mapped accurately. For example, the Training Brain Operations Center in the US specialises in network analysis and the ability to identify weak points or actors to be targeted by TACC efforts.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avoid overreliance on data and metrics.</td>
<td>• Avoid relying too heavily on data, metrics, and short-term indicators for analysis. For instance, information related to organised crime is driven almost entirely on seizure data, which in the context of widespread corruption is not a useful or accurate indicator.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In an intervention environment, contracting is not just a technical purchasing function. It is an integral part of the mission strategy. It is also very vulnerable to being exploited by those who wish to extend the conflict.

The choice of who to contract with can significantly influence local political dynamics, can strengthen or weaken allies of the intervention operation, and can have a major impact on local employment, which would normally be one of the key desired outcomes of the conflict. For all these reasons, the normal contracting process, as illustrated by diagram A, needs to be modified to ensure an input from a strategic perspective.

The revised process proposes three extra stages:

i. An analysis of the bidding companies according to the way in which they may have engaged in the conflict and the way they have utilised the receipts.

ii. Input from those experienced in intervention contracting and corruption how the contract may play out in unexpected ways.

iii. Input from the mission commander on how the contract and the different bidders may impact the mission strategy.

Diagram B gives an illustrative example. It is based on the experience of the Contracting Chief in Helmand province in Afghanistan, and outlines process they developed to review the bidding companies and their suitability for particular sorts of contract.
**Diagram A | Modifying the normal contracting process for input from the strategic perspective**

1. Requirement for contract
2. Invitation to tender
3. Tenders received
4. Selection

- Company analysis (Clean / Fresh / Capable)
- COIN Contracting advice & recommendation
- Battle Space Owner direction & guidance

**CJ4 INPUT (CO-ORDINATION)**

**CJ4 INFLUENCE (POLICY, ETC)**

**Diagram B | Expeditionary contracting**

- **WHO?**
  - Ugly
  - Bad
  - Good

- **WHY?**
  - LN impact
  - Value to Operation

- **WHEN?**
  - Effective Alternative
  - Rate of Change

- **HOW?**
  - Endorsed COA
  - Review scaling up
  - Review contractor value to mission
  - Review all contractors for insurgent connections

**BOX 5 | CONTRACTING EXAMPLE: ISAF IN AFGHANISTAN 2011 (CONT.)**
FORCE STRUCTURE & PERSONNEL

Force structures are typically aligned to traditional forms of combat, i.e. delivering kinetic effect, and do not necessarily support TACC requirements. It is necessary to identify suitable personnel and experts on corruption to deploy on a regular basis. The force structure may need to be significantly adjusted, with more emphasis on supporting counter-corruption activity. Utilising staff from external entities such as the UN, the World Bank, the private sector, Transparency International or other NGOs remains a challenge as these civilians do not generally have the security clearance to work alongside military missions on operations. The ability for them to ‘rapidly deploy’ may be hampered by internal security policies. Key information relating to corruption may be locked away in security compartments due to its sensitive nature, and is inaccessible to civilians without appropriate security clearances. Even if they have it, their ability to support coordinated effective action may be constrained by policies over information access. Intervening forces will need to think carefully about the policy issues involved in addressing these challenges.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONSIDERATION</th>
<th>POTENTIAL SOLUTION/OPTIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Access to specialist planning cells with detailed corruption and TACC knowledge | • Planning staff specialists with knowledge of corruption-related issues should be deployed immediately into theatre to advise commanders and international organisations within a specialist high-level cell. The chief of this cell should work in close coordination with the senior civilian representative/political advisor.  
• TACC expertise should be retained in organisations responsible for the oversight of the deployed forces.  
• Human resources identification and planning measures are required to ensure long-term availability of TACC experts for deployments. |
| Knowledge of local media and civil society | • TACC cells need dedicated public affairs and information operations personnel to cross-pollinate information throughout the operating environment to ensure that knowledge of the mission’s focus on TACC is widely shared inside and outside of military circles.  
• Irrespective of the duration of the operation, a capability should be established within the TACC cells to conduct outreach with citizens and civil society organisations. |
| Comprehensive approach to governance, capacity, and rule of law | • Planning staff must be aware of what organization, either national or international, is leading on what elements of governance, the rule of law, capacity building, etc. They should be able to operate across departments to establish a cohesive TACC security programme in the host country. |
### CONSIDERATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inclusion of professional expertise to assist TACC operations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Planning staff should draw on specialist expertise to build their understanding and appreciation of anti-corruption planning and pre-and post-deployment issues.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### POTENTIAL SOLUTION/OPTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TACC specialists should be integrated within the planning staff, ideally pre-deployment. Consider embedding experts from development agencies/specialist TACC contractors/SMEs (see the UK Stabilisation Unit for possible model).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Manpower to assist TACC operations include:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>» EUPOL TACC specialists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>» intelligence officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>» organised crime experts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>» contract specialists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>» UN police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>» civil engineers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>» auditors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>» financial and banking specialists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>» military police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>» military prosecutors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>» forensic accountants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>» fraud investigators</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Understanding corruption requires understanding of money flows. This requires unique skills not normally present within military intelligence organisations and includes financial analysts, auditors, banking and other monetary specialists. Such specialties may be “borrowed” from other agencies or incorporated into Reserve forces. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resources should be identified as soon as possible in the contingency planning cycle from military, police and non-military sources.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Plan to generate specialist manpower over the projected life cycle of the operation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specialist planning cells in subordinate formations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Dedicated TACC cells should be available at all major deployed units.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• TACC cells should be integrated vertically and laterally to implement routine knowledge sharing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONSIDERATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Vetting host nation forces          | • Early planning is needed to build a robust vetting capability in advance.  
• Vetting officials should be deployed to analyse and assess potential and existing contractors.  
• Officials should be deployed to assist early integration of host nation personnel into deployed forces.                                                                                   |
| Range of TACC activities            | TACC activities to be considered include:  
• Information operations.  
• Education and training of host nation military forces, organisations and ministries.  
• If there are resource gaps in organisations specialised in law enforcement, e.g. EUPOL, UNDP, embassies, etc., conduct education and training of other host nation entities, such as police, customs, border guards.  
• The introduction of knowledge transfer, capacity building, and preventative measures, such as transparency, accountability, and financial oversight.  
• Mechanisms to reduce the incentives for corruption, such as appropriate wages, pensions, promotions.  
• Training oversight of own forces, especially mentors for host nation capacity building and transfer.  
• High-level advice to senior-level decision-makers.  
• Help engage civil society in long-term oversight when the mission is terminated.  
• Collection, feedback and remedial measures for current and future TACC operations.                                                                 |
| Communication between planning cells | • Strategic TACC cells should introduce regular workshops and institute communication between all TACC cells in the operational environment.  
• Cells working at the operational and tactical levels should ensure that there is lateral communication.  
• Commanders should introduce a feedback system to ensure that his/her intent has been implemented.                                                                                   |
CONTRACTING & LOGISTICS

The demands of an unstable, highly corrupt environment add to the ‘normal’ complexity of contracting in several key ways.

The environment will be different to what contracting staffs are used to in almost every respect, from organised crime running the fuel suppliers, to insurgents using specific contracts as a way to build power and influence in key conflict areas. Assurance of contract completion can also be difficult in a conflict zone and is also a prime target for fraud.

Contracts and contractors have both a potentially positive and negative impact on the conflict environment. Commanders need to appreciate the ways in which contracting can influence the operational situation. Contracting is also the major way through which funds flow to the population, and involves more than merely the supply of goods and materials – it also impacts local jobs and prosperity.

In addition, the scarcity and unknown nature of local suppliers is a challenge. Changing from tried and tested international contractors can be a risk, but it has major local benefits.

Another risk factor is that major contracts may be subcontracted multiple times, leading to the loss of oversight and the impression of a corrupt, uncaring international force.

In this environment, it should also be of high priority to ensure delivery of equipment or food items to the correct specification, and utilise remedial measures to replace unfit items or collect financial recompense.

Contracting staff should also consider ‘design and build’ options suitable for local circumstances (not the typical specifications of the mission forces), as they may present good value for money.

In all cases, effective contracting oversight and reporting should be introduced at the earliest possibility. Contracting staffs need particular training to prepare them for working in corrupt environments.

Contracting - pre-deployment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONSIDERATION</th>
<th>POTENTIAL SOLUTION/OPTIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ensuring a common view of corruption risks in contracting</td>
<td>• Contracting teams need to have a common view of the corruption risks and risk reduction strategies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• All contracting staff should be required to read both core guidance and current guidance on contracting in a highly corrupt environment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• All contracting staff, both in and out of theatre, should receive training and briefings on the corruption assessment and how to deal with the corruption risk.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Forces deploying into theatre may come from different countries, with a range of contracting expertise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONSIDERATION</td>
<td>POTENTIAL SOLUTION/OPTIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Risk of overlooking corruption to achieve operational requirements | - Identify what third-party knowledge there is in-theatre on contractors, drawing on both local capability and national and international NGOs.  
- Identify one or more members of the contracting team to become the specialist on corruption issues and risks.  
- Ensure that the planned contracting process includes a stage for reviewing how the possible contractors and contracting strategy will impact the conflict environment.  
- Resources to ensure value for money and assurance of contract implementation should be planned for within force structures and regularly revised in theatre to reflect operational need.  
- Ensure that there is a database to record all contractors and all contracts entered into. If this does not already exist, set one up.  
- Introduce contract TACC oversight and audit mechanisms with feedback loops.  
- Conduct training on topics such as hotlines and corruption reporting procedures. |
| Donor approaches to corruption in contracting | - Ensure plans for contract audits are established before deployment.  
- A contract oversight body may be required. If not in place already, establish such a body immediately after deployment. |

**Contracting - during deployment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONSIDERATION</th>
<th>POTENTIAL SOLUTION/OPTIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Commanders have range of responsibilities, primarily traditional combat operations. Contracts are part of operational environment. | - Commanders and/or contracts chief need to know the allegiances of the different possible contracting parties.  
- These allegiances need to form part of the contracting decision making chain.  
- Intelligence staffs should include contractors and contracting (plus effects) in their analysis to inform the Commander’s decision making.  
- Ensure that the military Commander has endorsed the project.  
- Will the project or construction contribute to the long-term security of the host nation/deployed forces? |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONSIDERATION</th>
<th>POTENTIAL SOLUTION/OPTIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Theft and extraction from contracts is lucrative source of money; may be used to support criminal patronage networks, sustaining conflict | • Assess the main sources of financial leakage based on previous evidence, if available.  
• Analyse what corruption risks exist for the different types of contracts that are likely to be implemented.  
• Establish regular performance and audit reports to donors on building quality, costs, value for money, and corruption experience. |
| Links between local providers and mafias or insurgency                        | • Analysis of local contractors to identify criminal groups.  
• Review what alternative contracting partners/mechanisms are possible.  
• Introduce competition with fresh contractors, or split the contract value up to promote competition. Ensure that the latest intelligence is utilised when the Commander in charge creates his/her plans. |
| Mitigating risk in own forces                                                 | • Ensure that oversight mechanisms and reporting structures for military spending and contracting are transparent from the outset.  
• The absence of clear accounting for contracted logistics and building services can mean that the mission pays for the same projects multiple times. |
| Certifying contract and subcontract execution                                 | • Ask: Has a 'build assessment' been arranged at regular stages to monitor progress on the project?  
• Ask: has the feedback to donors been arranged?  
• Contracts that are executed quickly can be very vulnerable to corruption; extra attention should be paid to anti-corruption controls on projects.  
• Ask: Has an independent assessment of the building and construction quality been arranged and published? Assess the independence and double-check it.  
• Consider using local NGOs for independent assurance.  
• What contractual mechanisms are in place to retrieve money/remedial work should the build/project quality be insufficient.  
• Avoid long chains of contractors and subcontractors at all cost. These heighten corruption risks, and can be perceived by local citizens as corruption. |
### Consideration: Potential Solutions/Options

#### Contracting - during deployment (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Consideration</th>
<th>Potential Solutions/Options</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Consignation**                                   | **Ask:** Should conditionality be part of the contracting process?  \  
|                                                    | **Ensure that donors do not have unrealistic expectations of project completion against unacceptable timescales – what feedback loops are in place to reduce this risk in the future?** |

#### Contracting - local contracting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Consideration</th>
<th>Potential Solutions/Options</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Analysing local contractors                        | **Ask:** Has an appropriate analysis been undertaken?  \  
|                                                    | **Develop a body of knowledge of local contractors and their capabilities.**  \  
|                                                    | **Consult with NGOs like Building Markets. They are specialists in interfacing between international organisations and local contractors.**  \  
|                                                    | **Has the local population been consulted? Will they take ownership of the project in order to reduce corruption risk?**  \  
|                                                    | **Consider using groups of local citizens as assurance mechanisms. Such groups have worked well in other contexts.**  \  
|                                                    | **To reduce inter-group rivalry and conflict, ensure that the ethnic makeup of the workforce does not deviate significantly from the local community demography.** |
| Transparency of contract, contractors, and costs     | **Require and offer full contract transparency. Publish all the successful contracts so local citizens can see them and alert you to any odd factors.**  \  
|                                                    | **Is the project appropriate for local circumstances and not over-specified or complicated?**  \  
|                                                    | **Ask:** Can the project or construction be monitored locally when completed?  |
| Alignment with insurgents                           | **Ask:** How clean is the local contractor?  \  
|                                                    | **Ask:** Has due diligence been applied?  \  
|                                                    | **If a corrupt contractor has been used (for example, because military expediency made a full assessment impossible), put in place mechanisms to replace them with new, clean contractors.** |
| Local prices of key commodities, goods, and services | **Monitor local prices and talk to people who can tell you the reasons for price fluctuations. Local prices are often a prime indicator of rigged markets. This is when firms agree to artificially inflate prices in order to increase profits.**  \  
|                                                    | **Engage with NGOs; groups like Building Markets specialize in understanding local contracting.** |
**TRAINING**

Standing forces in readiness for operations have a scheduled training programme, which caters for potential mission scenarios. The impact of corruption on military operations and ways to mitigate it are becoming gradually more widely recognised as key factors in mission success. Incorporating knowledge on corruption risks into training and through regular and progressive professional development training will improve understanding of this area. However, such training is not yet the norm, and large-scale international operations brought together on an ad hoc basis may not have sufficient time or understanding to cover corruption during preparation. It is therefore important that corruption knowledge and TACC measures are introduced into the pre-deployment training of the force.

Training considerations are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONSIDERATION</th>
<th>POTENTIAL SOLUTION/OPTIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Training for potential commanders and force leadership | • Commanders and their leadership teams should receive training covering corruption on operations and TACC measures.  
• The minimum training should be a half-day pre-deployment workshop.  
• TACC training is undertaken at some military centres, e.g. NATO, UK Defence Academy, Norwegian Centre for Integrity in the Defence Sector. It is also available from Transparency International. |
| Training for planning staffs | • Very few staffs have counter-corruption experience and remedial training should be a priority.  
• Mission leaders should specify the requirement for dedicated training covering corruption. |
| Training for major formed units | • Anti-corruption knowledge and skills should be a formal part of contributing nations’ training requirement.  
• Corruption and TACC training should be introduced as part of pre-deployment training.  
• Provide training for personnel who will be in contact with the civilian population, who will need to understand and report on corruption. |
| Training for contract officers | • Due to their central role in disbursing money, contracting officers should undergo TACC training both in and out of theatre.  
• Contract officers should contribute to the threat assessment, and have a central role in TACC measures.  
• There is currently no specialist contractor training course for TACC on operations. The relevant training should instead be one or two in-depth workshops with external experts, to review the corruption risks in the |
### CONSIDERATION | POTENTIAL SOLUTION/OPTIONS
--- | ---

host country and the ways in which the contracting officers can counter them.

**Training for specialists and senior mentors**

- Planning staffs should consider the need for pre-deployment training for individual specialist augmentees. For example, civil engineers brought in to oversee reconstruction projects will need to understand the technicalities of corruption in their field and how it can be identified, mitigated, reported, or resolved.
- Individuals and mentors to ministerial level posts usually have specialised professional knowledge. However, they may have little understanding of corruption and need to be trained and suitably briefed on TACC and the threat assessment.

**Training for host nation personnel**

- Planning for the subsequent training of host nation personnel on TACC measures prior to main force deployment is often difficult. However, any commitment is potentially a significant one in order to facilitate potential governance rebuilding and regeneration of the host nation armed forces. Host nation trainers in TACC skills need to be developed as soon as practicable.

**Ensuring theatre-wide understanding of anti-corruption**

- The HQ should ensure that the Commander’s intent on corruption and TACC is understood and implemented at all levels.
- Regular meetings and communication are essential at all levels to generate knowledge and ensure effective implementation. Commanders should regularly include anti-corruption during briefings and feedback.

---

‘The military alone cannot counter corruption, although they have a significant role to play; dealing with it requires inter-agency cooperation and coordination.’

NATO Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre
CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION

Corruption in fragile environments is a key challenge for governance and rule of law and is a major obstacle to sustainable, private sector led economic growth. Countering it requires the efforts of many actors outside of the intervention force. Engagement and coordination with other key political entities, (e.g. if there is a UN mission in place) and civil society actors is required for the intervention force to contribute towards a holistic approach. Organisations and nations refer to this coordinated approach in different ways:

The ‘whole of government’ approach
This national approach to planning involves departments responsible for security, political and economic affairs, as well as those responsible for development aid and humanitarian assistance.

The comprehensive approach
This approach involves political, civilian and military instruments. Its effective implementation requires all actors to contribute in a concerted effort, based on a shared sense of responsibility, openness, and determination, taking into account their respective strengths, mandates and roles, as well as their decision-making autonomy.

The integrated approach
Integration involves the formation of a single multi-disciplinary and multi-departmental team to take on a task in the planning process. Integration can reduce institutional misunderstanding and prejudices early in the process.

Any intervention force must then carefully coordinate with other actors and agree rules and limits for its engagement in counter corruption activity. Organisations outside of the military or police may be better placed (in terms of human resources and mandate) to deal with certain aspects of corruption.

Whilst the military refers to this engagement as CIMIC (short for civil-military cooperation) or CMI (civil-military interaction), the phrasing has been heavily debated. Other organisations such as the UN take a more cautious approach towards engagement with military forces and using the phrase “CMCoord” (“civil-military coordination”).

CONSIDERATION POTENTIAL SOLUTION/OPTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spheres of activity</th>
<th>POTENTIAL SOLUTION/OPTIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spheres of activity</td>
<td>• It is important for the military and police to be aware of the interests of different actors, and that certain NGOs may be disinclined to openly communicate with uniformed personnel as it can taint the perception of their position of neutrality and impartiality.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutionalisation of civ-mil relations on the ground</td>
<td>• Coordination of TACC efforts should be institutionalised by applying best practices and through regular meetings. Ensure that strategic direction is synchronised with efforts at the tactical level in a way that offers some flexibility in approach and does not make the lower-level</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONSIDERATION | POTENTIAL SOLUTION/OPTIONS
---|---

**Awareness of other actors and their activities**

- Planning cells need to be aware of other key (civilian) organisations that are working on anti-corruption.
- Use meetings to exchange perspectives and different approaches.
- High level and key leader engagements need to be coordinated. The mission and other relevant organisations/diplomatic staff should be aware of each other’s meetings when possible.

---

**DATA & METRICS**

Senior military and civilian decision-makers frequently rely on data (or ‘metrics’) to measure mission progress. Whilst intervention forces have improved the data range they examine, this often falls short of being an effective indicator. Gathering reliable data is also challenging in unstable environments.

However, when data is collected correctly and consistently, it can provide accurate information to the mission’s leaders and planners on the effectiveness of their counter-corruption efforts. In addition, publication of data can demonstrate the mission is addressing an issue that is important to the host nation citizens and politicians.

A system of metrics should be established from the outset of the mission. They should be based on perceptions, daily experiences, and other technical measurements. The data requirement should cover the following:

- Citizens’ experience of corruption.
- Status of the major pathways of corruption.
- Implementation progress of anti-corruption agreements and plans at the national and international level.

**Surveys of corruption**

Hundreds of corruption perception and daily experience surveys have been carried out in conflict environments. The most recent experience is from Afghanistan, where numerous organisations conducted and published routine surveys (e.g. World Bank, Asia Foundation, Integrity Watch Afghanistan, UNODC, and Transparency International). These surveys have shown that the host nation’s population is primarily concerned with security, corruption and unemployment. Account should also be taken of external factors that may affect the quality of the survey. In hostile environments, there is a danger of over-reliance on statistics and numbers when facing methodology constraints due to security or capacity.

Surveys should therefore be undertaken to ascertain the perceptions and experiences of both citizens and experts. The survey should centre on a broad range of topics, not just corruption, and should be carried out on a regular basis. Survey questions need to
cover the perception of high level corruption and also day to day citizen experiences (e.g. paying to get access to a doctor, paying to be in the police, etc.). Commanders should focus on maximising the use of unclassified statistics from surveys to allow aggregation or public reporting.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONSIDERATION</th>
<th>POTENTIAL SOLUTION/OPTIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Metrics to understand corruption pathways</td>
<td>Once a planning team has identified the expected major pathways of corruption, they need to set out metrics that will enable them to have a quantitative understanding of progress in each of the pathway areas. Potential indicators include:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Short term metrics:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>» Monthly volume of cash leaving the country (by air/land/sea).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>» Price of staple foods, such as wheat, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>» Average value of bribes paid by trucks nationwide and also by province/district/border checkpoint.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>» Percentage of border crossings at each border in which a bribe is paid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>» Monthly volume and location of citizen complaints about land title expropriation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>» Average number/value of bribes received by each category of public official each month.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>» Number of incidents where project costs have greatly exceeded the market/local price.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Longer term metrics:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>» Percentage of public posts controlled by CPNs or ethnic groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>» Percentage of leadership posts controlled by CPNs or ethnic groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>» Percentage of natural asset production (for each asset) controlled by militias/non-government bodies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>» Percentage of GDP represented by organised crime.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-corruption progress in national and international plans</td>
<td>Obtain copies of anti-corruption documents, strategies, and plans from relevant organisations and government institutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Examine the following indicators:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Public and expert perception of corruption in each of the anti-corruption institutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONSIDERATION</td>
<td>POTENTIAL SOLUTION/OPTIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical input/</td>
<td>Proportion of police and military vetted and trained.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>output measures</td>
<td>Proportion of contracts gained by specific elite groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Proportion of aid projects that have verifiable monitoring and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>evaluation mechanisms to ensure quality and completion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percentage of contractors/subcontractors vetted.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sample statements for a perception survey

Perception surveys may use the 5-point Likert scale wherein those questioned can show the extent to which they agree or disagree with a particular statement. The survey may include some of the following statements:

- There are limits on elite power.
- Institutions have adequate enforcement powers to reduce predatory behaviours.
- Presence of independent regulatory institutions with substantial powers of enforcement.
- Local minority leaders and elites have a high level of influence in local politics.
- Disputes with the state are handled primarily via non-violent means.
- The state’s role in economic regulation is considered acceptable, predictable, and fair among most of the merchant and business class most of the time.
- Local minority groups and marginalised groups largely see economic development.
- Social services, like enrolling a child in school or getting medical care, are considered largely fair, transparent, and accountable.
- Effective dispute mechanisms and ombudsman-type institutions exist to handle disputes between citizens and public service providers.

Undertaking a survey

- One way to carry out a survey would be to utilise existing resources such as Human Terrain Analysts (social scientists in the field).
- Ensure that the sample used in the survey is representative of the local or national demographics.
**CONSIDERATION**  **POTENTIAL SOLUTION/OPTIONS**

- Survey data may not be easily or readily available. Account for this ahead of time.
- The survey must be pitched according to the audience and the questions must be carefully checked to ensure that they translate accurately.
- Intervening forces should coordinate with other agencies and organisations (that already focus on corruption issues) as much as possible to avoid duplication of efforts and resources.
- Protect respondents from retribution by spoilers.

**LEGAL**

International law, the domestic law of troop contributing countries, and host nation law, to varying degrees, govern the actions of forces in all operations. Operations in fragile environments supporting anti-corruption programmes may, depending on their mandate and the degree of host nation consent, require commanders to provide legal and financial guidance to assist the government’s counter-corruption efforts. US doctrine field manual FM 3-07 notes that, “while some level of corruption is common to many cultures, its existence can unhang reform efforts and put the entire mission at risk.” It is therefore important to understand the tasks military forces can take to restrain corruption across host nation institutions.

People who illegally exploit the financial flows within a region can present a major obstacle to a mission’s efforts to improve security. Ensuring transparent and accountable financial systems are in place in both the host nation government and the mission is key to ensuring the mitigation of corruption.

If there is an anti-corruption law that complies with human rights and is consistent with international standards, it can strengthen the host nation’s legitimacy and help foster a culture that supports the rule of law. It is important to ensure that nothing the intervention force does contributes to the proliferation of corruption or weakens the rule of law.

**CONSIDERATION**  **POTENTIAL SOLUTION/OPTIONS**

**Initial legal considerations**

- Analyse the host nation’s law on corruption and bribery offices. Ensure that it is clearly understood by all of those involved in the mission.
- Ask: Is there clarity in the mission on the extent to which bribery and corruption will not be tolerated? (e.g. Commander’s guidance on the issue?)
- Consult legal advisors when formulating new policies.
- Provide legal and ethical advice to the forces on their obligations with regard to TACC operations.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONSIDERATION</th>
<th>POTENTIAL SOLUTION/OPTIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clarify the reporting structure</td>
<td>• Clarify the reporting structure for bribery and corruption issues/cases to all military and police forces, both for the mission and the host nation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>for bribery and corruption issues</td>
<td>• Develop and publicise ethical standards for all security force officers and civilian officials, and a compliance system that is legally binding.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cases to all military and police</td>
<td>• Support whistle-blower protection programmes, which complement reporting procedures for corruption and intimidation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>forces, both for the mission and</td>
<td>• Ensure transparency in the distribution of resources to host nation military and police forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the host nation.</td>
<td>• Identify TACC issues related to ethnic and minority groups to ensure that host nation military and police authorities do not target groups for extortion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• When appropriate, develop and publicise ethical standards for civil servants and a compliance system that is legally binding.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensure TACC activity is compliant</td>
<td>• Ensure TACC activity is compliant with international law and standards, and also adhere to host nation anti-corruption laws and regulations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with international law and</td>
<td>• Endorse provisional legal codes and TACC procedures consistent with international law.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>standards, and also adhere to</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>host nation anti-corruption laws</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and regulations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is the quality of</td>
<td>• What is the quality of investigation and prosecution of corruption cases? If very poor, is it worth investing in making it more effective or, in extremis, establishing an alternative process?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>investigation and prosecution of</td>
<td>• To what extent can prosecutions for corruption be effective in removing a spoiler from the environment? Prosecution and imprisonment may be more effective than other mechanisms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>corruption cases</td>
<td>• Locate and safeguard key witnesses, documents, and other corruption related evidence in ongoing or potential investigations and prosecutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is there a database of all</td>
<td>• Is there a database of all disbursements of funds? And of all contracts entered into by the mission?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disbursements of funds? And of</td>
<td>• Are the licit and illicit financial flows in the region known? If not, are resources in place to develop an understanding of them?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>all contracts entered into by the</td>
<td>• How are all expenditures and contracts audited? By whom? How frequently? Where is the data stored/reported?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mission?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
If the achievements of an intervention mission are to be sustainable it is vital to build the capacity of, and ultimately transfer authority to, the military and security forces of the host nation. Corruption in host nation forces is highly visible, threatens their operational effectiveness, and has a direct impact on citizens’ acceptance of host nation forces in the medium and long-term. They may be under the influence of elites, be involved in the illegal exploitation of natural assets, have illegitimate access to government funds, or be funded by neighbouring states or organised crime groups. As well as those determined to maintain the status quo, there will also be those within the host nation force that want to tackle corruption and restore public trust. The tone struck by the intervention force from the start will be critical to laying the foundations for subsequent development of an effective TACC capability.

The scope of the counter-corruption measures required exceed the remit of the immediate mission. It is important, however, for policymakers and commanders to appreciate what the long-term goals are, and to help embed the necessary processes and infrastructure.

Establishing a training regime, possibly drawing on independent international expertise, is a vital building block. The ultimate objective should be to develop the host nation’s own core training capability.

Specific measures and considerations include:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONSIDERATION</th>
<th>POTENTIAL SOLUTION/OPTIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Levels and types of corruption present</td>
<td>• These should be identified in the baseline corruption threat assessment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status of host nation security forces.</td>
<td>• Analyse whether host nation forces should be disbanded, restructured, or left as they are.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• This should be addressed at the planning stage. The decision of how many and who of the existing forces to retain is a difficult one.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• A functioning security force structure is essential but measures may be needed to replace those perceived to be corrupt. The sooner this is addressed the better, but care will need to be taken to ensure that</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### CONSIDERATION | POTENTIAL SOLUTION/OPTIONS
--- | ---
Those that are removed do not use their authority to extort further funds before they go.

**Measures to address corruption and build capability**
- Measures that might be considered include the following:
  - A public oversight body should be considered. It may be drawn from civil society and could perhaps be based on the independent anti-corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (MEC) established in 2011 in Kabul to monitor anti-corruption reforms. The MEC comprised three representatives from both the Afghan and international communities supported by a small secretariat.
  - Training/mentoring of the military and other security force leadership and senior officers and officials on the role they have to play in TACC.
  - Drawing on existing host nation training assets and materials, which are tailored to local circumstances.
  - Building a domestic centre of excellence for TACC training and education.

**Quality versus quantity**
- Commanders should resist pressure to engage in multiple capacity building efforts within the host nation at the expense of quality. Inadequate foundations are counterproductive in the long term.

**Credibility and accountability of integrity measures**
- Address the vetting of all prospective members of the new force(s), although this will be difficult without substantial investment in a fragile state.
- Consider the establishment or strengthening of an Inspectorate General, perhaps supplemented initially with international secondments.
- Create internal affairs departments for police and border forces, possibly staffed through the secondment of international officers or civilian experts. Such departments are important for controlling the risk of corruption internally.
- Create machinery for both internal and external reporting of illegal activity, and the protection of whistleblowers.
- Effective oversight and vetting of the staff of oversight bodies is essential if they are not to be infiltrated by corrupt individuals. A corrupt
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONSIDERATION</th>
<th>POTENTIAL SOLUTION/OPTIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>oversight body is often worse</td>
<td>Consider the role of third country experts to advise and mentor officers and officials, but recognise that activities need to take account of the culture and practices of the host nation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>than no oversight body at all.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The design of anti-corruption</td>
<td>Structured and relevant training for all levels should be introduced at the earliest opportunity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>training</td>
<td>Focus higher level training on the strategic political and military effects required to counter corruption during operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Those overseeing curriculum development and implementation must understand all elements of anticorruption activities. They may draw on external expertise to assist and evaluate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Training must be tailored to the cultural mores and levels of literacy within the host nation force for maximum impact.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-term TACC training</td>
<td>Training capability should ideally be provided at OF5 level, with MOD experience and from across all disciplines (operational, procurement, HR, finance, legal, etc).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>capability</td>
<td>Adequately resourced and supported training, with staff appointed for at least three years who are literate and possess appropriate linguistic skills.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Suitably qualified/experienced TACC mentors should be in place to support host nation ministers, officers, and officials.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Material and methods of delivery must take into account the host nation’s culture and be tailored to the rank and literacy of targeted individuals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Metrics to capture evidence of impact and progress to support reform and attract international donors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Host nation capability</td>
<td>Host nation should make transparency the default, with limited exceptions for genuine security caveats.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Adopt ethical standards and behaviours at all levels through, for example, an Oath of Office or codes of conduct.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|                                | Engage civil society to provide oversight, particularly of procurement and finance.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONSIDERATION</th>
<th>POTENTIAL SOLUTION/OPTIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sustainability and long-term</td>
<td>• Self-sustaining TACC centre of excellence in host nation promoting professional development training for long term career development. This may be on a regional level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>goals</td>
<td>• Language training to allow those undergoing training to communicate internationally.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Adoption of international standards and qualifications (for example, in audit processes).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Independent audit conducted by international authorities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Guidance on anti-corruption from other sources

EXTRACTS FROM NATO JALLC RECOMMENDATIONS

NATO’s Joint Analysis Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC) noted in its study Counter-/Anti-Corruption: Theory and Practice from NATO Operations, that corruption is extremely complex, and in many missions there is (and must be) a trade-off between corruption and security, especially in the early stages. There are no easy answers and few proven lessons. Fighting corruption requires coordinated action by a wide range of organisations including the Host Nation and the International Community (IC) – the military can do little on its own, and generally should not be in the lead. Overall NATO can contribute to fighting corruption in two ways: minimizing the adverse effect of NATO actions on corruption and supporting Host Nation Counter-/Anti-Corruption (CAC) institutions in the defence sector.

Corruption, once established, is hard to reduce; ideally it should be taken into account from the planning stages of any crisis response operation. Fighting corruption is a long-term issue and expectations of rapid results need to be managed.

The international community (IC) (including the military) contributes to, exacerbates and provides opportunities for corruption through: a large influx of funds into a fragile state with weakened institutions; a nation’s desires to effect change quickly and show their own public that they are attacking the problems; a lack of coordination across the IC; and the related lack of control over funds and projects.

GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS

Corruption issues must be factored into assessment and planning activities and a comprehensive approach is essential. In the short term, operations like ISAF and the future Resolute Support Mission (RSM) should enhance sharing of information with relevant non-NATO entities; facilitate access to ISAF staff; and share CAC lessons and best practices. In the longer term, the relationships that are needed at the operational level can be cultivated through agreements or exchanges at the political-military and/or strategic levels.

RSM and future operational structures will need to incorporate, where appropriate, a Branch or Cell to
deliver output similar to that of ISAF’s Combined Joint Inter-Agency Task Force-Shafafiyat to lead efforts against corruption, including mentoring Host Nation officials. Access will be needed to relevant financial data and other intelligence on contractors (international and Host Nation) and criminal patronage networks.

Command headquarters needs to ensure that a linked and coordinated approach to corruption, in line with the Commanders specific direction and guidance, exists within its own structure and across all levels of command. The use of host nation contractors and companies should be increased, but attention should be paid to gathering and sharing intelligence on contractors. Command headquarters should seek to sustain and enhance CAC mentoring of Host Nation security and defence personnel.

Current and future missions must make effective use of influence capabilities (i.e. Strategic Communications, Public Affairs, and Information Operations) to foster an appreciation and understanding of CAC activities amongst the Host Nation population.

**SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Develop CAC Policy at the Political-Strategic level.
- Ensure that CAC Subject Matter Expert (SME) inputs are incorporated in future reviews of policy and doctrine documents.
- Enhance current CAC training for ISAF within Pre-Deployment Training (PDT) and Key Leader Training (KLT).
- Undertake a training needs analysis on NATO’s broader requirements to facilitate development of more focused CAC training in NATO.
- Encourage Nations to incorporate CAC issues into appropriate levels of military (and possibly governmental) staff training to build enhanced awareness and understanding of CAC and to develop future SMEs.
- Incorporate corruption risk assessment and CAC activities into planning processes and review relevant documents (i.e. NATO’s Operations Planning Process; Allied Command Operations (ACO) Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD); Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational Planning).
- At the operational level, facilitate cooperation with in-theatre Non-NATO Entities (NNEs), in line with the basic principles of the comprehensive approach, to ensure coherence and unity of purpose and effort, through sharing information, facilitating HQ access, and exchange of lessons learned.
• At the political-military level, foster cooperation with NNEs on CAC through coordination and agreements, and provide access to and promote shared use of the NATO Lessons Learned Database (LLDB) for CAC issues.

• Validate the implementation of the previous COMISAF’s CAC guidance (or issue new guidance) throughout all ISAF entities, and ensure liaison and coordination between them is improved.

• Establish a CAC focal point in the Comprehensive Crisis Operations Management Centre (CCOMC) at SHAPE.

• Pass current CAC activities on to RSM and ensure the CAC entity includes a Financial Intelligence Cell.

• For future operations, the International Staff (IS) and NATO commands should make use of CAC SMEs within existing databases, such as the COMPASS28, to support planning and operations, and work with Allies and Partners to identify any additional expertise for inclusion.

• Establish a central ISAF contracting office, mandate its use by all ISAF elements and promote its use by Nations, and maintain it for RSM.

• Enhance vendor vetting, ensuring contracts are based on the principle of phased payments and incorporate mechanisms within contracts and the NATO–HN SOFA to enforce performance and allow for contract cancellation and access to HN courts in cases of proven corruption or inefficiency.

• Prefer local firms over multinationals, enhancing Afghan First policies. Use a similar principle for future operations.

• Provide appropriate CAC education and training to Host Nation security forces in CAC-related military disciplines.

• Involve appropriate citizens in management and oversight of civil works and projects initiated on their behalf, enhancing their understanding of financial and project management and audits.

• Capitalise on the Afghan Hands Program by developing a cadre trained in anti-corruption issues who can then work to institutionalize anti-corruption within planning for future operations.

• Use NATO/ISAF Strategic Communications to deter and influence corrupt parties and complement other CAC activities. Support ISAF and GIROA with Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy efforts at SHAPE and NATO HQ.

The “Operationalizing Counter/Anti-Corruption Study” released by the J-7 division of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff offers a number of recommendations for future US military engagement in missions abroad. Specific recommendations of the report are detailed in Appendix B. The acronym DOTMLPF-P denotes the different areas: doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy.

### DOTMLPF-P Domain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domain</th>
<th>Force Development Implications from CAC Findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Doctrine</td>
<td>Update JP 5-0 (Joint Operation Planning), JP 4-0 (Joint Logistics), and subsidiary publications to emphasize:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Understanding the operational environment includes an understanding of the potential for corruption from DOD activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- The need to plan short-term operations with the expectation that they may expand in scope and duration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Commanders must consider conditions that may foster corruption and account for these conditions in early CAC and contracting guidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Commanders must account for the cumulative effect that logistics spending will have on Phase IV and V operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Wartime contracting should be on par with CCMD top-level tasks and objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Commanders and other USG leaders must have the capability to track the flow of USG and international community spending and its effects on the operating environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- The need for improved coordination with USG department and agency partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Update JP 3-24 (Counterinsurgency) to emphasize that commanders must apply a CAC framework that recognizes the need for a pragmatic and incremental approach when operating in support of a host-nation government. Commanders must:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Work toward meeting the four preconditions of combating corruption:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Understanding the operational environment specific to the culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Establishing an acceptable level of security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Developing political will</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Building popular will to combat corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Work with members of the USG and international community to build rule of law capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Move toward transitioning the lead to the host nation, with the international community in support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Update JP 4-10 (Operational Contracting Support) with a vignette on contracting lessons from OEF, including:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- How lack of contracting oversight helped fund the Taliban insurgency and wasted US tax dollars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- How poor oversight of large-scale logistics contracting in an underdeveloped nation like Afghanistan did damage to that nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Update JP 2-01.3 (Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment), JP 3-07 (Stability Operations), JP 3-07.4 (Joint Counterdrug Operations), JP 3-08 (Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations), JP 3-24 (Counterinsurgency), JP 3-26 (Counterterrorism), and JP 3-57 (Civil-Military Operations) to emphasize:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- The criticality of understanding the operational environment, including economic considerations, before taking action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Clarification of the military’s role in CAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Key roles and authorities that other USG agencies possess that DOD may need to rely upon in contingency operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Intelligence fusion across the USG to better use departmental strengths</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- The importance of cultivating host-nation ownership as a foundation of successful efforts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Doctrine continued

- Update relevant Service and CCMD doctrinal publications to address the potential for corruption regarding CERP and development spending.
- Present a template for a CJATF-A type organization that includes the integration of supporting intelligence elements, such as CJATF – Nexus, the IOCC, and the ATFC.
- Provide a template for an organization similar to TF-2010 to support focused leadership, planning, and oversight of money as a weapon system in large-scale joint operations.
- Develop options to provide similar capabilities for smaller and/or enduring missions, such as SFA and BPC, including support to existing efforts within embassies.
- Emphasize that planning, including by the USG, should carefully consider the impact of the rate of dollar inflows and related second- and third-order effects within host nations.
- Codify CAC framework to guide planning and operations across the range of military operations.
- Discuss methods to improve linkages from HHQ CAC efforts to regional command/tactical unit efforts. Include the need for broadened understanding of corruption implications across the operating area, early consideration in planning, early commander guidance and intent at all levels, and embedded HQ nodes at subordinate commands.

### Organization

- Improve intelligence across the operational continuum by forming multiagency and multinational intelligence cells at the CCMD or JTF that are focused on understanding the operational environment in the context of the nexus of corruption, narcotics, host-nation resource flows, and criminal networks.
- Include deployable CAC expertise in the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC) to augment staffs of operational commanders, as needed.
- DOD continue to support USG working groups to address transnational corruption and criminal threats.
- DOD support interagency billets within CCMDs to fully staff a JIACG-type organization.
- CCMDs develop and maintain an enduring capability to conduct contractor vetting within their areas of responsibility.
- Implement TF-2010 best practices, to include linkages with relevant CCMDs, in any future vendor vetting capability.

### Training

- Services train personnel to recognize and address corruption in an operational environment.
- Services train their contracting personnel to conduct effective CAC actions in any environment.
- Develop realistic exercises that force intelligence fusion and coordination across the USG. Training and education should emphasize the importance of interagency cooperation and coordination.
- Joint training emphasize the need to for commanders to provide early CAC and contracting guidance.
- Reexamine training for intelligence personnel and enhance their integration with law enforcement and other USG specialties to develop capacity for understanding corruption in specific operational and cultural environments.
- Joint training emphasize that planning, including by the USG, needs to carefully consider the impact of the rate of dollar inflows and related second- and third-order effects within host nations.
- Add corruption as a facet of the operational environment in joint exercises and training.
- DOD and Services develop effective, integrated, and auditable accounting systems using standard accounting principles.

### Materiel

- JPME should include vignettes and discussions on the potential dangers of using money as a weapon system.
- Provide key corruption lessons to senior leaders in JPME, Pinnacle, and Capstone.
- Develop corruption-specific training courses for contracting officers and advisors.
- Complementary to training, include corruption-related vignettes in PME to help students think through the problem. Emphasize the importance of interagency cooperation, the role of the military in CAC, corruption as part of the operating environment, and the tradeoffs associated with prioritization, lead agencies, and authorities.
- Sustain and enhance PME for military CAC subject matter experts.
- Key leader engagements with partner nations should include assessment and cultivation of national ownership regarding the partner’s internal security challenges. SFA/BPC level of involvement should be predicated on the partner’s national ownership.
- Joint and Service PME include the need to be aware of the threat corruption can pose to the mission, that our actions have impacts on the corruption environment, and that these impacts need to be
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leadership and Education</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Leadership and Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Considered in the context of other mission objectives.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint education emphasize the need for commanders to provide early CAC and contracting guidance.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint and Service PME emphasize that commanders must apply a CAC framework that recognizes the need for a pragmatic and incremental approach when operating in support of a host-nation government. Commanders must:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Work toward meeting the four preconditions of combating corruption:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Understanding the operational environment specific to the culture</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Establishing an acceptable level of security</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Developing political will</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Building popular will to combat corruption</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Work with members of the USG and international community to build rule of law capacity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Move toward transitioning the lead to the host nation, with the international community in support</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At each level of command, commanders must emphasize the importance of CAC efforts, explain how CAC fits into their guidance and intent, and overtly empower those subordinate elements whose mission is CAC.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Include corruption-related vignettes in PME that emphasize the importance of USG internal coordination and cooperation, the role of the military in CAC, corruption as part of the environment, key roles and authorities of USG agencies that may be needed in contingency operations, and associated factors such as prioritization, lead agencies, and authorities.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint education should emphasize that planning, including by the USG, needs to carefully consider the impact of the rate of dollar inflows and the related second- and third order effects within host nations.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop a JPME case study and concise briefing on corruption in Afghanistan, highlighting key considerations for planning and operations.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensure personnel assigned to BPC, SFA, train, advise, and assist (TAA), and CA positions have the requisite CAC experience and training.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD support interagency billets within CCMDs to fully staff a JIACG-type organization.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reevaluate existing programs and constructs related to corruption and the operating environment, including AFPAK Hands, human terrain teams, foreign area officers, civil affairs and other specialists from the Reserve Component, and law enforcement support to intelligence. Continue investments to sustain and improve capabilities.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review effectiveness of past incentives and modify as necessary to develop a quality pool of specialists who can be called upon to staff CAC organizations.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop linkages to DOS Interagency Management System and other USG organizations to augment and broaden military staff expertise.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Personnel</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Facilities</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At the highest levels, USG department and agency leaders must discuss CAC and its role in future contingencies in order to develop a comprehensive USG strategy that will:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Assign lead and supporting agencies (define roles and responsibilities)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Prioritize CAC (how to address in each phase of operations)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Examine use of a conditions-based approach to allow the USG to evaluate partner-nation ownership of its key challenges</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continue to develop/revise national CAC guidance, as necessary, to provide a firmer basis for CAC planning, conduct, and coordination of military and non-military CAC efforts.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consider developing legislation, similar to the Leahy Amendment for human rights vetting, to support conditions-based aid.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review legislative contracting authorities for sufficiency. Support efforts to provide permanent capabilities for future contingency requirements.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD continue to support USG working groups to address transnational corruption and criminal threats.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD and the international community monitor and assess spending to avoid surpassing the host nation’s absorptive capacity.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconsider classification guidance to improve information sharing among CAC partners, including the international community and the host nation(s).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A guidance note from the UK’s Land Warfare Centre (LWC) states that countering corruption should be a necessary element of tactical and operational planning, particularly as it relates to partnering and the training of host nation forces in Afghanistan. According to the note, focusing on countering corruption will contribute to the fight against Taliban influence. The note aims to provide guidance to military commanders who are partnering with host nation forces and to initiate a dialogue on how to refine doctrine as it relates to counter-corruption.

The UK LWC outlines four primary reasons why the military should care about countering corruption. Firstly, countering corruption bolsters the host nation government’s authority to govern legitimately. Secondly, insurgencies fundamentally revolve around local issues and therefore the local military commander, if equipped with an understanding of counter corruption, has the scope to change local issues. Thirdly, corruption undermines confidence both within the host nation and the home nations sending mission forces into theatre. And lastly, failing to address corruption risks leaves commanders vulnerable to accusations that they themselves support corrupt administrations.

The note includes a number of practical recommendations for countering corruption which are summarised here:

- **Provide guidance on countering corruption.** Military commanders should develop and disseminate clear and precise counter corruption policy, with guidance from higher headquarters, to all relevant partners (military and civilian). This guidance should also be a “part of formal handovers to ensure continuity and continuation of activities/relationships.”

- **Conduct full partnering with the ANA and ANP.** When engaged in partnering with the host nation, the UK military will have direct access to counter corruption. Counter corruption activities include:
  
  » **Evidence of corrupt practices in the ANSF.** Corruption within the military forces, whether ANSF or UK troops, “can lead to the undermining of troop morale, absenteeism, poor discipline, or lack of public support.”

  » **Effective mentoring of the ANP.** Mentoring and training initiatives should include both the ANA and the ANP.

  » **Mentoring pay and administration.** Since unpaid salaries are a primary cause of corruption in the ANSF, “[m]entors should strive to understand where and how pay is stolen, siphoned,
withheld or paid to ghost soldiers and quickly engage the perpetrators of these acts.”

» **Training and enforcement of ethics and standards of conduct for host nation forces.** The ANSF should undergo training on formalised ethics and standards. This should take place as part of routine training courses and should also be included in the training that takes place at provincial and national training courses.

» **Monitoring deployed security forces to prevent opportunistic collection of payments.** Checkpoints are one example of collection of payments through corrupt means. For instance, “[i]f ANSF remain on a particular checkpoint for a prolonged period the odds of them engaging in corrupt practices increases dramatically.” A rotation system could be introduced to break the cycle of establishing networks and relationships that can lead to this type of corruption.

• **Seeking to Understand Corruption as part of the Human Terrain.** Intelligence resources should be put in place to target corrupt activities since “[u]nderstanding the human terrain is an integral part of COIN doctrine for a commander”.

• **Tracking the Movement of Aid such as Food, Clothing and Blankets.** Corrupt actors may steal and re-sell basic goods, including aid and foodstuffs. This theft “can be mitigated through monitoring stock quantity against transportation and delivery quantities. This can be done through mentoring ANSF and GIROA officials at distribution points.”

• **Overseeing Contract Management Procedures.** Commanders should be aware of major contracts within their area of operation, especially in construction as corruption is likely in this sector due to the large sums involved. These projects “must be closely monitored, as it could destabilise local contributions to development.”

• **Audit, Prosecutorial and Judicial Support.** Commanders should be aware of evidence of bribery and other forms of corruption amongst the judiciary and other elements of the legal system. Corruption in the judiciary and legal system “not only erodes public confidence in the rule of law, but also increases the perception of insecurity, which can in turn fuel the insurgency.” Monitoring of the judiciary should be conducted in order to coerce would be perpetrators from engaging in corrupt activity. The note cautions that this matter “should be addressed primarily by HQs and Commanders with the necessary capacity and expertise to engage with the judiciary.”
• **Whistleblower Protection Schemes.** Anonymous corruption hotlines can protect whistleblowers and has been proven successful in theatre.

• **Planning Factors**
  » **Cultural Considerations.** The note states that some activities which the Western society regards as corrupt may be a normal part of life in parts of Afghanistan. The note goes on to argue that “accepting this does not remove the responsibility to strive to identify right and wrong and to take appropriate action. It is therefore highly important to develop cultural understanding and develop relationships with Afghan partners.”
  » **Allegations and Hearsay.** Military commanders should be aware of allegations and hearsay when applying military judgment to allegations of corruption. A strong intelligence system combined with solid relationships with Afghan counterparts can go a long way in assisting commanders with their decisions.
  » **Other Nations under Command.** It is vital that countering corruption is “[addressed] consistently by all ISAF forces and that other nations under command are included in any direction issued on countering corruption.”
  » **Visibility.** Corruption may occur through covert means. As such, “it is likely to be a subtle activity best identified through vigilance.”

The document concludes by stating that, even in environments where corruption is endemic, “there are practical measures that commanders on the ground can take to play their part in what will be a major, theatre-wide effort. This means that countering corruption sits firmly within the military’s remits; failure to face up to the issue invites mission failure”.
CURRENT MILITARY DOCTRINAL GUIDANCE

US doctrine
US Army Field Manual 3-07 – Stability Operations:

- Section 3-25 – An essential list of law enforcement tasks include – “Identify, secure, and preserve evidence of war crimes, crimes against humanity, corruption, and transnational crime (terrorism, organised crime, human trafficking, and narcotics).”

- Section 3-53 notes that, “Providing legal guidance and assistance to the transitional government mitigates the near-term effects of corruption. Long-term measures ensure lasting success. Corruption and graft can hinder efforts to establish governance, restore rule of law, or institute economic recovery. While some level of corruption is common to many cultures, its existence can unhang reform efforts and put the entire mission at risk. The list of essential tasks may include an initial response in which military forces create mechanisms to curtail corruption across government institutions.”

- Section 5-26 states the following, but lacks guidance on how to execute the task – “officials who prove unreliable or corrupt must leave office through legal action or through an open, transparent administrative process.”

- Section 5-54 notes, “The transitional military authority will likely contend with corruption in certain sectors of the host nation. Appropriate anticorruption measures may need to be implemented to counter the influence of corrupt officials in host-nation institutions. Dismissing these officials, however, must be weighed against their prestige and influence. Transparent, legitimate processes are fundamental to effective anticorruption programs.” Vague guidance, such as this does not build a compelling case for a theatre commander to tackle this complex problem affecting fragile states.

- Sections 6-31, 6-51, 6-88, and D-62 point to the difficulty leaders and troops will encounter with regard to security sector reform and only notes corruption as a potential point of failure, which needs to be guarded against while also discouraging corruption and establishing anti-corruption measures early in the mission. Unfortunately, throughout the language is weak and doesn’t address the root issues a leader will need to address in a 'real time' strategic operational environment.
Section 3 explains the importance of legitimacy of the host nation government and that one of the indicators showing legitimacy is the level of popular participation in or support for national and local political processes and an acceptable balance between governmental corruption and transparency. The success of the counter-insurgency effort can, in part, be achieved when “The HN government has adequate capacity and willingness to address the root causes of insurgency (opportunity, motive, and means); government corruption is reduced and good governance increases.”

Section 4.d.(3) alerts readers that “In many cases that corruption is linked to the reliance of the HN government on revenue from external sources, such as the export of high-value natural resources or the rent of military bases.“

Section 5.d.(4) recommends providing reporting mechanism for “adversary or friendly acts of intimidation, violence, crime, and corruption.”

Section 10e recommends using Counter-Threat Finance cells: “CTF can be used in COIN to counter, disrupt, or interdict the flow of finances to an insurgency, thereby reducing its operational effectiveness. Additionally, CTF can be used against corruption, as well as drug and other criminal money-making activities that fund or fuel insurgencies and undermine the legitimacy of the host nation government.

Section 7 emphasises the importance of local context: “efforts that do not take local conditions and expectations as their starting point run the risk of disrupting or undermining benign local governance structures, strengthening the insurgency, fostering corruption, and creating dependencies”.

Appendix D states that forces should “Confront impunity. Protect the people from all enemies. These include known combatants, inadequate governance, corruption, and abuse of power. Empower the legitimate government by protecting the people from malign actors and other terrorists.”

Forces are instructed to “Identify and confront corrupt officials. Help the HN government achieve the aim of fighting corruption with all means possible. Work with trusted partners and within the chain of command to spotlight networks of malign actors. Act with HN officials and multinational partners to confront, isolate, pressure, and defund malign actors—and, where appropriate, refer malign actors for prosecution.”
Chapter 1 and 2 provide context for conducting assessments and activities. “Forces should, for example, assess whether bribes or gifts are normal in dealing with business, government officials or police. What is acceptable [level of corruption]?” Staff should also be aware that insurgents will seek to expose and highlight corruption, especially within the police force.

Section 4-38 mentions the need for the military force to support anti-corruption initiatives but fails to specify how.

Section 7-15 states that if US or host nation military forces are to conduct law enforcement, then their tasks should include, amongst other things, identifying, securing and preserving evidence of corruption and the subsequent detention of perpetrators.

Section 7-48 recommends the provision of legal guidance and assistance to any transitional government to mitigate the near-term effects of corruption. This may include “Disseminate ethical standards for civil servants; Ensure transparency in the dispersal of government resource; Implement reporting procedures for corruption and intimidation.“

Section 7-100 on accountability urges “Enforcing accountability, building transparency into systems, and emplacing effective checks and balances to guard against corruption are important components to any relief, reconstruction, or development program.

Section 8 recommends considering levels of corruption when assessing host nation capacity and also recommends using a metric (number of rejections of corruption) to contribute towards evaluation of host nation forces.
**UK doctrine**

Joint Doctrine Publication 2-00 – Understanding and Intelligence Support to Joint Operations:

- Chapter 6, Section II covers Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment. The key message is the importance of awareness and understanding and how the various factors specific to the operation affect the planning and decision making process.

Joint Doctrine Publication 3-40 – Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution:

- JDP 3-40 makes numerous references to corruption and recognises that “The commander’s strategy for winning the influence contest can easily be undermined by actors and events outside of his control; corruption, ineptitude and chronic failings of the host government are possible examples.”

- Section 425 notes to commanders that “Where corruption on a grand scale is occurring under the cover of the security provided by our forces, the commander will need to make it clear to the host government that our cultural norms are being flouted.”

- Sections 613-614 speak specifically to anti-corruption and the definitions necessary to understand what could be observed on the ground in a conflict environment. For example, section 615 describes how “Anti-corruption measures are likely to directly affect those elites on which a political settlement depends,” giving them high incentives to resist. The section goes on to acknowledge that this means that it can be necessary to temper anti-corruption measures “so that they do not undermine local accommodations.” Once anti-corruption initiatives are in place, however, the document puts particular emphasis on the fact that international forces may need to support:
  - "Integrated coalition efforts to eradicate grand corruption.
  - Enforcing codes of conduct for indigenous security forces and civil servants.
  - Training in ethics and standards of conduct for security forces.
  - Monitoring deployed security forces to prevent opportunistic extortion.
  - Audit, prosecutorial and judicial support.
  - Tracking the movement of aid such as food, clothing, and weapons.
  - Overseeing contract management procedures, for example, in dispersing reconstruction funds with local companies.
  - Ensuring security forces are properly paid and the funds accounted for.
  - Whistleblower protection scheme."
• Section 616 describes how any perceived corruption among state officials in post-conflict societies such as Afghanistan can cause a disastrous crisis in local confidence. It uses the example of Afghanistan to show how the Taliban clearly benefited from a lack of trust in official state judiciary systems, which enabled them to run popularly supported trials for cases referred to them by village elders. This parallel legal system has apparently “established a reputation for fair and quick justice” not enjoyed by the official courts.

A recent, well publicised, case took place in Garmir where the formal state court had sentenced a murderer to six months imprisonment. The shortness of the sentence, for a crime which would usually attract the death penalty, was said to have been explained by the fact that the murderer’s family had bribed the judge. Not satisfied with the state judicial process, the victim’s family referred the case to the Taliban who re-arrested the murderer on his release from Lashkar Gah prison. The Taliban heard the case again, found him guilty, and presented him to the victim’s family who subsequently killed him. This kind of justice is common in Helmand where the Taliban are keen to portray the government as ineffectual and chronically corrupt.

Extract from Joint Doctrine Publication 3-40

• Section 1071 follows up on these risks that corruption can pose to fragile states, noting that “it could be a major contributor to the state’s decline” while also jeopardising the already-delicate process of state recovery. While noting that corruption is “invariably difficult to eradicate” as it can become an all-encompassing system of how things are run in certain societies, the report notes that “where it begins to effect the pace and efficiency of the recovery, it must be addressed through administrative, judicial and legislative measures.” This places an imperative on anti-corruption policies while acknowledging that some local populations are likely to view “certain levels of what may be considered corrupt practices… [as] perfectly normal.” Despite this, the risks to stabilisation missions of ignoring or cooperating with corrupt systems are seen as too high to be justifiable through arguments of local custom or practice. The document notes that “If it is perceived that the UK and multinational forces are associated with corrupt organisations, our legitimacy will also be tarnished and international forces will lose the support of the population.”

• Section 1079 calls for the creation of special task forces based on the “complexity of the threat”, these special organisations should include a cross-cut of governmental entities, to include the security sector. Counter-corruption is named as one of the four areas where a special task force should be created in the wake of diminishing military involvement.
British Army Field Manual, volume 1 - part 10, Countering insurgency

Chapter 8 – Execution, Section 3 - Secure, 8-16 of the British Army Field Manual highlights the risks that corruption poses to resolving a conflict and effective counterinsurgency. It makes the point that corruption can contribute to financing the insurgency.

It acknowledges the pervasive nature of corruption in some societies, and that can be extremely difficult to tackle. It notes that “in some cultures, certain levels of what may be considered by us to be corrupt practices will be perfectly normal in the eyes of the indigenous population.”

The manual points to law enforcement agencies as the primary institution that should deal with corruption, but states that “in practice it will be the framework security forces that will make the significant contribution in this area.” Practical guidance must be provided to help security forces understand how to deal with corruption when it is uncovered. The manual addresses the complexity of the problem: “Arresting a tribal leader who has offered or accepted a small bribe may cause more harm than good in the long term.”

It also highlights the importance of dealing with corruption within host nation forces, and calls for it to be a “high priority within security sector reform.”
ISAF COUNTERINSURGENCY CONTRACTING GUIDANCE

ISAF issued a set of guidelines for contracting of services and personnel in sustainment of operations in Afghanistan in September 2010 in an effort to reinforce its commitment and support for the Afghan government’s intent to reduce corruption. The guidelines directed NATO commanders at all levels to align every aspect of contracting with the Coalition’s and the Afghan government’s efforts to ensure the security and well-being of the Afghan people.

The guidance built on a number of principles and instructions to ensure contracting would be done wisely and be mindful of its impact on the mission and the Afghan people. These principles include: direction to operational commanders to consult with local leaders, linking contract decisions with intelligence, developing Afghan First initiatives, and being aware of the importance of greater inclusion, transparency, and adequate oversight at all levels.

This Counter-Insurgency (COIN) Contracting Guidance, initiated by General Petraeus, emphasised that the scale of contracting efforts in Afghanistan were both an opportunity and a danger, but with proper oversight, the contracting could spur economic development while also providing support to the Afghan government and ISAF campaign objectives. The coalition money spent accomplished objectives such as: improving roads, power sources, commercial infrastructure, water and medical clinic availability, and security efforts. This guidance was intended to protect against inadvertent consequences of some contracting and procurement actions and maximize the positive impact of every dollar invested in Afghanistan.
SUBJECT: COMISAF's Counterinsurgency (COIN) Contracting Guidance

The scale of our contracting efforts in Afghanistan represents both an opportunity and a danger. With proper oversight, contracting can spur economic development and support the Afghan government’s and ISAF’s campaign objectives. If, however, we spend large quantities of international contracting funds quickly and with insufficient oversight, it is likely that some of those funds will unintentionally fuel corruption, finance insurgent organizations, strengthen criminal patronage networks, and undermine our efforts in Afghanistan.

In view of these points, contracting has to be "Commander's business." Indeed, I expect Commanders to consider the effects of our contract spending and understand who benefits from it. We must use intelligence to inform our contracting and ensure those with whom we contract work for the best interests of the Afghan people. We must be better buyers and buy from better people. Consistent with NATO and national contracting laws and regulations, we must:

Understand the role of contracting in COIN. Purchases we make for construction, goods, and services can bolster economic growth, stability, and Afghan goodwill toward their government and ISAF. Contracts with Afghan firms that procure Afghan goods and services generate employment and assist in the development of a sustainable economy. However, if we contract with powerbrokers who exclude those outside their narrow patronage networks or are perceived as funnelling resources to one community at the expense of another, the effect on Afghan perceptions and our mission will be negative. Thus, we must incorporate COIN Contracting topics into training for Commanders.

Hire Afghans first, buy Afghan products, and build Afghan capacity. Use contracting to hire Afghan workers and Afghan-owned companies. If we are unable to contract with an Afghan company, encourage companies to hire Afghans and sub-contract with responsible Afghan firms. Emulate successes such as NTM-A/CSTC-A's Afghan First program that created a boot making industry in Kabul. Find solutions that tap existing, but sometimes limited, Afghan capacity, such as maximizing the opportunities for local small and medium-sized companies to compete for our contracts. Adapt procedures, such as facilitating base access, to remove obstacles to hiring Afghans. Wherever appropriate, use in-country sourcing rather than imports.
Look for opportunities to incorporate maintenance and repair training in existing contracts to build Afghan skills and to create long-term employment. Focus efforts on promoting industries with immediate and long-term growth potential, such as agriculture, food processing, beverages, and construction. Adopt a fair wage and fair price approach that minimizes market shock and inflation. Guard against "front businesses" that fraudulently claim to be Afghan-owned.

**Know those with whom we are contracting.** Where our money goes is as important as the service provided or the product delivered. Establish systems and standard databases for vetting vendors and contractors to ensure that contracting does not empower the wrong people or allow the diversion of funds. Support contracting agencies and officers so they can get out in the field and build relationships with local businesses and community leaders. Gain and maintain visibility of the sub-contractor network. Contract with vendors that have fewer sub-contractors. Excessive sub-contracting tiers provide opportunities for criminal networks and insurgents to divert contract money from its intended purpose. Hold prime contractors responsible for the behavior and performance of their sub-contractors. Ensure that prime contractors provide detailed information on all sub-contractors consistent with coalition requirements and with CENTCOM Contracting Command's new sub-contractor clause.

**Exercise responsible contracting practices.** While we all desire fast results, haste in contracting invites fraud, waste, and abuse. Plan ahead, establish reasonable timelines, and ensure transparency and oversight so that contracting and procurement reinforce rather than detract from our objectives.

**Integrate contracting into intelligence, plans, and operations.** Commanders must know what contracting activity is occurring in their battlespace and who benefits from those contracts. Integrate contracting into intelligence, plans, and operations to exert positive influence and to better accomplish our campaign objectives. Commanders should use COIN Contracting Management Boards to coordinate contracting efforts and ensure contracts support campaign goals. Commanders and contracting agencies should share best practices, align policies and procedures, and exchange information on contractor performance-positive or negative (using digitally linked CIDNE/INDURE databases).

**Consult and involve local leaders.** Use local shuras and Afghan government and private sector leaders to prioritize projects, identify viable companies, vet potential contractors, improve oversight, hold contractors accountable, and provide post-award feedback to inform future projects. Work with and through the Ministry of Rural Reconstruction and Development to leverage existing monitoring, procurement, and implementation capabilities and to build long-term Afghan institutional capacity.
Develop new partnerships. Contracts with a broader range of Afghan companies will help break monopolies and weaken patronage networks that breed resentment. In situations where there is no alternative to powerbrokers with links to criminal networks, it may be preferable to forgo the project. Broadly advertise contract opportunities to local communities beyond bases. When appropriate, use NGOs to identify potential contracting partners and train them to navigate our contracting processes.

Look beyond cost, schedule, and performance. Evaluate the success of a contract by the degree to which it supports the Afghan people and our campaign objectives. Include operational criteria in decisions to award contracts such as the effect of the contract on security, local power dynamics, and the enemy. Invest in oversight and enforce contract requirements. Ensure post-award oversight of contractors and their performance to get what we pay for and to ensure the contract supports our mission. Because the number of contracts each contracting officer oversees has increased, commands must devote additional personnel to oversight. Designate top-performers to serve as Contract Officer Representatives and ensure that they are trained and understand the operational importance of contracting.

Act. Upon identification of linkages between contractors and criminal networks, we must take appropriate actions, such as: suspension and debarment of the individuals or the company, contract termination, or not renewing a contract option period. Recognize that some of these actions may have broad or significant ramifications and plan accordingly. Establish rapid, flexible, and thorough processes to develop, coordinate, approve, and implement contract actions to end contracts that undermine our mission.

Get the story out. We must improve our contracting practices to ensure they fully support our mission. However, we must also recognize what our contracting has accomplished. Our contracting efforts have sustained widely dispersed and high tempo operations and helped build Afghan national security capacity. Our contracting has also improved the lives of many Afghans, enhanced infrastructure, delivered essential services, supported local businesses, increased employment, and fostered economic development.

David H. Petraeus
General, United States Army
Commander, International Security Assistance Force/United States Forces-Afghanistan
ANTI-CORRUPTION GUIDANCE NOTE
EMBASSY OF DENMARK, KABUL
NOVEMBER 2013
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Anti-Corruption Policy

ZERO TOLERANCE TOWARDS CORRUPTION

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and thus Denmark, actively supports the international fight against corruption and advises partners on how to avoid corruption. In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, we are determined to maintain the highest standards of integrity and work ethics among our staff and across all areas of activity. We therefore maintain a policy of zero tolerance towards corruption in all its forms.

This Anti-Corruption Guidance Note is intended to guide the Embassy’s work and provide good practice in handling the corruption challenge in Afghanistan. It will be reviewed and updated regularly. It is complimentary to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Anti-Corruption Policy and Code of Conduct which are applicable to all staff working in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Copenhagen and at Danish Missions. Their purposes are to ensure and support behaviour and work ethics characterised by the highest standards of personal and organisational integrity, both internally and externally with our many different partners.

WHAT IS CORRUPTION?

Corruption is defined as the misuse of entrusted power for private gain. It affects everyone whose life, livelihood or happiness depends on the integrity of people in a position of authority, it threatens the stability and security of societies, and it undermines democratic institutions and values.

This definition corresponds to the concept of corruption in the Danish Penal Code and in international anti-corruption conventions, and it covers situations involving the taking and giving of bribes as well as other types of active or passive corruption.

Corruption is best known in the form of bribery, fraud, embezzlement or extortion. However, corruption does not exclusively involve money changing hands; it may also include providing services to gain advantages, such as favourable treatment, special protection, extra services or quicker case processing.

SAFEGUARDING DANIDA FUNDS IN AFGHANISTAN

Corruption is pervasive in Afghanistan, which in 2012 ranked as one of the most corrupt countries in the world by the Transparency International perception index of public sector corruption. A UNODC Survey finds that corruption is perceived by the Afghan population as one of the most important issues facing the country only second to concerns about insecurity.

REPORT CORRUPTION

Confidentiality:
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Danida will treat your report confidentially and ensure that it will only be handled by the relevant people in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Danida’s anti-corruption team, under the limitations of the Danish Access to Public Administration Files Act.

The Process:
When we process your information, we may find it necessary to return with more qualifying questions regarding the activities under suspicion in order to substantiate the case. It is therefore essential that you give us an active e-mail address to respond to.

When you file a report you will receive an automatic acknowledgement of receipt from our system.

We seek to process your report within two weeks and we will always give you acknowledgement of having processed your report.

Read more:

Link to report:
While Denmark as a development partner accepts the high risk of corruption as a factor in providing development assistance to Afghanistan, protecting Danish funds is a key priority. The Minister for Development Cooperation has therefore launched a five-point action plan to strengthen oversight of DANIDA funds in Afghanistan.

Denmark is committed to support the development efforts of Afghanistan through the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework with approx. 530 million DKK in development assistance annually. DANIDA uses a range of funding modalities to implement this mutual partnership. Funds are channelled through multilateral development agencies including the World Bank, multi-donor trust funds and UN agencies, funds and programmes, in delegated cooperation with other bilateral partners, through non-government and civil society organisations and as bilaterally implemented programmes. Each of these modalities has different risk profiles.

Additionally, Denmark adheres to the Paris Principles and New Deal aid effectiveness principles and the Tokyo commitments on mutual accountability and channels approx. 50 per cent of development assistance through the Afghan national budget.

The transition post-2014 including the drawdown of international forces and the developing security situation poses challenges in terms of monitoring of the development assistance. Denmark will therefore support the UN in developing a specific risk-management framework for the post-2014 period.

An active civil society that holds the executive accountable is vital for combatting corruption. Denmark will therefore continue and seek to deepen the engagement with civil society actors to strengthen domestic oversight and accountability.

The embassy’s risk management approach is based on the DANIDA guidelines for risk management (August 2013) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Anti-Corruption Policy and tailored to the sectoral composition and implementation modalities of the portfolio as well as the special Afghan context.

In 2013-2014, Denmark will prioritise to:

- Deepen the engagement in public financial management in collaboration with development partners with a view to strengthening the oversight of on-budget funds;
- Strengthen oversight and accountability in the education sector through targeted value for money audits;
- Work with development partners to strengthen financial management and oversight of the “Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan” (LOTFA) and the “Strengthening Provincial Administration and Service Delivery Programme” (SPAD);
- Support the UN to develop a coherent risk-management framework tailored to Afghanistan.
- Conduct an internal risk-study based on the DANIDA guidelines to prepare for the post-2014 risks;
f) Strengthen Danish engagement with multilateral and bilateral development partners to pursue a coherent strategy for combatting corruption;
g) Strengthen the policy dialogue with Afghan authorities on corruption;
h) Support civil society organisations that work in the field of anti-corruption either directly or through the Tawanmandi programme.

The following steps have already been taken to ensure that the Embassy maintains a strong focus on corruption in its activities.

1. All staff at the Embassy will adhere to the code of conduct (insert link);
2. All staff handling payments and cash or working with DANIDA funds will complete the mandatory on-line e-learning: [http://um.dk/en/about-us/e-learning/anti-corruption/](http://um.dk/en/about-us/e-learning/anti-corruption/);
3. The Embassy has established an Anti-Corruption Task Force that reports to management in Kabul and maintains monthly dialogue with the Quality Assurance Department and Afghanistan Team in Copenhagen;
4. The Embassy will conduct an annual portfolio review exercise according to the AMG Guideline to Risk Management and consult key external counterparts on implementation issues and fiduciary aspects where major issues have been identified.

**EMBASSY PRACTICE IN HANDLING CORRUPTION CASES**

1. All cases where there are suspicions of irregularities, fraud, corruption or other kind of misuse of Danish funds will be reported as corruption-cases (filed in the c-case system);
2. The embassy policy is that the Minister for Development Cooperation will be notified in all c-cases filed in Afghanistan. Parliament will be informed in all substantial cases (above DKK 10m) and cases that are deemed to be of political interest;
3. The responsible programme officer is in charge of making the initial reporting in the c-case system and following the concrete cases in their programmes keeping management up to date on progress;
4. The embassy will suspend all funding to programmes with open c-cases except in rare exceptional cases;
5. The Anti-Corruption Task Force will review progress on all c-cases on a monthly basis; Management will decide when there is sufficient evidence to close a c-case based on a recommendation from the programme officer.

**LET DANIDA KNOW**

Danida welcomes your feedback:

The main objective of Danida Feedback is to enable the beneficiaries of Danish development cooperation in Danida’s priority countries to provide feedback concerning activities and decisions in which Danida is involved.

Danida welcomes all feedback, whether it concerns information that is considered valuable for Danida in its work with local partners, draws attention to adverse consequences of Denmark’s development cooperation or concerns complaints by people directly affected by Denmark’s development cooperation. Anonymous feedback is not processed.

How Danida handles your feedback:

Feedback is handled by the Danish mission responsible for Danish development cooperation in the Danida priority country in question. Before you send us feedback, you are advised to read more about feedback to Danida in order to know how the Danish mission will deal with your feedback.

The ten main corruption pathways

1. CRIMINAL PATRONAGE NETWORKS

Patronage and patronage networks exist in all societies, and are usually a strong societal force. These networks are often based on ethnicity, religion, or tribe. Problems arise when the patronage system is adapted to criminal ends and/or to illegal enhancement of political power.

The most serious and destabilising forms of corruption are carried out systematically by criminal patronage networks that operate with political protection. These criminal patronage networks (CPNs) are engaged in the capture and subversion of critical state functions and institutions. They divert customs revenue at international airports and border crossing points, steal international security and development assistance, and abuse public and private financial institutions at the expense of the nation’s economic stability. The networks may also profit from facilitating, protecting, and participating in the trade of natural resources or narcotics. CPNs “operate with impunity by exerting influence within law enforcement, investigative, and judicial institutions across the government.”

In these types of systems, powerbrokers gain and maintain legitimacy in part based on the extent to which they seem to represent the interests of segments of the population on whose behalf they are supposedly acting. These CPNs will seek to control key state assets and institutions and pursue criminal and political agendas. The powerbrokers behind them provide protection and perhaps other resources to those businesses, political groups, and civil society groups that support their agenda, and deny protection to those on the outside.

CPNs play a key role in de-legitimising a host government. Achieving advancement in a society controlled by a predatory elite pact government operating through CPNs relies on who you know and not what you know. Businesses get ahead through personal connections or kickbacks to powerbrokers. Those without these protections find it too hard or too unprofitable to stay in business.

In addition to de-legitimising the government, CPNs strengthen malign actors such as insurgents and criminals. For example, private security firms, logistics providers, and construction companies linked to powerbrokers and their militias may receive contracts from international donors, strengthening their patronage networks and further excluding the majority of the population.
Key indicators of such an environment include:

- The “recycling” of corrupt officials – rather than being prosecuted, those accused of gross injustice are moved to new jobs or fired, only to reappear a few months later in a different capacity.
- Degrees of impunity – when government officials, key powerbrokers, or their senior lieutenants are arrested, they are rarely tried or convicted. Law enforcement agencies may refuse to act to arrest or prosecute key powerbrokers or their protégées even with overwhelming evidence or intelligence. Charges may be dropped, evidence lost, or judges bribed or coerced. Sentences may be inappropriately light or forms of escape, medical release, or house arrest may be offered in lieu of spending time in jail.
- The high-level collusion between the government and criminal organisations.
- A highly politicised civil service employment system.
- Nepotism – civil service jobs may be based on personal contacts and/or the “highest bidder”.
- Honest workers and reformers are forced out of government, placed in highly undesirable jobs, sent abroad, or demoted. They may be threatened or killed by those with government connections.
- Suppression of civil society – effective anti-corruption organisations and their members may be isolated, threatened, or killed. They may find their resources cut or laws may be created that significantly hinder or marginalise their operations. Leaders commonly viewed as corrupt or ineffective are put in charge of such organisations to keep them in line or ineffective.
- In the most egregious cases, anti-corruption organisations will be at least as corrupt as the corrupt government itself.

If operating in an environment in which the government is largely controlled by a predatory elite pact, controlling criminal patronage networks is extremely difficult. Nevertheless, there are areas that can limit the functioning of CPNs and deliver improvement in the long term.

These include:

**Map CPNs**

Use intelligence assets to map the various personal, business, and other linkages between individuals, organisations, and government posts to establish where key powerbrokers and their relatives (who may operate the network by proxy) sit within the larger political elite context. Through understanding the CPNs and how they operate, additional steps can be taken to limit their effectiveness. This will also assist in detecting the recycling of government officials at all levels.

**Do no additional harm**

With understanding of CPNs, try to ensure that contracts, aid, and other money and resources are provided to the least
corrupt organisations. In highly corrupt environments, it may not be possible for individual workers, companies, or government agencies to be uninvolved in patronage networks, but attempt to find those that are less corrupt or those that are most likely to provide legitimate services.

**Insist on full transparency with aid, contracts, and budgets**

For long-term development aid, contracts should be made contingent on full transparency. It is essential to insist that performance be verified by outside sources. Subcontracting is a prime means to move money and resources to CPNs. Limit the ability for subcontracting, and examine subcontractors with the same vigour as prime contractors are investigated.

**Support legitimate reformers**

Individuals, civil society, and other reform minded groups may need direct or indirect support. Individual supporters or groups may need physical protection from powerbrokers.

**Support political space for transparency and reform**

Support will be needed to create a more level playing field for all actors. This includes encouraging freedom of the press and enabling them to report on corruption and powerbrokers. Include educational programmes that explain what rights citizens have so that they know what they should expect.
2. FACTIONALISM

Corruption can significantly exacerbate factionalist conflict, increasing the complexity of missions. Patronage networks are often structured around a pre-existing partisan, sectarian, or ethnic affiliation. In such situations, corruption can quickly become factionalist in nature, with faction-based powerbrokers supplying jobs, humanitarian aid, and other benefits to their ethnic group or tribe, while excluding others. Because powerbrokers often have their own militias, resource allocation can become violent as powerbrokers fight each other for access to business opportunities, natural resources, and political and economic opportunities.

Factions or sectarian loyalties can act as a bond to mobilise support, and at the same time, faction leaders can claim that efforts to promote integration, transparency, or accountability will expose the faction to ‘external’ threats. As faction leaders may be tied to powerbrokers for financial support and protection, they may find themselves in a symbiotic relationship so that both require an unstable environment in order to survive and prosper. Corruption can reinforce ethnic, religious, and other divisions that help feed cycles of violence, and make a lasting peace all the more difficult.47

If a political settlement has factionalist overtones, it is common to find geographic areas or specific ministries given over to certain partisan or sectarian groups as a form of reward. The result is a government ridden with different factions competing with one another for short-term gains and illicit profits so that little actual governance or economic development can be accomplished.

Factionalism and corruption can also have a direct impact on the host nation security forces. If one ethnic group is given opportunities and others are discriminated against, for example, the result will be a security force that exacerbates local tensions rather than mitigating them. Counterinsurgency doctrine speaks to putting a host country’s security forces in the lead, but if sectarian-based corruption has made the forces non-representative, the result is likely to be less rather than more stability. In the worst case, factional militias can become legalised death squads.

Factionalist powerbrokers, such as ethnic group leaders, can use threats to their group as an excuse to establish “self-protection” forces, especially in a state that fails to provide security for its citizens. Even if these groups are originally established to legitimately protect their communities, they have a tendency to evolve into predatory groups, attacking external enemies while extorting, or preying upon, their own community. Moreover, if outright criminal networks are tied to ethnic powerbrokers, they are very likely to find that an unstable environment provides a better opportunity for their illegal activities. They thus have a strong incentive to maintain their corrupt and powerful patronage and to undermine mission objectives and goals.

What can be done in such situations? Specific steps include:
Map the ethnic network
This involves mapping faction-based individuals in the patronage system, institutions, interests, and sources of income. In many cases, this will centre around ethnically based groups. The mapping should include not only the security forces, but also other government ministries and shadow actors, as these have significant influence on the overall security situation as well. Mapping such patronage groups may also help indicate which powerbrokers are acting more on behalf of legitimate grievances of their population, and which are using that as a cover for corrupt and illicit activities.

Establish and maintain some level of ethnic and tribal balance
At the strategic level, consideration should be given to ensure equality of ethnic, tribal, and sectarian representation in security forces. In all cases, senior leaders should consider host nation norms for balance and to ensure that an unsustainable change is not imposed on the host nation.

Address factional militias
Request a requirement to disarm such militias as part of the mission mandate.

Empower local and national-level leaders
Empower those leaders willing to work on behalf of the larger national good with the aim of drawing support away from corrupt faction-based leaders who rely on an unstable environment to prosper. Especially look for leaders who are able to transcend ethnic loyalties, such as doctors, lawyers, etc.

Provide oversight of local security forces
On a long term and consistent basis provide supervision and ensure more professional standards, especially in areas where there are concerns about faction-based corruption and extortion from security forces.
3. ELECTIONS

Elections are seen as a key prerequisite to establishing a legitimate government and enabling the effective/sustainable receipt of humanitarian, development, and security assistance. The assumption is that elections will bring about a legitimate government with a popular mandate to act in the national interest. However, this is often not the case in fragile states, especially with a government run by a pact of powerbrokers. Instead, politics and elections, both at the national and local level, are often a series of political settlements, with election results used to entrench the current powerbrokers rather than establish a true mandate of the people.

Elections can therefore have the perverse effect of further delegitimising a government. Politics and elections in such conditions can be a pathway to further corruption, predation on the population, and instability, rather than a force for legitimacy and building resilience. There is some evidence that elections can lead to more violence in highly fragile states. However, there are some tools that can make such political settlements more inclusive and legitimate while decreasing pathways to corruption and violence.

Knowing that political institutions, especially elections, are usually required by the international community, powerbrokers manufacture the institutions and the election results they require. The international community tends to focus on the actual balloting on election day itself, and perhaps the few days or weeks after as the votes are counted. For powerbrokers, however, the political campaign is a much longer process, usually beginning at least months, if not years, before the election day itself. It is in the pre-campaign stage that the jostling, deals, and violence begin in order to determine who will ultimately be the winner and how the spoils will be shared between the main players. These deals, as well as shaping the election environment, continue throughout the campaign period, including the voter registration process.

Election day itself is often fraught with intimidation of voters and election fraud in all its forms. Election corruption and fraud will be both violent and non-violent. Many election-related actions will be within the minutiae of election rules and powerbrokers will use them to mould the political environment into the form they seek.

Security assistance forces should not assume that the old political settlement is broken because someone new has taken office. Instead, these settlements often involve the same powerbrokers or their protégées circulating amongst a variety of senior posts and remaining in place. The result can be that the international community considers that the regime now has some level of legitimacy and a mandate from the people. The local population, however, sees the election as a further de-legitimisation of the government and further entrenchment of corruption. Rather than making stabilisation efforts easier, elections may lead to missions becoming more complex, difficult, and challenging than before the elections.

Establishing inclusive and reform-minded political forces takes time and constant pressure. Mission personnel in a fragile or...
failed state environment should consider the following measures to improve the situation:

Map the political context
In advance, map the political key actors, institutions, and interests in order to best anticipate the types and levels of corruption, intimidation, and violence that may result. This may also assist security assistance forces in anticipating types, levels, and locations of violence during and after election campaigns.

Refrain from involvement in political processes
Security forces should not be involved in political processes or elections, they should ensure a level playing field for all actors. This may include providing protection to politicians, political offices, and rallies, so that all candidates may run their campaigns. They should also work with the broader international community to ensure freedom of the press and balanced election coverage.

Assist in providing security
The international mission should assist and educate host nation security forces on their role in providing security during the political process and elections. This includes providing security to the whole of the election process, end to end, including provision of security for election monitors, secure registration, and balloting stations. Host nation troops may have never received training on their role during an election.

Establish clear guidelines to handle election fraud
Security assistance forces should develop clear guidelines for what to do if they see corruption and election related fraud. For instance, what should security assistance forces do if they see the abuse of international election monitors or the voters themselves? Do they have a mandate to protect them? Who do they report these situations to?
4. ORGANISED CRIME

There is no internationally recognised definition of organised crime, but generally, it is criminal activity that involves three or more persons, exists for an extended period of time, is a serious crime (though what constitutes “serious” can be controversial), and is to obtain financial or other benefit. Organised crime issues have usually been considered a law enforcement problem rather than a military one, but it is now increasingly becoming a military and political concern on stability operations.

Organised crime has become a military problem because of the links between insurgent or terrorist forces and criminal groups. While terrorists and insurgents have always relied upon criminal activity for financing, significant linkages between insurgencies and terrorists with organised crime groups have become more pronounced and prevalent over the last 40 years. These linkages provide a stream of finance for all these groups, making such conflicts more intractable.

Criminal and insurgent groups may morph into one another. Criminal organisations may take on ideological or ethnic overtones, or insurgent groups may lose much of their former political ideology and goals and become essentially criminal in nature. In these cases, conflict resolution becomes more difficult as new actors and interests evolve, many of whom will have an incentive for maintaining instability.

Cross-over tactics
Moreover, increasingly, some organised crime groups such as drug trafficking organisations in Mexico and Central America are using tactics more akin to insurgency than traditional criminal activities. For instance, in order to protect their drug supply chains, Mexican gangs have not only sought to intimidate local law enforcement, but also local populations with large scale attacks on civilian targets, beheadings, and other forms of violence normally associated with an insurgency or terrorist campaign. Since 2006, over 70,000 people have been killed in drug related violence in Mexico – more than the 58,000 people that the United States lost in Vietnam.

Operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Mali have demonstrated that organised crime can have serious military effects. In Iraq, there was a triangular relationship between criminal, terrorist and insurgent organisations, and the government. The Iraqi state became an instrument for the elites to accumulate power and wealth, and they became intertwined with the criminal networks. Parts of the Iraqi government were tied to various militia, most notably Shia-controlled military forces that became de facto government death squads while engaging in criminal activities. This led to a vicious cycle where the lack of state legitimacy made partisan or sectarian affiliation even more important for an individual’s protection, which in turn further weakened the state. Corruption in ministries, especially the Ministry of Oil, meant there was insufficient revenue to properly fund the police or military force even if the government had the will to fight these terrorist, insurgent, and criminal groups on behalf of the Iraqi people.49
Loss of social trust
Organised crime has significant consequences for fragile states, and for the missions sent to assist. Countries with significant organised crime become locked in a vicious cycle where social trust is lost and the economy is subverted. This leads to greater grievances in the population, while at the same time forcing people into organised criminal activities as a way to cope with a lack of opportunities. As crime becomes more entrenched, corrupt powerbrokers linked to organised crime may be less likely to deploy forces to combat it. At its worst are the criminally captured states, where those running the state become a criminal enterprise, with the institutions of the state being used to advance criminal interests rather than those of its citizens. Such highly corrupt states provide many opportunities for organised crime to flourish, including some level of safe haven, poor border controls for smuggling, and a large labour pool due to a lack of economic alternatives.50

Effect on rule of law
The effect on the justice and law enforcement systems can be particularly pernicious, where subversion by criminals causes citizens to lose faith with the state to act as a neutral enforcer of laws.51 In such cases, police may revert to extra-judicial killings rather than hand criminals over to a corrupt legal system. Police may themselves become organised crime groups, as the Zetas did in Mexico when they defected from Mexican Special Forces to become enforcers for a drug cartel, and later, a cartel in their own right. Moreover, vigilante groups that spring up to defend neighbourhoods or cities may themselves become involved in organised crime, as right wing paramilitaries did in Colombia in the 1980s and 1990s.

Practices that work best in such an operating environment include:

Map and identify the linkages between organised crime and corruption
Map all aspects of corruption and CPNs. This includes identifying, for example, the intersection between the government, insurgents, narcotics producers, and traffickers. Assess key vulnerabilities of the middle and senior producers and traders in order to craft an effective counter-narcotics and counter-corruption strategy.

Keep criminal aspects in mind when fighting insurgents
There has been a tendency to focus on fighting the insurgents in isolation, while ignoring criminal aspects and the role of government corruption. All three must be addressed for successful long-term mission success.

Establish rule of law and local security
In the initial stages of an international mission or operation, if the mandate permits, establish rule of law and local security. In a non-secure environment, both pre-existing and new criminal actors will step into a vacuum. Assist the international (and national?) community in building capacity for security and judicial sectors, as a mission’s credibility will suffer if it is seen to be powerless to act against organised crime.
Encourage the host government to stop collaborating with favourite tribes or groups Encourage the host government to stop arming tribes or groups as their proxy and to stop allowing those militias to engage in criminal activity.

Provide effective monitoring and oversight of mission contracting and foreign aid Effective monitoring should be provided to minimise a relationship where corrupt government officials use mission contracting to enrich themselves and empower their chosen militias and/or criminal groups.

Investigate contractors Ensure that contractors are not part of a network of legitimate front companies hiding illicit activities as part of an organised crime enterprise. Along with international community partners, ensure that this information is catalogued and shared for continuity for the duration of the operation.

5. NARCOTICS

The narcotics industry, drug trafficking organisations (DTOs), and the corruption that results from them form an especially toxic combination for security assistance forces in international missions, because it usually leads to some level of criminal state capture in fragile states.

In Afghanistan, Mali, and Yemen, narcotics may be a critical revenue stream that governing networks tap, usually with profoundly destabilising consequences.52

Drug trafficking supply chains are complicated and almost always cross numerous borders. Most drugs, especially those that are cocaine and opiate-based, are grown in poor countries such as Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Afghanistan, and Burma. Their customer locations are in North America and Europe in the case of cocaine, while Russia and Europe are the major consumer locations for opiates. In between the farmers producing raw material and the consumers of the drug are complicated supply chains: laboratories to process the raw inputs into illicit drugs, supply of precursor chemicals, smuggling chains to transport drugs, warehousing, storage, and finally, distribution to customers. There are also complicated payment methods, which include money laundering and informal financial networks. Each step in these chains has a high likelihood for corruption, as government officials, especially in very poor locations, may be paid a lifetime’s wages simply to look the other way on shipments. Moreover, violence to protect important drug production and trafficking routes is common when counteracting government or mission-
led counter-narcotics operations, and between rival drug producers and trafficking groups.

Drug production and trafficking are also important for financing insurgencies. As such, insurgent and terrorist organisations may have significant links to drug trafficking organisations or may be drug trafficking organisations in their own right.

DTOs deliberately permeate political and state institutions to facilitate their operations and they thrive in an environment of insecurity, with peace and stability a threat to their interests. In order to further their interests, they engage in everything from sporadic bribery to infiltrating important government institutions. In particular, DTOs will bribe officials and/or infiltrate supporters into the police and judicial process in order to have long-term protection from arrest and prosecution.

In its most malign form, DTOs undertake state capture, where the senior levels of the state act on behalf of the interests of the narcotics industry and other criminal networks. The leadership in the country may even actively take part in the drugs business. Examples of this include the arrest of the former head of the Guinea-Bissau Navy in April 2013, and regular allegations of narcotics trafficking by powerful Afghan governors appointed by President Karzai.

Practices which work best to address these types of issue are:

**Map and identify linkages between narcotics and corrupt networks**

Identify where there is an intersection between the government, insurgents, narcotics producers and traffickers in order to craft an effective counter narcotics and corruption strategy.

**Avoid crop eradication**

Undertaking crop eradication without adequate security and viable alternative livelihoods for small farmers and traders is strongly discouraged. Often there are no actual crop substitutes that can equal the amount of money a small farmer or trader can make from drugs. Plants used for the production of narcotics often grow in marginal lands and can be stored more easily than perishable crops. The system of narcotics production and trading must be understood, as well as the entire system required for any crop or other substitution, if eradication and crop substitution is to be effective. Alternative livelihoods alone will not be sufficient, so substitution will have to be combined with effective law enforcement. This is a role for national government, in coordination with development and international organisation and agencies and specialist NGOs.

**Carefully vet law enforcement individuals and organisations**

Ensure thorough vetting of law enforcement individuals and organisations before working with them to investigate, prosecute, and incarcerate narcotics leaders. Providing public backing and assistance to significantly compromised and corrupt counter-narcotics forces only increases insecurity and tensions with the public, while entrenching DTOs further into criminal patronage networks.
Understand the role of narcotics in the lives of ordinary citizens
Narcotics are often used as cash crops by poor families to raise funds to buy goods that they need to survive. Recognise that many small scale drug producers are essentially sharecroppers, who go into debt before the planting season with the intent of paying their debts after the harvest. Threatening that livelihood can easily force small farmers and labourers to align with insurgents and criminal networks to protect their survival. Destroying their caches can lead to their financial ruin and dangerous indebtedness to warlords.

Assist host nation forces in protecting judges and their families
Judicial officials often have a choice of “silver or lead”, where a judge can either take the bribe and look the other way or face death for him or his family. Without credible protection, few judges or other judicial officials have a serious option.

Consider assisting with a specialist judiciary for narcotics cases
As there will be intense political and other pressure on narcotics cases, external assistance might be helpful.

Assist in the protection of credible civil society
Assist in protecting credible civil society and independent media elements that can expose corrupt activities of government officials and their connections and interplay with DTOs. If the mission mandate permits, this will likely have to include security assistance to some civil society and media groups from intimidation by narcotics criminals, as well as the ability to protect or move reformers and their families if their lives are threatened.
6. EXPLOITATION OF NATURAL ASSETS

Corruption is intimately tied to natural resources in two ways:

Rent-seeking
Individuals and groups compete to garner the revenues from the natural resources for themselves and their social, ethnic, national or tribal group at the expense of the population overall.

Corrupt management
Corrupt management within the natural resource industry itself, leading to poor development or other use of the resources.

Countries highly endowed with natural resources tend to experience economic development more slowly than those without such resources. This is called “the resource curse”, leading to the country becoming less secure, with poorer economies and decreased levels of democracy and other citizen political participation. Examples include Sudan (oil), Democratic Republic of Congo (minerals), Guinea (minerals), and Liberia (diamonds and timber).

Logging or the trade in restricted wildlife products such as ivory may be particularly lucrative in other countries and can involve guerrilla movements and military authorities in some cases. Cash crops, such as cocoa, cotton, or palm oil, may also be captured in destructive ways by kleptocratic networks.

Such an environment is a challenge for international missions. Control over natural resources enables a steady source of finances for militias and violence between competing groups may break out if new natural resources are found. To prevent this, international missions must work with host nation security forces to secure these natural resources. If the host government is in a situation requiring large-scale outside assistance, it is likely engaged in a vicious cycle of patronage politics, rent-seeking, and corruption, and providing those resources only fuels this vicious cycle with insurgency, criminality, and other violence.

In this situation, suggested courses of action include:

Encourage transparency and independent oversight of contracts and contracting
The process of tendering contracts, bidding, awarding of contracts, extraction, processing, and transporting should be transparent. Encourage “publish what you pay” requirements at all levels, with both companies and the government transparently publishing all contracts, and bids in a manner that is easily and publically accessible in local languages.

Many NGOs provide natural resource charters, handbooks, and references on how to do this (see websites in Resources Annex).

Ensure credible security planning
Work with the government, natural resource industries, and development agencies involved to develop a full and comprehensive plan for the entire system of natural resource extraction. This should
include securing of sites such as mines or drilling sites, roads leading into and out of mining areas, electricity and water supplies, and so on.

**Ensure efficient use of security assistance forces**
Ensure that security assistance forces are located in areas of major natural resources and vital economic facilities including lines of communications such as major roads in order to secure them from criminality and rebel forces. Assist host nation forces in training, planning, and operational delivery.

**Protect civil society groups**
Protect civil society groups, reformers, whistle blowers, and the media from intimidation and violence from the government, rebels, and other violent illicit actors.

**Use inclusive and vetted military forces**
Ensure that military forces used to secure natural resources and other economic sites are not tied to local powerbrokers or warlords. Be wary of the use of private security companies (PSC) that may be owned by local powerbrokers to secure these locations and resources.

**Train host nation forces**
Explain the importance of safeguarding natural resources for the nation, and how successful resource extraction can lead to greater long term national benefit over short term rent-seeking.

**Be careful of inadvertently incentivising attacks**
For example, oil pipeline protection forces have in the past been paid for each attack on a pipeline that they defeated. The result was an incentive for commanders and soldiers to clandestinely attack the pipeline or cut a deal with insurgent or criminal elements to do so in order to keep their jobs. Designing incentives to avoid violence and defend such assets must be carefully considered.
7. LAND TITLE AND EXPROPRIATION

Corruption in land titling and land disputes is often a major source of violence, instability, and corruption. Public land is a source of wealth and corrupt actors attempt to exploit it. In arid countries, access to water and thus suitability for agriculture is the key feature determining a piece of land’s value. In other examples, the most important factor may be proximity to the seashore or other tourist attractions.55

Corruption in land titling manifests itself in two ways:

Land mafias

A highly corrupt government may empower one or more 'land mafias' as a means of rewarding powerbrokers or passing on the spoils of governing, leading to new grievances, violence, and refugees or internally displaced persons as tenants and owners are forced from their lands.

In fragile states, land records are non-existent or likely to be destroyed. As a result of poor judicial and other institutions, bribery becomes the means to secure or to keep land. In a land dispute, a judge may be bribed to make a ruling in favour of the wrong individual or a powerbroker, regardless of the merits of the case. The local official at the land office may be bribed to 'find' the title to land or to 'lose' it so someone else can buy it or otherwise exploit it. In some countries, where there are different tax rates or other rewards for how land is classified, there may be bribery in establishing the zoning of land or in designating it as urban or rural.

These problems are compounded by fighting, climate change, or natural disasters which can lead to internally displaced persons and refugees. Hostile elements can often garner support by acting as neutral arbiter in the resolution of subsequent land disputes.

Corrupt governments may also give land to local powerbrokers in return for their allegiance, taking this land from rivals or the powerless, creating another source of grievance. If ethnic patronage networks are involved, such land grabs invariably take on an ethnic overtone. The disenfranchised become a viable source of support to rebel and/or criminal organisations in order to find a new livelihood and for support to regain their lost land. The result is a much hated 'land mafia', supported by the government or factions of the government.

Mission force basing

Corruption may complicate basing for security assistance forces, in acquiring land and leases to set up bases and logistics nodes, and when returning land to the rightful owners upon termination of the mission.

It is not uncommon for original owners and tenants to be evicted from their land by local or national powerbrokers when security assistance forces are about to arrive. The security assistance forces may then be offered leases or billeting from the new
'owner', often at very highly inflated prices. This enriches the local or national powerbroker and security assistance forces may be seen as complicit in the land grab, making them a target of resentment and violence.

All of these are complex situations for security assistance forces and usually outside the experience of the international mission.

In such situations, suggested courses of action include:

**Understand local land ownership**
Map land ownership patterns, and the culture of how land is owned, rented, and used. Map the local powerbrokers and their relationships to land disputes and land mafias. This will provide strong indicators of local grievances, possible avenues for rebels to gain support, and early warning of sudden, local violence.

**Try to verify the true owners of land or buildings**
When setting up base, try to investigate into the buildings being rented, bought leased, or borrowed. This may not be possible where time is critical. Try to investigate to ensure that rent payments are going to the rightful owners or, if government owned, to legitimate government accounts. Be wary of situations where land dispute is suddenly 'solved' overnight and secure title to land is suddenly found.

**Encourage credible local dispute mechanisms**
Official dispute mechanisms for land disputes may be lacking due to lack of capacity and/or corruption.

**Secure local land records, if they exist**
This may include helping ensure the security of local land titling personnel and judges and their families, who may experience intimidation and violence from criminals and powerbrokers. Assist development personnel in (re-) establishing land registries and conducting land surveys.
8. BORDERS

Borders form a key terrain in a political settlement as they provide a significant opportunity for corruption. Warlords and key powerbrokers can finance their patronage networks with the proceeds from controlling border crossings, smuggling routes, ports, and airports. These powerbrokers can extort additional ‘fees’ and ‘taxes’ on cargo coming into or out of the country. Additional revenues can be garnered from looking the other way as smuggling occurs, such as allowing consumer goods in without paying the requisite tariffs. Greater fees can be garnered if drugs or other highly profitable illicit goods are involved.

Even more lucrative is the explicit involvement of the customs and border authorities in smuggling themselves. In these cases, the smugglers swear allegiance to the government and provide money, votes, or other goods to the elites in return for a blind eye to their smuggling activities. The ability to move bulk cash or valuable metals like gold or precious stones can also facilitate money laundering and moving profits to more secure locations in other countries. Other forms of corruption at borders include passing information to criminal or insurgent groups, favouritism, bribery, fixing of investigations and evidence, failing to report violations, diversion of police resources or theft, and internal payoffs.56

Insurgent and criminal networks will typically need access to border areas, and it is not uncommon for government agents and agencies to provide access in return for protection from attack, financial rewards, or other advantages. For example, in Afghanistan, insurgent forces have long moved valuable resources such as chromite to market in Pakistan, which in turn provides resources for insurgent groups like the Haqqani Network.

A corrupt border security force allows transnational criminal activity to function efficiently, enables insurgent and other forces to bring in weapons, improvised explosive devices, and manpower across borders. Numerous studies have demonstrated that one of the key means for an insurgent or terrorist group to survive is the ability to have a cross border safe haven.

Finally, foreign security assistance forces’ supply lines will most likely cross borders. Corrupt customs and border enforcement forces complicate security assistance logistics lines both bringing in and retrograding material at mission termination.

Corrupt border forces can be reformed quickly. Georgia was able to dramatically improve its border enforcement and decrease corruption in the early 2000s. In seven years, it went from one of the most corrupt borders and customs agencies to one of the cleanest and most business friendly in its region.57

Options for improving border security and reducing border corruption in such situations include:
Map the border framework
Map the actors, institutions, and interests involved to establish the unwritten rules of how the border really functions.

Seek a mandate to provide significant, daily oversight of border areas
It should be recognised that this undermines the goal for the host government to accept security responsibility and also requires additional security assistance troops and other resources.

Clarify and post a simplified customs schedule
Often, border control agencies can maintain bribery simply by making it impossible for someone to decipher the rules and fees. A simplified process and schedule of fees posted in the local languages in plain view at border crossings. While not a panacea, can assist in improving transparency and revenue collection that goes to the state.

Mission forces operating alongside border units
This will enhance professionalism and encourage more honest conduct. Additionally, such oversight provides customs and border agents plausible deniability. They now have an excuse for not collecting bribes because they are being supervised, thereby alleviating some of the possible consequences for not providing money to their chains of command. If border agents do engage in corruption, mission forces may be seen as colluding with them.

Vigorous and public presentation of illegal acts by officials
For the longer term:
- Vet applicants to establish a professional, impartial, and effective border and customs security force.
- Establish training programmes to build capacity and professionalism.
- A professional, neutral internal affairs capability and judicial processes will be crucial to eventually clean up border processes.
- Establish easily auditable border control programmes to increase transparency, including electronic customs declarations and clearing. Long and cumbersome paper trails of handwritten forms provide customs officials the ability to collect bribes when paperwork invariably is not in order. Ensure that wages are at least at a minimum wage to survive and provide for a family, thereby eliminating the need to collect bribes for daily survival. Studies show that after that level, it becomes the political will and enforcement mechanisms that decrease bribery. A higher wage to officials will not necessarily decrease bribery, it can simply provide a higher minimum wage which bribes then supplement.
9. FOREIGN AID

There are two basic types of international aid associated with international missions.

Humanitarian aid, also called emergency aid, is usually short-term aid provided immediately after a natural disaster or crisis.

Development aid is also known as development assistance, technical assistance, international aid, overseas aid, official development assistance (ODA), and foreign aid. This aid is provided over the longer term and is designed to support governments and assist them in economic, environmental, social, and political development.

Military personnel assigned to international missions have to deal with both types of aid (for the purposes of this section, “foreign aid” refers to both types of aid unless otherwise specified). Military forces will often assist government personnel and international agencies in providing both humanitarian and developmental aid. Additionally, in conflict and post-conflict environments, military forces will often be required to secure access for the delivery of aid, as UN troops were mandated to do in Somalia in the early 1990s.

In some cases, aid may provide a perverse incentive to “ensure the persistence or appearance of some terrorist activity, in order to keep aid flowing.” Examples of this is military or counter-terrorism assistance provided to countries such as Algeria, Egypt, Pakistan or Yemen.

Aid inflows are another source of funds to be captured and diverted. Militants, criminals, warlords, and indeed ordinary citizens often pilfer, skim, or steal foreign aid. At the national level, jobs in ministries to which developmental aid flows will be in high demand due to the ability to skim funds, divert aid projects to allies, and hire their own private companies as contractors in major projects. Donors may also feel conflicted. They may be unwilling to push funds through a fragile government, while at the same time perceive funnelling it through government may actually enforce sovereignty and drive the government to create change to comply with funding schemes.

At the local level, aid agencies have encouraged local leaders to create lists of what their constituents need rather than having aid provided to them from above. However, it is important to ensure that the powerbrokers are establishing priorities based on the needs of their populations and not on what can reinforce their power, influence, and financing. If a powerbroker is particularly predatory or violent towards the population, the result of aid may be to increase the influence of a malign actor, further delegitimise the government, and push the population further towards the belligerents rather than creating a more secure environment.

There are also aid funds that are directly dispersed by military forces, which have been increasing in the last decade. US military concepts such as the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) have meant that military forces may provide substantial developmental aid. Under CERP,
even relatively low-level commanders may be able to approve and fund projects up to US$5,000, a substantial sum when average yearly incomes in a village may be less than US$1,000 per year. This is a controversial practice, as it distorts local economies and is perceived to lack transparency, whilst there is no consensus on its efficacy.

In conjunction with contracting oversight, mission forces should consider the following to limit aid corruption:

**Robust transparency and audit requirements of all aid projects**

There are many ways that aid requirements are routinely bypassed, e.g. by bribing the supposedly independent assessors, and a robust audit process is therefore required.

**Recognise that foreign aid attracts corruption**

At a time when people are starving or homeless, it may seem impossible that actors – whether they are in the government, private citizens, local powerbrokers, or aid agencies – could have anything other than the best of intentions of alleviating suffering. While some agencies have long established track records and reputations, many others could be small fly-by-night operations or fraudulent. Powerbrokers will control aid for their own ends.

**Establish vetting and oversight structures**

Humanitarian crises situations eventually move into longer-term, more developmentally focused aid and at that point, greater accountability, transparency, and oversight be put in place, including vetting of contractors and civil society groups. “Government-operated NGOs” (GONGOs) may be founded expressly in order to capture development funding.59

**Establish codes of conduct, transparency policies, and complaints mechanisms**

These types of structures should be established for personnel (internal and external) to allow them to voice their concerns of government behaviour and the aid agencies they partner with.

**Be very strict in ensuring financial oversight and accountability of all aid.**

If possible, insist on personnel visiting the location to verify work is done to the agreed standards, rather than relying on paper trails, photographs, or personal testimony.

**Publish all local aid, projects planned and actual costs**

For example, if US$25,000 has been given to build a school, ensure that this is publically announced on TV, radio, and in newspapers and post it in the local language at the school site. This allows locals to assess whether the work on the new school is to the value of US$25,000. It is common for host governments to be willing to publish which ministries that have used donated funds to projects, but they are often reticent to advertise how much was actually allocated to the project. Security assistance forces will have to assess whether those security concerns are legitimate or a mask to hide the corruption that dissipates aid money before it reaches the intended projects.
Ensure military forces receive training on corruption risks and aid

Establish risk management policies for dealing with it. If they do not exist, establish and publicise policies and punishments for troops involved in sexual abuse or other favours in return for aid. Also establish policies for what troops should do if they witness host government, coalition partners, or aid agencies involved in such abuse.
10. MILITARY, POLICE, AND MILITIAS

In a country controlled via a political settlement, the government does not usually have 'a monopoly on violence', and they may not have control over their territory. In some fragile states, the writ of the government’s armed forces may not even extend across the capital city. In such cases, powerbrokers will still have access to some sort of armed force that is capable of challenging government authority.

Branches of the military, police, and intelligence forces may be controlled by various powerbrokers or factions. Senior leadership roles may be juggled to enhance or decrease the control of various powerbrokers within the elite pact. At the subnational level, while military units may officially pledge allegiance to the country, they may really act on behalf of their local leadership, tribe, or ethnic group.

A prime example is the M23 Gang in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Though they were officially under the larger DRC government after a peace deal with the group, they later split again from the DRC military. In Mali, the various units known as the “Red Berets” and “Green Berets” are different factions under key powerbrokers, which became a major issue during the 2012 Malian coup.60

In addition to army units, there are other security force actors in a country, most significantly the police. It is the police who interact with both the public and criminals on a day-to-day basis, and who are also usually the first responders to criminal activity and violent attack. Local police tend to be the least professional, have the lowest level of pay and the least training. In extreme cases they may be acting on behalf of a local powerbrokers or criminals.

Additional corruption concerns involve private security companies, who may be merely a militia by another name, albeit with some form of incorporation papers.

Corruption in these forces causes major difficulties for mission success. At their worst, the security forces may be more predatory than, or be working with, insurgents or criminals. Corruption may lead to a hollow, ineffective, or brutal force that pushes the population into support of the insurgents or criminals.

Additionally, in fragile states, some of the largest inflows of money will be associated with funding for security forces. This makes it a prime target for corruption in the form of kickbacks, diversion of money and resources, theft of equipment, and favouritism toward allies. Likewise, international aid may provide some or all salaries for security personnel. The large, regular payments also make it a target for corruption, for example through withholding money from troops, ghost soldiers (soldiers who only exist on paper, with commanders or other powerbrokers receiving their pay), demanding bribes to accept soldiers or for conscripts to avoid conscription.

The result is a difficult situation for security assistance forces. Military professionals are used to working with other
military and security professionals, with the assumption that everyone at some level is acting in the larger national interest. However, this is usually not the case in highly corrupt societies where the various security forces are often locked into a corrupt network.

Some key issues mission forces should consider when working with the security sector, whether at the local or national level, include:

**The key allegiances**

Map the allegiances of host country personnel, including those in the security sector. This may not be for their country, but their family, clan, tribe, ethnic group, and/or militia network that they belong to.

**Appointments**

Maintaining government positions, including key appointments in the security sector, is often contingent on providing money, access, or other resources to the individual’s network, even if his personal choice would be to not be involved in corrupt activities.

Unless an individual has very high political or other protection, not conducting corrupt activities will at least be viewed with suspicion in a system where corruption is expected. It could lead to being shunned or denied promotion. In its most dangerous forms, it could lead to an individual or his family members being attacked or killed.

Measures to be taken may include force vetting, re-selecting police officers, and training, working alongside the police, civil society oversight and dedicated anti-corruption units. A good tool for assessing the effectiveness of a government’s management of corruption risk in the defence sector is the Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index published by Transparency International UK’s Defence and Security Programme.
Endnotes

6. Fund for Peace.
7. Several countries have established specialised interagency organisations in recent years that seek to improve how such missions are planned and led. For example: UK’s Stabilisation Unit, the US Army’s Peacekeeping and Stabilisation Operations Institute (PKSOI) , and Canada’s Stabilisation and Reconstruction Task Force (START).
12. T Sullivan and C Forsberg.
22. CEIP, p.7.
27. JCOA.
29. Felbab-Brown.
31. Sullivan and Forsberg.
32. Sullivan and Forsberg.
34. JCOA.
37. IGOAC.
38. IGOAC.
39. Ethan B. Kapstein. 'Military Metrics: How Do We Know When We’re Winning (or Losing) A War?', Small Wars Journal, 06 July 2011.
40. ISAF also conducted a survey though the extent to which this addressed issues of corruption is unknown due to its restricted classification.

41. JCOA.

42. To assist in designing such a survey it may prove useful for those in charge to consult the World Bank’s Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys (PETS) and Quantitative Service Delivery Survey (QSDS) data portal which provides information on how to design such a survey. Further information can be found at http://web.worldbank.org/WEBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPoverty/EXTPoverty/PAGE0,,contentMDK:20467190~isCURL:Y~menuPK:1108016~pagePK:148956~piPK:490130~theSitePK:490130,00.html.

43. T Sullivan and C Forsberg, p. 159.


54. There are international organisations and best practices that can assist in providing guides to monitoring
resource extraction, guides for civil society groups, and even some third party monitoring. Some of the most notable include the Natural Resources Charter, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and the NGO Global Witness.

55. CIEP.


Additional reports from the Defence and Security Programme


Watchdogs? The quality of legislative oversight of defence in 82 countries (2013), http://government.defenceindex.org/parliaments

Raising the Bar: Good anti-corruption practices in defence companies (2013), http://companies.defenceindex.org/good-practice


Defence Companies Anti-Corruption Index (2012), http://companies.defenceindex.org/report


Transparency International UK's Defence and Security Programme works to reduce corruption in defence and security worldwide.

We engage with governments, armed forces, security forces, defence companies, civil society, and others to advance this goal.

We provide new tools, practical reforms, benchmarks, and research to enable change.

www.ti-defence.org