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INTRODUCTION

Transparency International Defence & Security (TI-DS) is part of the Transparency International movement. It acts as a sector specific centre of defence and security anti-corruption expertise for the entire Transparency International movement. TI-DS is hosted by Transparency International UK, has programme representatives in key regions and works with a range of TI chapters across the movement.

This iteration of the strategy covers 2021-2023 and builds upon the 2015 strategy. The focus of TI-DS’s strategy runs across four key areas of focus: Defence Governance; Corruption, Conflict & Insecurity; Private Sector Integrity; and, Corruption and Arms Control.

VISION, PURPOSE AND VALUES

We envisage a world in which government, business, civil society, and the daily lives of people are free from corruption.

The purpose of the Defence and Security Global Thematic Network Initiative is to ensure that defence and security institutions are accountable to their publics and subject to civilian democratic control and oversight, and that corruption risks are reduced.

Our strategic objectives are:

1. To mitigate corruption risks in the defence and security sector
2. To reduce the role of corruption that impacts the defence and security sector as a factor contributing to conflict, insecurity and crises
3. To improve the integrity of private sector defence and security actors
4. To mitigate critical corruption risk factors in arms control regimes

TI-DS adheres to the values and guiding principles of the TI Movement, namely: transparency, accountability, integrity, solidarity, courage, justice and democracy.
EXTERNAL CONTEXT: SETTING THE SCENE FOR THE WORK OF TI-DS

Five global trends that are critical to the work of TI-DS.

1. **Continued fragmentation of global power** including the disintegration of a rules-based multilateral approach that challenges collective action, and the erosion of global leadership in fighting corruption. Competition for power is persistent, among states, firms, and organised crime networks. These new power dynamics are challenging the norms and mechanisms established during the last century to resolve disputes and address global challenges, threatening to sideline international institutions and treaties.

2. **Growing impact of technological change** such as artificial intelligence, machine learning, big data, and information warfare. Corrupt actors exploit new digital spaces, using cryptocurrencies to launder money, manipulating and stealing data and by leveraging artificial intelligence and machine learning. The vast amount of personal data stored online is open to abuse and illicit financial flows are expected to grow, facilitated by ICT networks. There is a pressing need to monitor the evolving digital space and its impact on the defence and security sector, with the aim of understanding the role of corruption in these dynamics.

3. **Increasing insecurity and conflict**, driven by climate change, resource scarcity, and civil emergencies. In this context, defence and security forces are faced with more frequent and concurrent operational commitments, which stretch resources and reduce readiness for other requirements. Corruption is one of the key factors leading to, and exacerbating conflicts. It is a key grievance against those in power; it undermines democracy, strengthens extremist and organised crime groups and facilitates the unchecked trade in arms.

4. **Increasing inequality** is driving both populism and the deterioration of civil rights as well as motivating new forms of activism. There is an erosion of solidarity, social trust and faith in democratic institutions. Widespread public disillusionment with existing institutions and dissatisfaction with chronic inequality has been seized on by populist leaders to rally public support against entrenched “corrupt elites” with neither correcting these dysfunctions. The defence and security sector has a unique role in this context which affects people’s everyday lives, and to which TI-DS has already made an important contribution.

5. **The growing role of corporations on matters of public concern**, especially where they are performing public duties leading to undue influence in policymaking, and the engagement of private actors in security situations and defence R&D. Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) have become a staple of modern conflict: strengthening and circumventing the use of traditional military. The arms industry is increasingly being relied on by states for innovation and to gain competitive advantage for their militaries and to spur advances in dual use technology. At the same time, emerging defence industries are characterised by a high degree of state ownership, with states seeking both product and foreign policy benefits, creating an increased risk of bribery and/or undue influence.
GOALS AND APPROACH

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<th>Goals</th>
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<td><strong>We advance policy:</strong> Use research, evidence and advocacy</td>
<td>Corruption is a long-term problem that rarely responds to linear, predetermined anticorruption interventions or short time-frames. This is particularly true for anti-corruption efforts in the defence and security sector, which are often characterised by conflict and insecurity, limited information flows, suspicion of civilian oversight, and overlapping spheres of influence among leadership.</td>
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<td>to drive the use and improvement of law, regulation, systems and policy to deter and pursue corruption.</td>
<td>Our work is based on an in-depth knowledge of the defence and security sector and the specific types of corruption it faces. It is informed by ongoing political economy and contextual analysis. We contribute to broad-based coalitions and collective action working with reform-minded actors to bring about change. As we build on our data and research, we think both long-term and strategically. We will draw on learning from the previous strategy period and current evidence from the wider spheres of anti-corruption and governance programming to inform what we do.</td>
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<td><strong>We improve practice:</strong> Drive the public and private sectors to change behaviours, attitudes and stop corruption.</td>
<td>TI-DS employs a “policy windows” theory of change which aims to define the problem of corruption in the defence and security sector, develop policy options to reduce corruption risks, and influence the political climate through working with others. This approach is aligned with the most recent research into how control of corruption is most likely to be achieved. It is also founded upon current trends in wider governance programming, emphasising programming being adapted to ongoing political economy or contextual analysis and building broad-based coalitions and collective action. Our external advocacy and communications planning is built around these concepts. Our research and insight are living assets that lead to sustained action, often with, and through partners in challenging contexts, leading to real world change.</td>
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<td><strong>We promote change:</strong> Share knowledge, create pressure and reduce opposition, mobilise and support allies to tackle corruption</td>
<td>Given the specificities of the defence and security sector, an emphasis on thinking and working politically, and with credibility at senior levels, is also seen as critical. We therefore deploy elements of a “power politics” theory of change where we develop relationships and undertake direct advocacy with key senior decision-makers to make the case for change as we identify policy windows. Blending our programmatic expertise with a network of credible, senior advocates we seek to meet our target audiences in a manner that will have the most impact.</td>
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PROGRAMME AIMS

In the three-year period from 2021 we aim to have:

- Based on analysis of the Government Defence Integrity Index (GDI) developed clear and compelling global policy recommendations on the big issues – financial transactions, procurement, access to information, defence governance in fragile states - and seen these have traction with key actors.
- Developed strong collaborations, sharing knowledge, tools and resources with a core set of TI chapters in support of their nationally driven strategies to tackle weak defence and security sector governance by providing the global evidence base and relevant policy analysis.
- Established the importance of anti-corruption being mainstreamed into Security Sector Reform and Governance (SSR/G) processes, and developed guidance, policy and tools on how to do this working in partnerships with the key actors – for example the UN Office Rule of Law and Security Institutions (UNORLSI) – to implement new approaches.
- Built on our partnership with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) on anti-corruption and building integrity in military operations and influenced at least one other international institution - for example, the UN Department of Peace Operations (UNDPO) or the European Peace Facility (EPF) - to mainstream building integrity/anti-corruption into their activities.
- Developed an evidence base to highlight the role of the private defence sector in corruption that exacerbates conflict, and continued to advocate for defence companies to improve standards, especially in relation to high-risk areas such as the use of intermediaries and offset practices.
- Increased awareness and understanding with key audiences – for example, the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), the European Union’s (EU) Common Position on arms export control, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) - on the role of corruption in the arms trade, and made progress towards the inclusion of corruption risks in arms control regimes and the use of corruption risk mitigation measures in both exporting and importing countries.

Over a ten-year period we aspire to see:

- Reduced levels of corruption risk across the defence and security sector in key countries, and at a regional and global levels.
- Civil society better able to scrutinise the defence and security sector, and therefore hold it to account, and a growing network of TI chapters/national NGOs sharing learning and knowhow on effective approaches to improve defence governance.
- The role of corruption – both as a cause and exacerbated by – conflict is widely recognised and corruption risk mitigation is common practice in international peacekeeping and peacebuilding initiatives and security sector reform processes, thereby making them more likely to achieve their aims.
- Corruption risk mitigation practices in public-private interactions in defence and security are the norm.
- Criteria on corruption risk are included in license risk assessments as part of arms control regimes.
- Implementation of corruption risk mitigation measures is strengthened in both supplier and destination country.
THEORY OF CHANGE

1. Defence and security institutions are accountable to their publics
2. Defence and security institutions are subject to civilian democratic control
3. Corruption risks in the security sector are reduced

Changes in policy and practice:
1. To mitigate corruption risks in the defence and security sector
2. To reduce the role of corruption that impacts the defence and security sector as a factor contributing to conflict, insecurity and crises
3. To improve the integrity of private sector defence and security actors
4. To mitigate critical corruption risk factors in arms control regimes

WE DEFINE THE PROBLEM
...of corruption in the defence & security sector through our research, including indices, and by generating evidence-based analysis and producing original data where there are gaps

WE DEVELOP POLICY SOLUTIONS
...which we take forward through strategic advocacy plans based on collaboration with TI chapters and experts in fields related to defence & security anticorruption

WE STRENGTHEN ORGANISATIONAL CAPACITY
...by building high-impact collaborations with TI Chapters and the TI Movement, civil society, governments and policy-makers, militaries, international organisations, the private sector, funders

WE INFLUENCE THE POLITICAL CLIMATE
...by undertaking strategic advocacy to promote standards and principles in global and regional governance and by creating connections with key influential organisations and coalitions that can sustain efforts at reform. We provide an expert, evidence-based voice on issues of transparency, accountability and anti-corruption in the defence sector and where they intersect with matters of defence and security and conflict and insecurity including undertaking high-level policy dialogue with key actors

Outcomes

Increased agreement on problem definitions and solutions
Increased ability to create recognize and respond to policy windows
Increased political will and strategic alliances with important partners

Activities & Outputs

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 1:
TO MITIGATE CORRUPTION RISKS IN THE DEFENCE AND SECURITY SECTOR

TI-DS will contribute to improved defence governance through institutional reform, by advocating for improved policy and legislation concerning corruption risks and weak governance, and by supporting independent oversight.

How to govern military power presents one of the great global challenges of our age. Powerful, secretive and responsible for the world’s most destructive capabilities, when the governance of defence fails, it fails spectacularly. However, defence sectors often lack the basic governance standards of other public sectors, with oversight, transparency and accountability requirements so often excluding the defence sector.

TI-DS’s Government Defence Integrity Index (GDI) provides the only global analysis of institutional and informal controls to manage the risk of corruption in defence and security institutions in over 80 countries. It is a set of standards which we can use to advocate for institutional reforms and positions TI-DS to provide policy analysis and advice. Our research will provide a global body of knowledge and evidence that national actors can draw upon, providing strategic insights to the international community in national efforts for reform. Our approach will be driven by context, working with the most viable and incremental pathways to change in more fragile states.

Key Priorities 2021-2023

We will advance policy by:

- launching the latest iteration of the GDI and producing a range of evidence-based analysis and resources on defence governance to make the data accessible to a range of audiences
- researching key risk areas such as transparency and information flows, the role of democratic and civilian oversight, and corruption-risk approaches to procurement to understand what is important
- researching how defence governance can be improved in Fragile and Conflict Affected States (FCAS) to identify feasibility of measures such as effective oversight mechanisms (civilian, parliamentary, etc.) in less stable contexts

We improve practice:

- developing robust global policy recommendations on the priority issues - starting with access to information, civilian oversight and procurement - relevant to national, regional and international actors
- advocating for the inclusion of defence governance in global and regional instruments and for bodies that influence anti-corruption norms (for example the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and UNCAC)
- delivering targeted policy advice to implement standards to a range of actors, for example policy-makers and those who can influence policy-makers such as parliamentarians, experts, specialised media, think tanks and international organisations
- promoting learning and models for improving defence sector governance in FCAS
- supporting national and regional coalitions for change to advocate for defence establishments in FCAS to establish feasible accountability measures

We will promote change by:

- working with key TI chapters globally that have prioritised defence governance to develop effective approaches to tackling corruption in the defence sector providing targeted capacity building where needed
- supporting TI Chapters in countries affected by conflict to address the role of corruption in the defence and security sector where national actors judge it safe to do so. Countries will be identified based on specific criteria that make national level action feasible and where there is a likelihood of progress. We will, for example, support civil society oversight mechanisms, mobilise resources, provide policy expertise and guidance on approaches that can then be contextualised
- developing a network of TI chapters to build demand and capacity across the TI movement to focus on the defence and security sector. This will involve regular information sharing, webinars, co-creation of interventions, and a bi-annual conference

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3 For example: there are legally defined institutional responsibilities and relationships that place the armed forces under clear civilian control; there is (potential for) engagement of civil society in defence matters; where government has the (general) monopoly on the use of violence
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 2: TO REDUCE THE ROLE OF CORRUPTION THAT IMPACTS THE DEFENCE AND SECURITY SECTOR AS A FACTOR CONTRIBUTING TO CONFLICT, INSECURITY AND CRISSES

TI-DS will contribute to mitigating the role of corruption in the defence sector in driving conflict and insecurity and exacerbating crisis.

Corruption is widely recognised as a threat to peace and stability, often creating the specific conditions, such as inequality and resource scarcity, that fuel insecurity. The defence and security sector is one of the key state functions through which security and stability is achieved. Yet, when the defence and security sector is poorly governed or weakened by corruption, it can further contribute to states being unable to provide effective internal and external security, even leading to warfare.

In situations of conflict the international community often steps in, undertaking a range of initiatives that have the broad overall aim of “sustaining peace”. These initiatives aim to address the root causes of violent conflict, and encompass activities aimed at preventing the outbreak, escalation, continuation and recurrence of conflict.

TI-DS has already contributed to the understanding of corruption as a causal factor in conflict and instability. We have specific expertise in the role of international military operations in conflict settings, and the measures that can be taken to mitigate the impact of corruption which we have developed through a partnership with NATO. Building on our work with TI chapters in West Africa and our understanding of the role corruption in the security sector plays in causing conflict, we have initiated work on how SSR/G efforts could be strengthened through the integration of anti-corruption approaches.

Key Priorities 2021-2023

We will advance policy by:

- bridging the knowledge gap on the role different types of corruption play in causing and exacerbating conflict,
- investigating areas such as the links between corruption, war economies, human rights abuses, gendered outcomes and inequalities, the role of non-state armed actors and illicit financial flows in perpetuating conflict
- monitoring global trends and corruption risks in countries affected by crisis, conflict and insecurity so that we are well-placed to highlight the role corruption plays in such situations
- researching further how anti-corruption initiatives can contribute to SSR/G processes and developing clear policy recommendations on this topic
- researching how corruption risks in the defence and security sector impact efforts to sustain peace and security to identify opportunities to mitigate corruption risks in such initiatives (for example, Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration processes)
- researching the potential corruption risks and mitigation measures linked to the European Peace Facility’s support to peace operations to identify mechanisms to strengthen corruption risk analysis and corruption risk mitigation

We will improve practice by:

- maintaining our partnership with NATO through the provision of anti-corruption expertise to military exercise planning and execution, with an increased emphasis on the operational military level in addition to the strategic military level
- developing further our partnership with the UN system targeting the departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations and its Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions to promote anti-corruption initiatives in SSR/G processes

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4 PBSO on Guidance on Sustaining Peace
5 Security Sector Reform (SSR) is the political and technical process of improving state and human security by making security provision, management and oversight more effective and more accountable, within a framework of democratic civilian control, rule of law and respect for human rights. The goal of SSR is to apply the principles of good governance to the security sector. DCAF
6 The European Peace Facility (EPF) is a new fund worth €5 billion financed outside the EU Budget, for a period of seven years (the current Multiannual Financial Framework 2021–2027). This facility will fill a gap in the EU’s external action by creating one instrument to finance Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) actions in military and defence areas. The ultimate aim of the EPF is to enhance the EU’s ability to prevent conflict, preserve peace and strengthen international stability and security. It will do so by allowing the EU to better help partner countries, either by supporting their peace-keeping operations or by helping increase the capability of their armed forces to ensure peace and security on their national territory, as well as through broader actions of a military/defence nature in support of CFSP objectives.
creating opportunities for learning and exchange on corruption within crisis, conflict and insecurity, convening INGOs, experts, governments, and militaries on issues of corruption and the abuse of power in crisis and conflict settings, for example at events such as the Munich Security Conference, UNGA, the IACC

We will promote change by:

participating in multi-stakeholder fora to elevate voices of affected populations with policy-makers and decision-makers, including in relation to countries where national-level work is not safe or feasible because of the security situation
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 3: TO IMPROVE THE INTEGRITY OF PRIVATE SECTOR DEFENCE AND SECURITY ACTORS

TI-DS will improve the integrity of private sector defence actors to reduce corruption risks sector wide; we will bring a specific focus on risk areas relevant to situations of conflict and crisis.

The private sector plays a critical role in defence and security in crisis and conflicts. Companies develop, produce and trade in weapons and provide defence and security services, which frequently reach or affect fragile contexts. Companies increasingly perform defence and security duties outsourced by governments, and advise governments on defence policy. To do this they are supported by subcontractors, and a myriad of other private sector services providers: consultants, brokers, legal professionals, and financiers. Most states, including those facing conflicts and crisis, would be unable to deliver on their defence and security obligation without the private sector’s involvement. While it can be beneficial, this intensive cooperation and reliance inevitably creates significant corruption risks. There is disproportionate and often unaccountable influence of corporates on policy and decision-making, and insufficient public oversight of private sector delivery of defence and security duties. Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) specifically operate in a legal grey area and can pose a serious corruption risk.

Over the past decade, TI-DS has engaged with the defence sector industry through Defence Companies Index on Corporate Transparency and Anti-corruption (DCI) which provides standards to guide businesses in improving integrity and transparency practices, especially relating to their activities in high corruption risk markets. The DCI receives strong engagement from stakeholders, and the 2020 iteration places an increased emphasis on disclosure and introduces new topics such as interaction with public officials and corporate transparency. TI-DS has also researched the influence of the defence industry on public policy in Europe and the US, and its impact on foreign policy. We have also examined the relationship between PMSCs, corruption, and conflict in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).

Key Priorities 2021-2023

We will advance policy by:

- researching activities of the private sector in relation to defence and security in fragile contexts
- developing robust global policy recommendations on key issues such as: the use of offsets and related practices; the use of agents and intermediaries to facilitate corruption; corruption risks related to the use of private sector military companies; undue influence of the private sector on policy decisions that may worsen conflicts and crises; and, the role of illicit financial flows and opaque corporate structures in facilitating corruption

We will improve practice by:

- using the DCI 2020 to push for the defence sector to improve its corporate anti-corruption and transparency practices
- identifying and promoting measures to governments, the private sector and international fora that can be taken to proactively reduce corruption risks in the defence sector in fragile and conflict affected contexts, and engage with them and their environment to promote such behaviour
- advocating for robust systems for oversight by national authorities of outsourced defence and security functions to ensure that private sector execution of defence and security duties is fully regulated and compliant with public sector standards, accountability, and meaningful transparency

We will promote change by:

- developing our work in key arms manufacturing and exporting markets such as the US to drive business standards and conduct in this under-regulated field
- collaborating with NGOs, international organisations and business ethics coalitions active in the area at the intersection of business and human rights, for example the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries under UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner
- partnering with other organisations to investigate and review decisions and practices of national governments, defence deals and corporate practices to identify gaps in corruption risk mitigation and to identify new and creative ways of exerting influence on the environment in which private sector actors operate
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 4: TO MITIGATE CRITICAL CORRUPTION RISK FACTORS IN ARMS CONTROL REGIMES

TI-DS will highlight critical risk factors for corruption in arms control regimes and seek to ensure that these improve legal and policy decisions in supplier countries.

Despite an extensive focus on corruption more generally, little progress has been made in addressing corruption in arms control, procurement of weapons and associated services. Arms deals involve vast amounts of state budget, sometimes disbursed over long periods of time, with very limited oversight and secretive decision-making processes. Arms deals can shape foreign policy decisions, much of which is behind a veil of national security-imposed secrecy, in an environment of minimum accountability.

TI-DS was created in response to corruption in the arms trade and to push for corruption risks to be addressed in arms transfers’ legislation. More recently, our work in the US has examined how corruption risks in arms export controls limit the US federal government’s efforts to improve the capacity of foreign defence forces to address shared international security threats. In the first 18 months of this strategy, we will seek to confirm that there remains a specific contribution that TI-DS can make focused on anti-corruption in arms trade regimes.

Key Priorities 2021-2023

We will advance policy by:
- researching instances of corruption in the arms trade, aiming to identify the links between lax control systems, undue external influence and instability through, for example, arms diversion, fragmentation of global power and rise of arms and organised crime

We improve practice:
- contributing research and policy analysis to the efforts of states and civil society organisations that call for better transparency and reporting, mitigating measures for diversion and small arms proliferation to non-state actors
- advocating for anti-corruption standards to be included in the Arms Trade Treaty, aiming to make the flow of arms better regulated, transparent and accountable

We will promote change by:
- increasing activities in key arms manufacturing and exporting markets such as the US to drive business standards and conduct in this under-regulated field
- advocating as an expert voice for corruption considerations within the arms trade, adding our voice to the efforts of the arms control community, including Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), international organisations and states by putting corruption on their agenda
CROSS CUTTING ISSUES

Technology
The defence and security sector is experiencing rapid technological development. Between 2021-2023, TI-DS will seek to position itself to respond to the new corruption risks and opportunities that arise from this technological development. We will work with the TI Movement and will also seek to develop a tech-focused partnership so that TI-DS is in a position to articulate the risks and put forward solutions to the corruption challenges posed to the sector in subsequent phases of this strategy period.

Gender
Patterns of both facilitating and tolerating corruption are gendered, and are often based upon patriarchal structures and imbalances of power within societies. Fragile and insecure contexts, in particular armed conflict settings, exacerbate underlying gender dynamics and make the varied experiences of women, men, girls, and boys more visible.

We will build on extensive work on gender already undertaken by other actors in both the anti-corruption and defence and security fields and apply this to our work to mainstream gender analysis into our research, advocacy and programmatic work. We will ensure that the differentiated impacts of defence sector corruption on gender is taken into account and that this is an integral part of what we do. We will ensure that policy solutions put forward address gender differences and will seek to develop a partnership with at least one key international organisation in this field to support us in this aim.
OUR CONTRIBUTION TO THE TI MOVEMENT

We have a unique position within the TI movement as a Global Thematic Network Initiative (GTNI) housing the movement’s expertise on corruption in the defence and security sector.

We will ensure that our activities contribute to the TI Movement’s strategy: Holding Power to Account a Global Strategy Against Corruption 2021-2030 to maximise our contribution to the wider efforts of Transparency International.

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<th>TI-DS’s principal contribution:</th>
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<td>Protect the public’s resources »</td>
<td>through our work on improving defence sector governance and reducing governments’ exposure to corruption risks and calling for transparency and oversight in procurement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Secure integrity in politics »</td>
<td>through our work focusing on the relationship between the private sector and public policy making</td>
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<tr>
<td>Drive integrity in business »</td>
<td>through our work to improve defence sector corporate transparency and anti-corruption measures</td>
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<tr>
<td>Expand civic space for accountability »</td>
<td>by strengthening the public understanding of the impact of corruption in the defence and security sector by building coalitions that are equipped to push for change</td>
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We will operationalise our relationship with the TI movement by:

- developing our work with a core set of TI chapters on a sustained basis and underpinned by a clear set of criteria, specifically:
  a. **NEED**: where there is a clearly identified need to improve policy and practice, and galvanise change to reduce corruption risks in the defence sector.
  b. **ASSETS**: where there is a TI chapter or anti-corruption partner that can lead a national body of work.
  c. **FEASIBILITY**: where there is an opportunity to apply our theory of change to bring about changes in policy and practice that contribute to our purpose.
  d. **GEOGRAPHY**: where a clusters of countries can work together to address shared issues, tackle regional or cross-border issues or lead to regional and global momentum.
  e. **SYNERGIES**: where high-value synergies with existing international actors can be harnessed and where TI-DS can add value and/or create possible opportunities for impact yet, where the environment is not saturated by on-going international activities, or where there is limited partner capacity or donor attention.

- developing a systematic approach to joint project development and ensuring that collaboration is consistently and adequately resourced.

- building a TI DS network to convene individuals and chapters working on anticorruption in the defence and security space, who are interested in doing so, or are working on related issues where agendas intersect to facilitate exchange of learning and build capacity and demand from across the movement in relation to addressing defence and security issues in future strategy period.

- working closely with the TI Secretariat to ensure a coordinated approach vis-à-vis TI chapters, advocacy targets and funders so as to maximise the overall impact of our efforts.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

TI-DS would like to sincerely thank the volunteer members of the programme’s Expert Reference Group for their generous contribution of time and expertise to this strategy:

Brigadier David Allfrey MBE FRGS
Sir Ian Andrews
James Cohen
Sir Stewart Eldon KCMG OBE
Thammy Evans
Henda Fellah
James Fennell MBE
Air Marshal Sir Christopher Harper KBE
Professor Paul M Heywood
Professor Heather Marquette
Altynai Myrzabekova
Vaclav Prusa
Victoria Walker
Brian Wood

Our additional thanks to Professor Liz David-Barrett and Valerie Monk for their valuable insights and contributions.