Political Risk:
Very High
Score:
24/100
Defence and Security Policy and Policy Transparency
Q1
33/100
Is there formal provision for effective and independent legislative scrutiny of defence policy?
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It should be noted that, since the summer of 2018, the political regime in Turkey has changed from a parliamentary system to an executive…
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On any defence/security-related issue, the General Assembly can initiate a ‘parliamentary inquiry’, ‘general debate’, ‘parliamentary investigation’ or ‘written interrogation/parliamentary petition’. All four are governed…
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In parallel with President Erdogan’s consolidation of his political power within the state apparatus, which started with the presidential election on June 24, 2018,…
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Q2
15/100
Does the country have an identifiable and effective parliamentary defence and security committee (or similar such organisations) to exercise oversight?
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There are two committees in parliament that are tasked with legislative oversight/monitoring in the fields of defence/security. These committees have formal duties during both…
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The National Defence Committee is chaired by AKP Member and former Minister of Defence Ismet Yilmaz [1]. The committee has two members with a…
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Since summer 2018, which marked the beginning of President Erdogan’s super presidency, both the National Defence Committee and the Security and Intelligence Committee have…
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Since summer 2018, the National Defence Committee has only had three official meetings, while the Security and Intelligence Committee has only had one meeting…
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Please note that through the oversight mechanisms of parliamentary investigation and parliamentary inquiry, the general assembly has full authority to conduct audits on the…
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This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’, given that the committe does not issue any recommendations. The only institutional oversight mechanism that the committees have…
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Q3
25/100
Is the country’s national defence policy or national security strategy debated and publicly available?
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The Secretary of the National Security Council, the state institution in charge of the development of the National Security Policy Document (MGSB), has been…
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After the coup on September 12, 1980, the institutionalisation of the ‘national security state’ reached its peak and, since summer 2018, President Erdogan’s cabinet…
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From time to time, the presidential palace and Ministry of Defence invite scholars and experts (mainly pro-government ones since the start of super presidency)…
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Please note that the three strategic documents presented above are classified as the ‘Cosmic Top Secret’ level of secrecy, meaning that even upper-mid level…
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Q4
8/100
Do defence and security institutions have a policy, or evidence, of openness towards civil society organisations (CSOs) when dealing with issues of corruption?
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As seen in the past 17 years since the AKP took office as a single-party government in 2002, the leadership style of President Erdoğan,…
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Civil society organisations and free media in Turkey are still active, but very weak. There are still some critical academicians, experts, retired bureuacrats and…
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There are some CSOs, such as Ankara-based SETA and ORSAM, producing in the fields of defence/security. Additionally, in parallel with the government’s increasing interest…
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Q5
63/100
Has the country signed up to the following international anti-corruption instruments: UNCAC and the OECD Convention?
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In the period 2016-2020, Turkey was the thirteenth largest exporter of major arms in the world as according to SIPRI [1].Turkey signed the United…
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The most recent UNCAC Compliance Review for Turkey was published in 2015 [1] and not a single report/review has been published since the beginning…
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Q6
38/100
Is there evidence of regular, active public debate on issues of defence? If yes, does the government participate in this debate?
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Outside government, there is occasional public debate among academics, journalists, opinion-formers and CSOs about defence issues. It should be noted that military subjects in…
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The defence industry and defence/security-related issues are good tools for producing success stories for President Erdogan to divert public attention at a time of…
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Q7
0/100
Does the country have an openly stated and effectively implemented anti-corruption policy for the defence sector?
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Turkey does not have a general anti-corruption or bribery law written specifically for the defence/security sector. However, other Turkish laws contain provisions on anti-corruption…
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Turkey does not have a general anti-corruption or bribery law written specifically for the defence and security sector. As such, this indicator is marked…
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Q8
0/100
Are there independent, well-resourced, and effective institutions within defence and security tasked with building integrity and countering corruption?
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There are no independent, well-resourced or effective institutions within the defence/security sector tasked with building integrity and countering corruption. There are currently two primary…
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This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’ as there are no such institutions in place. The Secretary of National Security and the State Supervisory Board…
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This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’ as there are no such institutions in place. According to Interviewee 4, who worked on military finance for…
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Q9
NS/100
Does the public trust the institutions of defence and security to tackle the issue of bribery and corruption in their establishments?
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This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. In almost all public surveys, the Turkish Armed Forces is rated among the top…
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Q10
0/100
Are there regular assessments of the areas of greatest corruption risk for ministry and armed forces personnel, and are the findings used as inputs to the anti-corruption policy?
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Interviewee 5 suggested that there are no regular assessments of the areas of greatest corruption risk, either at the Ministry of Defence or the…
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This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’ because, as explained in 10A, there is no regular schedule for risk assessments in the Ministry of Defence…
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This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’ because, as explained in 10A, there is no regular schedule for risk assessments in the Ministry of Defence…
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Defence Budgets
Q11
17/100
Does the country have a process for acquisition planning that involves clear oversight, and is it publicly available?
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Despite the declared strategic plans and the 10-year procurement programme, major procurement decisions have taken a very long time due to constant shifts in…
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Due to the fact that the entire process detailed above has ‘top secret’-level security clearance and these strategic procurement documents shaping Turkey’s procurement in…
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At least in theory, legislative oversight is required at each step of the acquisition planning and budget allocation processes, during the debates on the…
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Q12
63/100
Is the defence budget transparent, showing key items of expenditure? And it is provided to the legislature in a timely fashion?
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It is not easy to estimate how much Turkey spends on its defence/security sector and the military [1]. The headline figure for spending by…
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Article 5 of the Constitution states that budget approval is among the duties and responsibilities of parliament [1]. Article 15 assigns the preparation of…
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Q13
25/100
Is there a legislative committee (or other appropriate body) responsible for defence budget scrutiny and analysis in an effective way?
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The oversight of military spending must be analysed at each of its three levels: – legislative (Turkish Grand National Assembly), – executive (Government and…
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Interviewee 1 suggested that the National Security Council reviews the defence budget, in the form of questions asked to the Minister of Defence and…
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Q14
17/100
Is the approved defence budget made publicly available? In practice, can citizens, civil society, and the media obtain detailed information on the defence budget?
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In early October of each year, the budget for the subsequent year is delivered to parliament’s Planning and Budget Commission by the executive body…
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As exemplified by an article in Jane’s Defence Weekly [1], the most comprehensive open-source content about the defence budget only addresses the overall budget…
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Some journalists and researchers apply to the CIMER, the Presidential Information Request System, to get more information about the security/defence budget, but all requests…
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Q15
0/100
Are sources of defence income other than from central government allocation (from equipment sales or property disposal, for example) published and scrutinised?
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The sources of defence income other than the budget allocated by the central government are listed below: * Defense Industry Support Fund (Savunma Sanayi…
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* Law 3238 regulating the Defense Industry Support Fund and SSB activities does not contain a single article about oversight/monitoring mechanisms or about the…
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Overall, there is no CSO or NGO in Turkey that regularly monitors the means of defence income other than central government allocation. Since summer…
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Q16
13/100
Is there an effective internal audit process for defence ministry expenditure (that is, for example, transparent, conducted by appropriately skilled individuals, and subject to parliamentary oversight)?
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The central government defence budget has three main parts: the Ministry of Defence Budget, the Ministry of Internal Affairs Budget and the Presidential Covert…
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As explained above, the Turkish Armed Forces’ (TAF) internal audit is conducted by internal auditors of the Ministry of National Defence (MSB) working in…
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The Ministry of Finance has an Auditing Board formed under Law No. 5018 but, according to the law, the Ministry of Defence expenditure is…
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As explained above, the Financial Audit Department produces reports of the results of annual internal audit activities, which the department conducts in an on-call…
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Q17
13/100
Is there effective and transparent external auditing of military defence expenditure?
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The Court of Accounts (CoA), as the State’s external auditing body, audits military expenditure on behalf of the Grand National Assembly, but there are…
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Given the restrictions on and erosion of the independence of the CoA in the presidential system, detailed above, an important opportunity for transparency and…
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The most recent CoA report available online about the central government allocated defence budget is dated 2013 [1]. The CoA has not published a…
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In Turkish State tradition, the CoA has historically been a strong and well-respected judicial oversight mechanism. Despite the erosion of its reputation under the…
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Nexus of Defence and National Assets
Q18
67/100
Is there evidence that the country’s defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation and, if so, are these interests publicly stated and subject to scrutiny?
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There are some military-affiliated business entities, such as the Turkish Armed Forces Foundation (TSKGV) and the Turkish Military’s Trust and Pension Fund (OYAK), but…
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Based on open-source research and in-depth interviews, it can be suggested that there are not any military-affiliated companies operating in the fields of energy,…
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There is no evidence of defence personnel being involved in businesses associated with natural resources in Turkey. Article 28 of Law No. 657 on…
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This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’ as there is no evidence of defence institutions having financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural…
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Thsi indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’ as there is no evidence of defence institutions having financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural…
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Organised Crime
Q19
63/100
Is there evidence, for example through media investigations or prosecution reports, of a penetration of organised crime into the defence and security sector? If no, is there evidence that the government is alert and prepared for this risk?
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There is little evidence of the penetration of organised crime in Turkey’s military. However, there are some open-source reports of military personnel involvement in…
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Interviewees 4, 5 and 6 all unanimously agreed that both the government and the public institutions would be in a position to take action…
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Q20
0/100
Is there policing to investigate corruption and organised crime within the defence services and is there evidence of the effectiveness of this policing?
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The Turkish military has a City Military Police Command directly attached to the Garrison Commander, the most senior commander in any given city. The…
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As noted in 20A, although a policing function exists, they have no mandate over defence institutions, as such this indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’.…
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As noted in 20A, although a policing function exists, they have no mandate over defence institutions, as such this indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’.…
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Control of Intelligence Services
Q21
0/100
Are the policies, administration, and budgets of the intelligence services subject to effective and independent oversight?
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Besides presidential executive oversight and legal investigation in extreme cases, the intelligence agency in Turkey is practically immune to any legislative, judicial and executive…
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This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’ as there is no independent oversight of the intelligence services. It is almost impossible to publish anything about…
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Q22
33/100
Are senior positions within the intelligence services filled on the basis of objective selection criteria, and are appointees subject to investigation of their suitability and prior conduct?
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With Presidential Decree No. 694 [1], passed in August 2017, the National Intelligence Organization (MİT), which had formerly been an undersecretariat attached to the…
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It should be noted that, particuarly after the failed coup attempt on July 15, 2016, almost one third of National Intelligence Organization (MİT) personnel…
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The assessor could not find any reliable information to further elucidate this question. According to an open-source report, in August 2018, a change was…
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Export Controls
Q23
67/100
Does the government have a well-scrutinised process for arms export decisions that aligns with Articles 7.1.iv, 11.5, and 15.6 of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)?
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Turkey signed and ratified the ATT in July 2013 [1].
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As seen in the country profile on the ATT website [1], Turkey is compliant with Articles 7.1 iv, 11.5 and 15.6 of the ATT…
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Interviewees 1 and 3 suggested that the only authority for Turkish firms to get permission for arms exports is the SSB as the executive…
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Lobbying in Defence
Interviewees 2 and 3 suggested that there is no lobbying tradition or any mechanisms/entities fulfilling this service in Turkey as it they do in…
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This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’ because, as established in 76A, there is neither law nor regulation regulating lobbying in the field of defence…
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This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’ because, as established in 76A, there is neither law nor regulation regulating lobbying in the field of defence…
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This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’ because, as established in 76A, there is neither law nor regulation regulating lobbying in the field of defence…
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