Q10.

Are there regular assessments of the areas of greatest corruption risk for ministry and armed forces personnel, and are the findings used as inputs to the anti-corruption policy?

10a. Risk assessments

Score

SCORE: 0/100

Assessor Explanation

Assessor Sources

10b. Regularity

Score

SCORE: NA/100

Assessor Explanation

Assessor Sources

10c. Inputs to anti-corruption policy

Score

SCORE: NA/100

Assessor Explanation

Assessor Sources

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There is no evidence that a defence-specific assessment of corruption has been commissioned since the last assessment of the country, which came to the same conclusion (6). It appears that such assessments have also not taken place in other sectors. In the summer of 2018, for example, the ONPLC and the finance ministry set up a working group that should determine how to implement corruption risk mapping in the financial sector (4). At the end of 2018, it seems that the group was still working on it (5).

The president of the AACC, Djilali Hadjadj, has emphasized that there is a “lack of political will on the part of the government to fight corruption” (1). In October 2018, unprecedented detentions of military officers happened, when five generals were arrested for alleged corruption offences. They were accused of “squandering” public funds and “mismanagement” (2). No evidence could be found that these cases have already had an impact on the ministry’s risk assessment concerning corruption. As has been outlined before, “corruption is an essential feature of the country’s system of governance” (3, p. 19), which makes it doubtful that changes have taken place.

No assessment on the regularity is therefore possible and the answer is scored “Not Applicable.” There is no evidence that a defence-specific assessment of corruption has been commissioned (see the answer to question 10A). The ONPLC and the finance ministry set up a working group to determine how to implement corruption risk mapping in the financial sector, which, at the end of 2018, was still working on it (1) (2).

No assessement on inputs to anti-corruption policy is therefore possible and the answer is scored “Not Applicable.” There is no evidence that a defence-specific assessment of corruption has been commissioned (see the answer to question 10A). The ONPLC and the finance ministry set up a working group to determine how to implement corruption risk mapping in the financial sector, which, at the end of 2018, was still working on it (1) (2).

No evidence could be found that defence-specific assessments of corruption risk have been commissioned or conducted in the last few years.

According to an Institute for Security Studies (ISS) (2017) report, “Incoming President Joao Lourenco will need to institute difficult economic reforms and restore the functioning of key state institutions. Reforming the security apparatus will be a challenge if Lourenco wants to streamline command and control and professionalise the sector … the fragility of the security apparatus needs to be addressed. Corruption and opaque arms procurement deals need to be curtailed; defence spending requires oversight.” (1). This indicates a lack of professionalism, continued corruption, and a lack of oversight or order in the sector.

No evidence could be found that defence-specific assessments of corruption risk have been commissioned or conducted in the last few years. Thus, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

No evidence could be found that defence-specific assessments of corruption risk have been commissioned or conducted in the last few years. Thus, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

No defence-specific assessment of corruption risk has been commissioned or taken place in the last 2-3 years. However, the ASCE-LC assesses many institutions on an annual report, along with some recommendations (1). From 2015, the ASCE-LC was granted power to investigate and prosecute cases of corruption. It should be able to expand its assessment to many public institutions, including the defence ministry. Assessments by the ASCE-LC usually results in recommendations being sent to each ministry, but the assessed ministries do not take them into account (1), (2). Additionally, there is the Supreme Audit Institution, which assesses public accounts managed by the government institutions. There are also civil society organizations, which assess corruption in public institutions. The REN-LAC has also identified key areas of greatest corruption risk (3). According to the DOS 2017 report, the National Anti-Corruption Network (REN-LAC) has identified the Municipal Police as the most corrupted government institution (4). The report also mentions that the REN -LAC also reported that “pervasive corruption in the customs service, gendarmerie, tax agencies, national police, municipal police, public health service, municipal governments, education sector, government procurement, and the Ministry of Justice, Human Rights, and Civic Promotion” (3).

No defence-specific assessment of corruption risk has been commissioned or taken place in the last 2-3 years. As such this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

No defence-specific assessment of corruption risk has been commissioned or taken place in the last 2-3 years. As such this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

No systematic assessment has been carried out of corruption risks for the Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces personnel, but it is believed that there is a growing awareness amongst military personnel of the risks of being charged with corruption as names of some corrupt military personnel are being broadcast over the state media [1] [2] and top military officials are allegedly charged with corruption. As reported by the head of the communication division at the Ministry of Defence, there is no tolerance or complacency in the face of differences in behavior in the Cameroonian army (speaking in an interview with the national daily Cameroon Tribune in June 2017). This was in connection with acts of corruption perpetrated by two non-commissioned officers of the gendarmerie to which Mindef (Ministry of Defence) reacted by levying heavy sanctions, including imprisonment [2]. The head of the communication division reported that there is a structure within the gendarmerie which, for example, sanctions both gendarmes and the military when cases of abuse are proven. Military Security receives many complaints from the public, including those posted on social media. These are taken with the utmost seriousness by the Minister Delegate to the Presidency in charge of Defence and all his colleagues. Naturally, investigations are always opened when the the complaint is well-founded. [2].

However, widespread corruption in the defence and security sector suggests that there are no such measures carried out systematically on a consistent basis. The GAN Business Anti-Corruption Portal reports states that “Cameroon’s police force is inefficient, poorly trained and plagued by corruption. Bribery is widespread among the police, and officers often demand payments at checkpoints and in exchange for granting unlawful freedom to detainees (HRR 2016). Further, corrupt police officials arrest and abuse individuals in exchange for monetary rewards from influential entities and individuals (HRR 2016). Over half of Cameroonians consider the police to be corrupt (GCB 2015). The government has taken some steps to hold officers accountable for abuse of functions, yet impunity remains widespread in the institution (HRR 2016). Cameroonian police cannot be relied upon to enforce law and order, and more than one in four firms identify crime, such as theft, and disorder as a major constraint (GCR 2016-2017, ES 2016). Companies attribute significant costs to crime; three out of five firms pay for their own security.” [3].

There is no information to indicate that regular and consistent assessments are conducted. Investigations are only carried out when there has been a reported case of corruption and abuse of power that was already publicised on social media [1] [2]. Thus, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

Risk assessments are not regularly conducted [1]. Thus, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

There is a lack of evidence in the last 2-3 years that the government or the NA has subjected the areas most at risk of corruption within the MoD or the armed forces to regular assessments.

MoD: No evidence that at-risk areas (arms procurement, military expenditure) are assessed for corruption risk regularly.
armed forces: No evidence that at-risk areas are being assessed.
Police Nationale, Douanes, Protection Civile: No evidence that at-risk areas are being assessed.

The Plan National pour la Bonne Gouvernance et la Lutte Contre la Corruption, established in 2013 as a broad-based anti-corruption plan, does not include regular assessments of at-risk areas, and certainly not at the MoD or armed forces. In general, anti-corruption initiatives in Côte d’Ivoire are driven by actions against specific people accused of bribery/corruption rather than being preventive by nature. For example, the Loi de Programmation Militaire (LPM 2016-2020) allocated resources (2.254 billion FCFA; about USD 745 million per year) to the different military budgets through 2020, an increase in expenditure compared to the previous Law. The reasons for increased spending included the need to reequip the armed forces, the strengthening of border controls (especially in the more unstable western regions) and the fight against terrorism (1). The LPM 2016-2020 was approved by the NA Commission de Sécurité et Défense (CDS) on 4 January 2016. It has been characterized by the minister of defence as a reform bill driven by the professionalization of the armed forces. It seeks to reduce the number of soldiers in the armed forces to save on personnel expenditure. The executive hired Jefferson Waterman International (JWI), a US-based consultancy, to help draft the terms of the program. The document does not appear to mention areas in the military budget (such as arms procurement) that should be regularly audited for corruption risk (2), (3), (4), (5).

There is no evidence of regular assessments of at-risk corruption areas in the defence sector. Therefore, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

There is no evidence of regular assessments of at-risk corruption areas in the defence sector. Therefore, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

After surveying the Constitution, the anti-corruption strategy, all defence-related laws and media platforms, no evidence has been found to suggest that defence-specific assessments of corruption have taken place in the last three years. Interviewees agree that there have not been any risk assessments within the army for at least ten years (1), (2), (3).

As our sources indicated there are no risk assessments, this sub-indicator has been scored Not Applicable (1), (2), (3).

As our sources indicated there are no risk assessments, this sub-indicator has been scored Not Applicable (1), (2), (3).

There are no publicly available corruption risk assessments for ministry and armed forces personnel. However, activity 11 of the NACAP “Strategic Objective 1: to build public capacity to condemn and fight corruption and to make corruption a high-risk, low-gain activity” includes, “conduct[ing] assessment of institutions/agencies on the integration of corruption prevention measures in their work programmes” with an indicative budget allocated of 500,000 USD (1), (2), (3), (4). No information about its implementation has been found.

This indicator is scored Not Applicable because there is no evidence that risk assessments are conducted.

This indicator is scored Not Applicable because there is no evidence that risk assessments are conducted.

There is no evidence in Arabic and English sources of published reports by defence officials or bodies measuring or assessing high corruption risk in its own or associated institution, in spite of renewed defence risks. While the state officially exercises command over all security agencies, the PMF command structure, “does not necessarily go up to the prime minister, who serves as commander-in-chief” (1). The fact that the organization competes with other forces commanded by the state, “over checkpoints and operations” raises new defence concerns the government of Iraq is yet to address (1). The fragmented nature of the armed forces, a retired military officer explained in an interview (2) with Transparency International, reflects the “lack of agreement on which areas represent the greatest corruption risks” (2). Recent calls from State of Law MP Aliyah Nassif for the integrity and judicial commission to resume their investigation of ex-defence minister Obeidi goes against not guilty verdict issued by Iraq’s courts (3), in another example of political infighting which continues to hamper Abadi’s corruption reform. While investigations are, by law, handled by Iraq’s integrity commission alongside inspector generals, there is no evidence of assessments of risks they have examined in the case of the military or armed forces. In November 2017, the Parliament voted to abolish the inspector general’s offices (4), as one article states “a clear indication of their abject failure” (5). Some inspectors, are additionally implicated in corruption cases themselves. Therefore, a score of ‘0’ has been chosen in the absence of assessment risks, as far as Iraq’s security actors/institutions are concerned. The impact of corruption risks on Iraq’s military and defence sector is better assessed by INGO’s, including NATO (2018), to tailor their training programmes intended to professionalize and develop the capacity of Iraq’s security forces and defence establishment.

No evidence was found to support the claim that scheduled risk assessments are enforceable by Iraq’s security and defence establishment. This is all the more likely in light of ever-shifting political developments (1), (2), (3), (4) that would disrupt planned scheduling, including the potential reemergence or continued attacks by the ISG.

In the absence of a national anti-corruption strategy and compliance programmes, it cannot be proven that corruption risk assessments are conducted or scheduled, although the responsibility on Inspector Generals within the respective ministry concerned, which ought to serve as an internal control system (1), (2). In spite of that, few effective measures have been adopted by IGs within their respective ministries (1).

There is no evidence to support that the defence sector conducts corruption risk assessments in Jordan. In fact, the only entity that could possibly run such assessments is the Audit Bureau, which does not seem to have much oversight power over defence institutions. According to the list of ministries, institutions and authorities audited by the Jordanian Audit Bureau, the General Intelligence Directorate and the Public Security Directorate are included in the audited entities section [1]. However, there is no indicator or any evidence that the Armed Forces have been audited at all in the past three years [3, 4]. The lack of an effective defence ministry in the country, and accountability reasons in matters related to defence, also makes it difficult to carry out audits. In recent parliamentary discussions, amendments have been proposed to the mandate of the Audit Bureau in order to ensure its independence and partiality, when auditing all governmental institutions [2]. These assessments of security and defence in the country are irregular and do not apply to all entities relevant to defence, and they also fail to provide recommendations around corruption risks [5].

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable because corruption risk assessments are not conducted in relation to defence [1,2,3].

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable because corruption risk assessments are not conducted in relation to defence [1,2,3].

Corruption risks are not clearly identified and the internal financial departments of the security agencies do not have a culture of corruption risk assessment — but that appears to be changing. The SAB created, in 2017, a unit whose sole job will be to establish a guide for auditors to use to identify risks in Government agencies that lead to the squandering of public funds, the SAB said in its annual 2017 report (1).

So far nothing has emerged to suggest that this unit will address every department in every ministry, or if it will simply examine defence and interior ministries as a whole.

This sub-indicator has been marked as Not Applicable because the SAB unit was created in 2017 and at the time of the GDI research the 2018 annual report was not published. In this regard, access to information about regularity can be further assessed only after the SAB releases its 2018 report. The 2017 report does not say how often the institution will conduct the risk assessments, but it does talk about how they intend to change their (yearly) system based on this new unit’s findings, so it would not be unreasonable to assume that they will be conducting these risk assessments at least once a year starting from 2018 (1).

This sub-indicator has been marked as Not Applicable because the SAB unit was created in 2017 and at the time of the GDI research the 2018 annual report was not published. We will not see the effects of this unit until the 2018 report is available.

No evidence of regular defence specific assessments of corruption risks done by the Ministry of Defence was found. The Ministry of State for Combating Corruption did not conduct such assessment before it was dissolved, which source 1 confirmed (1). The DoO has indicated that anti-corruption measures are integrated into the laws and provisions regulating the LAF which military personnel are continuously reminded of by their seniors (2).

This sub-indicator has been marked as Not Applicable, as there is no evidence of defence specific corruption risks assessments being conducted (1). However, the DoO has indicated that anti-corruption measures are integrated into the laws and provisions regulating the LAF (2).

This sub-indicator has been marked as Not Applicable, as there is no evidence of defence specific corruption risks assessments being conducted. Although the research found no risk assessments conducted (1), the LAF’s Directorate for International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights conducted anti-corruption training on two rounds at the Fouad Chehab Military College. The training was led by two colonels who had undergone combating terrorism and money laundering training in the US (2).

In 2014, the Minister of Economy and Finance and the Minister of Justice and Human Rights requested that the IMF conduct an assessment of the primary corruption risks in Mali. The report was commissioned in the wake of the controversial off-budget purchase of a new presidential jet for USD35-40 million without parliamentary approval. Curiously though, the IMF report, which was completed in December 2014, focuses on corruption risks in real estate, banking, mining and the use of shell companies. It does not analyse the risks of corruption in either government ministries or in defence procurement. Since then, there is no public record of any further assessments being undertaken. This was confirmed by a security expert working in Bamako, who said that they had no knowledge of the MDAC instigating any kind of risk assessment for corruption during the past three years [3].

There is no regular schedule for risk assessments. Therefore, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

No risk assessments were conducted after 2014. Therefore, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

No evidence of a defence-specific assessment of corruption risk that has been commissioned or taken place in the last 2-3 years was found (1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8)(9)(10)(11)(12)(13)(14)

Risk assessments are not conducted, and this sub-indicator is therefore Not Applicable

Risk assessments are not conducted, and this sub-indicator is therefore Not Applicable

No defence-specific assessment of corruption risk has been commissioned or taken place in the last 2-3 years. Even though an official risk assessment has not been conducted (1), interviews with officials in the Defence and the Interior ministries have revealed that there is a specific awareness of the risk areas, namely on the positions requiring direct contact with the population for instance at the border checkpoints as well as during the procurement process (2,3). 

Risk assessments were not conducted, therefore, the section is marked Not Applicable.

Risk assessments were not conducted, therefore, the section is marked Not Applicable.

The Anti-Corruptions Units have not developed and published their action plans, despite requirement by the NACS that such assessments should be carried out. Despite the publication and adoption of the NACS there is little information about its operationalisation. The anti-corruption strategy does call for regular and periodic reviews of action plans and makes provision on paper for monitoring of the implementation plan (1), (2).

The operations of Anti-Corruptions Units are unknown. Although the NACS has mandated the ACU to conduct assessments regularly, there is no evidence of such assessments taking place. Therefore, this indicator is marked Not Applicable.

The operations of Anti-Corruptions Units are unknown. Although the NACS has mandated the ACU to conduct assessments regularly, there is no evidence of such assessments taking place. Therefore, this indicator is marked Not Applicable.

There has never been any risk assessment of corruption within the sultan’s armed forces or the defence ministry. Corruption is not seen as a risk within the armed forces and therefore, there is no need for risk assessment (1). Capacity building by the National Centre for Financial Information website contains annual reports to combat money laundering and terrorist financing; this involves workshops and collaboration with armed forces (2), (3). No explicit mention is made to risk assessments of corruption targeted at dealing with corruption within the defence ministry or armed forces personnel. Importantly there exists no indication that there have ever been defence-specific assessments of corruption risks, at least publicly available.

This sub-indicator has been marked as Not Applicable, as there is no evidence of any risk assessments conducted around corruption risks either within the Ministry of Defence or the armed forces in the country (1), (2).

This sub-indicator has been marked as Not Applicable, as there is no evidence of any risk assessments conducted around corruption risks either within the Ministry of Defence or the armed forces in the country (1), (2), (3).

There has not been any risk assessment within any of the PA armed services institutions (1), (2).

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable, because there has not been any risk assessment within any of the PA armed services institutions (1), (2).

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable, because there has not been any risk assessment within any of the PA armed services institutions (1), (2).

There are no committees within the Qatari Advisory Council that are tasked with carrying out risk assessments of the areas of greatest corruption risk within the defence sector. The Qatari Audit Bureau is also not mandated or authorised to carry out assessments for either the Ministry of Interior or the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces [1]. It is explicitly stated that ‘matters within the scope of military and security requirements of the accounts of Ministry of Defence, Ministry of the Interior and other military and security entities as determined by their competent higher command, shall be excluded from the Bureau review and audit’ [1]. According to our sources, there is no regular assessment of the areas of possible corruption due to the belief that there is no corruption in the armed forces. [2]

This sub-indicator has been marked as Not Applicable as no risk assessments of the areas of greatest corruption risk within the defence sector have been conducted.

This sub-indicator has been marked as Not Applicable as no risk assessments of the areas of greatest corruption risk within the defence sector have been conducted.

According to our sources, there has not been any defense targeting assessment of corruption been taken place. There is no, in general within the Saudi Government any corruption and corruption risks assessments(8,9). The General Auditing Bureau (GAB) is responsible for auditing the state’s revenues, expenditures, and assets, and technically has oversight over all ministries and government departments. According to its charter, this includes the auditing of military sector accounts (1). The GAB submits its annual report to the king and the Council of Ministers (the country’s Cabinet which is chaired by the King), however it does not have any real authority to independently assess potential corruption in those sectors given they are the domain of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the de facto ruler of the country.

In November 2017, Mohammed bin Salman arrested the commander of the Saudi Arabian National Guard Miteb bin Abdullah, the son of late King Abdullah, as part of a widespread anti-corruption purge. This sweep was spearheaded by a newly-formed anti-corruption committee led by the crown prince, with authority to investigate, arrest, issue travel bans and freeze the assets of those it found to be corrupt (2). The committee included heads of several Saudi government bodies, such as the Control and Investigation Board; the National Anti-Corruption Commission; the General Auditing Bureau; the Presidency of State Security; and the Attorney General at the Public Prosecutor’s Office (3). French publication Intelligence Online characterized the arrest as a move designed to remove the informal deal-making channels that were prevalent in the defense industry, including those previously managed by Miteb’s maternal uncle Salah Fustok (4). Charges against Miteb include embezzlement and awarding fake defense contracts to his own firms; he later paid a USD 1 billion dollar settlement relating to these charges (5,6). In addition to Miteb, according to a senior Saudi official, Saudi authorities also arrested 14 retired military officers who previously served in the Ministry of Defence, as well as two retired SANG officers, on suspicion of involvement in financial contracts which were allegedly corrupt (7).

While this does appear to represent scrutiny of corruption specifically in the defense sector and of the armed forces and personnel, it was carried out in an ad hoc manner by the Crown Prince and does not reflect a formalized or regular process that feeds into an overall anti-corruption policy.

Risk assessments on high-risk areas for corruption are not conducted, so this sub-indicator is not applicable (1), (2).

Risk assessments on high-risk areas for corruption are not conducted, so this sub-indicator is not applicable (1), (2).

According to our sources, there are no defence-specific assessments of corruption risk. The MoD does not consider corruption as a great risk and therefore there is no such assessment(1,2,3).

This indicator is marked Not Applicable because there is no evidence of the existence of defence-specific assessments of corruption risk.

This indicator is marked Not Applicable because there is no evidence of the existence of defence-specific assessments of corruption risk.

There is no evidence available that shows that any risk assessments for the defence sector have been commissioned in the last 2-3 years. The websites of the Ministry of Defence and the State Audit Institution include no information about corruption risk assessments. (1), (2), (3), (4), (5).

This sub-indicator has been marked as NA, as no assessments of corruption risks have been commissioned in the past few years, and for this reason, assessing the regularity of the non-existent assessments is not relevant in this context (1), (2), (3), (4).

This sub-indicator has been marked as NA, as no assessments of corruption risks have been commissioned in the past few years, and for this reason, assessing the regularity of the non-existent assessments is not relevant in this context (1), (2), (3), (4).

Country Sort by Country 10a. Risk assessments Sort By Subindicator 10b. Regularity Sort By Subindicator 10c. Inputs to anti-corruption policy Sort By Subindicator
Algeria 0 / 100 NA NA
Angola 0 / 100 NA NA
Burkina Faso 0 / 100 NA NA
Cameroon 0 / 100 NA NA
Cote d'Ivoire 0 / 100 NA NA
Egypt 0 / 100 NA NA
Ghana 0 / 100 NA NA
Iraq 0 / 100 NA NA
Jordan 0 / 100 NA NA
Kuwait 25 / 100 NA NA
Lebanon 0 / 100 NA NA
Mali 0 / 100 NA NA
Morocco 0 / 100 NA NA
Niger 0 / 100 NA NA
Nigeria 0 / 100 NA NA
Oman 0 / 100 NA NA
Palestine 0 / 100 NA NA
Qatar 0 / 100 NA NA
Saudi Arabia 0 / 100 NA NA
Tunisia 0 / 100 NA NA
United Arab Emirates 0 / 100 NA NA

With thanks for support from the UK Department for International Development and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs who have contributed to the Government Defence Integrity Index.

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