Q25.

Is independent and transparent scrutiny of asset disposals conducted by defence establishments, and are the reports of such scrutiny publicly available?

25a. Scrutiny

Score

SCORE: 0/100

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25b. Independence

Score

SCORE: NA/100

Assessor Explanation

Assessor Sources

25c. Transparency

Score

SCORE: NA/100

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There is no evidence that asset disposal by the Ministry of Defence is scrutinized by an internal oversight body. The last country assessment came to the same conclusion (1) and no evidence was found in the official gazette that an oversight body has been established in the meantime (2). The only other information related to the control of assets is Executive Decree No. 92-371 of October 10, 1992. It stipulates the rules regarding the management of real estate allocated to the Ministry of Defence and properties under the authority of the ministry are inventoried by the Ministry of Defence (3). No further information could be found.

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable because there is no evidence that asset disposal by the Minstry of Defence is scrutinized by an internal oversight body, see the last country assessment (1) and laws passed since 2016 (2). Also, see answer 25A.

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable because there is no evidence that asset disposal by the Ministry of Defence is scrutinized by an internal oversight body, see the last country assessment (1) and laws passed since 2016 (2). Also, see answer 25A.

Generally, the inventory and disposal of public assets are regulated by the Law on Public Assets (Law 18/10 of August 6) (1). This explicitly includes military naval vessels, combat vehicles and other equipment of similar durability (Law 18/10, Art. 12) [1]. Public asset disposals fall under the same legal procedures as their acquisition – the public procurement law (1), under the oversight of the Audit Court and the National Procurement Service of the Finance Ministry. However, there is no evidence of effective and transparent scrutiny of asset disposals by any oversight body. Arms, military and police logistics are exempt under a secrecy clause (Law 18/10, Art. 7) (1). The inventory and disposal of military defence and intelligence services assets fall under a special regime managed by the armed forces and the intelligence services (Law 18/10, Art. 84) (1).

Recently, according to a Maka Angola article, in 2017 the Finance Minister Archer Mangueira authorized the selling of three light aircraft to three private companies (SJL – Aeronáutica, EAPA and Air Jet) (2). Two of the companies are owned by two current senior officials (one is President João Lourenço’s brother), and one by a former senior military official. According to Maka Angola, no public tender took place, and the transaction violated the Law on Public Probity. Meanwhile, the national director of national assets of the Finance Ministry claimed a public tender took place and the sales were legal (2), (3).

Undue influence by the military or the executive on asset disposal scrutiny is likely to be a common feature of asset disposals (1), (2).

Audit reports on asset disposals are not available to the public (1), (2).

There is no evidence concerning military disposals. However, the GAN 2016 report states that “Businesses dealing with public procurement in Burkina Faso are faced with high corruption risks. Corruption in the form of facilitation payments, bribery and preferential treatment in procurement deals is common (GCR 2014-2015) (2). The people of Burkina Faso rank procurement officials among the government staff who commonly engage in corruption (ICS 2016). Procurement procedures are not always respected; in certain tenders, contract conditions are not clearly defined (GI 2016) (2). The Autorité de Régulation de la Commande Publique (ARCOP) is responsible for monitoring the execution of all government contracts and ensuring transparency and fairness of in the process (ICS 2016). ARCOP works closely with the media, which substantially increased the latter’s ability to report on high-profile corruption cases (ICS 2016). Furthermore, reports suggest that several public contracts have been awarded without a tender, but merely through mutual agreement (GI 2016). The percentage of tenders awarded no tender increased from 14% in 2014 to 18.5% in 2015, indicating a decrease in the levels of transparency in public procurement (GI 2016). However, when tenders are publicized, private and state-owned companies compete on equal terms and conditions, yet public enterprises have a monopoly over the segment in which they are active (ICS 2016). Companies found guilty of violating procurement regulations are prohibited from participating in future bids (GI 2016) (1).

Article 174: Every public purchase contract shall be subject to supervision, control, monitoring and supervision of its administrative, technical and financial execution. These missions are carried out by the Contracting Authority and the Central Procurement Directorate. The various clauses of the administrative and technical clauses set the conditions and the modalities of the exercise of these missions (2).

Article 175: Independently of these controls, the execution of any public order is submitted to the various bodies of inspection and control of the State. Article 176: Periodic external audits may be organized as necessary on the initiative of the Central Directorate of Public Procurement (2).

Because there is no scrutiny of asset disposals, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

Because there is no scrutiny of asset disposals, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

Although there are several organs with the authority to audit state institutions, including defence and security, there is no evidence that these institutions have been audited for asset disposals over the past five years. Constitutionally, scrutiny of defence and security matters falls under the authority of the executive and this is carried out at the discretion of the Head of State, who is also the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (Article 35 of Law No. 96-06 of 18 January 1996) [1]. There is also no evidence that civil society has played an effective oversight role in scrutinising defence and security, whose processes are often labelled as matters of national security [2].

In addition, the most recent budget did not present individual sources of non-tax revenue in the Executive’s Budget Proposal, which confirms the fact that there is hardly any scrutiny [3].

There is no evidence that defence and asset disposals are subject to any form of scrutiny or oversight [1] [2]. Therefore, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

There is no audit report on the military and other security institutions in the annual budget for 2017 [1]. Therefore, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

The procedure for disposing of arms and ammunition is subject to the controls of ComNat-ALPC, a coordinating body of the Ministry of the Interior. There is no evidence that asset disposals carried out by the ComNat-ALPC are audited by the Cour des Comptes (Supreme Audit Court) or by the NA. However, part of the responsibility of the ComNat-ALPC is to raise public awareness about the need to control the circulation of arms and ammunition. Because the first and second phases of ComNat-ALPC activities have been financed by the government of Japan, it is in theory subject to the scrutiny of the Embassy of Japan (1). Additionally, scrutiny might be carried out by the Comptroller General, the Commissariat des Armées, the Inspection générale des Armées, the Inspection générale d’Etat or the Cour des Comptes.

Given the tension and rivalry within the government of President Ouattara, it is inevitable that some of the more problematic asset disposal activities of the ComNat-ALPC are subject to undue pressure by the executive and high-ranking officials. Further, the informal pressure from the former rebel leaders known as COMZONES likely regularly undermines the independent scrutiny of assets disposals. For example, a video uploaded to the Ivoire Business website in 2013 allegedly showed decommissioned armoured vehicles, pickup trucks and cars that now belong to the former rebel leader known as Wattao. Though dated, it illustrates how Investigating such instances of illicit decommissioning of assets would likely result in “undue pressure” (1).

There is no evidence that the coordinating body, ComNat-ALPC, makes its audit reports on the disposal of arms and ammunition publicly available. However, Ivorian media coverage of asset disposals coordinated by ComNat-ALPC often provides details about the number and types of machine guns, sub-machine guns, ammunition, explosives, vehicles, license plates, and other things that have been seized or destroyed.
For example, the ComNat-ALPC destroyed a cache of 360 small arms in the region of Soubré from 12 to 15 September 2017. The stockpile had been initially seized by a court of law in Soubré during a judicial investigation. Before their destruction by ComNat-ALPC, they were registered in a database of destroyed arms set up by UNDP. A ComNat-ALPC spokesperson explained that the arms had been separated by type, then registered in the database and then destroyed, as per Article 17 of the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms (1). In an interview with Abidjan-based Fratmat.info in April 2018, the President of the ComNat-ALPC, Kouadio Yao, provided details about the decommissioning of arms within the forest reserve of Goin Débé in the region of Cavally. In 3 months, ComNat-ALPC collected 600 arms and 5,000 rounds of ammunition from locals in the region (2).

The two bodies that might have some formal oversight powers over asset disposal are the parliament and the CAA. This Parliament has very limited powers vis-a-vis the National Defence Council (1), (2). This Parliament has never summoned the minister of defence for questioning despite summoning most of the other ministers, including the minister of interior (3). As for the CAA, it is very unclear the extent to which asset disposals are subject to external audits, but the complaints of the former chief auditor Hisham Geneina shows that whatever formal legal powers the CAA might have over the defence sector, it does not translate to real power. Geneina in April 2013 before the military power takeover said: “the economic projects, companies, social clubs and hospital of the ‘sovereign entities’ are not subject to the scrutiny of the CAA.” (4). This statement was given in 2013 before the current reporting period however, all the development since shows only indicate that the CAA has fewer powers in auditing military defence expenditure, especially the increasing power of the president and the executive over the CAA manifested in the law passed by al-Sisi granting himself the power to remove the head of the CAA (5).

According to our sources, both the executive (which is mostly made up of former military officers) and the military undermines the work of the oversight agencies. Although there are laws (1) that provide oversight agencies with the right to scrutinize the military, they have been sidelined by passing other laws that give the military special status against scrutiny (2), (3), (4). The wide powers granted to the military and the executive undermine scrutiny by the audit body over asset disposals, and even if the CAA has formal powers to audit, they do translate to a real power to audit asset disposal in the defence sector. For example, there are secret budgets (1) that are exempted from financial regulations and scrutiny when it comes to tenders (5) and any arms-related contracts (6).

According to our sources, there are no such reports available internally in the MoD in principles. Therefore, the public will not have reports that do not exist (1), (2), (3). There are no external audit reports on asset disposals due to the restrictions imposed on the CAA concerning the defence sector.

Asset disposals are scrutinised by an audit body the Public Procurement Board they are scrutinised to meet a set of minimum regulations. Scrutiny after contract approval has been criticised as sporadic and often superficial (1), (2), (3), (4), (5). For example, in February 2017, soldiers complained that their senior officer had sold off military land to private developers with no intervention from officers of a higher rank (6).

On paper, the military has a thorough process for asset disposal; armaments are destroyed. The disposal of assets that are not armaments is governed by a board within the armed forces, which follows the laws that govern the armed forces. However, there is no public evidence that asset disposal is independent of any other sections of the services, particularly arms disposals (1), (2).

The Public Accounts Committee of Parliament scrutinises the Auditor General’s Report that covers the disposal of assets within the Ministry of Defence. Those reports are made public to Parliament, and they are indicated in the annual budget and budget adjustment bills, but they are not extensively detailed (1), (2).

No single body can be identified as the body tasked with the responsibility of Iraq’s asset disposal practices, but that is not to deny the existence of various oversight bodies; the COI, FBSA and the largely defunct Ombusban Institution (1). However, in the absence of reliable information, the interaction of these agencies with procurement officials in managing or scrutinising asset disposals is not known.
The FBSA’s ability to conduct checks and monitor expenses and payment to contractors (2) hinges on its ability to maintain independence from the respective governmental ministry department and limited interagency cooperation. Provided that both the FBSA and the COI report to the CoR, their ability to act independently has been in doubt, owing to the alleged exploitation of constitutional powers by the council’s members, acting as the highest executive branch of government which, alongside the PM, have the final say over the appointments of the Judicial Supreme Court (3). Criminal proceedings in Iraq are activated only under the CoR’s approval (3). Ties forged by members of the CoR to powerful militias and rivals of the Iraqi state (4), as one interviewee told Transparency “are swayed by political or material incentives which has historically culminated in abuses of power (5).

The data sought out by the FBSA and its sister bodies, including the COI, is not always readily available, an obstacle that discernibly undermines its scrutinising powers in and beyond the defence and security sector (1).

Various international monitoring agencies including Amnesty International (2) have reported on the unlawful seizure of Iraqi army stockpiles by paramilitary outfits for committing war crimes and reprisals, which suggests lax controls facilitating the theft, seizure and transportation of state weapons by sub-state actors (2) which further undermines the ability of relevant stage agencies. A case in point comments that COR member Ahmad al Asadi has vocalised in favour of salary payments to PMF recruits equal to those army soldiers receive, while some were receiving both salaries from Baghdad and Iran (3).

A military expert (4) interviewed stated for this assessment explains that “as the rule of law stands, the responsibility of approving asset disposal fall squarely on the current commander-in-chief of the armed forces; Iraqi premier Adel Abdul Mahdi” (5). Outgoing PM Abadi previously announced a difficult task of launching an arms inventory of Iraqi stocks following calls from the country’s highest clerical leadership; Ayatollah Ali al Sistani’s Office.

Little evidence of scrutiny could be found but recent in light of ‘non-public disclosure’ of sensitive defence information. Recent reports disclose the seizure of scrap metal from vehicles and other metal debris in Mosul by PMF security forces. An investigation by Reuters discovered that the “PMF have made millions of dollars from the sale of anything from wrecked cars and damaged weapons” (6). While this does not offer direct evidence of asset disposal scrutiny it suggests that gains on assets seized or disposed of by the PMF are out of central state control. What this demonstrates is the absence of an effective system of asset disposal, in-built scrutiny within that and, a disposal doctrine and standards instructing armed forces.

In light of the above information, it can be said that warnings of weak arms controls, while heeded by the GOI, have done little to ensure either transparency or strict central control of weapons arsenals (7) [969]. The need to introduce such controls may be telling of asset disposal and the overall management of surplus defence equipment.

Reports that divulge information and details of asset disposal are not available online. Nevertheless, some details are leaked live on television. The widely watched ‘Single Word’ Television programme presented by Ahmad Mullah Talal on Shariqiyya (1) revealed that the latest MoD defence auction yielded a total of 50 million IQD. These proceeds, are leaked, rather than being issued by a state-sanctioned government department/agency. As various sources make clear, weapons and equipment are distributed exclusively by the MoD as the “sole supplier of the Iraqi security system” (2). In spite of this, it’s official website does not disclose asset disposal guidelines or procedural rules.

There is no evidence that asset disposal within the defence sector is scrutinised by an oversight body of any form. In fact, the list of audited entities by the Jordanian Audit Bureau excludes the Ministry of Defence, the Armed Forces and all commercial entities associated with the Armed Forces such as the King Abdullah II Design and Development Bureau (KADDB) [1]. In addition to that, defence sector income is not declared or included in the final governmental financial annual accounts [2]. Media and news reporting sporadically mentions instances of sales or disposal of defence assets, which shows that there is activity in relation to the disposal of defence assets in the country [3, 4, 5] but these are not reported or accounted for by neither the Audit Bureau, the Ministry of Finance or any other entity that could possibly exercise such oversight.

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable because, as explained in the previous sub-indicator, there is no audit body overseeing asset disposal within the defence sector [1]. The fact that there is no entity that exercises scrutiny over asset disposal by the defence establishment means that assessing independence is irrelevant.

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable because in Jordan there is no entity/unit within the Government that is responsible for reporting or oversight over defence sector asset disposal. There is, however, a committee within the armed forces responsible for that. The official page of the House of Representatives in Jordan includes several reports presented to the legislature by the Audit Bureau [1]. However, none of these includes information on defence asset disposal. There are no comprehensive audit reports on asset disposals by the defence sector, and there is not an effectual defence ministry in the country. On the list of audited entities by the Audit Bureau there is no mention of any defence-associated entities [2, 4, 5]. In addition to that, the annual financial reporting carried out by the Ministry of Finance does not cover either defence income or expenditure [3].

Both the military and the executive branch undermine the internal audits in general and not just the ones concerning audit disposals, auditors said (1, 2 and 3). The SAB has been publicly complaining for years about the failings of the internal audits in Government agencies, and SAB officials say these audits tend to be missing key facts, and the organisations almost never respond to demands for more information. (4, 5 and 6).

The military and the police also happen to be full of officers related to the royal family, which makes them particularly uncooperative with auditors, the auditors said.

This interference is one of the main reasons why the SAB often says that the internal auditing system in many Government facilities are weak (and underqualified), and that its auditors are frequently ignored and stonewalled in its annual reports, they added. The SAB does not name them usually so as not to embarrass the country’s security leader, they said.

Both the military and the executive branch undermine the independence of both the internal auditors and the external auditors, the aforementioned officials said (1, 2 and 3).

The internal auditors are particularly easy to threaten because they are legally under the control of the Defence and Interior Ministers. External auditors who are interested in scrutinising deals are often threatened with arrest, among other things, by individuals from the military or the executive branch, they said.

The end result is that Kuwaiti auditors are often too intimidated to scrutinise these deals. But a brave few do manage to get some of the job done.

(Many auditors are demoralised and passive towards corruption because they believe there is no serious political will to fight and so they are not willing to put their jobs on the line to fight a losing battle, officials said.)

Also, there has been a rumour making the rounds in Kuwait about auditors getting assaulted and verbally abused in unnamed Government agencies when they asked to view their records since 2016. Waleed al-Tabtabaki, a lawmaker, formally asked the Finance Minister to respond to these claims in May 2018 (4).

Both the internal and external audit reports are never made public, auditors said (1, 2 and 3). The external bodies like the SAB, however, address these issues in their final report about the financial year as a whole, and they rarely address specific issues in the security and defence sector, to spare the public embarrassment, officials said. This annual report has to come out before the end of October each year, and it has never been late, the officials and activists said (4, 5 and 6). These reports are, however, comprehensive but they do not address corruption clearly in each institution. They almost never talk about the defence and security sector in a critical manner (7, 8 and 9).

No evidence of an exclusive audit body to oversee the asset disposal was found (1). According to a source, asset disposal takes place with the approval of the Council of Ministers through a ministerial decree (2). The LAF has disposed of heavy military equipment and but not light weapons (2). However, it is important to note that scrutiny exists at the level of the LAF, as opposed to the legislative level (3). LAF’s Logistics Brigade and Directorate (J4) are one of the most sensitive to systems and assets’ improper allocation, use, accounting, or disposal(3). For instance, the LAF is gradually phasing out its small arms based around the AK-47 and the AK-74 legacy Warsaw Pact weapons (3). Those systems/assets are being kept in secure stockpiles, until the LAF finds a suitable arrangement to dispose of them without proliferation risks (3).

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable, as no exclusive governmental audit body to oversee the asset disposal of the LAF was found (1). However, it is important to note the high level of cautiousness over asset controls amid the absence of active and effective government and/or parliamentary scrutiny.

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable, as no evidence of an exclusive governmental audit body that publishes reports for the public was found (1).

The assessor did not find any information relating to asset disposals with regard to the defence and security sector. Indeed, the Malian government’s own evaluation of the 2015 budget notes that “there were no asset disposals” during the year.[12] The report goes on to state that the public body responsible for managing state resources and assets, the Direction Générale de l’Administration des Biens de l’État (DGABE), failed to meet its objective that year. The goal had been to implement the programme of reforming public sector organisations. But the document records that the DGABE was unable to survey or evaluate existing assets within the public sector due to a “lack of financial means”.[12]
The body that would be tasked with auditing such disposals would be the BVG, which has 17 agents and which publishes annual reports evaluating the government’s various spending programmes and budgets. But the BVG’s last published report came in 2015 and made no mention of defence spending.[7] The failure to publish any subsequent reports or to address the defence budget by the body supposed to monitor accountants and administrators highlights the lack of external oversight. As the World Bank points out, the BVG has not specifically reviewed Ministry of Defence accounts, and only an aggregate administrative account is transmitted to the auditor when the annual budget is examined.[3,4]
Recent reports by the IMF and by the World Bank make no mention of asset disposals in the context of the Malian military.[2,3,4,10,11] Similarly, previous analyses of the Malian defence sector by Transparency International, RAND and SIPRI do not contain any information concerning the disposal of defence assets.[5,6,9] The websites of the Malian armed forces, the Malian government and the BVG do not contain any information about asset disposal in the defence sector either[1,7,8].

Because asset disposals are not scrutinised by an oversight body of any form, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

The body that would be tasked with auditing such disposals would be the BVG, which has 17 agents and which publishes annual reports evaluating the government’s various spending programmes and budgets. But the BVG’s last published report came in 2015 and made no mention of defence spending.3 The failure to publish any subsequent reports or to address the defence budget by the body supposed to monitor accountants and administrators highlights the lack of external oversight. As the World Bank points out, the BVG has not specifically reviewed Ministry of Defence accounts, and only an aggregate administrative account is transmitted to the auditor when the annual budget is examined.1,2
When the IMF demanded an audit of the off-budget purchase of a new presidential jet in 2014, the BVG led the investigation (see 16C). But the BVG never received access to the plane’s operating contract, highlighting the limited ability of independent and external audit bodies to perform their functions in the face of opposition from the executive and/or the military.4

Because asset disposals are not scrutinised by an oversight body of any form, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

The body that would be tasked with auditing such disposals, were they to take place in a formal manner, would be the BVG. The BVG has 17 agents and publishes annual reports evaluating the government’s various spending programmes and budgets. But the BVG’s last published report came in 2015 and made no mention of defence spending [12]. The failure to publish any subsequent reports or to address the defence budget by the body supposed to monitor accountants and administrators highlights the lack of transparency relating to defence activities. As the World Bank points out, the BVG has not specifically reviewed Ministry of Defence accounts, and only an aggregate administrative account is transmitted to the auditor when the annual budget is examined [8,9].
When the IMF demanded an audit of the off-budget purchase of a new presidential jet in 2014, the BVG led the investigation (see 16C). But the BVG never received access to the plane’s operating contract, highlighting the limited ability of independent and external audit bodies to perform their functions in the face of opposition from the executive and/or the military.²²
Recent reports by the IMF and by the World Bank make no mention of asset disposals in the context of the Malian military [7,8,9,16,18]. Similarly, previous analyses of the Malian defence sector by Transparency International, RAND and SIPRI no do contain any information concerning the disposal of defence assets [10,11,14]. The websites of the Malian armed forces, the Malian government and the BVG do not contain any information about asset disposal in the defence sector [3,12,13]
Moreover, the current government’s major reform programme for the armed forces (LOPM), which was adopted by the National Assembly in May 2015, does not contain any mention of formal systems for asset disposals, underlining the lack of attention paid to the subject [17]. The LOPM provides for USD2.3 billion of investment for the armed forces and is set to recruit an additional 10,000 personnel between 2015 and 2019 [17].

There is little to no information publicly available about the process of asset disposal.

Recent official and press statements on anti-corruption fail to mention the process of asset disposal within the Moroccan armed forces, or the armed forces in general (1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6).

This process was also left unaddressed by official public bodies that might be in charge of asset disposal processes, such as the Ministry of Finance, the National Audit Office or the Royal Treasury (7)(8).

Interviewees argue that this lack of evidence indicates a lack of transparency, which in turn could imply risks of corruption (9)(10).

Almost no information is available about the clear process of asset disposal. In Morocco’s anti-corruption legislation or other related articles, there is no clear statement on how to dispose of assets within the Moroccan army. The absence of independent scrutiny could also be explained by the fact that the King is the head of the military, and that the defence administration (lead by a Minister in charge of defence, but not a dedicated Defence Minister) remains strongly controlled by the Palace. .

Because there is little to no information publicly available about the process of asset disposal, this sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

Recent official and press statements on anti-corruption fail to mention the process of asset disposal within the Moroccan armed forces, or the armed forces in general (1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6).

This process was also left unaddressed by official public bodies that might be in charge of asset disposal processes, such as the Ministry of Finance, the National Audit Office or the Royal Treasury (7)(8).

Interviewees argue that this lack of evidence indicates a lack of transparency, which in turn could imply risks of corruption (9)(10).

Almost no information is available about the clear process of asset disposal. In Morocco’s anti-corruption legislation or other related articles, there is no clear statement on how to dispose of assets within the Moroccan army. The absence of independent scrutiny could also be explained by the fact that the King is the head of the military, and that the defence administration (lead by a Minister in charge of defence, but not a dedicated Defence Minister) remains strongly controlled by the Palace.

As there is little to no information publicly available about the process of asset disposal, this sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

Recent official and press statements on anti-corruption fail to mention the process of asset disposal within the Moroccan armed forces, or the armed forces in general (1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6).

This process was also left unaddressed by official public bodies that might be in charge of asset disposal processes, such as the Ministry of Finance, the National Audit Office or the Royal Treasury (7)(8).

Interviewees argue that this lack of evidence indicates a lack of transparency, which in turn could imply risks of corruption (9)(10).

Almost no information is available about the clear process of asset disposal. In Morocco’s anti-corruption legislation or other related articles, there is no clear statement on how to dispose of assets within the Moroccan army. The absence of independent scrutiny could also be explained by the fact that the King is the head of the military, and that the defence administration (lead by a Minister in charge of defence, but not a dedicated Defence Minister) remains strongly controlled by the Palace.

There is little to no information publicly available about the audit process of asset disposal (1). According to an interviewee, there is an internal commission (audit body) that ensures control of weapons and vehicles disposal; this process depends on the Chief of the General Staff of the Armies (2). This information could not be verified through a different source; therefore, a score of 0 is the most appropriate here.

The assessor found no evidence of a functioning audit body or of military or executive undermining scrutiny by the audit regarding asset disposals (1).

There is little to no information publicly available about the audit process of asset disposal, should there be any. However, according to an interviewee, data regarding the number of weapons seized may be available on the request from the relevant institution. According to the Small Arms Survey report (2017), it should also be noted that currently Niger has limited capacity and resources to assist with international tracing requests. Nigerien authorities have not sent out any tracing requests to other national authorities. The lack of a central registry of lost or stolen weapons makes domestic tracing difficult (1). 

The Committee on Audit of Defence Equipment Procurement (CADEP) under the authority of the president was created to audit defence equipment procurement from 2007 to 2015. It has made few indictments including, two ex-army chiefs and a former minister. It is not clear if the disposal of special goods and services involving defence and security receive any scrutiny since, under Section 15 (2) of the PPA 2007, they are excluded from the process under the act unless the president approves (1). Since the disposal of defence and security assets are under the president’s authority, there is no evidence to justify it being scrutinised. The committee is set up to audit defence procurement from 2007 to 2015, which looks more as a special mission not free and independent committee to scrutinise present and future disposals of defence assets (2).

Because asset disposals are not scrutinised by an oversight body, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

Because asset disposals are not scrutinised by an oversight body, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

There is no internal or external scrutiny mechanism for asset disposal. The process follows the flawed regulations and policies, and the final report is sent to the commanders or head of units. There is no transparency regarding the disposal of assets. No scrutiny procedures were located on the Ministry of Defence website (1). Moreover, the tender board mentioned on the MoD Secretary-General website has no details about its work or actions beyond its name (2). As discussed in sub-indicators 1A-C, the elected al-Shura is not mandated to address issues of defence, this extends to expenditure and financial scrutiny (3). Reference is made to the State Audit Institution capacity to provide independent scrutiny; however, there is a lack of detailed information about the STI mandate in the defence sector (4). There is no clear evidence that an oversight body dedicated to scrutinizing asset disposals exist (5), (6).

This sub-indicator has been marked as Not Applicable, because there is no body to scrutinise defence asset disposals.

As there is no scrutiny mechanism, there is no way for it to be undermined by the executive or the military itself (1), (2). As set out above, there is no audit board scrutinising asset disposal (3), (4), (5). In the absence of an audit board, it is not possible to comment if the military or the executive regularly undermine such a body.

This sub-indicator has been marked as Not Applicable, because there is no body to scrutinise defence asset disposals.

As there is no scrutiny mechanism, there is no way for it to be undermined by the executive or the military itself (1), (2). As set out above, there is no audit board scrutinising asset disposal (3), (4), (5). In the absence of an audit board, it is not possible to comment if the military or the executive regularly undermine such a body.

The State Audit and Administrative Control Bureau, the Department of General Supplies, and the military auditing unit within the MoF control and audit asset disposal in Palestine (1). The SAACB conducts annual or bi-annual inspections on internal reports, the MoF department is engaged with the process as well (2), the regularity of and the depth of oversight are superficial, accountability is also absent in the case of corruption findings (3).

The SAACB, and the military auditing unit within the MoF, are independent of the national forces but the SAACB is part of the MOF (2). They are subject to political influence from the executive in case of misconduct (1). As most of the auditing is superficial, there are only rare incidents that the audits generate serious recommendations. According to an officer from the SAACB, the audits are superficial, and when an institution is checked, they are informed beforehand of the SAACB’s arrival to prepare the inspection. Furthermore, according to the source, a phone call from the head of a security agency to the head of the SAACB, all issues will be buried (1).

There are no reports published other than the annual report of the State Audit and Administrative Control Bureau (1). The annual report of 2017 focused in the security/military section on the use of military circles for private use by officers. The report shows that it does not have in-depth access to the security apparatuses financial system auditing (the internal unit). Access to internal reports on auditing is simple.

There is not an independent body mandated to scrutinise defence asset disposals. There is no information available about any regulations or processes for asset disposals, and asset disposals are not made available to the public. Neither the State’s Audit Bureau nor the Administrative Control and Transparency Authority has the power to scrutinise defence assets disposal [3,4,5].

This sub-indicator has been marked as Not Applicable, as there is no independent body mandated to scrutinise defence asset disposals [1,2].

There is no information available about any regulations or processes for asset disposals, and asset disposals are not made available to the public. Neither the State’s Audit Bureau nor the Administrative Control and Transparency Authority has the power to scrutinise defence assets disposal [3,4].

This sub-indicator has been marked as Not Applicable, as there is no independent body mandated to scrutinise defence asset disposals [1,2].

Defence institutions in Qatar are not subject to any external form of audit or scrutiny, and therefore, there are very few audit reports on asset disposal for the public. There is no information about audits within the defence sector on the official webpages of the Ministry of Finance, the State’s Audit Bureau, or the Administrative Control and Transparency Authority [1,2]. There is no transparency in relation to asset disposals, and audit reports on asset disposals are not made available to the public [3,4,5].

According to our sources, there is a defined process of scrutiny by an internal unit, but the process in itself is superficial (1). The external relevant body that would be tasked with this is the General Auditing Bureau, which has, in theory, a mandate to audit all government bodies and departments (2). Nonetheless, in practice, it does not have access to full information relating to the activities of military and security agencies. This is especially the case given that the Ministry of Defence is tightly controlled by Saudi de facto leader Mohammed bin Salman, who became minister of defence in January 2015 (3).

This sub-indicator is Not Applicable because asset disposals only superficially scrutinised by an oversight body.

The internal unit that is responsible for oversight and scrutiny of the asset disposal is not independent, and the external body, the General Auditing Bureau is not(practically) have access to the MoD informations and data(6,7).

This sub-indicator is Not Applicable because asset disposals only superficially scrutinised by an oversight body.

Although there are some internal reports which are produced, there are none of these reports are made publicly available for the public or media. These reports are kept private; with the auditing unit, the only unit allowed access to it (1), (2).

According to our sources, there is a very clear and defined monitoring and follow-up mechanism for more than one institution (Ministry of Finance, MoD, and the Auditing units at the officeof the Prime Minsiter) that scrutinises the asset disposal at a different level. They have the capacity and the power to stop, intervene and investigate any asset disposals. The process happens either annually or based on the oversight institutions schedule. Sometimes they conduct a surprise auditing and scrutinise the process of asset disposal (1,2) . In addition to the concerned department at the Ministry of Defence, specialised departments of the Ministry of State Properties and Land Affairs are responsible for asset disposal in terms of monitoring, following-up and keeping statistics of these properties, as well as for selling them when they become unusable. The Public Services General Control (under the authority of the President of the Government) and the Court of an Audit can also intervene in the scrutiny of such matters.

According to our sources, neither the executive nor the military has made any effort to unduly influence the process of asset disposal or the scrutinisation of it. As the number of scrutinisation institutes is high, there is no way that one institute would try to intervene. (1,2)

According to our sources, there are no auditing reports of asset disposal made public and available. (1,2)This is because most of the reports are internal.

There is no external auditing or a body that audits defence expenditure and income from asset disposal. There is an internal reporting mechanism, but it is not considered auditing or oversight. Although the SAI is mandated to audit all governmental departments, research has revealed that since the SAI reports to the FNC, it undermines its authority, mainly since the FNC does not provide a role of oversight or scrutiny. As the evidence suggests, defence institutions have not gone through an external audit (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), in general, it can be concluded that there is no oversight body in any form that does scrutinize asset disposals.

This sub-indicator has been marked as Not Applicable, as with the lack of existence of a body to scrutinise defence asset disposal, an assessment of independence is not relevant in the context of the UAE.

It has been established that defence institutions, generally, do not go through scrutiny in any form, and particularly concerning asset disposal (Q25A). In the absence of a body tasked with scrutinising asset disposal within defence institutions, it is not possible to comment on whether the military or the executive regularly undermine such a body (1), (2).

This sub-indicator is marked Not Applicable because, in the absence of an entity that is tasked with scrutiny over defence budgets, expenditure and asset disposal an assessment of transparency of results is irrelevant in this context.

Country Sort by Country 25a. Scrutiny Sort By Subindicator 25b. Independence Sort By Subindicator 25c. Transparency Sort By Subindicator
Algeria 0 / 100 NA NA
Angola 0 / 100 NA 0 / 100
Burkina Faso 0 / 100 NA NA
Cameroon 0 / 100 NA NA
Cote d'Ivoire 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Egypt 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Ghana 25 / 100 0 / 100 25 / 100
Iraq 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Jordan 0 / 100 NA NA
Kuwait 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Lebanon 0 / 100 NA NA
Mali 0 / 100 NA NA
Morocco 0 / 100 NA NA
Niger 0 / 100 NA 0 / 100
Nigeria 0 / 100 NA NA
Oman 0 / 100 NA NA
Palestine 25 / 100 50 / 100 0 / 100
Qatar 0 / 100 NA NA
Saudi Arabia 0 / 100 NA NA
Tunisia 100 / 100 100 / 100 0 / 100
United Arab Emirates 0 / 100 NA NA

With thanks for support from the UK Department for International Development and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs who have contributed to the Government Defence Integrity Index.

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