Do defence and security institutions have a policy, or evidence, of openness towards civil society organisations (CSOs) when dealing with issues of corruption?
4a. Policy of openness
Algeria score: 0/100
There is no formal or informal policy that requires openness towards CSOs in the defence sector.
There is a policy that requires defence and security institutions to be open towards CSOs. However, there is no explicit mention of how to do that.
There is a policy that requires defence and security institutions to be open towards CSOs and the establishment of mechanisms to that end (e.g. consultation and sharing of information).
No evidence could be found that there is a formal or informal policy that requires openness towards civil society organization in the defence sector.
Formal commitments to include civil society actors into anti-corruption works were found, created by the government, but not the military specifically. Algeria ratified the UN Convention against Corruption in 2003, which states that each state shall take appropriate measures to promote the active participation of persons and groups outside the public sector, such as civil society, non-governmental organizations and communities of persons (Art. 13), (1). This is formally implemented into the legal framework of Algeria’s anti-corruption agency, the National Body for the Prevention and Fight against Corruption (ONPLC). According to Art. 15 the participation of civil society in the prevention and fight against corruption should be encouraged through transparency of the decision-making process and the promotion of citizens in the management of public affairs; education and awareness training on the dangers of corruption; and access by the media and the public to information concerning corruption (2). In practice, It is unclear to what extent the ONPLC follows these rules. On its website, only information on awareness training was provided (3). There is no evidence that the defence sector is required to follow these regulations and there is no evidence that it did. Also Art. 15 of the ONPLC’s legal frameworks limits the access to information stating that it is subject to national security requirements (2).
In practice, there is evidence that the ONPLC is not working with civil society organizations. The Association algérienne de lutte contre la corruption (AACC) said in a statement that it is fully willing and available to work with the ONPLC suggesting that this had not been the case (4). In December 2018, the AACC revealed that the Algerian government has prohibited all civil society, including the AACC, from celebrating International Anti-Corruption Day (5).
1) Presidential Decree No. 04-128 (April 19, 2004), “Ratifying, with reservation, the United Nations Convention against Corruption, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in New York on 31 October 2003. Accessed November 14, 2018. http://www.onplc.org.dz/images/ONPLC/français/convention%20onu%20jo%20fr.pdf.
2) Law No. 06-01 (February 20, 2006), “On the prevention and the fight against corruption”, Titel III “The National Body for the Prevention and Fight against Corruption”, Art. 15. Accessed November 14, 2018. http://www.onplc.org.dz/images/ONPLC/français/recueil_fr.pdf.
3) “Actions de formation et de sensibilisation“. ONPLC website. Accessed November 14, 2018. http://www.onplc.org.dz/index.php/fr/actions-de-formation-et-de-sensibilisation.
4) “Djilali Hadjadj dénonce la paralysie de l’Organe de lutte contre la corruption (ONPLC),” lematindz.net, June 22, 2016. Accessed February 27, 2019. https://www.lematindz.net/news/21070-djilali-hadjadj-denonce-la-paralysie-de-lorgane-de-lutte-contre-la-corruption-onplc.html.
5) Madjid Makedhi. “Journée internationale de lutte contre la corruption : L’AACC fait un constat accablant,” elwatan.com, December 9, 2018. Accessed February 27, 2019. https://www.elwatan.com/edition/actualite/journee-internationale-de-lutte-contre-la-corruption-laacc-fait-un-constat-accablant-09-12-2018.
4b. CSO protections
Algeria score: 0/100
There is very little or no space for civil society organisations to operate within the country. Independent CSOs may be accused of / charged with treason, espionage, subversion, foreign interference, or terrorism.
CSOs are allowed to operate within the country, but the government uses manifestly restrictive laws to silence them or establishes burdensome registration and tax requirements.
CSOs enjoy a range of protections from government interference, and are able to operate within the country. However, they experience or fear potential reprisals by government.
CSOs enjoy a range of protections from government interference, and are able to operate without intimidation from the government. However, they may not have complete access or freedoms in some sensitive areas.
CSOs enjoy a range of protections (e.g. rights to freedom of expression or freedom of association) from government interference, and are able to operate openly and without intimidation from the government.
The space for civil society organizations in Algeria is limited. The freedom of non-governmental organizations is scored 1 out of 4 by Freedom House. The establishing, funding, and operation of non-governmental organizations are restricted by the law. Moreover, organizations face bureaucratic hurdles during the formation process (1). Yazbeck, explains how the government has not only used measures to control civil society actors but has also sought to co-opt them into the system. For example, receiving foreign funding is limited and organizations may have to rely on state funds (2). Other academic research shows how the Algerian government has used civil society organizations as a tool to legitimize their rule. For example, Jasmin Lorch and Bettina Bunk describe in their research how Algerian civil society organizations help the regime to increase its output legitimation, for example, by providing social services in cooperation with state agencies. CSOs also reproduce historical discourses which likewise strengthen the regime’s legitimacy (3, p. 994f). Louisa Dris-Aït Hamadouche, argues that the regime uses civil society actors to strengthen the political system (4).
1) Freedom House Country Report Algeria 2018. Freedomhouse.com. Accessed November 11, 2018. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2018/algeria.
2) Dalia Ghanem-Yazbeck. “Limiting Change Through Change. The Key to the Algerian Regime’s Longevity.” Carnegie Middle East Center, April 2018. Accessed October 17, 2018. https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CMEC_70_Yazbeck_Algeria_Final.pdf.
3) Jasmin Lorch and Bettina Bunk. “Using civil society as an authoritarian legitimation strategy: Algeria and Mozambique in comparative perspective”, Democratization, Vol. 24, Issue 6, 2017. Accessed November 11, 2018.
4) Louisa Dris-Aït Hamadouche. “La société civile vue à l’aune de la résilience du système politique algérien.”, Dossier : États et territoires du politique, 16/2017. Accessed November 11, 2018. https://journals.openedition.org/anneemaghreb/3093.
4c. Practice of openness
Algeria score: 25/100
Requests by CSOs to work with the defence sector are denied.
There has been some consideration of engaging CSOs and meetings may have taken place with the defence sector, but they tend to take place with CSOs that are either very supportive of, or are explicitly funded by, the government. OR CSO activity is extremely minimal in this area, and defence and security institutions rarely engage for this reason.
Defence and security institutions are seeking (or are beginning to seek) CSO engagement from a range of CSOs, but not on corruption issues.
Defence and security institutions are open towards CSOs but have infrequently or superficially worked on issues of corruption. The military does not engage with CSOs on corruption issues.
Defence and security institutions have specifically worked with CSOs on corruption issues on a regular and/or in depth basis. This includes not only civilian representative of government (head of internal audit, PR person), but also military representatives.
There is evidence that civil society actors requested to work with state authorities in regards to anti-corruption in general but not the defence sector specifically. The Association algérienne de lutte contre la corruption (AACC) said in a statement that it is fully willing and available to work with the ONPLC (1). Yet, the AACC has also been very critical of the government’s anti-corruption policies. In the wake of the reshuffle at the top of the ONPLC in 2016, it said that the ONPLC has so far been “absolutely useless” since nothing has been done in nearly six years following the installation of the seven former permanent members in January 2011 (2). After the arrest of five military generals in 2018, the president of AACC noted that although the detentions were “unprecedented”, “corruption is almost widespread” which makes it questionable “how dirty hand can conduct a clean operation” (3). No evidence could be found that there is cooperation in general or with the military specifically. Taking the answers to questions 4A and 4B into consideration, it seems very likely that the military would deny it.
1) “Djilali Hadjadj dénonce la paralysie de l’Organe de lutte contre la corruption (ONPLC),” lematindz.net, June 22, 2016. Accessed February 27, 2019. https://www.lematindz.net/news/21070-djilali-hadjadj-denonce-la-paralysie-de-lorgane-de-lutte-contre-la-corruption-onplc.html.
2) Le Matin. “L’Association de lutte contre la corruption appelle l’ONPLC à exercer ses prerogatives”, lematindz.net, September 16, 2016. Accessed November 11, 2018. http://www.lematindz.net/news/21789-lonplc-un-changement-dans-la-continuite-estime-lassociation-de-lutte-contre-la-corruption.html.
3) “L’affaire des généraux emprisonnés est liée à l’échéance présidentielle, selon Abdelaziz Rahabi et Djilali Hadjadj Instrumentalisation politique?“, huffpostmaghreb.com, October 20, 2018. Accessed November 11, 2018. https://www.huffpostmaghreb.com/entry/laffaire-des-generaux-emprisonnes-est-liee-a-lecheance-presidentielle-selon-abdelaziz-rahabi-et-djilali-hadjadj_mg_5bcb21bde4b055bc94810ba4.
Compare scores by country
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|Country||4a. Policy of openness||4b. CSO protections||4c. Practice of openness|
|Algeria||0 / 100||0 / 100||25 / 100|
|Angola||0 / 100||25 / 100||25 / 100|
|Burkina Faso||50 / 100||75 / 100||25 / 100|
|Cameroon||0 / 100||25 / 100||25 / 100|
|Cote d'Ivoire||0 / 100||75 / 100||25 / 100|
|Egypt||0 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Ghana||0 / 100||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Jordan||0 / 100||25 / 100||25 / 100|
|Kuwait||0 / 100||25 / 100||25 / 100|
|Lebanon||25 / 100||75 / 100||75 / 100|
|Mali||25 / 100||50 / 100||50 / 100|
|Morocco||0 / 100||50 / 100||0 / 100|
|Niger||0 / 100||50 / 100||25 / 100|
|Nigeria||0 / 100||25 / 100||50 / 100|
|Oman||0 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Palestine||0 / 100||75 / 100||25 / 100|
|Qatar||0 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Saudi Arabia||0 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Tunisia||25 / 100||25 / 100||25 / 100|
|United Arab Emirates||0 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|