CORRUPTION THREATS ASSESSMENT IN HIGHER MILITARY EDUCATION

Analytical review based on content analysis of information sources

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Our Defence and Security Programme works with governments, armed forces, defence companies and civil society organisations to reduce the risk of corruption in defence and security. This is a serious topic: defence is a sector that is crucial to a country’s security, and corruption in it is dangerous, divisive and wasteful. It puts international security at risk, it can lead to regional arms races to satisfy the greed of intermediaries, and billions can be wasted in dishonest arms deals. Our approach is non-political, neutral, and is focused on practical measures to reduce corruption.

Transparency International UK has engaged with Ukraine since 2008, participating in anti-corruption training of defence and security officials, assessments of corruption risk, and leadership reviews. In addition, we host senior secondees from Ukraine—officers, officials and experts—to spend some months with us at our offices in London, working on projects of common interest. This secondment has been possible thanks to financial support from the UK’s Ministry of Defence.

Colonel Yuriy Repilo and Lt. Colonel Serhiy Tarasov, of the National Defence University of Ukraine, were secondees at our office in London from October to December 2012. They have performed two major tasks: to prepare the anti-corruption training course for wide usage in the National Defence University, and derivatives from it in other organisations; and they have performed an analysis of corruption issues in military higher education, especially in former Soviet Union countries, which is the subject of this report.

They have put forth an effort to explore the uncharted territory of corruption risks in military higher education. They have used a content analysis of internet citations to get an idea of the prevalence of corruption in different areas of the education process. This piece of work will, we hope, spark interest in and further research on this problem. In turn, this will enable military educators in many countries to strengthen their organisations against corruption.

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Mark Pyman
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At daybreak, this Mexican highway provides a fantastic view. It looks like a picture of a clean and tranquil future. But there is no such future yet—neither here, nor for the higher military education in Ukraine.

To get to this future, we must not only create strong institutional measures against corruption, but we must be ready to welcome the norms that come with them.
"It is better to know some of the questions than all of the answers" J. Thurber

Why have the authors become interested in the issue of corruption in higher military education?

The system of military education and science is an indispensable part of the military organisation and the state as a whole. Its condition and efficiency considerably (if not decisively) affect the state’s security and defence capacity.

The study of numerous information sources on corruption and anti-corruption activities in different domains have shown that nowadays there is no material on the above issues available in practice. It can be asserted that, generally, a great many materials are devoted to corruption worldwide (Figure 1). However, there is a very limited number of such materials available that focus on the defence sector, particularly in the area of higher military education.

In the authors’ opinion, the reason is that the problem of prevention of corrupt activities in higher military education is quite new; whereas the issue proves hardly relevant at all for Western European countries applying other dominant education models.

This problem is amplified by the inaccessibility of this information, which is especially notable in the countries most exposed to corrupt practices. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that there are many studies on corruption in higher education and some studies on corruption in defence sector available. However, the authors have not found any research devoted to joint consideration of these two problems.

Hence, this analytical survey is based on the collection, analysis, and generalisation of common corruption principles found in reports from various countries struggling with corruption in their educational systems, including higher education.
The sources have been used with relative context-sensitivity, as some countries have principally different approaches to education and defence on the whole. Nonetheless, there are tendentious problems of corrupt activities in the domains of comprehensive and higher education, and defence. In the authors’ opinion, such problems are caused by universal philosophical problems, probable in any country at any time by the peculiarities of the educational and defence processes rather than as a result of a national character. In other words, one may draw a conclusion on whether or not such problems exist under certain historical and public conditions only on the basis of respective practical research.

The authors have tried to deal solely with the problem of prevention of corruption in the system of higher military education, putting aside the problem of combatting existing corruption.

Information for the purpose of the study was taken from various sources meant for different domains (mainly for non-defence institutions) and for different type of students. All types of students (trainees, cadets, higher school students, etc.) are hereinafter referred to as the “students” (a conventional term in higher military schools of the post-Soviet countries).

A preliminary discussion of the problematic issues dwelt upon in the analytical survey was led by the framework of Transparency International’s Defence and Security Programme (TI-DSP). The discussion was attended by the TI-DSP experts on corruption study and prevention.
A review of diverse information sources on the problem of corruption in different spheres of human activity revealed that the methods of gathering such information are, at best, based on statistical data or method of expert polling; but most often just haphazardly observed. Besides, experts or researchers may seldom be able to enumerate all the factors that, at least to some extent, affect the metrics under study. Even if they are aware of many suchlike factors, their inclusion into the research may be either impossible or undesirable. It is impossible to obtain information regarding some of them, whereas other factors may be not measurable or known to only insignificantly affect the metrics under study. Finally, inclusion of an exhaustive number of factors makes the study cumbersome. Apart from that, the experience proves that expansion of the components will not always improve quantitative characteristics of the study.

Hence emerges an actual problem of searching for a methodological mechanism able to consider maximum possible relevant (having to do with the research issue), pertinent (directly relating to the research object and subject) and verifiable (to be taken as a basis for scientific results) information, provide for its representativeness, and exclude subjective assessment of the role of separate factors.

The studies have shown that, currently, many different mathematical methods are applied for data array processing. They are mainly able to operate only with quantitative variables subject to usual operations. At the same time, much more information is available from text sources and the Internet. This may be quite difficult—or even impossible—to transform into numerical format, hence it becomes crucial to search for such methods of analysis of suchlike information that may help pull useful data out of qualitative text information.

Analysis of contemporary methods in other scientific domains showed that the most efficient means of interpreting largely qualitative data in a quantitative way is the content analysis technique. Content analysis is a formalised technique of investigation into the contents of information with the help of identification of the constantly repeated meaningful text units (names, notions, opinions, etc.). It is based on isolation and further analysing of repeated and easily countable sense units, e.g. keywords, phrases, or ideas. Content analysis is a non-experimental method, as the researcher exercises no level of control over the words placed within the text or the frequency with which they appear. With the aid of this method, a researcher may compare the contents of a great number of texts and analyse them by quantitative methods (e.g., charts, tables, etc.), measuring the level of importance of concepts by the frequency of their appearance in the texts. Content analysis may show documentarily, with the help of objective and quantitative indicators, if our assumptions based on non-systematic observances are true. It delivers reproducible and precise results based on the study of the text.

Existing for over a hundred years, this method had been applied in various spheres of human activity until the mid-1960s. However, taking into account its need of a great volume of calculations on the one hand, and practical infeasibility to perform them timely and reliably by researchers on the other, this method became practically abandoned.
With the advance of technology allowing computers to aggregate and comb through sources efficiently and effectively, researchers have returned to the content analysis method.

Within the analytical methods, content analysis occupies a peculiar place due to it being most technologically advanced and, therefore, best corresponding to systematic monitoring of large data flows. Apart from that, content analysis is quite flexible to allow for a diverse circle of concrete research types to be “inserted” into its framework.

Finally, as an inherently quantitative method (although with a prominent qualitative constituent), content analysis yields to certain formalisation and computerisation.

The method of content analysis includes systematic digitalisation, assessment and interpretation of the form and contents of the information source. The information, or documentation, sources were any print or manuscript, magnetic, photographic or cinematographic film, or electronic copies of relevant pieces of work. It is noteworthy that the first two constituents of the method are well researched and successfully used in various domains of science.

Based on the above, the authors have considered it possible to apply content analysis in this study to contribute substantially to the existing approaches.

Content analysis is known to employ the following analytic procedures:

- text frequency analysis, construction of sense-groups
- text sense analysis, identification of synonymic expressions
- search for the links in the text for the given words
- discovery of functional dependencies between the information characteristics, and check-up of these dependencies on other sources, etc.

In this study, content analysis was proposed to be applied as the main method aimed at recovering the most important information and as a processing procedure of the data obtained in other studies on the phenomenon of corruption in higher military education system.

The objects of content analysis in the study were as follows: information from the Internet, newspapers, public appearances, TV and radio programmes, contents of public and personal documents, etc. Content analysis was based on isolation and subsequent analysis of the following easily countable sense units:

- the notions expressed by words or terms—e.g., corruption, bribe, etc.
- the subject expressed by whole sense paragraphs, parts of the text, articles, etc. (e.g., the problem of lowering of the corruption level in the country)
- the names of the public and political figures, prominent scientists, names of the companies and organisations
- a whole public event, official document, fact, work of literature, case, etc.

Naturally, the above is by far not a full list of the calculation units. The value of application of content analysis in our study lies in the fact that all its results have been recorded and may be exposed to control by any experts, at a speed and in succession considered most convenient by them.
In this study, content analysis was proposed to be applied as the main method aimed at recovering the most important information and as a processing procedure of the data obtained in other studies on the phenomenon of corruption in higher military education system.

For the purpose of systematising the data collection procedure, the finished and approved approach of virtue self-assessment in the domains of defence and security was used,¹ as a result of cooperation between the NATO states and Transparency International.

With the help of this approach, the authors were able to assess the strengths and weaknesses of their analysis from this assessment and make suggestions about further action. The study analysed sources pertaining to the following issues:

1. democratic control and cooperation
2. national anti-corruption law and policy
3. anti-corruption policy in the domains of security and defence
4. the personnel – behaviour, policy, training and discipline
5. planning and budgeting
6. operations
7. purchases
8. relations with defence companies and other suppliers
9. issues specific for a concrete state

“It is easy to think, hard to act, but the most difficult thing in the world is to turn a thought into an act”
J. Goethe

All human beings endowed with discretionary power—the power to distribute resources using their own judgment (a functionary, MP, law-enforcement officer, administrator, examiner, etc.)—are known to be inclined to corruption. The main incentive for corruption is an opportunity to attain economic profit (rent) related with the use of office. The main restraining, preventative factor is the risk of exposure and punishment.

German philosopher Schmidt considered that “the notion of a nation is the notion of education. Only educated people constitute a nation in the sense of such qualities as people’s will and people’s self-consciousness.”

Not one of the Ukrainian higher schools has ever been included into the World University Rankings, run for the last nine years by the competent British magazine Times Higher Education, as the 400 of the world’s best universities.

The data for the rankings are powered by Thompson Reuters. The universities are assessed by 13 indices. To rank them, all main tasks standing before a contemporary university are considered—scientific research and educational activities, transfer of knowledge, and international activity. Other important indices are the world’s largest polling on the universities’ reputation, and analysis of 50,000,000 citation cases compared with the mean global citation numbers determined for every specific field of knowledge.

This year, the methodology of the ranking appeared improved even further, so that now the universities paying special attention to the arts, humanities and public sciences could compete on equal terms with those specialised in "exact" sciences. In the past the assessment of the latter may have been artificially overrated, in part due to the fact that they usually get more financing. Owing to such a complex and up-to-date methodology, the Times Higher Education’s ranking is deemed the most competent university ranking worldwide.2

According to the report Corrupt Schools, Corrupt Universities: What Can Be Done? prepared by the UNESCO International Institute for Educational Planning,3 corruption in universities inflicts serious damage to educational systems worldwide. The analysis of the situation performed in 60 countries showed that unlawful extortions for matriculation, bribery at exams, misappropriations, forgeries and other abuses are practiced in industrially advanced countries as well as in developing ones.
Ukraine has typically scored quite poor in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index. In 2010 Ukraine occupied the 134th place out of the 178 countries assessed; and in 2011, the 152nd place out of the 183 countries assessed. Starting from 2001, the numerical value produced by the Corruption Perception Index has remained practically invariable at approx. 2.4; having risen up to 2.7 in 2007 only.

The results of another of Transparency international’s comparative studies showed equally troubling results. Their Global Corruption Barometer’s methodology, which provides for the registration of the real corruption experience, showed that the share of bribers in the educational system varies from 30 up to 48 per cent (according to the respondents’ assessments).4

In addition, the Education Index is used within the framework of the special series of UN reports on human development as one of the key indices of social development to calculate the Human Development Index. It is with the aid of the Education Index that the country’s achievements are measured from the viewpoint of its population’s level of education attained by the following two main indices:

1. the adult literacy index (2/3 of the weight)
2. the index of the aggregate share of students of primary, secondary and higher schools (1/3 of the weight)

The above two measurements of the educational level are consolidated in the resultant Index standardised as numerical values from 0 (minimum) to 1 (maximum). While doing so, it is accepted that the developing countries must have 0.8 as the minimum index, although most of them have the value of 0.9 or above. To have their place determined in the global ranking, all countries are ranked by the Education Index. The top place in the ranking corresponds to the highest value of the Index, and the last place, to the lowest one. The Index is updated annually. By this Index, Ukraine occupied the 76th place among 187 countries.6

The results of the studies performed in June 2011 in the framework of the UNITER Project let us make the following conclusion regarding the level of corruption in the system of Ukraine’s educational institutions: “voluntary bribes”—25.5 per cent, “extorted bribes”—49.7 per cent, “string-pulling”—20.0 per cent.7

According to the results of the sociological survey conducted on 23 March to 3 April 2011 at higher schools by Ilko Kucheriv of the Democratic Initiatives

All recent studies performed in Ukraine prove that corruption in education is recognised as one of the most widespread.

Foundation jointly with the Ukrainian Sociology Service, 33.2 per cent of the respondents had the direct experience of bribery in higher education; 37.7 per cent did not have such experience; while the remaining 29.1 per cent stated that they had heard of it from the people who had had such direct experience. As the scholars concluded, “it is mainly bribery that underlies the corruption practices encountered by the students”.

An average salary of a Ukrainian university academic is 25 times less than an American professor’s average salary, 15 to 20 times less than in the EU, and 8 to 10 times less than in neighbouring Poland.\(^8\)

The results of the performed study have allowed us to classify the potential cases of corrupt actions in higher military education system according to the following main stages:

- obtaining the licenses to provide educational services in the sphere of higher education (by specialisation, science branch, institution);
- matriculation of university/college entrants;
- learning process of university/college students (full-time tuition, tuition by correspondence, externship);
- graduation from university/college (defence of a graduation thesis, final examination)
- accreditation of the university/college (specialisation, science branch).

The results of the study have proved that the main cases of potential corruption in higher education establishments (including military) are the following:

First, it is a payment for matriculation in one of the following ways:

- a pay for full matriculation
- a pay for a certain mark (grade) in the entrance examination
- a pay for a “loyal” attitude in the examination

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This is not an exhaustive list of instances of students having matriculation paid for. However, these examples offer a portrayal of some forms of corruption in this area. Students can also gain a guarantee of matriculation via relatives or friends, and a guarantee of matriculation due to a subordinate relationship.

Second, it is a payment or work carried out for the benefit of the university/college staff in exchange for the test/credit, a mark in the exam, yearly projects, practical training, etc.

Third, it is writing of different essays/tests, etc. by the academics for their students subject to respective remuneration.

Fourth, it is a payment and gifts for the “loyal” attitude of the department, dean’s office, or a certain academic.

Fifth, it is either pay, gifts and/or services granted to the dean’s offices and other university/college departments in exchange for the reports, permits, and access to material wealth (resort house vouchers, places in dormitories, etc.).

Sixth, all the above, but done by pulling strings rather than with money/gifts/works—nepotism in the above spheres.

Proceeding from the frequency of records in the sources, the most “corrupt” stages revealed are the matriculation of university/college entrants and learning process at the universities/colleges.

In addition to that, it is poor students who usually take part in corrupt relationships. According to the report by the World Bank, the following corruption forms can be distinguished:9

- bribery
- purchase of contracts/job tickets and other governmental preferences, concessions (licenses) or court decisions
- evasion of customs, tax or other lawful payments
- theft
- deliberate, unlawful disposal of the budget and public property
- favouritism and patronage
- nepotism
- financing of the elections or political parties in exchange for obtaining of influence

Proceeding from the frequency of records in the sources, the most “corrupt” stages revealed are the matriculation of university/college entrants and learning process at the universities/colleges.

The results of the analysis of higher military education let us conclude that consideration of corruption threats in this domain is generally carried out on the basis of the classification suggested by M. Johnston:10

- Bribery: It is related with unlawful deeds, like bribes for the credit/exam, issuance of the license, possibility of matriculation, etc. Most bribes are given at correspondence and externship departments, and chairs responsible for the training of reserve officers in civilian schools.

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• **Patronage systems**: Its purpose is to patronise the “right” persons able to grant welfare or services for such “aid.” The officers in charge of such patronage systems try to monopolise their power up to the establishment of total control over the activity of a legitimate body (the council or other collective body).

• **Nepotism (friendship)**: It leads to the appointment of relatives to the key positions in education (clannishness), which in turn results in the manifestation of subjectivism in the management system and in the approval of managerial decisions in favour of the clan rather than the institution.

• **Crisis corruption**: the system of interrelations between the university/college staff and the business elite and crime representatives under circumstances when subjects of purchase and sale become decisions of the authorities that may cause large-scale social and political changes on the national and regional levels (privatisation of high-end technology businesses and scientific objects, transfer of leading universities/colleges under the authority of an unconstitutional body, decline of public prestige of a diploma of higher education, academic degree, academic rank by means of their conferring on representatives of the state machinery, business, criminal world, etc., with subsequent employment of such “scholars” as university/college academics).

At the same time, content analysis has helped us reveal other corrupt practices in higher education, viz.:

• **Influence**: The use of acquaintanceships or ties of relationship to enter the university/college.

• **Mark (grade) manipulation**: An unexpected change of the admission criteria for the given specialisation to give a handicap to the group of persons forewarned of such changes.

• **An appeal**: It refers to the persons that were short of several grades to be admitted to the chosen specialisation (most often, in their appeals the entrants refer to the aspects considered as obscure, but important from their viewpoint);

• **Purchase of the entrance exams**—the price depends upon the prestige of a given university/college. It may be a “direct” use of force, “if X is not admitted, you will be terminated”; a direct transfer of money; or an “indirect” pressure when the demand to admit an entrant is disguised as a request rather than a demand, whereas in fact it is meant that if the needed person failed to enter, then the requester would “get insulted.” It is such departments as the accountancy, dean’s offices (timetables of the studies), logistics or trade unions that have most efficient levers to exert such pressure.

• **Purchase of examination cards, tests; order, writing and defence of a yearly thesis via the acquaintances, Internet, scientific and teaching staff, etc.**

• **Order of the graduation (bachelor’s), diploma and master’s degree**: Certain university/college departments grant the “all inclusive” services: “practical training + report, degree examination + graduation (diploma, master’s) thesis + defence presentation with demo software + defence of the thesis + guarantee of the desirable mark”.

• **A bribe**—it may help enter the university/college, pass the exams, or enter the PhD studies (including at a military academy/college);

• **A gift**—money or other acknowledgments (often to be determined by the examiners themselves) in exchange for a positive exam mark.

• **Private tutorship**—the service is granted by the academics of the chosen specialisation (lecturers and members of the board of examiners are the most expensive).
• “Buy my book please!”—a substitute bribe lying in the fact that the students are required to come to the exam with the textbook/manual written by their lecturer. Availability of such book is the main permit to pass the exam.

• Plagiarism—rewriting of somebody else’s works, or use of the works written by straw men.

The Ukrainian scholars have suggested that the types of corruption activities be classified as shown in Figure 2. The study has also revealed data on the initiative of the bribe (Figure 3).

Another interesting aspect of our study has been the authors’ distribution of corruption activities in the sphere of higher military education in regards to the “who is doing it?” principle, based on characteristics of the corruption actions. We based this on the classification of corruption patterns active in Russia, where such corruption practices are divided into the following types – “dinosaurs,” “predators,” “black cash,” “rodents,” “hooks,” and “penguins”.11

The “dinosaurs” (i.e. the corruption practices that are gradually passing away) are characterised by: acceptance of commission charges or other material benefits from the candidates for a job; lease of the premises or equipment belonging to the educational institution for the purpose of personal use; payment of overrated rewards to the “right” members of the academic and specialised councils and juries.

The “predators” are the corruption patterns based on squeezing money from educational institutions by state control authorities. The polling shows that this pattern is used as actively as it was in the past. The managers confessed that they were making payments to the customs office, fire inspection and law enforcement agencies, either voluntarily or pursuant to pressure from these agencies. Thirteen respondents declared that they themselves regularly suggested paying for the services of the officers of regional controlling authorities, and 7 respondents stated that such practice had become systematic.

The “black cash” is the form of corruption payment that used to be adopted in the form of envelopes with cash, but now gives way to new patterns—e.g. acceptance of a share through formal appointment to scientific and teaching positions or those of research officers.

According to the polling, 21 managers sometimes use “cash” to pay for the publications in the media. Thirteen managers sometimes pay “cash” for the services of the regional executive power (trips abroad, medical treatment, etc.), while five others systematically use it to pay for the needed court decisions.

The “rodents”: The school’s resources are used for the purposes of personal enrichment (purchase of luxurious cars, organisation of tourist trips, etc.).

The “penguins” are a corruption type very much peculiar for the ex-Soviet countries. This is how friendship and other personal relationship are used for corrupt purposes. The managers may often not even consider such phenomena as employment of relatives or use of the suppliers on friendly terms with the top management as corruption, says the study.

The “hooks” are, effectively, blackmail. The matter is the use of leverage upon colleagues, partners and responsible officers in one’s own interests through collection of confidential and discreditable information. Many of the respondents did not see this as a corrupt practice, either.

To fight corruption, the managers may apply the techniques much similar to those applied by the corrupt officials themselves—formation of a network of informal contacts to exert pressure on the public officials to make them have the laws enforced, collection of discreditable data on the corrupt officials, etc.

FIGURE 2: DATA ON THE TYPES OF CORRUPTION ACTIVITIES IN HIGHER SCHOOL

- Passing the examinations: 70.32%
- Entrance to a university/college: 5.65%
- Threat of expulsion from a university/college: 4.42%
- Obtaining the grant/scholarship: 3.88%
- Passing the examination ahead of schedule, passing for an exam: 3.88%
- Transfer to another faculty (form of tuition, another university/college): 3.40%
- Other: 1.21%


FIGURE 3: DATA ON THE INITIATIVE OF THE BRIBE

- Passing the examinations: 44.19%
- Taking parents'/relatives' advice: 3.88%
- By the mediator's order: 6.98%
- Volunteer offer: 12.19%
- Other: 32.17%
3. POTENTIAL CAUSES AND BACKGROUND FOR APPEARANCE OF CORRUPTION THREATS IN HIGHER MILITARY EDUCATION

CAUSES

Most specialists have agreed that the main cause of high levels of corruption (including in the sphere of higher military education) is imperfection of the institutions that ensure the internal and external mechanisms of its prohibition. Apart from that, there are certain grounds to guess that the following objective circumstances may substantially amplify the presence of corruption:

- Overly-complex, ambiguous and verbose legislation calling for a large-size bureaucracy and complicating the comprehension of law by the citizens that inhibits oversight and accountability.

- The students’ ignorance or incomprehension of the legislation, making it possible for the officials to try to avoid bureaucratic procedures or to change the due payments.

- Dependence of the standards and principles underlying the activity of bureaucratic mechanisms upon the governing elite’s policy.

- Lack of professional competence of the bureaucracy.

- Nepotism and political mediation, leading to the formation of personal relationships (secret agreements) weakening the corruption control and prevention mechanisms.

- Lack of unity in the system of executive power; i.e. regulation of the same activity by several different authorities.

- Underdeveloped civil society, resulting in the lack of sufficient civil influence on, and efficient control over, the activities of the legislative, executive and judicial branches of the state power.

Most specialists have agreed that the main cause of high levels of corruption (including in the sphere of higher military education) is imperfection of the institutions that ensure the internal and external mechanisms of its prohibition.

- Contemporary education is becoming more like a “social filter.” Consequently, if the filter acts formally (diplomas), then the students’ feedback will be the formal receipt of diplomas, without keeping to the unnecessary formalities. This is how higher education system works in the ex-Soviet countries.

- Extremely low salaries of research and teaching personnel in the state sector as compared with the private sector, making the former search for alternative survival strategies. The existing level of remuneration of labour of full-time university/college employees
leaves them particularly vulnerable to corrupt incentives;

- low level of the country’s economic development;

- high quantity of “superfluous” (from the students’ viewpoint) curricular subjects; to waste no time on them, the students would rather spend money to pass them. Currently, most students cannot understand why the humanities are part of the curricula of engineering schools, or technological sciences at classical universities;

- the culture and traditions in the state on the whole, as studies have found that a perceived abundance of corruption precipitates more corruption.

The results of the study carried out by content analysis technique, have let us reveal typical backgrounds for the appearance of corrupt activities in the sphere of higher military education with identification of “importance ranks” for each such activity (Table 1).

A comparative analysis of characteristic features of education, military education, higher education and defence in different countries has let us formulate the peculiarities of higher military education that are to be taken into account when assessing corruption threats.

**PECULIARITIES OF HIGHER MILITARY EDUCATION COMPARED WITH CIVIL EDUCATION:**

- A closed (from the civil society) character of information used in the educational and scientific research process.
A diploma is a necessary criterion for career “lifting” (the diploma is primary, whereas the knowledge is secondary).

A graduate is to be sent to a place and position for further service.

No examples of purchase of the diploma of higher military education (at least, no such examples have been reported)

A three-level character of higher military education (a bachelor’s degree – an academy of a certain branch of the armed forces; master of state military administration – a university, operational-tactical (pre-strategic) level; master of state military administration – a university, operational strategic level);

Tougher absenteeism control

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**TABLE 2: TO PREVENT CORRUPTION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Peculiarity revealed</th>
<th>Prevention trend</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>facilitates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>A closed (from the civil society) character of information used in the educational and scientific research process</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>A graduate is to be sent to a place and position for further service</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>No examples of purchase of the diploma of higher military education (at least, examples reported)</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Tougher absenteeism control</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Job qualification required to enter the university/college (starting from the pre-strategic level)</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Absence of nostrification of diplomas issued by the military educational institutions of other countries</td>
<td>No impact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Absence of alternative higher educational institutions to get a diploma of a certain education level</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>No competition on certain specializations</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Greater part of syllabus is allocated to the subjects that may be needed some time in future, but never immediately after the graduation (up to 70 per cent, depending upon the education level)</td>
<td>No impact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Absence of the scientific and teaching staff with a real (battle) experience on the subjects they teach</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
• Job qualification required to enter the university/college (starting from the pre-strategic level)

• Absence of notification of diplomas issued by the military educational institutions of other countries

• Absence of alternative higher educational institutions to get a diploma of a certain education level

• No competition on certain specialisations

• Greater part of the syllabus is allocated to the subjects that may be needed some time in future, but never immediately after the graduation (up to 70 per cent, depending upon the education level).

• Absence of the scientific and teaching staff with a real (battle) experience on the subjects they teach

With the aim adopting the respective officials’ best decision on anti-corruption activities in the sphere of higher military education (prevention of corruption, or fight against it if it has already appeared), expert polling has been conducted (Tables 2 and 3) to identify the trends of the revealed peculiarities of higher military education (whether such decision facilitates or complicates the process under review).

As seen from the data of Tables 2 and 3, the results of the polling on the identification of trends of the revealed the peculiarities of higher military education have proved that the best choice for anti-corruption activities in the sphere of higher military education is the prevention of corruption (the ratios of the facilitation trend to complication trend equal to 4 to 6, respectively—Table 2), as compared with combatting it after it has already emerged (which showed a facilitation to complication ratio equal to 1 to 10, respectively – Table 3).
## TABLE 3: TO PREVENT CORRUPTION

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4. POSSIBLE APPROACHES TO PREVENT CORRUPTION IN HIGHER MILITARY EDUCATION

“It is more useful to know several wise rules that may always serve you, than to learn many things that will remain useless” Seneca Lucious Annaeus

The following are the possible approaches to prevent corruption in the sphere of higher military education:

- improve measures addressing legal prosecution of corruption
- intensification of administrative control
- anti-corruption education
- expansion of social protection of the teaching staff
- improvement of the educational process
- intensification of administrative sanctions and control
- promotion of transparency
- expansion of social guarantees for the teaching staff to make them value their job

The results of the studies conducted by content analysis technique have let us divide possible approaches to prevent corruption in higher military education into the following groups with the identification of “importance ranks” for every group – both on the national level (Table 4) and on the level of a separate educational institution (Tables 5 to 8).

ACTIVITIES ON THE LEVEL OF A SEPARATE HIGHER EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION

The suggested activities to be accomplished on the level of a generic university/college are to be classified as follows:

- economic activities
- organisational activities
- controlling activities
- media activities

To facilitate adaptation of the activities to each concrete university/college, we have suggested the following generalised formulations of prevention approaches rather than a detailed list of activities.
"The point is not to run quickly, but to run out as soon as possible" F. Rabelais

Practically all the sources have stated that corruption – both in higher education and defence, which means that in higher military education as well – is a phenomenon that exists in all countries of the world where such education exists.

As a result of this study, the authors have come to a regrettable conclusion: part of the revealed information indicates that some experts do not see the value of working to prevent corruption.

The main idea of practically all sources reviewed is the fact that it is cheaper to prevent the phenomena of corruption in most cases, than to fight them later on.

The results of the study indicate that corruption in the domain of higher military education can take different shapes and be of different types; it can occur at different stages of training and affect different spheres of activity of a university/college, starting from issuance of license on education services, matriculation, education proper and graduation, up to accreditation of the educational institution.

No doubt, corrupt military higher schools will result in the graduation of untrained and unskilled military personnel. This fact negatively affects the development of the society on the whole and its ability for efficient defence, specifically—in both short and long-term outlooks.

The facts, conclusions and proposals represented in this survey do not always correspond with the authors’ viewpoints to the problem; therefore they are of objective rather than subjective character, and are reported with the sole purpose of their unbiased representation.
Other reports from the Defence and Security Programme:


Building Integrity and Reducing Corruption in Defence and Security: 20 Practical Reforms (2011)
[Also available in Russian and Ukrainian]

Codes of Conduct in Defence Ministries and Armed Forces (2011)
http://www.ti-defence.org/publications/90-codes-of-conduct-in-defence-ministries-and-armed-forces [Also available in Arabic]

A Review of Anti-Corruption Reform Measures in the Defence Sector in Colombia (2011)


The Transparency of Defence Budgets (2011)

Counter Corruption Reforms in Post-Conflict Countries (2011)

Military-Owned Businesses: Corruption and Risk Reform (2012)

Due Diligence and Corruption Risk in Defence Industry Offsets Programmes (2012)


Defence Companies Anti-Corruption Index (2012)
http://companies.defenceindex.org/report

Arresting Corruption in the Police (2012)

Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index (2013)
http://government.defenceindex.org/report
Transparency International UK’s Defence and Security Programme works to reduce corruption in defence and security worldwide.

We engage with governments, armed forces, security forces, defence companies, international organisations, civil society and others to advance this goal.

We provide new tools, practical reforms, benchmarks and research to enable change.

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