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Alianza
por la Paz
y la Justicia

CORRUPTION RISKS SERIES

Advocating for Peace, Justice and Security in Honduras

An evaluation of *Alianza por la Paz y la Justicia*

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This document was prepared by a team of graduate students from Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA), under the sponsorship of Transparency International UK's Defence & Security Programme (TI-DSP), and with the collaboration of *Asociación para una Sociedad Más Justa* (ASJ). The authors – Giuliana Carducci, Catalina Iglesias, Charlotte Gossett, Danilo Moura and Dariela Sosa – would like to thank Professor Paul Lagunes for his guidance and feedback throughout the process, as well as Abram Huyser Honig for his logistical assistance in securing many of the in-country interviews upon which much of this report is based. Thank you also to all interview participants for sharing their time, stories and expertise, particularly those who have dedicated themselves to challenging corruption and violence despite the risks and continue to believe in a peaceful future for Honduras.

This project serves as an independent and constructive evaluation of the APJ model. Any mistakes contained herein are the responsibility of the authors and should not be considered as reflecting the views of TI-DSP or SIPA.

We dedicate this work to Ema, hoping that the Latin America in which she will grow up will be a safer, more just, and more peaceful region than it is today.

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ACRONYMS

ACF	Advocacy Coalition Framework
APJ	Alianza por la Paz y la Justicia
ASJ	Asociación para una Sociedad Más Justa
CCN	Comisión Coordinadora Nacional
CEDOH	Centro de Documentación de Honduras
CIPRODEH	Centro de Investigación y Promoción de los Derechos Humanos
COFADEH	Comité de Familiares de Detenidos Desaparecidos en Honduras
COSUDE	Agencia Suiza para el Desarrollo y la Cooperación
CPI	Corruption Perceptions Index
CRSP	Comisión de Reforma de la Seguridad Pública
CSO	Civil Society Organizations
DIECP	Dirección de Investigación y Evaluación de la Carrera Policial
EPD	Economic and Political Development Program
GSC	Grupo Sociedad Civil
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
JD	Junta Directiva
LGBT	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender
NGO	Non-governmental organization
OSF	Open Society Foundation
PNUD	Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo
SIPA	School of International and Public Affairs
TBD	To be determined
TI	Transparency International
TI-DSP	Transparency International UK – Defence and Security Programme
UNAH	Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

PROJECT SPONSORS

TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL UK
DEFENCE AND SECURITY PROGRAMME

Transparency International is an independent and nonpartisan civil society organization founded in 1993. TI's global mission is "*to stop corruption and promote transparency, accountability and integrity at all levels and across all sectors of society*".[1] Today, the Transparency International operation is composed of three branches: a board of directors, the TI Secretariat in Berlin, Germany and over 100 national chapters and chapters-in-formation. Through collaborative global partnerships with civil society and the private, public and nonprofit sectors, Transparency International is realizing its vision of "*a world in which government, politics, business, civil society and the daily lives of people are free of corruption*".[2] Transparency International maintains multiple projects aimed at addressing corruption in vulnerable sectors. One such sector is defense and security.

In 2004, Transparency International UK's Defence and Security Programme, based in London, began its work to improve transparency, accountability and reduce the levels of corruption in defense and security ministries, in armed forces and in defense companies. TI-DSP works closely with government agencies, international organizations, defense companies and civil society to address corruption in the defense and security sector. Expanding the role of civil society in improving transparency and accountability in this sector is especially important to the mission of TI-DSP.[3] To that end, *Asociación para una Sociedad Más Justa* (ASJ), a recently accredited TI Honduras national chapter-in-formation, is an active member of the *Alianza por la Paz y la Justicia*.

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The Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA), a global public policy school in the city of New York, strives to achieve its mission to serve the global public interest by educating students to serve and lead and by producing and sharing new knowledge on the critical public policy challenges facing the global community.[4] The Economic and Political Development (EPD) program at SIPA equips students with a variety of skills in policy analysis, program planning, monitoring and evaluation, and advocacy to take on the global challenges of fighting inequality between and within countries, eradicating poverty and its causes, and promoting inclusive growth and human development by expanding people's civil and political as well as economic and social rights and freedoms.

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[1] Transparency International, *Who We Are*, retrieved January 2014, http://www.transparency.org/whoweare/organization/mission_vision_and_values
[2] *Ibid*.
[3] Transparency International UK – Defense and Security, *About Us*, retrieved January 2014, http://www.ti-defence.org/about-us#tabs0270
[4] Columbia | SIPA – School of International and Public Affairs, *Experience SIPA, Letter from the Dean*, retrieved May 2014, https://sipa.columbia.edu/experience-sipa/about-sipa/letter-from-the-dean

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Honduras is among the poorest and most unequal countries in the world and suffers from the world's highest homicide rate. Corruption is also a problem, which, added to the perception of insecurity, has had the effect of eroding confidence in the country's institutions. As a direct result of these dire conditions, *Alianza por la Paz y la Justicia* (Alliance for Peace and Justice) was born in the end of 2011 to perform social auditing, conduct legislative advocacy and generate spaces for inclusive citizen participation for the efficient and effective development of the Honduran justice and security system.

Alianza por la Paz y la Justicia (APJ) is an evolving model for civil society participation in security and justice policy reform. What began as a very loose coalition of organizations quickly found the need to begin institutionalizing its efforts and eventually formalize its structure and strategy. In the short years since it was founded, it has grown and adapted organically as new opportunities and challenges have arisen. It provides a space for different types of non-profit organizations, catholic and evangelic churches and the Honduran University to promote public dialogue about the security problem in Honduras and to work closely with the government to advance solutions to that problem.

This report aims to answer whether *Alianza por la Paz y la Justicia* serves as an effective model for civil society participation in advancing justice and security reform in Honduras.

Alianza por la Paz y la Justicia (APJ) is a membership organization. The members have different backgrounds: religious-affiliated charities, children's and minorities' rights defenders, and others. The full membership is called the Assembly and is divided into two tiers with differing levels of decision-making power and responsibility. APJ's leadership has played a key role in their rapid public recognition. The leadership consists of a handful of advocates and human rights defenders, recognized by other civil society organizations and the government.

The organization has created a theory of change that emphasizes four strategies: (1) mobilization, (2) campaigns and communication, (3) legislative advocacy (lobbying), and (4) research and social auditing. These four strategies lead to initial outcomes: (a) capacity and knowledge building; (b) shifts in public opinion and sub-sector reform, which in turn lead to intermediate outcomes of civil society's participation in the reform process; (c) knowledgeable, responsible and capable state actors; and (d) allied international participation. Together, these outcomes yield long term outcomes of good governance through a well-performing justice and security system, transparency, respect for human rights and active civil society participation. Ultimately, through these steps, the goal of a Honduras with peace, justice and security is to be realized.

The work APJ has produced in its first two-and-a-half years has not always followed this path. It would be very unlikely that an organization as ambitious as APJ would be able to achieve full success over such short time. Overall, the organization has faced many challenges – challenges that come from Honduras' political culture and history, from the much-politicized nature that security topics have acquired in Honduras in the past few years, and from its own early successes.

Findings

The communications strategy has been very successful, with efficient spokespeople securing considerable space in the media for the organization. The mobilization strategy has been seldom employed, with APJ being until very recently too concentrated in the capital, Tegucigalpa.

The idea of using its research arm as a method of slowly building reputation, knowledge and long-term strategy has not worked very well, with short-run crises taking precedence, even if high-quality research has been produced. People outside of APJ have acquired a view of the organization as an element of the public debate (which it certainly wants to be), but as part of the political discourse; not as much a proponent of alternative or new policies as a critic of the current ones.

The results of APJ's advocacy with the government have also been mixed. The organization has been criticized both for being too close to the government (a critique heard mostly from traditional human rights advocates) and too critical of the government without enough proposals of its own (a critique heard mostly from government officials themselves, although APJ deliberately held back to let the government define itself in the first six months), and with limited ability to force changes in policy, and very contingent on alignment with other interests. It should be noted that even keeping such a coalition alive is difficult, especially so in the current political climate in Honduras on a topic as sensitive as security. Overall, APJ's efforts seem to have contributed positively to some advances in justice and security reform and created footholds for progressive civil society participation in the process.

RECOMMENDATIONS

APJ is an effective model. However, as mentioned above, it is evolving and still faces internal and external challenges. The recommendations provided in this report aim to address those challenges and to strengthen APJ's model. Among others, we recommend that APJ's theory of change be strengthened, acquiring specific pathways connecting activities and outcomes and a timeframe for outcomes to be realized. Likewise, the organization should professionalize its internal mechanisms of decision and administration, with more inclusion of organizations that are not among the leadership. In its strategies and activities, APJ could be more strategic in choosing political actors that share its vision, and strengthen its research arm and the dissemination of the research produced. Lastly it should seek to cooperate on issues of common interest with other organizations, especially traditional human rights organizations.

I. INTRODUCTION

An effective public security and justice sector is a common desire among governments, civil society organizations and the people of any nation. Yet violence, corruption and other security challenges plague many Latin American countries. This is the case in Honduras, where citizens are confronted regularly by violence splashed across the pages of every newspaper and impacting their their daily lives. Though there have been several attempts at security policy reform over the last few years, the country continues to battle against the highest homicide rate in the world, engendered by a weak security and justice system, high poverty, local gangs, drug-trafficking, and international organized crime that is believed to have infiltrated high into the ranks of government.[5] As a result, much of Honduran society has lost faith in the country's institutions, as evidenced by their dismal ranking on the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (see p. 14).

Despite a difficult reality, Hondurans have not remained complacent in the face of these growing threats. Although civil society has not traditionally been active in the security and justice sector, the seemingly downward trajectory of the nation's security has given rise to the people's demand for peace and justice. From these demands emerged a coalition of civil society organizations, *Alianza por la Paz y la Justicia* (APJ), a new voice advocating for a shared vision of peace, justice and security.[6]

Today, only two and a half years later, APJ has grown to include 18 diverse member organizations and networks that together represent at least 1.9 million Hondurans. APJ has sustained its work through financial support from multiple international NGOs and the United States government. They have recently modified their model and developed a strategic plan that generally appears to follow an advocacy coalition theory of change,[7] which includes legislative advocacy (lobbying), media campaigns, mobilization and social auditing / research to achieve a shared core policy goal. While the security situation remains grave in Honduras, APJ has become a publically recognized actor in the justice and security sector. However, the question remains: can *Alianza por la Paz y la Justicia* serve as an effective model for civil

ALIANZA POR LA PAZ Y LA JUSTICIA

THE MISSION

"We are an alliance of civil society organizations and networks that performs social audits and legislative advocacy, and generates spaces for inclusive citizen participation for the efficient and effective development of the Honduran justice and security system."

THE VISION

"A Honduras with peace, justice and security on a foundation of good public management of the Honduran justice and security system with respect to human rights and transparency."

(APJ Strategic Plan 2014-2106; translated from the original Spanish)

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[5] C. Arnson, J. Bosworth, S. Dudley, D. Farah, J. López & E. Olson, 'Organized Crime in Central America: The Northern Triangle', *Woodrow Wilson Center Reports on the Americas*, no. 29, 2011.
[6] Alianza por la Paz y la Justicia , *Quienes Somos?*, retrieved January 2014, http://www.pazyjusticiahonduras.com/index.php/quienes-somos
[7] S. Stachowiak, *Pathways to change: 10 Theories to Inform Advocacy and Policy Change Efforts*, Center for Evaluation Innovation /ORS Impact, October 2013. Retrieved May 2014: http://www.evaluationinnovation.org/sites/default/files/Pathways%20for%20Change.pdf

society participation in advancing justice and security reform in Honduras?

In order to approximate an answer, a five-member team of graduate students from the Economic and Political Development program of Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs[8] conducted an independent evaluation of the APJ model. The evaluation spanned six months and comprised five phases, including field research in Tegucigalpa, Honduras. The study was sponsored by Transparency International UK's Defence & Security Programme (TI-DSP), and received logistical support from Transparency International's Honduras chapter, *Asociación para una Sociedad Más Justa* (ASJ), a founding member of APJ.

This report is organized into seven sections. The first offers an introduction. In the second section, the research goal, objectives and methodology of the research are presented. The third section provides a brief contextual overview of the current situation in Honduras. In the fourth section, the theories upon which the evaluation is based are reviewed. After that, APJ's formation, strategic plan and current model are described. The sixth section follows with an evaluation of the *Alianza's* work so far. Finally, recommendations are provided and a conclusion presented.

Ultimately, what the evaluation will show is that *Alianza por la Paz y la Justicia* is an evolving model for civil society participation in justice and security policy reform. What began as a very loose coalition of organizations quickly found the need to begin institutionalizing its efforts and eventually formalize its structure and strategy. In the short years since it was founded in late 2011, it has grown and adapted organically as new opportunities and challenges arose, managing some better than others. Overall, APJ's efforts seem to have contributed positively to some advances in justice and security reform and created footholds for progressive civil society participation in the process. However, APJ's ability to substantially influence policy reform and be accepted by the government as a legitimate and knowledgeable participant in the reform process remains uncertain, as it is hampered by both internal and external factors. These factors must be addressed and their organizational strengths capitalized on to fully realize *Alianza por la Paz y la Justicia's* potential to serve as an effective model.

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[8] More information at: https://sipa.columbia.edu/

II. GOAL, OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY OF THIS RESEARCH

The study team developed a comprehensive five-phase research methodology, which began by establishing a clear goal and objectives and included two broad qualitative data collection phases with desk research, interviews and in-country field research. In total, 26 interviews were held with experts, stakeholders and APJ members and staff. The data was analyzed to achieve each research objective and ultimately evaluate if APJ can serve as an effective model for civil society participation in advancing justice and security reform in Honduras.

RESEARCH GOAL

To evaluate whether APJ can serve as an effective model for civil society participation in advancing justice and security reform in Honduras.

OBJECTIVES

1. To understand the historical and current contexts of justice and security in Honduras and the role of civil society in public security sector reforms.

2. To document APJ's policy reform model and implementation strategy for civil society participation in advancing justice and security reform in Honduras.

3. To discern what, if any, contributions have been made by APJ to the advancement of justice and security reform in Honduras and identify obstacles to success.

4. To evaluate how, if at all, APJ has served as an effective model for civil society participation in advancing justice and security reform in Honduras and identify obstacles to success.

5. To identify opportunities for improvement and provide recommendations based on accepted theoretical approaches and good practices of civil society participation in government reform and policy advocacy

METHODOLOGY

Phase 1: Plan Design

Communication was initiated with the study's sponsor, TI-DSP, and local agency contacts at ASJ were identified. The study team roles and responsibilities were established. The study goals, objectives and scope were developed and agreed upon by the study team and sponsor.

Phase 2: Baseline Data Collection

Baseline data from primary and secondary sources was gathered via desk research, literature review and through semi-structured interviews with 1) the TI chapter in Honduras and 2) experts on the subject. Subjects

of interest included historical and current contextual information on Honduras, regional and global examples of civil society participation in security reform, participatory and democratic theories, collective action theories, theories of change in advocacy and good practices in measurement and evaluation of advocacy. The assembly of baseline data on APJ was also initiated.

Phase 3: Field Research

Extensive field research was conducted in Honduras from March 15th to 28th, 2014. Semi-structured interviews were held with various APJ member organizations and the APJ technical team. Additional semi-structured interviews were conducted with individual stakeholders from APJ grant-funders, Honduran national government agencies, international organizations represented in Honduras, and other civil society organizations working on justice and security reform who are not members of APJ (see Appendix II for a comprehensive list of interviewees). Subjects of interest included the political and cultural contexts of Honduras, national security sector development and reforms, the role of Honduran civil society in government reform and the security sector specifically, background on APJ's mission, model and history, and the specific work of APJ in the security reform process.

Phase 4: Data Analysis

In the fourth phase, data obtained about Honduras and APJ in phases two and three was methodically reviewed and analyzed to identify significant themes, conflicting information, events, activities and relevant context. As a valid model emerged of APJ's current structure, practices, strategies, and contributions to the security sector, it was measured against accepted theories of civil participation, coalition building and advocacy models, as well as good practices of advocacy evaluation. Additionally, the model that emerged from the research was compared against the more theoretical advocacy model and strategy that was developed by APJ during their January 2014 retreat. Next, a basic SWOT (Strength – Weaknesses – Opportunities – Threats) analysis was applied to identify the internal and external assets and vulnerabilities of the organization within the context of Honduras. The cumulative findings of the analysis were combined to develop a picture of APJ that addressed objectives one through four.

Phase 5: Recommendations and Final Report

Objective five was realized in the final phase. Relevant contextual information, applicable theories, and the findings from phase four were compiled and utilized to identify opportunities for improvement and provide recommendations that would potentially lead to a positive outcome of their mission and vision. With all five objectives achieved, a holistic analysis based on the results was completed and a conclusion drawn to determine if APJ can serve as an effective model for civil society participation in advancing justice and security reform in Honduras.

III. HONDURAS CONTEXTUAL OVERVIEW

SOCIO-POLITICAL CONTEXT

Honduras is a Central American country with a very particular recent political history. Unlike other countries in the region, Honduras did not experience a local guerrilla war in the 1980s. The spillover from its neighbors did impact Honduran society and government, but the crisis that led to the wars in those countries never reached Honduras.[9]

The Honduran political system has survived remarkably well over time, with its two-party system remaining unchanged until quite recently, even during the military-controlled government between the 1960s and the 1980s. When democracy was reestablished (with the 1981 elections and the 1982 Constitution), the two parties (*Partido Nacional and Partido Liberal*) maintained dominance in elections and in the political system. After the 2009 institutional coup that ousted democratically elected President Manuel Zelaya, a new political party, LIBRE, formed to contest the 2013 elections. This altered the political landscape, but it is still too soon to know if there will be a long-term change.

However, the relative stability of the Honduras political system has not assured Hondurans much economic progress. Honduras is among the poorest countries in Latin America, with 60% of its population living in poverty.[10] It is also one of the most unequal countries in the world.[11]

Figure 1: Honduras map

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[9] Honduras did not have its own guerrilla war, but it had plenty of political violence. This is exemplified by the 1988 Velázquez Rodríguez case, one of the most important decisions in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights' slow buildup of jurisprudence of governments' responsibilities to victims of government-sponsored torture and assassination. Inter-American court of Human Rights, *Vélazquez Rodríguez v. Honduras*, July 29, 1988, retrieved April 2014, http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_04_ing.pdf

[10] World Bank Poverty & Equity Data, *Honduras*, retrieved April 2014, http://povertydata.worldbank.org/poverty/country/HND

[11] Index Mundi, GINI index, *Country rankings*, retrieved April 2014, http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/indicators/SI.POV.GINI/rankings

Figure 2: Honduras in numbers

Corruption across many sectors is also a widespread problem. In Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index, Honduras ranks 133rd (of 176), while in the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators, Honduras' relative position on "Rule of Law" and "Control of Corruption" have worsened between 2002 and 2012.[12] The justice and security sectors have experienced especially high levels of corruption, much of it the result of increasing influence from organized crime.[13]

DRUG TRAFFICKING, VIOLENCE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Honduras sits in the middle of the biggest international cocaine route in the world: one that connects the Andean producers (Colombia, Bolivia and Peru) to its biggest market – North America, particularly the United States.[14] The UNODC estimated that in 2008 the flow was 140 metric tons, and everything indicates that number has increased.

Being a main route for drug trafficking has had many consequences for the Central American countries. International drug smugglers need locals, and those locals retain their share of the profits. These locals form their own criminal organizations, not only with intent to support the cocaine route to the north, but also to create and maintain a local market of their own.

AN INSTITUTIONAL COUP

Manuel Zelaya took office as President of Honduras on 27 January 2006. On 28 June 2009 he was removed from office by an order of the Honduran Supreme Court, supported by Congress and executed by the military, and was illegally forced to depart from the country. President Zelaya's removal from office was prompted by his insistence on trying to force a change in the Constitution to create the possibility for him to run for reelection – the mere proposal of such a change is against the current Constitution.

In interviews, human rights and democracy activists presented the coup as a turning point for Honduran civil society. The fact that traditional institutions had supported the ousting of the president increased the popular demand for alternative channels of pressure and influence in the system, and strengthened a refusal to let entrenched elites drive the policies of the country. The first years after the coup, 2009-2011, were also the years when violence exploded and peaked.

(Salgado, R.U., Crisis institucional y golpe de estado en Honduras*, Universidad Pedagógica Nacional Francisco Morazán, Tegucigalpa, 2010)*

(Interviews with Maria Luisa Borjas, Miguel Cálix, Victor Meza)

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[12] World Bank, *Worldwide Governance Indicators*, retrieved April 2014, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home
[13] Programa de Seguridad y Defensa de Transparencia Internacional, *Arrestando la Corrupción Policial*, pp. 44-48.
[14] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), *World Drug Report*, 2007, pp. 70.

These two elements – the routing and the local markets – combine with each other to create a volatile situation that turns into urban violence faster than governments can respond to it.[15]

The incentives of these criminal groups to corrupt the institutions of the countries where they operate are also very high. With access to great amounts of money[16], they have the means to corrupt police officers and judges, prosecutors and politicians. The pressure this context places on any country's institutions is severe, especially when there is a weakened judicial and security system. The chief result of that pressure is the inability of the system to produce justice, with high rates of impunity.

Graph 1: Homicides' rate in Honduras (1999-2013)
Source: UNODC

Honduras has been particularly ineffective in dealing with the problem and the violence has skyrocketed in the past decade, reaching the point today where Honduras has the highest homicide rate in the world[17]. Although both Presidents Zelaya and his successor, Porfirio Lobo, pledged to address the violence during their tenure, reforms proved ineffective.[18] The situation was exacerbated after the 2009 institutional coup destabilized the nation and necessitated national security forces to turn their already limited capacity away from combating organized crime and towards maintaining public order.[19] According to a report by the Wilson Center:

> The 2009 coup against President Manuel Zelaya facilitated the expansion of organized crime in the country. Honduras' international isolation and the termination of [international] assistance and information-sharing deprived the government of resources to fight transnational criminal organizations.[20]

Unsurprisingly, according to polling data a third of the Honduran population say that crime/public security is the number one problem of the country, by far the most mentioned problem.[21] The combination of insecurity and the perception of corruption have had the effect of eroding confidence in the country's institutions. Two thirds of Honduran crime victims say they did not report it to the police, or to anyone else for that matter.[22] Almost 80% of Hondurans say they have little or no confidence in the country's judiciary and more than 80% do not trust Congress or political parties.[23]

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[15] This topic is discussed, among others, in: J. Bunk & M. Fowler, *Bribes, Bullets, and Intimidation: Drug Trafficking and the Law in Central America*, The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2013. P. Gootenberg, *Andean Cocaine: The Making of a Global Drug*, The University of North Carolina Press, 2009. M. Naim, *Illicit: how smugglers, traffickers, and copycats are hijacking the global economy*, Doubleday, New York, 2005. See also U.S. Department of Justice - National Drug Intelligence Center, *National Drug threat Assessment*, 2010.

[16] The UNODC estimation puts the size of the global cocaine market in $88 billion in 2008. Through the route in Central America passes about 40% of total cocaine produced in the world. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Drug Trafficking*, retrieved in April 2014, https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/drug-trafficking/.

[17] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Global Study on Homicide*, 2013.

[18] Arnson & Olson, 2011.

[19] Interview with Arturo Corrales. A comprehensive list of interviewees and their positions can be found on Appendix II.

[20] Arnson & Olson, 2011.

[21] Latinobarómetro, 2011.

[22] *Ibid*.

[23] *Ibid*.

THE HONDURAN SECURITY SYSTEM

According to the Honduras' 1982 Constitution, Honduras has a civilian National Police force, administered and subordinated to the national government under the Minister of Security. The National Police, or *Policía Nacional*, is the institution tasked with protecting citizens and investigating crime. The Constitution also establishes municipal police administered by local governments, but their functions are more related to traffic offences and, sometimes, property guarantees.[24]

The other two arms of the Honduran justice and security system are the prosecutor's office and the courts. The first, called *Ministerio Público*, is also a national, centralized agency responsible for taking to trial any case that reaches that stage of investigation. The courts are formally independent, with a centralized and powerful Supreme Court at the head of the system and the Iberian Civil Law tradition as the basic legal framework.[25]

A final element of the justice and security system – a very contentious one – is the reintegration of the military in the internal security of the country. Although some specialists argue that the internal culture of the National Police has never actually been civilian,[26] a strong push for the militarization of security policy has been part of the political debate in Honduras over the past few years. By 2013, Congress had created the Military Police of Public Order, a military force whose primary concern would be to fight crime inside the country. The desire to resort to direct military involvement in internal security has many origins, but one of them is undoubtedly the fact the National Police is seen as corrupt.[27]

Transparency International defines corruption as "the abuse of entrusted power for private gain."[28] Police corruption then is the abuse of police powers – the power to arrest and to set free, to produce or ignore evidence, to intimidate or pretend not to see – in return for private gain in the form of money, or favors, or any other kind of private advantage. Police corruption and abuse of power is a particularly vicious form of corruption in that it perverts one of the essential foundations of the relationship between the state and its citizens.

The modern state can be defined by its monopoly on the legitimate use of force;[29] the process that codifies and restricts the exercise of that monopoly defines the rule of law. It is the rule of law, then, that police malfeasance is corrupting, as Transparency International wrote when discussing the Honduran situation:

> Corruption enables criminal organizations to infiltrate institutions responsible for public security and justice. As a consequence, these institutions not only fail to meet their objectives effectively, they also allow criminal acts to escape investigation so perpetrators go unpunished.[30]

Police corruption in Honduras, according to TI, has moved beyond "taking bribes, destroying evidence, and tipping off criminal elements", with police officers being implicated in violent crimes, from extortion and armed robbery to homicide, "against the very communities they are charged with protecting."[31]

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[24] *Constitución Política de Honduras de 1982*, art. 293, 297. *Ley Orgánica de la Policía Nacional* (2013).
[25] J.G. Apple and R.P. Deyling, *A Primer on Civil Law System*, Federal Judicial Center, 1995.
[26] The contention is actually old. The National Police was a military institution during the military governments; its transition to civilian nature only came in the 90s, with the participation of civil society. Experts interviewed for this report argue the military habits never really left the culture of police work in the country. Interviews with Julieta Castellanos, Victor Meza, Bertha Oliva. And Joaquin Rivera.
[27] Interviews with Julieta Castellanos and Joaquin Rivera.
[28] Transparency International, *Global corruption Report 2007 – Corruption in judicial systems*, 2007, pp. xxi.
[29] This is Max Weber's traditional definition in *Politik als Beruf* (1968).
[30] Transparency International UK – Defense and Security, *Elections in Honduras: is public security a priority for presidential candidates?*, retrieved April 2014, http://ti-defence.org/what-we-do/news-events/blog/234-honduras-elections
[31] Transparency International UK – Defense and Security, *Arresting corruption in the police*, retrieved April 2014, http://issuu.com/tidefence/docs/2012-11_arrestingcorruptioninpolice

IV. THEORIES OF CIVIL SOCIETY PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNMENT REFORM

In order to evaluate whether APJ can serve as an effective model for civil society participation in advancing justice and security reform in Honduras, it is important to refer to relevant accepted theories, such as those centered on citizen participation, democracy, advocacy and coalition building theory. These provide the conceptual framework that supports the evaluation of and recommendations for APJ.

KEY COMPONENTS OF A SUCCESSFUL REFORM PROCESS

Economic or political pressures, international influence, culture, and the strategic choices of reformers could affect the process of public sector reform.[32] Despite the presence of similar reform drivers in different countries, the kind of reform, how it is implemented, and its future success will depend on each country's unique context.

However, the study of country cases by various authors has consistently shown that no matter how the idea of reform is triggered, for a reform to be successful good ideas are not enough. Research indicates four fundamental conditions are necessary to maximize successful policy reform and implementation:

- Strong leadership
- Genuine political support
- Internal and external accountability systems
- Culture of transparency

In particular, lack of political commitment may negatively affect even the most uncontroversial reforms, preventing their successful implementation and longevity.[33] Political commitment becomes even more important when the reform is linked to changes in the political and constitutional framework. This political support is also needed from middle and lower level bureaucrats, so there are no attempts to sabotage reforms.[34]

Other authors conclude that for any kind of reform to be successfully implemented, internal and external accountability systems must be in place: "they are building blocks for a formal, rule-based, honest public sector… [they build] confidence between citizens and government, and encourage managers to internalize a public ethic of proper behavior."[35] It is also argued that the "opening up of the core activities of the state to societal participation is one of the most effective ways to improve accountability and governance."[36] In the case of security and police reform, the role of civil society in external oversight of the police is every day more recognized. More political forms of societal participation such as mobilization, legislative action, media exposure, or co-production of specific services can effectively improve government accountability (all key

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[32] B. Heredia & B.R. Schneider, 'The Political Economy of Administrative Reform in Developing Countries', in B Heredia & B.R. Schneider (ed.), *Reinventing Leviathan: The Politics of Administrative Reform in Developing Countries*, North-South Center Press at the University of Miami, 2003, pp. 1-22.

[33] The World Bank, *Public Sector Reform: What works and why?*, Washington, 2008.

[34] B. Nunberg, 'Exporting administrative excellence: adapting advanced-country models to developing contexts', in C Ban & N Riccucci, *Public Personnel Management: Current Concerns and Future Challenges*, Longman Press, 2002, pp.52-71.

[35] A. Schick, 'Why Most Developing Countries Should Not Try New Zealand Reforms', *The World Bank Research Observer*, vol. 13, no. 1, February 1998, pp. 123-131.

[36] J. Ackerman, 'Co-Governance for Accountability: Beyond Exit and Voice', World Development, vol. 32, no. 3, 2004, pp. 448.

strategies used by APJ as described in subsequent sections). Because of this, government and societal actors should collaborate from the beginning of the reform process and ensure the participatory process framework is preserved through institutionalization.[37]

Accountability systems must be accompanied by a culture of transparency to have a real effect. In the case of police and security reform, the public needs to feel they understand what the police are doing; understand the laws and what they mean; know what the process of justice is; and to feel they have access to the police so they can report crime and have a positive outcome.[38]

TWO APPROACHES TO THE REFORM PROCESS

Two different approaches to the reform process can be found in the literature: a top-down or a bottom-up approach. With a top-down approach, central authorities, or the political elite of the institutions drive the idea, willingness and leadership for reform. In the bottom-up approach, the process of reform is triggered in the lower levels of government or by civil society.

When analyzing the chances of success, both approaches have their strengths and weaknesses, depending on the context. Regardless of the approach chosen, all of the factors reviewed previously are still important, however, depending on the approach, some of them are more relevant than others. For a top-down approach to succeed, reformers first need support from the top executive officials and second-level officials inside the government. The weaker the links among elected officials and the bureaucrats being affected by the reform, the more open top officials would be to receive reform proposals.[39]

On the other hand, for a bottom-up approach to succeed, it has to be accompanied by strong leadership able to successfully involve different sectors of government to carry out the project and allow the reform to dodge political implementation challenges. The decisions taken during the first implementation stage must give the correct incentives for civil servants to embrace the reform and gain their support.[40]

In both approaches it is important to have a cohesive civil society voice. A fragmented civil society pushing for different objectives will reduce the chances of success for all. It will generate an unsatisfied group or "losers" of the reform and negatively impact the longevity of its implementation.[41] For this reason it is important to address the collective action theory, discussed later in this section. Ultimately, neither approach is definitively better than the other; the context should determine which one is followed.

It must be noted that many reform processes follow a mixture of both approaches, sometimes simultaneously. In Honduras' example of police and security reform, the central government has pushed and implemented a new police system (i.e. militarization) and attempted new oversight mechanisms (i.e. DIECP). At the same time, organized civil society, such as APJ, has also been pushing for reforms.

Developing countries face particular challenges and hard choices to make when implementing any kind of governance or administrative reforms in what are often under-resourced and low-capacity environments.[42] Ideally, this is where international donors can play a key role, offering resources and capacity-building knowledge to allow developing countries' reforms to develop. Lack of frequent coordination among donors and pressure for particular models that are not adaptable to local contexts are downsides of foreign aid. It generates competition for funds among civil society organizations, instead of making them work together,[43] and it forces those organizations to choose between strategies based on foreign models or their own favored path

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[37] *Ibid*. pp. 447-463
[38] Interview with Caitlin Gokey, Vera Institute of Justice.
[39] Heredia & Schneider, 2003, pp. 1-22.
[40] C. Polidano, 'Why Civil Service Reforms Fail', *Public Management Review*, vol. 3, no. 3, 2001, pp. 345-361.
[41] D. Rodrik, 'Understanding Economic Policy Reform', *Journal of Economic Literature*, 1996, section III.
[42] Nunberg, 2002.
[43] Interview with Enrique Betancourt.

without external assistance. International donors, therefore, also have an important role not to undermine the capacity of civil society to serve as a unique and coordinated voice to push for reform.

ADVOCACY COALITION FRAMEWORK

The literature on advocacy coalitions is useful to understand the citizen participation context for *Alianza por la Paz y la Justicia*. The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) is frequently used to grasp the factors affecting the policy process and "explain stakeholder behavior and policy outcomes in intense political conflicts."[44] Advocacy coalitions are comprised of a variety of stakeholders specialized in a policy subsystem (e.g. justice and security). According to Paul Sabatier, who developed the framework, a policy subsystem is the most useful unit of policy process analysis. This subsystem has territorial and substantive scope and includes actors from diverse backgrounds who are actively concerned with a specific issue and aim to influence public affairs to produce a policy change.[45] Subsystems are essentially issue-specific networks.

Most important to the creation and survival of an advocacy coalition are shared core policy beliefs, "i.e. a set of basic values, causal assumptions, and problem perception" of the stakeholders involved.[46] Policy change may then happen through the collaborative efforts of those with the same core policy beliefs over long periods of time in order to achieve the implementation of policy objectives.[47]

The ACF also stipulates that policy change is unlikely to happen without political will; and a coalition will either advocate to change the policy decision-makers in power and replace them with allies or seek to gain their support through multiple and simultaneous strategies of influence and pressure.[48]

APJ falls easily within the Advocacy Coalition Framework. According to the Framework, the *Alianza* is still a nascent subsystem; coalitions are mature only when they have been working on influencing public policy over seven to ten years. Sabatier crafted several hypotheses concerning advocacy coalitions. Figure 3 includes the most helpful hypotheses to understand the advocacy context of APJ.

ADVOCACY COALITION FRAMEWORK
Selection of Sabatier's Hypotheses to Study the Case of APJ

Actors within an advocacy coalition will show substantial consensus on issues pertaining to the policy core, although less so on secondary aspects.

An actor (or coalition) will give up secondary aspects of his (its) belief system before acknowledging weaknesses in the policy core.

On major controversies within a policy subsystem when policy core beliefs are in dispute, the lineup of allies and opponents tends to be stable over periods of a decade or so.

Significant perturbations external to the subsystem are a necessary, but not sufficient, cause of change in the policy core attributes of a governmental program.

Figure 3: Hypotheses Concerning Advocacy Coalitions
Source: Sabatier, 1998

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[44] P. Sabatier, 'An advocacy coalition framework of policy change and the role of policy-oriented learning therein', *Policy Sciences*, vol. 21, no. 2-3, 1988, pp. 133.
[45] Sabatier, 1988.
[46] *Ibid.*
[47] P. Sabatier 'The advocacy coalition framework: revisions and relevance for Europe', *Journal of European Public Policy*, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 98-130, 1998.
[48] Stachowiak, 2013.

A LADDER OF CITIZEN PARTICIPATION

Civil society actors within the Advocacy Coalition Framework are motivated to transform their beliefs into policy but are limited in their ability to do so by the political system and leadership in power. As previously explained, genuine political commitment is key to successful reform process. In trying to achieve policy reform, civil society is aided tremendously by influential citizen participation.

Sherry Arnstein defines citizen participation as the redistribution of power that allows excluded citizens to be deliberately included in the future political and economic processes.[49] Moreover, she identifies eight types of participation in "A Ladder of Citizen Participation."[50] Arnstein groups types of participation into non-participation, tokenism and citizen power. At the lowest levels, Non-participation is comprised of Therapy and Manipulation. In the middle, Tokenism covers Placation, Consultation, and Informing. At the highest level, Citizen Power includes Citizen Control, Delegated Power, and Partnership.

Figure 4: A Ladder of Citizen Participation
Source: Arnstein, 1969

Various stages of tokenism were observed in the relationship between the Honduran government and civil society. Tokenism refers to the practice of giving an appearance of inclusiveness through a token effort or granting only minimal concessions.[51] The types of tokenism are:

a.   Information: letting citizens know about their rights, responsibilities, and options is the first step toward legitimate citizen participation. However, if there is no channel provided for feedback and no power for negotiation there is no real citizen empowerment.[52]

b.   Consultation: Encouraging citizen opinions may be a step toward their full participation. Nevertheless, consulting should be combined with other modes of participation to assure citizens that their proposals will be taken into account.

c.   Placation: refers to making concessions to appease or allay the anger of the population.[53] Even if citizens are included in decision-making bodies, their ideas are not taken into account. They have a voice but no vote.

COLLECTIVE ACTION

One additional issue that many activists face in advocating for reform is the collective action problem. When a lot of people – a whole country, say – can benefit from a new policy, who is going to step forward and pay the cost of actually working through the democratic process to achieve its implementation? That is a collective action problem, and one of immediate relevance in Honduras.

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[49] Arnstein, S , 'A Ladder of Citizen Participation', *Journal of the American Planning Association*, vol. 35, no. 4, 1969, pp. 216-224.
[50] *Ibid.*
[51] "tokenism, n. ". *Oxford English Dictionary*.
[52] Arnstein, 1969.
[53] "placation, n". *Oxford English Dictionary*

Security is one of the most classic public goods known to economic and political theory. Although some forms of security can be privatized (e.g. private security details) or privately administered (e.g. privately-run prisons), the benefits of the absence of risk to property and to life should be for all and happen simultaneously to all. But precisely because of that, public demands for security can be hard to translate into effective pressure for policies that promote security.

The literature on collective action can offer some insight into how coalition building proved to be an effective strategy to solve some of the collective action problems for *Alianza por la Paz y la Justicia*. When a group of organizations are all working towards a common goal, some of them – the biggest ones or those most directly impacted by success – can pay the largest share of the costs (workload, time, resources, financial obligation, risks, etc.) If those organizations were alone in their efforts, the associated costs would be too high for them, but in a coalition the effort is coordinated and those costs are distributed among members and reduced enough to make them feasible.

Advocating for the depuration of a corrupt police force can generate life-threatening costs and becomes more dangerous the more corrupt the police force is. When the cost of action is the real threat of physical harm or death, as has proven to be the case for some justice and security reform advocates in Honduras, then collective action through coalition building can also decrease the cost. When a dedicated coalition advocates for reform, their power is in their numbers and they become more difficult to intimidate than one organization or advocate alone. The risk/cost is again lessened as it is shared amongst members allowing APJ to more confidently and safely challenge powerful corrupt people and systems than any one of their member organizations could do alone.

The challenge the collective action problem puts to democracy is that it means small but better organized and more financially invested groups can have a disproportional impact on policies that relate to public goods, because it is very difficult to organize every stakeholder that has something to gain or to lose.

This is why, in relation to security, police officers, represented by their union, can wield much more power than the number of people whose interests they represent should give them. It is also why civil society would need a special coalition model to overcome individual costs and allow for an effective push for policies that are not solely in the interest of police officers or dominant stakeholders, but that are in the interest of a large portion of the population.

ADVOCACY EVALUATION: UNIQUE CONSIDERATIONS

The political process is nonlinear and often takes years to unfold, making it difficult to use traditional measures to evaluate the effectiveness of advocacy coalitions. Complexity, extended timeframes, shifting context and strategies, and tight resources are some of the particular challenges of evaluating policy advocacy.[54] Additionally, the absence of adequate baseline information is a very common complaint found in both NGO and donor meta-evaluations.[55] In an attempt to appease donors by providing strong quantitative measurements of immediate outcomes, many NGO evaluations systems set impossibly high expectations of what can be achieved in the short turn-around of a grant cycle, only to find themselves forced to retreat and make cautious and tentative conclusions about the results of their work.[56]

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[54] S. Mathes, 'Planning for and Evaluating Advocacy A step-by-step Introduction', Presented at the Advocacy M&E Workshop, School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University, New York, April 2014.
[55] Mansfield, 1996; Riddell et al, 1997; Oakley et al, 1998; Evison, 1999.
[56] Riddell et al.1997, DAC review: 66.

Unlike general program evaluations, which seek to identify concrete results that can be attributed specifically to the activities and outputs of the program or agency, advocacy evaluations must take into account the longer timeframes, vague outcomes, and multiple participants in the advocacy arena. Rather than definitive, attributable results in policy outcome, advocacy is more about defining contributions towards policy goals.[57]

In developing a theory of change, advocates should also be mindful of barriers to success and ensure their strategies address each barrier along the way. Each activity, output and outcome should include a specific evaluative indicator that can be used to measure progress and make adjustment to strategies along the way. Indicators designed to assess the interim outcomes and the impact of the coalition's advocacy efforts should be specific about the goal, measurable, achievable given context and capacity, relevant to achieving the goal and mission, and time-bound (SMART).[58] Figure 5 shows an outline —designed by the Center for Evaluation Innovation — that is helpful to guide APJ's advocacy evaluation.

IMPACTS
What social impact will your advocacy work, together with the work of other advocates, ultimately achieve?

POLICY GOALS
Where in the policy-making process is your target policy and where are you trying to move it?

INTERIM OUTCOMES
What interim outcomes do you hope to achieve on the way to your policy goal(s)?

ACTIVITIES/TACTICS
What tactics will you use to achieve your interim outcomes?

Figure 5: Questions for Advocacy Evaluation
Source: Center for Evaluation Innovation, as quoted by Subarna Mathes

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[57] Mathes, 2014.
[58] *Ibid.*

GOVERNMENT ATTEMPTS TO
INCLUDE CIVIL SOCIETY IN SECURITY REFORM

Since 2009, the worsening of the security situation and increasing pressure from civil society organizations compelled the government of Honduras to open spaces for their participation. Thus far, none of these instances has lasted or proven effective; however, they are worth noting to understand the recent relationship between government actors and civil society organizations like APJ in the debate and creation of justice and security policies.

Dirección de Investigación y Evaluación de la Carrera Policial - DIECP (Directorate for the Investigation and Evaluation of the Police Career): DIECP was created in November of 2011 as a response to the increasing demand of the Honduran society to purge the police of corrupt officers and improve the transparency and effectiveness of police activities. The current reputation of the institution is poor. It has proved ineffective in its mandate and not open to cooperating with civil society organizations, including APJ.

Comisión de Reforma de la Seguridad Pública (Public Security Reform Commission): The Commission was formed in January of 2012, as a temporary and independent committee with the responsibility for designing and certifying the public security reform process, including the National Police, Public Attorney and judiciary. The specific objectives of the Commission were to formulate proposals to carry out the process of purging government institutions in charge of managing justice; to certify the implementation of such proposals and to make other pertinent recommendations for citizen security. These recommendations would be presented to the Public Attorney, the Secretary of Security and the judiciary. The Commission was installed by President Lobo and formed by five commissioners, including representatives from Honduran civil society. Although a government initiative, the Commission was given very little funding and power to enforce its proposals, which resulted in the government institutions dismissing their work. APJ began working in collaboration with the Commission but eventually the working relationship eroded, despite one Commissioner, Victor Meza, also being leader of an APJ member organization. In January 2014 the Commission was disbanded by the newly elected administration.

Public hearings in the National Congress: The public hearings of April 2013 are considered one of the most effective actions directed by APJ. The hearings took place after APJ met with authorities from the executive and judiciary branches to demand accountability from the DIECP, the Secretary of Security, the Director of the National Police, the Office of the Attorney General and the judiciary. This meeting resulted in public hearings at the National Congress where members of the civil society interrogated representatives from the five organizations mentioned above. Two months after the hearings, the Attorney General, Luis Rubí, was dismissed from his post.

Junta Proponente del Ministerio Público (Attorney General Proposal Board): This board was created in September 2013 with the mandate to assemble a list of five potential candidates for the Attorney General and the Assistant Attorney General to be sent to Congress. Its members included Rector Julieta Castellanos representing APJ and UNAH, Carlos Hernandez representing AJP directly, the Commissioner of Human Rights, representatives from the Lawyers College, the Supreme Court and private universities. After beginning the process multiple board members, including Julieta Castellanos, resigned before a decision was made due to lack of transparency of the process.

Alianza por la Paz y la Justicia, *Informe Narrativo Intermedio*, remited to Cooperaciorrativo Intermedioicia, ade due to lack of transparency of the prSegridad Pgridad P*Reseid General del CRSP,* retrieved April 2014, http://crsp.hn/crsp/resena-general-de-la-crsp.html
Ley de Organizacip.hn/crsp/resena-general-de-la-crsp.html.htmllcrsp.html process.ommissioner of Human Rights, representatives from the Lawyers College, the Suretrieved May 2014, http://www.alianzapazyjusticia.com/phocadownload/Eleccion_fiscal/ley%20junta%20proponente%20ministerio%20pblico%20documento%20borrador.pdf

V. AN ALLIANCE FOR PEACE AND JUSTICE

The following section describes *Alianza por la Paz y la Justicia*: the context in which it was formed, its current structure, theory of change and strategic plan. At the end of this section we present a timeline highlighting relevant events related to APJ and the Honduran justice and security sector.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The 1980s ushered in a growth in what are today considered traditional Honduran human rights organizations such as *Comité para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos en Honduras* (CODEH, Committee for the Defense of Human Rights in Honduras), *Centro de Documentación de Honduras* (CEDOH, Documentation Center of Honduras), *Comité de Familiares de Detenidos Desaparecidos en Honduras* (COFADEH, Committee of Relatives of the Disappeared in Honduras) and *Centro de Investigación y Promoción de los Derechos Humanos* (CIPRODEH, Center of Investigation and Human Rights Promotion). Until recently, it was through these organizations and a human rights framework that civil society addressed security-related themes in Honduras. Their concerns were mostly specific human rights violations and focused on justice and reparation for past government-sponsored crimes. The government was resistant to civil society involvement, and benefited from the combination of complexity and risk associated with the topic to keep most organized groups out of the process.[59]

That started to change in 2009 when the combination of the deposition of President Zelaya and the beginning of the spike in violence rates brought in a new scenario. The coup isolated Honduras. Its interim government was criticized by almost all countries on the continent, which diverted the attention of policymakers as they tried to rebuild foreign relationships.[60] With the violence levels turning fast into an acute crisis, the pressure for new policies was building even faster. The trust in the institution of the National Police was shattered both by the politicization of the institution (which was involved in the deposition of Zelaya) and recurring events of abuse and corruption reported by the press.

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[59] There was an exceptional and brief window of time in the 1990s in which civil society agents, mostly academics, had some input in security policy, but that did not last long. Interview with Julieta Castellanos. Also: Washington Office on Latin America, *Protect and Serve? The Status of Police Reform in Latin America*, June 2009.
[60] Current Security Minister Arturo Corrales described that process as a search for "recognition" of the new government by external partners, some of which were very reticent. Interview with Arturo Corrales.

All it took within this context of violence and corruption to start a fire was a spark, and that came two year later, at the end of the most violent year in the country's recorded history.[61] On October 22, 2011 twenty-two year-old Rafael Alejandro Vargas Castellanos (son of Julieta Castellanos, Rector of the National Autonomous University of Honduras) and his friend, Carlos Pineda, twenty-four, were murdered by on-duty officers of the National Police in an attempt to steal their vehicle. The delay by the National Police's commanders in arresting the officers accused of the killings prompted public outrage after Rector Castellanos began to publicly admonish public officials for trying to protect those responsible.[62] The pressure on the government to act against corrupt and/or criminal police officers was immense. Following the tragedy, Rector Castellanos' courage transformed her into a beloved national figure and one of the most recognized public voices against police violence. It would also soon lead to the formation of *Alianza por la Paz y la Justicia*.

As a result of this crisis, various civil society organizations that previously had little contact with security themes were chosen and invited by *Associación para una Sociedad Mas Justa* (TI-Honduras), to begin discussions with Rector Castellanos and the UNAH about organizing a coordinated response to violence, corruption and impunity in the justice and security sector.[63] Within a few months of the murder, this group traveled together to Guatemala to learn how civil society there had dealt with security- and justice-related themes. "Their model was not applicable [in Honduras], but the trip brought us together" by making clear interests and concerns were common, said the Rector.[64]

Alianza por la Paz y la Justicia was founded in December of 2011. Its initial membership included most of the leaders who travelled together to Guatemala and a few newly invited advocates. These original members

JULIETA CASTELLANOS

Julieta Castellanos is a sociologist who had already taught at the National Autonomous University of Honduras for 30 years when she was elected Rector in 2009. Castellanos is a specialist in security and justice, and she was the coordinator of the University's Violence Observatory before being elected rector.

The 2011 killing of Rector Castellanos' son was not only the catalyst that brought APJ together, but also the moment in which her public persona changed. An image of a grieving mother was added to her respected academic voice, and quite quickly her story became a point of reference for the whole country. 2011 is still the most violent year in Honduras' history, and Rector Castellanos' indignant and forceful denunciation of the security system that produced almost 100 murders per 100,000 inhabitants that year helped build an image of her as a national figure.

In the interviews we conducted, the Rector's name was always mentioned in context as that of a leader, an influential voice taken seriously in the media and listened by the Honduran society. Many times her potential future political aspirations were also brought up or alluded to frequently in the context of discussing her role as a leader of APJ.

Interviews with Maria Luisa Borjas, Miguel Cálix, Julieta Castellanos, Arturo Corrales, Aline Flores, Carlos Hernández and Kurt Van der Beek, Gail Morgado and Nicolas O'Neill, Josué Murillo, Bertha Oliva, Joaquin Rivera, Omar Rivera. Also: UNODC, 2013.

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[61] UNODC, 2013.
[62] Interviews with Julieta Castellanos, Carlos Hernández and Kurt Ver Beek, and Josué Murillo.
[63] Interviews with Julieta Castellanos, Carlos Hernández and Kurt Ver Beek, and Josué Murillo.
[64] *Ibid*.

represented the Catholic and Evangelical churches, marginalized and vulnerable groups (i.e. LGBT, indigenous groups, laborers, women and children), the national university and international NGOs among others. Although they represented diverse organizations and social sectors that traditionally had not worked together and in some cases even had discordant views,[65] ,they were able to look past their differences and give strength and shape to their coalition through identifying their shared core policy beliefs and goals.. This is in accordance with the Advocacy Coalition Framework.

It is important to situate APJ in the larger context of civil society in Honduras. Traditional human rights organizations (such as some of those previously mentioned) had some expertise on security and justice themes and also a long history of conflict with the political establishment. APJ had neither when it started: not specific knowledge in the subject area (with the exception of Rector Castellanos/UNAH) or strained relationships with government stakeholders from the justice and security policy sector. They would soon get their share of both, but the more politically neutral history of the organizations that are part of APJ gave them the opportunity, which they took, to attempt to work with (and within) the political system to change policy and legislation. The coalition's agreement to participate in direct legislative advocacy (lobbying) with the government is also a component of the ACF Coalition Theory of Change.[66]

The creation of APJ coincided with a shift in political will and a spur in reform from the Honduran political institutions. This important policy window was initiated by mounting pressure to placate the public and address violence. The Commission for the Reform of Public Security was created almost simultaneously with APJ, and many initiatives related to the topic were underway in Congress. Taking advantage of the heightened public and media attention on the issue and of Julieta Castellanos' relative importance and fame, APJ was able to situate itself at the center of the media coverage as leaders on the issue, a feat that would have long lasting impact on the organization's strength and strategy.

THE COALITION'S STRATEGY AND WORK

This past January 2014, after two years of existence, APJ held an important three-day retreat with its leaders and representatives of the member organizations. Together they institutionalized much of APJ's structure and practices, clarified their vision, mission, and theory of change for the Alliance, and developed a two-year strategic plan for 2014-2016. The following is based on information gathered from materials produced from that retreat and the APJ leadership. It is presented as a general overview of *Alianza por la Paz y la Justicia's* model and strategic plan, which is to guide their work for 2014-2016.

Membership and Structure

Alianza por la Paz y la Justicia is an advocacy coalition of 18 diverse Honduran civil society organizations and networks, who together represent at least 1.9 million Hondurans from distinct sectors and interest groups of the population (see Appendix I for a complete list of APJ's membership). In addition to their common concern for the grim state of national security and its causes, members share an APJ vision for the future that includes peace, justice and security as well as "good management of the

Figure 6: APJ Structure

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[65] The fact that APJ united under a common set of objectives the conservative Honduran religious leaders, Catholic and Evangelical, and a group that defends LGBT rights gives a good idea of how unlikely a coalition it has been from the beginning.
[66] Stachowiak, 2013.

Honduran justice and security system with respect to human rights and transparency." Of equal importance, they share a core belief in the form and direction that policy changes should take within the security and justice systems and in the necessary inclusion of civil society in the reform process. Although security is not central to the mission of any particular member, it is their shared concerns, vision and beliefs on security and justice policy that create the unifying foundation of their work, despite divergent positions on other socio-political matters.

The full membership is called the National Assembly and is divided into two tiers with differing levels of decision-making power and responsibility. Power is shared horizontally across each tier and all decision-making is consensus-based. If a decision proves divisive, unity is prioritized and discussion of the decision is dropped.

The first tier is the *Comisión Coordinadora Nacional* (CCN, or National Coordinating Commission), formerly known as the *Junta Directiva* (JD, or Board of Directors). The CCN includes nine members who meet weekly and assume the responsibility for general leadership, strategic decision-making and political analysis. The CCN is currently comprised of self-appointed members, most of them (though not all) founding members. The new structure, however, states that the full assembly will delegate future CCN members. There is no specification on the process or frequency of leadership rotation.

The second tier is currently comprised of the remaining 9 members. It is considered the broad base of support and is called the *Plataforma Institucional* (or Institutional Platform). This group meets infrequently, two or three times per year (along with the CCN for full Assembly participation). As such, its responsibilities are limited to defining policy and approving plans, budgets and reports. New members would enter at this level.

A technical team, led by manager Maribel Muñoz and APJ Coordinator Josué Murillo, oversees daily operations, implementation of their strategies, grant compliance, and monitoring and evaluation. This team is co-located within the space of *Asociación para una Sociedad Más Justa*, which is a CCN member and an APJ founding organization. ASJ also serves as APJ's fiduciary agent due to the fact that APJ is not established as an official non-profit organization. All grant funding is received and administered by ASJ. Although not a part of their formal structure, a Multinational Commission of six recognized security and justice experts that APJ assembled acts as a technical advisor for justice and security issues and proposal development.[67]


Figure 7: APJ Membership - March 2014

[67] Alianza por la Paz y la Justicia, *Comisión Multinacional*, retrieved 9 May 2014, http://www.alianzapazyjusticia.com/comision_multinacional/

THEORY OF CHANGE

Alianza por la Paz y la Justicia has created a theory of change that appears to generally follow a "coalition theory of change" based on the Advocacy Coalition Framework of Paul Sabatier and Hank Jenkins-Smith, briefly discussed in previous sections.[68] It emphasizes four strategies: 1) mobilization, 2) campaigns and communication, 3) legislative advocacy (lobbying) and 4) research and social audit. For APJ, the four strategies are theorized to lead to initial outcomes like capacity and knowledge building of the public, state actors and the international community; shifts in public opinion and salience of the issue; base building; proposal development; and sub-sector reform. These will lead to intermediate outcomes of civil society's active participation in the reform process; knowledgeable, responsible and capable state actors; and allied international participation. Together these three sectors will share a vision of the necessary justice and security policy reforms and accomplish an effective and transparent reform process. This will yield the long-term outcome of good governance through a well-performing justice and security system, transparency, respect for human rights and active civil society participation. Ultimately, through these steps, the goal of a Honduras with peace, justice and security will be realized.

Each strategy includes specific, prioritized activities that in theory will bring about the desired outcomes described in the theory of change.

Strategies

1. Mobilization

- Priority 1: Expand through development of regionalized chapters with regional leadership.
  - Develop an APJ Security 101 kit for capacity building.
  - Provide regional operational assistance.
- Priority 2: Build the capacity for creative, timely, mass mobilization of the national social base.

2. Campaigns and Communication

The purpose of this strategy is to:

1. Spread awareness of and trust in the APJ message, vision, strategy and interventions to the public and key actors. The principal audience is the member networks and bases.
2. Pressure policy decisions-makers and mobilize the population around the issue.

Activities include:

- Priority 1: Develop a communication strategy that strengthens the image and visibility of APJ and its members and shares positive messaging.
- Priority 2: Build relationships with the media to increase ongoing coverage of the issues.
- Priority 3a: Use social media and online resources administered by APJ to spread awareness.
- Priority 3b: Develop a communications commission made up of the communication officials from each member organization to serve as a communications network amongst members and a consulting group for technical assistance.

3. Legislative Advocacy (Lobbying)

- Priority 1a: Regular dialogue and periodic negotiation with decision makers and key national and international stakeholders in the security and justice sector to construct a shared vision and performance indicators.
- Priority 1b: A comprehensive focus with actions directed at key justice and security institutions; construction of a shared vision and reinforcement of mechanisms for inter- and intra-institutional coordination.
- Priority 2a: Demand professional development (training) of civil service employees.

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[68] Stachowiak, 2013. Also: University of Colorado, School of Public Affairs, *Advocacy Coalition Framework Overview*, retrieved May 2014, http://www.ucdenver.edu/academics/colleges/SPA/BuechnerInstitute/Centers/WOPPR/ACF/Pages/ACFOverview.aspx

- Priority 2b: Incentivize the role of Advisor of Security and Defense and the Coordinating Commission of the Penal Justice System as entities that encompass all of the institutions of the justice and security systems.

Primary institutions targeted for strategic interventions and advocacy:

- Office of the Public Prosecutor
- Judicial Offices

Secondary institutions targeted for strategic interventions and advocacy:

- National Police
- Armed Forces

4. Research and Social Audits

- Priority 1a: Defining the essential post-reform characteristics of the justice and security system.
- Priority 1b: A performance audit of the justice and security system to include a study on impunity in the system and development of APJ performance indicators to evaluate the system.
- Priority 2: General research on the justice and security sector.
- Priority 3: Strategies, laws, proposals and evaluations.

Financing

Alianza por la Paz y la Justicia has historically been well funded by a broad international donor base. At its start APJ was provided limited funds by ASJ to begin their work. It then was able to secure funding from the United Nations Development Programme and the US Department of State, which allowed them to expand their operations and reach. They currently receive grant funds from three international donors, including the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) of the US Department of State, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) and the Open Society Foundations. They do not receive any funding from Honduran donors, agencies or government.

Measurement & Evaluation, Accountability

APJ uses 34 quantitative measurement indicators divided across six categories to evaluate their work. There is a set of indicators associated with each of the four strategy areas, one set for general performance and one set for the Multinational Commission. Each indicator is related to one or more funders for grant reporting purposes. The results are collected on a monthly basis by the technical team and provided to the CCN. If there is baseline data that is being used for comparison it was not provided. Minimum or target outputs associated with each measurement are not included.

Figure 8: APJ theory of Change

2009

June: Institutional Coup d'état ousting President Manuel Zelaya

2011

October: Rafael Vargas Castellanos, Julieta Castellanos' son, and his friend, Carlos Pineda, killed by police officers.

November: Creation of the Dirección de Investigación y Evaluación de la Carrera Policial- DIECP

November: Alianza por la Paz y la Justicia is formed.

December: Alfredo Landaverde, recognized expert on security, organized crime and police reform, is murdered.

2012

January / February: Asociación para una Sociedad más Justa (ASJ) and several other CSOs travel to Guatemala.

February: Creation of the Comisión de reforma de la seguridad publica-CRSP.

July: Introduction of bill to create special police unit with strong military elements called TIGRES. APJ oppose bill and is given space by Congress to make an alternative proposal. The bill did not pass.

November: Asociacion por una Sociedad mas Justa is accredited as the Honduras chapter of Transparency International.

December: Commission of government actors, civil society and international donors meets to discuss plans and actions for 2013. APJ advocates for a public audiences to question government authorities.

2013

January: First visit of the APJ Multinational Commission with government to produce a recommendation report.

April, 4: APJ writes public letter to National Congress called "No Aguantamos Más".

April, 9-11: National Congress calls 5 authorities of the security system to be publically questioned by civil society. The Minister of Security is removed from his post.

May: Second visit of the Multinational Commission to Honduras.

May: APJ presents an alternative proposal to TIGRES focused on a community police. The proposal is not accepted.

May: APJ lobbies for and achieves the creation of the Comisión interventora, that lasts 4 months and investigates corruption cases inside the Attorney General's office.

June: Honduras Attorney General Luis Rubi and Deputy Attorney General Roy Urtecho submit their letters of resignation.

June: APJ mobilization activities related to security: Velas por la Paz

June: Congress gives final approval for the creation of the TIGRES police unit.

September: APJ was invited by the government to participate in the Junta Proponente del Ministerio Publico

September: APJ mobilization activities related to security: Dia de Oracion (National day of prayer)

2014

January: the elimination of the Comisión de la Reforma de Suguridad Publica

January: APJ holds first strategic planning retreat and launches index to measure progress in the security and justice sector.

March: APJ release an investigative report on transparency and the national security tax. In this period, APJ also published the Comayagua impunity report, a additional study on the Supreme Court and a report on the depurification process of the police.

Figure 9: Highlights of Honduran Security and Reform History

V. EVALUATION AND FINDINGS

This section provides an evaluation of *Alianza por la Paz y la Justicia* based on the findings of this research project. First, the structure and leadership of APJ are evaluated, then its theory of change and strategies. The organization's funding and tools for measurement and evaluation are also reviewed.

The evaluation presented in this report examines the APJ Strategic Plan 2014-2016 and other materials produced at the January 2014 APJ retreat, so it is a relatively recent product that incorporates elements derived from past work. The work executed by APJ prior to January 2014 did not necessarily follow the same model and strategy that they plan to use moving forward. Throughout the report, the efforts of APJ's first two and half years, including their newly revised model and strategy, are evaluated against globally recognized theory and good practices.

STRUCTURE AND LEADERSHIP

Structure

APJ's coalition structure follows the premise of Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF). As previously stated, it is a nascent coalition with a relatively short history. The nation's struggle for justice and security has impacted the entire population. As such, APJ member organizations were all stakeholders in the justice and security policy subsystem; they identified and joined with each other on the basis of shared core beliefs about justice and security policy. According to interviews, not only has this strengthened the coalition but also has made unlikely allies, even friends, of the leaders of the organizations that belong to the CCN.[69] Whereas other coalitions have struggled to survive past a one-year mark, APJ has grown in both size and capacity over the past two and a half years, meeting once a week and finding agreements on most issues.[70] The shared core beliefs about justice and security policy have helped to keep administrative and budgetary decision as secondary concerns, avoiding major power struggles that could doom a new coalition.

As discussed previously, civil society organizations face a collective action problem when promoting and pushing for reforms of the security sector, from which all society will benefit. The creation of APJ is a classic solution to such a problem – shared costs between organizations, with some organizations more directly invested in the outcome paying more. Moreover, working together strengthens the partners, enhances their ability to influence policymakers, and, crucially, diminishes the risk each individual leader faces, since physical violence against so many is much less feasible than against only one.

However, interviews with APJ members and stakeholders of the coalition also showed there were some internal problems with the implementation of their two-tier membership structure, both within and between the tiers. Although the CCN leadership is designed to be horizontal and non-hierarchical, in practice some members were perceived as having more authority and influence within CCN than others.[71] Between tiers, regular communication and a clear understanding of roles and expectations seemed to lead some members of the Institutional Platform to feel left out of the organization by the leadership.[72]

The role of ASJ is particularly relevant here. The organization undeniably has invested more than any other in APJ, and its leaders, Carlos Hernández and Kurt Alan Ver Beek, were prominent in the leadership of the Alliance from the start. The decision to not legally formalize APJ's existence means that another organization –

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[69] Interview with Josué Murillo.
[70] Interview with Carlos Hernandez and Kurt Ver Beek.
[71] Interviews with Carlos Hernández and Kurt Ver Beek , Gail Morgado and Nicolas O'Neill, Josué Murillo, and Omar Rivera.
[72] Interviews with Victor Meza, Gail Morgado and Nicolas O'Neill, and Joaquín Rivera.

ASJ – has to execute the fiduciary function of receiving and administering the *Alianza*'s budget, and even house and supervise APJ's technical team. If APJ is the answer to the collective action problem faced by its members in addressing justice and security, then ASJ is the leader that pays the highest "cost" of the organization. That, however, does not answer the question of how prominent one single organization can be without compromising the shared power and burden benefits of a coalition. As APJ evolves into a more institutionalized organization, the significant role of ASJ becomes more visible.

Another challenge evidenced in the conversations with APJ members relates to its decision-making mechanisms. Given the delicacy and immediacy of the context into which APJ was born, and the common goals and positive relationship between its more active members, they did not have the time nor did they find it necessary at first to establish clear internal decision-making mechanisms. Consistent with the ACF theory, members reported little conflict or discussion needed to reach consensus.[73] As a consequence, when the first major disagreement (and only notable one thus far) arose between the members it threatened the survival of the coalition.

The disagreement related to APJ's invitation by the government to participate in the *Junta Proponente del Ministerio Público* (Attorney General Proposal Board). Two members of the CCN saw the invitation as purely tokenistic. Their participation would serve the government's reputation well but give APJ little influence over the ultimate decision, and most damningly, they were concerned their complicity would also diminish APJ's ability to denounce flaws with the process.[74] The others argued that APJ might be able to exert significant influence, and that if the process was corrupted, APJ could always leave and publicly denounce the process. The decision to participate divided the CCN sharply.[75] ACF theory hypothesizes that on primary core policy beliefs (i.e. "the what") a coalition will easily find agreement, but on secondary beliefs, (e.g. "the how"), which are admittedly less critical to agreement, consensus can be more difficult to reach. APJ seems to have moved past this obstacle and transformed it into a building block. In January 2014, a more formal consensus mechanism was adopted to address similar disagreements in the future, although they are yet to test it.

Leadership

Strong leadership is a necessary component of the success of policy advocacy; however, it also has its limitations. This section examines the internal and external impact of APJ's leadership, including the role of leadership in APJ's strategies and a discussion on specific characteristics of APJ leaders.[76] The leadership is here understood as the representatives of the organizations that are part of the CCN, especially those who have had bigger roles in negotiations with the government, in media appearances and/or in the internal administration of the coalition.

> Set & develop consensus on goals: As described in the previous section, APJ does not have major problems with this aspect of governance. The leaders share a common vision of what they want for the security and justice system in Honduras and the reform necessary to achieve it. However, discrepancies seem to remain in how different leaders understand the theory of change, strategies and priorities of APJ, which will be discussed in more detail in the next section.

> Inspire internal commitment: APJ's leadership is personified by a handful of advocates and human rights defenders, well recognized by both civil society and the government. This, along with the coalition's purported political neutrality on issues unrelated to their mission and their dedication to shared core policy beliefs, has allowed them to sustain their diverse members and grow over the last two years. This is impressive when one considers the inherent risks involved in challenging corruption in the security sector, which might shake a coalition with weak commitments.

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[73] Stachowiak, 2013.
[74] Interviews with Julieta Castellanos, Carlos Hernández and Kurt Ver Beek, Josué Murillo, Omar Rivera, Gail Morgado and Nicolas O'Neill.
[75] APJ chose to accept the invitation but eventually resigned from the board due to lack of transparency in the process. Interviews with Julieta Castellanos, Carlos Hernández and Kurt Ver Beek, Josué Murillo, Omar Rivera.
[76] D.K. Leonard, *African Successes*, University of California Press, Berkeley, pp. 125-144; 248-274.

Negotiate inter-unit conflicts: Despite APJ only consisting of three large units in their structure, (CCN, Institutional Platform and the Technical Team), they have faced some minor inter-unit conflicts and negotiated some better than others. The example has already been given of how they resolved their decision-making conflict by developing a clear process. What has yet to be addressed sufficiently is the perception of some members that power and communication is not being shared horizontally within tiers or equitably between tiers[77]. Although a minor issue now, it has the potential to become fractious and divisive, especially as the coalition expands its membership.

The current technical team has not had any reported problems with the CCN. However with the exception of the team leader, they are new and replaced a previous team that, according to ASJ leaders, was dismissed for poor performance. One additional conflict between the CSO grant coordinator and some members of CCN was also brought out during interviews and will be included in the financing section.

Mobilize resources: Strong leadership not only had impact inside the Alliance, but was also fundamental to gaining support and developing a positive reputation. The leadership's ability to gain access to important international donors, assemble a team of multinational experts, attract leading media outlets and share resources within their member networks are all signs of effective leadership.

However, what is less convincing is the ability of APJ's leaders to mobilize support from what could be argued is their most important resource, i.e. the 1.9 million people who ostensibly make up the base of the APJ member organizations and give them much of their political influence. Mobilization strategies (or the lack thereof) are discussed in their own section later, but it should be noted this seems to be the weakest of the leadership elements so far.

Secure political support: Broadly evaluating political support, APJ has built relationships with numerous powerful multinational NGO's and the US Department of State. With each new APJ member organization they also expand their political base. Individually, many of the APJ leaders have amassed their own political power, and where they were once reliant on Rector Castellanos as the source of their power, they now command media attention and some government recognition on their own.[78]

Less apparent is who within the ranks of government and policy decision-makers supports APJ fully. Interviews with various political/government actors revealed little regard for APJ and its leaders as truly legitimate participants in the justice and security policy sub-system. Their ideal role was openly acknowledged by Minister Corrales as little more than token consultants and perceived as reactionary and often complaining.[79] Equally discouraging, Mauricio Villeda, the candidate of the Liberal Party in the 2013 Honduran presidential election, had not heard of APJ or most of its leaders[80]. Julieta Castellanos was an exception to this, however many implied the perception that she had personal political ambitions and could be using APJ as a springboard, which, true or not, impacts the political neutrality of APJ.[81] This is something of which leaders of APJ, including Castellanos herself, seemed aware.[82] Political support/allies are an essential component of the coalition-centric theory of change and necessary for successful policy reform. APJ's political support has been discussed further in the legislative advocacy section.

Overall, APJ's leaders seem capable and effective, largely due to their strong personalities and training. A heavy focus on personalities proved to have its own costs, however. For example, those strong leaders that

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[77] Interview with Victor Meza.
[78] Interview with Omar Rivera.
[79] Interviews with Arturo Corrales, Matias Funes and Eduardo Villanueva.
[80] Interview Mauricio Villeda. Villeda secured third place in the 2013 Presidential election, 28.20% of the votes, while elected President Hernandez obtained 36.54% of the votes. La Presna Honduras, retrieve May 2014 http://www.laprensa.hn/especiales/eleccionesgenerales/inicio/).
[81] Interviews with Maria Luisa Borjas, Wilfredo Mendez, Bertha Oliva, Miguel Calix, and Arturo Corrales.
[82] Interviews with Julieta Castellanos and Omar Rivera.

brought together the current members also kept others outside the alliance. Some leaders of traditional human rights organizations, with weaker ties to ASJ or the University, were not invited to be a part of the group that created the *Alianza*, and now have kept their distance in part due to a negative perception of APJ's leaders' control of the organization's agenda and strategy.[83]

Related to this and even more troublesome, some characteristics of the APJ leadership seem to replicate the elitist power structure that that APJ itself condemns in the government institutions it wants to change. In the interviews, it was possible to see instances in which a strong reliance on big personalities, personal relationships and individual opinions trumped process, equitable representation or the long-term objectives of the *Alianza*.[84] The political culture of Honduras is very dependent on who-you-are and who-you-know, which can go a long way in explaining the levels of corruption in the country.[85] An organization that fights corruption must be self-aware enough to avoid reproducing that culture; a coalition that claims to be horizontal and representative of the people even more so.

THEORY OF CHANGE AND STRATEGIES

The APJ theory of change seems to be built on a strong and well-thought out foundation that follows the Advocacy Coalition Framework, has a clear target audience and incorporates diverse strategies often included in a coalition theory of change: mobilization, communication, legislative advocacy/lobbying, research and social audit. What it is missing, however, constitutes an important element of its successful implementation.

In its current iteration, the theory of change shows no clear pathway between the activities of the coalition and the outcomes it expects. There is also little to no differentiation between activities and outputs, sometimes including just one and at other times both, but rarely in relation to each other. The absence of clarity in the relationship between work, its product and outcomes, and the way in which the outcomes address and remove barriers to long-term goals and objectives, can be seen in the members diverging visions of the organization's main strategies and activities[86]. If the theory were stronger and more focused, perhaps the members themselves would have a better common understanding of what they do and how they do it.

Other crucial elements are a timeframe and evidence for each component. Although the strategic plan is for the next two years, activity, outputs and outcomes were left open-ended with no estimate of either the amount of time necessary to achieve a goal or any indicators of achievement, although more specific plans have been drawn up. If the members do not share similar visions on the timeline for success, the APJ risks higher levels of internal frustration in the ong run. It also creates obstacles for the measurement and evaluation of the work by not offering a standard by which the organization's performance can be assessed.

Ideally, the APJ theory of change would specifically address the following issues: who will change; how they will change; by when they will change; what evidence of their change will be. In the remainder of this section, we evaluate the four specific strategies presented by *Alianza Por la Paz y la Justicia* in its theory of change.

Mobilization

"Mobilization" is one of the four main strategic pillars of APJ's theory of change and it would seem from the outside to have the potential to become their strongest tool for change. According to APJ, their coalition of eighteen organizations together represents approximately 1.9 million Honduran people.[87] As of April 2014, it has more than 21,000 likes on Facebook and a cultivated relationship with the media. However, massive

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[83] Interviews with Maria Luisa Borjas, Wilfredo Mendez, and Bertha Oliva.
[84] Interviews with Julieta Castellanos, Carlos Hernández and Kurt Ver Beek, Victor Meza, Josué Murillo, Omar Rivera.
[85] There are many classical discussion on this Latin American political phenomenon associated with the 19th-century *caudillos*, even if Honduras' case is less researched than others. A good summary of the topic, including the classic essay by François Chevalier written in the 60s and essays that discuss the relationship between this culture and corruption, can be found in: H. M. Hamilton [org.], *Caudillos: Dictators in Spanish America*, Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1992.
[86] Interviews with Julieta Castellanos, Carlos Hernández and Kurt Ver Beek, Victor Meza, Josué Murillo, Omar Rivera.
[87] Interview with Josué Murillo.

mobilization and/or grassroots leadership development and organizing for collective citizen participation in practice do not seem to be a priority for the coalition, historically or in the near future, and is admittedly their weakest tactic.[88] On the other hand, APJ has been proactive in improving this strategy and is broadening its reach with four regional chapters up and running.

Massive and timely mobilization is listed as a secondary priority activity of the broader APJ mobilization strategy. Yet, just two of eleven events in APJ's 2013 summary of activities are classified as mobilizations and they seemed to be the only mobilization actions attempted in APJ's history[89]: *Primer Día de la Oración* (First Day of Prayer) and *Velas Por la Paz* (Candles for Peace). Although both events seemed relatively successful, attracting thousands of participants, they were rarely mentioned by any one interviewed about APJ, not even by members. Mobilization as an APJ tactic was downplayed by many and even dismissed entirely by Julieta Castellanos, who stated that mobilization was not a main objective of APJ. She argued that the added value of APJ is in its proposal capacity and traditional lobbying of political decision-makers: "[w]e do not persuade through mobilization."[90]

Outside experts familiar with APJ, including Eric Olson, Associate Director of the Wilson Center's Latin America Program, lamented the lost opportunity of utilizing mass mobilization to raise the pressure on political decision-makers;[91] APJ has not tapped into its members' bases to build support and pressure the political apparatus. It has made efforts to mobilize its followers through events and social media, though the process has proven challenging. One of the coalition's donors, the CSO of the US Department of State, has repeatedly pressured the coalition and even provided technical assistance to encourage creation of a grassroots social base and capacity-building of the APJ leadership.[92] Both *Primer Día de la Oración* and *Velas Por la Paz* were created with CSO support. However, their persistence in promoting grassroots theory and tactics and their close involvement with the operations of APJ were not received well by all leaders.

Steps to Developing a Theory of Change in Advocacy

6. Identification of Activities to Achieve Outputs and Contribute Towards Outcomes

4. Identification of Outputs (Steps) Towards Intermediates Outcomes

3. Identification of Intermediate Outcomes that Address Barriers

2. Identification of Barriers to Long-term Outcomes

1. Identification of Long-term Outcomes for Each Objective

Long-Term Policy Objective

Evidence of Output

Evidence of Outcome

5. Identification of Evidence/Indicators to Monitor Progress Towards Intermediate Outcomes and Outputs

Figure 7: Developed from Innovations for Scaling Impact, as quoted by S. Mathes, 2014

So far APJ has been more successful in creating spaces for leaders of organized civil society than actual citizen participation. As stated in the leadership evaluation, this has led to the negative perception of APJ replicating elitist structures and the organization being perhaps not as representative or inclusive of their social base as they aim to be.[93] As it evolves, APJ needs to reflect on how it engages with individuals inside its member networks and organizations so their voices, the voices of those most vulnerable to the impact of violence and corruption, can be at the forefront of the reform movement.

To its credit, one element that APJ recognized as problematic and has plans to address through their mobilization strategy is the over-concentration of its activities in Tegucigalpa. One member of the APJ

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[88] Interview with Julieta Castellanos, Carlos Hernández and Kurt Ver Beek, Gail Morgado and Nicolas O'Neill, and Joaquín Rivera.
[89] *Informe Anual ASJ 2013. Logros Alcanzados y Actividades Realizadas, 2014,* pp. iii.
[90] Interview with Julieta Castellanos.
[91] Interview with Eric Olsen.
[92] Interview with Gail Morgado and Nicolas O'Neill.
[93] Interview with Maria Luisa Borjas, Miguel Cálix, Bertha Oliva, Gail Morgado and Nicolas O'Neill.

Multinational Commission, Joaquin Mejia Rivera, described APJ as "a giant with feet of clay."[94] The problem is not just APJ's; Honduras overall has a problem with the over-concentration of its political elite and political process in Tegucigalpa. With its concentration in the capital, APJ is, again, reproducing inside the organization a vice that it seeks to change elsewhere. The strategic plan points out regionalization as the mobilization primary priority for 2014-2016, and that most certainly is a necessity. Regionalizing leadership, advocacy and accountability mechanisms were positive future goals for the coalition.[95] The benefits of regionalization should be multifold, including a broader base of support to pressure decision-makers and a better understanding of how violence and corruption are experienced outside of Tegucigalpa to better advocate for reform.

Campaigns and Communication

The murder of Julieta Castellanos' son represented an unpredictable (and mournful) opening in the policy process to influence peace, justice and security issues in Honduras.[96] A well-known and respected scholar and mother losing her son to the nation's ongoing violence and corrupt police force created a strong narrative that all Honduran families could identify with. If it could happen to her family, it could happen to anybody.

Figure 10: Sources of APJ's Agenda-setting Power

That narrative, combined with the powerful image of a new, broad coalition of civil society organizations allying themselves with a mother around a common message, was a story that quickly and easily found an eager listener in the media.[97]

Over the last two and half years, the *Alianza* has been very effective in generating worthwhile media content on peace, justice and security issues, presented to an attentive press in highly organized and professional events where skilled spokespeople were always available before, during and after the event for interviews. It is clear that APJ has achieved agenda-setting power.

Campaigns and communication are currently APJ's strongest strategies and provide a solid foundation for their other strategies to build on. As described in the leadership evaluation, APJ leaders have become recognized and sought after by the media on security- and justice-related news.[98] Their communication skills have improved over the years through individualized training, refined messaging, and the development of a capable technical team that assists with all aspects of media and communications.[99] APJ has also done well in framing itself as a peace, justice and security "brand". According to an opinion study conducted by Le Vote Marketing Research in August 2013, 50% of the Honduran population knows about the Alliance and, of those, approximately 80% have a good opinion about it.

The activities the APJ have planned for their campaigns and communication strategy are well aligned with their capacity and theory of change as well as with the existing weaknesses detected in their work. Whereas individual leaders of APJ are fast gaining public recognition, the public's clarity on APJ's message, vision, strategy and interventions or who represented the organization has been hitting some bumps. This seemed to be the likely result of the multiple hats worn by APJ leaders in advocacy and the media: each leader joined APJ without vacating their roles and responsibilities in the member organizations they represent. The multiple hats have not represented an internal conflict of interests due to limited involvement each individual organizations had had with security issues before APJ was created – it is not a core area of any member.

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[94] Interview with Joaquin Rivera.
[95] Interview with Josué Murillo.
[96] Interview with Sergio Membreño.
[97] Even the international media reported the story. *The New York Times* ran an article on rector Castellanos on a Saturday edition. J Hernández, 'An Academic Turns Grief Into a Crime-Fighting Tool', *The New York Times*, 24 February 2012, p A.4.
[98] Interview with Carlos Hernandez and Kurt Ver Beek, and Josué Murillo.
[99] *Ibid*.

However, for the public and key stakeholders interviewed, understanding when APJ's leaders were speaking on behalf of APJ and when they represented their individual organizations was problematic.[100] For example, Carlos Hernández is a leading representative of three distinct Honduran civil society groups: APJ, ASJ (which is also a CCN level member), and a third coalition – *Transformemos Honduras* (which is also an APJ Institutional Platform member). Each group is focused on different social issues, though sometimes overlapping with the others. At press conferences for APJ, the media may take advantage of Hernández's presence to also ask about issues pertaining to ASJ or *Transformemos Honduras*. Omar Rivera, leader of CCN member *Grupo Sociedad Civil*, confirmed that the media is often confused and sometimes even attributes his words to organizations to which he does not belong. ASJ leaders were aware of the confusion, but unsure how to resolve it without losing important avenues of representation.[101]

Another area for improvement identified by the research ,which seems to be addressed in the APJ's new plan, was the consistency of messaging. APJ's horizontal leadership structure has allowed for any and all members of the CCN to speak publicly on behalf of APJ. In many ways this has been positive for their leadership development, the collective action problem, and base building. However, it was also suggested that this has led to APJ having more reactive messages than strategic ones and meant that those leaders with more media pull also have more power to set the agenda and can sometimes derail attempts at being more strategic.[102]

LEGISLATIVE ADVOCACY (LOBBYING)

In the Advocacy Coalition Theory, nurturing political will and action from allied decision-makers are both necessary for success. Legislative advocacy has become a prominent APJ strategy to address both. APJ's leaders strongly believe that real policy change occurs through authentic negotiations with policymakers; strictly confrontational forms of influence result in conflict, not reform. "If we do not talk to the government, with whom will we talk?" Rector Castellanos asked. APJ has made some headway in their strategy; despite a traditionally opaque political culture, the government has at the very least recognized the coalition as a legitimate representative of civil society and offered APJ a seat at the table. [103] However, it became clear through the research that representation at the table has not generally translated into legitimate civil society participation and power.

APJ seems to find itself moving through the tokenization rungs of Arnstein's ladder: the coalition has grown influential enough to make it in the best interest of the government to consult with and often placate their demands, but they have yet to achieve authentic citizen power. Victor Meza, who has worked closely with the government on reform, explained: "[t]he government confuses participation of civil society with the presence of civil society."[104] This was reinforced in conversation with National Minister of Security Arturo Corrales, who acknowledged the importance of APJ in the process as a voice for civil society's concerns,[105] but also stated that while he was willing to listen to concerns the final decisions were his to make and he would not justify himself against critics.[106]

Other officials were less supportive of APJ. Eduardo Villanueva, former director of DIECP, one of the individuals most severely criticized by APJ, argued that the alliance's presence is not constructive to the reform process. For example, he argued that APJ criticize the police without understanding its procedures and the way the institution functions. He also accused APJ leaders of lacking objectivity, as exemplified by the personal attacks they have made against him and others.

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[100] Interviews with Arturo Corrales, Rigoberto Cuellar, Aline Flores, Carlos Hernández and KurtVer Beek, and Omar Rivera.
[101] Interviews with Carlos Hernández and Kurt Ver Beek.
[102] Interviews with Maribel Muñoz, Josué Murillo, and Omar Rivera.
[103] Interviews with Arturo Corrales and Héctor Velásquez.
[104] As a long-time human rights and democracy activist, Mr. Meza would know better than most.
[105] This sentiment was also expressed by Héctor Velásquez in interview.
[106] Interviews with Arturo Corrales.

Arguably, much of this is a product of a political culture that has very little practice with real democracy; where leaders are not used to being contested; and where individual reputation and personal relationships are much more important than formal mechanisms of democratic representation.[107] Therefore, it becomes more impressive that within this context APJ has made inroads and found some success. APJ leaders also argue that one of their greatest contributions thus far has been creating a sense of civil society and public ownership of justice and security themes, which were previously the exclusive domain of experts, the government and security actors.[108] This shift in social norms and public will are important steps towards genuine citizen power and reform success.

Additionally, the coalition's pressure was instrumental in the resignation of public prosecutor Luis Alberto Rubí in June 2013. The *Alianza*'s participation in the board to select Rubí's successor, however, shows the limits of their role and influence. APJ's leaders conveyed the impression that the selection process was rigged from the start. They point out that members connected to the government's party (the majority) were intentionally over-represented on the board so that in voting together they could defeat any proposal made by the civil society representatives, effectively tokenizing their presence.[109]

As the *Alianza* evolves, it is important to take into account the kind of public sector and public officials it faces. The APJ model was described as more "Anglo-Saxon" than Honduras is used to having;[110] how that model can effectively adapt to the Honduran political system is anybody's guess, and still an open question to APJ. The corollary of Rector Castellanos rhetorical question, however, is that APJ is not willing to wait for an answer. The government and political structures are what they are, and changing them takes time. APJ's position is that opposition to the government's positions is part of its role, but it also wants real changes in security policy and practices and feels that negotiating directly is the best way to achieve them. If they find an official ready to listen to what they have to say and to work with them, they will be available.

With all this, the *Alianza* is trying to strike a difficult balance. It has been accused by other civil society groups of being too close to the government, which makes it particularly easy to be viewed as a pawn. If that impression were to hold in the long run, APJ would have problems being seen as credible. How to actually build influence inside the flawed Honduran political system without legitimizing those flaws is not a small challenge. APJ counters that while it is interested in engaging with the government, it is not willing to compromise its values or critical voice for the sake of a seat at the negotiation table. As it proved when it resigned from the board selecting the public prosecutor, when justice is not being served it will leave the table.

RESEARCH AND SOCIAL AUDITS

With the exception of the National University's Violence Observatory, the organizations that founded APJ had neither significant experience with macro-level national security policy topics nor systematic knowledge of the theme. On a more micro-level, ASJ had been working with investigative police and prosecutors on individual murder, rape, and extortion cases since 2005. If that had an upside in their relationship with the government (they had no history of antagonizing political figures), it also meant that they came up short on their ability to offer policy alternatives or judge the ones being offered. Today they can confidently claim strong improvements in this strategic area.

Through research, training, consultation with security experts and assistance from APJ's Multinational Commission, APJ's capacity as a knowledgeable security and justice actor has increased tremendously and members of the CCN are ready to act as spokespeople on the subject when needed.[111] However, their larger plan of internally producing and actively using research to build awareness and inform strategic policy

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[107] Hamilton, 1992.
[108] Interviews with Josué Murillo, Omar Rivera.
[109] Interviews with Julieta Castellanos, Carlos Hernández and Kurt Ver Beek, Gail Morgado and Nicolas O'Neill, Josué Murillo, Omar Rivera.
[110] Interview with Joaquín Rivera.
[111] Interviews with Carlos Hernández and Kurt Ver Beek, Josué Murillo, Omar Rivera.

proposals for broader and deeper change, does seem to have taken a back seat to the often immediate needs of communication and legislative advocacy. Many APJ leaders acknowledged that the need to respond to the pressing "everyday fires" – the small crises timed by the news cycle – weakens their ability to maintain a more strategic course.[112]

The predominant reputation of APJ in the eyes of outside stakeholders—as a group that spends its time "criticizing" instead of "proposing"[113]—has taken a toll on the image and effectiveness of the coalition. It may not be a fair assessment, but it is understandable given how the organization worked in its first two years. While being a presence in the media to discuss the day's security related events is not bad for APJ's purposes, the continued subordination of the knowledge-centered strategy may have long term impacts, especially on their legislative advocacy.

In the APJ's 2014-2016 Strategic Plans, there are strong goals for a research and social audit strategy towards which APJ has already shown advancement. In March 2014 APJ presented a thorough study they authored on the so-called "security tax" (*tasa de seguridad*), with evidence of its misadministration, lack of transparency and the fact that the original promises behind its creation were never fulfilled. The media gave it ample coverage; it wasa clear example of APJ putting its research arm to good use to further its overall objectives. By April 2014 they had also announced the creation of APJ social audit indicators, created in collaboration with the APJ Multinational Commission of security and justice experts. The indicators are intended for the measurement and evaluation of progress on policy reform and performance within the National Police, Public Prosecutor's Office and Supreme Court. Assuming their successful implementation, the information gathered through the indicators should have a substantial impact on APJ's ability to produce influential research and proposals.

FINANCING

APJ has been successful at securing diverse funding sources to maintain and grow their operation over the last two and half years. This has likely been helped by the strong reputations of the organization that make up the members, including ASJ as their fiduciary agent. With the exception of the seed money provided by ASJ to get APJ off the ground, APJ has been fully funded through international NGOs and the US Department of State. Different from many civil society experiences with international aid,[114] they have found that receiving money from external entities has allowed them to act autonomously with little outside influence or pressure to set a reform course related to the donors' priorities or political agenda.[115] This is uncommon and hence, vey positive. APJ has begun to seek more long-term and national sources of funds that will allow it to continue to work autonomously on its mission.

MEASUREMENT AND EVALUATION

Measurement, evaluation and learning (MEL) in policy advocacy is a far more challenging task than other types of MEL applications, made more difficult when the advocacy is initiated through a coalition. For this reason, many advocacy groups leave MEL out, to their own detriment. APJ has attempted to develop indicators for funding accountability and monthly reports to relay their progress to donors. Similar to the concerns expressed regarding their theory of change, APJs indicators for measurement and evaluation seem only partially realized and more useful to achieving funder reporting guidelines than for their own use in the MEL of their performance and strategic plan. The complexity and incompleteness of their theory of change makes it only more difficult for APJ to develop precise and practical tools for MEL.

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[112] Interviews with Carlos Hernández and Kurt Ver Beek, Victor Meza, Maribel Muñoz, Josué Murillo, Omar Rivera.
[113] Interviews with Arturo Corrales, Rigoberto Cuellar, Aline Flores, and Eduardo Villanueva.
[114] See Easterly, William. *The White Man's Burden.* The Penguin Press. New York, 2006 and . Fengler, Wolfgang and Kharas, Homi. *Delivering Aid Differently: Lessons learned in the field. Brookings Institution Press. Washington DC, 2010.*
[115] Interview with Josue Murillo.

The coalition does seem to have made an effort to have specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound (SMART) indicators, although for many, applying the SMART evaluation required generosity (for indicators and their evaluation, refer to Appendix VI).

The most prominent concern with the indicators currently being utilized by APJ is how disconnected they are from the theory of change, its activities, outputs and outcomes. Ideally there would be one indicator to provide evidence for each activity and output along the way.

5 MOST COMMON MISTAKES IN ADVOCACY EVALUATION

- Staff measuring outputs—or even outcomes—that are no longer relevant because the strategy has changed
- Funders and staff mistakenly assume that more is better and that only things you can count are important to measure
- Funders and advocates have unrealistic expectations within the measurement period
- Staff are not specific enough about *who* will change and *how* they will change
- There is a mismatch between the tactics used and the outcomes expected

(Center for Evaluation Innovation as quoted by S. Mathes, 2014)

APJ AND OTHER CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS

As a final evaluative note, it is relevant to delve deeper into APJ's relationships with other Honduran civil society organizations. As mentioned in the previous section, the dynamics during the formation of APJ led to an initial distance between APJ and traditional Honduran civil society organizations, many of which were not invited to participate in the new coalition[116]. During the decades of the 80s and 90s, these organizations' efforts were focused on human rights violations, education and health. The political crises that exploded in 2009 changed the direction of the organizations, opening spaces for new organizations to diversify their topics and include security, a topic traditionally monopolized by the state.

The interviews revealed that traditional organizations like CIPRODEH and COFADEH do not collaborate with APJ in their current efforts. This seems to be a result of their initial distance mentioned above and of divergent views on security and the approach that civil society organizations should take with advocacy and the government.

Importantly, however, APJ and external CSO stakeholders have no conflicts and the conversations with leaders from both groups provided hints that they share a common goal. When faced with the fact that their objectives are quite similar, leaders seemed open to the idea that each group's unique contributions to advocacy could also complement each other.[117] Still, strategies were very different and the groups did not express much interest in combining forces.

Is it in their interest to work together? What are the political and social costs of not doing it? According to all the major theories of participation and advocacy,[118] joining together in a united front presents advantages for the negotiating power with the government and for the success of the reforms. However, given the delicate political situation in Honduras, it is not clear how this could be achieved and who should take the initiative.

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[116] Interview with Kurt Ver Beek and Carlos Hernandez.
[117] Interviews Bertha Oliva, Jousé Murillo, and Wilfredo Méndez.
[118] Stachowiak, 2013.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

The recommendations to improve the work of *Alianza Por la Paz y la Justicia* are offered as ways to strengthen the organization internally and to give it a better chance to produce the changes it pursues. For organizational purposes, this section is divided in three major components, each with its own set of inter-related recommendations. The first deals with APJ's theory of change and internal cohesion; the second with internal structure; and the third with changes in strategy and relationships with outside actors.

THEORY OF CHANGE

1. Build a more robust theory of change with clearer links between strategies/actions and outcomes

Benefits: A clear internal vision of how APJ's work can and should generate desired outcomes should make it easier for members to identify with the organization's work, unifying the different voices.

Challenges: It will require the members to come together on the specifics of priorities and detailed actions.

2. Create a timetable for desired outcomes

Benefits: Allows for better measurement of results and brings indications of necessary course corrections within the organization's process. The current model makes measurement really hard because it does not explicitly set up ambitions, and makes identification of failures an *ad hoc* process.

Challenges: Stating time objectives requires internal cohesion, and the clear definition of disappointing results demands contingency plans from the leadership for the worst-case scenarios.

3. Define specific responsibilities for activities

Benefits: Increases accountability and opens space for direct engagement of the members; decreases risk of free-riding.

Challenges: It will require members' agreement on the activities and stronger involvement of some organizations that currently are not as active.

INTERNAL STRUCTURE

4. Define a clear process for delegating new members to the CCN, with predetermined timeframes. Ideally, establish a rotation system for membership in the CCN

Benefits: For the current two-tier system to be efficient, all members need to feel represented by the CCN, and a necessary element of that is that any member sees the possibility of joining the body. Regular, one-organization-one-vote elections can go a long way in making the CCN an administrative body with a mandate to speak for the members and defend APJ's positions.

Challenges: Current leaders need to be ready to relinquish control to organizations currently outside CCN; a better level of coordination is needed to create the rules and make sure the organization adheres to them in the long run.

5. Clarify the role of the Institutional Platform and create a formal method for its members to influence APJ's strategy, especially through a twice-a-year meeting of the full National Assembly

Benefits: Engages the members that do not occupy leadership positions in the organization, and assures that their concerns and vision are being considered when the *Alianza* acts.

Challenges: Articulation needed to convene regular meetings and balance all opinions in a more regular basis; current leadership needs to be able to compromise with the other members of APJ if and when necessary.

6. Keep an ongoing evaluation on how the new decision-making system is being implemented

Benefits: Pre-determined rules to the internal decision-making of APJ allow for all members to be able to predict and believe in the process; in this case, the process matters as much as the results. In the long run, only if the members trust the internal functioning of APJ will they remain engaged and offer full support to the organization's work.

Challenges: It requires current leaders to make the effort to build up and strengthen the process, leaving aside some of the comfortable informality that derives from their personal friendships.

STRATEGY AND RELATIONSHIPS WITH OUTSIDE ACTORS

7. Lobbying: Create a system to give grades to lawmakers based on their votes on security-related themes

Benefits: Paves a way to escape the logic of personal relationships by establishing an open and clear process in which any lawmaker from any party can be praised or criticized depending on how positions are taken on security themes. Offers the possibility to identify potential allies inside the political system.

Challenges: It demands great internal organization and it may cause strains on some relationships with APJ's leaders.

8. Lobbying: Be strategic on building relationships with policymakers who share APJ's vision and avoiding appearance of alliance with those that do not

Benefits: Gives potential access to the political system in the long run; creates a route to avoid tokenization.

Challenges: May cause strains on some relationships with APJ's leaders; demands a long-term strategy that in the short term implies distance itself from potential powerful actors.

9. Lobbying: Avoid participating in government-sponsored initiatives that invite civil society but do not give it real influence over decisions

Benefits: Protects APJ from becoming the incarnation of the government's attempts to tokenize organized civil society and builds credibility of the organization in the long run.

Challenges: Demands renouncing possible access to powerful policymakers and can strain relationships with the government.

10. Research: Increase the priority given to the elaboration of proposals

Benefits: Creates a more solid base for debate; builds a critical mass of knowledge that can be constantly used to try to influence the political system; pressures government critics who see APJ as an organization that "only criticizes" and does not offer alternatives.

Challenges: It will require APJ to devote more time and resources to research and, especially, to the dissemination of that research.

11. Mobilization: Develop and implement better strategies of mass mobilization

Benefits: Builds a direct relationship with the members' bases and invests them in APJ's success; increases the pressure on the government to listen and to act.

Challenges: It will require a strategy of mobilization and grassroots actions that might not be appealing or natural for all members.

12. Implement the current objective to expand APJ's actions to outside of Tegucigalpa

Benefits: Builds a direct relationship with the members' bases and invest them in APJ's success; increases the pressure on the government to listen and to act; challenges the logic of hyper-concentration of the Honduran political system in the capital city.

Challenges: It will require a strategy of mobilization and grassroots actions that might not be appealing or natural for all members.

13. Communication: Unify the message – The messaging strategy should be discussed with at least the CCN members before liaising with the media

Benefits: Develops internal cohesion and helps avoid confusion in the media among APJ's and members' actions and positions.

Challenges: It needs to be fast (APJ should not lose its media access because of internal discord), and some members may have objections to unification when they disagree with the majority position.

14. Improve collaboration with other organizations related to security and justice, chiefly the traditional human rights organizations

Benefits: Relays a vision of a unified civil society; increases the pressure on the government; strengthens the position of APJ with international donors.

Challenges: Demands an effort to put aside personal differences and to find common ground on the themes with organizations that were not invited to be part of APJ and/or have had political disagreements with its leaders.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

Alianza por la Paz y la Justicia is a welcome development for Honduras, a country that has been plagued by high levels of violence, a corrupt and unaccountable police force and an elitist political system that is hardly willing to include civil society and answer to its concerns.

The model APJ has been trying to implement, of a coalition of organizations not traditionally related to security and justice themes, is still evolving, changing as the members experience frustrations and successes and build a critical mass of knowledge on the subject.

Within just two years, the organization has been very successful in positioning itself as a part of the debate, and the organizations' leaders have been very effective in presenting APJ's point of view. It has already had a few successes in actually influencing policy decisions and has been offered some space, but the government has more often than not tokenized it.

Undoubtedly, *Alianza*'s greatest potential strengths are related to the diversity of its members and their bases spread across Honduras. If APJ further strengthens its use of those networks, especially the ones outside of Tegucigalpa, it would likely empower the coalition to achieve its desired goals and contribute to the longevity and success of their implementation.

APJ's riskiest features come from its internal structure. The current structure inside the organization risks replicating problematic aspects of the overall political system, with an over-dependence on individual personalities and an unclear power structure. If APJ strengthens its internal systems, making management systems and accountability mechanisms clearer, it will limit this risk and likely improve the organization's effectiveness.

The potential of the *Alianza* to improve the Honduran justice and security system is clear, as long as the members remain committed to their shared beliefs and continue to use their influence to foster political will within the system. As the organization matures, improves and increases civil society's ownership over the subject, it can have a lasting positive impact, becoming the effective model to promote change in the security and justice system of Honduras that it wants to be.

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APPENDIX I
APJ MEMBERSHIP MATRIX

The *Alianza por la Paz y la Justicia* comprises 18 members. A brief description of each one is provided below:

- *Caritas de Honduras* (Caritas of Honduras): the Social Pastoral Caritas of Honduras is a Catholic organization, a department of the Episcopal Conference, aiming to promote the experience of charity according to the criteria of the Bible and the principles of the Social Teaching of the Catholic Church.[119]

- *Grupo Sociedad Civil* (Civil Society Group): a Honduran civil society organization, non-political, non-profit, which aims to represent the interests of civil society organizations to strengthen citizen participation; promote democracy, equity, political dialogue, economic stability and social justice.[120]

- *COIPRODEN - Red de Instituciones por los Derechos de la Niñez* (Network of Institutions for the Rights of the Children): a non-governmental institution, nonprofit, made up of 29 organizations working for the welfare of children in Honduras.[121]

- *UNAH - Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras* (National Autonomous University of Honduras): an educational institution of the State of Honduras. It has a campus in Tegucigalpa and eight Regional Centers.[122]

- *ASONOG - Asociación Civil de Organismos No Gubernamentales* (Civil Association of NGOs): a non-governmental organization that works with refugees in the border areas of western Honduras.[123]

- *Visión Mundial* (World Vision): a Christian organization that aims to promote justice and provide emergency care to children, families and communities in order to overcome poverty and injustice.[124]

- *VMH - Visión Mundial Honduras* (World Vision Honduras): the local chapter of *Visión Mundial* is considered as an independent organization. It aims to improve education, health and economic development in Honduras, and provides preventive, emergency and rehabilitative aid through the continued development of a system of mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery from emergencies and disasters.[125]

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- *ASJ - Asociación para una Sociedad Más Justa* (Association for a Fairer Society): Transparency International Honduras, a national chapter-in-formation of the global Transparency International movement.[126]

- *FOPRIDEH - Federación de Organizaciones No Gubernamentales para el Desarrollo de Honduras* (Federation of Non-Governmental Organizations for the Development of Honduras): a federation to promote the comprehensive and sustainable development of Honduras.[127]

- *Confraternidad Evangélica* (Evangelical Fellowship): the official representative institution of the Evangelical Church of Honduras.[128]

- *Fundación Alfredo Landaverde* (Alfredo Landaverde Foundation): a foundation that aims to preserve the legacy of Alfredo Landaverde, seen by many Hondurans as a man who gave his life for truth and justice in Honduras. Their objective is to fight against impunity in crimes against life.[129]

- *MOPAWI - Agencia para el Desarrollo de la Mosquitia* (Agency for Development of the Mosquitia): association of civil society groups, non-profit, with the mission of accompanying the people of the Mosquitia in the search for sustainable cultural, social, economic, and environmental development solutions, and strengthening democratic governance.[130]

- *Alianza Cristiana* (Christian Alliance): a coalition of organizations that advocates for dialogue and reconciliation in Honduran families.

- *CEDOH - Centro de Documentación de Honduras* (Honduran Documentation Center): a non-governmental, non-profit organization dedicated to collecting, classifying, producing and disseminating information about current issues in Honduras.[131]

- *CCL - Comunidad Cristiana de Liderazgo* (Christian Community of Leadership): an organization that aims to create a space of reflection and action for Christian leadership.[132]

- *Jóvenes contra la Violencia Honduras* (Youth Against Violence Honduras): a platform that seeks to influence youth participation in regional public policies to prevent violence.[133]

- *Proyecto Aldea Global* (Global Village Project): an organization created with the mission of empowering families to reduce poverty and building just, peaceful, and productive communities based on Christian values.[134]

- *Transformemos Honduras* (Transform Honduras): a social movement formed by churches, civil society organizations and individuals that work on education, health, security, justice, and transparency. Their activities include conducting social audit, research, publications and follow-up, and proposal development.[135]

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[126] Asocación para una Sociedad más Justa, *Quienes Somos*, retrieved 6 May 2014, http://asjhonduras.com/cms/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=87&Itemid=53
[127] FOPRIDEH, *Quienes Somos*, retrieved 6 May 2014, http://foprideh.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=230&Itemid=110
[128] Confraternidad Evangélica de Honduras, *Antecedentes*, retrieved 6 May 2014, http://www.confraternidadevangelica.org/
[129] Fundación Alfredo Landaverde, *Misión*, retrieved 6 May 2014, http://www.fundacionlandaverde.com/mision/
[130] MOPAWI, *Quienes Somos*, retrieved 6 May 2014, http://www.mopawi.org/
[131] CEDOH, *Quienes Somos*, retrieved 6 May 2014, http://www.cedoh.org/
[132] Comunidad Cristiana de Liderazgo – Honduras, *Bienvenidos y Bienvenidas*, retrieved 6 May 2014, http://ccl-honduras.blogspot.com/
[133] Jóvenes Contra la Violencia, *Inicio*, retrieved 6 May 2014, http://www.jovenescontralaviolencia.com/
[134] Proyecto Aldea Global, *About PAG*, retrieved 6 May 2014, http://www.paghonduras.org/about-pag/
[135] Transformemos Honduras, *Quienes Somos*, retrieved 6 May 2014, http://www.transformemoshonduras.com/ES/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=49&Itemid=53

APPENDIX II
LIST OF INTERVIEWS

NAME	AFFILIATION
Adriana Beltrán	Senior Associate for Citizen Security at Washington Office in Latin America (WOLA)
Arturo Corrales	Honduran Security Minister since May 1st 2013
Aline Flores	President of the Honduran Council of Private Enterprise, COHEP (*Consejo Hondureño de la Empresa Privada*)
Abram Huyser Honig	Coordinator of Research and Investigations at *Asociación para una Sociedad más Justa* (ASJ)
Bertha Oliva	One of the founders and General Coordinator of COFADEH, the Committee of Relatives of the Disappeared and Detained in Honduras.
Carlos Hernández	Executive Secretary *Asociación para una Sociedad más Justa* (ASJ)
Caitlin Gokey	Program Associate, International Program at VERA Institute of Justice
Enrique Betancourt	Yale World Fellow. He recently served as Executive Director at the National Center for Crime Prevention and Citizen Participation in Mexico.
Eduardo Moncada	Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Rutgers University
Eric Olson	Associate Director at Wilson Center, Latin American Program. His areas of expertise are: Democracy; Security and Defense; Border Security; International Security; Organized Crime; Crime; Drugs; Latin America.
Gail Morgado	Foreign Affairs Officer at U.S. Department of State
Hector Iván Mejía Velazquez	Police Commissioner and Director of the National Police University of Honduras (UNPH).
Josué Murillo	Coordinator of the *Alianza para la Paz y la Justicia* (APJ)
Joaquín Mejia Rivera	Coordinator of the Department of Human Rights in the Reflection, Research and Communication Team, ERIC (*Equipo de Reflexión, Investigación y Comunicación*). Former candidate for the National Commissioner for Human Rights
Julieta Castellanos	Rector of the National Autonomous University of Honduras (UNAH) since 2009, and founder the *Observatorio de la Violencia* (Violence Observatory) at UNAH in 2004, a center that analyzes crime statistics in Honduras.

NAME	AFFILIATION
Kurt Ver Beek	Assistant Professor and Director of the Honduras Program at Calvin College. Co-founder of *Asociación para una Sociedad más Justa* (ASJ) and part of the leadership of both ASJ and APJ.
María Luisa Borjas	Former Director of the Internal Affairs Unit of the National Police
Matías Funes	Political analyst, member of the Reform Commission of Public Safety (*Comisión de Reforma de Seguridad Pública*)
Maribel Muñoz	Coordinator research team of *Asociación para una Sociedad más Justa* (ASJ)
Mauricio Villeda	Honduran attorney, leader of the Liberal Party of Honduras. He ran as a presidential candidate in the 2013 presidential elections obtaining the third place with 28.20% of the votes.
Miguel Cálix	Representative of the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy
Omar Rivera	Executive Director at Civil Society Group, GSC (*Grupo Sociedad Civil*)
Rigoberto Cuellar	Associate Attorney General for Honduras
Victor Meza	Founder and Director of the Documentation Center of Honduras, CEDOH (*Centro de Documentación de Honduras*)
Wilfredo Méndez	Director of the Center for Research and Promotion of Human Rights, CIPRODEH (*Centro de Investigación y Promoción de los Derechos Humanos*)

APPENDIX III
RESEARCH TOOLS

The third phase of the five-phase research methodology developed for this study consisted of field research. During the field research, we conducted 26 semi-structured interviews with various APJ member organizations and the APJ technical team, with additional semi-structured interviews with individual stakeholders from APJ grant-funders, Honduran national government agencies, multinational organizations represented in Honduras, and other civil society organizations working on security reform who are not members of APJ.[136]

The following section presents three semi-structured lists of interview questions. These questionnaires served as a guide and were adapted for each interviewee according to their respective role. These interviews were held in Spanish or English, depending on the native language of the interviewee. The questions are presented in English.

EXPERTS INTERVIEW GUIDE

Presentation

We are graduate students from Columbia University, and we are currently working with Transparency International on research about the role of civil society in the security reform process. Particularly, we are interested in studying *Alianza por la Paz y la Justicia* model and its role in the security reform in Honduras.

Before we start, we wanted to ask you if we could record this interview, for our own use.

 (If yes): If you want to say something off the record you can do it.

A. Introduction

A.1 What is your name?

A.2 What organization do you work for?

A.3 What is your position?

A.4 What is your professional responsibility?

A.5 How long have you held this position?

A.6 In which area/region do you work?

A.7 How long have you worked in this area/region?

A.8 Have you worked in other areas/regions?

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[136] See Annex III for a comprehensive list of interviewees.

A.9 (*If yes*), in which area/region have you worked before?

A.10 Would you consider yourself knowledgeable about the whole country or only specific regions?

A.11 Could you please provide your contact information? (Record separately)

A.12 Could you identify one or more of the following areas that fall under your expertise

(*check all that apply*) :

- Police and law enforcement
- Judicial system (courts, prosecution, criminal defense)
- Civil Society
- Government and Public Administration systems
- Coalition building and community action

(Select from the following questions depending on interviewee expertise)

B. Honduran Civil Society

We would like to ask you some general questions about Honduras and its civil society.

B.1 How would you describe Honduran civil society? Is this a participative/organized civil society?

B.2 How do you see civil society participation has evolved along the last years?

B.3 It is there any particular sector (economic, politic, religious…) that participates more than others? Any of them more organized than the others?

B.4 In your opinion, what is the citizen's perception of civil society organizations? Do they have good or bad reputation?

C. Civil Society participation in reform

C.1 Based on your experience, how much influence do civil society organizations in Honduras have to participate in government reform process?

C.2 In general, which conditions do you think are necessary for a civil society organization and the Government to work together in a reform process?

C.3 In the particular case of Honduras, do you think those conditions are met? Which ones need to be improved?

D. Security Reform

Now in the particular case of security reform.

D.1 Are is there any additional conditions that should be met to institute collaboration among civil society organizations and the government?

D.2 Are those conditions met in Honduras? (*if not*) What is missing?

E. APJ

Now going to the particular topic of APJ.

E.1 How did you learn about APJ's work?

E.2 What do you think about APJ's work?

E.3 In your opinion, what are APJ's strengths?

E.4 What are APJ's weaknesses?

E.5 What could APJ do do to improve their work?

F. External conditions

Let's talk now about the context in which the Alliance works.

F.1 In your opinion, which conditions (political/economical/legal/social) of Honduras have helped APJ to accomplish what they have accomplished?

F.2 Which conditions have undermined APJ's chances of success?

G. APJ results

And to end the APJ topic.

G.1 In your opinion, has APJ been successful generating public support the justice and security reform process?

G.2 From your perspective, which are the main accomplishments of APJ?

G.3 What are the main accomplishments of APJ?

H. Other experiences in Honduras

To end this interview, we would like to ask you about other experiences of civil society participation in security reform process in Honduras.

H.1 Do you know of any other cases?

H.2 (*If yes*) In your opinion, was it successful? How do you define this success?

H.3 Can these other experiences inform APJ's work?

Closure

Thank you very much for your time. We hope our work will contribute to promoting peace and justice in Honduras.

GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS INTERVIEW GUIDE

Follow Experts Interview Guide, adding the following section between section E and section F.

X. Government relation with APJ

X.1 How seriously do you take APJ? Do you listen to them?

X.2 What policies do you think APJ's research and advocacy activities have affected most?

X.3 Who supported those reforms? Who pushed back?

X.4 What were/are the concerns about APJ's work?

X.5 How subjective was the success to the government in place?

X.6 What do you think about the role and performance of the government in the process of reform?

APJ AND OTHER CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS INTERVIEW GUIDE

Presentation
Follow same presentation as in the Expert Interview Guide.

A. Introduction

A.1 What is your name?

A.2 What organization do you work for?

A.3 What is your position?

A.4 What is your professional responsibility?

A.5 How long have you held this position?

(Select from the following questions depending on interviewee expertise)

B. Background
Let's talk about the beginnings and history of Alianza por la Paz y la Justicia (APJ)

B.1 When and how APJ was formed?

B.2 Which elements triggered the creation of the coalition?

B.3 Who had the initiative?

B.4 Who decided who would be invited to participate in the coalition?

B.5 Was APJ inspired by other coalition models (from Honduras or other countries)?

B.6 Is there any other coalition in Honduras similar to APJ in terms of composition or work?

B.7 (*If yes*) Do they work together?

C. Internal functioning

Now going to the internal functioning of APJ

C.1 How is the leadership team of APJ constituted? Who are the members?

C.2 How are the topics in which APJ is going to be involved decided?

C.3 Who canpropose specific topics? Is there a channel to present proposals?

C.4 Who are APJ's spokespersons?

C.5 Who represents the Alliance when speaking with government officials?

C.6 How is APJ financed? Who are the donors?

D. Internal and External context

In terms of APJ influence in the security reform.

D.1 In your opinion, has APJ been able to open channels of dialogue with the government?

D.2 (*If yes*) Which characteristics of APJ have allowed the coalition to be able to speak with the government?

D.3 Since APJ's beginnings, did the coalition have support from government officials who could facilitate their work with the government?

D.4 Have any external conditions helped APJ with its research and advocacy work?

D.5 Could you point out the most important topics/activities of APJ? (Please give examples)

D.6 How does the coalition measure the success of their strategies?

D.7 Based on those experiences, which are the strengths and the weaknesses of APJ's model?

D.8 What external factors would you consider as opportunities and threats for APJ's model?

D.9 Do you know of any other previous attempt to promote security reform of civil society organizations in Honduras? Have they been successful?

D.10 How successful has APJ been in generating public support for their proposals?

D.11 Is there any discrepancy between what people think APJ does and what the coalition really does?

Closure
Follow same presentation as in the Expert Interview Guide.

APPENDIX IV
TIMELINE

2009

June, 28: Military coup d'état removes President Manuela Zelaya, illegally forcing him to leave Honduras.

2011

October: Rafael Alejandro Vargas Castellanos, Julieta Castellanos' son, and his friend, Carlos Pineda, are killed by police officers. This event caused public outrage, which eventually led to the creation of the Commission for the Reform of Public Security. The Commission was established to propose an overhaul of the National Police, the Attorney General's Office, and the judicial branch.

November, 11: Creation of the *Dirección de Investigación y Evaluación de la Carrera Policial* (Directorate for the Investigation and Evaluation of the Police Career, DIECP). The DIECP replaced the Internal Affairs Unit of the National Police and was directed to investigate crimes and misconduct committed by police officers, as well as to continuously evaluate police personnel to remove corrupt officers. This is considered to be the beginning of the security reform in Honduras.

November: Members of *Asociación para una Sociedad más Justa* (ASJ) and leaders of several other civil society organizations travel to Guatemala to learn from the experience of that country with civil society organization and participation in security issues. They decided the experience in Guatemala was not the most appropriate for Honduras; however, they did decide to form the Alliance after that trip.

Creation of the *Alianza para la Paz y la Justicia* (APJ)

December: Alfredo Landaverde is murdered. He was a recognized expert on security, organized crime and police reform.

2012

February: Creation of the *Comisión de Reforma de la Seguridad Pública* (Commission on the Reform of the Public Security, CRSP). The commission was created by the government with the objective of designing, planning and certifying the process of reform of public security.

July: Juan Orlando Hernández, former president of the National Congress, leads the introduction of a bill that created a special police unit with strong military elements called TIGRES. APJ denounces the bill and is given an opportunity by Congress to make an alternative proposal.

December, 19: A new commission formed by actors from the government, civil society and international donors discusses plans and actions for 2013 in the area of citizen security. The members present were: BID, OEA, US Embassy, UNDP, Swiss Cooperation,

presidential and security representatives and APJ as the civil society representative. In this dialogue APJ started advocating for the need for public audiences to question government authorities.

2013

January, 13: First visit of the Multinational Commission of the *Alianza por la Paz y la Justicia.* This commission was assembled by ASJ with international experts who met with the government and other national actors in order to produce a report with recommendations.

April, 4: APJ writes a public letter to the National Congress called "*No Aguantamos Más*" asking for transparency in the security system and the destitution removal the director of the DIECP.

April, 9-11: National Congress calls five officials of the security system to be publically questioned by civil society members. The officials were: Pompey Bonilla, Security Secretary; Luis Alberto Rubí, Public Attorney; Jorge Rivera Avilés, president of the Supreme Court; Eduardo Villanueva, Director of the DIECP and Juan Carlos Bonilla, Director of the National Police.

May: Second visit of the Multinational Commission to Honduras.

APJ presents an alternative proposal to the TIGRES bill focused on a community police. The proposal is not accepted.

APJ lobbies and achieves the creation of the *Comisión Interventora*. The commission lasted four months and was in charge of investigating corruption cases inside the Attorney General's office. APJ proposed two of the four people participating in the commission.

June: APJ organizes a mass mobilization called *Velas por la Paz* (Candles for Peace).

Honduras Attorney General Luis Rubí and Deputy Attorney General Roy Urtecho submit their letters of resignation to the Honduran National Congress, thus making it necessary to replace the leadership of the Attorney General's Office.

Congress gave final approval for the creation of a special national police unit, the TIGRES, a proposed high-technology force with investigative and intelligence capacities.

September: APJ was invited by the government to participate in the *Junta Proponente del Ministerio Público* (Proposal commission of the Attorney General Office). The commission's objective is to propose and evaluate the candidates for Attorney General. Along with APJ, the commission was formed by Julieta Castelleanos (UNAH), Ramón Custodio (Commissioner of Human Rights), representatives from the Lawyers College, the Supreme Court and private universities. Given the lack of transparency of the process, APJ, Julieta Castelleanos and Ramón Custodio left the commission before a decision was taken.

APJ's members organize a second mass mobilization called *Día de Oración* (National Day of Prayer).

November: ASJ is accredited as the Honduras chapter of Transparency International.

2014

January: The *Comisión de la Reforma de Seguridad Pública* is eliminated after making its proposals for the continuation of the reform of the public security system.

APPENDIX VEVALUATION OF INDICATORS

Below it is an evaluation of APJ's 2014 indicators and metrics of success. The indicators were translated into English. The SMART methodology was used to assess each indicator in terms of specificity, measurability, attainability, relevancy and time bounding.

INDICATOR	SPECIFIC	MEASURABLE	ATTAINABLE	RELEVANT	TIME-BOUND
Number of processes within the security and justice system related to APJ research or advocacy activities where an improvement is perceived	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Number of decisions made by politicians and key actors that are influenced by APJ advocacy activities during a specific project				✓	✓
Number of technical proposals presented to decision-makers per year	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Number of events coordinated with main peace & security stakeholders per year (Police Evaluation Department, Attorney General, international cooperation) per year	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Number of follow-up actions for each agreement from APJ meetings		✓	✓	✓	
Number of documents (strategic plans and reports) received from government institutions per year.	✓	✓	✓		✓
INVESTIGATIONS / TECHNICAL PROPOSALS					
Number of authorities, civil society members, international cooperation initiatives and other key actors who know about how the justice and security institutions need to improve (per project)				✓	

INDICATOR	SPECIFIC	MEASURABLE	ATTAINABLE	RELEVANT	TIME-BOUND
Number of authorities, civil society members, international cooperation initiatives and other key actors who are informed through conferences, seminars, and discussions on justice and security issues during a project	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Number of capacity-building events with participation of organizations that work on peace and security	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Number of papers/technical proposals per year	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Number of opinion studies per year	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT					
Number of justice and security institutions' performance measurement reports	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Number of press conferences per year to present measurement reports on the government	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Updates to APJ's website on institutions' measurement reports	✓	✓	✓		✓
MULTINATIONAL COMMISSION					
Number of international and national experts that form the Commission per year	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Number of meetings of the Multinational Commission per year	✓	✓	✓		✓
Number of evaluation reports of the Commission per year	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Number of press conferences to present the performance measurement report, per year	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
MOVEMENT					
Number of participants in "plantones" (advocacy activities)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

INDICATOR	SPECIFIC	MEASURABLE	ATTAINABLE	RELEVANT	TIME-BOUND
Number of people who participate in Alianza's activities	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Number of mass activities per year	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Number of new organizations that become part of APJ per year	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Number of new persons in the APJ database	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Number of followers on Facebook and/or Twitter per year	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Number of APJ meetings per month	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Number of General Assembly meetings per year	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Number of new country regions where the APJ strategy is implemented	✓	✓	✓	✓	
CAMPAIGNS					
Number of campaigns per year	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Short campaigns (signatures, votes, likes, etc.)					
Advertising material per year (for "movement" activities)	✓	✓	✓		✓
Price of unpaid media coverage per year	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Percentage of the Honduran population that knows about APJ	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Percentage of the Honduran population that knows APJ and has a positive opinion about the coalition	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Number of people reached through media campaigns					

Additional reports from the Defence and Security Programme

Corruption Threats & International Missions: Practical guidance for leaders (2014), http://www.ti-defence.org/publications/dsp-pubs/307-corruption-threats-and-international-missions.html

Single Sourcing: A multi-country analysis of non-competitive defence procurement (2014), http://www.ti-defence.org/publications/dsp-pubs/303-single-sourcing.html

Building integrity in UK defence: Practical recommendations to reduce corruption risk (2014), http://www.ti-defence.org/publications/dsp-pubs/267-building-integrity-uk-defence.html

Corruption as a threat to stability and peace (2014), http://www.ti-defence.org/publications/dsp-pubs/257-corruption-threat-stability-peace.html

Corruption & peacekeeping: Strengthening peacekeeping and the UN (2013), http://www.ti-defence.org/publications/dsp-pubs/128-dsp-pubs-corruption-pk.html

Watchdogs? The quality of legislative oversight of defence in 82 countries (2013), http://government.defenceindex.org/parliaments

Raising the Bar: Good anti-corruption practices in defence companies (2013), http://companies.defenceindex.org/good-practice

Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index (2013), http://government.defenceindex.org/report

Arresting Corruption in the Police (2012), http://www.ti-defence.org/publications/1431-arresting-corruption-in-the-police

Defence Companies Anti-Corruption Index (2012), http://companies.defenceindex.org/report

The 3rd Line of Defence: How Audits Can Help Address Defence Corruption (2012), http://www.ti-defence.org/publications/1121-the-3rd-line-of-defence--how-audits-can-help-address-defence-corruption

Due Diligence and Corruption Risk in Defence Industry Offsets Programmes (2012), http://www.ti-defence.org/publications/1019-due-diligence-and-corruption-risk-in-defence-industry-offsets-programmes

Military-Owned Businesses: Corruption and Risk Reform (2012), http://www.ti-defence.org/publications/997-military-owned-businesses--corruption-and-risk-reform

Counter Corruption Reforms in Post-Conflict Countries (2011), http://www.ti-defence.org/publications/907-counter-corruption-reforms-in-post-conflict-countries

Organised crime, corruption and the vulnerability of defence and security forces (2011), http://www.ti-defence.org/publications/dsp-pubs/182-dsp-pubs-organised-crime-corruption-vulnerability-defence-security-forces.html

The transparency of defence budgets (2011), http://www.ti-defence.org/publications/dsp-pubs/124-dsp-pubs-transparency-defence-budgets.html

A review of anti-corruption reform measures in the defence sector in Colombia (2011), http://www.ti-defence.org/publications/dsp-pubs/203-dsp-pubs-anti-corruption-reform-colombia.html

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