Q77.

Is comprehensive data on actual spending on defence published during the budget year?

77a. Proactive publication

Score

SCORE: 0/100

Assessor Explanation

Assessor Sources

77b. Comprehensiveness

Score

SCORE: NA/100

Assessor Explanation

Assessor Sources

77c. Timeliness

Score

SCORE: NA/100

Assessor Explanation

Assessor Sources

77d. Comparison against budget

Score

SCORE: NA/100

Assessor Explanation

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Relevant comparisons

No information could be found that the government publishes data on the actual defence spending during the budget year. A review of the laws and decrees published in the Official Gazette since 2016 showed no evidence that such information is provided to the public (1). As has been outlined in previous questions, the government only provides aggregated figures in the Finance Law (2). (3), (4).

This sub-indicator is scored Not Applicable because no information could be found that the government publishes data on actual defence spending during the budget year in either the Official Gazette (1) or the Finance Laws (2), (3), (4). Thus, the comprehensiveness cannot be assessed.

This sub-indicator is scored Not Applicable because no information could be found that the government publishes data on the actual defence spending during the budget year in either the Official Gazette (1) or the Finance Laws (2), (3), (4). Thus, the timeliness cannot be assessed.

This sub-indicator is scored Not Applicable because no information could be found that the government publishes data on the actual defence spending during the budget year in either the Official Gazette (1) or the Finance Laws (2), (3), (4). Thus, a comparison against the budget cannot be assessed.

The Ministry of Finance publishes the budget online in a disaggregated form (1). The budget is accompanied by an explanation intended for experts; however, despite publishing the Citizen Budget in 2016 (2), Angola failed to do so for 2017 and 2018.

The vast majority of actual spending is fully disclosed. For instance, spending in the 2018 Budget is divided into six sections: business activity, functions, programmes, support to development, investments, and budget unit (1).

According to the 2017 Open Budget Survey, both Angola’s legislature and supreme audit institution provide weak oversight during the budget cycle (score below 41 out of 100) (2).

Details of actual spending are published more than twelve months after the end of the financial year. In fact, at the time of writing Parliament has not yet adopted the Year-End report (Conta Geral do Estado) for FY 2016 (1).

The Year-End report for 2016 (Conta Geral Do Estado) was produced for internal use only (1).

Details of actual spending are published online in aggregated form.[1] The budget is accompanied by an explanation in a language intended for non-experts (Budget Citoyen).[2] These documents have been retrieved from the Collaborative Africa Budget Reform Initiative (CABRI), due to the Ministry of Finance’s website being inaccessible at the time of writing (August 2018).

The vast majority of actual spending is not disclosed, without there being clear justification for this. For instance, the 2018 spending for the MoD is divided into five sections: training and deployment of forces (Préparation et emploi des forces), equipment (Equipement des forces), support for public security and civil protection (Appui à la sécurité publique et à la protection civile), reinforcement of military-nation relations (Renforcement du lien Armée-Nation), steering and support (Pilotage et soutien).

With regards to the Ministry of Security, the same document provides information on the actual spending for three sections: state security (Sureté de l’Etat), internal security (Sécurité intérieure), management (Pilotage et soutien des services du Ministère de la Sécurité).

According to the 2017 Open Budget Survey, Burkina Faso’s legisalture provides adequate (score 62 out of 100) oversight during the formulation stage of the budget cycle and weak oversight (score 26 out of 100) during the implementation stage. The supreme audit institution (Cour des Comptes) provides weak oversight (score 17 out of 100).[1]

Details of actual spending are published more than twelve months after the end of the financial year. For instance, the last Year-End Report available online refers to the FY 2013 and was published on April 2016.[1]

No information on actual spending for FY 2016 or FY 2017 is publicly available.

The Presidency of the Republic of Cameroon publishes the budget online in aggregated form [1].

Information on actual defence spending is provided in a highly aggregated form. No information is provided beyond the total amount of resources that are allocated to the MoD. For 2018 these amounted to 238,910 million FCFA [1].

Cameroon usually publishes the Year-End Report (Settlement Law) within six months after the end of the financial year [1].

For 2016, the difference between budget and actual expenditure was negligible as actual expenditure stood at 99.07% of the defence budget [1]. Therefore this indicator is marked Not Applicable.

The secretary of state in charge for the budget and the state portfolio (Secretariat d’État Auprés du Premier Ministre Chargé du Budget et du Portfeuille de l’État) proactively publishes the budget online in a disaggregated form (1). The publication is accompanied by an explanation intended for experts (2).

The vast majority of actual spending is disclosed. For instance, the 2018 Budget (Loi de Finances Portant Budget de l’État Pour l’Année 2018) is divided into 9 sections: general administration, army, aviation, navy, security and police, military police, republican guard, prisons, civil protection and firefighters (1). According to the 2017 Open Budget Survey, the legislature and the supreme audit institution of Côte d’Ivoire provide a weak oversight (a score below 41 out of 100) during the budget cycle (2).

Details of actual spending are published within twelve months of the end of the financial year (1).

For 2016, no difference was reported between the budget and the actual spending (1). Therefore this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

According to our sources, the data on the actual spend of the military are never published. In all the published financial data from the government, there are no details of the military expenses on the budget. The data on military spending and its details are considered confidential, and therefore inaccessible (1), (2), (3). The main published national budget document that covers actual public spending is the Closing Account (al hisab al khitami) of the national budget which is usually published on the website of the Ministry of Finance albeit with big delays (4). However, what applies to the national budget (projected spending) also applies to the closing accounts (actual spending) in the sense that only a topline figure is provided with little to no breakdown and disaggregation of the figures. According to the Constitution, the military budget is incorporated as a single figure in the national budget (Art. 203) (5). It is also worth noting that this figure does not constitute all military spending but only the part that is taken from the state treasury, because the military has its large revenue streams from its various economic activities that are even more opaque (6).

This sub-indicator is marked Not Applicable because the Egyptian constitution provides for the secrecy of the armed forces budget by stating that only a topline figure shall be published. Closing accounts, which cover actual spending, follow the same rules and disaggregation and are considered one of the budgetary documents.

This sub-indicator is marked Not Applicable because the Egyptian constitution provides for the secrecy of the armed forces budget by stating that only a topline figure shall be published. Closing accounts, which cover actual spending, follow the same rules and disaggregation and are considered one of the budgetary documents.

This sub-indicator is marked Not Applicable because the Egyptian constitution provides for the secrecy of the armed forces budget by stating that only a topline figure shall be published. Closing accounts, which cover actual spending, follow the same rules and disaggregation and are considered one of the budgetary documents.

The Ministry of Finance publishes the budget online in a disaggregated form (1). The budget is accompanied by an explanation intended for experts as well as a document with clear language for non-experts (Citizens’ Budget) (2). Additionally, the Ministry of Finance provides information on the single MDAs, including the MoD (3).

The budget for the MoD is divided into twelve sections: General Administration, Veterans Association of Ghana, Secretariat, General Headquarters, Army, Navy, Air Force, GAFCSC, MATS, Defence Advisors, Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, Military Hospital (1).

According to the 2017 Open Budget Survey, Ghana’s legislature provides weak (score 39 out of 100) oversight during the budget cycle; while the Audit Service provides limited oversight (score 50 out of 100) (2).

Details of actual spending are usually published within six months of the end of the financial year. However, for FY 2016 and 2017, the End-Year reports have not been published online. The last available online report was published in June of 2016 and concerns the 2015 FY (1).

Actual spending for FY 2015 was slightly over the budget (104%) (1). Details for FY 2016 and FY 2017 are not published online.

Publications on defence spending are scarce; coverage is infrequent, void of explanation, and generally discussed within bigger debates concerning the Federal Budget; from challenges (1) to trends (2). Visits conducted by MoD delegations or members of the parliamentary security and defence committee receive coverage, largely in local and at time international press (3). There is no official record of explicit spending figures available to the public, or law that obliges the government to disclose defence expenditure. Under the MoD’s official website’s ‘Contracts and Tenders’ section, a number of tenders are downloadable and accompanied by procedural guides (4). In spite of the existence of scant coverage, information is shared by media outlets. Publications on the official platforms managed by government security and defence ministries is not proactive.

The vast majority of defence spending is not publicised on any of the government’s official online platforms. In absence of such information, actual MoD spending cannot be subject to public scrutiny. The choice to withhold these figures is explainable under the MoD’s policy of non-disclosure, to protect state secrets (1). No written evidence in support of the latter could be found however.

Another theme that resonates are future trends in Iraq’s defence procurement (1). As a recovering military power, one paper notes that out of Iraq’s 14 army divisions “the federal budget only provides enough funding for six to be converted to fully mechanised units by 2020” (1). Potential visits and defence speculations — positive and unsettling — dominate the headlines more than Iraq’s actual spending on defence. Scant facts perforate the web such the latest contract ($28,812,143) Iraq’s MoD awarded to Florida-based NIC4 Inc for repairs to Iraq’s Aperture’s Terminal (VSAT) for the transmission of information in and around the battle zones. Other expense items have received coverage (2) but coverage is noticeably thin. Sources providing the coverage are interested in defence matters, but the data is not presented by any state department. Broader budget cuts (3) have allegedly lowered the ceiling of defence spending to $1 billion but it is difficult to verify whether actual spending amounts to that figure or falls well below it — in absence of government-approved data and general opacity. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute website features information concerning the country’s defence spending, from arms transfers from Iraq to Syria (4). The wider picture, generally speaking, concerning Iraq’s defences is incomplete, inconsistent and in need of comprehensive explanations.  

It is not clear to say in absence of published data, please refer to the answers above.

It has been established throughout this assessment that Jordan does not make its general defence expenditure public. The official webpage of the House of Representatives in Jordan includes several reports presented to the legislature by the Audit Bureau. These reports, namely the 2015 Financial Accounts, are the only evidence of defence expenditure publicly available, and that only shows a general breakdown of items and expenditures [1]. There is no evidence on the armed forces webpage that suggests that it makes its spending on defence budget public during the year [2]. Other than one annual report available online, there is no information available on actual defence spending during the year [3,4].

This sub-indicator has been marked as Not Applicable as Jordan does not provide information about its actual defence spending, neither does the defence sector make information about its procurement public [1,2,3,4]

This sub-indicator has been marked as Not Applicable as Jordan does not provide information about its actual defence spending, neither does the defence sector make information about its procurement public [1,2,3,4]

This sub-indicator has been marked as Not Applicable as Jordan does not provide information about its actual defence spending, neither does the defence sector make information about its procurement public [1,2,3,4]

Figures from the security agencies and other Government bodies for actual spending are published on the Finance Ministry’s website monthly but they are broken down into vaguely worded categories like “expenses and other transactions” (1, 2, 3 and 4).

Also, the finance ministry says that it these reports are not entirely because “some” bodies do not present their monthly reports on time (1). Officials, including one from the interior ministry, said the security agencies are among the bodies that are frequently late (4, 5, 6, 7 and 8).

Both the monthly reports and the annual reports do not include explanations for the spending decisions.

The language used tends to be too complicated for non-experts. They, for instance, could have graphs on “current liabilities — amounts deducted from types of budget spending.”

It is important to note that the monthly reports of the 2016/2017 financial years were not released (9). The reason for that remains unclear.

Most of the budget is disclosed to the public, CSOs and the media but it does not come with a detailed breakdown of the expenses, explaining where the money went. Significant areas like arms procurement, cost of training and maintenance of equipment are not detailed on their own. They are often lumped together into one or two vaguely described categories like “expenses and other transactions” (1, 2 and 3).

The monthly and annual reports on budgets and spending do not include any justification for this. Neither do officials and the media (4,5, 6 and 7) . As previously discussed, auditing and oversight authorities do have access to the full budget even though much of military/security spending may be presented in highly aggregated form. The authorities do have the general power to demand more information but they are often unsuccessful in these attempts due to political interference and loopholes in the laws that regulate their work.

As discussed earlier, most details of actual spending are published in summary form without clear categories within a month of the actual spending decisions, sometimes eleven months before the end of the financial year (1). But even the Finance Ministry acknowledges in these reports that they do not accurately reflect all expenditures because the ministries are often late in their reporting. It is unclear how late they usually are but there is reason to believe that duration can be anywhere between a month or two to several years, officials said (2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7).

Variances between the published budget and actual spending are never explained (1, 2, 3 and 4).

There are no reports published on actual defence spending, specifically (1). The Ministry of Finance (MoF) publishes irregularly a “Public Finance Annual Review” that indicates current expenditures including the actual annual “Salaries, Wages, and Related Benefits” expenditure for the LAF personnel (2). The MoF also publishes a monghtly reports, solely for the cost of personnel with the, including the military (3). However, the reports are not published in a timely manner. For example since 2015, MoF published the annual review for 2015 and 2017 but not for 2016 and 2018. (3)

The “Public Annual Finance Review,” when published, does not disclose the majority of the defence budget’s actual expenditure (1). Under the “Breakdown of Salaries, Wages, and Related Benefits” section, both the Annual Review and the Cost of Personnel reports cover salaries and wages, employment benefits, allowances, and “other”- “payments for maternity and sickness, marriage, birth, death, hospital, education, medical and various social allowances, and provided to military personnel only” (2) (3).

The published reviews are not presented to the public promptly. For example, the annual review for 2016 and 2018 are not published on the MoF’s website (1).

The annual reviews do not mention the expected expenditures present in the budget. The reviews present the actual expenditure for a set year and compare it with one to two years before. For example, the 2017 review included a summary of Lebanon’s fiscal performance for 2017 compared to 2016 and 2015 (1). The 2015 review compares the year with 2014 and 2013 as well (2). The reviews do not offer a comparison between the budget’s expected expenditure and the actual expenditure.

The Ministry of Economy and Finance of Mali proactively publishes the budget online in disaggregated form.¹ Details of actual spending on defence and security are accompanied by an explanation intended for experts.² Mali also publishes the Citizens’ Budget, a simpler and less technical version of the government’s Executive Budget, designed to convey information to the public.³

The vast majority of actual spending is disclosed. For instance, the 2018 budget for the MoD is divided into 5 sections: administration, military operations, army inspections, education, telecommunications.¹ However, according to the 2017 Open Budget Survey, the legislature overall provides a weak oversight in Mali (score below 41 out of 100). In particular, the debate on the budget occurs only after the publication of the Executive’s Budget Proposal, the legislative committees do not examine or publish the reports of their analyses of the Executive’s Budget Proposal online, and the legislature is not consulted during the implementation stage.² The supreme audit institution provides a better oversight (scoring 50 out of 100) and is considered to have autonomy of action and to be independent from the executive, but it is under-resourced and understaffed.

Despite publishing the In-Year Reports, which provide detailed information on the execution of the budget,¹ Mali does not make the Year-End reports publicly available.

The In-Year reports provide information on the execution rate of the budget for the defence and security sectors, which as of 31 March 2018 stood at 24 and 17 percent respectively. However, as the End-Year report is not made publicly available, it is not possible to assess the difference between budget and actual spending.

No evidence was found in online research, offline research and interviews to suggest that reports on actual spending were made available to the public. Neither government nor non-governmental sources such as the media (foreign and local) and NGOs (foreign and local) mentioned that this information was available through other means such as face-to-face consultation. The interviewees stated that reports on actual spending were not disclosed to the public or to counter-powers such as Parliament (including members of the defence commission) (1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8)(9). This lack of transparency represents an increased risk of corruption.

No information on actual spend is publicly available, therefore this sub-indicator is marked as Not Applicable.

No information on actual spend is publicly available, therefore this sub-indicator is marked as Not Applicable.

No information on actual spend is publicly available, therefore this sub-indicator is marked as Not Applicable.

The Ministry of Finance proactively publishes the annual budget on its website in an aggregated form (1). For 2018, Niger adopted a Citizen Budget but did not make it publicly available online (2).

The vast majority of actual spending is not disclosed. For instance, in the 2018 Budget 127 620 531 550 francs CFA was allocated to the MoD under only three vague expenditure categories: management and administration, security, and peacekeeping (1).
According to the 2017 Open Budget Survey, Niger’s legislature provides limited oversight in the formulation stage (score of 57 out 100) and a weak oversight in the implementation stage (score of 7 out of 100); according to the same survey, the supreme audit institution provides limited budget oversight (score of 45 out of 100) (2).

Details of actual spending are published more than twelve months after the end of the financial year (FY). For instance, the End-Year Report for 2015 has been adopted by the legislature in May 2017 and published online only in October 2017 (effectively 22 months after the end of the FY) (1).

Niger publishes the End-Year Report with considerable delay. Also, despite being updated on the Ministry of Finance website, the document for the FY 2015 is not accessible (1). For FY 2014, the End-Year Report did not show the difference between budget and the actual spending (2). For 2018, Niger published the In-Year report, which provides information on the budget’s execution rate for the Ministry of Defence as of 31 March 2018 (3).

The Budget Office of the Federal Republic of Nigeria proactively publishes the budget online in a disaggregated form (1). The budget is accompanied by an explanation intended for experts (2) as well as two documents intended for non-experts (Citizens Guide to Understanding the FGNs’ 2018 Budget of Consolidation and Countryman’s Guide to the 2018 Approved Budget) (3), (4).

TThe vast majority of actual spending is fully disclosed. For instance, the 2018 Budget provides detailed information on all the expenditure items, including spending on management and administration, procurement of military equipment, training, military operations, personnel (1).

According to the 2017 Open Budget Survey, Nigeria’s legislature provides a limited oversight (score of 53 out 100) in both the planning and the implementation stages of the budget cycle; according to the same survey, the Auditor-General for the Federation provides adequate budget oversight (score of 61 out of 100), in so far it has significant autonomy of action and independence but it is insufficiently resourced (2).

According to Section 30 and 50 of the Fiscal Responsibility Act (2007), the Budget Office is required to prepare and submit periodic Budget Implementation Reports to the Joint Finance Committee of the National Assembly and the Fiscal Responsibility Council no later than 30 days after the end of each quarter (1). The Fourth Quarter and Consolidated Budget Implementation Report (BIR) provides information on the allocation and spending of resources by Government Agencies during the fourth quarter, as well as the entire fiscal year. As of October 2019, all the BIRs for 2018 – including the Fourth Quarter and Consolidated BIR for 2018 had been published by the Ministry of Budget and National Plannning.

Actual spending for the 2016 FY was slighlty lower than the budget (95.93%) (1). Variances are explained in the budget.

The government and the MoD do no release any reports on spending and expenditures on the military. It is considered confidential data and not accessible to the public (1), (2). The website of the MoD does not include any reports on defence expenditure (3), (4). No media reports were found breaking down defence spending. The only public information available is the defence budget, published through royal decree (5). All information detailing defence procurement was found on foreign websites (6), (7).

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable because no reports are released to thepublic on actual spending.

Oman does not provide any information about its actual defence spending, and neither does the defence sector make information about its procurement public. However, there are some figures available from external sources. The government provides the annual budget of the MoD without any details (1), (2).

This sub-indicator has been marked as Not Applicable, as Oman does not provide information about its actual defence spending, and neither does the defence sector make information about its procurement public. There are no published financial reports to answer this question (1), (2).

This sub-indicator has been marked as Not Applicable, as Oman does not provide information about its actual defence spending, and neither does the defence sector make information about its procurement public. There are no published financial reports to answer this question (1), (2).

Up to 2016, it was possible to read published reports on the total spending of the military and security apparatuses in the West Bank. In 2017, the reports were taken down (researcher observation in 2016), they started to upload them again in 2019. However, Alaa Tartit, a Palestinian researcher, has published some articles on the security sector in which he argues that the military and security consume more than 30% of the PA budget. Other news outlets (in resources) have mentioned these figures. In general, the publication of the budget and actual spending is minimal (1). Aman discussed the general budget in 2016, and some data comes from their reports (2).

According to several AMAN reports and their officials, there is no detailed and comprehensive budget and spendings of the defence expenditures (1). There are reports available online at the MoF website that show total spending and the total income monthly, but nothing is disaggregated or explained in detail (2).

There is no defined date or a routine of publishing the budget or reports. According to several sources, there is a need for routine publication of data related to the budget, considering public consultations to discuss the budget and expenses (1). Quarterly reports about the PA’s finances used to be published on time, which was indeed a good practice; however, they did not include sufficient information on the security forces (2).

Any new budget includes a section that explains the variations between the actual and the budget amount for the year before (1). However, this narrative summarizes the general budget for the PA, and not the security or defence sector. Furthermore, some economic think tanks such as the Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute-MAS, as well as the IMF, keep track of such differences of the overall budget, but not on the defence and security sector per se.

Qatar does not make reports on defence spending available to the public [1]. The Qatar defence budget and expenditures that are made available to the public do not include any breakdown and consist of top-line round figures rather than actual spending reports [2]. There is no comprehensive information available in relation to the defence budget and expenditure. There is a total lack of transparency in relation to information about defence in Qatar [3,4].

This sub-indicator has been marked as Not Applicable as Qatar does not provide information about its defence spending, and the defence sector does not make information about its procurement public [1,2].

This sub-indicator has been marked as Not Applicable as Qatar does not provide information about its defence spending, and the defence sector does not make information about its procurement public [1,2].

This sub-indicator has been marked as Not Applicable as Qatar does not provide information about its defence spending, and the defence sector does not make information about its procurement public [1,2].

The Saudi government has never published reports on actual defence spending, only minimal details on projected defence budgets.

As Saudi Arabia does not publish figures on actual defence spend, this sub-indicator is marked not applicable.

As Saudi Arabia does not publish figures on actual defence spend, this sub-indicator is marked not applicable.

As Saudi Arabia does not publish figures on actual defence spend, this sub-indicator is marked not applicable.

According to our sources, there is no public detailed data on the actual military spendings. Although there are efforts to make budgets and financial data available for the public through the MoF, the MoD are still not included in these budgets (1,2).

As there is no publicly available information on actual spend, this sub-indicator should be marked as Not Applicable.

As there is no publicly available information on actual spend, this sub-indicator should be marked as Not Applicable.

As there is no publicly available information on actual spend, this sub-indicator should be marked as Not Applicable.

There is no evidence that military spending and military purchase reports are made public. Data on military purchases is considered confidential and not published (1,2).

As there is no information on actual spending that is publicly accessible, this indicator is marked Not Applicable.

As there is no information on actual spending that is publicly accessible, this indicator is marked Not Applicable.

As there is no information on actual spending that is publicly accessible, this indicator is marked Not Applicable.

Country Sort by Country 77a. Proactive publication Sort By Subindicator 77b. Comprehensiveness Sort By Subindicator 77c. Timeliness Sort By Subindicator 77d. Comparison against budget Sort By Subindicator
Algeria 0 / 100 NA NA NA
Angola 50 / 100 50 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Burkina Faso 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 NEI
Cameroon 25 / 100 25 / 100 100 / 100 NA
Cote d'Ivoire 75 / 100 75 / 100 50 / 100 NA
Egypt 0 / 100 NA NA NA
Ghana 100 / 100 50 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Iraq 0 / 100 NA NA NA
Jordan 0 / 100 NA NA NA
Kuwait 25 / 100 50 / 100 50 / 100 0 / 100
Lebanon 25 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Mali 100 / 100 50 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Morocco 0 / 100 NA NA NA
Niger 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Nigeria 100 / 100 75 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100
Oman 0 / 100 NA NA NA
Palestine 50 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Qatar 0 / 100 NA NA NA
Saudi Arabia 0 / 100 NA NA NA
Tunisia 0 / 100 NA NA NA
United Arab Emirates 0 / 100 NA NA NA

With thanks for support from the UK Department for International Development and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs who have contributed to the Government Defence Integrity Index.

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