Has the country signed up to the following international anti-corruption instruments: UNCAC and the OECD Convention?

5a. Signatory and Ratification status


SCORE: 100/100

Assessor Explanation

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5b. Compliance


SCORE: 50/100

Assessor Explanation

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Relevant comparisons

According to SIPRI’s Arms Transfers Database, Algeria has not been a significant defence exporter between 2015 and 2017.
Algeria signed the UNCAS on December 9, 2003, and ratified it on August 25, 2004. It ratified it with a reservation regarding the possibility of extradition to the International Court of Justice.

A UNCAC report of 2016 outlines (1) what Algeria had done to address recommendations of the first review report, which was done in 2014 (2). The 2016 report mentions a couple of measures Algeria has introduced regarding: the protection of witnesses, experts and victims, property protection, improvements in stopping money laundering and mechanisms in the fight against corruption (1). Algeria will be reviewed in Chapters 2 and 5 of the UNCAC Convention in 2019/2020. Therefore, at this time, it is not possible to fully assess whether Algeria entirely complies with the obligations (3).

Angola signed the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) on December 10th, 2003. It subsequently ratified it on the 29th, of August 2006 (1), (2). Angola does not export defence sector items.

According to the UNCAC implementation review report of June 2017 (review cycle 1), Angolan authorities have, for the most part, successfully complied with the convention, although it also highlights a lengthy list of implementation challenges, namely in the area of criminalization and law enforcement (Articles 15, 16, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 29, 30, 32, 33, 37, 38, 39, 42 of UNCAC), (1).

Among the challenges noted is the absence of any protection mechanism for witnesses and reporting persons, and the lack of criminalization of active and passive bribery of foreign public officials under Angolan law (1).

Burkina Faso signed the United Nations Convention against Corruption on December 10, 2003, and ratified it on October 10, 2006, (1). An update of the implementation of the UNCAC in Africa includes Burkina Faso on the list of countries that ratified the UNCAC (2). Burkina Faso does not export arms (3).

The CNT adopted a law on the prevention and repression of corruption in March 2015, and another one on the creation of the High Authority for State Control and Anti-corruption (ARCE-LA), to ensure compliance with UNCAC (1). The passing of these laws formalizes Burkina Faso’s compliance with the UNCAC. Burkina Faso participated in the Conference of the Parties (CoP) as well (2), (3).

However, Burkina Faso still has the following challenges: The Anti-Corruption Act requires public institutions to adopt codes of conduct, these codes of conduct have not been adopted by certain bodies. The declaration of gifts, donations and other benefits are mandatory for all public officials; however, at the time of the country visit, that system was not yet operational. It is also recommended that Burkina Faso: Ensure greater coherence in its national anti-corruption policy ; Ensure that ASCE-LC has an adequate budget and thus the necessary material resources and specialized staff; adopt and implement a training plan for ASCE-LC staff; Adopt the decree establishing the terms of recruitment of the Comptroller General of the State and the comptrollers of the State; Establish adequate procedures for the selection and training of individuals for public positions that are considered vulnerable to corruption and the rotation, where appropriate, of such individuals to other positions (Arts. 7 (1) (b) and 9); Endeavour to adopt codes of conduct for all public officials and disseminate the content of those codes; Put the asset declaration system into operation; expand the list of persons required to declare their assets to cover all positions vulnerable to corruption; Ensure that the provisions of Act No. 051-2015 on the right to access public information are implemented; adopt legal instruments that enable the national authority for access to public information to fulfil its mandate (Art. 10) (2).

On 10th December 2003, the Government of Cameroon signed the UNCAC. This Convention was later ratified, on 6th Febraury 2006 [1]. Cameroon is not an arms exporter.

According to the review of the implementation of the UNCAC. Cameroon has complied with some of the provisions of the UNCAC [1]. The following areas are sanctioned by the Cameroon Penal Code [2]:
– Bribery and trading in influence (arts. 15, 16, 18 and 21)
– Money-laundering, concealment (arts. 23 and 24)
– Embezzlement, abuse of functions and illicit enrichment (arts. 17, 19, 20 and 22)
– Obstruction of justice (art. 25)
– Liability of legal persons (art. 26)
– Participation and attempt (art. 27)
– Prosecution, adjudication and sanctions; cooperation with law enforcement authorities (arts 30 and 37)
– Protection of witnesses and reporting persons (arts 32 and 33)
– Freezing, seizing and confiscation; bank secrecy (arts 31 and 40)
– Statute of limitations; criminal record (arts 29 and 41)
– Jurisdiction (art. 42)
– Consequences of acts of corruption; compensation for damage (arts 34 and 35)
– Specialized authorities and inter-agency coordination (arts 36, 38 and 39)

According to the UNCAC review, “Cameroon has criminalised the bribery of foreign public officials and officials of public international organisations in Sections 134 and 134-1, read together with Sections 89 and 131-1. Cameroon has partially criminalised trading in influence in section 161 PC. Cameroon has criminalised passive bribery in the private sector in section 312 PC, as well as false declarations and the misleading of contractors by directors and managers of private entities, in section 313 PC. As regards money-laundering and concealment (arts. 23 and 24), Cameroon has criminalized money-laundering in line with the Convention (art. 1, Regulation No. 02/10). Cameroon follows an all-crimes approach to money-laundering whereby all offences under the laws and regulations of Cameroon constitute predicate offences. For prosecution of money-laundering, the predicate offence should constitute a criminal offence in the country where it was committed (art. 1). Self-laundering is punishable (art. 51, Regulation No. 02/10) [1].

According to the UNCAC review, there are some areas Cameroon has not addressed. Acts of indirect bribery are not specifically mentioned in the Penal Code; it is noted that benefits accruing to third parties are mentioned only in section 134 and not 134-1 of the Penal Code. There is an automatic exemption from prosecution for persons who were solicited for bribes and who reported the offence to the judicial authorities but did not render assistance in the investigation (Section 134-2 PC). Case statistics on the implementation are not available. There is no statistical data on the number of criminal investigations, prosecutions and convictions. The sections on embezzlement do not cover the full range of embezzlement, misappropriation and other diversion of property or funds for the benefit of a public official or another person or entity. No case law has been provided to demonstrate that private property is covered. The failure to perform an act, or an omission, in violation of law is not explicitly covered. The criminal offence of illicit enrichment has not been established, although a draft bill on anti-corruption contains relevant provisions [1]. Overall, Cameroon did comply with some of the provisions and did not comply with others. The UNCAC report contains a detail record of the items complied with and not complied with, the challenges and the recommendations made by the UNCAC review commitee.

Côte d’Ivoire signed the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC; CNUCC) on December 10, 2003, ratifying and publishing it on December 6, 2011. The country deposited its instrument of ratification with the UN Secretary-General on October 25, 2012, (1), (2).

Partly as a result of UNCAC signature and ratification, Côte d’Ivoire has instituted several laws and decrees related to fighting corruption in different sectors (1).

They include the following:
• Act No. 2013-875 of December 23, 2013, ratifying Order No. 2013-660 of September 20, 2013, on preventing and combating corruption and similar offences (Order No. 660), which broadly reflects the provisions of the Convention that establish corruption offences
• Act No. 2013-661 of September 20, 2013, establishing the powers, composition, organization and functions of the High Authority for Good Governance (HABG)
• Act No. 2005-554 of December 2, 2005, on combating money-laundering
• Act No. 2014-337 of June 5, 2014, establishing a code of transparency in the management of public finances.

Côte d’Ivoire is still working on implementing all the UNCAC provisions. The compliance issues that remain outstanding are regularly discussed during government compliance (mise-en-oeuvre) sessions, which are routinely relayed by Ivorian media.

As per the UNCAC Implementation Review Group (8th session, 19-23 June 2017), a meeting held in Vienna in 2017 to review individual country compliance with UNCAC, the country report for Côte d’Ivoire contained a very long list of outstanding issues, including the following:

“3.3. Challenges in implementation
In order to further strengthen existing measures to combat corruption, it is recommended that Côte d’Ivoire:
• Conduct a comprehensive review of the current Extradition Act of 1927 in order to ensure that
– The requirement that a corruption offence be punishable by two years of imprisonment in order for that offence to be extraditable does not hamper the ability of Côte d’Ivoire to carry out extradition in relation to offences established by the Convention (Art. 44, para. 8)
– Sentences imposed in other States are enforceable in Côte d’Ivoire if the person is not extradited on the ground that he or she is one of its nationals (art. 44, para. 13) (1).
– Fiscal offences, although extraditable under the ECOWAS Convention on Extradition, are also extraditable beyond the ECOWAS region (art. 44, para. 16)
• Establish the obligation to consult with requesting States or allow them to present their opinions and provide additional information before requests for extradition are refused (art. 44, para. 17)”
[See the full list of outstanding issues on p. 13-14 of the country report] (1).

The US State Department maintains that although Côte d’Ivoire has signed and ratified UNCAC, it is not a signatory party, for example, of the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery, which is considered more applicable for commercial trade issues (2). On September 22, 2015, then Minister of State Hamed Bakayoko, took part in a UN-sponsored workshop to examine Côte d’Ivoire’s progress toward implementing UNCAC (3). The Council of Ministers informed about a meeting that President Ouattara held on February 17, 2016, with the government cabinet to inform about the implementation of a review mechanism for UNCAC and to report on Côte d’Ivoire’s participation at a UNCAC convention in St. Petersburg, Russia (4). On October 1, 2018, iMatin, a digital news platform, reported that an NGO (Social Justice) had organized a workshop in Abidjan, financed by Transparency International, to discuss a report about the implementation of UNCAC in Côte d’Ivoire. Attendants included civil society organizations, media and lawyers, as well as Diamouténé Oumar Doh, the representative of the High Authority for Good Governance (Haute autorité pour la bonne gouvernance, HABG) (5).

Egypt is not among the 56 arms exporters listed by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (1), and therefore cannot be considered a significant defence exporter. It ratified the UNCAC in 2005 (2).

Egypt has failed to achieve to meet many of the improvements that the UNCAC requires, despite passing some anti-corruption laws (1), (2), (3). At the implementation level, anti-corruption policies in general and the UNCAC in particular still face immense challenges in making the fight against corruption an effective reality. Egypt’s poor performance on most corruption indicators is evidence of that (4). Even the official national anti-corruption strategy highlights the weak implementation of the UNCAC (5), (6).

Ghana signed and ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) in 2004, and 2007 respectively (1), (2). Ghana also signed the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption in 2007 (3), and the ECOWAS Protocol on the Fight against Corruption in 2001.

Ghana adopted the Anti-Money Laundering Act (Act 749) in 2008, which was amended in 2014 (Act 874), the Whistleblower Act (Act 720) in 2006 (1), and the National Anti-Corruption Action Plan (NACAP) in 2014 (2). Ghana has also passed the Witness Protection Act, 2018 (Act 975) (3). More recently, the Right to Information Act, 2019 (Act 989) was passed by Parliament in March 2019 and signed into law in May 2019 (4).

Although Ghana has signed and ratified most of these treaties, compliance with most of its obligations in priority areas has largely been lacking (5), (6), (7). Following the sixth session of Implementation Review Group of the United Nations Convention against Corruption, Ghana has been encouraged to: clarify and align its investigation and prosecution powers as well as responsibilities to ensure efficiency, effectiveness and independence of the persecution function in corruption cases (UNCAC, Chapter III); and facilitate international cooperation, particularly in extradition procedures (UNCAC, Chapter IV) (8).

Iraq is not a defence exporter. The country’s legislature approved and ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption UNCAC, on March 17, 2008, in Law. No. 35 (1), (2). Iraq has been repeatedly urged by the UN to implement its instruments in a move towards good governance and to satisfy the stipulations of the convention. At the national level, Iraq’s Accountability and Justice Act (3) is the most significant anti-corruption instrument, passed by the council of representatives in 2008, “criminalizing the major forms of corruption”; “active and passive bribery attempted corruption, extortion, money laundering and abuse of office” (1). Iraq’s anti-corruption watchdog, the Commission of Integrity acts under article 6 and 36 of the UN Convention Against Corruption (2). At its 13th meeting, the conference of the states parties to UNCAC, in November 2017, Iraq sponsored the amended draft resolution for “Strengthening mutual legal assistance for international cooperation and asset recovery” (3).

The UNCAC covers the following areas that signatories are required to engage and ultimately fulfil; prevention, criminalization, international cooperation and asset recovery. Compliance is compromised by several factors. Two of the most critical factors are, firstly, the failure of institutions to act as a check on power and, secondly, the poor and biased application of the rule of law (1). Provisions and penalties exist (2), but the real challenge noted by a UNDP-advisor is the ability of the existing leadership to transform “the political model from hegemonic imbalance and institutional fiefdoms” to one that respects diversity “with democratic oversight and accountability preventing the use of the security sector for suppression” (3). Iraq scores 11.6 out of 100 for its legal environment; fourth to last in the region (4). The culture of bribery and deployment of intermediaries as a conduit for unlawful payments undermines the quality of services provided and job performance. Furthermore, we see that UNCAC compliance is compromised. Many analysts and legal experts, among those interviewed, note that the anti-corruption laws laid out in the penal code only apply to the public sector and fail to include war crimes and human rights abuses (5). The political elite’s involvement in organised crime has fostered a culture in which existing checks and laws are weakened and the law does not allow for countervailing actions against the elite (6). These failures culminated as one article put it “a head-on confrontation with institutionalised corruption” as protesters called for the fall of the government (9). This was summarized further by an adviser to current PM, Laith Kubba as unconventional, “Iraq has 10 blocs who have real power via armed groups, they have banks, TV stations, MPs and the corruption merges with those blocs”.

Iraq has shown an openness to work and accept assistance in the form of policy guidance from the International Community. The inauguration of the Supreme Anti-Corruption Council (SCC) represents an important expression of commitment to the ground covered by the UNCAC. Decisions adopted by the SCC are not limited to defence but have seen the referral of cases of corruption to the judiciary (8) although coverage of the mechanisms and outcomes are demonstrably opaque. Colossal revenue loss remains an issue, which suggests a minimal impact from the UNDP asset recovery framework (7), it has not been a sufficient enough mechanism for the recovery of billions, due to the politicisation of corruption matters and investigations which the National Integrity Commission (COI) undertakes, hence recent calls from the KRI COI for Baghdad to appoint a court for prosecuting corruption (8).

In light of the evidence presented, there is little question that the behaviour of Iraq’s ruling class has fostered a culture of corruption.

Jordan signed the UNCAC convention on 9 December 2003, and ratified it on 24 February 2005 (1)(2)(3).

Since its ratification, Jordan has exerted major efforts for compliance with UNCAC. In 2006, the government established the Anti-Corruption Commission and an Ombudsman Office, which carried on their work until 2016, when both entities merged together to constitute the Integrity and Anti-Corruption Commission [1]. The Commission drafted and published its 2017-2025 strategy during a press conference by the Prime Minister [2, 3]. Jordan has also amended a number of laws in order to comply with the UNCAC [4]. The country has also submitted a number of reports to the UNCAC. Despite the fact that changes were made to the legal frameworks preventing corruption, there is little evidence on how issues of corruption are being dealt with, and how cases are being treated.

Kuwait signed the UNCAC in December 2003 and ratified it in February 2007 (1), but it did not sign up to the OECD convention (2), as it is not a high-profile defence exporter. Like other Gulf countries, Kuwait’s military is small, with about 15,000 only (3) in active duty, and it is not a producer of military equipment, and it is not a major imports of arms either, (5) even though it has increased the number of purchases in recent years in the wake of the Arab Spring revolts, which politically destabilised the region and eventually led to the current rift between Qatar and Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states — a conflict where the threat of military action by Saudi Arabia against Qatar has been been seriously discussed, and which Kuwait is trying to resolve as a mediator, according to officials and news reports (4, 6 and 7).

Kuwait has taken many steps to comply with UNCAC standards, especially the ones listed in Chapter IV, according to the UN’s 2015 implementation review (1). In recent years, it has streamlined its extradition and mutual legal assistance procedures with other states, offering frameworks for bilateral cooperation agreements, increasing its cooperation with networks such as Interpol, and expediting extradition requests.

It also established the ACA in 2016 (2), whose job is to gather, investigate and refer to the prosecution corruption complaints from all Government sectors, including its defence and security agencies, according to the UN’s 2016 review (1).

ACA requires all civil servants to disclose their personal finances, which applies to all defense and security sector employees, and it issued Law no. 23 of 2013 (3), which requires banks in Kuwait to ask for and retain more information from their clients to prevent money-laundering, according to state media (4).

But Kuwait has not taken similarly positive steps since 2016, and the steps that it took did not yield results. The public has yet to see their effects. As far as local media, journalists and activists are concerned, no senior official has served time or paid a fine for corruption or negligence — and that is not for a lack of both. In May 2018, the head of the ACA, Abdel Rahman Al-Nimsh said that IMF studies showed that bribery alone costs the country at least 2.2 billion USD a year (5).

Moreover, Kuwait still has not determined its position on bribes offered to foreign officials or occurring in the private sector. And its Public Tenders Authority does not have the right to audit and monitor purchases of “defence materials” made by Kuwait’s military, police or KNG (according to article 2 of Law no. 29 of 2016, the public tenders act) — that task goes to a special committee formed by an executive order from the Prime Minister, and the heads of the agencies making the purchases are the ones who choose the members of this committee (6).

In 2009, the Lebanese government signed and acceded to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) (1). Furthermore, Lebanon is not a defence exporter and, at the time of the research, is not an OECD member and has not signed the organization’s convention (2).

Though Lebanon has enhanced its anti-corruption legal framework and has passed significant laws to improve transparency including the access to information (2017), transparency in oil and gas (2018), and the protection of whistleblowers (2018) (1). Nevertheless, the country still faces gaps in its legal framework in compliance with the UNCAC. For example, Trading in Influence (UNCAC Art. 18) is not criminalized by Lebanon’s Penal Code (LPC). The private sector bribery section in the LPC does not cover all the sections in UNCAC Art. 21. Similarly, Art. 23, 24, and 25 are partially adopted by LPC. On the other hand, Lebanon’s LPC is in line with Art. 15 (a,b), 17, 19, 20, and 22. For instance, Art. 670, 671, and 673 criminalize embezzlement of property in the private sector (UNCAC Art. 22) (2).

The country has yet to industrialise and thus does not have any kind of domestic defence manufacturing industry to speak of. It does not manufacture firearms or any kind of heavy, sophisticated military equipment, neither for export nor for domestic use. Mali ratified the UNCAC in 2008.

In 2014, the government enacted a law that requires all civil servants, including military personnel, to declare their assets.² ⁴ However, members of parliament and their children are not covered by the law. State employees were supposed to comply with the law by 2017, but following strike action by civil servants, the government agreed to suspend the application of the law and revise the text.⁵ The government has subsequently limited the application of the law to certain categories of civil servants, meaning that now only about 1,500 will have to declare their assets.⁴

The UN Convention Against Corruption was signed by Morocco on 9 Dec 2003 and ratified on 9 May 2007 (1).

Morocco is neither a member of the OECD nor a full participant in the OECD Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions. It therefore cannot ratify the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention (2)

Morocco is not a significant defence exporter: it is not part of the top 10 arms exporters (3)

There has been formal compliance from the Moroccan side to the international treaties the country has signed and ratified. Additionally, there has been an increase in the number of corruption cases brought to court. Nevertheless, corruption remains a widespread phenomenon within public administration including in the defence sector according to academics and NGOs. The Moroccan Penal Code dedicated section IV to corruption and influence meddling (Art 248 to 256-1) (1). Article 36 and 167 of the 2011 constitution are dedicated to the fight against corruption (2). In compliance with Article 6 of the 2003 UNCAC, a Central Authority for the Prevention of Corruption (Instance centrale de prévention contre la corruption, ICPC) (3), was created on March 13, 2007. On 13 December 2018, King Mohammed VI appointed Mohamed Bachir Rachdi as the president of a National Instance of Probity, Prevention and Fight against Corruption (Instance Nationale de la Probité, de la prévention et de la Lutte contre la Corruption, INPPLC). Furthermore, Morocco approved on 28 December 2015 a National Strategy for the Fight Against Corruption. The strategy aims to promote integrity and reduce corruption by 2025. It covers various areas, focusing on those related to the institutional and legal aspects. The implementation of this strategy was officially launched on 3 May 2016. A National Anti-Corruption Commission (CNAC) (chaired by the Head of Government and consisting of ministerial departments, relevant governance institutions, the private sector and civil society) is responsible for overseeing and monitoring the implementation of this strategy (4).

Niger is not a defence exporter. The Parliament of Niger ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption through Act No. 2008-26 of 3 July 2008, and it was signed by the President of the Republic through Letter No. 15/PRN of 22 July 2008. The Convention was published in the Official Journal through Decree No. 2008-301 of 11 September 2008 (1,2). 

The UNCAC obliges the state parties to implement a full range of anti-corruption measures affecting their laws, institutions and practices. These measures aim to promote the prevention, detection and sanctioning of corruption, as well as the cooperation between state parties. The UNCAC establishes obligations for governments concerning preventive measures in different public sectors, and it also provides for punitive measures for behaviour considered as bribery or illicit enrichment of a public official. It has also provisions regarding international cooperation between law enforcement authorities, asset recovery, technical assistance and mechanisms for implementation. The Implementation Review Mechanism (IRM) is a peer-review process that assists state parties to implement the Convention effectively. For Niger, the latest review was conducted by the UNODC experts in 2016, resulting in a report, the executive summary is public and was published online (1).
According to the document, Niger complied with most of the obligations in priority areas covered by the Convention: “In general, Niger has undertaken substantial efforts of reform aimed at implementing the provisions of the Convention. The drafting of a bill containing relevant amendments to the Criminal Code on combating corruption is particularly noteworthy. This bill was submitted during the country review and has proved to be in full compliance with the Convention. Its adoption will provide a response to the comments made below concerning challenges in implementation. Furthermore, the establishment of HALCIA and the Information and Verification Office of the Ministry of Justice have been highlighted, as well as preventative and awareness-raising initiatives on corruption issues. Effective inter-agency coordination and cooperation at a national level have also enabled various authorities involved in the fight against corruption to define their roles and actions more clearly” (1).
Among the challenges identified by the UNODC review, a better law reinforcement was needed. The Niger government adopted the anti-corruption bill on 6 December 2016 and HALCIA has become more effective in the identification and seizure of assets (2).
For example, in April 2017 the government of Niger has recovered more than USD 5 million in bank accounts, real estate and property (3). Furthermore, in January 2018, the Council of Ministers adopted a decree project on the policy document regarding National Strategy against Corruption and its Action plan/Stratégie Nationale de Lutte contre la Corruption et son Plan d’action (4,5). However, in the context of insecurity on Niger borders, the spread of smuggling, drug trade and illicit arms circulation since 2011, compliance to the UNCAC is facing numerous challenges.

Nigeria signed and ratified the UNCAC on December 9, 2003, and October 24, 2004, respectively (1).

Nigeria is not an exporter of arms, and therefore not a member of the OECD convention (2). Nigeria has also ratified the Ecowas tax administration treaty which aims to improve the exchange of tax-related information between ECOWAS member states. Nigeria is a party to the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption [AUCC] which was adopted in Maputo on July 11, 2003, to fight rampant political corruption on the African continent.

A first cycle review was conducted between the 7-9 April 2014 (Chap III & IV), a second review cycle (Chap II & V) has also been conducted (1). There are a few issues concerning the implementation of domestic law which have been identified. It does appear that some of these issues have been adequately addressed by the Federal Government of Nigeria, for example, Anti-Corruption and Transparency Monitoring Units have been set up in State Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs). A National Anti-Corruption Strategy was launched in April 2017 (2). However, the problems of coordination between the different anti-corruption agencies continue to exist (2). Limited resources and funding have created communication challenges. Implementation challenges exist with the mandate of the preventative bodies due to the interference of other branches of government. This often manifests in institutional resistance, political interference, and the unwillingness of public officials to comply with the law. Inadequate financial resources also limit the effectiveness of agencies. No candidate or political party has been sanctioned for violating the laws or rules on political funding/campaign finance laws, this is because the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) does not have the power to prosecute. Power to prosecute lies with the Attorney General of the Federation (AGF) and no requests for prosecution has been forwarded to the AGF.

Oman is not a significant defence exporter and has ratified the UNCAC Convention in January 2014 (1), (2). In August 2016 Oman ratified the OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery of Foreign Officials in International Business Transactions (2).

Oman has compliance issues, although there is some evidence to suggest it has made initial attempts to formalise obligations from the UNCAC convention. One formal UNCAC consultation was conducted by the Implementation Review Group of the UNCAC in April-May 2015 (1). This review focused on the implementation of Articles 15-42 of Chapter III and Articles 44-50 of Chapter IV of the UNCAC based on self-assessment from Oman in review cycle 2010-2015 (2). The implementation review group’s document includes a list of 26 recommendations for the Omani government to comply with the convention, and these specifically highlight issues related to bribery, physical enforcement, imprisonment and the rights of victims and whistleblowers (2). There is a reference to the review concerning ratified legislation, where a dedicated team working on the implementation of UNCAC cooperates with the State Financial and Administrative Audit institution to review the implementation (1). Since 2015, there has not been a second review of Oman’s compliance (3). Oman has largely failed to comply with the UNCAC convention in light of the review completed in 2015.

The Palestinian Authority signed and ratified the UNCAC in 2014, as part of its efforts to gain international recognition(1). The Anti Corruption Commission has issued several statements on this issue, trying to apply all UNCAC articles and instruments, as much as it can, because the PA is not a sovereign state yet (2). However, Palestine is not a defence exporter and does not import any heavy weaponry.

This indicator has not been assigned a score due to insufficient information or evidence.

There has not been any report or information about compliance relating to the ratified agreement (1), (2).

Qatar signed the UNCAC Convention on December 1, 2007. It was ratified on January 30, 2007 through an Emiri Decree No. 17. The convention came into force for Qatar on March 1, 2007. [1] Qatar has not signed the OECD Convention, as it is not considered a first-hand arms exporter.

According to the Implementation Review Group of the UNCAC, Qatar has failed to fulfil its obligations, as stipulated in the UNCAC. [1] The observations of the Implementation Review Group were relevant to Bribery and Trading in Influence (arts. 15, 16, 18 and 21) and Extradition; transfer of sentenced persons, and transfer of criminal proceedings (arts. 44, 45 and 47). The Implementation Review Group’s document includes a list of recommendations for the Qatari government to follow, so that they comply with the convention. These specifically highlight issues related to bribery, physical enforcement, imprisonment and the rights of victims and witnesses. [2] According to our sources, Qatar has advanced in its effort to amend its laws to meet all UNCAC terms. According to our source, Qatar does not partake in many corrupt activities. [3] In addition, the ACC is newly established and tries to match its work with international standards. [4]

In April 2013, Saudi Arabia ratified the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) (1). However, like many of the signatories of the convention (including the USA), Saudi Arabia does not consider itself bound by Paragraph 2 of Article 66 of the convention, which provides for universal jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice to pursue violations of the convention; nor does it consider the convention to be the legal basis for extradition with other parties to the convention, which is provided for in Paragraph 5 of Article 44 (2). Saudi Arabia is not a member of the OECD and has not signed the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. The Convention is open to accession by any country, which is a member of the OECD or has become a full participant in the OECD Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions (3).

According to the report by the Implementation Review Group for UNCAC published in June 2018, Saudi Arabia has committed itself to pursue zero-tolerance against corruption and has made significant efforts in the field of corruption prevention. Saudi Arabia has made progress in several areas. This includes simplifying administrative procedures across government departments; developing a comprehensive programme on corruption prevention; implementing various forms of professional and specialised training to counter corruption and strengthen integrity in the public sector; establishing a Standing Committee in Nazaha, the country’s main anti-corruption body, in September 2016 to follow up and monitor the implementation of Saudi Arabia’s national anti-corruption strategy. The report also outlines several challenges and recommendations for Saudi Arabia in terms of implementation of the Convention’s stipulations to bring the country more in line with international good practices, including in the areas of public procurement, management of public finances, and anti-money laundering (1). In August 2017, Saudi Arabia held a joint workshop together with the United States to review their experiences in implementing UNCAC (2), (3).

Tunisia is not a significant defence exporter (1). Tunisia signed the UNCAC on 30 March 2004 and ratified it on 23 September 2008 (2)

There are shortcomings in complying with some parts of the Convention. In 2014, 16 gaps were identified by the team responsible for self-assessment of the implementation of the UNCAC in Tunisia, including the non-criminalisation of corruption in the private sector and the non-protection of whistleblowers. A civil society shadow report confirmed the 16 gaps and added specific recommendations to address the weak areas in the legal framework (1). Since then, multiple laws have been adopted to remedy these gaps: protection of whistleblowers (2), declaration of gains and interests and illicit enrichment (3), and access to information (4). However, some gaps persist, such as the non-criminalization of corruption in the private sector.

The UAE is a signatory to the United Nations Convention against Corruption, the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, and the Arab Anti-Corruption Convention, but is not a signatory to the OECD (1). The UAE is considered a major arms exporter, as well as a second-hand exporter of arms, as weapons purchased by the UAE are shipped to Yemen and Libya. The UAE has also become the third-largest weapons importer in the world. Most of these imports are from the United States, followed by France, Russia, Italy, and Sweden (2). The UAE signed the UNCAC on August 10, 2005, and ratified it on February 22, 2006. The UAE’s ratification, however, came with reservations on articles related to arbitration. Even though the country has signed up to the UNCAC, it has not ratified all the relevant instruments within the convention.

This indicator is marked Not Applicable because the UAE has not ratified the OECD Convention, which is the relevant instrument in this case, considering the UAE’s status as a significant defence exporter.

Country Sort by Country 5a. Signatory and Ratification status Sort By Subindicator 5b. Compliance Sort By Subindicator
Algeria 100 / 100 50 / 100
Angola 100 / 100 0 / 100
Burkina Faso 100 / 100 50 / 100
Cameroon 100 / 100 25 / 100
Cote d'Ivoire 100 / 100 25 / 100
Egypt 100 / 100 0 / 100
Ghana 100 / 100 25 / 100
Iraq 50 / 100 0 / 100
Jordan 100 / 100 50 / 100
Kuwait 100 / 100 25 / 100
Lebanon 100 / 100 25 / 100
Mali 100 / 100 25 / 100
Morocco 100 / 100 100 / 100
Niger 100 / 100 50 / 100
Nigeria 100 / 100 50 / 100
Oman 100 / 100 0 / 100
Palestine 100 / 100 NEI
Qatar 100 / 100 0 / 100
Saudi Arabia 50 / 100 25 / 100
Tunisia 100 / 100 50 / 100
United Arab Emirates 25 / 100 NA

With thanks for support from the UK Department for International Development and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs who have contributed to the Government Defence Integrity Index.

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