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Does the country have a process for acquisition planning that involves clear oversight, and is it publicly available?

11a. Acquisition planning process


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11b. Transparency



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11c. External oversight



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Defence acquisition planning is conducted following the long-term plan on the development of the armed forces 2016-2025 [1]. Under the Law on the Powers and Commanding Authorities of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania (Article 11), the Council of Ministers approves specific acquisition and modernisation programmes for the armed forces while the parliament approves the long term plans on development and modernisation [2].
Acquisitions are conducted following the Law on Public Procurement (LPP) [3]. According to the LLP, procurements related to national defence are exempted from the law and conducted following the Decision of Council of Ministers (DCM 1403/2008) [4] and for the intelligence services under DCM 17/2000 [5].
DCM 1403 links procurement to resource management and budgeting through multi-year and annual contracts, and specifies that approval of multiyear contracts fall under the responsibility of the Council of Ministers (Chapter II). DCM 1403 specifies also all the bodies responsible for the acquisition cycle [4]. These bodies have specific responsibilities such as the structures responsible for the generation of demands, those responsible for the evaluation and classification of acquisition requests, the structure for the negotiation of the contracts, and those for the management of the contracts [4].
The MoD publishes some general information on past and expected acquisition, albeit with no financial data included [7, 8]. Thus, it is not possible to estimate the extent to which defence acquisition derives from strategy or the long-term development plan.

The public has very limited access to the acquisition process. No acquisition plan is published by the MoD. Under the transparency program the MoD has published a list of 11 completed procurement procedures for the year 2015, and a list of ongoing procedures for the same year [1, 2]. Among the five services, only the Support Command Service has published the procurement plan for the year 2018 [3].
The Public Procurement Agency publishes the annual procurement plans, including the MoD, which includes only the acquisitions conducted through procedures that are not exempted by the LLP (open procedures). The annual plans include the aim of the procurement, the amount of funds available, the time of the tendering, the procurement procedure and the source of financing [4].

The parliament is not involved in ex-post oversight of acquisition planning. Ex-ante oversight is conducted by the parliament through the adoption of the long term plans on development and modernisation [1] and the adoption of the annual budget. The SSAI oversees the accusations but focuses mainly on the legality of spending. Recent major procurements have revealed flaws in the procurement procedures related to the costs or adequacy of the acquisitions, but the parliament has not taken any action, although cases have been investigated by the prosecution services. For example, the case of the procurement of helicopters for the modernization of the air force or the procurement of armoured vehicles [2]. However, there was a follow-up action by parliament [3]. No assessment of the long term performance of the acquisition has been conducted by the SSAI [3].

No information on a defined process for acquisition planning was found during the research. There is no clear defence strategy published, for example, on the Ministry of Defence website (1), which could be connected to specific purchases. Policy analysis confirms that the Vice Defence Minister has not publicly spoken about a strategy (2). There are public statements about national threats namely organized crime and terrorism (3). With regards to the latest acquisitions, McGregor writes, the military equipment that Algeria has bought mainly from Russia is only partly useful for counter-insurgency or counter-terrorism and is better suited for defending the country against foreign countries (4).

Since there is no defined process for acquistion planning, this sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable. No information on the acquisition planning process could be found, i.e., the Ministry of Defence website (1). If there is any information available on acquisitions made, it can be found in the magazine of the armed forces which occasionally reports about acquisitions retrospectively. For example, the military notified the public about the inauguration/launching of a corvette in 2016 (2). The national media have retrospectively reported about acquisitions (3).

Since there is no defined process for acquistion planning, this sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable. No information on external oversight of the acquisition planning process could be found. The military has not allowed any civilian oversight over its affairs (1), (2), which makes it likely that no external oversight exists. No evidence could be found that the two chambers of the Algerian parliaments oversee the acquisition planning process (3) (4).

There is an internal acquisition planning process at the ministerial level, though it is not transparent and accessible to the public. The public company Simportex is tasked with investments and acquisition of goods and services for the defence and security sector (1). Despite being formally under the supervision of the Ministry of Defence, the company has reportedly long been under control of the President’s Security Bureau chief. Formal oversight is exercised through the state budget process in Parliament and the Audit Court (2). Though comprehensive data on the defence budget and acquisition planning is unavailable to the public, there are indications that due to the financial crisis in Angola since late 2014, off-budget spending in the defence sector has again increased (2).

Simportex has reportedly long been controlled by the long-time head of the President’s Security Bureau, General Manuel Hélder Vieira Dias “Kopelipa”. For example, in 2014, General “Kopelipa” allegedly sidelined Simportex to directly award army food delivery contracts to a company owned by a strawman. Under its 2018 organic statute, Simportex’s monopoly for service delivery, arms and military logistics procurement for the armed forces was reaffirmed (3).
According to a recent interview with the management board chair of Simportex, Luís Manuel Pizarro, budget constraints have led to increasing off-budget spending through additional credit lines that often imply direct contracts awards. Yet, Angolan media reports have accused Pizarro of complicity with the former head of the President’s Security Bureau, General “Kopelipa” (4).

The 2016 Public Procurement Law establishes that arms and military logistics procurement is classified as secret (Art. 7, 1, b) (1). The acquisition planning process of the state-owned procurement company Simportex is mostly non-public, though the audit court has published some opinions on contracts submitted by the company (2).

Oversight of the defence acquisition planning at the ministerial level is not transparent. Oversight by the Audit Court is limited to formal compliance with basic aspects of the public procurement law, and parliamentary oversight over the defence budget is limited (1), (2).

According to an Institute for Security Studies (ISS) (2017) report, “Reforming the security apparatus will be a challenge if Lourenco wants to streamline command and control and professionalise the sector … the fragility of the security apparatus needs to be addressed. Corruption and opaque arms procurement deals need to be curtailed; defence spending requires oversight.” (3).

Since 2007 there is a planning cycle for the defence area, which is specified in stages and internal functions. However, mechanisms for a procurement plan that functionally separate the budget, commercial, and financial areas are not provided. There is no evidence that the acquisition plans of the Armed Forces have been published, either in official portals or in the press. The defence planning cycle is framed in Decree 1729 of 2007 and specifies the assignment of tasks to each of the corresponding intervening entities. This indicates that the cycle is quadrennial and begins in the National Defence Policy Directive issued by the executive branch of the Nation (under the proposal of the Ministry of Defence), in its constitutional role as commander of the country’s Armed Forces. [1] [2] From that Directive, the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces will formulate a Military Strategic Planning, which will be materialised in the documents: a) Directive for the Development of the Military Strategic Planning (DEPEM), b) Appreciation and Strategic Military Resolution (AREMIL), c) Strategic Military Directive (DEMIL), d) Short-, Medium-, and Long-Term Military Plan. According to the decree, the defence investment plan is part of the medium-term planning (4 to 20 years) of the military capabilities formulated by the EMCO and must be approved by the Ministry. PLANCAMIL fulfills the functions of aligning military acquisitions with what is established by the DPDN. There is also Law 24,948, known as the Law of Military Restructuring, which is in force and establishes the functions that the military have in the equipment process, in Title 6, Articles 17 to 25, which has been enforced partially due to the constant financing problems that the defence sector has in the public budget. [3] [4]

The beginning of the planning cycle is public knowledge. This begins with the DPDN (quadrennial) of the national executive branch that is established by Presidential Decree and is announced in the official bulletin. [1] [2] However, the other stages are not easily accessible since they were not raised in the regulations as public documents. The DPDN 2018 starts the third planning cycle and proposes as a guiding criterion for resource planning the implementation of a progressive internal redistribution of military spending, destined for the reconversion process of the Military Instrument. Likewise, Decree 683/18 establishes that the Armed Forces will mark their planning in operations in defence of vital interests, operations within the framework of the UN, operations framed in the Internal Security Law, and operations in support of the community. However, the procurement plan that follows from these regulations is not public knowledge. [3] [4] [5] Access to information regarding this plan is based on information portals related to budgets, such as COMPR.AR and CONTRA.AR, [6] so that access to information is relative and only around parts of the process. In turn, both in the news published by the Ministry and the press, the information is about advanced or already completed acquisition processes. Likewise, there are processes that are excluded from the process of publication in the portals, such as when it comes to agreements with foreign states, which are part of the exceptions regulated in Decree 1023 of 2001 and 1030 of 2016. [7] In addition, there is legal framework that allows for secret purchases, for example Decree 125/2018, which initiated the process of purchasing military equipment, as well as low and very low coverage anti-aircraft defence. [8]

Procurement planning supervision occurs within the Ministry of Defence. Although there may be controls by external organisations, such as the AGN or the Anti-Corruption Office, they do not mention supervision of the procurement plan, but rather around completed operations or general controls. The main role in the cycle regarding the planning and execution of the acquisitions and contracting of the defence jurisdiction is found in the organisation chart dated July 2019 in the Secretariat of Logistics Services of the Defence and Military Coordination for Emergencies. [1] The AGN for its part conducts financial audits of control and compliance and special studies in order to contribute to the economic, efficient, and effective use of public resources. For this, it prepares an Annual Operational Plan (POA) that contemplates the projects to be audited for their significance, risk, relevance, and interest. For 2019, for example, auditable institutions of the defence jurisdiction are considered only to the financial statements of Military Manufacturing and COVIARA (Construction of houses for the Navy). [2] However, external control bodies, such as the Anti-Corruption Office, are sometimes questioned for their independence or performance. Thus, Bermolén points out that the ineffectiveness of these organisations has been evidenced in recent cases of complaints involving officials in their exercise of power, mostly detected by investigations conducted by foreign media. [3]

The basis for the procurement planning process is the Development Plan of the Armed Forces for 2019-2024 approved by the long-term program and the state program of development of the armament and military equipment for 2018-2024.
The acquisition of the defence sector is regulated with the same laws and procedures as the general one for all public institutions. The main source regulating the defence sector is the Law on Procurement. Clause 2 of Article 15 of the Law provides the cases when the acquisition may be considered secret and not disclosed through public outlets. In all other cases, once the acquisition plan is approved, it should be released through the Bulletin ( This is provided by Clause 3 of Article 15 of the law [1]. The acquisition plan for 2018 is on the procurement website and is available as an Excel spreadsheet download [2]. Recently, the entire procurement system of the state has changed, the MoD did remain unaffected. Some legal regulations are now in place which will make it even more difficult to apply past practices. The low score tends to increase [3]. Defence system planning and budgeting process are implemented by the through the Law on the Budget System of the Republic of Armenia [4]. It begins within the framework of the annual state budget approval process following the PM’s decree, which consists of two stages: the development of the medium-term expenditure framework (MTEF) for the next three years, which is the strategic stage of the budget process and serves as a basis for the drafting of the state budget, and development, presentation and approval the draft state budget for the next year. The budget process is implemented in two stages. In the first stage, the activities carried out by the MoD in the current year are development and submission of the MTEF’s application to the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Armenia, discussions in the permanent working group on MTEF’s development, drafting and presentation of the finalized MTEF to the Ministry of Finance.
The second stage includes. development of budget finanсing application and its submission to the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Armenia, discussion of budget financing applications with the PF, presentation of other materials following the draft state budget approved by the government and the laws.
The government submits the draft state budget for consideration to the National Assembly at least sixty days before the beginning of the budget year.
The main purpose of the MTEF application is to present the Defence Expenditure Strategy for the next three years. This strategy includes the programs and activities foreseen in the mid-term framework, as well as the clear arguments on how they will contribute to the implementation of the defence objectives. The MTEF application also presents the financial assessment of the planned programs and activities and their justifications. The main purpose of the annual budget financing application is to present detailed calculations on the programs and policy measures to be implemented within the state budget. When submitting a budget financing application, they are guided by the quantitative financing guidelines set by the MTEF Superior Council.
The main categories of resource planning in the annual budget application are:
1. Salaries and current transfers, including the provision of military personnel, salaries of staff without military rank and equal payments, scholarships, lump-sum money allowances, benefits, and compensations.
2. Current expenditures for goods procurement, works, and services, including expenses for food, transportation, communication and utilities, clothing, office supplies and materials, medications and bandages, ongoing repairs, business trips, and service trips.
3. Non-financial assets including in the cost of acquisition and overhaul of capital construction of buildings, equipment, property, and other fixed assets [5].

The search did not identify any source for public awareness of acquisition planning. The main acquisition bulletin, www., provides data on acquisition plans of non-classified procurements that have been approved by relevant state agencies. Some items are excluded; however, has all the information. There is no other alternative to the bulletin, and the public is not engaged in the planning stage of acquisitions [1].

Both the Audit Chamber and the State Supervision Service can exercise control over the observance of the procedures operating in the RA Ministry of Defense. [1]
The Audit Chamber of the Republic of Armenia conducts audits in state and local self-government bodies and institutions financed from the state and community budgets, including the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Armenia.
The Audit Chamber conducts three types of audits: financial (including the reliability of submitted reports), compliance (compliance of funds spent with legal acts), and performance audits, which determine the effectiveness state budget and community budget funds, loans and credits received, the use of state-community property in terms of economy, purpose, and costs. [2]
However the Audit Chamber performs ex-post autits, not ongoing oversight of the process.

After a major overhaul following the First Principles Review [1], the Department of Defence has put into place a more streamlined acquisition planning process which has now been in place for several years. Major acquisitions are announced in the Integrated Investment Program [2], which follows directly from the national defence strategy outlined in the Defence White Paper 2016 [3]. For all other acquisitions, the Capability Acquisition Sustainment Group (CASG) are required to develop a business case [4], which would address why a procurement is being undertaken [5], as justified by the national strategy [6]. In the acquisition planning process, the internal processes are separated. Budget is planned and written into law by Parliament [7]. Commercial operations are carried out by the Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group [4]. Finance reports and advice are delivered by the Defence Finance Group, including annual performance reports and Portfolio Budget Statements financially justifying budget requests to parliament [4, p 20, 8].

While the Business Framework for the Capability Acquisition Sustainment Group [1], Defence Procurement Policy Manual [2], Commonwealth Procurement Rules [3], Integrated Investment Program (IIP) [4], and Defence White Paper 2016 [5] are all publicly available, some other documents that would be key to understanding holistically how acquisition planning work are not publicly released. Most critically, the Capability Life Cycle Detailed Design, which was put into force in March 2016 following recommendations by the First Principles Implementation Committee and provides guidelines for defence procurement, is only available in summarised form [6]. More broadly, business cases are not made publicly available. Beyond the capabilities outlined in the IIP (almost all greater than $100 million in value), it is difficult or impossible to find out the specific justifications, timelines, and outcomes of individual projects. Even for major projects listed in the IIP, there is little information on important details such as project approvals and shifting project names and numbers makes tracking acquisition projects exceedingly difficult [7]. The low level of granularity of information available, compared to previous instruments that reported planned defence spending, means that the “IIP represents the lowest point in defence capability planning transparency in a quarter-century” [8]. The lack of transparency on these matters means that “It’s now almost routine that [the Australian public and analysts] learn more about Australian defence matters through the US than from our own defence organisation,” including on matters related to “weapon system acquisitions” [9].

External oversight is carried out primarily through the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO). The ANAO carries out three types of performance audits on defence procurements: ad-hoc audits on a topic or range of projects [1]; ad-hoc project audits, which the Auditor-General has the authority to carry out on any project but usually focuses on projects with large expenditure and troubled projects [2]; and the annual Major Projects Report (MPR), which looks at up to 25 major projects of interest [3]. The MPR is largely prepared by the Department of Defence and verified by ANAO. All of these audits focus on whether projects are meeting long-term outcomes identified at the initial stages of planning and represent value for money [2, p23-36], but do not pose the question of whether the acquisition was justified and in line with strategic needs in the first place [4]. Since 2000, the Australian government has also commissioned several external reports to conduct reviews of Defence acquisition and administration. This included the Mortimer Review, which lead to the 2009 Strategic Reform Program [5], and the First Principles Review of Defence, which led to major reforms since 2015 and may run until 2023 [6]. These reports also tend to be focused on efficiency concerns rather than the legitimacy of acquisitions. Though Parliament is not specifically mandated to oversee acquisition planning, the Senate Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade and Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade can open inquiries into any issues related to defence referred to them by Parliament or the Minister. This does occasionally include inquiries focused on acquisition planning (last in 2011 (7)), and in practice, these types of inquiries are rare.

The main law governing public procurement in Azerbaijan is the Law on Public Procurement (2001) (1). According to experts, the existing law has shortcomings, and its modernization is very important (2). According to the Transparent Public Procurement Rating (TPPR) the state procurement system in Azerbaijan lacks transparency and efficiency, the legislative framework leaves space for collusive and corrupt practices and public oversight over the procurement system is not ensured by the law. Azerbaijan received 49% of the total score, which makes it the least compliant country with the TPPR standard among the target states (3). After amendments were made in April 2012, the names of companies and founders participating in tenders are not disclosed as they are commercial secrets. According to experts, this creates the possibility of serious corruption (4).
The main procurement agency in Azerbaijan was the State Procurement Agency (1997-2016). Under a decree signed by the President of Azerbaijan in 2016, the State Procurement Agency was abolished, and its functions and state-owned property were transferred to the State Service for Antimonopoly Policy and Consumer Rights Protection under the direction of the Ministry of Economy (5). According to several studies, the main reason for this change was related to the problems with the procurement agency. The activities of the agency were not open to the public and there were always corruption claims against it. Experts believe that most of the winning bidders in the tenders were owned by officials, and this is still happening. The state agency was involved in hiding these cases (4).

Currently, in Azerbaijan, the public has limited access to information about the process itself, because a great deal of information is excluded from publication (1). Large amounts of purchases are hidden from the public. The public is not informed about the winning bidders of tenders. Experts believe that over the past ten years, it has become almost impossible to hold tenders transparently. As the budget expenditures increase, the Law on Tender has begun to form a formal character as the investment projects become more numerous. After 2005, the implementation of the articles of this law was almost not possible. Often, it was formal. Many officials offered to name a few companies close to them, formally creating a competitive image. However, everybody knew that these companies were owned by the same person, and the company that won the tender would also a company owned by a close relative of that officer or minister (2).
According to experts, the tender announcement should be reflected in the media. In Azerbaijan, only the results are reported. Studies show that the requirements of the legislation are not met. Some companies are registered 3-5 months prior, and then they win a million-dollar tender. According to the legislation, the tender should be won by a company offering the best quality, cheapest and shortest time. However, it is not possible to determine what criteria are used to evaluate the companies after a tender has been awarded (3).

External oversight over procurement and expenses is carried out by the Milli Majlis and the Chamber of Accounts. The Chamber of Accounts is the Supreme Audit Institution, which carries out external oversight. The Chamber’s activities are determined by the Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan and relevant laws (1).
According to the Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan “On Budget System” (Article 21), control over the execution of the state budget is carried out by the Milli Majlis and its Chamber of Accounts. Audits of revenues and expenditures of the state budget and consolidated budget, including off-budget state funds, are regulated by the Legislation Chamber of the Republic of Azerbaijan (Article 22). (2)
According to the Law on Approval of the Internal Regulations of the Chamber of Accounts (Article 1), the audit of the state financial and budgetary control by the Chamber of Accounts is an audit (3).
According to experts, external control over the procurement can not be considered effective. Even though the Chamber of Accounts publishes reports, there are almost no facts of fighting against corruption. There have been no serious discussions on the procurement in the Parliament so far (4).
According to the Transparent Public Procurement Rating (TPPR), the annual audit reports of Azerbaijan’s chief auditing institution – Chamber of Accounts indicates a heavy reliance on single-source procurement, especially, in the construction sector. For example, in 2015, the audit of over three billion AZN (about 1.7 billion USD) funds spent on public procurement indicated that single source procurement accounted for 77,8% of the expenditures, whereas open tenders involved 14%. The findings of the reports also attest to the adverse impact of substandard accountability and oversight mechanisms on the integrity of public procurement (5).

According to interviewees, there is no acquisition planning process for defence, as most significant purchases are made through the king’s office and his deputy. Given the size of the army and the defence sector, the acquisition process is limited to the royal office [1, 2, 3].

As established in 11A, there is no acquisition planning process for defence. This indicator has therefore been marked ‘Not Applicable’ [1, 2, 3].

As established in 11A, there is no acquisition planning process for defence. This indicator has therefore been marked ‘Not Applicable’ [1, 2, 3].

Bangladesh has a clear process for the entire acquisition planning cycle [1]. The flowchart for the acquisition system is guided by the Armed Forces Procurement Policy of 2010, which also lays out stages of procurement activities and a clear delineation of organisational responsibilities [2]. All central purchases are guided by Defence Purchase 35 (DP-35) regulations, financial regulations of the government and a revised system of financial management for defence forces [3]. Recent military purchases have been guided by Forces Goal 2030, although details of this plan are not publicly available.

On its website, the AFD has provided a flowchart with 14 stages, detailing the names of the unit/desks/agencies responsible for implementing the procurement action plan [1]. However, detailed information about activities/actions in each stage of the acquisition or procurement process is not publicly available [1].

There is an internal oversight mechanism in the form of financial advice, which is provided by the Directorate General Defence Purchase (DGDP) and the Senior Finance Controller Defence Purchase [1]. However, this advice is not publicly available, nor is any external oversight conducted by Parliament or the PSCMoD.

The Law on Public Procurement Contracts (‘Wet op Overheidsopdrachten’) describes the cycles the process of acquisitions must go through. These include the official disclosure and negotiation, as well as other cycles which may be activated depending on the character of the purchase [1]. These procedures are further specified in the law of 13 August 2011 and the Royal Decree of 23 January 2021 [2, 3].

The process formally separates internal acquisition planning functions, for example ‘operational value’, ‘financial value’, ‘logistics support’. The weight of each of these functions is debated and approved by the Minister of Defence, and then passed under closed envelope to the Inspector of Finances. Once the Best and Final Offers are in, the envelope is opened and the offers are weighed based on the criteria [4, 5]. Connections between specific purchases and defence strategy requirements are made explicit in the Strategic Vision [6].

The laws describing the entire acquisition process are available online [1, 2, 3]. The public has access to relatively detailed information on the process through a number of channels. First, planned acquisitions are elaborated on extensively in the Strategic Vision, including disaggregated data on equipment/projects and budget [4].

Second, the public can follow the implementation of these ambitions by accessing accounts of political debates on the topic online (eg. [5]) although most discussions take place in the Commission for Defence Purchases, which holds its meetings behind closed doors. Third, based on the Law on Freedom of Information (11 April 1994), every individual may request insight into official Defence documents, including those concerning the acquisition process – although requests may be denied if a possible risk in disclosure is identified. This is also indicated in the FAQ section of the Ministry of Defence website [6, 7].

Not all information on the acquisition process is made public, partly due to the industries introducing a confidentiality clause to safeguard their knowledge or technologies [8].

The Court of Auditors (‘Rekenhof’, ‘Court des Comptes’) is an independent audit body which reports directly to the Parliament (specifically, the Champer of Representatives) [1]. They have the power to investigate the acquisition process through free consultation of the official documents and interviews with the parties involved [2]. Their reports can be debated in the Commission of Defence and are published online [3].

Secondly, the Commission of Defence Purchases is also involved in the acquisition planning, ranging from the decisions to acquire specific material to overseeing the acquisition process [4, 5]. While these meetings take place behind closed doors, the members of this committee generally also attend the Commission of Defence, which means that knowledge transcends the metaphorical walls of this commission.

The Ministry of Defence (MoD) only recognizes budgetary planning for procurement [1, 2, 3]. The process of logistics needs planning and procurement is in conformance with the process of medium-term planning and annual work program, i.e. with procedures of planning, programming, budgeting and execution system (Rulebook on Planning, Organizing and Executing of Logistics Needs within the BiH Ministry of Defence and BiH Armed Forces) [4]. The main document in planning financing and public procurement is the Medium-Term Work Plan Of the Ministry of Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Currently, the Medium-Term Work Plan of BiH MoD for the period 2018-2020, No: 06-03-1-1798-25/17, dated February 12, 2018, is in force and it is based on the strategic and normative legal documents in BiH (Review of Defense, Modernization Plan of BiH AF, Training Doctrines, etc.) [5, 6, 7]. In Chapter I – Strategic Framework, and also in Chapter V, the sources of plan realization funding are defined. Based on the Medium-Term Plan, the Action Plan of Medium-Term Work Plan of the BiH Ministry of Defence is created. Strategic goals and key processes, realization period and funding sources are stated in the Action Plan, among other things [4]. The framework three-year budget is planned following the Concept and Procedures of Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Executing, No. 12-16-1-5836/08, dated October 21, 2008, as it was, for instance, the document Framework Budget of BiH Institutions for the period 2018-2020. On page 41 of the document, there is the framework for BiH MoD for 2018-2020 [4]. For 2018, the budgets of BiH institutions were planned and based on that the Public Procurement Plan of BiH MoD was brought for 2018 [8]. Each procurement is published at the portal of public procurement [4].

The public has access to information about the entire process of public procurement itself. Namely and following the response given by the MoD to the Transparency International in BiH’s Questionnaire, the website containing the relevant information regarding the process of public procurement and it is being regular update [1]. The MoD website contains the following procurement information:
1. 2018 Procurement Plan for Ministry of Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina;
2. Notification on public procurements;
3. Decision on selection of the best bidder in the procurement proceedings before the Ministry of Defence;
4. Calls for tenders;
5. Data on concluded contracts.
All documents relating to public procurement are published on MoD’s website, the portal of the BiH Public Procurement Agency, and the Official Gazette of BiH per the obligations defined in the BiH Public Procurement [2, 3]. The missing thing is that there is no clear answer explaining the justification of the purchase of some items.

There is no external oversight of the acquisition planning process.
Article 17 of the Public Procurement Law prescribes that the contracting authority can start with the procurement if the acquisition is envisaged in the procurement plan, which has to be published on the website of the contracting authority within 60 days of the adoption of the budget. The plan has to have all procurements in the value higher than 50,000 BAM for goods and services and 80,000 BAM for works [1]. The model for the procurement plan was published by the Public Procurement Agency of BiH and it contains the item procured; the CPV code (common procurement vocabulary); estimated value; procedure; indicative date of start of the procedure; indicative date of contract signing; and a column for comments [2].
In cases of acquisitions which will be paid in multiple years, the Council of Ministers has to approve it as a “multi-year project”, such as the purchase of two helicopters for the MoD and armed forces for 65,000,000 BAM [3].

There are clear planning and acquisition processes that are guided in terms of the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act [1]. These are available under the auspices of the PPADB. However, not all acquisitions are available to the public for security reasons [1]. In terms of the law, The Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Board (PPADB) was enacted by an Act of Parliament [Cap 42:08] of 2001 [2]. PPADB is a parastatal organisation, operating under the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MFED) [2]. The primary mandate of PPADB is to adjudicate and award tenders for the Central Government and any other institutions specified under the Act for the delivery of works, services and supplies [2]. The Board is also responsible for the registration and discipline of contractors who do business with the Government. It supports capacity building on procurement and asset disposal, monitor adherence to the Act and provides advice [2].​ There are some internal documents that relate to the strategy and purchases. What is then published are the final determinants of the planning outcomes. These are what you find on the PPADB website.

The Public Procurement Manual defines the public procurement philosophy as to continually introduce higher standards and to achieve:
a) Open, fair and transparent tendering and commercial practices;
b) Uphold integrity, impartiality, anti-corruption measures;
c) Abide by a Code of Conduct and Ethics;
d) Specifications offering the widest participation of competition – neither to favour, nor discriminate against any potential contractors;
e) Specifications to be open and generic (they may be to an international, regional or national standard) [1,2].
The public has access to information about the process itself, but information may be delayed or not timely published.

There is no evidence that the country has a clear process for acquisition planning within the BDF and Defence Sector that involves clear oversight that is publicly available. For that reliance on External Oversight is provided for by the following: Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC), Directorate of Public Service Management (DPSM), Office of the Ombudsman, Office of the President, Auditor General, Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Board (PPADB), Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MFED), Financial Intelligence Agency (FIA), Bank of Botswana, Botswana Unified Revenue Services (BURS), Non-Banking Financial Regulatory Authority (NBFIRA), Police Service, Administration of Justice, Directorate of Public Prosecutions (DPP), Attorney General’s Chambers and Competition Authority [1,2]. It must be noted that none of these organisations has an explicit and final oversight over acquisition. These organisations provide general checks and balances not just to Defence but to all other State Institutions.

As the previous assessments pointed out, most of the defence acquisitions occur under the same Acquisitions Law (Law 8.666/1993) [1], which is a complex piece of legislation that imposes many bureaucratic mechanisms (and burdens) to governmental institutions. This law determines a set of acquisition modes – from long and manual processes in the case of complex, expensive or international acquisitions, bidding (electronic or not) and invitation (in cases where there is only one provider with recognizable authority in the service or product). The government has been making policies to foster electronic bidding as the standard acquisition mode, leaving the other modes of bidding to utilized as exceptions [2]. This standardization of electronic bidding is extendable to the armed forces, according to a military interviewee [3]. Article 24 of Law 8.666/93 establishes the possible exemption from public bids when: (a) there is the possibility of harming National Security, in cases established by a presidential decree, with the approval of the National Defence Council (OBS1); (b) for the contracting of high technology related to National Defence [4]. One of the regimentations of this law (Decree 2295/97), establishes a bidding exemption for warfare assets, technology development and services related to intelligence. The Law 12598/2012 establishes special norms for defence acquisitions, defining important concepts such as Defence Product (Prode), Defence Strategic Product (PED), Defence Systems (SD) and Defence Strategic Company (EED) [5]. According to a military interviewee, the armed forces have acquisition plans for many basic items such as parachutes, food and uniforms. The acquisition planning of specific and strategic projects of the armed forces is generally present in the long-term contracts made with the companies that won the acquisition. Brazil has a general plan of what will be developed (which involves acquisitions) in its three strategic defence documents: the Defence National Strategy (END – Estratégia Nacional de Defesa) the Defence National Policy (PND – Política Nacional de Defesa) [6] and the White Paper [7]. There is also a defence acquisition planning section called Plano de Articulação e Equipamento de Defesa (PAED), but there are not many details about it on official websites [8]. There is a document that elaborates on the PAED’s history, stating that it was the result of a study group created within the Ministry of Defence in 2011, envisioning a projection of defence acquisitions for the next 20 years. The normative that created the study group established a necessary connection between the plan and the national defence strategy documents (cited in Q60A) [9]. However, when the assessor asked to have access to the document through an FOIA request, the Ministry of Defence asserted that the document is still being prepared, and the study group will only release the document by the end of 2022.

All government acquisitions are registered and displayed on government websites – whether on Comprasnet (the federal government acquisition portal) [1, 2] or specific websites of strategic programs of the armed forces. One example of that is the PROSUB website, which contains all the submissions of prices received in electronic biddings [3]. The Air Force and the Army do not present acquisition documents and contracts the same way the Navy does – which is separated by project. However, the contacts and bidding processes are available in the Transparency Portal [4], linked to the access-to-information area of each website. This is a prerogative of the Freedom of Information Law 12.527/11 [5]. However, there is a high variation among projects and single forces, and the lack of information in Brazil’s Transparency Portal. According to one of the reviewers, this lack of information is more related to delays and not timely publication at the Portal da Transparência or through the secretary of planning, but they are not excluded from publication.

The existing oversight functions assess performance and the country’s long-term acquisition plans, and they also assess the legitimacy of plans. The Court of Auditors (TCU) is an important actor in this sense since it has produced extensive audits for all the strategic programs of the Brazilian defence [1, 2, 3, 4]. Answering an information request sent by the assessor, the TCU stated that the periodicity of these assessments is determined in their audit planning criteria [5, 6]. They also stated that an audit on any military procurement or project can be made through a request of the legislature or the TCU’s own initiative [6]. The parliament engages in the discussions about important acquisitions, calling auditions with relevant officials and institutions. However, the debates still have a superficial tone, as explained partially by previous questions.

Law N° 039 (2016) sets up the rules on the contract, the execution and the control of public orders and public service delegations that contractual authorities have agreed on with delegated authorities. It also makes a list of the different institutions which should abide by its provisions whenever they launch a call for offers for acquisition purposes. Indeed, this list includes the NA, ministries, public enterprises, diplomatic missions and consulates (1). Law N° 039 (2016), has also put in place the Authority for the Regulation of the Public Order (ARCOP), which coordinates all the procurement and contracting processes. To complement the provisions of the above law, the Ministry of Finance has initiated the Decree N° 0049 (2017) on the procedures of contracting, executing and regulating public services; it entered into force on February 1, 2017 (2).

Law N° 039 (2016) organizes acquisitions for government institutions, including the defence ministry (1). Article 19 of the law imposes planning requirements for acquisitions for all government institutions, including the defence ministry. Article 20 imposes a publication of an announcement enumerating all items that it intends to purchase for the budget year in question. Finally, Article 21 imposes the publication of all calls for bidders/contractors, if not it is not posted it becomes null and void (1). There is no evidence of a connection between purchases made and defence strategy requirements.

There are irregularities in public acquisition processes. According to the General Controller of State, Mr. Luc Marius Ibriga, some public agents have refused to make necessary documents available that should have allowed state controllers to proceed during the 2016 control session (1). Ibriga goes further stating that many agents involved in procurement often presented to state controllers fabricated documents made during or after the control process, to hide fake acquisitions. To mitigate these fraudulent issues, the general state controller states that his institution will no longer take into account justification documents presented after a control (1). In any case, the government has already been criticized more than once for not making information available (2), and for not enforcing the law, continually persisting in covering up officials involved in the misuse of public funds (3).

The key external oversight institution is the ASCE-LC, which was recently provided with both independence and the constitutional power to investigate and directly prosecute cases of corruption taking place within institutions (1). However, there is no evidence that it has sufficient resources to exercise this independence. In any case, it is more likely to face the government’s lack of collaboration as with regards to information sharing and law enforcement, as well as the lack of collaboration of agents managing public affairs at overseeing institutions (1), (2), (3), (4). According to the Business Anti-Corruption Portal, (2018), “poor access to information, a culture of impunity, weak institution, have made the fight against corruption all the most difficult.” Oversight institution (Parliament, ASCE-LC or the Supreme Audit Institution), are all given power by the constitution to scrutinize public acquisitions made by government institutions, including the defence ministry. However, the opacity of the armed forces does not favour the work of these institutions (5). Therefore, these oversight functions simply review the figures or check that the internal audit has reviewed the figures.

Defence purchases are not publicly known [1]. The laws governing procurement including PPPs in Cameroon are currently governed by Law No. 2006/012 of 29 December 2006, enacting the general regulations of Partnership Contracts [2]; Decree No. 2008/035 of 23 January 2008, organising and creating the National Partnership Contracts Support Council – Conseil d’Appui à la Réalisation des Contrats de Partenariat, CARPA [3]; and Decree No. 2008/0115/PM of 24 January 2008 regulating Law No. 2006/012 [4].

Other applicable laws and regulations are: Law No. 2008/009 of 16 July 2008, enacting the accounting, financial, and tax system applicable to partnership contracts [5]; Order No. 186/CAB/PM of 15 November 2011, to fix terms and conditions for the collection of fees payable for partnership contracts [6], and Decree No. 2012/148 of 21 March 2012 [7], to amend and supplement certain provisions of Decree No. 2008/035 of 23 January 2008 relating to the organisation and functioning of the National Partnership Contracts Support Council [3]. However, defence purchases are not publicly known.

Because there is no process for acquisition planning, this indicator is marked Not Applicable.

Because there is no process for acquisition planning, this indicator is marked Not Applicable.

The Defence Investment Plan and the Canadian Armed Forces Defence Plan 2018-2023 lay out the connection between needs, capabilities, and acquisitions. The process and stages of defence purchases and upgrades are publicly disclosed, with cost constraints and fiscal considerations included. [1] [2]

The former Defence Acquisition Guide was renamed the Defence Investment Plan in 2018, but continues to be published biannually and publicly available. The acquisition planning process used by the Department of National Defence (DND) is published online, with links to the agencies involved. Information about outcomes is harder to find and not routinely disclosed or clearly linked with earlier policy statements or documents. [1] [2]

There is an Independent Review Panel for Defence Acquisition within the DND, which provides broad advice about procurements to the Minister of Department of National Defence and Treasury Board prior to the formal approval process.[1] Public Works Canada administers the Defence Procurement Strategy, which ensures that procurement and acquisitions plans meeting national security needs are integrated with national capabilities, and fall within guidance for major capital projects more broadly. While Parliamentary Committees have tremendous latitude to oversee acquisitions, their involvement (as discussed above) can be sporadic. [2]

The development of a process for the acquisition planning cycle in defence is recent. Experts have identified many inflexibilities in the decision-making process, which negatively impact the allocative and technical efficiency of the resources destined for the defence of the nation [1]. In 2006, reforms to the Law of Fiscal Responsibility [2] established that studies and projects of acquisitions in the armed forces should be given to the Ministry of National Defence (MDN). With the enactment of the Organic Statute of the Ministry of National Defence in 2010 [3], the MDN advanced in the establishment of a framework for the analysis of initiatives of investments and acquisitions. In the last edition of the Book of the Defence, the MDN assumed a crucial role in the orientation of decisions in acquisitions in the institutions of the armed forces [4]. The process for the acquisition cycle begins with the strategic planning of the institutions of national defence, which identifies gaps between the needed and the existent capacities. Investment projects are elaborated, considering the phases of pre-investment, investment, operation, and disposition. The MDN, in the Division of Project Evaluation of the sub-secretary of defence, oversight the acquisition planning functions. Formally, connections between acquisitions and defence strategy requirements should be specified in the presentations of investment projects that commander and chiefs’ make to the MDN. Likewise, Expenditure Background Sheets (Fichas de Fundamento de Gasto) (FFG) must be elaborated in acquisition projects related to the reposition and maintenance of the military capacity. However, it is difficult to evaluate the connections between specific purchases and defence capacity requirements due to the lack of information and the restricted nature of some purchases. Improvements in the traceability and control of acquisitions are needed [5], and the MDN is still developing a structure for the monitoring of investments.

There is limited access to accurate, detailed and timely information on the procurement planning process in the armed forces. The information for the acquisition planning process and its associated structures is too general and not always easy to access. Although it is possible to find information about specific purchases for the armed forces through the public market system [1], there is no information about how the cycle of investment is executed and how oversight is applied both in theory and in practice. Moreover, because the Expenditure Background Sheets (Fichas de Fundamento de Gasto) (FFG) used for military equipment and materials are funded through resources from the Resrticted Law of Copper, they are considered restricted [2], and the public has no access to this information.

The oversight function of the elaboration and implementation of acquisition plans in the armed forces and El Estado Mayor Conjunto (EMCO) (Joint Chiefs of Staff) relies on the MDN [1]. Particularly, the sub-secretary of defence elaborates and update the policy of national defence, including the political planning from which the operational planning is done. It also proposes the general framework for acquisition planning and, through the Division of Project Evaluation, performs the assessment of acquisition and investment projects in the military institutions and the EMCO [2]. However, because this oversight occurs within the MDN and with important shortcomings in transparency, an assessment of the legitimacy of the plans is absent. On the other hand, the oversight performed by Parliament in these matters is extremely limited. The MDN presents the plan with the projects of acquisitions and investment to the Permanent Commissions of Defence and informs about the acquisitions executed. However, Congress has been excluded from the elaboration and discussion of the strategic orientation of these plans [3]. Moreover, Congress cannot modify the estimate of resources made by the executive branch, and can only reduce the proposed expenditures as long as they are not fixed by-laws of a permanent nature, as is the case with constitutional organic laws [4, 5].

Broadly, acquisitions planning follows the national security priorities as analysed in White Papers that are periodically published. Acquisitions decisions are made by the Central Military Commission but there is no transparency in the decision making processes. Following these, there is a clear process for procurement, with the General Armaments Department in charge. The CMC Procurement regulations (articles 16-21) [1,2,3] set out an annual procurement planning cycle with milestones and deadlines for submitting proposals. The proposals need to be justified and include a rationale, along with the details of the equipment, quality, price, funding plans, the method of procurement etc (article 17). The regulations are clear and comprehensive. However there is no stipulation on oversight or transparency. Although the acquisitions planning process is not transparent, it is known to exist due to a) the alignment between security priorities and announced acquisitions and b) the existence of a regulated procurement process.

Transparency in the decision making process is limited but there are two sources of information evaluating acquisition planning: 1) the White Papers published by the MoD and the CMC, and 2) announcements on procurement in the state media and on official PLA procurement websites. [1,2,3] The public has very little information on the process itself but can still evaluate if there is correspondence between China’s strategic goals and acquisition of weaponry.

The acquisition planning process is controlled by the CMC, with no external oversight. The NPC does not have any formal role in approving the acquisition process.

All public entities must develop and publish an Annual Procurement Plan, which is the contractual planning instrument of each institution and allows for the identification of purchases made and lists the goods, works, and services to be acquired during the year of validity of said Plan. Decree 1510 of 2013 [1] regulates the construction of this Plan, and states that entities must identify the need to contract the good or services, codify it, estimate the value, the type of resource, the type of contracting, and the estimated date of the procurement process. The Plan is an informational document, and included acquisitions may be cancelled, revised, or modified. Although the format of the Plan calls for explicitly describing the strategic perspective in which the plan is framed, in practice the entities do not clearly present or generate very few connections between the specific purchases and the strategic requirements or strategic lines of operation of the entity. [2] It is established that there is a legal framework for the process of acquisition of goods in the Colombian public system, including defence, which is governed by Decree Law 4710 of 2011, which created the National Agency for Government Procurement, “Colombia Buys Efficiently” as the governing body of public procurement. [2, 3, 4]

Article 6 of Decree 1510 of 2013 [1] obliges all state entities to publish their Annual Procurement Plan, in addition to updates made during the year of the term of the Plan. The plans are published through the website of each entity in the transparency and access to information section. They are also published on the Electronic System of Government Procurement (SECOP II), [2] a platform that allows buyers and suppliers to carry out procurement processes online and on the website of the National Agency for Government Procurement (Colombia Buys Efficiently), [3, 4] the governing entity for the development and promotion of public policies and tools oriented to the organisation and articulation of the procurement and public procurement processes. There is also the Integrated Financial Information System (SIIF), created by Law 298 of 1996 and administered by the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit, through which the financial information of the entities that make up the General Budget of the Nation are consolidated, and control is exercised over the budgetary and financial execution of these based on a monitoring of the expenses carried out by each. [5] This process ensures that public accesses to information regarding the acquisition plan of each of the entities maintains relevance and clarity in terms of descriptions, responsibilities, deadlines, mechanisms, and results. Information on procurement by public administration entities can be found on the portals of each institution and on specific webpages such as SECOP II, which connects suppliers with buyers, and which is publicly accessible. [6]

The oversight functions of procurement plans are stipulated in the Colombian legal framework in Law 80 of 1993, Decree 1082 of 2015 and Law 1474 of 2011. [1, 2, 3] According to these rules, there are two types of monitoring: the supervision of state contracts and the intervention or technical follow-up to the execution of contracts. The first is characterized by the state entity through state contractors or public officials, and involves the administrative, financial, accounting, and legal follow-up to the execution of the contract. The intervention feature is characterized by the involvement of a technical follow-up only, and only applies if the State entity deems it necessary. It may correspond to financial, administrative, and/or legal accounting matters, and is carried out by natural or legal persons contracted by the entity for the conduct of such supervision externally. It is common for entities to present balance sheets around the implementation of their Annual Procurement Plans. [3, 4] It should be reiterated that the procurement plan is an informational document and that procurement proposals may be cancelled, revised, or modified. Therefore, this information does not represent a commitment or obligation on the part of the State entity to acquire such goods or services. The revised literature does not clearly demonstrate the participation of the Congress of the Republic in the role of planning and oversight of public procurement, in the issues of defence and security. However, this body’s participation in decisions around the General Royalty System Budget is evident, even though the rules stipulate the supervision of procurement plans by public officials. [6]

The government has instituted an annual acquisition plan for the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of the Interior, which is derived from a newly introduced 5-year planning cycle (Loi de Programmation Militaire, LPM). The 5-year roadmap (feuille de route) does not provide a breakdown of spending details. The NA, via the Commission de Sécurité et de Défense (CSD), is nominally tasked with oversight.

According to Ivorian Vice-President Daniel Kablan Duncan, the Loi de Programmation Militaire (LPM) serves to codify the government’s policy goals in terms of expenditure in defence and security, as well as the budgeting of personnel, equipment and operations at the Armed Forces of Côte d’Ivoire (Forces Républicaines de Côte d’Ivoire, FRCI), the Gendarmerie Nationale and the Police Nationale. [These last two are technically under the Ministry of the Interior] (1).

“The first of its kind in Côte d’Ivoire, the law on military programming was adopted on 4 January 2016. Over the period 2016-2020, the text intends to reform the Ivorian defence in depth. The long-term goal is to adapt the army to the current realities of the country. The program is endowed in accordance with its objectives: no less than 2,000 billion FCFA (3.8 billion euros) have been budgeted through 2020, mainly to pay for the modernization and purchase of equipment, but especially for reshaping the workforce (2). The LPM 2016-2020 has allocated a total of 2.254 billion FCFA (EUR 3.4 billion). It is seen as a political signal about where defence expenditure is headed. It also reflects the regulatory changes introduced by the Réforme du Secteur de la Sécurité (RSS, SSR) in 2011-2015, including the drafting of a national security strategy. By end-2017, more than 1,000 soldiers had agreed to early retirement as part of a budgetary rationalization effort at the Ministry of Defence linked to LPM 2016-2020 (1), (3), (4).

A similar roadmap for expenditure at the Ministry of the Interior (Loi No. 2016-09, Portant programmation des Forces de Sécurité Intérieure pour les années 2016-2020) was published in the Official Journal on 17 March 2016. (5) Known as the LPSI, it outlines the budgetary guidelines for the Ministry of the Interior, including:
– Police Nationale.
– Douanes.
– Direction Générale des Affaires Maritimes et Portuaires, des Eaux et des Forêts.
– Office National de la Protection Civile.

The main guidelines of the newly introduced Loi de Programmation Militaire (LPM), the military expenditure roadmap, have been widely reported by Ivorian media. But details of expenditure are reported in highly aggregated form. For example, total expenditure over five years in LPM 2016-2020 has been made public (2.254 billion FCFA; EUR 3.4 billion), as well as the amount allocated to acquisitions of equipment (EUR 1.2 billion). But the exact itemized expenditure seems to be excluded from publication. According to Ivorian media, the LPM is a step forward in transparency and accountability in the defence and security sectors. For example, the current LPM 2016-2020 is, in theory, readily accessible to the public for consultation. It is also, in theory, subject to NA oversight and a way for government defence policy to be examined beyond military institutions (1).

According to the Paris-based Le Point, a weekly magazine, the current LPM 2016-2020 foresees defence and security equipment acquisitions of EUR 1.2 billion. There is no breakdown of the expenditure over the 4-year cycle (2). Some details about acquisitions included in the LPM 2016-2020 have been unveiled by Ivorian media, such as the spending on armed vehicles, combat helicopters and drones, among others (3).
“Over four years, the government has planned to purchase 515 light and armored vehicles for its ground forces, two drones, two combat helicopters, troop transports and rehabilitation, and the construction of army barracks.” Another aspect of acquisition planning at the Ministry of Defence that can be qualified as non-transparent is the “donation” of equipment by other nations, particularly China. The MoD reported on its website on July 17, 2017, that China had delivered its 4th naval ship to the Ivorian Navy (4).

In theory, external oversight of the LPM involves the Lower House via its Commission de Sécurité et de Défense (CSD). As Curtis writes:

“Clearly, it is not enough to pass a law on a specific subject to ensure that it is effectively taken into account, which is why it is more important than ever that the two ministries that have the responsibility of executing the promulgated laws also have the mechanisms to monitor and evaluate their implementation. It will be up to the National Assembly, through its specialized committees, to monitor the chapters of defense and security in the execution of their respective laws” (1).

There is a clear process for the acquisition planning cycle [1] and internal functions within the Danish Ministry of Defence Acquisition and Logistics Organisation (Forsvarsministeriets Materiel og Indkøbstyrelse, DALO) are clearly separated [2]. Connections between larger specific purchases and defence strategy is made overall on the Defence Agreement [3]. The document “Outline of Planned Larger Material Acquistions and Material Service Tasks” (“Oversigt over planlagt større materielinvesteringer og materieldriftsopgaver”) provides a comprehensive picture of planned procurements and service tasks but explicit connections to defence strategy are minor [4]. The annual report of DALO also makes ad hoc connections between material investements and the tasks of the Defence [5]. The DALO website contains information on certain material investments including background information on need and purpose [6].

Information about the acquisition process, tenders, forthcoming equipment, planned investments and so on is available on the DALO website [1]. However, description on processes etc. could be more detailed and the website appear not to be updated regularly [2].

As The Ministry of Defence Internal Audit Office and The Danish National Audit Office audits the Defence, these offices also function as an oversight mechanism. The Danish National Audit Office has for instance been actively engaged in reviewing the acquisition procedures [1, 2]. As the Defence Agreement includes major acquisitions and it is a political agreement, Parliament is involved in oversight of acquisition planning. As the Defence Committee (can) scrutinise every aspect of the defence policy, the committee is also involved in oversight of acquisiton planning [3].

According to our sources, there is acquisition planning in place, but it is not clear, and it has no defined processes or procedures. Furthermore, acquisition planning has no connection with strategic defensive needs. Acquisition planning is based more on political and personal wills and needs rather than what the defence sector/strategy requires (1), (2), (3), (4).

Law No. 14 (1967) prohibits the publishing or broadcasting of any information or news about the armed forces and its formations, movement, armaments and personnel, and everything related to the military and strategic aspects except after obtaining written approval from the director of the military intelligence department. Therefore, even if an acquisition planning process exists, the law would prohibit the publishing of any related information except that which is approved by the director of military intelligence (1).

As explained in 11A, it is unclear whether there is a clear and defined acquisition planning process to determine whether it is subject to external oversight. However, there is no external oversight on the issue related to the acquisition and procurement of arms. For example, Article 77 of Law no. 182 (2018) allows the MoD, MMP and the MoI to conduct procurement through limited or local tenders, limited practices or direct contracting (1), (2), (3). Moreover, Law no. 147 (1964) exempts all arms contracts from taxes, fees, and most importantly from financial regulation and scrutiny, and monitoring by both the CAA and the Ministry of Finance (4).

Since 2015, the Centre for Defence Investment handles all the procurement and manages property in the defence sector. Since the centre was formed, the procurement procedure has become more transparent. The procurement waspreviously handled by the National Defence Forces and there were instances where the contractor and the beneficiary were the same person, which was potentially a source of corruption and conflict of interest. [1]
The Centre for Defence Investments organises procurements for the whole area of government of the Ministry of Defence: the Defence Forces, the Ministry of Defence, Defence League, Defence Resources Agency and Estonian War Museum. The Centre has its own budget that is approved, amended and overseen by the Ministry of Defence, as stated by the Statute of the National Defence Investment Centre. The Statute also stipulates the structure and the responsibilities of the Centre. [2]
The planning of development of national defence in Estonia is based on the capability management framework and the DOTMLPFI planning model. This approach links the security environment and potential threats with scenario profiles (which determine the conditions and standards), sectorial profiles (which determine the aims), the alternative military structures (which determine the levels of capability, i.e. what mark on a global scale could be rewarded to the capability that could be achieved in Estonia), the existing resources and structures (which determine the existing capabilities), the desired resources and structures in the future (which determine the future capabilities). The gap between the existing and the desired capabilities is defined as the capability gap. To close the capability gap, alternative decisions are considered and, on this basis, the decisions are made and formulated in the guidelines of national defence. Specific purchases are directly linked to the gaps in strategic capabilities.
The acquisition planning is thus based on detailed procurement rules [5] and approved by the Minister of Defence, in accordance with the Public Procurement Act. [3] All the purchases are based on the defence strategy and national development plan. [4] These are one of the most detailed strategies within the public sector in Estonia, as pointed out by interviewees. As the development plan is the result of numerous consultations, agreements and compromises from different units, departments and politicians, it is to be followed carefully and adding major new acquisitions or any other changes that have not been unanimously agreed on is unlikely. [6,7]

All major procurements and general information about them can be found in the defence budget and the ten-year National Development Plan. [1] The budget outlines all the main activities and investments for the coming year in the defence sector. The National Development Plan for 2017-2026 [2] consists of public and non-public parts. The public document describes all the main investments within the next ten years in the defence sector in very general terms and without going into detail. It lists the priorities for strengthening defence capabilities and requirements, long-term development programs and overall resource constraints in developing defence capabilities. Detailed instructions are provided by the directive of the Ministry of Defence. [3] However, the information available is generally about the outcomes or directives of the process, and not a detailed overview of the current process itself. The information that is made publicly available does not include justification of purchases, chains of responsibility, timelines, mechanisms, nor outcomes about the planning process itself. The lack of transparency has been justified using the argument of classified information.

The Riigikogu approves the basis of Estonia’s defence policy, which is the fundamental document for the course of action within the defence sector. [1] The Riigikogu also approved the “National defence development plan 2017–2026”, assessed by the parliamentary committee. [2]
The Security Committee, consisting of ministers responsible for the areas related to national defence and led by the Prime Minister, coordinates the activities of the authorities of executive power upon planning, development and organisation of national defence. The Committee also coordinates the activities of the security authorities. Government authorities are required to provide information related to national defence to the Security Committee. [3] In addition, each succeeding development plan assesses the accomplishments of the goals in the previous development plan. [4]
And finally, as stipulated by the National Audit Office Act, [5] the National Audit Office exercises economic control in order to ensure to the Riigikogu and to the public that the funds of the public sector are used legally and effectively.

Justifications for major acquisitions are publicly given in the Government’s Defence Report (around 5 years’ timeframe), which again is streamlined with the Government Report on Foreign and Security Policy (around 5 years’s timeframe). In addition, justifications are given for acquisitions in the annual budget proposals of the Defence Forces and the Ministry of Defence, as well as in the State Budget. And again in the performance agreement between the Ministry of Defence and the Defence Forces, as well as in the Finance and Performance Plan of the administrative branch of the Defence Forces (4 years). The Government Programme also influences defence planning.

The acquisition cycle is based on strategic planning and the performance requirements for the Defence Forces (and the maintenance or improvement of defence capability), but adjustments and prioritisation is carried out, for example, due to budget contraints. Major acquisitions’ (currently the replacement of Hornet fighters and the acquisision of new naval vessels) acqusition cycle is more open (i.e. press releases, interviews given, information provided about the different stages of the process, the media being able interview also the representatives of the potential sellers, etc.) than that of, for instance, annual defence material purchases dueue to the financial value of the acquisition, its importance for the Finnish defence system, and the legitimacy of the purchase. The Defence Forces also provides information on lesser acquisition plans e.g. the introduction of a third type of UAVs in the operational capability of the military [1].

According to the Act on State Budget, Chpt 1, Section 12: Ministries will need to plan for the societal effectiveness of their actions, as well as the finances of their branch of administration and the effectiveness of their performance in advance and for a number of years. Agencies and institutions will need to plan their operations, finances and the effectiveness of their performance in advance and for a number of years. This planning needs to provide information necessary for the preparation of the State Budget and other financial planning carried out by the Government. [2]

The Ministry of Defence’s Strategic Plan, which is part of the administrative branch’s planning system and is implemented through performance guidance procedures, is the administrative branch’s main planning document (long-term) and supplemented with sub-strategies (mid- or short-term) e.g. on material policy, personnel, security, information management, and communication. [3] The strategic plan is updated in at least four years’ intervals and/or when strategic changes or political guidance so require. The plan is a result of the strategy work carried out in the Ministry of Defence, which timeframe is about 20 years to the future from the current moment. [4]

The material policy of the defence administration is aimed at maintaining and developing Finland’s defence capabilities in the long-term by acquiring material and services that are suitable to the needs of the Defence Forces, and meet the international inter-operability requirements. A pivotal target is to ensure military security of supply in all circumstances. [5] The Ministry of Defence guides material acquisition, which is carried out and monitored by the Headquarters of the Defence Forces. National defence and security industry has been integrated in national defence, security of supply, and international defence industrial cooperation. [6]

The Ministry (the commercial directorate and the material policy directorate are pivotal actors) issues and updates the material policy of defence administration, which the Headquarters of the Defence Forces (the Chief of Staff, the chief of the HQ, the chief of logistics, the chief of wartime economy, and the director of the commercial sector are pivotal actors) turns into material strategy guidance.

The commercial sector of the Logistics department of the Headquarters of the Defence Forces guides, directs, trains, develops and monitors the acquisition of defence material. The Defence Forces purchase order is the document which then guides acquisition processes so that they are carried out according to the law and other regulations, relevant strategies and policies. The Defence Forces has all in all 27 procurement units. [7] The National Audit Office inspected the steering mechanism of the Defence Forces in 2017. According to the inspection report, strategic planning within the Defence Forces has improved and is streamlined, cooperation between the Ministry of Defence and the Defence Forces is smooth, material policy and its implementation is justified, but the connection between strategic planning and performance-based management ought to be strengthened. [8]

The public has access to information about acquisition planning. For example, the Government’s Defence Report, budget proposals and state budgets and budget amendments, the performance agreements between the Ministry of Defence and the Defence Forces, and the finance and performance plans of the administrative branch of the Defence Forces are publicly available ̶ as are the old strategic planning documents of the Ministry of Defence that have been used in answering the question 11A. Inspection reports of the National Audit Office are also publicly available, unless redacted or concealed.

Both the Ministry of Defence and the Defence Forces provide little information on the acquisition cycle on their websites. One can request further information from the Ministry of Defence or the Defence Forces on the basis of Freedom of Information Act (Act on the Publicity of the Activities of Authorities), but one needs to know what information (s)he is looking for. According to the act, public officials should advise citizens on the information they are looking for and officials should also actively publish relevant information. [1] Answering to the question 11A turned out to be challenging which in itself testifies that information available is scattered and one needs to know where to look for it.

The Parliament and its Parliamentary Committees are involved in many different stages of the acquisition cycle, starting from the discussion and approval of the Government’s Defence Report, the annual State Budget and its amendments, and the final acquisition. At the last stage, the Parliament accepts the final central government accounts. The National Audit Office may choose to inspect any of the acquisitions and is also involved in the approval of the final central government accounts. For example, in 2020 NAO inspected the expenditure and funding of the Defence Forces’ strategic capability projects (HX Fighter and Squadron 2020 projects). The actual inspection report is concealed, but a summary is available on the office’s website. [1] In 2017, NAO inspected the steering system of the Defence Forces and this report is fully avaiable. [2]

The military programming law (LPM) 2019-2025 states the acquisitions, strategy, and the connections between the two, that are planned for the next 6 years. In addition, every year, during the vote of the finance law, the Parliament is presented with a report with acquisitions strategies and planning for the year to come, in order to vote on the budget of the army. It is also a moment of debate, when deputies can discuss, question, and review the acquisitions planned and put them into perspective with the strategic objectives and procurement of defence equipment planned in the LPM.
For example, in the latest LPM, the government states its “ambition 2030”: the acquisition of “two light surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft, three strategic reconnaissance aircraft (CUGEs) and the control of a light surveillance and reconnaissance vessel, as well as the commissioning of space systems CERES (Listening and Intelligence Capability Electromagnetic Space) and MUSIS (Multinational Space-based Imaging System for Surveillance, Recognition and Observation).” [1]
The budget function is assumed by each army, the acquisition process is conducted by the “Direction générale de l’armement” (General Directorate of Armements, DGA) in agreement with the “équipe de marque” [brand team] of the final buyer. Concerning the other acquisitions for each branch of the army, the Service du commissariat and the Mission des achats launch public invitations to tender. And finally for the finance function there is the Direction des affaires financières (Directorate of Financial Affairs). However, little information is available to the public explicitly concerning the organisation of the « purchase department » within the ministry. [2]

The LPM, the Finance law stating the armed forces’ yearly budget, like any law, is available to the public online on open access. All debates at the Parliament on defence issues or debates [1] within the Defence Commission of the National Assembly can be either streamed live online or streamed afterwards on the National Assembly website. Citizens can also be present, and listen to the debates in person.
The DGA [2] is in charge of arms acquisition. It gives detailed reports on its website, as well as on the “arsenal platform”. [3]
Activities of the standing committees of the National Assembly and the Senate in charge of defence are, however, limited by the secrecy of defence (art. 9) which sets boundaries for the field of investigation. [4] Their mission “may not be exercised with the specialised intelligence services mentioned in I of Article 6h of Ordinance No 58-1100 of 17 November 1958 relating to the functioning of parliamentary assemblies or to deal with matters of a secret nature concerning national defence and internal or external security of the State”, de facto excluding external operations (OPEX), strategic weapons acquisitions, or exports from the scope of the activities. [5]

External oversight is carried out by Parliament. The Minister of Defence has to present the implementation of the law every semester to the Parliament [1]. MPs can review, from one year to the next, and at every LPM vote, the results of policies and validate the budget of the armed forces in terms of equipment-renewing, for instance, but, as we saw earlier, the strategic decisions are taken by the executive power: the President, chief of the armed forces, and Ministry of Defence in general. The legislative power has no say in planning the involvement of the armed forces or in choosing which specific equipment acquisitions will be made. The case of the current PNF investigation into ICS influence-peddling [2] shows how high-ranking officers within the Armed forces ministry chose their subcontractors without any external control.
Again, activities of the standing committees of the National Assembly and the Senate in charge of defence are limited by the secrecy of defence which sets boundaries to the field of investigations. Their mission “may not be exercised with the specialised intelligence services mentioned in I of Article 6h of Ordinance No 58-1100 of 17 November 1958 relating to the functioning of parliamentary assemblies or to deal with matters of a secret nature concerning national defence and internal or external security of the State”, de facto excluding OPEX, strategic weapons acquisitions or exports from the scope of the activities. [1]
But the overall scrutiny is exerted by the Cour des comptes [Court of Auditors], through investigating, auditing, questioning and the publishing of reports. [3] [4] [5] [6]

The Federal Office of Bundeswehr Equipment, Information Technology and In-Service Support (BAAINBw) is the central procurement office within the ministerial portfolio of the Federal Ministry of Defence (BMVg). Besides this, there are also more than 1,000 decentralised purchasing offices to contract the recurring needs of the units, off-the-shelf products and services. A collection of all procedural regulations can be found in the Customer Product Management (CPM) regulation, which stipulates clear goals for fostering transparency and ensuring a fair and public procurement cycle. All information about the CPM is publicly available online via the agency’s website [1].

Details of defence acquisition can be found in the Ministry of Defence budget (Einzelplan 14, part of the annual Federal Budget) [2]. The entire process is overseen by the Federal Audit Office, as defined in Article 114 of the German Grundgesetz [3], with evaluations included in the Annual Reports on Federal Financial Management (‘Bemerkungen’), Category C (Sonstige Prüfungs und Beratungsergebnisse) [4].

There is a clear and transparent process in place for the entire acquisition planning cycle, with formally separate functions for internal acquisition planning. The connections between specific purchases and defence strategy requirements are made explicit. For example, the integrated planning process and the subsequent coverage processes, etc. upstream of the CPM procurement process is fully described in ZDv A-400/7 ‘Performing integrated planning service process’ [5]. In addition, further information on the subject of ‘performing integrated planning’ is publicly available on the website of the Planning Office of the Bundeswehr [6].

In terms of equipment, the Customer Product Management (CPM) is a procedural regulation for the identification and coverage of needs in the Bundeswehr. The central requirements defined in the CPM aim to shorten development and procurement times as well as coordination processes, and to minimise administrative effort [1]. This streamlining of procedures is intended to ensure that the identified needs of the Bundeswehr can be met economically in a shorter period of time.

In addition, a clear separation of military and civilian responsibilities is to be established within the Bundeswehr and requirements are to be met on the basis of a Bundeswehr-wide capability analysis. According to the CPM, feasibility studies should minimise the risk prior to the Bundeswehr’s procurement decision and give preference to commercially available or marketable material [1].

In 2016, then-Minister von der Leyen initiated the ‘Trendwende Material’ (loosely translating as ‘equipment reform’), which seeks to improve the deployability of the German Armed Forces. The aim is to ensure there is adequate equipment for the task portfolio (e.g. regular attacks, terror attacks, cyber attacks). The investment sum is set at EUR 130 billion for the 2016-2030 period [7]. The ‘Trendwende Material’ is in line with the military objectives set in the 2016 Weissbuch, but is also adapted to respond to material shortcomings that emerge during ongoing deployments. Furthermore, to support the reform project, an armament board (‘Rüstungsboard’) was established within the Federal Ministry of Defence, which is tasked with reviewing the progress and potential risks of defence acquisitions. The results of this review are summarised in a report to the German Bundestag [8].

The public has access to information about the entire process, so they can obtain information as needed. Information is proactively published on the Bundeswehr website. The 109-page document outlines justifications of purchases, lines of responsibility, timelines, mechanisms and outcomes in great detail [1,2,3].

The review reports provided by the armament board (‘Rüstungsboard’, see 11A) are also publicly available [4].

There are strong external oversight functions that assess the country’s long-term acquisition plans, their legitimacy and the likelihood that they are going to function properly. Parliament is also involved in the oversight of acquisition planning. For example, the Federal Ministry of Defence must submit all procurement projects requiring an outlay above EUR 25 million to the Defence Committee for discussion [1]. The Customer Product Management regulation states: ‘Taking into account the relevant decisions on the obligation to submit a draft contract to the Budget Committee of the German Bundestag (generally applicable if the contract value exceeds EUR 25 million), the draft contract prepared and finalised in accordance with the contract management manual must be submitted to the Budget Committee of the German Bundestag for approval prior to signature (this is called a “EUR 25 million proposal”)’ [2].

The acquisition planning cycle is regulated by the Public Procurement Act, 2003 (Act 663) (1), (2) which was subsequently amended by the Public Procurement (Amendment) Act, 2016 (Act 914) which established the Public Procurement Authority (PPA) (3). The PPA is mandated to “regulate, assess and ensure full compliance” of state institutions with the Act. The act applies to the security services and Ministry of Defence, including the Ghana Armed Forces (GAF) (4).

According to the Public Procurement Act, each procurement entity shall establish a Tender Committee (Art. 17.1) to “(a) ensure that at every stage of the procurement activity, procedures prescribed in this Act have been followed; (b) exercise sound judgment in making procurement decisions; and (c) refer to the appropriate Tender Review Board for approval, any procurement above its approval threshold, taking into consideration the fact that approval above the Entity Committee is a one stop only approval” (Art.17.2) (3). Within the MOD there are two committees, the Tender Committee and the Audit Committee; while the Ghana Armed Forces (GAF) has a Tender Committee (5).

Information on the acquisition planning process is not publicly available. The MOD’s budget includes information on the procurement activity (1), (2), (3), (4).

The PPA is the regulatory body responsible for implementing and enforcing compliance of the procurement laws, regulations, manuals, and guidelines and ensuring that all public entities comply with the various procurement legislations (1).

The current government established the Office of the Minister for Public Procurement to advise the president on matters of public procurement and with the aim of “building and sustaining efficiency in the Public Procurement System of Ghana in accordance with International Best Standards and Practices” (2). Additionally, the Audit Service has also functions of oversight over the MOD procurement process whereas the Special Budget Committee can approve or reject the MOD budget. However, long term planning is not well-conceived as part of comprehensive strategic planning (3), (4), (5). Overall, there are no clear external powers that have significant influence over acquisition planning.

There are very few explicit connections made between specific purchases and defence strategy requirements [1]. However, there is a process in place stipulated by Law 3433/2006 and internal functions are separated [2]. The General Directorate of Defence Equipment and Investments (GDDEI) or the General Staffs of the branches are involved in the acquisition planning process, depending on the case [2]. There process is only partially transparent: for example, key activities such as meetings with defence sector contractors and the MoD’s procurement decisions are made public.

The Greek public has limited access to information regarding acquisition planning because this is treated as a national security issue [1, 2]. The MoD website only provides some information about the planning process. There is no clear oversight of the process.

There is no external oversight of the acquisition planning process [1, 2].

There is an acquisition planning process internally in the ministry, while some elements of the Zrínyi 2026 plan (the mid-term development plan of the HDF) are also available [1]; however, detailed acquisition plans with are not available to the public at all. Sources have suggested that even internal plans are not detailed, and they are mostly not respected by political decision-makers [2, 3].

The public has limited access to information, only has certain suggestions on the priorities based on the public elements of the Zrínyi 2026 plan [1]. As the public version of the plan contains only mostly conceptual ideas, but very few details, there is not much that the public could debate at all. Most of the plan is classified, thus cannot be publicly debated [2, 3].

No sources had evidence that any external oversight existed [1, 2, 3, 4].

India has a clear process for the whole acquisition planning cycle. The Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) is entrusted with coordinating the fifteen years Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP), five years Services Capital Acquisition Plan (SCAP) and an Annual Acquisition Plan (AAP) from each of the services. DAC approves the LTIPP and SCAP; and the Defence Procurement Board (DPB) approves AAPs [1][2][3]. Explicit connections between defence purchases and requirements are usually made, though there is no well-defined defence policy or strategy publicly communicated [4][5].

Procedures and guidelines related to defence acquisition are publicly available as is information regarding assessment of needs. However, given the complexity of defence acquisition in India, there can remain ambiguities [1][2][3].

Oversight of defence acquisitions is primarily undertaken by the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG), the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC), the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), and the Standing Committee on Defence. Independent monitors who are retired civil servants with necessary expertise monitor Pre-Integrity Pacts and any issues that arise during the acquisition process [1]. Oversight seems to focus on timely fulfilment of contractual obligations and procedural compliance. There have been recent concerns raised regarding redactive pricing in the ‘Performance Audit Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India on Capital Acquisition in Indian Air Force (Union Government – Defence Services, Air Force, Report No. 3 of 2019)’. It is believed that the redactions due to the Ministry’s concerns about security, obscure the pricing component of procurement decisions such as the Rafale deal [2].

The mechanism for arms procurement is regulated by Defence Minister Regulations (Permenhan) No. 17/2014 [1] and No. 46/2016 [2]. These regulations do not address the entire acquisition cycle, i.e. the cradle-to-grave cycle of defence equipment readiness, focussing only on the formulation of needs and procurement. Nor do these regulations address the other stages, such as upgrading and disposal. This is because Indonesia’s approach to new procurement is limited to the purchasing stage. Permenhan No. 28/2015 [3] describes the mechanism for preparing defence planning as the basis for procurement. The amount of planning includes six strategic documents on national defence, including postures, and 15 documents of long-term, medium-term and annual planning. This planning is carried out by different levels of bureaucracy in the Ministry of Defence, the TNI, organisational units (in each service) and the municipal/working unit (satker). This Permenhan was revised in 2019 through the issuance of Permenhan No. 31/2018, which increases the number of bureacratic units involved in the planning formulation and approval, as well as the number of short-term planning documents. The new Permenhan decreases the number of long-term planning documents and even eliminates strategic documents as a reference for defence planning. There are concerns that these changes will increase short-term technocratic work and reduce long-term foresight in planning formulation [4].

Procedural details of the procurement cycle for defence equipment are not open to the public. Strategic processes such as requirement planning are carried out internally and only involve limited participation of external parties (for example, academics and civil society organisations), in focus group discussions for example [5]. The technical processes, such as translating the needs plan into operational requirements and technical specifications, are completely closed. The results of long-term defence acquisition planning are contained in the Minimum Essential Forces (MEF) document for the period of 2010-2024 (15 years). MEF is not meant to be a static document; instead, it can be adapted to new considerations, including strategic defence review and the issuance of new laws in the defence sector (such as Law No. 16/2012 on Defence Industry). Since the first MEF policy was issued in 2010 [6], the Permenhan concerning MEF alignment policy has now been reissued four times (2012, 2014, 2015 and 2019) [7,8,9]. It is not yet clear to what extent the changes have taken effect due to the absence of some MEF documents on the Ministry of Defence website, specifically the first Permenhan concerning the MEF and the most recent Permenhan No. 6/2019 concerning MEF alignment.

Procedural details of the procurement cycle of defence equipment are not open to the public, under the pretext of confidentiality. Strategic processes, such as needs planning, are carried out internally and only involve a small number of external parties, such as selected academics and civil society organisations [1]. Even these external parties are not given access to the strategic planning document. The technical processes, such as translating the needs plan into operational requirements and technical specifications, are completely closed. The process of procurement, including awarding contracts and receiving deliveries, is carried out in a more transparent manner, in the sense that the government provides information about its annual plan to the public regularly every year [2] and from time to time, the government releases information on milestone achievements. The post-contract procurement process up to the disposal stage is rarely reported.

External oversight of the long-term acquisition plan is carried out by the House of Representatives (DPR) and CSOs. Due to limited access to government planning and budget documents, the DPR cannot understand the weapons system procurement programme in detail but only in the form of logs [1]. Therefore, the DPR cannot check whether the government’s procurement plan is going in accordance with how it was originally defined. Civil society organisations have complained about the lack of parliamentary oversight creating potential room for corruption in the defence sector [2]. Every year, the government, through the Ministry of Defence, reports the progress of MEF compliance to the public and Parliament, without any proper methodology to explain the numbers.

There may be a defined process for acquisition planning, but it is not made publicly available. The Law of the Armed Forces states that the mission of the three branches is to prepare the logistical requirements plan and take action to procure the supplies relevant for the service [1]. It unknown if internal functions are separated, although if the treasury designations are considered on Iranian and foreign entities for missile procurement activity [2], it would seem that they are explicit connections between specific purchases and defence strategy requirements [3].

There is no transparency over the acquision planning process [1, 2].

There is no external oversight of the acquisition planning process [1, 2].

Acquisition plans for defence requirements are not published by defence institutions or their online platforms. Details on costs, scheduling and management are similarly absent from public debate and press coverage. While the latter may not offer firm evidence of the absence of planning, or discussions around objectives of even unpublished plans/advanced planning. Present-day discussions are limited to expressions of intent to purchase foreign equipment from allies and MoD-led efforts to restructure the army (1), (2), (3), and protect borders from infiltration. Iraq’s existing NSS pertains no information explicit to planning. As the previous version of this assessment notes, quoting the OECD’s 2010 report on procurement; “the lack of public procurement planning that is linked to the more general problem in planning and can partly be justified by the Iraqi context” (4). In corroboration of this, an Iraqi military affairs expert (5) cited “capacity shortfalls” as far as the acquisition is concerned, due to funding shortages and the MoD’s ability to release only parts of its investment budget” (5). In the absence of acquisition marketing or relevant discussions, it appears that planning has not improved, owing to Iraq’s uncertain security situation.

There is not a high degree of transparency within the field of acquisition planning. Its absence may imply that plans do exist but are not published; however, years of mismanagement, misallocation and disappearance of funds also present sound evidence of no planning. While Iraq has a variety of national defence colleges (1) it is unclear if, after 2003, acquisition planning was incorporated. into their taught curriculum. It is fair to conclude that there is no rolling strategy for defence acquisition.

Since there is no process for acquisition planning, this sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

There is a process for acquisition planning in place, internal acquisition functions are separated, e.g. budget, commercial, and finance. There are some explicit connections between specific purchases and defence strategy requirements. For instance, the Procurement and Production Directorate (PPD) as part of the Ministry of Defence “handles procurement and oversees the manufacture of systems and products, maintenance services for the military and civilian defense systems, and ministry agencies’ overseas procurement activities. The PPD also oversees the development of the country’s military-industrial infrastructure, thus facilitating more extensive and intensive local production and reducing defense imports (1) (2). The PPD operates with the defence system’s future needs and the country’s industrial-technological potential in mind. The PPD also administers the maritime and air transport of equipment and goods acquired abroad for Ministry of Defence and other government ministries, as well as equipment and goods exported from Israel. The PPD is composed of five executive and several staff units. Four executive units, organized as divisions, deal with procurement. Each of these (Air, Land, Maintenance, and Sea) coordinates its operations with a corresponding logistical center in one of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) branches, two or three specific-area systems, and one or two branches located in IDF logistical centers, in charge of rapid procurement entailing small-scale expenditure. The “office” or unit is the basic entity that performs most procurement coordination work, specializing in procurement areas according to types of equipment and technologies. Each such unit has a corresponding procurement agency in one of the IDF logistical units, and several such units are organised within a divisional framework. The fifth division – Overseas Handling and Transport – arranges the handling and shipping of import and export cargoes of the defence system and other government ministries, draws up contracts and agreements for the purchase of air and maritime shipping and handling services, and is responsible for paying import taxes (customs).” (3) The PPD formulates procurement plans based on IDF requirements established in the IDF’s confidential five year budget plan. This makes establishing connections with the IDF’s strategy complicated.

The public has only limited access to information about the process for acquisition planning itself. A lot of information are excluded from publication, or not provided upon request (1). The IDF’s acquisition plan for instance is confidential and not subject to publication. There are only a few publications that are available to the public such as the Plan of the Israeli Air Force (2) which entails very superficial, general information (2).

Oversight functions that are mainly conducted by the Knesset and the State Comptroller assess performance, and the country’s long-term acquisition plans, but they fail to assess the legitimacy of plans. For instance, the parliament is involved in oversight of acquisition planning, but its oversight functions are limited, in particular in relation to acquisitions (1). However, the State Comptroller who is accountable only to the Knesset is allowed to get all necessary information (2). According to the Basic Law “audit the economy, the property, the finances, the obligations and the administration of the State, of Government Ministries, of all enterprises, institutions, or corporations of the State, of Local Authorities, and of bodies or other institutions which were defined by law as subject to audit by the State Comptroller. The State Comptroller shall inspect the legality, integrity, managerial norms, efficiency and economy of the audited bodies, as well as any other matter which he deems necessary. A body subject to State Audit will upon request, immediately provide the State Comptroller with information, documents, explanations, or any other material which the Comptroller deems necessary for audit purposes.” (3)

Italy recently underwent a process of revision of the public system, in view of a more transparent and accountable system of the Italian Public Administration (PA). This led to the adoption of the Legislative decree 97/2016 that ensures, among others, more transparency on the management of each Administration [1].

According to the Code of the Military System, long term programmatic planning is carried out by the Secretary General of Defence (art. 26) [2] [3] after the coordination with the Chief of Defence Staff of each branches of the armed forces. From the long term programmatic planning, annual planning and financing are derived by the Secretary General, and takes the form of the Pluriannual Programmatic Document (Documento Programmatico Pluriennale, DPP) [4] that is updated yearly with the estimates that the Minister of Defence presents to the Parliament each year, according to art. 2 of Law 25/1997 [5]. Moreover, procedures and timelines are identified in the Code of the Military System (artt. 536, 536-bis), which also requests a separation between the different planning functions [6]. For the acquisitions not included in the ordinary budget (extraordinary), the approval of the expense by a specific law is necessary. In both cases, defence committees of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate have to give consensus in the forms and time provided by law. If this counsel is not given during the window of opportunity defined by law, then the approval is granted. For ordinary expenses, subsequently to the counsel of the committees, the decree is approved by the Minister of Defence.

Information on the acquisition process are made publicly available on the website of the Ministry of Defence, where all required information on the DPP and estimates can be found [1]. Further information on the planning process can be found on the webpage of the Secretary General of Defence, which is the entity responsible for the implementation of the acquisition plan [2]. Nonetheless, information on this part of the Ministry’s website is not constantly updated [3]. It is possible to obtain most of up to date information regarding, justification of purchase, mechanism, outcomes and costs on each of armed forces branch procurement websites [4].

Parliament exercises its right to oversee the acquisition planning. Decisions are made publicly available on the websites of both the Ministry of Defence [1] and of the responsible Commissions of the Parliament. The Defence Commission can also carry out interrogations on the advancements of specific acquisition programmes [2]. Nonetheless, the effectiveness of oversight is deficient. The responsible parliamentary committees can exercise effective oversight only when the acquisition is undertaken through legislation. In this case the government has to take into consideration the remarks of the committees [3]. In all other cases, parliamentary commission provide opinions [4].

The broad outlines of the acquisition planning cycle are clear. The “Medium Term Defence Program” is an acquisition plan for a five-year period. [1] This document builds on the National defence Program Guidelines, [2] which are subordinate to the National Security Strategy. [3] A feature of the Abe premiership (2012–2020) was that the Prime Minister’s leadership was strengthened, including over defence procurement. [4] The decisions to purchase the Aegis Ashore missile defence system, taken in 2017 [5] and followed up with subsequent investments, and to terminate final assembly and check out in Japan of F-35s and instead purchase completed F-35s off the shelf from the US, in 2018, were made by the Prime Minister, who utilised the decision making apparatus of the Prime Minister’s Office. [6] Within the Ministry, there are different procedures for planning different types of acquisitions. Selection of aircraft follows explicit rules in a circular issued by the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defence. Based on requests from the Chiefs of Staff, the Minister of Defence writes a letter to request bids from companies with information on the required performance, cost and rear support for the aircraft that the Ministry wishes to procure. A committee made up of the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defence and other Ministry of Defence officials, the Chiefs of Staff and other service branch officials advises the Minister on the letter of request, and later, on the selection of a winner among the bids. [7] The government may also request a bid from the US to sell the equipment to Japan under the Foreign Military Sales arrangement. [8] The Ministry of Finance has pointed out that most other equipment is selected by the separate service branches. Rules exist for the performance assessment of some such equipment, and the cost of the equipment is included in the budget. However, for these categories of equipment, rules for the selection process as a whole are not available. [9] In addition to the top-down planning cycle described thus far, the Ministry also has a bottom-up planning cycle leading up to a budget request. This process is not transparent, but available sources provide an outline of it. Planning of the budget for a fiscal year that starts in April will begin in May two years earlier. Each unit of the Self-Defence Forces (SDF) submits requests for equipment. By May the year before the budget year starts, the staff of each service branch issue a document with its equipment requests. This is centrally assessed by the Ministry of Defence, which makes a budget request by August. It is worth noting that in June 2020, Minister of Defence Kono decided to suspend the deployment of the Aegis Ashore missile defence system after having consulted with the Prime Minister. This was a deployment for which the Prime Minister had taken the initiative, according to some press reports. Some argue that this indicates that the link between the purchase and technical (and hence strategic) requirements had not been well enough considered. [10] Regarding financial policy functions, the Ministry is conscious of financial constraints created by multi-year procurement contracts when making budget proposals. [11] ATLA acquires commercial information in the form of the production cost of equipment by enterprises. [12] Building on this information, ATLA calculates lifecycle costs of equipment, although the Ministry of Finance has pointed out that the calculation is often based on prices at a later time than when the equipment was selected and that some of the lifecycle cost components are left out of the calculation. [9] The decision to suspend deployment of the Aegis Ashore missile defence system in 2020 indicates that this deployment had not been optimally planned and there is evidence that lifecycle cost planning is not satisfactory.

The public has access to documents from the whole procurement process. The NSS, [1] NDPG, [2] and Medium Term Defence Program [3] can all be downloaded from the MOD website, and budgets are all publicly accessible and can also be downloaded from the website. The MOD’s Defence Programs and Budget of Japan (我が国の防衛と予算) explains in a clear manner the acquisition plans and the rationale for them, the sectors of the MOD and SDF that are involved, schedules, mechanisms, and outcomes. [4] A similar document for the JCG is found on its website. [5] The circular “On the criteria for the selection of aircraft” specifies that the result of aircraft selection processes shall be made public. [6] However, often after the selection has been made, only brief information on the aircraft that were proposed and on the selection process is given. Details of the assessment of different aircraft are often not made public. Regarding other types of defence equipment, only contractual information that is relevant for budget implementation is made public, and the content of the assessment and results of performance tests are not publicised. [7] Nevertheless, budget information is not always available for the public either. According to a FY2017 budget supplement, lifecycle cost for two aircraft selected in November 2014 were publicised in August 2016, and such costs for a third airplane selected at the same time were to be made public later. [7] According to Defence of Japan 2018, information on the price of equipment acquired from the US through Foreign Military Sales was often not transparent, but the US had, in June 2018, expressed that it would work to provide more information on such prices. [8]

A Medium Term Defence Program (MTDP) acquisition plan covering FY 2019 – FY 2023, as well as National Defence Program Guidelines (NDPG) for FY 2019- were adopted by the National Security Council and the Cabinet in 2018. While the NDPG describes the strategic challenges facing Japan and the principles that should guide Japan’s response to them, the MTDP gives details on the types of arms that Japan should acquire and the measures it should take to meet these challenges, and provides an estimate of how much this will cost. [1] [2] The only external oversight of the drafting of these documents that is mentioned in documents on the homepages of the Ministry of Defence is that which was managed by the Prime Minister’s Office. [3] In addition, representatives of the largest ruling party LDP’s Research Commission on National Security and its National Defence Division submitted a document with requests for the NDPG (which would have implications for the MTDP) to the Prime Minister. [4] Drafts of the NDPG were discussed at seven meetings attended by the Prime Minister and other members of the Cabinet, members of the Cabinet Secretariat (including the National Security Secretariat), the Chief of Staff, one official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and one official from the Ministry of Defence, as well as a panel of external experts. The Security Committee of the House of Representatives discussed the NDPG for FY 2019– and the MTDP for FY 2019-FY2023 in November 2018, about a month before the cabinet adopted them. [5] At the meetings of the Security Committee during the Diet session following the adoption of the documents, the MTDP and NDPG were mentioned most frequently in March and June. In February 2020, Prime Minister Abe answered questions in the Budget Committee of the House of Representatives about the focus in the newly adopted NDPG and MTDP on the multiple domains of space, cyber and EMP and on modifying the Izumo-class helicopter carriers to allow them to carry STOVL fighter aircraft. [6] Questions about long-term acquisition plans for defence equipment were also asked to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the third subcommittee of the Budget Committee of the House of Representatives, which considered the Defence Budget, in February 2020, and to the Minister of Defence in the Budget Committee of the House of Representatives in February and March 2020. A Diet report about these questions indicated that members of the opposition asked questions to gain information and express positions, but not to achieve a change of policy in the short run. [6] Hence, the Ministry of Finance conducts long-term financial assessment of acquisitions. A panel of experts contributed to giving the NDPG a more solid scholarly foundation, thereby strengthening the legitimacy of the MTDP long-term acquisition plan, which built on it. MPs conduct oversight by asking critical questions and requesting information from the government about long-term acquisitions, but their ability to produce changes in policies is limited.

There is no defined process for acquisition planning in most of governmental departments and ministries in Jordan. However, research has shown that part of the U.S military assistance to Jordan, has been the development of a five-year procurement plan for the Jordanian Armed Forces [1]. The public, however, has no access to this plan and it is not available online. A report by the SIGMA in 2016 suggested that there is no clear public acquisition strategy [2], and it seems that this has not changed since then.

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable because, despite the availability of the SIGMA/OECD corruption risk assessment of public procurement in Jordan [1], there is no evidence that the public has access to comprehensive information around procurement or acquisition, particularly weapons and military equipment [2, 3,4]. The government does post some information about tenders on the Government Tenders Directorate however, these lack detail [5].

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable because, although Jordan has an Audit Bureau that is supposed to audit several governmental entities, [1] it is not mandated to audit the Armed Forces. There is also no evidence of the Audit Bureau carrying out assessments or overseeing actual acquisition planning, and thus far their work seems to be focused on reviewing general figures and identifying discrepancies in these figures. The Integrity and Anti-Corruption Commission could also provide external oversight over acquisition planning [2], however, there was no plan in the first place.

It is not clear from infomation currently publicly available what equipment is covered in acquisitions; however, the Ministry of Defence (MOD) has, through its website, provided some indication of the process for the acquisition of major defence equipment. The process has five main sequences: (1) Identification through a strategic defence review; (2) market survey; (3) tendering; (4) trials; (5) contracting. [1]

Previously, according to literature, the MOD has been operatating the New Management Strategy (NMS) which empasised on efficient accounting and transparency. [2] The equipment acquisition process is outlined in the NMS guidelines and it is expected to be guided by the Defence Policy, availability of resources, manpower among others. In addition, the NMS procurement process integrated the Downey procedure, especially for the purchase of armaments. The process involves several stages, among them concept-formulation or technical stage which forms the core part of the planning stage. [3] It is not clear if this process is still in place. However, other procurement processes are handled by the supply chain management services which are on the website, which is regarded as being responsible for overseeing procurement activities in MOD. The managment services provide secretarial services to the ministeial tender committee.

The website indicates there is a procurement unit within the division whose functions are derived from the Public Procurement and Disposal Act No. 33 of 2015. Among the functions of the unit is to set and enforce procurement standards and guidelines for the ministry, preparation of the civilian annual procurement plan. In law, the MOD is expected under section 90 (1) to adhere to provisions Public Procurement and Disposal Act No. 33 of 2015. [4] The only exception is in the case of classified procurement and disposals procedures for National Security Organs, in which Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) is classified as such by the constitution. In this case, KDF is expected to have a dual list that lists items that are classified. The list is submitted annually to Cabinet Secretary for MOD who in turn is required to submit the list for Cabinet for approval.

The public has limited access to the information and processes on both the acquisition planning process, including the changes to the acquisition process. Moreover, the audit reports of the ministry conducted by the Auditor-General have made limited information available. The main instance when the public gets to know about queries raised in the audit processes is through inquiries or reviews of auditor-generals reports by either the parliamentary committee on defence and foriegn affairs or Public Accounts or Investment Committees. [1] Furthermore, most if not all guidelines such as procurement standards and guidelines for the ministry mentioned on the MOD website are not publicly available.

There is no indication of the oversight mechanism for the Defence Procurement process outlined on the website. Information available from literature indicates in the previous New Management Strategy (NMS) oversight was reliant on the Equipment Committee that is steered by the Directorate of System and Procurement and the Equipment Approval Committee (EAC) which is headed by Chief of General Staff. [1]

The task of the EAC is to scrutinise the expenditure and ensure the validity of the projects as well as authorise major defence systems and plans. There is no external oversight mechanism indicated; however, it is expected that the office of Auditor General is largely resposible for evaluating these such projects, especially the financial aspects of the projects. In some instances, KDF has prevented the Auditor-General from scrutinising these reports. [2]

Based on the current legal framework which regulates public procurement in Kosovo, contracting authorities are required to prepare a preliminary procurement plan and submit this to the relevant Chief Administrative Officer no later than thirty days before the beginning of each fiscal year (1st December) [1]. This preliminary procurement plan needs to identify suppliers, services and labour that the contracting authorities plan to procure each fiscal year [1]. Furthermore, the preliminary procurement plan should include the following specifications: i) in the case of supply contracts, the estimated total procurement by value and by product classification that the contracting authority intends to procure over the fiscal year; ii) in the case of service contracts, the estimated aggregate value by category of each service that the contracting authority intends to procure over the fiscal year; and iii) in the case of working contracts, the essential characteristics of each working contract that the contracting authority intends to award over the course of the fiscal year [2]. The contracting authority is requested to finalise the procurement plan within fifteen days following the adoption of the state budget for each fiscal year [3]. According to the procurement rules set out by the Public Procurement Regulatory Commission (PPRC), the contracting authorities are obliged to publish on their relevant websites their procurement plans and submit these to the Central Procurement Agency (CPA) [3]. It is important to note that the Rules and Operational Guidelines for Public Procurement adopted by the PPRC in 2019 stipulate that the contracting authorities should use the electronic procurement platform for submission of the final procurement plans to the CPA , and these are automatically published on the electronic platform [3]. The procurement rules in Kosovo state that procurement planning needs to comply with the contracting authorities’ allocated budget, and the procurement officers must closely cooperate with the Department on Budget and other relevant departments to prepare realistic procurement plans [4].
The purchases from the Ministry of Defence are not connected to defence strategy requirements, because the National Defence Strategy is not yet in place. However, the Comprehensive Transition Plan for the Kosovo Security Force, approved by the Minister of Defence on 22 January 2019 [5] outlines the purchases of the Kosovo Security Forces for the period from 2019 to 2027. The following defence purchases are outlined across various plans: Equipment Purchasing Plan, Vehicle Purchasing Plan, Armament Purchasing Plan, Ammunition War Reserve Purchasing Plan, Radio-Communication Purchasing Plan, and IT Equipment Purchasing Plan [5]. Given the document is not fully published, its content and details are not summarised in the document published by the Ministry of Defence. The full document is not publicly available, and the Ministry of Defence has only published a summary format on its web page [5].

Like other state institutions at a central level that do not publish their procurement plans [1], the Ministry of Defence and the Kosovo Security Forces do not publish nor make publicly available their procurement and acquisition plans [2]. In fact, the only public institutions in Kosovo that do publish their procurement plans are municipalities (and even here, some do not publish them) [3]. In contrast, contracting authorities are obliged to publish their procurement plans, as stipulated by the rules of the Public Procurement Regulatory Agency [4]. The Comprehensive Transition Plan outlines the Kosovo Security Force’s purchasing plans for an eight-year period (2019-2027) [5]. However, the document is only published in a summarised form, and more specific content and details of these purchasing plans are not available in the summary document published by the Ministry of Defence [5].

Procurement and acquisition planning are monitored by two external overseeing bodies: the Public Procurement Regulatory Commission (PPRC) and the National Audit Office (NAO). The PPRC’s 2018 Annual Report stated that the contracting authorities in Kosovo should pay particular attention to prepare quality procurement planning, and a number of challenges were highlighted in the monitoring phase [1]. With regards to long-term acquisition planning, this institution found that the contracting authorities need to be cautious when preparing long-term projects that have budgetary implications for more than a year [1]. Furthermore, the PPRC reported the absence of coordination in the preparation phase of the procurement planning among internal units (Department on Procurement, requesting units, etc.) of certain contracting authorities, thus concluding that the procurement planning is superficial. Given these challenges, the PPRC suggested that such practices should be changed as early as possible [1].
Meanwhile, the NAO highlighted major challenges in procurement planning due to the fact that 499 contracts were signed outside the procurement plans of various contracting authorities (72 percent of which were municipalities, 15 percent central institutions, and the other 13 percent were independent institutions) [2]. Moreover, the NAO stated in its annual report that the poor assessment of needs and the necessity for additional contracts led to the delay of projects and impacted on the state budget [2].
Although the Kosovo Assembly possesses the constitutional power to oversee the work of the Kosovo Government and other public institutions [3], there is little information that the it has been involved in overseeing acquisition planning. Furthermore, the relevant Assembly’s committee which oversees the Kosovo Security Forces (KSF) is responsible for reviewing the KSF’s ten-year plan; but this oversight has been reported to be insufficient over recent years.

Acquisition falls under the financial policies of the defence and interior ministries, which are completely shaped by the heads of these ministries, according to article 27 of the police’s law (1) and 24 of the military’s law (2). The current interior and defence ministers have followed in the footsteps of their predecessors and made no moves to reveal any information to the public about their acquisition planning policy, according to auditing officials.

However, there is internal acquisition planning, but it is not separated into budget, finance and commercial, officials said (3,4). These ministries also make almost no links between purchases and strategic goals.

Also, the purchases of “defence materials” made by these institutions are not subject to the oversight of the Public Tenders Authority, according to article 2 of Law no. 29 of 2016 for public tenders (5).

Defence purchases, including the Government guide of doing business in Kuwait, include all weapons, communications and monitoring systems related to defence and security. There are internal policies regulating these purchases but the Government admits that they are “more flexible” than the ones applied by the PTA and not available to the public (6).

SAB and ACA officials have the right to review all the details related to acquisition planning but they often do not get the full story, and the auditors usually accept that and make no attempt to refer the matter to the prosecution, because they believe, like many others, that there is no real political will to fight corruption (4 and 5).

Article 80 of the SAB’s laws even demands that ministries with secret spending present reports every three months about these projects, which should plainly state how much money has been spent and should come with a personal statement from the minister in question vowing that the funds were spent according to the approved plan (7). This power is, however, somewhat diminished by the article 78, which allows the SAB’s chief to reduce the amount of records to be reviewed by the auditors by up to 50 percent.

The SAB chief however, does not tell the Government agencies that are being partly exempted that they are receiving less scrutiny.

The ACA can only investigate if it received a tip or complaint, or if there was public anger over some incident.

Security agencies in Kuwait do not publish or announce most of the purchases they make. They only seem to announce big Western warplane deals, presumably because these are already likely to get attention in the West, according to journalists, activists and officials (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7). But these announcements never officially justify the purchase or reveal information about the timeline of the deal, the mechanisms of the equipment or the desired or expected outcomes of the deal.

These agencies religiously ignore information requests from regular citizens and activists, but they do provide them to Parliament, in private sessions, they said.

Parliament has the right to assess the country’s long-term acquisition plan, its legitimacy and expected efficacy, according to PIL article 76 and 147 (1), but their assessments and recommendations can be ignored since the Emir can easily dissolve the chamber if it tries to pressure his security agencies into accepting them. Generally, however, Parliament approves these plans without giving it much thought for the reasons addressed in the answer to Q 1 A, officials said (2, 3 and 4).

There is also external oversight from SAB, but that is mostly concerned with reviewing figures and checking that the internal auditors have done the same. Even behind closed doors, SAB officials almost never comment on the legitimacy or soundness of the plans these ministries make, officials and activists said (2, 3, 4, 5 and 6). ACA’s mandate also include the defence and interior ministries but their auditors are frequently stonewalled, a senior ACA official said (2 and 6). ACA auditors are not treated as well as the SAB because they are new and have no experience with security. As a result, the ACA does not have a solid assessment of these plans.

Also, ACA auditors are only allowed to review records when they are investigating a specific case.

There is a clear formal process in place for the entire acquisition planning cycle. The legal framework is defined in the Law on public procurements [1] and a specific Law on defence and security procurements. [2] The planning is based on the strategic planning documents, especially the State Defence Concept [3], and, in general, major procurements align with the needs defined at the strategic level. At the same time, the State Audit Office has not identified effectively available information on priorities and long-term need.s [4] [5] On the basis of recommendations provided by the State Audit Office the situation has improved: coordination is taking place among relevant bodies and in consultation with other NATO member states based on the presence of the EFP and Host Nation Support obligations. [6]

Often, major arms procurement decisions via government-to-government (G2G) contracts, are announced post-factum, e.g. the decision to procure CVR(T)s in 2014, M109 155mm self-propelled howitzers in 2017, or Stinger man-portable air-defence systems [1] [2] [3]. MoD publishes information about bilateral G2G cooperation only when negotiations are complete and respective government accepts the release of public announcement. According to both public and defence and security procurement legislation, G2G are exemptions from the respective EU Directives and national procurement laws.
On one recent occasion, the communication on a major procurement was done prior to a decision being made – there is a recent example where the process of selection and procurement of off-road vehicles was announced with several contenders mentioned in 2018. [4] Similarly, transparency has been strengthened with more information available online, e.g. description of the procurement process [5] and a list of expected procurements and expected centralised procurements [6].

According to the government reviewer, with the exception of G2G contracts, all public procurements MOD announces publicly and all information and documentation, including procurement documents (technical specifications, evaluation criteria, commercial contract outlines etc.) are publicly available on Procurement Monitoring Bureau and other relevat webpages. MOD always publishes prior anouncements according to national legislation. All information on MoD procurements and respective documents are available online at Procurement Monitoring Bureau [7], electronic procurement system [8] and TED webpages [9].

External oversight functions are carried out by the State Audit Office, for whom one of the points of working interest in the defence sector is acquisition planning and procurements. [1] Recently, there has been an extensive audit regarding acquisition planning and procurements, with criticism over the lack of effectively available information on priorities and long-term needs. [2]
Though the Parliament discusses the priorities and long-term needs of the defence sector and hears from the State Audit Office about its audits in the defence sector, [1] it is not directly involved in oversight of acquisition planning.

The LAF’s J5 (Planning Directorate) and J4 (Logistics Directorate) operate with significant synergy and coherence on acquisition planning processes (1). With the absence of a defence strategy, the directorates cooperated to create the CDPs, which are not publically available, for the Rome conferences to help support the LAF – since the defence budget renders the military unable to purchase and equipment to improve the military capability (1), (2). This reflects enhanced acquisition and systems integration training, and an increased emphasis on developing the LAF’s integrated planning capability. The development of the acquisition process has occurred gradually over the 2010 to 2019 timeframe due to (3), (4), (5). Equipment delivered and military assistance is often made public (6).

The LAF’s J4 does not proactively publish the entire acquisition process and the justification of purchases, lines of responsibility, timelines, mechanisms, and outcomes (1). However, the process is not transparent, it is indirectly visible through partner nations and defence news outlets publish the acquisition process (2), (3).

External oversight towards long term acquisition plans, their legitimacy and likelihood of their appropriateness is done superficially. Donations that are sent to the LAF are approved by the CoM and then sent to the MoD (1). According to interviewee two and four, The LAF presented the CDP for the Defence, Interior, Municipalities’ Parliamentary Committee for one session. However, the LAF did not provide the members with the document. The presentation occurred after the committee requested it (2), (3).

The Ministry of Defence has a process for acquisition planning and publishes this online. However, there are no connections between specific purchases and the defence strategy, nor is there public information available about internal acquisition functions. The most recent plan published is for 2018-2020 and includes objectives, tasks, measures and appropriations [1]. The process for acquisition planning is in place. With the establishment of the Defence Resources Agency in 2018, internal acquisition planning functions were separated [2].

According to the government reviewer, at the end of 2018, the Parliament of Lithuania adopted a renewed National Defence System Development Programme for 2019-2028, which provides long-term goals and priorities of the National Defence System development [1, 3]. As a result, on 12 June 2019 the Government approved a National Defence System Acquisition plan for 2019-2028, based on Capabilities [4], which was endorsed by the Parliament of Lithuania (Committee on National Security and Defence) and Ministry of Finance.

In general, the public has access to procedural information online. The Public Procurement Plan for 2018 (established by the Defence Resource Council, the Lithuanian Armed Forces, the Infrastructure Development Department, the Information Technology Service and the Ministry of National Defence), as well as general public procurement information, reports, and contracts already signed are published online (with information including the amount, supplier, tenders, contract itself etc.). Most of this information is based on the Central Public Procurement Information System, with website links provided [1].

The Parliament of Lithuania approves the State Budget. The Public Procurement Office (PPO) monitors procurements in Lithuania, including defence procurements, and annually assesses around 3 percent of all public procurements taking place in Lithuania [1,2].

According to the government reviewer, at the end of 2018, the Parliament of Lithuania adopted a renewed National Defence System Development Programme for 2019-2028, which provides long-term goals and priorities of the National Defence System development (3, 4). As a result, on 12 June 2019 the Government approved a National Defence System Acquisition plan for 2019-2028, based on Capabilities (5), which was endorsed by the Parliament of Lithuania (Committee on National Security and Defence) and Ministry of Finance.

The Ministry is required to advertise “in at least one local daily in the Malay language. International tenders must be advertised in at least two local dailies i.e. one in the Malay language and one in the English language.” [1] The acquisition process involves the technical and finance sub-committees before the recommendations are presented to the Procurement Boards of the Ministry. The decision usually takes into account government policy and the strategic defence requirements of the forces. [2] Nonetheless, in practice, procurement of military hardware is sometimes not related to strategic objectives or security interests; political interests and influential figures can play a role. The 2020 Defence White Paper (DWP) includes some information on planning, but it does not provide details of the whole acquisition cycle. [3]

Information on acquisitions for any military and defence-related projects is not made public. The details of acquisitions or the associated process do not appear to even be disclosed at the parliamentary level. [1] [2] This is problematic as it leads to limited available information, for example through public write-ups or academic journal articles destined for public consumption. [3] [4]

A Parliamentary Select Committee has been set up by the new government, but the details and acquisition planning progress are still under the strict purview of the Ministry. No details are made available to the public. Documents for members the Select Committee are considered confidential and are not available to all members of parliament. [1]

The LOPM provides for USD2.3 billion of investment for the armed forces and is set to recruit an additional 10,000 personnel between 2015 and 2019. The full text of the document is not available on any government website, but various news articles provide a rough overview of the spending plans. The plan states that the defence ministry will purchase helicopters, aeroplanes and uniforms with the money, but none of the media articles specify how many or at what precise cost. The purpose for the acquisitions is evident given the failings of the Malian armed forces in 2012 and the ongoing threat of terrorism in the north. Securing large swathes of the centre and north of the country is still a pressing necessity for the armed forces given the persistently high number of attacks by jihadist groups. However, there is no evidence that the internal functions of acquisition planning are separated.
Moreover, a senior security governance expert told the assessor that while the LOPM does offer a rough outline of defence purchases and overall spending, it is “far too broad and generic”.³ The security professional said this also the view of ECOWAS, which is trying to ensure that all member states have a more results-based programme of defence spending by 2020. The same interviewee also noted that the life cycle of maintenance costs is often more expensive than the initial purchase, yet there is simply no evaluation of such costs by the Malian defence ministry: “There is a lack of forward planning and lack of vision”. Equipment is purchased without its related spare parts being acquired at the same time, “which is why FAMa currently has two new planes that cannot fly”.

The military in Mali holds a highly privileged position compared with other sectors when determining the allocation of resources. Arms acquisition requests are required to include neither justification nor full costing. Hence why it was possible for the government to overspend on military equipment by about CFA40 billion in 2014.² This glaring example highlights that the following analysis from SIPRI, from over ten years ago, still holds true for present-day Mali.
SIPRI’s study from 2006 notes that “the full financial implications of arms-acquisition decisions, including debt incurred for military purposes, are often not reflected in budgets, which may eventually destabilise financial policy. This sort of behaviour contributes to the widespread problem in Africa of military budgets that cannot fully fund the defence function”.¹
A senior security governance expert told the assessor that while the LOPM does offer a rough outline of defence purchases and overall spending, it is “far too broad and generic”.³ The security professional said this also the view of ECOWAS, which is trying to ensure that all member states have a more results-based programme of defence spending by 2020. The same interviewee also noted that the life cycle of maintenance costs is often more expensive than the initial purchase, yet there is simply no evaluation of such costs by the Malian defence ministry: “There is a lack of forward planning and lack of vision”. Equipment is purchased without its related spare parts being acquired at the same time, “which is why FAMa currently has two new planes that cannot fly”.

A member of the National Assembly’s Defence and Security Committee told the assessor that not only did the CDSPC scrutinise the LOPM, but that every year the government has to present a list of its purchases to enable the committee to check that they conform with the needs outlined in the LOPM.³
However, the way in which parliament was entirely side-lined in the acquisition of the presidential jet (see evidence in 10A) and military vehicles (see Q63) highlights how the assembly’s formal oversight function can be bypassed.

There is a clear process for procurement. In the first phase, planning, the agencies define the goals of their organisation, formulate the purchase requirements based on their needs, and establish the priorities for the exercise of public resources through the detailed Annual Procurement Program that, based on the projects that will be developed during the year, include the products and services that they plan to buy or contract during that period. [1]

The planning and integration of said program must contain, at a minimum, the description and amount of the goods, leases, and services that represent at least eighty percent of the total estimated budget, as well as the approximate amount of the goods, leases, and services that make up the remaining percentage. [2] The law does not mention any separation in the internal acquisition planning functions, so it can therefore be inferred that there is no separation.

The agencies, including SEDENA and SEMAN, make available to the public the Procurement, Leasing, and Services Policies (Bases and Guidelines (POBALINES)), [1] the Annual Procurement Programs, [2] [3] and the quarterly reports on acquisitions and leases. In the POBALINES, some information, such as the hierarchical orders of responsibility and deadlines are indicated, although acquisitions are not justified.

The agencies are responsible for sending to the Ministry of Public Administration, the Ministry and the Ministry of Economy, the information related to acts and procurement contracts. [1]

The SFP can verify, at any time, that the acquisitions, leases, and services are carried out in accordance with the established regulations, in addition to making visits and inspections as it deems appropriate. The SE can verify that the goods comply with the requirements related to the degree of national content or to the rules of origin or market and, in case these do not meet those requirements, it will inform the Ministry of Public Function. [2] [3]

Parliament through the ASF can also perform oversight tasks. [4] In no case are the long-term results evaluated.

Acquisition planning procedures are not publically available, but the Ministry claims that they propose an annual plan to the government and NATO. [1] However, those plans are confidential. [2]
According to the MoD, there is a clear process for acquisition planning in place. The planned procurements are listed in the Public Procurement Plan in accordance with the provisions of the Law on Public Procurement. The Public Procurement Plan is prepared in the application software of the Public Procurement Directorate, adopted by 31st January of the current year and published (with any subsequent changes) on the official public procurement portal (Article 38 of the Law on Public Procurement). The procurement plan is consistent with the financial plan (budget) of the Ministry of Defence for the current year. [3] Plan for investments in defence for period 2018-2024 are adopted by Governement of Montenegro in 2017. This plan includes all the important purchases. In 2018 the Government adopted the Long Term Development Plan 2019-2024 which details all planned equiping and modernization of the Armed Forces of Montenegro untill 2028.
The defence strategy is very vague and does not specify requirements for purchases, [4] but the Long Term Development Plan [5] provides some deadlines.

According to the Ministry, plans for investments in the army by the government are made on an annual basis, and are classified. [1] In 2018 the Government adopted Long Term Development Plan 2019-2024 which details all planned equiping and modernization of the Armed Forces of Montenegro untill 2028. The document is publicly available. A part of the Plan which consists details related to equipment and modernization till 2028 is classified as restricted, which is accordance with NATO standards and regulations. There is a clear process for acquisition planning in place. The planned procurements are listed in the Public Procurement Plan in accordance with the provisions of the Law on Public Procurement. The Public Procurement Plan is prepared in the application software of the Public Procurement Directorate, adopted by 31 January for the current year and published (with any subsequent changes) on the official public procurement portal (Article 38 of the Law on Public Procurement). The procurement plan is consistent with financial plan (budget) of the Ministry of Defence for the current year.
According to the Government, a plan for investment in defence for the period 2018-2024 was adopted in 2017 and submitted to NATO, according to the Ministry of Defence. This plan includes all the important purchases and the document is NATO restricted. [2] No information on either of these plans are provided to public; only general information is provided in available strategic documents. [3][4]

The Government adopts plans for investment in defence. [1] According to the MoD, all major equipment aquisition is discussed and agreed with NATO within the NATO Planning process. The parliamentary Committee for Security and Defence discusses the development of and investments in defence while reviewing annual reports of the Ministry of Defence. [2] However, the Committee does not engage in serious oversight and since the 2016 Parliamentarian elections, the situation has worsened. [3]

No evidence of a publicly available defined process for acquisition planning was found in official sources such as websites of the Moroccan government or ministries. It must also be noted that Moroccan authorities do not communicate at all on defence matters (except in very rare circumstances such as on the occasion of the signing of military cooperation treaties with other countries and in broad statements about territory integrity and sovereignty that, although linked to the military, do not refer in detail to the functioning of the Moroccan armed forces). Moreover, it must be noted that the Ministry of Defence does not have a website (unlike other Ministries), and that there is no outline of the Moroccan government’s military vision on the website of the Moroccan government (contrary to the visions for the Ministries of Housing, Transport, Agriculture, Tourism, Environment, Education and Fishing). In detail, the Moroccan Code of Public Procurement Contracts makes the army exempt from a certain number of conditions (1), including:
– Procurement contracts for the army can be processed without prior publicity or bid for tenders (Article 86).
– The same applies for architectural consultancy (Article 129).
– Article 171 states that the National Defence Administration is exempt from a number of conditions, including budget restraints (Article 6), publicising offers (Articles 17, 36, 46, 63, 104 and 121), publicising their programme, publicising their market achievement report and a number of other documents (Article 147), use of electronic exchange procedures for documents and reverse electronic bids (Articles 148, 149 and 151), market audits and controls (Article 165), control over military equipment, weaponry and ammunition procurement contracts (Article 156). Also, some military procurement contracts can result from a restricted bid to tenders without a budget limit, or the establishment of an administrative certificate.

No mention of a process was found in other sources, such as reports from NGOs, or the Moroccan and foreign press. No interviewee was willing or available to speak on the matter, including individuals working for state-owned entities. Although it is not explicitly clear that there is no defined process for acquisition planning, it is definitely not publicly available.

There is no transparency surrounding the acquisition planning process.

No evidence of a national or foreign body in charge of externally overseeing the acquisition planning process was found:

The mandate of institutions responsible for budgetary control and acquisition planning in general does not include military spending. This has been illustrated lately in the 2018 Public Finance Report for the years 2016-2017, which does not mention military spending, although it does not explicitly exclude defence matters from its preview (1). Press coverage of the National Audit Office’s (Cour des Comptes) latest report does not mention military matters anywhere (2).

According to an interview with a retired senior officer, defence procurement is carried out by the Directorate of Defence Service Procurement [1]. Defence procurement requires the approval of the Military Research Department [2]. The process is supervised by the respective Commanders-in-Chief of the Army, Navy and Air Force, and the decision of the Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services is final [1]. The audit process is carried out by the Account Department under the Ministry of Defence [3]. So, the internal acquisition planning process is conducted solely by the Directorate of Defence Service Procurement and the decision of the Commander-in-Chief is final. Although there is an internal process, there is no transparency or integrity in the acquisition planning process. And there is no public knowledge about what they are doing.

Naing Swe Oo, a military observer from Thayninga Institute, said that one country’s exact military strength and productivity cannot be publicly available [1]. Major-General Myint New, Deputy Minister of Defence, explained the defence expenditure for the 2019-2020 fiscal year but did not offer any details regarding specific equipment that the military plans to purchase [2]. As a result, there is no transparency regarding defence acquisition.

U Aung Kyi, the Chairman of the Anti-Corruption Commission, said that the Commission cannot take any action against the Ministries of Home Affairs, Border Affairs or Defence, the ministers of which are nominated by the Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) of the Tatmadaw (military) [1]. MPs argue that they cannot scrutinise the Myanmar military’s budget or defence procurement effectively [2]. Overall, there is no defined oversight mechanism with respect to the acquisition planning process.

The Netherlands Court of Audit oversees the Defence Materiel Process (DMP), which clearly outlines internal acquisition processes for projects costing more than 25 million euros [1]. The DMP consists of five stages: analysis of requirements, study, follow-up study (for non-‘off-the-shelf’ purchases), procurement and evaluation (for large, complex projects) [1]. At the end of each stage, a letter is written by the Minister of Defence or the State Secretary to Parliament containing information about the specifics of the process [2]. The first letter on the Analysis of Requirements informs the House of Representatives of why the system or product is needed and what the MoD requires from the product [2].

Extensive information on the Defence Materiel Process is publicly accessible online [1,2]. Information on acquisition processes is available to the public through the annual Defence Project Overview (DPO) [3]. The DPO includes justifications of purchases, the current project phase, timelines, major changes (if applicable), finance progress, related projects and outcomes, but does not clearly include information on lines of responsibility or mechanisms [3]. Recently, the Court of Audit concluded that the archives of the Ministry of Defence are insufficient for proper transparency and democratic oversight to take place, either by Parliament or by the Court of Audit itself [4].

Strong external audits to assess long-term acquisition plans and their legitimacy are only conducted if the project is designated a ‘major project’ by the House of Representatives or if political defence leadership instructs the Central Government Audit Service to conduct an audit [1]. However, Parliament does oversee acquisition planning in a tangible way, as the Defence Materiel Process requires the Ministry of Defence to provide updates to the House of Representatives at the end of every phase [1]. Ultimately, the House of Representatives decides whether or not to approve the defence budget [2]. Recent research by the Netherlands Court of Audit stated that, in important acquisition processes, Parliament is too limited in its involvement (i.e. it receives limited information) and its involvement occurs too late in the process to have sufficient oversight of/influence on (particularly longer-term) acquisition processes [3,4].

The Ministry of Defence provides a clear and simple explanation of the procurement cycle on its website with links to relevant policy documents [1]. All capital projects must adhere to the Government’s Capital Asset Management regime including the Better Business Case model, which is administered by The Treasury and provides support through the Government Procurement Rules [2, 3]. There are sometimes exceptions to this rule, however: the New Zealand Government’s Procurement Rules allow an Agency to opt out of some procurement rules under certain circumstances, such as military and essential security interests [4]. The recent P-8A Poseidon aircraft procured through the United States Government Foreign Military Sales process is a recent example. Nevertheless, despite not strictly following the Better Business Case model, the same information was submitted by the Ministry of Defence, and therefore for practical purposes served the same function [5]. Rationale or reasoning behind major defence procurements are identified and explained in the Defence Capability Plan documents, if not in the Defence White Paper. The Ministry of Defence leads major procurement processes but works in close cooperation with the NZDF’s Defence Commercial Services, with input from Defence Industry Engagement Teams, and working groups governing asset management plans. According to publicly available information, there exists formally separate planning functions within the procurement process for the above-mentioned units [6]. However, the procurement process is more flexible for minor defence projects that have less than a $15 million total life cost, checks and balances are still maintained but the number of processes may be reduced in such cases. The same oversight regulations do not apply to the Intelligence Agencies, given their procurements are many time smaller. In principle specific acquisitions by the intelligence agencies could fall under IGIS, if there was a legality or propriety issue, however section 161 of the Intelligence and Security Act 2017 identifies other bodies that should be consulted, specifically the Auditor-General [7]. Thus, despite acquisition technically falling under the purview of the IGIS, the size and expertise of the Auditor-General’s Office mean that they would be best placed to monitor and investigate [8]. This process has worked well so far and the TCIL Report is a good example of how the relationship functions where the IGIS and another integrity agency have a common interest [9]. The then State Services Commission, during the TCIL inquiry, referred information relating to specific interactions to IGIS, for consideration, independently of the State Services investigation [10].

Transparency has improved since the last Defence Integrity Index and the public has access to information about the entire process. Major capital projects are justified and explained within Annual Report, Defence Capability Plans, and in the case of Defence White Papers years in advance, and any debate from members of the Select Committee would be freely available online via the Parliamentary website [1, 2, 3]. Proactive releases are becoming more common, such as in the case of Cabinet Papers related to the Network Enabled Army programme and Protected Vehicle – Medium Procurement, and which provide justification, lines of responsibility, timeliness, mechanisms and outcomes – though the details of each is dependent upon OIA compliance [4, 5]. This appears to be developing policy as the Defence Tactical Future Air Mobility Capability Cabinet decision of June 2019 was only released in February 2021 – though the announcement was published nearer to the time [6]. It should be noted that an enhanced, or more transparent, timeline of specific procurement projects could be released, such as estimated Initial Operating Capability and Full Operating Capability. An example of where this has not occurred is the redaction of the “Milestone” Schedule within the Protected Vehicle – Medium Procurement document release. Estimated maintenance costs are also withheld. Arguments on behalf of Operational Security could be made, but as New Zealand’s Defence Partners regularly release such details there seems little reason for New Zealand not to do so, or at least a comprehensive explanation could be provided. Relatively smaller procurements are published in newsletters, and usually accompanied by short explanations and descriptions, as seen within the Army’s purchase of Zodiac craft, for example [7]. Those wishing to view details of Government tenders must first register on NZDF’s SmartProcure website [8]. This does present restrictions as only individuals of corporates or limited liability companies may join. However, as proactive releases are becoming more regular this is less of an issue. Moreover, even if one does not register a brief overview is sometimes provided on the Government Tender Service website which includes timelines and outcomes [9]. Given the small size of the New Zealand Defence sector it is unlikely that any major capital projects would go unnoticed. Additionally, even if one were not representing a commercial enterprise, an OIA request could be made and there would be no reason to withhold that information based on the fact that it is already available to civilian entities.

Long-term acquisition plans are elucidated in Defence Capability Plans published by the Ministry of Defence. External financial oversight is conducted by the Auditor-General [1, 2]. Questions to the Minister regarding acquisitions are also frequently delivered in Parliament [3]. Traditionally concerns over external oversight of procurements have generally oscillated around the ability of the NZDF to maintain a certain level of serviceability [4]. Ordinarily, these relate to staffing as attrition rates within some sectors of the Military are too high to sustain effective readiness levels. For example, the FADTC raised concerns over the high attrition rates for the NZDF in the 2020/21 Estimates for Vote Defence and Vote Defence Force, with attrition within the infantry and armoured combat specialists approaching 34 and 27 per cent, respectively. It is perhaps no coincidence therefore, that the NZDF has placed nearly 30 per cent of its Light Armoured Vehicles fleet up for sale [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10]. As such, concerns over acquisition are not due to the inadequacies of the systems purchased, as they are required to fulfil the strategic national policy objectives, however there are queries over how realistic it will be for the NZDF to keep them operational. Another issue around the quality of external oversight has been fit-for-purpose issues resulting from purchase of systems according to value for money rather than effectiveness, which incidentally, shows a greater concern for fiscal prudence than operational readiness. The decommissioning of certain vehicles, by the Army, and vessels, by the Navy, are just two recent examples [11, 12, 13, 14, 15]. Ironically, this financial conservatism has only served to increase over-life costs due to the systems being inadequate for their operating environment and subsequently needing to be repaired and replaced before their envisioned end-of-service date. Despite these issues, according to a review of the defence procurement policies and practices, a new and improved level of project management oversight has been introduced since 2015, and which provides “a strong level of confidence and assurance to support informed decision making” [16]. The FADTC and OAG are both mandated to engage in external oversight. Regarding long-term acquisition plans, this process is achieved through the Estimates and Annual reviews briefings [see Q1 and Q2]. It is unknown to what extent the FADTC is involved in oversight of the Defence Capability Plans before they are published. THE OAG has the power to conduct performance audits, which can extend to the opening of Inquiries, but it does not comment on Policy [17, 18, 19].

The government has a process for acquisition planning as a result of the programming act of the Ministry of Defence. According to art. 20 of the 2013 decree on defence and security procurement, there is an annual acquisition. It is drawn from the needs identified by relevant technical departments of the Ministry of Defence. The plan must be drawn up no later than the end of January of the current budget year, but it is flexible and regularly updated (1). It is not available to the public and is classified as “top secret” (1). According to an interviewee, one of the general problems of the military expenditure is a disequilibrium between the resources allocated to military equipment, on the one hand, and resources allocated for their maintenance, on the other (2).
From data that could be sourced, it is not evident if internal functions are separated by budget, commercial and finance.

According to art. 20 of the 2013 Decree on defence and security procurement, the acquisition plan is not subject to publication and is classified as “top secret”. All correspondence regarding the project is to be carried out exclusively by “confidential mail” (1). In line with that provision, article 7 of the 2016 Niger Code for Public Procurements excludes goods, equipment, supplies and services related to defence and security (2). According to some analysts, the scale of renewal and modernisation of Nigerien military equipment is “impressive” (3). Some information regarding military equipment purchases or gifts from international partners may be available to the public through the media.

Given the confidentiality of the procurement procedures (1), it is unlikely that the acquisition plan is subject to any oversight. The plan is not subject to legislative scrutiny by the Security and Defence Committee (2). In general, the Niger legislature provides only limited oversight during the planning and implementation stage of the budget cycle (3). Furthermore, in the context of the rapid rise in internal and external threats since 2012, as well as the unstable security situation, the regular and systematic oversight mechanisms may have been disrupted.

There is an existing process for acquisition planning in the ministries and parastatals. This involves parliamentary oversight and appropriations are made public. Sanusi [2011:192] details the process of procurement in the Ministry of Defence as initiated by the Nigerian Army, Nigerian Navy, Nigerian Air Force or the civil departments, advertisements, pre- qualification, bid opening, and award process, as well as dues processes conducted by the Budget Monitoring and Price Intelligence Unit [BMPIU] and the Resident Due Process Team [RDPT]. The contract agreement and the Military Due Process Certification[MDPC] are sent to the Office of the Accountant General of the Federation for the final procurement process [Omitogun: 2006] [1].

However, there has been no coordination between purchases and strategic defence requirements. This has been highlighted over many years and has still not been rectified since the last report was published in 2006 [2]. A review of the 2015 report of the Nigerian National Defence Plan Committee has been carried out and the report has been delivered to the Minister of Defence. However, the details of the report were not shared with the public and the Minister of Defence merely made a public commitment to implement most of the recommendations of the 2016 report. The government recently entered negotiations with the USA to acquire some Tucano aircraft, the basis of the acquisition was stated to be the insurgency in the North East and no direct reference was made to the National Defence Strategy or Policy. The principal reason given for the acquisition was the insurgency in the North east and not a Defence Policy [Omitogun: 2006] [1]. The army, navy and air force each has a planning board that assess the needs of the services. These reports are then submitted to the Joint Services Department of the MOD for harmonization, instead to the National Assembly [Omitogun: 2006] [1].
As was noted in the PLAC assessment the National Assembly are not consulted in relation to weapons acquisitions. Also noted is that NASS does not play any key role in military expenditure particularly defence procurement contracts [PLAC JULY 2017] pg.50 [3]. Some military expenditure have been excluded from the appropriations law on the grounds of national security.

There is no transparency in the defence acquisition process. This has been highlighted over many years and has still not been rectified since the last report was published in 2006. Further, the Public Procurement Act of 2007 as it currently stands does not apply to defence planning or expenditure as it is expressly excluded in the statute subject to presidential discretion (1).

Some military expenditure tends to be ad hoc (1). Where parliamentary oversight is exercised it tends to be superficial and examines basic budget performance. There is little to no oversight about long term acquisition planning. NASS does not appear to be involved in oversight of long term acquisition planning (1), (2). This is also tied to the failure of not having a long term defence strategy plan that is operational. There is no legitimacy to the acquisition planning process, as there is no supervision by external oversight bodies (2). Further, the Office of the Auditor-General failed to submit reports in previous years. It is unclear if reports have been submitted for 2016-2017 (1). However, the NASS has severely criticised the Office of the Auditor-General for failing to submit reports in previous years. Further, there are considerable delays to the submission of reports. “To this end, committee slammed the Auditor-General of the Federation for what it described as gross negligence on audited annual reports of Ministries, Departments and Agencies, MDAs, of the federal government from 2009 to 2014. Consequently, it ordered the Auditor-General to issue clearance certificates to government agencies which annual audited reports had been cleared” (1).

The Public Procurement Bureau, acting under the Law on Public Procurement, outlines Macedonia’s public acquisition processes [1]. The Law stipulates that this process must be public and an annual procurement plan is required annually for every state and public institution (article 26). Article 6 of the Law explicitly prescribes the application of this Law to the field of defence, unless this application leads to disclosure of information which needs to be kept private in the country’s national interests. The Law further obliges the contracting authority to inform the Government, by the end of January of the given year, about its annual procurement plans. In accordance with this, the Ministry of Defence operates with such plans and publicly discloses its procurements [2]. In short, the process is such that a relevant strategic document (for instance the 2018 Strategic Defence Review) outlines the formation (both of personnel and equipment) of the Army. Based on this, the necessary equipment (weapons and military equipment) to be procured is identified. Following the procurement of equipment, the final technical specification of the equipment is acquired [3]. This planning process is internal. Only the annual procurement plan is finalised is it made comprehensively public [2]. However, these procurement plans are not explicitly linked to any country defence strategies publicly.
In 2019 the national legal framework was updated by a new Law on Public Procurement [4], which increases transparency of the process and by a new Law on Public Procurement in the Defence and Security, harmonized with the EU defence procurement directives. [5]

The Ministry of Defence publishes its annual procurement plans on its website while, although their planning process is internal. In 2015, the Ministry of Defence publicly presented its Public Procurement Plan to the Macedonian Chamber of Commerce [1]. Whilst the public had free access to procurement numbers, any qualitative explanation of the purchases, their aim, mechanisms and outcomes were not publicly available. Confidential purchases were exempt from having to be made public, in line with the Law on Public Procurement (article 6) [2].
The Procurement Plan is published after it is finalised. [3]
In February 2019 a new Law on Public Procurement was adopted, significantly increasing transparency in public procurements. As part of the procurement procedure, now in addition to the contract award notice the electronic procurement system shall also include the contents of the contract, the technical specification and the financial bid of the bidders. The value of the contract executed shall also be published. If the value is lower than the total value of the contract, an explanation shall also be published. The objects of procurement are declassified. All procurement notices are publicly available, and only the technical specification can be classified. Procurements above a certain value threshold are also published in the European Public Procurement Gazette. [3, 4]
Additionally, in September 2019 a new Law on Public Procurement in the Defence and Security, harmonised with the European Law was adopted. [3, 5]

The Defence and Security Council reviews annual defence procurements, and Parliament is involved in this process. The main tasks for the Defence and Security Council is to oversee general aspects of the plans rather than their specific details related to budgetary, commercial or financial aspects [1]. Interestingly, a detailed check of the minutes from the Defence and Security Council sessions between 2016-2018 showed no record of any formal debate, review or hearings related to the country’s long or short-term defence acquisition plans [2]. It is therefore unclear to what extent and how effectively the Council, as well as Parliament, truly oversees any defence acquisitions plans.

All material investments in the Defence Sector need the approval of the Ministry of Defence. The subordinate agencies execute the planning and procurements according to the existing procedures [1, 2]. The acquisition process is aligned with the white paper on the national defence industry strategy [3]. Connections between specific purchases and defence strategy requirements are made explicit. The Ministry of Defence uses the PRINSIX project model that describes phases, decision points, lines of responsibilities and outcomes [2]. This project model ensures a uniform execution of materiel procurements. The entire acquisition process is described in detail in a document published by the Ministry of Defence, “Guidelines for Investments in the Defence Sector” [4]. The document specifies that project budgeting has to include both project cost estimate and project budget. The Ministry of Defence, which is a principal agent, is formally responsible for establishing a framework for investment activities so that planning and implementation of investments can be carried out cost-effectively and in accordance with a conceptual study; allocating investment funds to Defence Material Agency or Defence Estates Agency in line with Parliament’s decisions; and managing the investment portfolio so that approved objectives are achieved. Depending on the kind of project, usually either the Defence Materiel Agency or Defence Estates Agency functions as a project manager. As project managers the agencies are, among other things, in charge of disposing of and accounting for allocated investment funds in line with the Ministry’s instructions as well as commercial responsible for material procurement [4]. Internal acquisition planning functions include 5 stages: the idea stage, concept stage, preliminary project stage, implementation stage and completion stage [2, 4]. At the concept stage, alternative concepts are assessed with respect to how capability requirements can be resolved in conceptually different ways. The outcome of this conceptual study is a document referred to as a Conceptual Solution. This document forms the basis for the decisions taken at the end of this phase. Once the Conceptual Solution has been approved, the project moves into the next phase which is the detailed planning process leading up to the approval of the acquisition of the materiel in question. At this stage, the project is referred to as a Planned Project. Important outcomes of this planning phase are scope, procurement strategy, timelines and contractual provisions. Once a project has been approved, the Ministry of Defence sends out an implementation order, usually to the Norwegian Defence Materiel Agency. A project in this phase is referred to as an Approved Project.

The document describing the entire acquisition process, as used by the Norwegian Ministry of Defence, is available online [1]. The PRINSIX project model, ensuring a uniform execution of material procurements, is also described in detail on the website of the Norwegian Armed Forces [2]. In addition, every 10 years the Ministry of Defence publishes a white paper on the national defence industry strategy [3]. The white paper defines the framework for the long-term acquisitions plan, which is updated annually [4]. The long-term acquisitions plan outlines lines of responsibility and estimates the cost and timeliness of planned and potential projects. Both documents are available to the public. Every year the ministry submits to Parliament a proposal on investments in the defence sector [5]. The proposal is published online and outlines the justification of purchases, estimate cost and summarises the quality control report at the conceptual stage.

There is an external quality control of the conceptual study for projects exceeding 750 million NOK (approximately USD 66 million on 23 March 2020). Quality control is conducted in accordance with the guidelines of the Ministry of Finance [1]. Defence procurement contracts over 500 million NOK (approximately USD 44 million on 23 March 2020), known as Category 1 projects, require the approval of Parliament. Category 1 also includes projects of special importance for the structure of the Armed Forces. Material investment projects under 500 million NOK are subject to decisions and approval by the Ministry of Defence [2]. In addition, the Office of the Auditor General may initiate in-depth investigations of the defence sector, including different aspects of planning and procurement. For instance, in 2018 the OAG published a report based on the investigation of the procurement of the NH90 maritime helicopters and their implementation in the Norwegian Armed Forces [3]. The Standing Committee for Scrutiny and Constitutional Affairs is responsible for reviewing reports from the Office of the Auditor General [4].

Acquisition planning is in place, but it is not clear as it is an internal process, not public, nor has a clear oversight. Acquisition planning does not inform the defence strategy (1), (2). The largest tender board in Oman is used across ministries; however, the Ministry of Defence and Royal Oman Police (as well as Petroleum Development Oman) have separate tender boards (3). According to, a US-based website advising US exporting firms, the tender board operates openly and transparently (3). The Ministry of Defence website states, “Tender module will be coming soon” (4). Neither the police nor defence websites make any reference to defined processes of acquisition planning. If it exists, it is not publicly available (4), (5). The Tender Board website has annual reports up to 2014 and references tenders granted in September 2018; one of which deals with medical supplies, while the other deals with construction and fishing (6). No mention on this website is made regarding defence or police acquisition planning processes (6).

The acquisition planning process is not transparent as most of it is single-sourced, or politically motivated in case of weapons purchases. There is no media coverage or any information available to the public with regards to acquisition planning. It is considered confidential information (1), (2). As established in sub-indicator 11A, no reference is made to acquisitions in defence and security on either the Royal Oman Police or the Ministry of Defence websites (3), (4). One news report on the Royal Oman Police website, from June 2015, concerning contracting for medical equipment and furniture acquisition for a new police hospital was published (5). This news item clearly states that all tenders are sealed stating, “the Royal Oman Police “DGPM” is not bound to accept any tender received and reserves the right to reject any or all tenders without assigning any reasons” (5). This news report demonstrates that it is clear that there is no transparency with tenders regarding the Royal Oman Police. No mention on the general Tender Board website is made to defence or police acquisition planning, which according to the US, “is the largest, though not exhaustive, a compilation of open government tenders and is updated on a regular basis” (6). Any mention of acquisitions by Oman army is found on foreign websites, there is no detail of the processes of acquisition undergone (7), (8).

There is no external or internal oversight in the acquisition planning process. In most cases, defence purchases and acquisitions, they go through a single source without internal oversight or scrutiny (1), (2). As established in sub-indicator 11A, a tender board exists across ministries; however, it does not oversee independent tender processes within ministries which have separate tender processes, these include the Ministry of Defence and Royal Police of Oman (3). As stated in the above indicator, the Omani police website emphasises decisions on tenders are made internally and are not subject to external scrutiny (4). The Ministry of Defence website does not refer to the acquisition planning process, the absence in information is thus extended to external oversight (5). As discussed in question 1B, the Al-Shura (parliament) has no mandate to discuss issues of national security, and cannot act as an external oversight to acquisition planning processes in the sectors of defence and security (6).

There is a general acquisition structure that follows the guidelines of the MoF. The process starts with the unit up to the head of the National Forces Office, and there it is approved and channelled to the MoF which manages acquisitions (1). The acquisition of ammunition and other weaponry does not go through this process as these resources are gifts from other countries. There are unsubstantiated rumours that the acquisition of resources is channelled towards specific people who have connections with the heads of the security apparatuses or other high-rank personalities (2).

The process is managed and directed internally, with no public transparency (1).

According to the law, the State Audit and Administrative Bureau (SACCB) is responsible for auditing all parties, including the security services (2). However, according to the military auditing department, there is no functional external oversight other than the MoF department that is designated to audit the financial affairs of the military and security agencies(1).

Programme planning and the procurement cycle are conducted in accordance with the Defence System of Management (DSOM), which treats strategic planning, capability assessment, acquisition planning, procurement, contracting, resource planning and financial management as an integrated process [1]. The DSOM has four mutually supporting components: the Defence Strategic Planning System (DSPS), Defence Capability Assessment and Planning System (DCAPS), Defence Acquisition System (DAS), and the Defence Resource Management System (DRMS) [2]. The DSPS identifies core and peripheral defence issues and concerns; the DCAPS identifies capability planning issues; the DAS evaluates options for obtaining equipment and operates in accordance with the Government Procurement Reform Act [3] and its Implementing Rules and Regulations [4]; and the DRMS issues defence resource planning guidance and financial management objectives [2].

Improvements have been made but, according to media reports, some information is still either excluded or not disclosed in a timely fashion [1, 2]. Major changes linked to the AFP modernisation and development programme (for example shifting submarine acquisition from Horizon three to two) show that there is no clear requirement for the DND to provide public information on major changes to planned acquisitions [3]. Such a change in schedule would certainly impact the budget for other modernisation priorities [4].

Congress serves as the oversight committee to monitor and oversee the implementation of the AFP modernisation and development programme [1]. The committee is mandated to conduct a systematic evaluation of the accomplishments and impact, as well as the performance and organisational structure of the acquisition planning involved in the modernisation as the need arises [1]. In reality, assessments of long-term outcomes do not take place unless there is a controversy [2].

The long-term plan for the technical modernisation of the armed forces for 2017-2026 has not been adopted yet (2018), which generates problems with the financing of the long-term modernisation projects [1]. The procedures of acquisition planning, provided in Decision no. 141, do not require explicitly to link the first (conceptual) phase on strategic defence documents.
In the case of operations of the Office for Anticorruption Procedures, there is a visible reduction in the number of supervised procurement procedures and lack of activity in the scope of anti-corruption supervision. As far as the audit of the acquisition system is concerned, there is none to date [2].

The Secretary of State of the MoND directly supervises the acquisitions department, which includes the Inspectorate of Armaments [1]. The Ministry of National Defence, however, lacks an external, comprehensive, formalized and clear process of supervision over orders [2]. There are reporting mechanisms carried out both internally (acquisition units) in written form or verbally (generally weekly), and the information is provided to the management member (Secretary of State responsible for technical modernization of the armed forces) in principle in the form of written and oral presentations on regular meetings presented by the management of the acquisitions unit (e.g. Inspectorate of Armaments). Within the acquisition units, there are also internal controls and audit departments. This process, however, does not equate to supervision by the public, the process is performed by the MoD and General Staff units and is not subject to regular, systematic public overview. The public has limited access to information about the process itself.
Other supervision mechanisms include the obligation by law to submit draft contracts worth more than PLN 100 million to the Office of the General Counsel to the Republic of Poland (Prokuratoria Generalna RP).

The main acquisition planning document is the “Plan of Technical Modernisation of Armed Forces” for 10 years, updated every 4 years. It specifies modernisation programs and their budgets. The plan for 2017-2026 was signed by the defence minister on February 28, 2019 [1].
A meeting of the parliamentary Defence Committee on February 19, 2019, indicates that the plan was developed by the General Staff and the committee did not perform oversight on the work nor was it informed on its progress.[2]

The Law on National Defence [1] defines the scope and depth of the minister of defence’s autonomy in defining acquisition planning, which is detailed in the Military Planning Act [2] and the Ministerial Directive for Military Defence Planning [3]. Planning functions are perceived as cross-sectional and not separate. The acquisition planning process is supervised by the minister of defence, coordinated by the Directorate-General of Defence Resources [4] and foresees participation by the Secretariat of the Ministry of Defence and the Directorate-General of Defence Policy [3]. The Ministerial Directive for Military Defence Planning clarifies how defence planning proceeds between DGDR and DGDP [4]. There is no quantifiable evidence of an explicit connection between actual purchases and strategic requirements as written into the National Strategic Defence Concept (NDSC).

The process is well documented (refer to Q11A). However, there is scant information on process outputs and outcomes: reports on the Military Planning Act or the Military Infrastructure Planning Act are not made available publicly fully [1], and contract execution, where contracts exist in the Public Procurement Database, is not documented. The most reputable public source is the series of explanatory notes published in addition to yearly state budgets by the Ministry of Defence [2, 3, 4, 5, 6]. Where documents exist, there is no redaction except when the General Data Protection Regulation applies.

Parliament is involved in the oversight of planning to the extent that the minister of defence is accountable to the National Defence Committee (NDC), and yearly reports on the Military Planning Act are required to be sent to Parliament [1] and reported upon [2], although not made available to the general public. The Court of Accounts (CA) operates a monitoring programme on the Military Planning Act [3], which offers important detail on formal and financial procedures related to defence procurement but excludes strategic consideration of military needs. Results are published with some delay.

After consulting official governmental websites, including the Ministry of Finance and the Qatari Government’s Communications Office, it became apparent that there is no publicly available process for acquisition planning that involves clear oversight [1,2]. Research has also revealed that the Ministry of Defence does not have a website, and there is no available information on defence policies in Qatar. Our information reveals that there is no planning process that includes clean oversight mechanisms. There is a process of acquisition planning in place, yet there is no oversight mechanism, and it is not available publicly [3,4].

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable, as there is no defined process for acquisition planning.

Occasionally, media platforms provide some information on arm deals that Qatar concludes with international governments such as the UK, France and Turkey. [1,2] This news, however, is mostly available in English and on non-Qatari media platforms. On occasion, the Minister of Defence Dr Khalid Al-Attiyah has discussed arm deals during interviews with journalists. The information available on such arm deals include, for example, the type of defence equipment that has been purchased and its price, rather than the process through which a deal was concluded [3,4]. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Qatari arms purchases have increased by 282% since 2012, but there is not much information about how such purchases were made or the processes that were followed in relation to the purchases. [5] There is no transparency of the acquisition planning process. Furthermore, the information that is there, is not publicly available. Data on sporadic purchases made is available.

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable, as there is no defined process for acquisition planning.

The State Audit Bureau and the Administrative Control and Transparency Authority, established through Emiri Decree No. 75 in 2011, do not have the authority to provide oversight for the Ministry of Defence or the Armed Forces. [1,2] According to our sources, a member from the Ministry of Finance (Auditing) may be part of the committees but has no legal or authoritative power. Therefore, there are no external oversight units or organisations (3,4).

The federal law ‘On State Defence Order (GosOboronZakaz – GOZ)’ [1] defines the acquisition planning process in the Russian defence sector and regulates the purchase of new arms and military equipment and R&D. It is a highly secret process with most of the steps classified as state secrets. Nevertheless, the Russian government has proposed restricting access to GOZ details even further and to make planning [2] and procurement [3] secret.

There is therefore no clear public information about the separation of internal functions or connections between specific purchases and defence requirements.

The public has very limited access to both the GOZ and federal defence spending. GOZ is very much classified. The Ministry of Finance publishes the federal budget when it is already set – there is no information about the budget when it is being drafted [1]. Moreover, the proportion of secret parts in the budget is regularly very high. According to an analysis by RANEPA and the Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy, The percentage of secret parts of the defence budget (which accounted for 2.8% of GDP in 2018) from 2016 to 2018 was 70.5%, 63.9% and 66% respectively [2]. According to this analysis, the percentage of secret parts of the federal budget ‘violates Article 5 of Federal Law No. 5485-1 “On state secrets”‘ [3]. Comment: the public has no access to information about defence acquisition planning. The public can only see the result when the Ministry of Finance publishes the federal budget with the planned spending on the defence sector [1]. Moreover, the announced spending only concerns non-secret items that reperesent the smaller share of defence budget [2].

There are a couple of oversight mechanisms that, however, exclude parliament from the process. Control over budget spending during the placement and implementation of GOZ is conducted by an inter-agency group. Its main members are the MoD, the Federal Antimonopoly Service, the Russian Federal Financial Intelligence Unit (RosFinMonitoring) and the Bank of Russia. Other agencies, such as the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Federal Security Services, may also participate in the control at this stage if they act as the main clients (i.e. a state agency that placed the order and performs the role of the main client. The Chief Prosecutor’s Office and Accounts Chamber oversee the implementation of state orders and the legitimacy and effectiveness of the state budget’s spending on GOZ [1]. There are, nevertheless, numerous violations in the acquisition process and oversight units fail to eliminate them in the long-term perspective. The Chief Prosecutor’s Office, for example, reports that embezzlements and money laundering are common in the implementation of GOZ [2]. Meanwhile, the media warns about strong administrative pressure on the businesses that receive GOZ contracts [3].

According to our resources and experts in the field, Saudi Arabia has recently developed a process of acquisition planning as part of the procurement system; however, because the procurement system is new, the process is not clear and in some cases is “messy”. Additionally, purchases and the system are not linked with the defence strategy and do not rely on needs assessments, particularly huge and strategic purchases (1), (2). However, the country does not appear to have a defined system for acquisition planning, with military spending accounting for a disproportionate amount of the total budget, which itself is largely based on oil revenues (3). Military and defence spending in Saudi Arabia is typically linked to regional politics. For example, the country projected a 6.7% rise in defence spending in 2017 to SAR 191 billion ($50.8 billion) amidst the war it is leading in Yemen, the stated aims of which include containing its regional rival Iran (4).

According to the Gulf-focused academic Steffen Hertog, recent developments in Saudi Arabia indicate that routine procurement is supposed to become more rule-bound and transparent if only to reduce opportunities for rent-seeking on lower levels and by family branches of the Al Saud who have lost out in recent power struggles. There is a general move across government to modernize procurement, and some of the anti-corruption drives behind this seem serious. All of this does not mean that large and politically sensitive contracts will be dealt with in a purely technocratic fashion, geo-strategic and personal considerations will continue to play an important role, but decision-making around them will be much more centralized, with less opportunity for peripheral royal or military players to act as spoilers and take cuts at various levels (5).

This sub-indicator has been scored Not Applicable because there is no defined process for acquisition planning.

The Saudi government does not disclose details of its acquisition planning process. According to our sources, the MoD will not disclose any information about future or current acquisitions. Such information and confidential and categorized (1), (2). The country has also recently incorporated two military industry bodies that will have a key role in the procurement process, the General Authority for Military Industries in August 2017, and the Saudi Arabian Military Industries in May 2017 (3), (4). However, it is unclear whether this will lead to more transparency in these processes.
According to a Gulf affairs expert, “The establishment of GAMI and SAMI will lead to a more formalized process of acquisition, following the example of the UAE and there is likely to be a cut in corruption in the process too altogether a more rational process, but it is unlikely to involve clear and transparent oversight, directions will be handed down and implemented without challenge or scrutiny (5).”

This sub-indicator has been scored Not Applicable because there is no defined process for acquisition planning.

Military acquisition decisions are made more or less unilaterally by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who also serves as the minister of defence (1), (2), (3), and are thus not subject to external oversight. The abovementioned SAMI, for instance, is reportedly steered by an inter-ministerial committee chaired by the crown prince (4). According to a legal expert with insight on regional armed forces, “there is not necessarily any external oversight in place following the establishment of SAMI and GAMI, but at least a form of ‘checks and balances’ inside the government apparatus when it comes to buying military equipment” (5). Another source, a consultant who works with the Saudi defence sector, stated that though changes to Saudi military procurement strategy are ongoing, and GAMI is likely to have oversight over Saudi defence procurement, the crown prince is the ultimate authority behind both SAMI and GAMI and the procurement process as a whole (6).

The acquisition planning process in the defence system is developed within the Public Procurement Law (PPL) and a series of specific bylaws. PPL obliges every contracting authority (budget beneficiary) to adopt an annual public procurement plan. The plan should encompass data on planned procurement including tentative dates, amount of planned funds, subject and type of procurement etc. No later than ten days after the adoption, the plan should be published on the Public Procurement Portal. If the plan contains confidential data it is supposed to be delivered to the Public Procurement Office (PPO) and the State Audit Institution (SAI) [1]. Following the model determined by the PPO, in October 2015, the MoD adopted an internal act that closely regulates the public procurement planning process [2].
When it comes to procurement in the field of security and defence (Art. 127 and 128 of the PPL), the MoD delivers the plans to the government which decides on the implementation of procurement procedures and should notify the DIAC. The process for acquisition planning is in place but it is not clear, and internal functions are not separated. There are very few, if any, explicit connections made between specific purchases and defence strategy requirements.

The MoD regularly publishes annual public procurement plans. Besides data on the type of the procurement and tentative dates, since 2016, plans encompass the number of planned funds and estimated values of the procurement [2]. However, MoD public procurement plans do not provide justifications for the purchases. Namely, in 2015 a provision requiring the justification and the way of determining the estimated value of each procurement was erased from the PPL [1]. Accordingly, justification and the manner of estimating the procurement value were deleted off the list of data each plan should contain in a bylaw that regulates the form of the public procurement plan [2]. Even though publishing planned funds and estimated values represents a positive step in transparent procurement planning, without the purpose of purchase and reason behind the calculation of the expected value, not much can be concluded about the procurement.
However, in practice, regardless of the annual plans, procurements often happen without any announcement on an ad hoc basis (detailed in questions 60 and 61).

Besides the DIAC, which discusses public procurement plans very superficially, there is no external oversight over the procurement planning process. The committee receives and debates three-monthly reports on the work of the MoD, that contain data on current public procurement plan and its implementation; however, without going into any detail [1].

MINDEF/SAFs long-term and multi-year acquisition programmes are premised on its defence and security budget plans, which are discussed and approved in Parliament during each year’s Committee of Supply session [1]. MINDEF/SAF’s acquisitions undergo stringent assessment by the SAF, MINDEF and Defence Science and Technology Agency (DSTA), based on careful studies and a cost benefit analysis. All acquisitions have to undergo an approval of requirements process, with endorsement and approvals sought from various committees, which are documented. There is also a segregation of duties for (a) approval of requirements and purchase; and (b) verification of purchase [1].. Internal acquisition planning functions are separated among the Defence Finance Organisation (a MINDEF division), Defence Science and Technology Agency and other MINDEF/SAF [5, 6].
It worth noting that the Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) and the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) have in practice generally refrained from releasing detailed information on its procurement processes. There have been occasional insights, but these are few and far between with procurement programmes largely taking place out of the public’s view [2,3]. However, independent analysts have nevertheless noted that Singapore defence planners have been meticulous in ensuring that the defence force’s requirements are being addressed despite these opaque activities [4].

Singapore’s defence and security strategy is openly discussed and approved in Parliament and there are provisions for planning oversight and budget audit by the relevant parliamentary committee and the Attorney General of Singapore. However, defence acquisition planning processes are not necessarily transparent, especially in terms of supplier/product selection as well as development/programme/platform costs. For example, procurement is typically aggregated with other expenditures under a vague subsection called ‘Military Expenditure’ with no access to detailed information by the public due to ‘operational security concerns’ [1].

Oversight on defence procurement is essentially limited given that such procurement initiatives are carried out in confidence within the MINDEF, the SAF, and the Defence Science and Technology Agency (DSTA), and only surface during the Committee of Supply Debate discussion in Parliament. Moreover, a People’s Action Party (PAP) majority parliament makes it unlikely that opposition will gain the necessary support it requires to block certain acquisitions [1].
External oversight may come in the form of audits carried out by the Auditor General’s Office (AGO). [4]
Media reports on defence procurement are typically made after an official announcement, with only rare instances of investigative reporting unearthing undeclared acquisitions or development programmes [2, 3].

Acquisitions within the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) are separated into two broad categories: Category 1 matériel (military equipment & associated parts which are not commercially available) and Category 2 matériel (components, parts, and supplies available on the open market without changes to specification baseline). These are managed under separate acquisition processes: Category 1 matériel is budgeted under Folio 02 in the Department of Defence (DoD) Financial Management System, is funded via the Special Defence Account (which permits rolling over of unused funds year-to-year), and governed by the Defence Acquisition Handbook (DAHB) 1000 armaments acquisition policy [1]. Category 2 matériel is budgeted under Folio 01, is funded via the General Defence Account, and is governed primarily by the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA)[2] and National Treasury instructions and guidelines [3]. According to DAHB 1000, all Category 1 acquisitions have to go through a process, involving both other services and the DoD Secretariat, to ensure that the stated required capabilities are aligned within defence policy as defined by white papers and defence reviews and available budget. This begins with a Required Operational Capability study, followed by a Preliminary Study, followed by a Staff Target document that specifies in detail the strategic rationale for the system being acquired, the operational requirements it has to meet, and preliminary budgeting and staffing analyses. The Staff Target has to be approved by one of the armaments acquisition committees before the acquisition can continue. The process then goes through various additional stages and approvals to fully define requirements, staffing, and budget plans, leading up to the actual decision to acquire a system. The level of approval for each step depends on whether the acquisition is defined as cardinal or not This depends on the level of importance and risk of the acquisition based on various parameters. For instance, if an acquisition’s total cost will exceed 5% of the DoD’s annual acquisition budget, the project is automatically classified as cardinal and its various stages must be approved by acquisition boards that include the minister of defence [1].

Whereas the laws, regulations, and tender documents for Category 2 items are public, many aspects of Category 1 acquisition are hidden from public scrutiny. DAHB 1000 itself is classified as ‘RESTRICTED’ and not made generally available [1], and the DoD does not publish information about Category 1 acquisitions beyond major items. The usage of the Special Defence Account is not shown in annual public budget documents beyond showing how much each service has contributed to its capital spending to it. This makes it very difficult for the media and public, in general, to be able to adequately understand, report on, and analyse Category 1 acquisitions and the usage of the Special Defence Account [2].

All SANDF acquisition and procurement spending is overseen both by the DoD Secretariat (including the Accountability Management Committee (AMC), Risk Management Committee and Audit Committee), as well as the Auditor-General of South Africa [1]. Legislative oversight is performed via various parliamentary committees including the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA), the Joint Standing Committee on Defence (JSCD), and the Defence and Military Veterans Portfolio Committee [2]. Committee meetings have shown the ability of parliamentarians to demand, and receive, documentation on ongoing acquisitions, their project names, budgets, stated requirements, and strategic justification. However, much of the acquisition documentation, including the Staff Target and User Requirement Specification have been classified in their entirety and are difficult for committee members to obtain, reducing their ability to properly provide oversight over acquisitions [1].

South Korea’s acquisition planning is conducted within clear policy statements such as the mid-term national defence plan. It contains potential defence purchases with a 5 year plan based on potential defence force needs and available financial resources. [1] The mid-term national plan is the basis for the MND to formulate budgets related to defence purchases. [2] Since procurement requirements are derived from the national defence strategy, connections between specific purchases and defence strategy requirements are made. The MND’s Defence White Paper outlines potential defence procurement plans, which align with the national defence strategy. In 2018, the MND stated that potential defence purchases, such as stealth fighter jets (F-35) and unmanned aerial vehicles, would be made to enhance the combat power of the Air Force. [3]

The Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) posts information on acqusition process in the “Prior Release of nformation” section on its website. It covers 88 ongoing or planned projects. [1] DAPA provides information on the procurement of military supplies through the “Open Public Data” service, too. [2] Morover, the public can access information through the information request system prescribed by the Official Information Disclosure Act.
However, detailed information is not fully disclosed (see Q30). While the mid-term national defence plan is available via the government website, it includes only limited information, excluding the full detail of each purchase. [3] This is because information related to national defence planning is considered a military secret under the terms of the Military Secret Protection Act 52] [4].

Oversight of acquisition planning is provided by the National Defence Committee at the National Assembly. The committee assesses the mid-term national defence plan, but its power is often limited to reviewing defence budgets. [1] Research titled “Reform Direction of the Defence Planning System” points out the lack of the oversight mechanism overseeing overall Joint military strategy at the very beginning of acquisition planning. [2]

The SPLA White Paper on Defence refers to acquisition happening according to a logistics guideline (Logistics Policy Guidelines) developed by the Ministry. [1] But it is not clear if these guidelines are being followed in the manner specified in this indicator because the issue is not discussed publicly by Defence Ministry officials and the top echelon of the army. [2] The Procurement Act, which applies to all government departments, however, spells out acquisition processes. [3]

The Procurement Act clearly stipulates an open and transparent process regarding acquisitions in the Defence Ministry. [1] It involves various stakeholders (a procurement committee, an internal auditor, an accountant to review documents, the involvement of the Auditor General etc). Although no major military hardware acquisitions seem to have happened since the Act was passed into law in April 2019, previous evidence of military purchases reveal an opaque process devoid of transparency. For example, South Sudan purchased Mi24 combat helicopters from Ukraine in 2014. [2] Locally, citizens were unaware of how the acquisition process for these helicopters unfolded, until it was exposed in a UN report, where the cost was mentioned as $42.8 million. According to UN, “even if the contract included fees for maintenance and operations, the unit price for that type of aircraft was inflated.” [3]

A defence and security committee in the National Legislative Assembly is supposed to provide external oversight. [1] However, there is no publicly available information to score this indicator, including through media coverage. [2] This could be because the underlying issues could be “classified” discussions and therefore media and public discussion may be prohibited from, respectively, covering or attending these discussions. Given the lack of available evidence, this indicator is not scored and is marked ‘Not Enough Information’.

Acquisition in defence is regulated. Acquisition planning is regulated in Spain by Law 9/2017 of Public Sector Contracts [1], which adapts to Spanish legislation several European Union Directives. Defence acquisitions are also regulated by Law 24/2011 of Public Sector Contracts on Defence and Security [2].

The defence planning process is regulated by the Ministerial Order 37/2005 [3], updated via the Ministerial Order 60/2015 [4]. Nevertheless, the case of Special Programmes of Armaments acquisition that started in the nineties but that continues in 2018, with a new proposal of renewal of armaments systems in Spanish armed forces, shows inconsistencies due to the recurring use of the jobs creation into the national companies as one of the main arguments to legitimate them [5].

Acquisition planning transparency is susceptible to improvement. The process is regulated by the Ministerial Order 37/2005 and 60/2015 [1, 2], but as stated in Art. 35 Law 24/2011, contracts are made public only if they are over €100,000, and that said, there are several cases in which no information has been published, including acquisitions that could undermine interests of defence and security or legitimate commercial interests, among others [3]. Thus, while the public has access to information about the process itself through these regulations, some information is still excluded.

There are several external oversight processes for defence acquisition in addition to the existing internal process of acquisition planning based on capacities present at the Ministry of Defence [1]. The main external oversight comes from the Court of Accounts, an institution that has published a specific report on the acquisition of the Special Programmes of Armament [2] and from the Defence Committee from the Spanish Parliament, that has included questions and debates about the controversies of legitimacy and the budget of the Special Programmes of Armament in its minutes.

Phone interviews with two experts on Sudan’s defence sector [1,2], as well as a thorough search of the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Finance websites [3,4,5] and an internet search of public statements by government officials, suggest that there is no defined process for acquisition planning in Sudan’s defence sector at a strategic level. The 2010 Procurement Act [6] outlines how a central directorate should establish procurement committees within ‘major government units’ to guide solicitation, selection and contract monitoring processes – but does not describe how decisions are made on how to use resources. Since, as described by one of the above-mentioned experts on Sudan’s defence sector [2], each armed force, in practice, plans and acquires most if not all of its own goods and services with revenue it generates through its own activities with no oversight, it follows that centralised acquisition planning is not realistically possible in Sudan’s security sector today. The extent to which acquisition planning processes are defined within the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and multiple paramilitary organisations is unclear.

This indicator is marked Not Applicable, given that there is no defined process for acquisition planning. Phone interviews with two experts on Sudan’s defense sector [1,2], as well as a thorough search of the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Finance websites and an internet search of public statements by government officials, suggest that there is no transparency in acquisition activities in Sudan’s defence sector. Many sources have documented that Sudan’s security sector activities, including purchases, are opaque even to the ministries that would theoretically oversee them. Freedom House reported that former President Bashir’s government ran large off-bugdet accounts [3]. Most military units derive their own revenues through private business transactions, many of which are deliberately hidden from view because they are illicit and/or privately benefit those involved; therefore, these units have incentives to avoid scrutiny -predominently by the media, civil society and the international community – by obscuring their acquisition processes. The U.S. Department of State’s 2018 Integrated Country Strategy for Sudan observed that ‘While the GoS has rules and policies by which local authorities must abide, it is known that many decisions and sales are made outside of the formal market… Sudan’s contract awards system is opaque’ [4].

This indicator is marked Not Applicable as there is no process for acquisition planning. Since there is no formal and official acquisition planning process in the defence sector, there can be no external oversight of whether acquisition processes are well-performing and compliant with laws and policies. Visibility into acquisition planning processes executed by individual military units has only emerged when organisations such as Global Witness [1] and The Sentry [2] have found and published leaked documents detailing purchase and transport plans for procurements of goods and services.

A clear process for the entire acquisition planning cycle is in place, with separated internal acquisition planning functions, e.g., budget, commercial, and finance. The government controls and monitors the materiel acquisition process, and delegates procurement tasks to the Defence Material Administration Agency [1]. It also appoints commissions for reviewing and planning the Armed Forces’ materiel needs, and their state investigation reports (SOU) make connections between specific purchases and defence strategy requirements explicit [2].

The public is able to access information about the process itself in line with the Public Access Law [1]. Beyond this general principle, detailed information on the acquisition process, including justification of purchases, lines of responsibility, timelines, mechanisms, and outcomes, have also been proactively published in the form of state investigation reports, e.g. the lengthy report on the ‘long-term materiel needs of the defence organisation’ [2]. In large part transparent, the government’s defence materiel planning and acquisition model has nonetheless been criticised by the Swedish National Financial Management Authority (ESV) for currently being ‘too complex’ [3] (see also Q11C).

The National Audit Office [1] reports to the parliament and provides a strong external oversight function, assessing the country’s long-term acquisition plans, their legitimacy and likelihood that plans are going to function properly. The Parliamentary Defence Committee [2]  is also involved in the oversight of acquisition planning thanks to its central role in scrutinising defence budgets and preparing defence policy ahead of parliamentary votes (see also Q2). Moreover, agencies in the defence and security sector may also give formal recommendations regarding the general direction of the defence budget as well as the defence resolutions [3] prepared by the government’s Defence Commission. The government has however been criticised by the Swedish National Financial Management Authority (ESV) that its financial model for the SAF’s materiel planning and acquisition is too complex for the government to be able to exercise effective financial control and monitoring [4].

The acquisition process is subdivided into several main phases preceding procurement: planning, evaluation and parliamentary deliberation. These first phases involve the Armed Forces Staff, the Armed Forces Logistics Organisation, armasuisse and political decision-makers. The project planning is subdivided into long and medium-term planning, conceptual foundations, requirement analysis (including cost planning) and the development of a project charter. The evaluation phase foresees a pre-evaluation, the evaluation itself, a verification of suitability for troop use, type selection and finally the approval of the armament programme. [1]. Only then will the Parliament deliberate on the proposal based on the programme. The armament programme lays out the reasoning for the requested by providing background, a description of the proposed solution and why this solution was chosen [2, 3, 4]. The framework programme then provides even more detailed explanations on background, strategic reasoning and justification. The different functions are internally separated.

The armament programme lays out the reasoning for the requested by providing background, a description of the proposed solution and why this solution was chosen [1, 2, 3]. The framework programme then provides even more detailed explanations on background, strategic reasoning and justification [4]. These documents that are part of the parliamentarian deliberations process are easily accessible on the Curia Vista website of the Swiss Federal Assembly [5]. Further, the Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport (DDPS) publishes documents, summaries and related information on its website and links to related documents from the parliamentarian process [6]. If part of the formal consultation procedures the “duration of the consultation period is at least three months” (Article 7.1 CPA) [7]. The Parliament Act also lays out time frames. As the Federal Assembly has four regular sessions a year and submissions by the government have typically to happen at least one month before the session [8], there is usually more than four weeks available for scrutiny. Information on the early stages of the process is more difficult to obtain. Members of parliament let alone the general public are little or not at all involved in these stages. The DDPS has a process for the approval of plans for modifications, extensions or creation of new buildings [9]. It also publishes a yearly “Project Report” to inform the public on the state of major projects [10].

The Swiss Federal Audit Office (SFAO) audits and publishes reports on a specific aspect of the processes within the DDPS [1]. Not all the reports are published though; however, they are generally covered by the Freedom of Information Act [2]. The DDPS also has an independent internal audit department that publishes its reports since 2015 [3]. The Security Policy Committee (SPC), as well as a sub-committee of the Control Committee of the Federal Assembly, have oversight functions when it comes to the DDPS [4].

In principle, Taiwan’s weapon systems acquisition programmes and resource allocations follow the logic of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS}. There are 3 steps of acquisition process: (1) programming stages, determining operational requirements and overall defence concept, (2) planning stages, documenting operational requirements and overall acquisition planning report, and (3) budget implementation, putting budget in the administration plan and carrying out the procurement management.
This logic is translated into the Ten-year Military Build Concept (10年建軍構想) and Five-year Force Buildup Plan (5年兵力整建計畫). These concepts and plans are then explain in different official documents released by the MND, for example the Quadrennial Defence Review and National Defence Report [1, 2, 3, 4, 8].

There are separate acquisition planning functions (e.g. strategy planning, operational requirements documenting, domestic production capability assessment, system analysis, overall logistics support and industry economic benefit analysis assessing, defence financial resources reviewing, budget allocating, procurement adopting). Different departments within the MND are responsible for the processes such as Department of Strategic Planning, Department of Integrated Assessment, Department of Resource Planning, Defence Procurement Office, and Comptroller Office [5, 8].

The logic of Rule of Law is implemented via inter-departmental interactions within the MND to complete the acquisition planning process and inter-ministerial interactions within the Executive Yuan to realise the acquisitions [5, 6]. However, there are still ambiguities identified within the acquisition process for specific armament procurement programmes [7].

The public has access to information about the acquisition process though the documents of the Concept & Plan of Ten-year Military Build Concept (10年建軍構想) and the Five-year Force Buildup Plan (5年兵力整建計畫). However, certain items or information are excluded from publication under the governance of the Classified National Security Information Protection Act [1] and the Enforcement Rules of the Classified National Security Information Protection Act [2]. For example, the 2019 Defence Budget was severely criticised for insufficient transparency of new armament procurements from the US [3, 4].
Some new armament procurements from U.S. are listed in the secret budgets before the U.S. government’s approval. For example, the procurement of M1A2T Abram tanks was listed in the secret budgets before the U.S. government agreed the sales in 2019. After receiving the approval from the U.S. government, the budget of the procurement was made publicly available [5].

Government acquisition processes are regulated by the Budget Act, Audit Act, Government Procurement Act, and Regulations for Coverage and Handling of Special Military Procurement [1, 2, 3, 4]. Inter-institutional audit and survey by the LY and CY serve as the external oversight mechanisms for acquisition processes of the MND [5].

Under these laws and regulations, the MND itself is the specific oversight body that is mandated to oversee defence acquisitions. In addition, the LY is responsible for budget review and approval and the CY is responsible for budget audit.

According to a senior military officer there is an acquisition plan in place with clear oversight. [1] However such a plan is neither publicly available (for national security reasons) nor was he willing to share it with the assessor. It is therefore very difficult to assess the accuracy of the statement by the officer.

Under the Public Procurement Act 2011, “defence and security organs” can present procurement requirements to the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (PPRA) classed as “open” and “restricted”. [1] These are known as ‘dual lists’. Only acquisitions on the ‘open list’ need to follow the requirements of the Public Procurement Act. In the past five years, the PPRA refers to just one ‘dual list’ having been agreed, in 2016-17, with the police. It is not clear if any such dual lists have been agreed with other defence and security organs. [2] [3] [4] Any further information about the acquisition planning process is not publicly known.

There is only external oversight if there is agreement on a dual list of open and restricted goods and services are required. [1] It is not publicly known what further oversight occurs.

According to Section 65 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, the National Strategy Act 2017 was developed as a framework for achieving the country’s goal for sustainable national development in accordance with the principle of good governance. In this respect, every government agency is responsible for implementing fiscal policy, planning and disbursement related to their objectives in order to achieve the national strategy goals in alignment with the central budget system [1]. According to Parameswaran (2018), over recent decades, after each military coup, Thailand tends to see rises in the defence budget; in the same manner, the military junta, which came to power in May 2014, has also been able to get some increases [2]. On February 27, 2017, the Defence Council approved a 10-year military development programme entitled ‘Modernisation Plan: Vision 2026’, drawn up in accordance with the military reform policy to enhance military capacity and readiness to deal with any potential threats to national security [3].

In 2020, the analysis report of the MoD’s expenditure budget fiscal year 2020 was issued, describing the ministry’s acquisition planning for each project in different internal departments to reach the goal of the National Strategy Act, which is to ensure the preparedness and capacity required for national protection and prevention of menacing threats in all forms and at all levels. However, the internal acquisition planning functions are not separated in the report and there are very few explicit connections made between specific purchases and defence strategy requirements [4]. This is because, in Thailand, defence acquisition planning is conducted separately and individually by each defence agency according to their immediate needs and budgets, which means that the individual armed forces (Air Force, Royal Army, Royal Navy) control the spending of their own budgets and procurement processes, with no common ground on the national strategic plan; for example, during the Covid-19 crisis, the MoD allowed the defence agencies to consider the necessity of each acquisition project individually and to decide whether to continue them or not [5,6].

It should be noted that the Public Procurement and Supplies Administration Act 2017 does not require state agencies to publicly disclose information about their planned purchases, and while this can still be done proactively, it isn’t [1]. In some rare cases, additional information about future purchase plans can be gained from the parliamentary reviews of the defence budget [2]. The analysis reports of the Ministry of Defence’s annual budget, which include a summary of acquisition planning for each fiscal year, are publicly available online. However, only the reports for the fiscal years 2017, 2018 and 2019 are available. These reports provide information on justification of purchases, lines of responsibility, timelines, mechanisms and outcomes [3,4].

In Thailand, the military’s acquisition planning is conducted separately and individually by each defence agency according to their immediate needs and budgets, which means that the individual armed forces (Air Force, Royal Army, Royal Navy) control the spending of their own budgets and procurement processes [1]. This process is subject solely to internal audit [2]. Nonetheless, according to the Government Procurement and Supplies Management Act B.E. 2560, the Comptroller General’s Department has played a role in oversight, though it is highly limited [3]. Moreover, Thailand did not have any parliamentary review on defence acquisition plans for several years after the military coup in 2014, but since the parliament oversight function returned after the general election in 2019, there has been occasional scrutiny on various defence acquisition plans, such as the planned purchase of Ukraine tanks during a censure debate [4].

There is a clear process for acquisition planning in place. According to Decree n°1039-2014 dated 13 March 2014, Organising Public Procurement, the public purchaser is required at the start of each year to develop an annual public procurement plan following the draft budget according to a standard model and a defined timetable(1,2). This plan must be compatible with the appropriations allocated and notified for information to the competent procurement control commissions within a period not exceeding the end of February of each year. The public purchaser must, compulsorily and free of charge, publish the provisional plan on the national public procurement website no later than 30 days before the beginning of the procurement procedures, except in cases of duly justified imperative (3). According to article 2 of Decree n°3013-2008 dated 12 September 2008, there is a specialised organism within the General Directorate of Financial and Administrative Affairs, which is the Directorate of Budgeting, Programming and Control responsible for carrying out the duty of preparing the Ministry’s budget, capital management and financial plan’s implementation (4). Based on our sources, the procurement in general has very little connection to the defence plan. (1,2)

According to our sources, there is limited information available for the public or oversight agencies on the acquisition and acquisition planning, this information is in abstract form(1,2). A review of the procurement plans published on the national public procurement website shows that limited information is availbale. This information is related to procurement plans produced by entities from the Ministry of Defence (Centre National de la Cartographie et de la Télédétection, Office de Développment de Régime Maatoug, Office des logements militaires) (3).

Oversight mechanisms exist during the annual budget preparation process and involve specialised departments from the Ministry of Finance and the Presidency of Government. When it comes to execution, the expenses related to procurement are subject to oversight, control and visa for approval of public expenditure control services (1,2,3). There is no oversight of needs requirement or procurement strategy (2,3). A unit of management by objectives is created at the Ministry of National Defence for the realisation of the project of reform of the management of the State budget. The unit is under the authority of the Minister of National Defence (4).

Despite the declared strategic plans and the 10-year procurement programme, major procurement decisions have taken a very long time due to constant shifts in procurement models and expected defence industry outcomes. There is also a lack of agreed goals and coordination between the institutions. There is still a lack of consistency in defence industry plans and procurement. There are two factors playing a role here. First, Turkey lacks the ability to construct an effective organisational structure that clarifies the roles and responsibilities of the military and civilian elites. Second, the civilian–military rivalry has lost pace due to increased presidential control over the military and the purge of thousands after the coup [1].

Law 1324 [2] provides the basis for the current defence planning and procurement system. This law prescribes the responsibilities of the Turkish General Staff (TGS) in defence planning and procurement management. Similarly, Law 1325 defines the responsibilities of the Ministry of National Defence for coordinating and cooperating with the TGS in procurement processes, as well as managing national arms industry activities [3]. The legal framework that makes the TGS responsible for defining, planning and conducting policy-making activities as regards requirements includes sub-procedures.

The first phase of the aforementioned activities is the TUMAS (Turkiye’nin Milli Askeri Stratejisi – National Military Strategy of Turkey) document, which defines the general framework for the military strategic planning and threat perception of Turkey. The TUMAS is considered the basis for the military’s requirements and forecasts for capability building. The Concept-Based Requirements System (CBRS) defines requirements accordingly. The subsequent planning phase is the preparation of the Strategic Targets Plan (SHP) document, based on the TUMAS document and the Operational Requirements Plan (ORP). The SHP is the principal guideline for the OYTEP (On Yillik Tedarik Plani – the 10-Year Procurement Plan). The preparation, prioritisation and budgeting of programmes is carried out pursuant to the OYTEP. This process is concluded with the preparation of the Project Definition Document (PDD). A PDD defines what type of product or service is going to be procured, as well as the general requirements, timeframe and expectations.

The release of the PDD effectively starts the procurement project through two main channels: the Ministry of Defence and the Presidency of Defence Industries (SSB). The project is mainly administered by the SSB if the procurement programme involves contributions from local industry in terms of research and development (R&D) or is envisaged as a production under license or joint development. Direct procurement programmes are usually handled by the Ministry, under the authorisation of the Council of Ministers. The Defence Industry Executive Committee, chaired by President Erdogan, authorises the SSB to commence the programmes [4].

Please note that the TUMAS, Operational Requirements Plan (ORP) and OYTEP, as the primary budgeting and procurement documents developed mainly between the Ministry of Defence and the Presidency of Defence Industries, are very critical for corruption [4]. These documents determine the scope, scale and pace of Turkey’s procurement plans and military expenditure in the coming 10-year period. So, these ‘Cosmic Top Secret’ documents explain the executive body’s prioritisation of procurements in the coming decade [4]. These ‘Cosmic Top Secret’ documents, which are not open for legislative or public access, may be defined as the only means of synchronising the political directives of the presidency and the technical/tactical needs of the military [5].

Due to the fact that the entire process detailed above has ‘top secret’-level security clearance and these strategic procurement documents shaping Turkey’s procurement in the coming 10 years are not open to public scrutiny, we cannot see to what extent the politically or financially-motivated decisions/preferences of President Erdogan have been involved in the document [1]. Currently, the military bureaucracy and offices at the presidential palace undertake the preparation of all documents and plans from the TUMAS and OYTEP.

At least in theory, legislative oversight is required at each step of the acquisition planning and budget allocation processes, during the debates on the defence budget by parliament’s Budgetary Commission, which are held in October every year. However, there is a lack of feedback, communication or coordination mechanisms during the preparation of these plans and strategic documents. Interviewee 3 suggested that there is no legislative oversight of the acquisition planning process, meaning that neither the general assembly nor the parliamentary committees have a say in acquisition planning [1].

The decrees adopted during the state of emergency also limit external oversight. The President has passed new laws granting him full authority over defence procurement and control over Turkey’s top defence companies. The state of emergency decree of December 24, 2017, forces the country’s procurement agency, the Undersecretariat for Defence Industries (SSM), to report directly to Erdogan. The SSM was previously under the authority of the Minister of Defence. The decree also authorises the President to call and chair meetings of the Defence Industry Executive Committee (SSIK), the panel in Turkey that oversees top procurement decisions and national arms programmes. The state of emergency decree No. 696 also brought a critical foundation under the Erdogan’s control. The Turkish Armed Forces Foundation (TSKGV), which owns majority shares in Turkey’s top defence companies, will now report to the President. Before the decree, it reported to the Minister of Defence. These moves weaken procurement and military bureaucracy [2].

During the budget planning process, the ministry presents a detailed break down of what it intends to spend on in that finacial year. There is a clear process, at least in theory/paper, for the entire acquisition planning cycle in place, with formally separate internal acquisition planning functions, e.g., budget, commercial, and finance. Connections between specific purchases and defence strategy requirements are made explicit because its a requirement for the budget to passed/approved by parliament save in cases which are classified in nature. There are clear acquisition planning processes that originate from different departments up to the central unit under the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development [1].

The government runs a central procurement online portal for all the ministries, and all the parastatals. In this portal, all the required items and services by any government ministry or parastatal must be uploaded here. The public has access to information about the entire process itself so that information can be obtained as needed. Information that is proactively published includes justification of purchases, lines of responsibility, timelines, mechanisms, and outcomes. All the planned acquisition processes are available to the public. The government procurement portal [1] has the lists of all the goods and services which can be accessed by the public at any time.

According to the defence policy[1], aqusition planning falls under non- operational areas under the section of logistics, procurement and infrastructure. It is stated that within the framework of an established accountable process, the Ministry of Defence/Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces must ensure more efficiency and effectivesness in the areas of aqusition of equipment, their maintenance, purchase and supply of stocks, and provision of barracks, training facilitiesas well as other infrastructure. The parliamentary committee on defence and internal affairs oversees the Ministry of Defence’s aqusitions in general terms as they have to approve its annual budgets.

The MoD generally conducts two types of procurement: open and classified. If the information on a particular good or service is classified (battle tanks, ammunition, etc.), the particular good or service is procured using the procedure for classified procurements – the so-called State Defence Order [1]. If the information on particular good or service is not classified (food, fuel, etc.), the particular good or service is procured using the open procurement procedure, according to the Law On Public Procurements [1]. Thus the acquisition planning process for both types of procurement differs and is provided by different pieces of legislation.
Under pressure of CSOs and foreign partners, there are discussions in the MoD and Parliament, about reducing the scope of secret acquisitions through the SDO and this work corresponds with the issue of reforming the Security service of Ukraine who is in charge of information classification, including the SDO [2].
There is a clear process for public acquisition planning, where government customers are empowered to carry out both the budget (customers submit their budget request based on the annual Law on Budget adopted by the VRU, which are further reviewed by the Ministry of Finance and should be finally adopted by the CMU), commercial and finance functions [3]. There is a clear requirement for government customers to plan their classified acquisitions in regards to defence policy provisions [4], although it is impossible to check this due to classification. There is also a clear process for public acquisition planning [5]. Under the framework of MOD public procurements, the Finance Department is empowered to carry out budget and finance functions [6]. The Department for Public Procurement conducts commercial functions [7].

Information on the process of classified defence acquisitions is classified itself including the information on the justification of purchases, timelines and outcomes. At the same time, information on lines of responsibility and mechanisms (general information) is publicly available [1]. Information on MoD Public Procurements is more open, in particular, the public has access to the information on lines of responsibility and mechanisms [2, 3]. The MoD also publishes open procurement announcements [4] and some of its annual procurement plans [5, 6]. Information on outcomes for each of the public procurements can be found on the e-procurement platform Prozorro; the MoD Budget Requests for next year contain reports for the previous year budget with very detailed information on funds spent [7]. Further, the minister of defence recently (February 7, 2018) reported to the VRU Committee on National Security and Defence on the procurements (general information) and the use of funds [8], although there is no evidence currently for public reports being conducted regularly.

There is a lack of evidence of external oversight over defence acquisitions, although there is oversight, particularly over procurements in place. If referring to procurements alone, there are several agencies: the State Audit Service carrying out the state financial control function [1], the Accounting Chamber carrying out the state financial control function of execution of the state budget including financial control over classified spendings on behalf of the VRU [2], the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine as an authority for appealing against violations of public procurement legislation [3], and the State Treasury Service of Ukraine exercising operational control of procurements when registering contracts and conducting contract payments [4]. At the same time, it is worth mentioning there is no clear mechanism for interaction between law enforcement and controlling authorities in counteracting offences in procurement. There is also an overlap of functions, an insufficient number of highly skilled employees, and uncertainty in the mechanism for monitoring purchases which results in lack of strong external oversight over defence procurements [5].

The defence sector in the UAE does not have a defined process for acquisition planning. The Office of the Crown Prince is responsible for major acquisition planning (1), (2).

This sub-indicator is marked NA because the UAE does not have a defined process for acquisition planning. There is no transparency concerning the acquisition planning process within the defence sector in the UAE. According to our sources, in some cases, the armed forces are informed of the acquisition of specific weapons, after the Office of the Crown Prince finalized the contract negotiation and/or acquisition terms (1), (2).

This sub-indicator is marked NA because the UAE does not have a defined process for acquisition planning. The defence sector is not subject to any oversight or scrutiny, and in general, it has its own internal procedures. There is an internal auditing department and an oversight committee, but it is inactive in most cases as assessment and acquisition planning usually occur within the Office of the Crown Prince (1), (2).

There is a clear process for acquisition planning in place which is outlined in the Knowledge in Defence (KiD) portal of the MoD [1]. It defines how the MoD conducts, governs and controls the defence acquisition process, and is the primary bearer of all policy and guidance governing defence’s project delivery and commercial functions. It contains formally separate internal acquisition planning functions, e.g., budget, commercial, and finance [2]. Connections between specific purchases and defence strategy requirements are made explicit [3].

The public has access to information about the entire process itself, so that information can be obtained as needed [1]. Information that is proactively published includes justification of purchases, lines of responsibility, timelines, mechanisms, and outcomes [1, 2]. Such information can be found in the Knowledge in Defence (KiD) portal and the Defence Equipment Plan [1, 2]. However, the KID is not a free to access portal which requires registration.

The National Audit Office assess performance, and the country’s long-term acquisition plans [1]. The Parliament (the Defence Committee) is also involved in the oversight of acquisition planning [2, 3, 4]. Finally, there is the Judicial review process which can be used to challenge the lawfulness of decisions of public authorities, and through which institutions and the public can take legal action against specific government decisions in the Administrative Court, including in relation to defence acquisitions [5].

A weapon system acquistion is composed of three mechanisms in order to establish a budget and acquire the system. The three separate mechanisms are: the Joint Capabilities Integration & Development System (JCIDS) for identifying requirements; the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System (PPBE) for allocating budgeting; the Defense Acquisition System (DAS) for developing/buying the item [1].

The JCIDS process is a capabilities-based approach to identifying requirements rather than a threat-based approach [1]. As such, the JCIDS is designed to identify the capabilities needed to meet the strategic direction set by the National Defense Strategy and other such documents. The PPBE is an annual process which develops the DOD’s proposed budget for all acquisitions [1,2]. The JCIDS is produced annually and the manual is publicly available. The manual makes explicit reference to the requirements as laid out by the National Defense Strategy [3]. The Defense Acquisition System is the DoD process for developing and buying weapons and other systems and is governed by Directive 5000.01 [4]. Each acquisition, e.g. the F-35, has a specific programme managed by an acquisition programme office. The programme office includes a staff of engineers, contracting officers, budget officers and evaluation personnel [1]. The Programme Manager develops an acquisition strategy following the pathways outlined in DoD Instruction 5000.02 ‘Operation of the Adaptive Acquisition Framework’ [5]. There are various pathways, depending on the acquisition and timeframe. The instruction guiding the JCIDS process notes that the JCIDS capabilities process is influenced by both strategic guidance and threats/conditions (the Joint Operating Environment) [6]. There is no clear connection between specific purchases and strategic documents that is justified publicly.

The directives which govern the acquisition planning process (as outlined in 11A) are made publicly available by the DoD. The Defense Acquisition University (the corporate university of the DoD) publishes the Defense Acquisition Guidebook [1] and all the major policies relating to acquisition for the DoD in general and each of the services specifically [2]. With regard to transparency around the acquisition programmes themselves, the budget materials include justifications of line items, which includes acquisitions. This includes the cost per year, the responsible department (e.g. Army), a brief description and timelines [3,4,5].

Congress generally assumes an active role in acquisition planning, in addition to its continued efforts to undertake reform of the DoD acquisition processes [1]. The Senate Committee on Armed Services has a subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support, which is responsible for contracting and acquisition policy, including oversight of the Under Secretary Defense (Acquisition & Sustainment) (USD(A&S)) [2]. The House Committee on Armed Services does not have a specific committee for acquisition oversight, but each of the two committees on ‘Tactical Air and Land’ and ‘Seapower and Project Forces’ has some jurisdiction relating to procurement for those services [3,4]. Long-term acquisition plans are outlined in the planning component of the PPBE process and annually outlined in the Future Years Defence Plan (FYDP) (further details can be found in Q60) [5]. Unclassified copies of the FYDP are submitted to Congress, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the Comptroller General and the Congressional Research Service for analysis and oversight [6,7]. The Government Accountability Office (GAO), the United States’ equivalent of a supreme audit institution, also conducts oversight of DoD acquisitions and undertakes an annual assessment of the acquisition programmes [8].

The Organic Law of the People’s Public Planning (LOPPP) sets out the planning procedure for the running of the different People’s Power institutions. This procedure includes the coordination of the Economic and Social Development Plan, the Sectoral Plan, the Strategic Operational Plan and the Annual Operational Plan [1, 2]. The latter includes planning for the use of the agency’s resources, including acquisitions [3].

The procedure is not entirely clear for the development of the Annual Operational Plan (POA); however, a need for coordination between this plan and the Institutional Strategic Plan is expressed, as well as for total coordination with the Economic and Social Development Plan. In the case of the defense sector, the Ministry of Defence is responsible for submitting both plans for presidential approval [4]. The planning of the execution of resources established in the POA is based on the draft budget by the Office of Planning and Budget of the MPPD [3].

While there are formal procedures, the processes provide no clarity on implementation; this situation has been aggravated in recent years by the use of the National Development Fund (FONDEN) as a financing mechanism for defence sector acquisitions [5]. The law establishing this fund [6], gives the executive branch complete discretion to use resources without oversight mechanisms to audit payments made from this fund [7].

Although evidence suggests that the POA is prepared [1], neither it nor the budget act for different fiscal years are made public, so there is no information available to allow an assessment of whether procurement is included in acquisition planning. According to social organisations that monitor public management and especially the defence sector, there has been no evidence of procurement planning in recent years beyond the strategic objective of increasing military power [2].

The general planning process for defence sector management lacks transparency; planning documents are disregarded [3] and the budget acts of recent years have not been published or approved by the National Assembly as established by the constitution [4,5]. Since 2015, the government continues to use FONDEN to purchase goods for the defence sector [6]. It should be noted that there are no public documents reflecting the use of these resources or the justifications for their use, contrary to plans established by law [7,8].

The LOPPP states that the POAs submitted by each ministry will be approved by the president without detriment to the constitutional oversight functions of the legislative, citizen, judicial, electoral, state and municipal branches [1, 2]. In this respect, although the law requires that external controls be carried out on each entity’s planning procedures, the blocking of National Assembly’s external control constitutes a constitutional violation that prevents the budget, including acquisitions, from being supervised by the legislative branch [3, 4].

The law provides clear acquisition procedures which ought to be followed by all government departments and public entities, defence institutions included [1, 2]. All public departments are supposed to have devoted procurement units which are centrally controlled by the Procurement Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe (PRAZ) [3]. However, procurements and acquisitions in the defence and security sector are usually corruptly influenced by senior officers and commanders, and it is difficult to establish the acquisitions to defence strategy requirements, even though the acquisitions are related to operations [4].

There is no transparency in the acquisition planning process [1]. Military and intelligence purchases are kept secret, and they are not publicised whatsoever, except when there are public commissions of acquired assets or goods, which are reported by the media [1, 2]. Government audit reports or budget statements do not have information on defence acquisitions; thus, they are not scrutinised by oversight institutions such as the Office of the Auditor General Zimbabwe and Parliament [3, 4].

There is external oversight of military plans done by the National Security Council (NSC) comprised of the president, vice president and select ministers, as well as service chiefs as ex-officio members [1]. The NSC reviews defence acquisition plans submitted by the Defence Staff Subcommittee on Acquisition and Equipment Approval, which is a subcommittee of the Defence Committee, chaired by the minister of defence and composed of the permanent secretary for defence, commander of the defence forces, commander of the Zimbabwe National Army and the commander of the Air Force of Zimbabwe [2]. There is also a National Defence Commission, as well as the parliamentary Portfolio Committee for Defence and Security, provided in terms of the Constitution whose responsibility is to ensure good governance of the defence forces, and this covers aspects of acquisitions [3]. However, the parliamentary committee is not involved in the oversight of acquisition planning [4]. It is difficult to establish whether the NSC or National Defence Commission assess the legitimacy of acquisition plans because records of their meetings are not publicly available and the operations are always deemed sensitive and classified.

Country Sort by Country 11a. Acquisition planning process Sort By Subindicator 11b. Transparency Sort By Subindicator 11c. External oversight Sort By Subindicator
Albania 50 / 100 25 / 100 50 / 100
Algeria 0 / 100 NA NA
Angola 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Argentina 75 / 100 50 / 100 25 / 100
Armenia 50 / 100 25 / 100 25 / 100
Australia 100 / 100 50 / 100 50 / 100
Azerbaijan 25 / 100 25 / 100 25 / 100
Bahrain 0 / 100 NA NA
Bangladesh 75 / 100 50 / 100 0 / 100
Belgium 100 / 100 75 / 100 100 / 100
Bosnia and Herzegovina 50 / 100 50 / 100 0 / 100
Botswana 75 / 100 75 / 100 50 / 100
Brazil 75 / 100 75 / 100 75 / 100
Burkina Faso 25 / 100 25 / 100 25 / 100
Cameroon 0 / 100 NA NA
Canada 100 / 100 75 / 100 75 / 100
Chile 50 / 100 25 / 100 50 / 100
China 50 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100
Colombia 50 / 100 100 / 100 50 / 100
Cote d'Ivoire 25 / 100 25 / 100 50 / 100
Denmark 100 / 100 75 / 100 100 / 100
Egypt 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Estonia 100 / 100 25 / 100 100 / 100
Finland 100 / 100 75 / 100 100 / 100
France 100 / 100 50 / 100 100 / 100
Germany 100 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100
Ghana 25 / 100 0 / 100 25 / 100
Greece 50 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100
Hungary 25 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100
India 75 / 100 75 / 100 75 / 100
Indonesia 50 / 100 25 / 100 50 / 100
Iran 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Iraq 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Israel 50 / 100 25 / 100 75 / 100
Italy 100 / 100 75 / 100 75 / 100
Japan 75 / 100 50 / 100 75 / 100
Jordan 0 / 100 NA NA
Kenya 50 / 100 25 / 100 25 / 100
Kosovo 50 / 100 0 / 100 50 / 100
Kuwait 25 / 100 25 / 100 25 / 100
Latvia 75 / 100 50 / 100 50 / 100
Lebanon 50 / 100 25 / 100 25 / 100
Lithuania 75 / 100 100 / 100 75 / 100
Malaysia 50 / 100 25 / 100 25 / 100
Mali 25 / 100 25 / 100 50 / 100
Mexico 75 / 100 50 / 100 50 / 100
Montenegro 50 / 100 25 / 100 50 / 100
Morocco 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Myanmar 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Netherlands 100 / 100 50 / 100 75 / 100
New Zealand 100 / 100 75 / 100 100 / 100
Niger 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Nigeria 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
North Macedonia 75 / 100 75 / 100 50 / 100
Norway 100 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100
Oman 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Palestine 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Philippines 100 / 100 50 / 100 50 / 100
Poland 25 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100
Portugal 50 / 100 50 / 100 75 / 100
Qatar 0 / 100 NA NA
Russia 25 / 100 25 / 100 50 / 100
Saudi Arabia 0 / 100 NA NA
Serbia 25 / 100 25 / 100 25 / 100
Singapore 100 / 100 50 / 100 50 / 100
South Africa 100 / 100 50 / 100 75 / 100
South Korea 100 / 100 50 / 100 75 / 100
South Sudan 25 / 100 0 / 100 NEI
Spain 75 / 100 50 / 100 75 / 100
Sudan 0 / 100 NA NA
Sweden 100 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100
Switzerland 100 / 100 75 / 100 75 / 100
Taiwan 100 / 100 75 / 100 75 / 100
Tanzania 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Thailand 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Tunisia 50 / 100 25 / 100 50 / 100
Turkey 50 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Uganda 100 / 100 100 / 100 75 / 100
Ukraine 75 / 100 50 / 100 50 / 100
United Arab Emirates 0 / 100 NA NA
United Kingdom 100 / 100 75 / 100 100 / 100
United States 75 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100
Venezuela 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Zimbabwe 25 / 100 0 / 100 75 / 100

With thanks for support from the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs who have contributed to the Government Defence Integrity Index.

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