Q52.

Is there training in corruption issues for commanders at all levels in order to ensure that these commanders are clear on the corruption issues they may face during deployment?

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There is no known training for commanders that deal with corruption issues.

Although they attend training sessions before deployment, these sessions are not usually meant to address corruption. The pre-deployment training sessions are for military commanders, and they focus on defence and security subjects, although they may be sensitized and informed on general field orders, including corruption. Transparency International (2016) (1) endorses this argument when it states that “10 out of the top 25 Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) are in band ‘F’ for preparing their troops to control corruption and behave with integrity in military operations, 8 are in band ‘E’ and 5 are in band ‘D’” (1). Very little information on corruption is provided to troops before deployment. Law N° 038 (2016), does not address capacity building on non-military subjects, including corruption. There is no evidence that the existing military policy and the recent Law of Military Programming integrate capacity building opportunities on corruption either. According to Diallo (2017), the Law of Military Programming will allow the armed forces to enhance the overall capacity of the military (3), but there is no evidence that corruption is among the training that will be delivered over the next five years that the Strategic Plan of Reform (PSR) of the armed forces will cover. However, online courses are available for military commanders for free, monitored by the Peace Operations Training Institute (POTI).

The main military institutions which train officers at the middle management levels are the Joint Military School (known by the French acronym EMIA), the War College and the International School for Security Forces, which trains police and gendarmerie officers in peacekeeping techniques [1] [2]. The French Embassy in Yaounde states on their website (July 2018), “38 police trainees and gendarmes from 16 nationalities were able to acquire knowledge in the fields of democratic crowd management, police techniques, weapons knowledge and pedagogy. Police and gendarmes trained in peacekeeping at Eiforces” [3].

There is no known evidence of anti-corruption training in any of these military and security institutions nor evidence of any anti-corruption training prioritized in these institutions. The International School for Security Forces handles some elements of ethics for peacekeepers at diploma level [1]. However, the processes of getting into such institutions are often marred by corruption and nepotism. Furthermore, there is not a vibrant culture of ongoing military training within the defence and security architecture. Obtaining a place on a course has to be sanctioned by the Minister of Defence (for military) or the Delegate of National Security (for police). This process is often bureaucratic, which makes it easy only for those who have some kind of connections to have these opportunities [4].

The 2017 US State Department Human Rights Report states: “In the context of the fight against Boko Haram, local sources indicated that corruption-related inefficiencies and diversion of resources from their intended purposes continued to represent a fundamental national security vulnerability” [5]. This evidence indicates the absence of proper, regular and effective anti-corruption training provided to the officers.

Côte d’Ivoire lacks a known training in corruption issues for commanders of the armed forces. This type of training is not provided in the pre-deployment of military personnel. As in 51A, there is no military doctrine or handbook to provide practical guidance to commanders and other high-ranking members of the military about corruption issues before or during deployment. Anti-corruption training for higher-level military ranks was provided in a very general way by the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) until its mission officially expired on June 30, 2017. According to a 2018 report by the World Peace Foundation, the training and capacity of the Ivorian military were insufficient in the aftermath of the post-election crisis of 2010-2011. UNOCI trained at least 7,000 police officers in human rights and child protection, promoted improved parliamentary oversight of the security sector and helped to draft defence legislation. It also supported a national training program for the Gendarmerie in the period 2015-2019 (1).

For example, the UN Police (UNPOL) in Côte d’Ivoire went operational on April 4, 2004, as part of UN Security Council Resolution 1528 and its mandate was amended several times subsequently. One of the key roles of UNPOL was to train members of the local police and gendarmerie in professional matters. But the training focused more on police science and judicial procedures than on corruption issues (2).

But since the end of the UNOCI mission in June 2017, training of commanders (and of the armed forces) has focused on technical skills without any mention of anti-corruption training. In the 2018 Report on Côte d’Ivoire by the Bertelsmann Foundation (BTI 2018), the soldier uprisings of January and May 2017 by powerful former rebel commanders known as COMZONES illustrates the failure to seriously reform the military apparatus at all levels (3). The BTI report states:

“The government has also failed to make any significant progress in fully restructuring and modernizing the security apparatus. The mutiny in January 2017, initiated by former rebels now integrated into the army, revealed both ongoing conflicts within the army as well as the capacity of soldiers to disrupt the political process and to question civilian supremacy… Other, more structurally oriented reforms regarding the reorganization of the security apparatus, judicial reform, or decentralization have been much less thoroughly implemented (or not even seriously initiated), both due to the technical complexity of the issues, but also to the political resistance of key actors within government” (3).

After reviewing and surveying the platforms of the relevant training authorities in the defence sector, such as the Nasser Military Academy, and the Training Authority of the Armed Forces, as well as consulting interviewees there is no training delivered for personnel (civilian or military) at any level on issues of corruptions or questions related to corruption or anti-corruption measures (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6).

Corruption is not specifically addressed in the MOD or GAF training. Officers deployed in international peacekeeping operations undergo pre-deployment training held by a KAIPTC training team. However, while the KAIPTC addresses the issue of corruption in its master degrees, it is not clear if the content of the pre-deployment training also specifically addresses corruption (1).

Despite the Iraqi government’s vocal commitment towards tackling defence corruption at its root (1), past training programmes and schemes — as the COI and NATO are concerned — focused predominantly on abating financial and administrative corruption (2), (3) and capacity building activities within Iraq’s military establishment (4). Contrary to evidence of anti-corruption training in the context of field deployment, liberation operations against the Islamic State Group since June 2014, underscore poor initial planning and the formation of an ad-hoc paramilitary apparatus, out of which A’Hashd al Shaabi, the PMF, grew. Empowered by the fight against the ISG, and prior to the group’s institutionalisation, various militias were deployed into former ISG-held areas, ahead of army personnel acting on the instructions of PMF commanders, whose plans to deploy have been announced prior to those issued by the Iraqi state — implying some level of competition between the Iraq state and the PMF. While the US continues to draw down forces, US commanders have also been actively training and advising Iraqi military personnel within battle zones (5), the focus of which, due to the prolonged precarity of the security climate (6) has been on guerilla warfare and counterinsurgency and not anti-corruption training to commanders. As compounded in the response of one Interviewee (7) “Iraq, has no official policy that informs deployment practices or the behaviour of commanders” in spite of the activities and initiatives run by Iraq’s Anti-Corruption Academy. Military appointments based on a persons political, and sectarian, affiliation has engendered a new focus as reported by NATO’s Iraq Training Mission (8) namely to “screen out potential war criminals and hardcore militia members from being instructors in the troubled country’s rebuilt army” (9).

There is a required training course for high ranked officers that includes a whole chapter on corruption and transparency. Such training is periodical, with the help of JIACC, and some NGOs. In 2018 and 2017, more three training courses were organised in some units in the armed forces and intelligence. It has become apparent that, although anti-corruption training takes place in Jordan, it is mostly not concerned with the defence sector. Some of these training sessions are organised by the Integrity and Anti-Corruption Commission, and there is some media reporting around them but that does not extend to defence [1, 2]. Most of this training took place at the Ministry of Education and the Judicial Council or was organised by foreign embassies [3]. Despite the fact that the Integrity and Anti-Corruption Commission published on its news section that a delegate from the general security department visited the Anti-Corruption Commission to understand its work within the framework of anti-corruption training [4], there is no evidence to suggest that training in corruption issues is provided to commanders at all levels [5,6].

There is a comprehensive training for at least all the heads of departments, auditors said (1, 2 and 3). But the training is superficial in nature — the lecturers simply reiterate the institution’s commitment to certain values like integrity and the need to obey the law and report suspicious behavior, auditors said. Sometimes they talk about new methods of fighting corruption in the West and how they should apply them in Kuwait.

They are not legally obliged to attend and they only do so because the security chiefs said to cooperate with auditors when it comes to training.

It is unclear how often the SAB offers lectures to the agencies but the CSC conducts at least six workshops a year and the ACA conducts about 12, the auditing sources said.

Training in corruption issues is conducted for commanders at some levels or in some units, but not all. Nothing was found to suggest it is a requirement (1). The LAF, in collaboration with LTA and TI, conducted a workshop for the LAF on the relationship between security and corruption. The LTA representative stated that the organization will work on conducting more workshops to improve the LAF’s transparency (2). Furthermore, the Directorate for Human Rights Law in the Lebanese Armed Forces has conducted two training cycles for 40 officers on combating corruption (3).

The assessor found no evidence to suggest that regular training on corruption issues takes place within the Malian army. Evidence from a number of sources indicates that there has been widespread corruption in the Malian army for at least the last decade,⁵ ⁶ ⁷ ⁸ ⁹ ¹⁰ ¹¹ indicating that any training mechanisms that are in place are highly ineffective. According to a World Bank report, corruption is commonplace among defence personnel. Indeed, a placement in the army is seen as an asset which generates “flows of illicit income”.² A NOREF report notes that the Malian army lacks “a unified national moral compass to underwrite its military operations”.³
There are two Malian training schools for international missions. The first is the Military Administration School (EMA) in Koulikoro, which provides training for officers from African contingents who carry out administrative or financial duties. The Koulikoro School of Peacekeeping offers courses on human rights and international treaties, but a specific focus on corruption issues is not in place despite the risk corruption poses to security assistance programmes.¹³
The second school is the Alioune Blondin Beye school of peacekeeping in Bamako, which trains officers from both the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development in Eastern Africa (IGAD), the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). It offers some anticorruption training as part of its standard UN peacekeeping modules. The course on ethics includes teaching on the Code of Conduct, Trafficking and Discipline.¹ However, a specific focus on corruption is missing.¹³ While anticorruption is not explicitly referenced, it is included peripherally in these training courses; “integrity and not soliciting or accepting material reward, honour or gifts” are for example mentioned in training texts.¹ No evidence was found to indicate whether or how officers are examined on the training they receive however. No evidence was also found, such as course participant lists at Alioune Blondin Beye, to indicate what proportion of commanders in each rank bracket attend training, although the school does provide courses designed for senior officers.⁴
The police, gendarmerie and national guard are receiving regular anticorruption training from the EU’s EUCAP Sahel Training Mission.¹² Reforms are designed to create a more effective and transparent human resources system. Training is designed to install a citizen’s ethic into the police to discourage them from preying on the population and demanding bribes.¹²
However, a security expert in Bamako confirmed that the EU’s military training mission (EUTM) focuses overwhelmingly on military tactics and contains no anticorruption component.¹⁵ Indeed, the EUTM is operating in Mali at the request of the Malian government. Therefore, it does not have an executive or mentoring mandate. It can only deliver what the Malian authorities want.¹⁵
Transparency International’s (TI) analysis of the previous US-led and French-led training efforts in Mali deemed that these were insufficient:¹³ “US interviewees pointed out that the Defence Institute for International Legal Studies (DIILS) delivered courses on human rights and ethics to the Malian military. However, DIILS would usually focus on human rights and civil/military relations before all other issues, including corruption. While programming in some cases did involve anticorruption courses, the usual focus was on human rights issues; this was the case in Mali as well”. TI notes that IMET training incorporates human rights training but does not have an explicit focus on transparency, accountability and counter-corruption (TACC) issues. The report says that “most interviewees argued that standalone counter-corruption courses in the Malian armed forces would not have worked. What was needed was an integrated approach addressing other issues, including civil-military relations and good governance, and encompassing state and social entities apart from the army. Thus tackling corruption needed to be embedded in a comprehensive reform of institutions and processes, as robust institutional systems and better civilian oversight were important mechanisms for decreasing the risk of corruption”.¹³
TI determines that the French training courses similarly did not include a component on tackling corruption.¹³

As discussed in question 48 there is a wide variety of training provided by different actors at bilateral and multilateral levels. However, the assessor did not find evidence that there is training for military commanders at all levels that address specifically corruption issues during deployment. Nevertheless, the lack of evidence does not mean that these issues may not be discussed as part of a larger curriculum.
Even though no evidence has been found that there is an explicit program directly addressing corruption as part of military or police training, officers are trained in general ethics and in line with the Military Penal Code which specifically addresses corruption. For example, Article 228 states that officers found guilty of corruption, theft or general crime can be dismissed, demoted or imprisoned. The Code provides for a judiciary military police that reports to the Ministry of Defence (Article 46). They are charged with finding and following up all infractions of the law (Article 47) at all levels of the armed forces (Article 48) (1).
Furthermore, even though there is no systematic approach to fighting corruption in the defence sector, national authorities at the higher level publically claimed their engagement to tackle the issue. For instance, principal outlines of the security and defence policy of the Presidential Renaissance Programme for 2016-2021 include fighting against corruption in the security and defence institutions as part of improving the security governance strategy (2). Therefore, the Niger government welcomes different initiatives coming from national and international institutions. In September 2016 the Abdou Moumouni University of Niger, with the support of Belgium, inaugurated the first in its kind Master in Security and Culture of Peace designed essentially for Niger military and civil officers (3). It provides in-depth training on a vast range of security and defence issues where, according to interviewees, corruption – as being directly related to the illicit circulation of drugs, arms or human trafficking – is often debated in class, even if it is not part of the curriculum as a separate subject.
The European Union also provides training to Nigerien civil and military servants. Launched in 2012, EUCAP Sahel-Niger provides advice and training to support the Nigerien authorities in strengthening their security capabilities. It contributes to the development of an “integrated, coherent, sustainable, and human rights-based approach among the various Nigerien security agencies in the fight against terrorism and organised crime” (4). The objective of EUCAP Sahel is “improving the efficiency of the regional mixed command posts to improve the response to crises and the interoperability of security forces; collecting and sharing intelligence between those forces; developing forensic science expertise; training the municipal police of the Agadez region; improving HR management systems; improving teaching capacity at the security forces’ training centers and schools; and ensuring that the armed forces act on a sound legal basis in their mission to combat terrorism and trafficking” (4). According to interviewees, training provided by CAP Sahel does not explicitly include “corruption” as a separate course either. However, invited experts regularly discuss and actively debate issues of corruption as being directly related to the illicit circulation of drugs, arms or human trafficking.
Finally, as part of bilateral cooperation with the USA, by signing the Joint Country Action Plan (JCAP) in October 2015 Niger engaged in the Security Governance Initiative. The objective of the programme is to contribute to improving decision-making processes that determine the allocation of human, material, and financial resources for the security sector as well as enhancing human resourcing procedures (5). This implies addressing corruption too. France, being engaged in the countries of the Sahel region (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger) with the ongoing Barkhane Operation also participates in regular training of the Niger military on general ethics. Finally, the International Committee of the Red Cross which plays an important role in Niger, also regularly provides training for Nigerien military in International Humanitarian Law where issues of corruption, even if they are not addressed directly are discussed.

Although there is some training on some issues relating to corruption the training available tends to be context-specific and the subject matter far from comprehensive. For example, the implications or connection between corruption and operational efficiency and effectiveness are not demonstrated or understood (1). Furthermore, different types of corruption risks and the operational contexts or situations which may give rise to corruption risks or ethics issues are not properly understood and incorporated into training manuals and materials in a comprehensive method. Training when provided tends to lean more in favour of operational issues, rather than conflict of interest challenges and how they should be overcome. Another example is concerning due diligence training and the importance of transparency and the actions or steps necessary to meet ethical challenges. There are generalised explanations and directions, signposting, on how to trigger issues and escalation through the chain of command but information regarding institutional support or commitment to support escalation is thin (1), (3). Corruption is identified in the National Defence Policy as a generalised risk with no significant policy recommendations on how it should be tackled in the context of operations. There is some training provided for corruption risks in procurement, but this training is not extended to field commanders. “As part of the challenge facing Nigeria in recent years, and as seen in the Sudan mission is perceived corruption regarding payment of deployed Nigerian military members in support of peacekeeping operations. For instance, to incentivize African countries supporting peacekeeping operations, the UN reimburses governments supporting these missions based upon a stipend per member and piece of equipment deployed (2), (3). However, the perception within the military is that Nigerian officials seem to be skimming these payments, reducing the reimbursement to the military establishment and shortchanging the personnel participating in peacekeeping operations. The response to the perceived government corruption is beginning to grow.

In 2008, Nigerian soldiers returning from peacekeeping operations in Liberia converged on the Nigerian town of Akure, located 300 km east-northeast of Lagos, and effectively shut it down in protest over the perceived pay skimming. Instead of the almost $7,400 per soldier total for the six-month deployment in UN allowances they expected (based upon the UN advertised stipend of $1,228 per soldier per month), they received only $3,000 from the Nigerian government (HUHUADMIN, 2012). In June Nigerian soldiers on a peacekeeping operation in Darfur, Sudan lodged a protested and forwarded a petition while on deployment, arguing to be paid their allowances and to be sent home right away. This was because their original six-month mission was extended by an additional month due to lack of return transportation”(1).

There is no evidence of training in corruption issues for commanders taking place in Oman. The armed forces have their own military colleges, in addition to training courses, the most renowned, Sultan Qaboos Military College (KSQA) and the National Defence College aim to train youth through a strategic curriculum designed to uphold Omani national security (1), (2). Neither websites refer to corruption-related training or courses. No publication or news items regarding commander level anti-corruption training courses were found on either the Ministry of Defence or Royal Armed Forces websites (3), (4). According to our sources, there have not been any training courses on corruption issues within the military in any of its units (5), (6).

There have only been a few training courses that included armed and security personals. The latest training course was on accountability and transparency, funded by the British Defence Academy, and it included senior officers and commanders from different security agencies in addition to civil bureaucrats (1). The main theme of the training is fighting corruption and transparency. In some of this training anti-economic corruption was the main theme. There is no indication from which units the participants, but usually from financial or operations units (2). The Ministry of Interior is implementing a leadership training project at three levels for officers of the security establishment (3).

There have been few training courses on corruption, transparency, and little training on anti-corruption issues, transparency and ethics, for commanders and mid ranks officers. Such training is irregular and is in collaboration with ACTA or/ and Rule of Law and Anti-Corruption Centre (ROLAAC). [1,2,3]

According to a military officer in the army, there is no training on corruption issues delivered to the commanders or officers (1). Another officer confirmed that corruption training does not exist at all for personnel in the field (2). Though public funding has been allocated to various government departments for training in the field of corruption, there is no indication that this training takes place in the military (3). The 2019 training schedule for officials at the Ministry of Interior does not reflect any anti-corruption training (4).

In 2014, an ad-hoc workshop was organized for employees of the Ministry of Interior, focusing on implementing the recently ratified UN Convention Against Corruption. It was held in coordination with the United Nations Office on Drugs & Crime (5). No further evidence was found in the public domain relating specifically to anti-corruption training for members of the army or security services in Saudi Arabia.

Several anti-corruption related workshops have been held by the High Academy of War (Ecole supérieure de la Guerre) in the last two years in collaboration with the DCAF Tunisia. Trainees at this Academy attended these workshops. These workshops had four subjects: good governance of the security sector in the light of international humanitarian law (1); good governance of the defence sector and crisis communication (2)(3); good governance of the defence sector and the role of the armed forces in a democratic society (4); legal framework in the fight against corruption and the concepts of whistleblower protection and conflicts of interest (5). Additionally, there is a program of cooperation between DCAF and INLUCC to support the agency in its interactions with the Ministry of Defence and other actors in the security sector (5). According to our resources, this training is organised periodically, but mostly the participants are personnel from the offices and Headquarters, and they rarely include personnel from other rural units (6,7).

There is comprehensive training in the prevention of corruption risks for leaders at all levels. Training is provided as part of military education, in military academies and schools, as well as in training abroad as part of international cooperation and in pre-deployment training for UN missions. The Armed Forces General Inspection also conducts also sensitization sessions for military commanders at all levels on corruption issues to ensure that they are fully aware of this issue (8).

There are training courses conducted within the armed forces which include specific and intensive modules on anti-corruption within the armed forces. These training courses are led by foreign experts and trainers who have experience. However, these courses only target specific departments, such as the financial department, human resources, and civil servants within the armed forces (1), (2).

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Algeria
Angola 0 / 100
Burkina Faso 0 / 100
Cameroon 0 / 100
Cote d'Ivoire 0 / 100
Egypt 0 / 100
Ghana 0 / 100
Iraq 0 / 100
Jordan 25 / 100
Kuwait 25 / 100
Lebanon 25 / 100
Mali 25 / 100
Morocco
Niger 0 / 100
Nigeria 0 / 100
Oman 0 / 100
Palestine 25 / 100
Qatar 25 / 100
Saudi Arabia 0 / 100
Tunisia 50 / 100
United Arab Emirates 50 / 100

With thanks for support from the UK Department for International Development and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs who have contributed to the Government Defence Integrity Index.

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