Q18.

Is there evidence that the country’s defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation and, if so, are these interests publicly stated and subject to scrutiny?

18a. Legal framework

Score

SCORE: 50/100

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18b. Defence institutions: Financial or controlling interests in practice

Score

SCORE: 0/100

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18c. Individual defence personnel: Financial or controlling interests in practice

Score

SCORE: 0/100

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18d. Transparency

Score

SCORE: 0/100

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18e. Scrutiny

Score

SCORE: 0/100

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There is evidence that individuals of the armed forces are prohibited from having control over or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural exploitation. However, the legal restriction refers to businesses in general and not natural resources specifically. Art. 34 of the Statute of Military Personnel states that it is prohibited for military members to engage in any private gainful activity in any capacity and of any kind (1).

The armed forces are formally involved in the energy policy of the country. The Minister of Defence is present at the National Energy Council, which is the supreme body on energy strategy and headed by the President of the Republic (2). Even though it should meet periodically, the Council has not been active for years (3).

Defence institutions are likely to have financial and controlling interests in businesses associated with Algeria’s natural resources and considering the answer to question 18A, it seems to be illicit (see the country’s last assessment, 5). Algeria is rich in oil and gas reserves, which are vital to the state. For example, revenues of the biggest African oil company Sonatrach amounts to 95% of Algeria’s external revenues and 60% of the budget. The company, therefore, belongs to the pillars of power (1). It is very difficult to find information on this issue and to distinguish between institutional and individual interests. Reports suggest that the DRS influences the appointment process of Sonatrach (2) (5). In the past (2009 and 2010), corruption scandals linked to Sonatrach also were interpreted as turf battles between official and the intelligence services (4, p. 3), suggesting that the intelligence service has a controlling interest in the company. Moreover, Algeria’s elite, including the military, reportedly profits from incomes of the energy sector. The former Vice-President of Sonatrach wrote that at least 5 to 6 billion dollars (some even speak of 10) of the energy sector, go into the pockets of the members of the nomenklatura annually (3).

As has been outlined in the country’s last assessment (4) and in the answers to question 18A and 18B, financial and controlling interests of individual defence personnel are likely widespread and illicit. It is however very difficult to find information about it. The national intelligence agency is reportedly involved in the appointment process of the state energy company Sonatrach (1). The current CEO of the company is considered to be a protégé of the DRS (2). Former Vice-President of Sonatrach Hocine Malti noted that at least 5 to 6 billion dollars, maybe even 10 billion dollars, of the energy sector go into the pockets of the members of the nomenklatura annually (3).

No evidence could be found that interests of the defence institution and individuals are publicly declared and transparent. Information found on the economic activities of the armed forces did not include the energy sector (1). An article published by the armed forces on energy issues did not mention any interests (2).

No evidence could be found that either parliament (1) (2) or the Court of Auditors (3) scrutinize these interests.

There do not appear to be formal restrictions for defence institutions to engage in or benefit from private businesses. The Public Probity Law prohibits individual public servants from engaging in private business activities that may constitute a conflict of interest, though the involvement of senior officials of the military and the presidency (SBP) in private businesses have been the norm. These businesses include exploration of natural resources, such as diamonds and oil, and presumably other natural resources (such as timber, gold and other precious metals) (1), (2), (3).

There is little evidence of direct involvement of defence institutions in natural resource exploration; however, that does not mean it does not exist. A 2017 Maka Angola report states, “the State Intelligence and Security Service (SINSE) sent the head of state information on illegal mining activities in the Cosse areas on the banks of the Luembe River, in the Nzagi district of Lunda Norte province, which involves the Military Intelligence and Security (SISM). For some time now, General Zé Maria has dedicated efforts to the creation of a cooperative for the exploitation of diamonds, in order to generate income parallel to the General State Budget for the SISM working capital. In Cabinda, General Zé Maria has engaged the SISM in the wood exploitation as part of its business efforts to maintain the said working capital without recourse to the OGE” (1).

There is evidence, though, of the involvement of individual senior military officials in natural resources exploration businesses. The involvement of senior military officials in diamond exploration has been well-documented since the 1990s. A recent example, according to Maka Angola, António José Maria, aka “Zé Maria”, the former head of the Military Intelligence and Security Services (SISM), who was forced to retire by President Lourenço in November 2017, had introduced SISM to timber and diamond exploration to give the services more financial autonomy (1), (2), (3), (4).

The involvement of individual senior officials from the Angolan military and the presidency in businesses relating to the country’s oil exploration has been well documented since the civil war and was confirmed again in recent investigative work on the Panama Papers (1), (2), (3), (4), (5).

Private business interests of senior officials are rarely publicly declared and commonly
concealed using little known employees or family members who appear in the business ownership declaration in the official gazette, or shell companies [1]. Ironically, in an unprecedented ruling in May, the Supreme Court ruled that Pedro Januário Macamba, an acquaintance of the former chief of the President’s Civil Bureau José Leitão, was the legitimate owner of the GEMA group, a powerful Angolan business holding company. Pedro Januário Macamba had filed a lawsuit against the group, claiming his signature had been falsified in company documents [1].

Private business interests of senior military officials have been subject to public scrutiny mainly by Angolan investigative journalists, though until recently without a response from the judiciary. Parliamentary scrutiny has been weak, due to its limited powers and its domination by the ruling party (1), (2), (3), (4), (5).

Defence institutions are by law prohibited from having a controlling or financial interest in business associated with natural resource exploitation. According to Article 33 of the Law N° 038 (2016) does not allow personnel to have interests in a private enterprise, nor hold a position or a private lucrative activity whatsoever for themselves or through people with other denomination. Also, Article 40 and 156 of the Law N° 081 (2015) prohibits holding any commercial interest in private companies.

There is no evidence connecting the country’s defence institutions to financial interests in businesses related to the country’s natural resources exploitation. However, given the high level of corruption in the country and the long-serving past regime, chances are great that some defence institution had some degree of control and financial interests in business associated with the exploitation of the natural resources of the country. Burkina Faso is known for being the fourth gold exporter country, after Ghana, South Africa and Mali (1), with about “US$2.5 billion worth of goods around the globe in 2016” (2). In the absence of evidence, this widespread gold exploitation could have driven defence institutions’ controlling and financial interest in business associated with the exploitation of natural resources. In addition to gold, the other natural resources of the country constitute zinc in exploitation at Perkoa, and manganese at Tambao. To mitigate the risk of widespread corruption the country acquire status with the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) since 2018. ITIE is known as an internal standard of good governance in extractive industries; it monitors the revenues that the government collects with each of existing gold companies across the territory (3).

The law prohibits any involvement of individual defence personnel in business relating to the country’s natural resource exploitation (1), (2). Complying with the military code of conduct and discipline is required in the defence institutions; any violation causes serious sanctions (3). Controlling or having financial interests in businesses associated with natural resource exploitation, is incompatible with the military, which is, by nature impartial, seeking common interests instead. As such, there is no evidence of involvement of defence personnel in businesses related to the country’s natural resource exploitation, and it would be considered illegal according to the law.

If there are some isolated cases of interests of the defence personnel in the country’s natural resource exploitation, these interests are not publicly declared, as they generate from illicit activities. The law on the status of the defence personnel prevents personnel from engaging in any commercial activity. Any personnel found guilty are immediately prosecuted and sent to prison and/or subject to payment of a considerable fine. When prosecution results in a penal sanction, it could result in a dismissal from the armed forces, if the sentence is more than 45 days (1). According to Burkina Faso’s penal code, funds resulting from illicit activities are not transparent and are more likely to nurture money laundry. Since defence personnel’s interests in natural resources exploitation do not comply with the law, the funds generated from having an interest in natural resource exploitation consequently become non-transparent (2), (3), (4).

There evidence found for scrutinizing the MoD or its personnel for involvement in the natural resource business. The Constitution grants power and legitimacy to the Court of Accounts and the Higher State Supervisory Authority/Fight Again Corruption (ASCE-LC) to scrutinize the national budget allocated to government institutions for their activities (1), (2). Therefore, interests resulting from businesses related to natural resource exploitation do not fall under any work of scrutiny. Further, as law enforcement institutions, the Court of Accounts and the ASCE-LC, would more likely apply sanctions for having such interests gained out of any legitimacy rather than seeking to scrutinize them (1),(3), (4), (5).

There is no evidence of any law that prohibits defence institutions from getting involved in any business transaction.

According to the Japan Times, “The local press says the Cameroonian elite — including generals, colonels, lawmakers, ministers and a nephew of President Paul Biya — hold mining permits, but it is impossible to confirm the information … ‘The army protects the Chinese at all their mining sites to the detriment of nearby communities and it participates in intimidating them and racketeering,’ said one activist, who asked not to be named” [1].

The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative states that “Cameroon published its beneficial ownership roadmap on 22 November 2016. Of the 17 companies in its 2015 EITI Report, six were either state-owned or publicly listed. Of the remaining eleven companies, five disclosed comprehensive information on their beneficial owners” [2] [3] [4].

According to the Japan Times, “The local press says the Cameroonian elite — including generals, colonels, lawmakers, ministers and a nephew of President Paul Biya — hold mining permits, but it is impossible to confirm the information … ‘The army protects the Chinese at all their mining sites to the detriment of nearby communities and it participates in intimidating them and racketeering,’ said one activist, who asked not to be named” [1].

According to the Japan Times, “The local press says the Cameroonian elite — including generals, colonels, lawmakers, ministers and a nephew of President Paul Biya — hold mining permits, but it is impossible to confirm the information” [1], meaning mining ownership is not transparent.

There are no mechanisms put in place to scrutinise such interests [1] [2].

There is no evidence of any legal prohibition against defence institutions (MoD structures) or individuals having financial interests in natural resources or extractive industries.

Illicit trafficking in natural resources and commodities (minerals, coffee/cocoa, timber, cotton, cashews and petroleum) is being carried out by former rebel leaders of the Forces Nouvelles (FN) and is completely non-transparent. However, this does not mean that defence institutions themselves have controlling or financial interests in such trafficking flows. It is individual members of the armed forces, including some residing in Abidjan, who have such controlling stakes.

According to a September 2017 report by the French-based OFPRA (Office français de protection des réfugiés et apatrides), UN experts calculated that up to 10% of the cocoa production around the towns of Man, Séguél and Vavoua were exported through Togo and sold to multinationals via the Port of Lomé. This production was controlled by local warlords. After the post-electoral crisis of 2010-2011, the COMZONES switched from trafficking in cocoa to trafficking in gold and diamonds (1). Citing a later UN expert study on natural resources trafficking in Côte d’Ivoire, the OFPRA report states that the chain of command in the illicit trade of gold, diamonds and cocoa (and of their involvement in artisanal mining) led to high-ranking members of the armed forces who were not only local warlords but also residing in the economic capital of Abidjan (1). In its April 2015 report, the UN Panel of Experts noted that trafficking in gold, diamonds and cocoa has remained active since the end of the crisis. The UN Panel has gathered information from multiple reliable sources indicating that the chain of command authorizing the artisanal and illegal mining of gold leads to important members of the security forces of Côte d’Ivoire in Abidjan. These individuals or their associates have set up a gold trade mechanism that includes the concession of land allotments for the purpose of the exploitation and sale of gold.

It is important to point out that defence institutions (MoD) are not directly involved in this kind of illicit activity. The government is attempting to put an end to this practice, in part via juicy early retirement schemes destined to high-ranking military officers foreseen by the current Loi de Programmation Militaire (LPM 2016-2020). According to the September 2017 report by the French-based OFPRA, half of the reforms that Côte d’Ivoire committed to in the process known as the Réformes du Secteur de Sécurité (RSS, DDR), which began in 2013, have not been honoured, including the reintegration of former rebels. Many of them are involved in illicit commodity trade that provides them and their troops with significant annuities. The OFPRA report names the COMZONES and the areas under their control. (1)
They include the following high-ranking officers: Morou Ouattra (known as Atchengué), Hervé Toure (known as Vetchio), Ousmane Cherif, Tuo Fozie, Messamba Kone, Zoumana Ouattara, Issiaka Ouattara (known as Wattao), Losséni Fofana, Daouda Doumbia, Ousmane Coulibaly, Gaoussou Kone, Martin Fofie and Zakaria Kone.

The natural resources controlled locally by COMZONES not only provide a supplementary income but also allow the former rebel leaders to perpetuate internal conflict, as occurred in January and May 2017 with the soldier uprisings in Bouaké and other towns. The sale of minerals (gold, diamonds) and the local management of trade in cocoa and coffee beans, as well as cotton and timber, even extends to the petroleum sector:

“Since the beginning of the political-military crisis in Côte d’Ivoire, the control of raw materials – and in particular the management of the coffee and cocoa sectors – has served to finance armed groups and militias of the rebellion as well as the central government. The same level of opacity exists for revenues from the exploitation of oil. The rebel leaders enriched themselves considerably during the ten years of crisis. They benefited from the exploitation of cocoa, coffee, wood, cotton, gold and diamonds. They also took over control of companies, collected high taxes on road networks and via utilities, and they admit to having done these things.”

A March 2016 IFRI report by Aline Leboeuf addresses the trafficking practices of Issiaka Ouattara (known as Wattao) in the region of Séguéla:

“While few COMZONES have been sanctioned by the UN Security Council, and none are currently being pursued by the International Criminal Court, the reports by the UN Panel of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire established in application of § 27 of Resolution 2153 (2014) exposed the types of informal parallel economy that some COMZONES managed to put in place in order to exploit the Ivorian resources to their ends…The last report, issued on 13 April 2015 by the Security Council, stresses that “the influence that some former zone commanders exert on the state security apparatus remains problematic”, and again highlights the involvement of Wattao in the trafficking of gold and diamonds and in the illegal taxation of the transportation network” (2).

Jeune Afrique has also carried regular news pieces about regional military warlords and the non-central government income they receive from operating an illicit parallel economy (3).

The interests of the COMZONES in the illicit trafficking of commodities and natural resources are not publicly declared and are entirely non-transparent. The government has sought to filter out the former rebel leaders via early retirement and retraining schemes. According to Jeune Afrique, the reason for tolerating the illicit trafficking by COMZONES is the threat they pose to political stability. Though they are pointed out by international media as guilty of trafficking in gold, coffee/cocoa, as well as of money laundering activities, they are perceived as judicially immune by the public and the MoD. Jeune Afrique cites the case of Martin Fofie in the northern region of Savanes (1). “Master of the capital of Savannah until January 2017, [FOFIE] has since been transferred to Daloa but continues to visit his stronghold of the North on a regular basis. This has led experts to suspect him of laundering money from the gold traffic in the region” (1).

In a separate article, Jeune Afrique cites the case of Issaka Outtara (known as Wattao and with 1,500 troops under his command), who was sent to Morocco for training at the Royal Military Academy of Meknes in 2018 to earn a certificate in security studies in a government attempt to neutralize him (2). “For the second time in less than three years, Wattao has been sent to Morocco, where, in the calm of the prestigious Royal Military Academy in Meknes, he is doing a six-month internship and from where he will return in late May with a degree in security and defense policy. Is it a punitive measure to keep him far away or a rewarding opportunity for training? A bit of both” (2).

Details that prove the opacity of the financial interests of COMZONES in natural resources in Côte d’Ivoire can be obtained from the OFPRA report (3).

The interests of former rebel leaders (COMZONES) in commodities and natural resources are not subject to any kind of public scrutiny due to political sensitivity and the power wielded by local warlords at the regional level. Though their involvement in illicit trafficking and money laundering activities has been reported by international institutions and media, intimidation and the threat of violence stand in the way of heightened public scrutiny of the COMZONES (1), (2), (3), (4).

Our sources have confirmed that the army has an extraordinary monopoly over many of the country’s economic and natural resources. From land, oil, to the sea (fishing) and the use of natural resources (investment in the natural resources) (1), (2), (3). The land is the natural resource where the army has complete control over and widely exploits to their economic and financial benefit. First, the Ministry of Defence can claim any “public” land by declaring it a military or strategic zone (4), (5). In the last few years, there have been many instances where land was granted at no cost to the Armed Forces for commercial purposes. For example, Presidential Decree no. 114 of 2018 allocated about two million square metres in the Fayoum governorate to the military’s National Service Project Organization (NSPO) to be used for animal production (7). Additionally, Prime Minister Decree no. 2428 of 2017 (8) allocated 6000 square metres in the Sohag governorate to the MOD to establish a Wataniya fuelling station. Moreover, Presidential Decree no. 424 of 2017 allocated 8000 feddans to the Armed Forces’ Land Projects Authority (AFLPA) to build modern greenhouses for agricultural purposes (6). These examples are believed to have been pervasive in the last few years despite the lack of aggregate figures on how much land has been given for MOD commercial activities. Other than land the Military also has companies working in the exploitation of bentonite, glass sand, talcum powder, marble, gypsum, sand cauline, limestone, and black sand (9).

The involvement of the armed forces in business activities related to natural resource exploitation, namely land, is pervasive but usually happens legally from laws and decrees issued by the president, prime minister and the minister of defence (1). However, these laws and decrees have mostly been established and issued by military-controlled governments and parliaments, and its “legality” could be considered a clear sign of the capture of state institutions rather than the respect of law (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7).

The armed forces as an institution is highly involved in businesses related to natural resource exploitation, there is no evidence, however that defence personnel have financial or controlling interests in their personal capacity as individuals.

According to our sources, the economic interests of the army and its personnel in the natural resources of the country are not usually declared officially (some are). None of the interests are clear. The interests of the army and its personnel are usually declared if there is public attention, but other people (relatives) are used as shadow managers/owners while the real owner is the military or the intelligence services (1), (2), (3), (4). Some of these interests are publicly declared on the websites of the relevant authorities, or through land allocation decrees like those mentioned in 18A, there is little to no information available about their operations, size and profits. The lack of information regarding the degree of involvement of the armed forces in business activity in general and natural resource exploitation, in particular, increases speculation regarding the size of such involvement.

The interests of the military in the economy and natural resources of the country are not subject to any mechanisms of scrutiny or oversight. The head of state, who is the head of the army has the authority to undermine, along with the senior members of the army, any kind of scrutiny or oversight (1), (2), (3), (4). The government, including the current president, have repeatedly asserted that all military economic activity is subject to scrutiny by the supreme audit institution the CAA. The reports and findings of the CAA are not made available to the public. However, in 2014 al-Sisi passed a law to allow himself to remove the directors of supervisory authorities including that of the CAA. Many commentators believed the law was passed specifically to “handle” the then CAA director Hisham Geneina. Geneina was removed from his post after speaking in the media about the size and scale of government corruption and began facing trial for “spreading false news” (5), (6). He also faces a military trial for “defaming the Armed Forces” after supporting the presidential candidacy of Sami Anan against al-Sisi. After Anan was arrested, Geniena threatened to expose top-secrets about the military’s involvement in causing social unrest following the 2011 revolution (7).

In sum, even if formal mechanisms and institutions exist, the type of scrutiny exercised by them is deemed ineffective given the broad mandate and powers of the president and the military courts to restrict these institutions and hunt down their officials. As for the Parliament, it is formally entrusted with “exercising oversight over the actions of the executive power” according to Article 101 of the Constitution, these formal powers are restricted by law which gives the defence sector extensive autonomy in managing its own affairs. The National Defence Council (NDC), for example, led by the president and senior military and security officials must be “consulted” on any law that is related to the Armed Forces or national security, and they are the entity mandated to discuss and develop defence policies, which could be interpreted to include the Armed Forces’ commercial activities (8).

There are no restrictions on defence institutions having control or interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation (1), (2), (3). Art. 210 (3) of the Constitution allows the armed forces to perform “other functions for the development of Ghana as the President may determine” (4).

There is no evidence that defence institutions have financial stakes in natural resource extraction. They protect mining sites within the framework of military operating procedures. These sites are considered areas of strategic national importance, and therefore often have military, as well as private, protection.

Defence institutions are involved in several other businesses through the “Industry of Defence Industries Holding Company (DIHOC) Limited,” but none of these activities are related to the country’s natural resource exploitation (1), (2).

Following research into the mainstream Ghanaian media (Modern Ghana, Myjoyonline, GhanaWeb, Ghana News Agency, Graphic Online) no evidence of individual defence personnel being involved in businesses relating to the country’s natural resource exploitation was found. To reduce risks of corruption in the natural resource exploitation industry, Ghana established the Public Interest and Accountability Committee (PIAC). The PIAC is an independent body mandated to promote transparency and accountability in the management of petroleum revenues in Ghana. The PIAC did not denounce, in its annual reports, defence personnel’s involvement in businesses relating to Ghana’s natural resource exploitation (1).

However, there are unverified suspicions that some military personnel assigned to protect mining sites are involved in natural resource exploitation for illegal or unofficial pecuniary benefits, which involves both individual commanders and to some extent the institution (2), (3), (4), (5).

There is no evidence of the involvement of the armed forces in the country’s natural resource exploitation (1), (2), (3), (4). As a result, this indicator is marked Not Applicable.

Defence institutions’ involvement in businesses is channelled through the DIHOC, which publicly declares its areas of intervention. However, detail on sources of income, operations, and expenditures are not publicly available. For instance, the DIHOC has a website (5), but it does not contain this information nor is it frequently updated.

The PSCDI has broad powers of scrutiny over the defence sector (the committee “shall examine all questions relating to defence and internal affairs”) including investigating the potential for impropriety within the defence sector (1). The EOCO, CHRAJ, BNI and other entities involved in fighting corruption in Ghana can also scrutinise cases of impropriety in the defence institutions (2), (3), (4).

There are no restrictions on defence institutions having financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resources. According to the official website of the Jordanian Armed Forces, under the Developmental Role section, the Armed Forces lists several entities and companies that provide income to the defence sector in Jordan, and those include business related to natural resources [1]. The Armed Forces have a vested business interest in King Abdullah II Design and Development Bureau (KADDB) and King Abdullah II Special Operations Training Centre (KASOTC) [2], which were built by the US on land donated by King Abdullah. Operating under the umbrella of KADDB Investment Group, KADDB owns several other companies, which are also associated with the country’s natural resources such as JLVM, JORDANAMCO, JMSS, JADARA, JORAMMO, and ARM [1, 3, 4]. Furthermore, there are no laws restricting the armed forces’ involvement in businesses associated with the country’s natural resources.

There are no legal restrictions on the Armed Forces or the Defence Sector’s involvement in businesses relating to the country’s natural resources, and the Jordanian Government, not limited to the defence sector, is involved in many businesses related to the countries natural resources [1]. The fact that such interest and involvement in businesses by the Defence Sector in Jordan is somewhat declared on the Armed Forces official webpage, demonstrates that it is not only legal but also commonly acceptable. The fact that the land was granted by King Abdullah II to build the King Abdullah II Design and Development Bureau is evidence that these activities are considered legal [2,3].

There are interest and exploitation of natural resources with huge revenues such as the dead sea chemics, however the government has taken no action [1]. There are no controls at all in relation to the defence sector’s involvement in businesses associated with Jordan’s natural resources (including personnel). Based on our sources, there are no restrictions on military personnel owning bussiness [2].

The Jordanian defence sector is transparent only in relation to declaring business and investment interests in the country’s natural resources [1], however, none of the expenditures, profit, or operations details of these ventures are declared [2,3,4].

Despite the fact that the Jordanian Armed Forces partially declares the investments and businesses it runs [1], none of these enterprises have been audited by Audit Bureau, as they do not appear on the list of audited entities [2]. Desk-based research into these enterprises in Arabic and English, particularly those listed on the Armed Forces official webpage, shows that none of them has come under public scrutiny in the past three years. There were some accusations around corruption in handling the retired military personnel fund managed by the Armed Forces, to which the Armed Forces issued a response denying such accusations [3]. Following that, there were no further investigations or interrogations, which demonstrated that entities affiliated to the Armed Forces do not receive much scrutiny.

Both the constitution and the laws of the police and Defence Ministry (1, 2 and 3) lack articles that forbid these institutions from having controlling shares in businesses associated with the country’s natural resources, but officials and activists say that these institutions are not involved in such activities (4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9). There are no media reports to suggest otherwise but, as discussed earlier, the laws of the police and the Defence Ministry allow them to do whatever they please with the funds of the institutions and the SAB and the Finance Ministry do not breakdown all their revenues and spending, so these institutions may be secretly involved in these activities. But the fact that the institutions are not involved in these activities is irrelevant as the question is about the legal framework, which is in this case quite defficient.

Article 14 of the military law (3) and 15 of the police law (2) forbids officers from getting involved in any kind of commerce or profiteering from their work in any way. The KNG’s law does not include a similar article but military law applies to them, according to article 9 of Law no. 136 of 1992 (10).

There are no cases of defence institutions being involved in businesses that exploit the country’s natural resources, but the defence minister, Sheikh Nasser Sabah al-Ahmed al-Sabah, is also the head of Kuwait’s Northern International Economic Zone’s board of trustees (1), so he is officially involved in business. But, so far, no evidence has emerged to suggest that he involved the Ministry in any business activity related to this.

There are no cases of individual defence personnel being involved in businesses that exploit the country’s natural resources, officials, analysts and journalists said. (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7). There are no media reports suggesting otherwise.

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable because there appears to be no such activities or interests to be transparent about.

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable because there appears to be no such activities or interests to be subjected to scrutiny.

No evidence was found on the restrictions on defence institutions or individuals having controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation (1).

There are no cases of defence institutions being involved in businesses relating to the country’s natural resource exploitation (1). An interviewed source disregarded, in general, the existence of businesses linked to the defence sector (2). Furthermore, LAF naval forces are being trained and strengthened to protect the countries’ maritime borders and secure oil and gas exploration (3).

No evidence was found of individual defence personnel being involved in businesses relating to the country’s natural resource exploitation (1).

No evidence was found of defense sector interest in natural resource exploitation, thus this sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicablee (1).

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable because no evidence of defence sector interest in natural resource exploitation was found. In this regard, scrutiny of interests will not apply. (1).

The assessor finds no legislation that explicitly outlaws military personnel from holding financial interests in natural resources exploitation. However, the 1961 Penal Code (amended in 2001) provides for conflict of interest and mentions all civil service employees (including military personnel) in Article 130.¹ Mali is Africa’s third largest gold producer, after South Africa and Ghana. Gold is by far Mali’s most important export, comprising nearly 70% of total exports in 2016.² Yet, there is no mention of military personnel being prohibited from participating in the sector in the Mining Code.³ As a member of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, the Malian authorities are working towards the full disclosure (scheduled for 2020) of the beneficial owners of companies active in the country’s extractives industries.⁵

There is evidence that the armed forces generate revenues from commercial activities, but these do not include the exploitation of natural resources.¹ The armed and security forces have a statutory duty to participate in public works as part of their contribution to the economic and social development of the country. The armed forces undertake their developmental mission through activities requested by the government, public administrations or territorial collectives. These activities take place mainly in sectors that are not considered to be cost-effective for profit-driven private companies; nonetheless, they serve as revenue-generating ventures for the military.
Furthermore, there is no mention of military involvement in the extractives sector in EITI’s latest annual report in December 2017.²
Nevertheless, there is clear evidence that, in 2012, French aviation giant Airbus purchased shares in the Kodieran gold mine. The company bought the stake by moving EUR15 million from an internal fund through a series of entities in the British Virgin Islands, Luxembourg, Switzerland and Germany. The company later sold the shares at a substantial loss in 2014, two years before the company delivered two helicopters to the Malian army.³
While there is no evidence suggesting that military officials have controlling or financial interests in firms operating in the extractives sector, there are no identifiable laws governing such interests.
Although there is no evidence of cases of defence institutions being involved in businesses relating to the country’s natural resource exploitation, there is no unit within the national police force to deal with corruption within the armed forces, including natural resource exploitation-related issues. This may explain the lack of investigations and therefore, lack of evidence.

The assessor finds no legislation that explicitly outlaws military personnel from holding financial interests in natural resources exploitation. There is no mention of military personnel being prohibited from participating in the sector in the mining code or in the general statutes of the police and army.³ ⁴
Although there is no evidence of cases of personnel in defence institutions being involved in businesses relating to the country’s natural resource exploitation, there is no unit within the national police force to deal with corruption within the armed forces, including natural resource exploitation-related issues. This may explain the lack of investigations and therefore, lack of evidence.

The absence of any legal framework relating to the potential financial involvement of defence institutions or security personnel in the extractives sector renders any such interests wholly non-transparent.

The absence of any legal framework relating to the potential financial involvement of defence institutions or security personnel in the extractives sector means that any such interests are not subject to any scrutiny.

There are no legal restrictions on defence institutions or individuals having controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation (1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)

In particular, Articles from 248 to 256 Section IV of the Moroccan Penal Code entitled Corruption and Influence Meddling (De la corruption et du traffic d’influence) that refer to acts of corruption and influence meddling committed by public agents do not refer in particular to military personnel and/or controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation.

The Moroccan armed forces have been stationed in Western Sahara since the beginning of the war in 1974 (1)This region is rich in phosphates (particularly around in the Boucraâ-Laâyoune area), which represents – along with other minerals – 25% of Morocco’s exports (2).

The extraction, management and export of phosphates is supervised solely by the Cherriff’s Office of Phosphates – OCP (Office Chérifien des Phosphates) (3).The OCP is a public limited company, with 95% owned by the Moroccan state. Its board is composed of the Interior Minister, the Foreign Affairs Minister, the Economy and Finance Minister, the Industry and Trade Minister, the Energy and Environment Minister, the Governance Minister and the Agriculture Minister (4). Both interviewees claimed that some cases of some military men’s illicit involvement in businesses relating to the country’s natural resource exploitation had been reported to them, but were not able or willing to provide detailed information about it (5)(6). No other specific natural resources were found in relation to the armed forces.

Due to the absence of the Ministry of Defence among the members of the OCP board and the tight control of the state over phosphates resources, it is unlikely that the involvement of defence institutions is widespread. If there is any involvement, it occurs with the explicit or implicit authorization of civil high-ranking individuals within the government or the palace.

This indicator has not been assigned a score due to insufficient information or evidence.

These interests are not mentioned in the 2018 Budget law (1)(2). These interests are not taken into account by auditing and accounting public bodies such as the National Audit Office and the Royal Treasury. There interests were not reported as being publically declareed by the national and international press, nor by CSOs. (3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8)(9)(10)(11)(12)(13).

Therefore it appears that these interests are not publicly declared and are wholly opaque.

These interests are not subject to scrutiny by auditing and accounting public bodies such as the National Audit Office and the Royal Treasury (1)(2). These interests are not subject to scrutiny by the legislature (3). These interests are not subject to scrutiny by civil society (4)(5)(6).

Based on these elements it appears that these interests are subject to no form of scrutiny.

Niger is currently the world’s fourth-largest uranium-producing country (1), with gold and oil being other important exports (2). No instrument directly prevents defence institutions from also controlling interests in the country’s natural resources. The Niger Miner Code does not provide for any explicit provisions regarding the matter (3). At the same time, the 2010 Constitution asks for full transparency with contracts for the exploration and extraction of natural resources (Article 150). It also provides for the sharing of revenues from mineral resources between the central government and local authorities (Article 152).
However, despite these provisions, the activity of defence institutions related to natural resource exploitation is not regulated. Art. 150 of the Constitution states that all revenues from the exploitation of natural resources should be transferred to the State and that companies must fully disclose such revenues. But, it does not explicitly exclude defence institutions from having controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with natural resources.
One peer reviewer provides a different interpretation of Articles 150 and 152 of the Constitution, by stating that “de jure it prevents defence institutions from controlling businesses involved in extractive industries (petroleum, uranium, gold and other minerals)”. However, such interpretation seems problematic: Art. 150 is mainly about the transparency of contracts and their publication in the Official Journal; whereas, Art. 152 addresses equal division of resources between the central government and local authorities. As mentioned above, nothing is explicitly stated about defence institutions in these articles.

The assessor found no cases of defence institutions involved with companies working in natural resource exploitation (1, 2). It should be noted that an absence of evidence does not imply the absence of activity. Additional investigative work beyond the scope of this research project would be required to establish that there is no illicit activity.

Based on interviews and media analysis, the assessor found no cases of individual defence personnel being involved in businesses relating to the country’s natural resource exploitation. However, according to the Small Arms Survey report, some military and security personnel may be occasionally involved in the gold-mining industry in the north of Niger, in two principal goldfields, Djado (closed since 2017) (1), and Tchibarakaten (2). According to the study, some soldiers hire locals to search for gold or to impose “taxes” on minors through ransoming back seized equipment (2); others ensure the safe passage of convoys between Agadez and army bases in the region in Dirkou and Tchibarakaten (for example, protecting water trucks) (2). However, these cases were not confirmed by the original research and require further investigation.

Since there is no legal framework for defence and security institutions regarding declaration of interests in extractive industries, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

Since there is no legal framework for defence and security institutions regarding declaration of interests in extractive industries, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

Although defence institutions are not expressly excluded from having an interest in natural resources exploitation, the legal rules surrounding the ownership and control of the exploitation process makes it impossible for the defence institutions to be legally and directly involved in the exploitation process (1). However, in the Niger Delta region, military officials have been identified partaking in illegal oil ‘bunkering’ and aiding in the theft and sale of oil. There are strategic exit points from the oil region, and these have significant numbers of security checkpoints. It is alleged that the military uses these checkpoints to extract revenue from the illegal sale of oil because the oil “bunkerers” cannot facilitate the theft, and export of oil resources without the connivance of military officials given their strategic control of the region (2).

Corruption is systemic and nationwide (1). However, there is no evidence that the army, navy, air force have institutional interests in natural resource exploitation; though individual military personnel may have. Legislators often manipulate the appropriation process at the National Assembly to serve private business interests rather than benefit the armed forces as an institution (2).

Corruption is systemic and nationwide (1). However, there is no evidence that the army, navy, air force have institutional interests in natural resource exploitation; though individual military personnel may have. For example The legal and regulatory framework does not make it possible for military officials or institutions to have a direct interest in the extractive sector (1). However, hidden ownership do exist. For example, the Eagle online states “former presidents, top military officers, politicians and businessmen of northern origin own not less than 83 per cent of Nigeria’s oil blocks” says “the Chairman, Senate Committee on Rules and Business, Senator Ita Enang, disclosed this on Wednesday during the debate by the Senate on the controversial Petroleum Industry Bill” (2), (3). Many of the arrangements are also informal as military personnel provide security cover for oil bunkering activities (4).

The legal and regulatory framework does not make it possible for military officials or institutions to have a direct interest in the extractive sector [1]. However, hidden ownership do exist. For example The eagle online states “Former presidents, top military officers, politicians and businessmen of northern origin own not less than 83 per cent of Nigeria’s oil blocks” says “The Chairman, Senate Committee on Rules and Business, Senator Ita Enang, disclosed this on Wednesday during the debate by the Senate on the controversial Petroleum Industry Bill” [2,3]. Many of the arrangements are also informal as military personel provide security cover for oil bunkering activities [4].

As this is illegal activity, there is no form of scrutiny which takes place. The operations are shrouded in secrecy (1), (2).

Anti-corruption legislation lays out the consequences of bribery of government officials with up to ten years imprisonment (1). However according to GAN, a business anti-corruption portal: “Exemptions from public tenders are provided for all of Oman’s defence procurement, and military procurement contracts with suppliers do not include anti-corruption requirements” (2). There appears an exemption of restrictions for the defence sector. Over the last five years, there have been several high profile cases against corruption in the petroleum sector, the latest in 2016 involving former officials at the top of Al Maha Petroleum Company (3). 2014 saw two high profile ministers charged with corruption relating to natural resources due to efforts by the State Audit Institute (3). Inferences are made on Oman News to widespread corruption in this sector, “corruption in energy sector hard nut to crack: Oman Minister of Oil and Gas” (4). No minister or official prosecuted has any stated links to the defence or security sector, which is expected because the State Audit Institute does not appear to have the right to scrutinise the Ministry of Defence (5). Therefore, although anti-corruption legislation exists to restrict officials financial interests in natural resources, there exists no clear legislation restricting defence institutions or individuals controlling or financing interests in businesses associated with natural resources exploitation.

No information is available setting out the links between the ministry of defence and natural resource extraction on the Ministry of Defence website (1). The sole example of defence investment in the natural resources sector comes from the MoD, the Ministry of Defence Pension Funds have a 4.3% share in the Oman Oil Marketing Company (2). The Oman News Agency website underlines, “the challenges facing investments of the MoD Pension Fund from oil price decline and how to benefit from the economic policies of the banks” (3), highlighting links between the MoD Pension Fund and oil shares. Apart from the two examples highlighted, there is a lack of transparency by the state about potential links between the two sectors as reported by Reuters, “the government does not disclose how much each fund is worth but each has extensive investments across the local stock market and in local real estate projects” (4). Reuters also reports that Omani ministries refused to comment on pension funds investments and shares (4). Though there is a real lack of transparency in defence investments and shares in this industry no legislation exists to curtail investments; one can assume it is “legal” (5), (6).

There are very few cases where individual defense personnel with very high-rank positions are involved in businesses relating to the country’s natural resource exploitation. These are common in areas of border areas / harbours or even regional network of natural resources, such as oil.

As discussed in sub-indicator 18B, the MoD routinely refuses to comment on shares and investments in the petroleum sector (1). Although the Oman News Agency referred to MoD’s reliance on oil prices (2), no direct link is made to MoD’s investment in oil companies. No mention is made on the Ministry of Defence website concerning defence investment in oil or natural resources (3). The Oman Oil Marketing company, which the MoD Pension Funds has shares in, mentions a Royal Air Force of Oman tender that was won in 2004, otherwise, no mention is made about the MoD or MoD pension funds on the website (4). On the Petroleum Development Oman website, recent trips to new development energy sites by MoD officials alongside members of the al-Shura, and MoD officials participation in workshops by the institute, demonstrating co-operation between the MoD and Petroleum Development Oman institutions (5), (6), (7). However, no explicit information detailing of Ministry of Defence interests in natural resources exploitation is publicly available.

As laid out in sub-indicators 13, 16 and 17, there is no internal or external auditing around defence expenditure or investment. The State Audit Institute lacks the mandate to oversee the Ministry of Defence (1). The al-Shura Council, the legislative body of government, also lacks the power to scrutinise defence and security issues (2). As stated in sub-indicators 4 and 15C public scrutiny is severely restrained, translating into a lack of accountability from the state. In the Oman Daily Observer, an article announces an internal review by the MoD pension fund, including the minister, in which an external audit was approved and financial statements reviewed (3). However, no details concerning the shares and investment in the petroleum industry, the date of the external audit, or the contents of the financial statements were released to the public. Though it is promising to see some form of an internal review, thorough scrutiny is lacking particularly concerning defence institutions’ investments in businesses associated with the country’s natural resources.

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable because the West Bank’s natural resources are under Israeli occupation, which prohibits PA personnel of agency involvement. Access to water also requires military permission from Israel (1), (2).

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable because the West Bank’s natural resources are under Israeli occupation, which prohibits PA personnel of agency involvement.

Neither the security agencies nor national forces are engaged in any financial interests related to natural resources (1). The natural resources of Palestine are under Israeli control (2).

As there is no business linked to the defence sector, there is no involvement of individuals from the national forces in businesses related to natural resources (1).

As there is no business linked to the defence sector, there is no related information available about natural resources and private bussinesses owned by the government or the PA (1).Thus, this sub-indicator is not applicable.

As there is no business linked to natural resources in Palestine, there are no enterprises owned or linked to the government (1). Thus, this sub-indicator is not applicable.

The Qatari Constitution does not prevent members from the armed forces or the institutions of the armed forces to invest or have interests in the country’s natural resources [1]. As the Head of State and the Chief commander is the Emir himself, he has a monopoly on power. He, therefore, issues decrees that legally authorise military investment in any sector. [2,3,4]

The involvement of defence institutions in business concerning Qatar’s natural resource exploitation is minimal and regulated. According to our sources, there are instances where the armed forces and military institutions have invested and controlled some of the natural resources of the country, however, these activities are not illegal. They are regulated by Emiri decree and approved by the appropriate institutions [1,2,3].

There are few cases where individuals from the defence sector are involved in business related to the country’s natural resources, but these businesses are regulated and legal. If the individual follows the laws and regulations, they are permitted to have their own business. In many cases, such businesses are registered under the names of family members, but the real owners are military personnel. In general, there is control over such instances. [1,2,3].

There is a total lack of transparency. The interests of military personnel are not publicly declared, and information about such interests is not openly published. The Ministry of Defence and the armed forces have investments in businesses, but those are not declared by the government [1,2].

Defence institutions and personnel interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resources are not subject to any form of scrutiny. This is because matters concerning security and defence are above the authority of independent scrutiny bodies such as the State’s Audit Bureau, and the ACTA [1,2,3].

According to our sources, there is no restriction or any legal framework that prohibits the military or the army from holding control over financial interest in businesses associated with the natural resources of the country (1), (2), (3). Another source, confirms that many of the royal family’s members who work in the army have financial assets and interest in many businesses within the sector of natural resources (4).

According to our sources, there are many individuals (i.e. royal family) who hold financial interests in the natural resources of the country (1),(2). However, these activities are considered legal as there is no legal framework that restricts such activities (1). According to a gulf-affairs expert, two parts of the government (defence institutions and natural resource exploitation businesses) have traditionally been kept separate (3).

According to our resources, senior commanders who are members of the royal family have a high level of involvement in businesses relating to the country’s natural resource. In other words, exploitation is common in areas with major revenue streams such as oil and gas (1), (2).

Interests of individual defence personnel or institutions in businesses associated with natural resource exploitation are not publicly stated. Royal family members and government officials are not required to publicly disclose their assets, although these have become subject to more scrutiny than under previous administrations from Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who has sought to curtail the personal expenditure of royal family members in a bid to centralize power and authority and shore up state resources (1). According to a Gulf affairs expert, “should these interests exist, they would certainly not be transparent or subject to any form of official scrutiny” (2). According to other sources, such interests are not publicly available as the amounts of revenue s are huge and do not go to the general budget, rather to royal family members (3), (4).

The financial interests of defence establishment individuals in enterprises relating to natural resource exploitation are not subject to any form of scrutiny in Saudi Arabia (1). There is a higher level of central government control and scrutiny of the finances of Saudi royal family members and senior officials in general. However, there is no indication that this scrutiny is focused on defence officials’ interests in such enterprises. According to a Gulf affairs expert, “should these interests exist, they would certainly not be transparent or subject to any form of official scrutiny” (2).

Defence institutions are, by constitutional means, prohibited from having controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation (1,2). Armed forces must remain apart from the exploitation of natural resources. Article 18 of the Constitution specifies that the army undertakes the duty of defending the nation, its independence, and its territorial integrity. It must remain entirely impartial. Article 13 stipulates the ownership of natural resources: ‘Natural resources belong to the people of Tunisia. The state exercises sovereignty over them in the name of the people. Investment contracts related to these resources shall be presented to the competent committee in the Assembly of the Representatives of the People. The agreements concluded shall be submitted to the Assembly for approval.’ (3).

According to our sources, there has been no case where the MoD or the armed forces have had any business or commercial interest in any of the country’s natural resources (1,2). Exploitation in natural resources is totally prohibited and illegal. (2) There is no other publicly available evidence that defence institutions or individual personnel within these institutions, have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation (3).

According to our sources, there could be rare cases of high profile officers who may own businesses and have financial interests, but these are illicit activities and usually are registered under another person’s name (e.g a relative)(1,2). There is no publicly available evidence that defence institutions or individual personnel within these institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation (1).

This indicator is marked Not Applicable as there are no financial interests and commercial enterprises managed and owned by the MoD or the armed forces ( except sports clubs, which are semi-independent) there is no data available for the public (1,2).

This indicator is marked Not Applicable as there are no declared financial interests of the MoD, and so there is no public scrutiny of it (1,2).

Research reveals that there are no restrictions on defence institutions or individuals having controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation, including oil and gas. There are legal provisions within the constitution that restrict institutions and individuals’ investments in the country’s natural resources; however, these do not apply to the defence sector and the federal armed forces. Article 120 of the Constitution states, “the UAE has exclusive legislative and executive jurisdiction in the following matters: Defence and the federal armed forces” (1). This means that the Constitution and other regulations and laws do not apply to defence and military institutions, but do apply to individuals within the sector. For example, Federal Law No. 6 of 2004 (the Federal Armed Forces Law) involves the service of officers in the armed forces. The law contains certain express provisions relating to the conduct of armed forces personnel with regards to conflicts of interest and gifts. Article 47 of the Federal Armed Forces Law prohibits officers from undertaking work for third parties under any circumstances without the permission of the Chief of Staff. Article 48 of the Federal Armed Forces Law prohibits officers from having any interests, whether personal or through an intermediary, in any works or contracts related to the armed forces, except for the leasing of property owned by him or her (4).

There is no legislation or any regulations that prohibit defence institutions from involvement in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation (1). There is also no indication that defence involvement in businesses is illegal.

Desk-based research shows that the Emirates Defence Industries Company (EDIC) is an umbrella company for many other companies (2), such as Mubadala Development, which focuses on natural resources including petroleum. The Chairman of Mubadala is H.H. Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed bin Sultan Al-Nahyan, who is the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, and the Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE’s Armed Forces (3).

Individual personnel, rather than institutions, need approval from the commander in chief to set up any kind of business in the country’s natural resources. The involvement of senior commanders is legal and widespread at different levels (of bussinesses) (1), (2).

The interests are not declared publicly. There are no details of sources of income, operations, expenditures, or full disclosure of activities (1), (2).

The military and defence sector do not publicly declare their financial interest in businesses associated with the country’s natural resources. The FNC (1), the consultative semi-legislative body in the UAE, has no power to scrutinise the financial interests of defence and military institutions in the country’s natural resource businesses. Additionally, there is no evidence of any media reporting or public debate scrutinising these interests or investments. Despite the availability of the audit report for the country’s major state-owned enterprise, which is also involved in the country’s natural resource exploitation, no evidence is available at all concerning the public or the media shedding a negative light on such interests (2).

Country Sort by Country 18a. Legal framework Sort By Subindicator 18b. Defence institutions: Financial or controlling interests in practice Sort By Subindicator 18c. Individual defence personnel: Financial or controlling interests in practice Sort By Subindicator 18d. Transparency Sort By Subindicator 18e. Scrutiny Sort By Subindicator
Algeria 50 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Angola 25 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 25 / 100
Burkina Faso 100 / 100 75 / 100 100 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Cameroon 0 / 100 50 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Cote d'Ivoire 0 / 100 100 / 100 50 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Egypt 0 / 100 25 / 100 100 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100
Ghana 0 / 100 100 / 100 75 / 100 NA 50 / 100
Jordan 0 / 100 25 / 100 25 / 100 50 / 100 0 / 100
Kuwait 0 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100 NA NA
Lebanon 0 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100 NA NA
Mali 0 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Morocco 0 / 100 50 / 100 NEI 0 / 100 0 / 100
Niger 0 / 100 100 / 100 75 / 100 NA NA
Nigeria 50 / 100 100 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Oman 0 / 100 25 / 100 100 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Palestine NA 100 / 100 100 / 100 NA NA
Qatar 0 / 100 75 / 100 100 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Saudi Arabia 0 / 100 25 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Tunisia 100 / 100 100 / 100 75 / 100 NA NA
United Arab Emirates 0 / 100 25 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100

With thanks for support from the UK Department for International Development and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs who have contributed to the Government Defence Integrity Index.

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