SECURING PROGRESS: MAPPING OPPORTUNITIES FOR ANTI-CORRUPTION IN SECURITY SECTOR REFORM FRAMEWORKS
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Transparency International Defence and Security (TI-DS) works to reduce corruption in defence and security sectors worldwide.

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Images: Front Cover – Icons of the key elements to improve anti-corruption in SSR processes

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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<td>ATT</td>
<td>Arms Trade Treaty</td>
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<td>OROLSI UN</td>
<td>Office of Rule of Law and Security Sector Institutions</td>
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<td>CEA</td>
<td>Council of European Assembly</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<td>CoSP</td>
<td>Conference of State Parties</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<td>CoC</td>
<td>Code of Conduct</td>
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<td>PSO</td>
<td>Peace Support Operation</td>
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<td>United Nations Office for Drug and Crime</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
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<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<td>FCAS</td>
<td>Fragile and Conflict Affected States</td>
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<td>United Nations Secretary General</td>
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<td>GDI</td>
<td>Government Defence Integrity Index</td>
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<td>United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime</td>
</tr>
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<td>ITGN</td>
<td>UN Integrated Technical Guidance Note</td>
</tr>
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<td>Women, Peace and Security</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A well-governed security sector is essential for sustainable peace and security, and security sector reform (SSR) is a key mechanism through which the achievement of such is sought. Yet SSR is typically still approached as a primarily technical task, overlooking its intensely political reality. Heavy reliance on technocratic ‘train and equip’ approaches turns a blind eye to political determinants and neglects the need for a sensitive rebalancing of power for reform success. Despite the centrality of corruption to power dynamics, the imperative of addressing security sector corruption is accorded insufficient priority within SSR processes: it is either viewed as an issue which can be addressed subsequently to initial reforms, or overlooked entirely.

This omission is argued to have contributed significantly to the lack of success demonstrated through the huge investments made in SSR to date: in FCAS contexts – typically high priority contenders for SSR assistance – it is difficult to find a compelling SSR success story.

Multilateral organisations play a central role in shaping the SSR agenda through their policy, guidance, and on the ground programming, and so the need to adequately integrate anti-corruption within multilateral SSR frameworks is paramount. These frameworks guide policy and programming during the most important window of opportunity for meaningful security sector anti-corruption reform.

This report reviews SSR frameworks from the United Nations, African Union, ECOWAS, European Union, and OSCE, assesses the extent to which they currently address anti-corruption, and identifies specific opportunities to advance each individual framework to better integrate this essential component of effective reform. Cross-cutting recommendations for embedding anti-corruption into all SSR processes are also identified.

The five frameworks assessed in this report vary considerably in terms of their thematic focus, content, and approach to SSR implementation, and they vary in terms of the extent to which they recognise anti-corruption as an essential component of reform efforts. Each of them, however, fails to adequately acknowledge the critical interlinkages between corruption, conflict, and insecurity, and to holistically integrate all good practice standards of anti-corruption into their approaches to SSR.

The frameworks also often fail to recognise the unique challenges SSR programmes face in fragile and conflict-affected state (FCAS) contexts, which are typically high priority contexts for SSR programming. As a result, they do not provide good practice policy and operational guidelines required specifically for such contexts, and they underestimate the political complexity of governance reform in fragile environments. Furthermore, the frameworks pay insufficient attention to strengthening internal processes and procedures for embedding anti-corruption measures in key aspects of SSR such as defence policymaking and political affairs, personnel management, military operations, defence finance, and procurement management. All of the frameworks assessed in this report need to be progressively updated to better integrate measures addressing corruption across these critical areas.

We urge SSR policymakers to assess the extent to which security sector corruption fuels conflict and insecurity in the respective contexts in which they apply these SSR frameworks, and to acknowledge fully the risk that corruption poses to the effectiveness of SSR programmes. We urge SSR practitioners to integrate anti-corruption measures into all planned SSR activities, including legislation, policies and programmes, and to mainstream anti-corruption efforts across the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of all SSR policies and programmes. Failure to do this is likely to result in failure of SSR efforts to support lasting peace and security. The ultimate goal is to address corruption strategically as a root cause of conflict and insecurity, and to reinforce human security.
Key elements to improve anti-corruption in SSR processes:

1. **Policy Recognition**: Recognise anti-corruption as a fundamental principle of Security Sector Reform by integrating anti-corruption standards into policy frameworks and codes of conduct.

2. **Corruption Risk Assessments**: Conduct comprehensive corruption risk assessments in the security sector, considering gender dimensions and previous anti-corruption efforts. Collaborate with national actors and specialists to integrate corruption analysis into SSR assessments.

3. **Independent Oversight Mechanisms**: Establish independent oversight bodies to monitor and evaluate anti-corruption measures, ensuring sufficient independence, resources and authority for investigations and recommendations.

4. **Public Financial Management**: Incorporate public financial management reforms into SSR processes, improving governance and accountability. Enhance capacity in areas such as resource allocation, budget reliability, financial transparency and audits.

5. **Transparency and Accountability**: Promote transparency by requiring regular reporting of security sector budgets, expenditures, and procurement. Conduct independent audits and evaluations. Apply general public procurement frameworks to the security sector, with reasonable restrictions based on national security concerns.

6. **Whistleblower Protection**: Implement comprehensive protection mechanisms for individuals reporting corruption, providing secure and confidential reporting channels. Offer legal protections, incentives and confidentiality throughout the reporting and investigation processes.

7. **Investment in Personnel and Capacity Building**: Implement anti-corruption measures in personnel management, including vetting processes and codes of conduct. Provide specialised training to raise awareness of corruption risks and promote ethics and professionalism.

8. **Civil Society Engagement**: Engage civil society organisations and stakeholders in the design, implementation and monitoring of SSR processes. Foster meaningful participation and consultation to reflect diverse needs and promote transparency and accountability.

9. **Monitoring and Evaluation Frameworks**: Establish frameworks to monitor the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures in SSR processes. Regularly evaluate progress, address challenges and publish evaluation reports to ensure transparency and accountability.

10. **International Co-operation**: Promote international cooperation and align with anti-corruption standards and guidelines. Collaborate with international organisations, regional bodies, and donor countries to share best practices, expertise and resources in combating corruption within SSR processes.
INTRODUCTION

Originating in the 1990s as part of the democratisation process of Eastern European states, SSR quickly became a pillar of the peacebuilding and human development paradigm of the early 2000s. The establishment of the interdependencies between security, peace, and social, environmental, political and economic development later led to an expansion of the concept of security from being purely state-focused to becoming more people-centred. In turn, this resulted in an acknowledgement of human security as a key building block towards preventing conflict and building sustainable peace.

The concept of SSR is based on the premise that the creation of a responsible, accountable and effective security sector will foster conditions “conducive to development, poverty reduction and democracy”. As such, SSR is commonly defined as “a process of transforming the security sector to strengthen accountability, effectiveness, and respect for human rights and the rule of law”. Meanwhile, the increasing recognition of corruption as a key driver of conflict and insecurity, as reflected in Sustainable Development Goal 16, has led to a rethinking of peacebuilding initiatives to address corruption more holistically.

While there have been important conceptual refinements, policy developments and programming innovations in recent years, these have largely focused on the technical challenges of delivering and coordinating assistance, including determining the “needs” of partner countries. There has been less headway on the more difficult political issues that relate to increasing buy-in to the SSR agenda and understanding and working with the political economy that shapes the SSR context, by both donor and partner countries, as well as providing assistance in a way that is politically-sensitive and consistent with the essential governance underpinnings of the SSR concept.

In the 2000s, multilateral organisations began adopting a series of strategic documents dedicated to guiding SSR processes, most of them drawing heavily on the UN’s work. Each upholds the basic principle that SSR is aimed at strengthening both the effectiveness and the accountability of the security sector, with robust parliamentary oversight and tight control mechanisms as key features. Thus, SSR presents a prime opportunity for tackling corruption in the security sector. But the UN Security Council Resolution on SSR only mentions corruption once, with a passing reference to the fact that “anti-corruption measures” are an “important factor of stabilisation and reconstruction”, and corruption is only superficially referenced in most other SSR frameworks.

Numerous studies have outlined a clear correlation between corruption and instability. It is, therefore, little surprise that five of the ten least peaceful countries according to the Global Peace Index 2022 are also ranked in the lowest quintile of the Corruption Perceptions Index 2022. Hence, the interlinkages between corruption and conflict inevitably mean that there is an intrinsic multidimensional correlation between human security, corruption, conflict and of course – security sector governance. To support this argument further, three out of the four least ten peaceful countries that were assessed in the Governance Defence Integrity Index (GDI) 2020 also exhibit critical corruption risk in their defence institutions.
In the security sector, corruption manifests in various ways. It hampers the effectiveness of security sector institutions by distorting decision-making processes, compromising the allocation of resources, and undermining operational integrity. On a broader scale, it also erodes public trust in security institutions and undermines their legitimacy: when the public witness security actors engaging in corrupt practices this can fuel grievances, alienate communities and contribute to social unrest. As a result, by failing to address corruption, SSR cannot fully achieve its main objective of transforming the security sector into accountable, efficient and affordable institutions that protect and promote human security.

Worse, by failing to address corruption, SSR can also contribute directly to undermining its own objectives: SSR efforts typically come with injections of funding and support which themselves increase opportunities and incentives for corruption to take hold.

Integrating anti-corruption measures into SSR frameworks is the first important step towards mainstreaming anti-corruption across SSR policies, programmes and actions plans. A key objective of this paper is to provide policymakers and advocates with a clear overview of where changes are needed in key frameworks for them to better mitigate corruption risks in the effective oversight, management and provision of security.

This report examines five key global and regional frameworks for SSR and presents a gap analysis of the extent to which anti-corruption measures are taken into account within these frameworks. The report focuses on the United Nations (UN), African Union (AU), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), European Union (EU), and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), as leading organisations in the provision of SSR. Their SSR frameworks, analysed in this report, differ based on the mandate and scope of the respective organisations. For instance, the European Union primarily focuses on external efforts, aiming to define the organisation’s role in providing SSR support beyond European borders. In comparison, the African Union and ECOWAS primarily concentrate on creating frameworks for their member states. The focus of this report, however, is on identifying the current scope of anti-corruption measures contained within the frameworks and, through comparison with existing good practice standards for anti-corruption in defence institutions, outlining opportunities for better integration of anti-corruption measures. Good practice standards as set out in the Government Defence Integrity Index (GDI) and other sources provide a reference point for managing corruption risk in the defence sector.

Alongside overarching recommendations on embedding anti-corruption into SSR, targeted recommendations are set out which specifically relate to each individual framework. Although the focus of this report is primarily on national defence institutions, the recommendations are applicable to other areas of the security sector such as police, judiciary, border forces, and others.

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11. Ibid.
DEFINITIONS

What is corruption and what does it have to do with security sector reform?

Before any discussion of anti-corruption efforts in SSR begins, it is essential to define the key terms this paper is interested in, starting with corruption, followed by the security sector, and security sector reform.

**Corruption:** what’s in a name? Transparency International defines corruption as the “abuse of entrusted power for private gain”. This definition includes an element of subversion, or illegitimate use of resources meant for a particular purpose to further another goal. It involves a benefit that should not have been obtained, as well as harm to someone who was entitled to a benefit they did not receive. When applied to the public sector, it entails expectations and norms being flouted due to misuse of a public (usually state) system for a private (individual or group) benefit, rather than public, good. If repeated regularly, it leads to the degradation of a system meant to benefit the public into one that benefits certain groups to the detriment of others.

**Security sector** is a broad term often used to describe the structures, institutions and personnel responsible for the management, provision and oversight of security in a country. It is generally accepted that the security sector includes defence, law enforcement, intelligence services and institutions responsible for border management, customs and civil emergencies. Elements of the judicial sector responsible for the adjudication of cases of alleged criminal conduct and misuse of force are, in many instances, also included. Furthermore, the security sector includes actors that play a role in managing and overseeing the design and implementation of security, such as ministries, legislative bodies and civil society groups. Other non-state actors that could be considered part of the security sector include customary or informal authorities and private security services. 

**Security Sector Reform (SSR)** is generally defined as the political and technical process of improving state and human security by making security provision, management and oversight more effective and more accountable, within a framework of democratic civilian control, rule of law and respect for human rights. The goal of SSR is to apply the principles of good governance to the security sector. By emphasising the need to take a comprehensive approach to the security sector, SSR can also help integrate a broad variety of actors and processes.

Within SSR, **Security Sector Governance (SSG)** refers to the structures, processes, values and attitudes that shape decisions about security and their implementation. SSG forms the normative component of SSR. This normative framework is what distinguishes SSR from conventional security assistance. It establishes a link between the security sector and good governance with its basic requirements of transparency, accountability and participation.

Taking into account these definitions and given the scope and main objective of this study, the term SSR will be used for the purpose of analysing the five key frameworks without complicating the subject unnecessarily.

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13 Ibid.
16 Ibid15.
17 Ibid15.
19 Ibid18.
A comprehensive SSR process ought to examine all of the following main areas, and to reform where necessary in accordance with the principles of good security sector governance:20

- **Political aspects:** including existing public defence and security policies, parliamentary oversight, oversight of intelligence services, oversight of arms deals, access to defence budgets, inclusion of civil society in debates about the security sector and SSR, anti-corruption policy and regulations, and international standards and conventions.

- **Financial aspects:** planning and budgeting, financial management and transparency, secret budget regulation, audit, acquisition and procurement, as well as the legal framework and regulations concerning budgets and any finances related to the security sector.

- **Human resources:** human resources management, gender, regulations on payroll, promotions and rewards, codes of conduct, conflicts of interest, integrity training, rules concerning gifts, whistleblowing systems and corresponding whistleblower protection, ombuds institutions, prosecution, and disciplinary mechanisms.

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20 DCAF, Security Sector Integrity, Security Sector Reform.
METHODOLOGY

The approach typically adopted by Transparency International Defence and Security is to conduct analysis to identify potential institutional weaknesses in regulation, policy, and decision-making processes that allow corruption to threaten peace and security. Informed by this analysis, the identification of solutions to tackle the intrinsic multidimensional correlation between corruption, conflict, and human security is at the heart of this paper. The aim is to offer a range of feasible and specific recommendations.

The methodology used in this study consists of two integral parts. The first includes analysing and comparing five key frameworks related to SSR, as well as reviewing related literature. The list of the documents reviewed includes the UN Integrated Technical Guidance Notes on SSR, the African Union Policy Framework on SSR, the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework, the EU’s Policy Framework on SSR and the OSCE’s SSR guidelines. The second part involves collecting primary qualitative data through interviews with field experts and practitioners\(^1\), using a set of interview questions\(^2\) informed by the conceptual framework and good practice standards on anti-corruption in defence governance represented by the GDI 2020. This dual approach enables the paper to capture material from a wide range of sources.

This material on the current focus and content of the five frameworks was then compared against good practice standards for institutional resilience to corruption in defence as set out in the Government Defence Integrity Index (GDI). This comparison enabled the identification of key gaps, the closing of which represent the basis of the recommendations reached. Specific country case studies further support the findings.

The focus of this analysis is primarily on national defence establishments although, particularly in light of the interlinkages between different elements of the security and defence sectors, the recommendations may be applicable to police, judiciary, border force and others.

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21 Interviewees cannot be named here for data protection reasons.
22 Please refer to Annex 2 for more details.
Figure 1: Areas of Corruption Risk in the Defence Sector: the GDI

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<td>10</td>
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# Timeline of Security Sector Reform Frameworks

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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Security Sector Governance and Reform: Guidelines for OSCE Staff (Updated edition)</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
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ANALYSIS OF FRAMEWORKS

This section provides an analysis of the five SSR frameworks adopted by different international and regional organisations, and their current status vis-à-vis anti-corruption. These frameworks vary considerably in their thematic focus, content, and approaches used to guide SSR implementation.

THE UNITED NATIONS (UN) POLICY FRAMEWORK ON SSR

The UN policy on SSR is mainly outlined in Security Council Resolution 2151, which was adopted in 2014. Previous policy documents laid the foundation for this resolution, including the Presidential Statement of the UN Security Council in 2007, the first Report of the Secretary-General on SSR (2008), and the second SSR Report of the Secretary-General (2013). The UNSC’s adoption of Resolution 2151, the first standalone resolution on SSR, unambiguously reaffirmed what was already widely accepted in the international community: that SSR was an indivisible pillar of the global peacebuilding and state-building agendas.

Other key milestones include the creation of the UN Inter-Agency SSR Task Force (IASSRTF), which comprises 14 agencies and departments and promotes an integrated, holistic and coherent approach to UN SSR support. In addition to this, The Group of Friends of SSR among UN Member States was established to work towards a consensus on the United Nations security sector reform agenda.

In 2012, the UN published their “Integrated Technical Guidance Notes on Security Sector Reform” (ITGN), developed by the IASSRTF, which serves as the key SSR instrument for the UN. However, these guidance notes did not elaborate on post-conflict or development issues, such as corruption, transnational organised crime, or poverty reduction, despite providing examples at several points throughout the document for how anti-corruption mechanisms could be included in SSR.

These guidance notes were later complemented by the 2016 “Integrated Technical Guidance Notes on Transnational Organized Crime and Security Sector Reform”, which were also developed by the IASSRTF under the leadership of the UNODC. This addition acknowledged that transnational organised crime poses a severe and underestimated threat not only to the success of SSR, but to peace and security more broadly. As organised crime is closely interlinked with corruption, this document contains the most specific advice on fighting corruption in the context of SSR that the UN have published to date.
What the UN framework does

The 2012 Integrated Technical Guidance Notes on SSR:

- Give frequent examples of where anti-corruption initiatives should be integrated to support democratic governance, in an effort to support coherence.
- Reference that judicial reform should be in line with the UNCAC, as well as including an informative box on the UNCAC.
- Recommend the establishment of codes of conduct to curb corruption and address the variety of codes of conducts that exist.
- Include a list of sample tools to build anti-corruption in the defence and security sectors in the annex.
- Recognise the linkage between corruption and transnational organised crime and its implications for the security sector.

The 2016 Integrated Technical Guidance Notes on TOC and SSR:

- Recognise corruption as a key enabler of transnational organised crime. The linkage between corruption in security governance institutions, lack of accountability and ineffective governance structures and organised crime is acknowledged.
- Emphasize the importance of legal instruments such as UNCAC, UNTOC and regional instruments such as the Inter-American Convention on Corruption, which are recommended as guidance for SSR processes.
- Acknowledge that fighting corruption is a whole-of-society effort which needs sound financial support and civil society participation.
- Highlight police corruption and corruption in the judiciary as two main obstacles to successful SSR and give recommendations on how to fight corruption amongst police, customs, immigration, border and prison personnel.

What the UN framework doesn’t do

- The 2012 Notes classify corruption and transnational organised crime as “post-conflict or development issues”, without elaborating on this classification. Whilst the notes suggest the implementation of anti-corruption efforts and reference UNCAC, they do not provide specific examples of anti-corruption initiatives to be implemented, as this is presented as something to be dealt with after SSR has been completed.
- The role of civil society in providing an oversight function is not acknowledged in the 2012 Notes and only marginally included in the 2016 Notes, as well as the need for civic space to effectively fight corruption.
- Whilst some of the core components of strengthening anti-corruption in SSR are included in the 2012 Notes, such as transparent and accountable procurement and financial management systems, the importance of these reforms in fighting corruption is not established.
- The recommendations on fighting corruption in the 2016 Notes have a narrow focus on financial forms of corruption and corruption linked to organised crime. The guidance is hence focused on mitigating financial corruption risks. It does not present a holistic assessment of the forms of corruption that can take place within the security sector, nor a comprehensive list of recommendations on how corruption can be addressed through SSR.
WHAT THE UN CAN DO

The approach within the 2012 Notes of separating anti-corruption from SSR by presenting it as an issue which can be considered sequentially, as a post-conflict development issue rather than something to be dealt with in the immediate peacebuilding process, is a critical error. This sequential approach has been shown time and again to be fundamentally flawed, as corruption undermines the effectiveness of the first-priority objectives and renders the SSR process unsuccessful.

In contrast, the additional 2016 Notes acknowledge much more directly the detrimental effect of corruption in the security sector for SSR and for peace and stability. However, due to the narrow focus of the document on organised crime, corruption is subsequently only discussed in this context. Whilst the guidance presents a good starting point and a helpful acknowledgement of the opportunities to fight corruption as part of SSR, practitioners will not find a comprehensive analysis or guidance on how anti-corruption can be embedded in SSR processes.

We therefore urge the UN to:

- Recognise anti-corruption as a fundamental component of SSR instead of an issue which can be considered separately or later and address it as a cross-cutting issue within the ITGNs, specifically acknowledging the threat that corruption poses to the success of SSR.
- Develop and publish separate Integrated Technical Guidance Notes on corruption and SSR, similar to those that were developed on transnational organised crime and SSR.
- Conduct comprehensive security sector corruption risk assessments to identify vulnerabilities and high-risk areas for prioritisation within all SSR activity.
- Promote a culture of integrity within security institutions beyond codes of conduct, by implementing strict anti-corruption measures for personnel management and providing specialised training on detecting, reporting and combating corruption.
- Implement comprehensive whistleblower protection mechanisms to safeguard individuals who report corruption in the security sector.
- Ensure that civil society organisations, non-governmental organisations, and other stakeholders are involved in the design, implementation, oversight and monitoring of SSR processes.
Despite Niger’s security and defence sectors’ continuous struggle to tackle organised crime and mounting jihadist threats on multiple fronts, until very recently, the country was still considered a safe haven in the midst of a regional violence spill-over.\textsuperscript{24} While French counter-terrorism efforts in Mali push fighters across the border in the east, in the south, Boko Haram’s campaign in the Lake Chad region continues unabated. Defence and security forces have been unable to provide protection to affected populations, as extremist groups have exploited Niger’s vast landscape and weak state presence to become entrenched. But more recently, Niger has fallen victim of Sahel’s expanding coup belt\textsuperscript{25}, when at the end of last month, a group of soldiers identifying themselves as the National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland (CNSP) claimed to have overthrown the government of President Mohamed Bazoum.\textsuperscript{26} After dissolving the constitution and suspending the work of all government institutions, the junta accused Bazoum’s government of failing to address the deteriorating security situation in Niger and its negative repercussions on the country’s economy.\textsuperscript{27} However, some analysts pointed out that the underlying cause of the coup d’état was related to the army’s foreseen restructuring.\textsuperscript{28}

The SSR programme in Niger has been led by the UN under the overall leadership of the Niger’s National Security Council. While some progress has been made, corruption and weak governance have continued to hamper efforts. Reforms have generally failed to reduce corruption risks in the defence sector. The GDI 2020 has found a “Very High Risk” for Niger’s defence sector, which underlined the urgent need for improvement. Oversight has been severely hindered by weak information flows between the government, audit bodies and parliament. The role of the National Assembly, regardless of its constitutional mandate, was heavily restricted when it came to shaping defence policy and overseeing defence institutions.

The defence budget remains only partly transparent. The exclusion of defence goods and equipment from standard procurement regulations significantly increases corruption risk, as does the opacity surrounding financial management and budgeting practices. The information that is made public is highly aggregated and purchases are made without justification, limiting their legibility. Furthermore, there is no military doctrine identifying corruption as a strategic risk for operations, nor are there any corresponding strategies to mitigate its effects. Consequently, there is no evidence that corruption risks are considered in the planning of operations.

Despite a 9% decrease in 2020, Niger’s defence expenditure constituted 19% of the national budget, a significant amount for a country with pressing development challenges. A lack of emphasis on corruption also risks undermining military operations and any attempts to build integrity and ethical practices within the armed forces.

Against this backdrop, the July 2023 coup begs the question: has there been any real progress of SSR in Niger, and if not then why not? And what preventative measures could stop the country from following the faith of its neighbours and enduring a series of coups and further instability?

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\textsuperscript{24} Kim Sengupta, “Niger: it’s the safe haven surrounded by jihadist radicals, Russian mercenaries and madcap dictators. Can it cling on?”, The Independent, 19 May 2023.


\textsuperscript{28} Ibid\textsuperscript{26}.
Africa is where the majority of SSR activity takes place, yet to date this SSR activity has been mostly informed by external frameworks that do not necessarily align with the realities and sources of insecurity of African peoples, states and societies.

Partly in response to this, and in accordance with its obligations under the Constitutive Act, the AU developed a comprehensive Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform (SSR) within the context of its Policy Framework on Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development (adopted in 2013).\(^{29}\)

The AU’s Policy Framework on SSR builds on the UN’s framework but, in emphasising national ownership of SSR by African nations, represents a major step towards localisation of SSR efforts on the continent. As part of its efforts to build capacity for the implementation of its Policy Framework on SSR, in 2013 the AU, together with the UN and the EU, launched a multi-year, multi-donor programme entitled “Building African Union Capacities in SSR”.\(^{30}\)

Likely influenced by its following of the patterns and principles set forth in the UN framework, the AU framework also fails to place sufficient emphasis on anti-corruption measures in SSR. This is a particularly significant gap considering the prevalence of conflict and its linkages with corruption on the continent.\(^{31}\) The framework is insufficient to effectively fight corruption in defence and security.

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**What the AU framework does**

- The framework acknowledges good governance as one of the core principles of SSR.
- Advises member states to ensure the effectiveness of security personnel by providing transparent, accountable and equitable recruitment mechanisms.
- Recommends the enhancement of democratic control and oversight mechanisms to ensure their functionality.

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What the AU framework doesn’t do

• The comprehensive needs assessment for SSR, which the framework encourages actors to undertake, does not include a corruption analysis and does not give any guidance on how needs related to fighting corruption can be assessed.
• While the framework requires institutional, legal and security policy frameworks to be established as part of SSR, it does not require legislation on corruption or on oversight and transparency of the defence and security institutions.
• The framework does not include legislation on whistleblower protection, or the provision of core civic space rights, such as laws on freedom of association, assembly, expression and information, which are vital to allow civil society to scrutinise defence and security governance.
• While the framework acknowledges the vital role of independent oversight bodies, it does not provide specific guidance on their establishment and functioning.
• Effective implementation of anti-corruption measures within the security sector requires adequate resources, including financial, technical and human resources. However, the AU Policy Framework does not address the resource allocation challenges that member states may face.
• One significant gap lies in the implementation and enforcement mechanisms of the framework, as specific provisions for member states to translate the principles set out therein into actionable policies, laws and regulations. Without clear guidelines and requirements for implementation, member states may struggle to effectively address corruption within their security sectors.

WHAT THE AU CAN DO

• Formally acknowledge the threat that corruption poses to the successful implementation of SSR and integrate anti-corruption provisions into SSR support to AU and member states. Specifically recognising the threat that corruption poses to security and stability in the AU Policy Framework on SSR and integrating anti-corruption measures across all provisions particularly under section ‘D’ would lay the foundations for ensuring that corruption is included in AU SSR support to member states and regional economic communities and mechanisms.
• Develop operational guidance notes on anti-corruption in SSR, which would provide member states with practical tools to translate anti-corruption policies into effective strategies and action plans.
• Include provisions for implementation and enforcement of the framework, for member states to adopt policies, laws and processes to address and mitigate the corruption risks.
• Set out clear guidelines and standards for strengthening the role of oversight bodies as part of SSR.
• Recognise the importance of civil society engagement and establish clearer guidelines on the involvement of civil society organisations in the implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of anti-corruption efforts, including clear benchmarks and standards for creating an enabling environment for civic activities and access to information.
• Encourage member states to adopt national legislation to protect whistleblowers and expand the scope of the implementing policies to security sector reform.
• Engage in regular monitoring, evaluation and revision of the framework would help identify and address emerging regulatory gaps to ensure its continued relevance and efficacy.
The palpable disconnect between SSR efforts and reality in Nigeria has left a profound mark on the country’s security sector. Ever since the push for SSR gained momentum under the Obasanjo regime in 1999, reform efforts have reflected the preference of military leaders for technical enhancements over realistic and substantive governance reforms. This is partially a result of the military’s desire to maintain its iron grip on many elements of defence policy and governance. Reform initiatives have failed to address dysfunctional aspects of Nigeria’s defence governance structures to such an extent that one observer described Nigerian SSR efforts as having “snatched defeat from the jaws of victory”. Considering all of this, it should not come as a surprise that Nigeria scored extremely low on the GDI 2020 with final band E, which signals very high corruption risk in its defence sector. Despite the country’s efforts to improve the levels of transparency on defence budgets and actual expenditures, Nigeria is still facing considerable corruption risk across its defence institutions, with extremely limited controls in operations and procurement. Even though there are some oversight mechanisms in place, the GDI 2020 country assessment shows that they often lack key elements such as coordination, expertise, resources and adequate information to fully perform their role.

The recent history of Nigeria provides a concrete example of how lack of transparency can fuel public-sector corruption. In April 2017, in one of the country’s biggest corruption scandals related to defence, more than US$43 million in cash was recovered in a raid on an apartment, reportedly owned by the wife of the then Director-General of the National Intelligence Agency, Ayodele Oke, who claimed the money was being stored for “covert purposes”. The size of the funds that were diverted in this case was only made possible by the opacity of these funding mechanisms and the ability of officials to use these resources at their discretion, with barely any oversight. In addition to that, there have been a variety of corruption cases in the Nigerian military. In 2013, Nigerian soldiers complained that 50% of their allowances for dangerous field duties were stolen by commanders, with troops living in poor conditions and lacking basic resources. Despite being budgeted and paid for, ammunition rarely reached the front, leaving soldiers with a few bullets each to fight militants armed with RPGs (rocket-propelled grenades). Soldiers also had to buy their military uniforms themselves and cover their medical expenses when wounded in battle. As a result, some soldiers started selling weapons and equipment to insurgents to boost their salaries.

Heavily reflected in the country’s GDI scores, in 2015, Sambo Dasuki, the former national security adviser, was arrested for allegedly stealing US$2.1 billion from the defence budget by awarding phantom contracts. Since then, numerous other cases have come to light including the alleged involvement of military officers in the diversion of US$15 billion meant for arms procurement. The situation has barely improved in recent years, with the issue of ghost soldiers, which has led to huge gains in terms of territory and equipment for Boko Haram. The terrorist group has garnered immense support among ordinary citizens, especially the youth. By using corruption in security forces as proof for the moral decay of the government, Boko Haram has successfully positioned themselves as alternative providers of security and justice. Moreover, in terms of corruption risk among personnel, access to certain positions more often than not seems to require a patron’s...

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34 Transparency International’s Defence & Security Programme, “Weaponising Transparency: Defence Procurement Reform as a Counterterrorism Strategy in Nigeria” (London: TI’s Defence & Security Programme, 2017). In March 2019, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (ECC) declared that Ayodele Oke and his wife were wanted after they failed to answer for fraud charges filed against them, without giving details on the origin of the sum found.
financial support with the expectation that they will be reimbursed by their “client” once they are in a position to benefit. More recently, reports emerged in 2020 of the systematic non-payment of Nigerian soldiers’ combat allowances, despite this being included in the official budget.

Yet, in the midst of all these inter-related dynamics, while violent extremist groups are capitalising on endemic corruption in state institutions and positioning themselves as alternative providers of security and justice, at the epicentre of it all – stands human tragedy. The numbers are constantly growing, but the instability in the country has left at least 35,000 people killed and over 2 million displaced. Seen from this angle, transparency, accountability, institutional resilience and good governance in defence equate to saving lives, and this is precisely why there is an urgent need for comprehensive security sector reform. Effective national and regional instruments that spell out the risks of corruption in the defence and security sector and set clear milestones and criteria for compliance and reporting on progress thus become operational tools to protect and enable human security and state stability.

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37 “Nigeria militants burn to death motorists as they sleep in their cars”, BBC, 10 February 2020.
38 Interview with “interviewee X”, November 2022.
Many West African states have experienced or are experiencing political instability including coups d’états, military regimes, and internal armed conflict: data from 2022 showed that there have been 53 successful and 40 failed coups since 1950 in the 16 independent states that West Africa comprises as a region\(^\text{39}\). Weak governance, closely intertwined with corruption, factionalism and kleptocracy, is a key contributing factor\(^\text{40}\).

Some countries have now transitioned to post-conflict situations, whilst other states are facing internal conflicts with the potential for escalation, or are confronted with regional conflicts that risk overspilling across their borders. The north of the ECOWAS space, in particular, is experiencing pressures resulting from both internal conflicts and cross-border crimes such as drugs, arms and human trafficking, terrorism, piracy and illicit maritime activities, among others.

ECOWAS has been actively supporting SSR processes in its member states: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. In 2010, ECOWAS led the development of the SSR Roadmap for Guinea-Bissau, building on their 2006 National Strategy for Modernisation of the Defence and Security Forces\(^\text{41}\).

ECOWAS’s engagement on SSR is guided by several policy documents, including a 2001 supplement to the ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, the ECOWAS Code of Conduct of the Armed Forces and Security Services (2006), and the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) of 2008. Most notably, in 2016 ECOWAS adopted the ECOWAS Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform and Governance which outlines ECOWAS’ own approach to SSR to distinguish it from that of other international actors active in the region, such as the AU’s policy framework. With the 2016 framework, ECOWAS set out to strengthen West African ownership of SSR processes and develop an approach to SSR which is more specifically tailored to the regional context.

The framework calls for the core principles of democratic governance to be respected by security institutions in member states. Article 72 of the 2008 ECPF highlights security governance as a key component of conflict prevention, with the objective of ensuring the emergence and consolidation of accountable, transparent and participatory security systems in member states.

Whilst acknowledging the fragility of the security situation in the region, the 2016 ECOWAS framework – which is regarded as the main guiding document, and which is the basis of our gap analysis and the recommendations below – falls short of recognising corruption as a specific driver of this instability. Although the importance of good democratic governance for peace and stability is recognised throughout the document, and many of the recommendations will also contribute in practice to addressing corruption, direct mentions of corruption are noticeably missing throughout the framework.

Given the number of coups in the region where corruption is a key driver\(^\text{42,43}\), and the fact that corruption in security forces leading to human rights abuses has proven to be a driver for recruitment into violent extremist groups such as Boko Haram\(^\text{44,45}\), it is imperative that the ECOWAS policy framework sets requirements and gives guidance for integrating anti-corruption measures into SSR.

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44 Ibid.
What the ECOWAS framework does

- States are encouraged to develop a national security strategy to identify security risks and guide strategic defence investments. This can help tackle corruption linked to waste, ensuring that defence purchases are justified on grounds of identified security needs.
- States are encouraged to periodically review security sector needs, including a review of security sector expenditure, which increases transparency.
- States are encouraged to establish transparent recruitment, training and promotion systems for security personnel and ensure gender equality.
- States are encouraged to establish transparent procurement systems in their security sectors which allow for accountability in budget allocation as well as usage of procured equipment.
- The framework recognises that SSR should also include non-state actors, as important security actors in many contexts. This includes customary authorities, community-based security and justice providers, as well as private security companies.
- The development, review and enforcement of a national code of conduct and ethics for security sector staff is encouraged, which can include provisions on anti-corruption.
- The role of civil society organisations and the media in the formulation, design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation phases of SSR is recognised and their involvement encouraged.
- The establishment of effective and accountable democratic control and oversight institutions including executive control, parliamentary oversight, independent and effective judiciary/court systems is an aspect.
- Anti-corruption bodies are acknowledged in the introductory definitions as institutions "responsible for the provision, management and oversight of security for the people and for the State" by exercising an oversight and control function.

What the ECOWAS framework doesn’t do

- In general, the framework lacks acknowledgment of anti-corruption as an essential feature of SSR.
- Whilst the framework acknowledges the role of private security companies and that they should be accountable to human rights law, no mention is made of their associated corruption risks and the need for related anti-corruption standards and legislation.
- Whilst recognising the importance of media and civil society action for accountability, this will not be feasible without accompanying civic space and legislation ensuring freedom of information, freedom of press and other rights – of which the framework makes no mention, despite challenges observed in several countries in the region.
- ECOWAS urges Member States to “commit human, material and financial resources to establish and support national institutions that will help uphold core principles of democratic governance, respect for human rights and rule of law within the security sector”, acknowledging that the name and shape of these institutions might vary from country to country. Anti-corruption institutions fall under this category of institutions but are not referenced in the subsequent sections.
- Section G is dedicated to effective resource mobilisation and financing for SSR programmes. However, no direct mention is made to ensuring dedicated funding for anti-corruption mechanisms.

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46 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
The current framework falls short on addressing security sector corruption as a driver of conflict and instability, and needs to include specific guidance on how anti-corruption policies and mechanisms can contribute to good security sector governance.

Although the policy framework aims to support the emergence and consolidation of accountable, transparent and participatory security sectors, a more robust and detailed framework is needed. In order to address the gap holistically, the document should also address problems of institutional corruption, corruption within non-state groups, repression of civic space and media, and defence exceptionalism. The current framework falls short on addressing security sector corruption as a driver of conflict and instability, and needs to include specific guidance on how anti-corruption policies and mechanisms can contribute to good security sector governance. Without this, the risk is high of the anti-corruption imperative being forgotten in the inception, design and implementation of SSR processes, which can lead to corruption becoming endemic – as has happened in various security and justice sectors across the ECOWAS region\(^50\).

WHAT ECOWAS CAN DO:

A more direct and explicit approach to integrating anti-corruption provisions into the policy framework would help policymakers and practitioners to address corruption in defence and security – a key cause of instability in the region. We therefore urge ECOWAS to:

- Acknowledge anti-corruption as an essential component of SSR in the region and explicitly recognise the threat corruption poses to the successful implementation of SSR. This should be contextualised with particular attention to the specific challenges that have faced the last two decades of SSR in the region, including democratic transitions, coups d’état, engagement with the plethora of state and non-state actors that provide security.

- Develop and produce guidance on how to mainstream anti-corruption in SSR in West Africa. Include provisions, specifically targeted to ECOWAS member states, for the implementation and enforcement of the framework.

THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU) POLICY FRAMEWORK ON SSR

The EU’s role in SSR derives from the institutional actors and tools that shape EU foreign policy, which include the European External Action Service, the Commission and the Council bodies as well as the EU Security Strategy of 2003.51 Both the European Council and the European Commission have engaged with SSR efforts that codified the EU’s practice in the area, resulting in two key documents in 2005 and 2006 – the “EU Concept for ESDP support to Security Sector Reform”, and the “Concept for European Community Support for Security Sector Reform” both of which provide the institutional policy frameworks for EU actors working on SSR.52,53 Adopted by the European Council in 2003, the European Security Strategy (ESS) provided the basis of a strategic framework for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as well as the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).54

The “Elements for an EU-wide Strategic Framework to support SSR” were approved by EU member states in 2016. In this new strategic framework, SSR is defined as “the process of transforming the security system of a state in a manner that is consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus contributing to a well-functioning security policy.”55

Out of five SSR frameworks reviewed in this paper, the EU’s is the strongest in terms of its integration of anti-corruption. Whilst it could be further strengthened, the main challenge is in ensuring practical implementation of the framework by all the relevant EU institutions across the EU’s programming and assistance measures relating to SSR. An internal review of the implementation of the Framework is currently under way and is expected to recommend pathways to stronger implementation. This is why the analysis on this framework is two-fold:

1) The first part looks at strengthening the language used in the future iteration of the framework;

2) The second part focuses on how implementation of the framework can be enforced better.

As the data presented in the GDI 2020 shows, countries to which the EU provides SSR support often suffer from high to critical levels of corruption risk in their defence institutions.

54 Ibid51.
What the EU framework does

- Fighting corruption is defined as one of the necessary pre-conditions for a security sector to be perceived as legitimate.
- According to EU processes, the framework must be reviewed regularly, which includes discussions with policymakers, experts and stakeholders addressing progress and challenges.
- Recognises corruption and lack of integrity as factors undermining public trust towards security actors and the effectiveness of the security sector.
- Addresses defence exceptionalism in procurement and policymaking and requires military and police procurement to be subjected to the same rules and the same national anti-corruption strategy as any other public sector. Furthermore, the EU acknowledges that limitations to access to information must be clearly defined and justified and should generally be kept to a minimum.
- Distinguishes between anti-corruption and good governance, while acknowledging that the fight against corruption goes beyond ensuring transparency and accountability on a technical level.
- The framework comes with several recommendations on public financial management and procurement.
- Corruption as a possible negative unintended consequence of SSR is understood. The EU acknowledges that some reforms and resources can favour certain parties and feed into corrupt schemes, which in turn fuel new instability.
- Demonstrates an understanding of the linkage between corruption and conflict as well as of the political dimension of corruption that requires context-sensitive solutions in order to do no harm.
- Effective civilian oversight is supported and the establishment of complaints and investigation mechanisms, such as anti-corruption commissions, is advised, which would allow for reporting of corruption.
- The importance of civil society and press freedom is acknowledged.

What the EU framework doesn’t do

- The definition of corruption given in the framework is fairly narrow, and focuses on bribery, extortion, embezzlement of funds, cronyism and nepotism. It misses mention of higher-level, more political forms of corruption, such as elite capture of institutions, conflicts of interest and undue influence from non-state actors.
- The framework focuses solely on institutional corruption and does not address the role of non-state and external factors, such as private military and security companies and deployed staff on a military operation.
- Whilst the need to conduct a structured context assessment containing political economy analysis, stakeholder analysis, and an assessment of security needs is included, it does not include the need to conduct a corruption risk assessment or a corruption analysis at the outset.
- The framework does not advise on establishing, implementing and enforcing robust anti-corruption legislation within SSR processes, without which there is no recourse to justice in dealing with cases of corruption. Whistleblower protection is also absent.
- Very limited mention of how anti-corruption should be strengthened in relation to risks at the personnel level, and within military operations.
WHAT THE EU CAN DO

The EU’s framework could be strengthened through the addition of specific anti-corruption guidelines and recommendations. We urge the EU to:

- Mandate comprehensive corruption risk assessments within the security sector as part of the recommended context assessment to identify gaps, vulnerabilities and high-risk areas for corruption. Ensure that national anti-corruption actors, including civil society, are engaged in this.

- Recommend the adoption and implementation of strong anti-corruption legislation, as well as comprehensive whistleblower protection mechanisms to safeguard individuals who report corruption within the security sector.

- Expand recommendations on public financial management and procurement to include budget transparency, e.g. through the disclosure of information relating to security sector budgets, expenditures and procurement processes; and by encouraging the use of open data and establishing mechanisms for independent audits and evaluations of security institutions to assess their integrity and effectiveness.

In order to support more effective implementation, EU institutions and member states should take the following steps:

- Invest in capacity-building for security personnel to prevent, detect and combat corruption effectively. This includes awareness and training programmes to enhance the knowledge and skills of security sector actors in combating corruption; develop EU-wide training modules on corruption prevention, detection, investigation and ethics; and promote exchanges of best practices and lessons learned among EU member states to enhance their capacity to address corruption effectively.

- Consider establishing specific funding mechanisms or grants dedicated to anti-corruption efforts as part of security sector reform efforts.

- Encourage cooperation and peer review mechanisms among EU member states and between the different EU institutions and instruments to facilitate the sharing of experiences, knowledge and expertise in combating corruption within the security sector; establish platforms for regular dialogue and exchange, such as workshops, conferences or working groups to discuss challenges and successes in implementing anti-corruption measures in SSR processes.

- With the expansion of EU military and security assistance to partner countries, the EU should issue guidance on how all areas of external action which aim to strengthen or support security or defence institutions in partner countries (beyond traditional SSR programming, to also encompass CSDP military and civilian missions, and EPF assistance measures, for instance) can implement the good practices and principles laid out in the SSR framework.
In recent years, the Tunisian government has geared significant resources towards modernisation of the military following threats from Libya. Despite some recent developments that could be seen as state efforts towards SSR, good governance standards are yet to be fully applied to the defence sector. Back in 2016 Tunisia passed the Right to Access Information Law (Law No. 2016-22), which not only obliges public bodies to publish extensive information on their work, but also limits some of their power to deny information. More recently, in 2018 the Parliament adopted the Assets Declaration Law, identifying 35 categories of public officials required to declare their assets upon being elected or appointed and upon leaving office. There have also been talks around a new code of conduct and an anti-corruption training module in the military academies, but that information is based solely on interviews between TI-DS and the Tunisian MoD. It comes as no surprise that the GDI 2020 found that there is a high corruption risk within Tunisia’s defence sector, with the lowest score being operational risk. The military does not have a doctrine that addresses corruption as a strategic issue for operations. Accordingly, corruption is not included in the forward planning of military operations, nor does it receive resources at the strategic level. Moreover, the military has no policy of monitoring and evaluating corruption risk in the field and personnel receive no guidelines on how to identify and address corruption-related issues while on deployments. But the country’s defence sector faces a multitude of other high-risk areas, including limited parliamentary oversight of military affairs and opaque practices in procurement. Even though procurement of new weapons, equipment and technologies has been a key pillar of modernisation, lingering opacity throughout the procurement cycle heightens corruption vulnerabilities and risks contributing to the loss of public funds. Though large defence purchases are usually made public, this is by no means systematic, and the authorities often exclude additional details related to contracting terms and bidders. Equally, notification of planned purchases is infrequent and individual purchases are not linked to explicit strategic objectives, leading to uncertainty around how such decisions are made. Considering the staggering amount of investment made in such a high-risk area as defence procurement, additional and urgent state efforts towards stronger oversight mechanisms are essential to avoid resource waste and move closer to effective SSR.

The military has no policy of monitoring and evaluating corruption risk in the field and personnel receive no guidelines on how to identify and address corruption-related issues while on deployments.
The OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security (1994) – widely considered the cornerstone of principles for democratic control of armed forces – has provided the basis for many key principles of SSR. Most of OSCE’s 12 current field operations engage in SSR either directly or indirectly. However, the fragmented nature of the framework is an obstacle to enabling coherent and coordinated SSR activity.

Sections VII and VIII of the Code serve as the basis for the OSCE’s engagement in SSR activities. They outline a number of standards that have guided the OSCE in supporting nationally led SSR processes: democratic civilian control over armed and security forces, their subjection to international humanitarian law, respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of armed forces personnel, and the regulation of the use of armed forces for internal security purposes. The premise is that the security sector should be subject to the same standards of good governance as any other public sector, however corruption is not explicitly mentioned or addressed.

In 2016 the OSCE published internal SSR guidelines with the aim of providing OSCE executive structures and staff with a tool to support nationally-led SSR processes. These guidelines were updated in 2022, to include significantly more mentions of corruption. Section 2.3 of the 2022 guidelines is dedicated to “Strengthening Integrity and Anti-Corruption”; herein the importance of security sector integrity is recognised, as is the need to build anti-corruption into SSR as a cross-cutting theme.

What the OSCE framework does

- Emphasis is placed on the same standards of good governance and integrity being applied to the security sector as any other public sector. Defence exceptionalism is addressed as an obstacle to monitoring of public procurement and in public financial management.
- Emphasises the need for a legal framework to fight corruption to be both in place and enforced.
- Recognises that legal reforms are insufficient to achieve effect in practice, and that formal reforms do not always bring real-world change.
- Acknowledges the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) and the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (UNTOC) as international norms applicable to SSR.
- Strong recommendations on preventing corruption within security personnel and human resource management.
- Recognises that corruption can often be a sensitive issue at national level and long-term national commitment can be scarce, at which point regional actors can step in to desensitize and facilitate further progress.
- Recognises the importance of civil society, including media and investigative journalism, in exercising oversight and enabling public access to information.
- Recommends the establishment of anti-corruption entities that are equipped with sufficient independence and resources and are able to co-operate and coordinate. Emphasis is also placed on building the capacity of the judiciary.
- Recommends the inclusion of anti-corruption strategies in national security strategies.
- According to OSCE procedures, the framework is regularly reviewed and updated.
What the OSCE framework doesn’t do

- The framework categorises corruption under the economic and human dimension of security, but not as a politico-military issue, thus leaving a significant gap in this area of work.
- There is an assumption that by focusing on formal structures, mechanisms and processes of governance, corruption risks will be mitigated.
- Even though the framework briefly mentions commitments on effective management of public and human resources, there is no explicit reference to the effective implementation of anti-corruption measures within the security sector focusing on utilising adequate resources.
- There is an over-reliance on fighting corruption through building integrity amongst military personnel through ethical values, principles and norms, as well as through civil society monitoring, whilst neglecting the role of complementary elements such as national legislation and whistleblower protection.
- Whilst there is the acknowledgement of defence exceptionalism, the guidelines do not make any specific recommendations as to how procurement processes should be designed to avoid this. Single-sourcing and other risk-inducing practices could still take place.
- There is no acknowledgement that civil society will not be able to carry out oversight if it does not have access to information on the defence sector, or if civic space is small.
- The fragmentary character of the framework is an obstacle to the development of a truly coherent and co-ordinated approach.
- Whilst the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) is recognised as indicator for accountability and transparency, the Governance Defence Integrity Index (GDI), which assesses risk of corruption in the defence sector specifically and is therefore more relevant to SSR, is not.

What the OSCE CAN DO:

The OSCE’s SSR framework should be updated to more fully take into account the political dimensions of corruption to provide a more holistic range of clear and concise anti-corruption recommendations. We suggest the following:

- Recognise the intrinsically political nature of corruption and add measures that address corruption in defence and security institutions to the politico-military dimension of SSR.
- Include more specific guidelines and practical tools on areas outside of personnel management, i.e. in the areas of policymaking and political affairs in defence, financial management, personnel management, military operations and procurement.
- Include the adoption and implementation of comprehensive whistleblower protection mechanisms to encourage individuals to report corruption within the security sector.
- Acknowledge the need for protected civic space and public access to information in order for civil society to be enabled to exercise effective oversight and establish clearer provisions on the involvement of civil society organisations in monitoring, oversight, and accountability of the security sector to enhance transparency and integrity.
- Add the GDI to the list of possible proxy indicators for accountability and transparency in SSR.
CONCLUSION

The five key multilateral SSR frameworks analysed in this report all emphasise the importance of good security sector governance and building accountable institutions, but fail to adequately prioritise and embed anti-corruption within their approaches. To varying degrees, all of the frameworks over-emphasise technical reform above the politics of reform: the power and incentives, including corrupt incentives, which ultimately determine the results of reform efforts.

We urge SSR policymakers and practitioners to recognise that good governance and accountable, trusted security institutions cannot be built without thoroughly embedding anti-corruption into SSR at all levels. Corruption must not be overlooked, or ‘worried about later’. The initiation of SSR activity represents the best window of opportunity to advance meaningful security sector anti-corruption reform before corruption hollows out from within the foundations of the SSR process itself.

We urge SSR policymakers and practitioners to recognise that good governance and accountable, trusted security institutions cannot be built without thoroughly embedding anti-corruption into SSR at all levels.

Securing progress is possible. This report sets out clear and specific opportunities to embed anti-corruption within the key SSR frameworks that guide policy and programming. We urge decision-makers to take heed.
1. **Policy Recognition**: Ensure that anti-corruption is recognised as a fundamental principle and objective of security sector reform. This involves integrating anti-corruption standards into policy frameworks, guidelines, and codes of conduct for security sector personnel.

2. **Corruption Risk Assessments**: Conduct comprehensive corruption risk assessments in the security sector to identify vulnerabilities and high-risk areas. Study corruption in conflict systems, understand its drivers, and assess its links to insecurity. Consider gender dimensions, power structures and previous anti-corruption efforts. Collaborate with national actors and anti-corruption specialists. Integrate corruption analysis into SSR assessments for effective legislation, policies and programmes.

3. **Independent Oversight Mechanisms**: Establish independent oversight mechanisms, such as ombudsman offices, parliamentary committees, Inspectors General or independent commissions, to monitor and evaluate the implementation of anti-corruption measures in SSR processes. These oversight bodies should have sufficient independence, resources and authority to conduct investigations, receive complaints, and provide recommendations to address corruption within the security sector.

4. **Public Financial Management**: Incorporate PFM reforms into SSR processes to improve governance, accountability and effectiveness in the defence sector. This includes measures to enhance capacity and expertise in areas in resource allocation, budget reliability, expenditure, management, assets and liability management, financial transparency, and internal and external audits. Implementing effective PFM reform will enable the development of resilience and better outcomes in critical risks areas such as defence spending, income and procurement.

5. **Transparency and Accountability**: Promote transparency and accountability in the security sector by requiring regular reporting and disclosure of security sector budgets, expenditures and procurement activities. This includes publishing financial information and making it accessible to the public, civil society organisations and oversight institutions. Independent audits and evaluations should also be conducted periodically to assess the integrity and effectiveness of SSR efforts. In addition, general legal frameworks for public procurement should also be applied to the security sector. While in some cases legitimate national security concerns may restrict availability of information, governments should work on the basis that as much information as possible will be released.
6. **Whistleblower Protection:** Implement comprehensive whistleblower protection mechanisms that safeguard individuals who report corruption within the security sector. Encourage the establishment of secure, confidential and gender-sensitive reporting channels, both internal and external, to enable individuals to come forward without fear of reprisal. Provide legal protections and incentives for whistleblowers and ensure their confidentiality throughout the reporting and investigation processes.

7. **Investment in Personnel and Capacity Building:** Promote a culture of integrity within security institutions by implementing strict anti-corruption measures for personnel management and providing specialised training in detecting, reporting and combating corruption. Measures should include vetting processes for personnel recruitment, promotions, and transfers, as well as implementing strict codes of conduct and ethics for security sector personnel. Invest in training and capacity-building programmes for security sector personnel to raise awareness about corruption risks, ethics, professionalism and the consequences of engaging in corrupt practices.

8. **Civil Society Engagement:** Actively engage civil society organisations, non-governmental organisations and other stakeholders in the design, implementation, oversight and monitoring of SSR processes. Create platforms for meaningful participation and consultation to ensure that anti-corruption measures reflect the needs and aspirations of all parts of the population. Civil society can play a critical role in monitoring and reporting corruption, as well as advocating for transparency and accountability.

9. **Monitoring and Evaluation Frameworks:** Establish monitoring frameworks to assess the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures in SSR processes. Regularly evaluate progress, identify challenges and make necessary adjustments to anti-corruption strategies. Increases in assistance levels from international partners, particularly in response to host-nation requests for more equipment or training, should be subject to a review of host-nation performance on building integrity concepts such as combating the circumstances and behaviour that cause corruption. Publish evaluation reports to promote transparency and demonstrate accountability in addressing corruption within the security sector.

10. **International Co-operation:** Promote international cooperation and support to address corruption within SSR processes, aligning with international anti-corruption standards and guidelines. Collaborate with international organisations and regional bodies to share best practices, technical expertise and resources for combating corruption. Forge partnerships with donor countries to provide assistance in strengthening governance structures, capacity building and implementing anti-corruption measures within the security sector.
## ANNEX 1: ANTI-CORRUPTION GAPS IN KEY SSR FRAMEWORKS

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<tr>
<th>Framework</th>
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| The United Nations Integrated Technical Guidance Notes on Security Sector Reform (ITGNs) (2012) | Overview: In its chapter on Democratic Governance of the Security Sector, the ITGNs outline the following areas for the UN’s support to strengthening governance of SSR:  
- Strengthening of the constitutional and legal framework  
- Strengthening of the role and capacity of civil society, including women’s groups  
- Strengthening of independent oversight institutions and mechanisms  
- Strengthening of the institutional system of governance  
Strengthening the management system and internal oversight | Excluding corruption and transnational organised crimes to be dealt with separately as other post conflict issues, creates a fundamental gap in the ITGNs. The ITGNs do not elaborate on corruption-conflict nexus which significantly reduces its effectiveness in FCAS contexts which is a high-profile target for SSR programmes. Moreover, the country case studies provided in the ITGNs are mostly from stable contexts that makes it less relevant to FCAS contexts. In general, there is a significant gap between policy and implementation, which means the ITGN needs to integrate anti-corruption measures to become relevant particularly in FCAS contexts.  
The following gaps are observed under the sub-heading:  
  **i. Strengthening of the constitutional and legal framework:**  
The ITGNs do not reflect the unique environment for SSR in FCAS contexts and rather provides a set of generic interventions. It underlines the need to use a more nuanced approach to strengthening constitutional and legal framework, especially in FCAS contexts.  
At strategic level, it is of utmost importance to recognise the political economy aspect of SSR, including from a gender perspective, as well as the impact of corruption on SSR programmes and provide clear policy guidelines accordingly.  
Guidance on gender-responsive approaches to SSR arising from the Women, Peace and Security Agenda resolutions 1820, 1888, 21106, 2122, 2467 and 2493 should be integrated into operational and strategic levels.  
At operational level, politically nuanced approaches, backed with relevant anti-corruption tools and strategies is needed to make the Note relevant particularly in FCAS contexts. |
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<tr>
<td>The United Nations Integrated Technical Guidance Notes on Security Sector Reform (ITGNs) (2012)</td>
<td>The ITGNs identify the following interventions at strategic and operational levels for strengthening democratic governance of SSR:</td>
<td>ii. <strong>Strengthening the role and capacity of civil society, including women’s groups:</strong></td>
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| | i **Strengthening Constitutional and Legal Framework:**  
*At strategic level,* the Notes identify support to securing political commitment for constitutional and legal reform, support ratification of international conventions, support monitoring and reporting, support an inclusive legal reform and strengthening the role of parliament in debating and passing constitutional and legal acts. At operational level, the ITGNs identify: providing technical support to assessment of constitutional/legal framework, support to legal drafting and support to newly established institutions. | For civil society to be effective in promoting anti-corruption and good governance measures, transparency is a key prerequisite; it allows access the documents and information needed to design evidence-based campaigns. CSOs must also enjoy a range of protections (e.g. rights to freedom of expression or freedom of association), and be able to operate openly without fear of repercussions. Special protection considerations should be given to women’s organisations. These aspects of support to civil society are not elaborated in the Note, particularly in view of the unique challenges civil society face in FCAS contexts. For instance, the Note does not elaborate on the importance of legal framework for CSOs, specialised training and capacity building on defence and security budget, policies and system. |
| | ii **Strengthening of the role and capacity of civil society, including women’s groups:**  
*At strategic level,* the ITGNs identify: Support inclusion of civil society in dialogue on SSR, support engagement of marginalised groups, and support confidence building between civil society and SSR actors. At operational level, the ITGNs identify: Support to mapping, capacity building, outreach and awareness raising, monitoring and reporting and identification of institutional point of contact for civil society in the SSR process. | iii. **Strengthening of independent oversight institutions and mechanisms:**  
The ITGNs do not elaborate on the unique challenges the oversight bodies in FCAS countries are facing. Evidence suggests that executive influence and ruling majority control of oversight bodies, particularly in FCAS contexts, make independent oversight and scrutiny of defence and security sector complicated. For instance, in Côte d’Ivoire, the Security and Defence Commission has formal powers to scrutinise policies; however, article 68 of the Constitution states that the President of the Republic presides over it. In Mali the Defence Committee was chaired by the president’s son until mid-2020.  
The ITGNs focus only on the formal role of the oversight bodies but do not provide clear policy guidelines reflecting the real nature of challenges facing democratic governance in FCAS contexts. |
### Framework


### Current State

**Strengthening of the institutional system of governance:** At strategic level, the Notes identify: government support and linking SSR to different aspects of government, promote the role of local government in SSR, support to regional mechanism, support to development of code of conduct at regional and national levels and adherence of SSR actors to code of conduct, support co-operation with international mechanism, and support initiatives to tackle corruption.

At operational level, the Note identifies support to local government reform process, support exchange of information, encourage cross-border co-operation, support participation at national/regional conferences, support exchange of information among national and regional stakeholders, support development of clear code of conducts, and support capacity development for CSOs at local level.

### Gaps

#### iv. Strengthening of the institutional system of governance:

The ITGNs recognise the importance of an integrative system of institutional governance which requires fostering a culture of openness, transparency and co-operation that would be supported through internal oversight and accountability mechanisms. What is needed under this section is a clear reference to the existence of key legislations, policies and procedures. For instance, whistleblower protection in defence sector. The current provisions are too generic to be useful and need more explicit language, including on gender-responsive whistleblower protection. Moreover, guidance needs to be provided on specific aspects of military operations, doctrine, forward planning, internal conduct of conduct and anti-corruption training for military personnel.

#### v. Strengthening Management system of Internal Oversight:

The ITGNs do not elaborate on some key aspects of defence governance and the guidance provided is generic to a large extent. For instance, the following points are not addressed:

- The need to publish defence and security sector budgets and expenditure including sources of extra budgetary income and military involvement in natural resources extraction and any other commercial ventures or beneficial ownership.
- Ensure clear and transparent procurement procedures are in place and parliament provides oversight and the process is protected from undue influence.

Development of robust and independent audit system.

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<td><strong>Human Resources management:</strong> including: institutional rules and procedures, fair and objective recruitment process, effective policies, and inclusion of women, support internal mechanism, support creation of database, support compliance to human rights obligations, including protection from sexual violence, and support for vetting process.</td>
<td><strong>v. Strengthening Management system of Internal Oversight:</strong></td>
<td>The ITGNs do not elaborate on some key aspects of defence governance and the guidance provided is generic to a large extent. For instance, the following points are not addressed:</td>
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<td><strong>Financial Resources management:</strong> Ensure budget process is subject to public financial management principles, support to secure political commitment for enhancing financial resources management as per international norms, support procurement system and support to audit system.</td>
<td>The need to publish defence and security sector budgets and expenditure including sources of extra budgetary income and military involvement in natural resources extraction and any other commercial ventures or beneficial ownership.</td>
<td>Ensure clear and transparent procurement procedures are in place and parliament provides oversight and the process is protected from undue influence.</td>
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Development of robust and independent audit system.

c. Development Management Capacity for Effective Policy Implementation: Ensure promoting transparency and accountability in management system, support independent analysis, support development of financial management system, support establishment operational capacity and support capacity development for strategic planning.

d. Support Information Management: Support collection and recording of data, ensure political commitment for information sharing, support establishing standardised procedures and rules, support platforms at local level for info sharing, support awareness raising on privacy and declassification of info, and support modernising infrastructure for info sharing.

Overview:
The Guidance Notes clearly explain and acknowledge the adverse impact of corruption on peace and security, and proceed to outline how SSR can help counter transnational organised crime. Corruption is clearly identified as key enabler for transnational organised crime and thereby as wider enabler for conflict and instability. Likewise, actions to reduce corruption are included in the scope of activities that can be included in SSR processes to help combat transnational organised crime. The contents of the Guidance Notes are as follows:

- The role of SSR in countering transnational organised crime.
- Transnational organised crime measures as crucial element of SSR
- Key areas of SSR to tackle transnational organised crime
- Risks and opportunities

With the main focus being on transnational organised crime the Guidance Notes only address corruption in relation to organised crime, and leaves forms of security sector corruption which are less relevant to organised crime mainly unaddressed.

It is important to acknowledge that it is not the mandate of the Guidance notes on transnational organised crime and SSR to address security sector corruption comprehensively – this should be done either in the main ITGNs, or in a separate additional document on corruption and SSR. However, as the Guidance Notes rightly acknowledge, corruption is a key enabler of organised crime and conflict and insecurity more broadly, and hence needs to be addressed thoroughly. Some of the most outstanding gaps are:

- Anti-corruption in policymaking and institutions, especially when it comes to increasing oversight, is absent.
- Corruption in natural resource management presents a large vehicle for organised crime, yet this link is not made in the Guidance Notes.
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<td>The United Nations Integrated Technical Guidance Notes on Transnational Organised Crime and Security Sector Reform (2016)</td>
<td>Under the section on ‘Key areas of SSR to Tackle TOC’, sub-section 6.7 on ‘Combating Corruption and Money Laundering’ gives direct input on how and which anti-corruption measures can be included in SSR processes to combat transnational organised crime. These are divided into strategic and operational measures. Synergies with other areas with SSR are also explored. Additionally, occasional recommendations to include anti-corruption are also made within the guidance on police reform, prison reform, and border management. Strengthening commitment to fighting impunity and corruption in security sector institutions at the highest level is also suggested as strategic measure within crime prevention more broadly. UNCAC as a global framework for fighting corruption, and the feasibility of UNCAC Review Mechanism as a tool to evaluate technical assistance needs for fighting corruption, are both identified as opportunities to integrate anti-corruption and SSR more strongly.</td>
<td>• Recommendations on anti-corruption in procurement and public financial management are generally absent. • Looking at the recommendations for personnel management, discussed under guidance for police, prison and border management reform, recommendations seem to mainly target lower-level officials. Whilst these present a part of the problem, these recommendations are unlikely to be effective if gaps are not closed in higher ranks.</td>
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<td>African Union Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform (2013)</td>
<td>Overview: The African Union's policy framework starts with accepting a set of global SSR norms and principles developed by the United Nations and elaborated in the UN Secretary-General's report on SSR and other relevant UN documents. These principles form the overarching framework for the African Union's approach to SSR. Moreover, the framework outlines that the following core principles of SSR encompass those values that are particularly relevant for or unique to the African continent: • African solidarity and partnership, • African regional integration and SSR, • National ownership of SSR, • Context specific approach, • SSR as part of broader democratisation, • SSR and good governance,</td>
<td>Despite the threats it poses to peace and security in the continent, the AU's policy framework on SSR misses to acknowledge corruption as a strategic challenge or anti-corruption among other principles for success of SSR initiatives. For a start, the framework poorly addresses different aspects of SSR and provides insufficient guidance on key issues such as building institutional systems and capacity, transparency and accountability and roles of different actors. It provides no guidance on interlinkages between corruption and conflict and makes no reference to lesson learned or SSR cases from the region. The GDI underlines a persistent lack of transparency and poor access to information in the defence sector in many African countries. A lack of transparency and access to information impairs the democratic control of the security sector as it hampers the ability of oversight bodies to undertake their duties.</td>
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<tr>
<td>African Union Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform (2013)</td>
<td>• SSR and gender and • SSR coordination.</td>
<td>This lack of scrutiny results in increased corruption risk at all levels of the sector, from operations to personnel financial and procurement management.</td>
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Under its section D, the policy identifies the following as key elements of SSR:

i. **Security sector review and needs assessment**: encourages Member States (MSs) to set up timetables for the regular review of SSR, identify security threats, justice needs, gender, capacity building and all other related issues of SSR:

ii. **National security strategies**: encourages MSs to produce a national security strategy, identifying security threats, security posture, efficient use of resources, commitment to regional and continental peace, use of technology and participation of all groups including women in SSR.

iii. **The existence of institutional, legal and security policy frameworks**: encourages MS to ensure existence of a sound legal framework for SSR including constitutional instruments and SSR legal and policy frameworks.

iv. **Comprehensive capacity building and professionalisation of the institutions of the security sector**: advises MS to ensure the effectiveness of security sector personnel, capacity-building programmes, including the provision of transparent, accountable and equitable recruitment mechanisms, appropriate training, equipment, and gender compliance.

v. **Ensuring that democratic control and oversight mechanisms are enhanced and functional**: advises MSs to commit themselves to strengthening instruments for democratic oversight of the SSR, including Executive Control of SSR, Legislative and Judicial Oversight, independent oversight by CSOs and financing of SSR, appropriate monitoring and evaluation; and an effective communication strategy.

i. As evident from previous studies, the first step to ensuring that SSR processes contribute to addressing corruption-conflict systems, is to undertake corruption-responsive SSR assessments. These assessments are intended to “lay the foundation for enhanced coordination and effectiveness by identifying needs, existing capacities, and priorities before policies and programmes are designed, implemented and evaluated”.

ii. The gap in the National Security Strategy is that it fails to encourage MSs to integrate anti-corruption measures in national security strategy. Anti-corruption measure should be a core principle in security strategies considering the threat it poses to peace and stability in the continent.

iii. The section on legal framework does not place sufficient emphasis on the need for transparency and accountability. Its current provisions are weak and to a large extent vague. Considering the complex situation in the region, it is important that the Policy Framework acknowledges the challenges and underlines the significance of establishing a proper legal framework for SSR.

iv. The existing provisions under this section lack any reference to the need for training on anti-corruption, establishing transparent mechanism for defence governance including personal financial, procurement and operations. The provision could have elaborated on the need for MSs to ensure existence of institutional safeguards to prevent corruption risk across the above aspects of defence governance.
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<td>African Union Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform (2013)</td>
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<td>v. The existing provisions are insufficient and generic. Across the region, oversight bodies face unique challenges, opaque practices and classification of information, which significantly limits the capacity of CSOs and other oversight bodies to carry out any effective oversight of the defence and security institutions.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic Community of West African States Policy Framework for Security Sector Reform and Governance (2016)</td>
<td>In its section III, the Policy Framework identifies the following as essential features of SSR: A. A National Security Policy which encourages MSs to develop a national security strategy, articulating risk and nations’ needs for security and justice B. A periodic security sector review and needs assessment: encourages MSs to conduct periodic review of security sector needs including a thorough needs assessment and a transparent appraisal of security sector expenditure. C. A comprehensive professionalisation and modernisation of the security and justice sector: encourages MSs to ensure transparent and accountability in recruitment, training and promotion of security personal, establish partnership, adopt security doctrine and ensure gender equality. D. The involvement of customary authorities and community-based security and justice providers: encourages MSs to integrate customary security providers into SSR/G, ensure private security companies respect to rule of law and human rights and adherence to international human rights normative frameworks. E. The effective involvement of Civil Society Organisations and the media: Encourages MSs to ensure the full and effective participation of CSOs and the media in the formulation, design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation phases of SSR/G programmes, projects and activities.</td>
<td>The principal gap in the ECOWAS policy framework is that it lacks depth or any contextual insight or policy guidance specific to the region and to a large extent, it mirrors the AU’s policy framework. While the entire continent shares challenges of similar nature, given that ECOWAS policy framework applies to a specific region, it would have been more effective if it had elaborated on specific issues countries in the region are facing in implementing SSR programmes and accordingly provided more practical guidance for MSs. For decades, stability in West Africa has been severely disrupted by internal conflicts, commonly financed by the illegal sale of arms or the illicit extraction of natural resources. Despite numerous initiatives, the results of past SSR processes in the region since the early 1990s have been mixed. It has rarely resulted in transformational change – whether in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea-Bissau, or in Côte d’Ivoire in the context of the recovery from civil war, or whether in Nigeria, Benin, Mali or Ghana in the context of democratic transitions. These challenges need to be addressed by a robust framework which also addresses the role of corruption as conflict-fuelling crime. The following gaps are observed in the current policy framework: A. It fails to encourage MSs to integrate anti-corruption measures into national security strategy. Anti-corruption measure should be a core principle in security strategies considering the threat it poses to the region.</td>
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<td>Economic Community of West African States Policy Framework for Security Sector Reform and Governance (2016)</td>
<td><strong>F. The establishment of effective and accountable democratic control and oversight institutions</strong> including executive control, parliamentary oversight, independent and effective judiciary/court systems.</td>
<td>B. The provision lacks detail on how needs assessment could contribute to measuring progress. To address corruption systematically, and the risks it poses to defence and other elements of the SSR, needs ought to be assessed periodically with clear benchmarks and timelines to be set as part of the process for measuring progress over time.</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU Commission and High Representative, “Joint Communication - Elements for an EU-wide Strategic Framework to Support Security Sector Reform” (2016)</td>
<td>The overarching goal of the EU-wide strategic framework on SSR is to help to make states more stable and individuals more secure. To this end, it aims to enhance the EU’s effectiveness in promoting and supporting:</td>
<td>C. Defence and security is one of the most significant areas of government expenditure for the countries in the region while access to information on defence issues is limited, oversight bodies face unique challenges and lack capacity and resources. The current guidelines do not place sufficient emphasis on defence governance and corruption risk facing defence institutions.</td>
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<td>A. Partner countries’ efforts to ensure security for individuals and the state; and</td>
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<td>B. The legitimacy, good governance, integrity and sustainability of the security sector of partner countries.</td>
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<td>The policy further illustrates that:</td>
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<td>Integrity and the fight against corruption, trust between the population and security actors is crucial for the effectiveness of the security sector. It is undermined by any instance of bribery, extortion, embezzlement of funds, cronyism and nepotism. The financial resources allocated to the security sector should be managed on the basis of the same good governance principles that apply to other public sectors. Like other public procurement processes, the procurement of military and police equipment and services should be subject to appropriate procedures, constraints and scrutiny. Nationwide anti-corruption strategies should equally apply to security actors.</td>
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<td>The policy does not distinguish between stable and fragile contexts and seems to suggest “one size fit all” approach to SSR implementation while evidence suggests that SSR in FCAS contexts face unique challenges as overall system of governance in those countries is weak, classification, opacity and defence exceptionalism is the norm and access to information is several limited.</td>
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<td>Furthermore, it does not elaborate on corruption-conflict nexus, transnational organised crimes and its linkages to corruption in FCAS countries, rise of extremist groups presenting themselves as alternative to corrupt governments in a number of countries in Africa and Asia, which are the high-profile target for SSR programmes.</td>
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<td>To a large extent, the guidelines are generic and top-level, which limits their effectiveness in the context of SSR. More granular policy guidelines developed considering the specificity of different stages in the process would be needed to ensure policymakers and practitioners are aware of the risk of corruption and integrate appropriate measure in each aspect in the process, including corruption risks from a gender-perspective.</td>
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<td>EU Commission and High Representative, “Joint Communication - Elements for an EU-wide Strategic Framework to Support Security Sector Reform” (2016)</td>
<td>Under the section on areas of engagement, the instrument mentions:&lt;br&gt;Support for oversight mechanisms:&lt;br&gt;The EU should support the establishment or strengthening of effective civilian control and oversight, inter alia by:&lt;br&gt;• promoting and supporting the formulation and enforcement of relevant legislation and procedures;&lt;br&gt;• increasing the capacity of independent complaints and civilian oversight institutions and mechanisms.&lt;br&gt;Beneficiaries may be national legislative bodies and independent or quasi-independent bodies such as ombudsmen, human rights institutions or commissions, anti-corruption commissions, independent police complaints commissions, and judicial authorities in their role of overseeing law enforcement agencies, etc.&lt;br&gt;The EU should promote the active participation of civil society in these oversight mechanisms and, where relevant, support civil society initiatives to monitor the conduct of the security forces. It will also promote the freedom of the media and strengthen its capacity to report responsibly on the security sector.</td>
<td>Greater insight and depth are also lacking in political economy aspect of SSR, including from a gender perspective. Studies show that SSR is inherently a political process as it targets the heart of power and hence normative instruments need to reflect that reality and provide relevant guidance.&lt;br&gt;The guidelines seem to pre-suppose existence of certain political principles and values and some degree of civil society which is in short supply particularly in FCAS context. This conceptual-contextual divide makes the framework less effective particularly in fragile contexts.</td>
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<td>The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Security Sector Governance and Reform: Guidelines for OSCE Staff (Updated edition - 2022)</td>
<td>• Strong recommendations on preventing corruption within security personnel and human resource management.&lt;br&gt;• Defence exceptionalism is addressed as an obstacle to monitoring and evaluation, in public procurement, and in public financial management. Emphasis is placed on the same standards of good governance and integrity being applied to the security sector as any other public sector.&lt;br&gt;• Emphasises the need for a legal framework to be in place as well as enforced to fight corruption.&lt;br&gt;• Recognises that corruption can often be a sensitive issue at national level and long-term national commitment can be scarce, at which point regional actors can step in to desensitize and facilitate further progress.</td>
<td>The fragmentary character of the framework is an obstacle to the development of a coherent and co-ordinated approach.&lt;br&gt;The assumption is that by focusing on formal structures, mechanism and processes of governance, corruption risks will be mitigated. However, evidence suggest that SSR programme in countries where OSCE is supporting the process, faces challenges and corruption is one of the root causes.&lt;br&gt;The guidelines’ overwhelming focus on applying good governance principle of the public sector in implementation of SSR, limits its scope to elaborate on unique features and challenges facing security sector governance. For instance, parliamentary oversight, although well established in legislation, often falls short in practice in many countries.</td>
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The UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) and the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (UNTOC) are acknowledged as international norms in the field of SSR/G.

- Recognises the importance civil society, including of media and investigative journalism, for exercising oversight, lobbying, and giving the public access to information is recognised.

- Recommends the establishment of anti-corruption entities that are equipped with sufficient independence and resources and are able to co-operate and coordinate. Emphasis is placed on building the capacity of the judiciary in that regard too.

Recommends the inclusion of anti-corruption strategies in national security strategies.

Increasing alignment between legislatures and the executive, government interference in parliamentary duties and curbs on legislative powers are noticeable trends, particularly in the Balkans, Central Europe and the Caucasus. Parliamentary defence committees often fail to exercise their formal rights, showing high levels of deference to the executive and playing a largely reactive role in legislating.

**Opaque Procurement Process:** Previous reports revealed considerable gaps in defence procurement processes that increases corruption risk throughout the countries in Balkan, Central Europe and Caucasus regions.

Most countries, with the exception of Estonia and Latvia, conduct the majority of defence procurement through single-sourcing or secret procedures. Many states use national security exemption clauses to justify these decisions, with defence procurement often exempted from public procurement law.

**Access to Information:** Across the Central and Eastern European region, there is a serious gap between legislative provisions for information access, and their enforcement in practice. Only Armenia and Azerbaijan, which were engaged in active conflict most recently, have no legislation guaranteeing access to defence information.
ANNEX 2: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

1. How long has the SSR programme been going on in your country and can you elaborate on what initiatives are undertaken to reform the defence sector?

2. In your view, what are the root obstacles to SSR implementation and has the SSR programme made any tangible progress in improving transparency and accountability of the defence establishment or is it focused only on training and equipment for the military?

3. Is there a governance reform programme supported by the donors to strengthen capacity of the oversight bodies such as the National Assembly, the National Audit Office, the judiciary or others?

4. Your country has ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption but since then has there been any initiative to integrate anti-corruption measures in defence related laws?

5. Is the Supreme Audit Office independence is guaranteed in the law? For example, does it submit its reports to the Parliament or the executive?

6. Is there a military code of conduct and if so, does it address corruption?

7. How do you assess the role of CSOs in pushing for transparency and accountability of the defence institutions?

8. In your view, does corruption fuel conflict? Can you point to some practical examples where corruption in defence sector has led to an increase violence and instability?


“Nigeria militants burn to death motorists as they sleep in their cars”, BBC, 10 February 2020. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-51445070


ADDITIONAL RESOURCES

UN work:

UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Sustainable Development Goals. [https://sdgs.un.org/goals](https://sdgs.un.org/goals)


UNSC Resolution 1325. [https://peacemaker.un.org/node/105](https://peacemaker.un.org/node/105)

AU work:


ECOWAS work:


OSCE work:

**Miscellaneous:**

Council of Europe, Democratic Oversight of security sector in Member States. [https://pace.coe.int/en/files/11000](https://pace.coe.int/en/files/11000)


