Q23.

Does the government have a well-scrutinised process for arms export decisions that aligns with Articles 7.1.iv, 11.5, and 15.6 of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)?

23a. Signatory and Ratification

Score

SCORE: 0/100

Assessor Explanation

Assessor Sources

23b. Compliance

Score

SCORE: NA/100

Assessor Explanation

Assessor Sources

23c. Parliamentary scrutiny

Score

SCORE: NA/100

Assessor Explanation

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Relevant comparisons

Algeria has not signed the ATT (1). According to the SIRPI Arms Transfers database, Algeria has not significantly exported arms (2).

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable because Algeria has not signed the ATT (1). According to the SIRPI Arms Transfers database, Algeria has not significantly exported arms (2).

This sub-indicator has been scored ‘Not Applicable’ as SIPRI has not recorded any arms exports from Algeria since 2015.

Angola signed the ATT on September 24th, 2013, it is not yet ratified (1). Angola is mainly an arms importer.

Because Angola has not yet ratified the ATT, this indicator is marked as Not Applicable.

Although there are no upcoming arms exports, they may be subject to parliamentary debate; however, Parliament has a limited ability to influence decision-making in general, including in the defence sector (1).

Burkina Faso has signed up and ratified the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) on June 3, 2013, and June 4, 2014, respectively (1), (2).

This indicator has not been assigned a score due to insufficient information or evidence.

This provision does not apply to Burkina Faso, as it is not an exporter of arms (1), (2), (3), (4).

Cameroon signed the Arms Trade Treaty in December 2014 and ratified it in June 2018 [1] [2].

This indicator has not been assigned a score due to insufficient information or evidence.

Data from the Stockholm International Research Institute between 2017-2018 suggest that Cameroon is not an arms exporter [1] [2]. It imports arms, from several helicopters received from China and Russia, to armoured vehicles from China, South Africa, Ukraine and the Czech Republic [3]. Parliament has no powers when it comes to the export of weapons.

Côte d’Ivoire signed the ATT on June 3, 2013. It ratified it on February 25, 2015. The date of effect of ATT ratification is officially listed as May 27, 2015 (1), (2).

Compliance and implementation of the ATT in Côte d’Ivoire are being tracked by the NA Commission on small arms (Commission Nationale des Armes Légères et de Petit Calibre, ComNat-ALPC) together with the Conseil National de Sécurité (CNS). Compliance involves harmonizing laws with ATT provisions and revising the tools and procedures for the transfer of arms and ammunition.

As of 2017, the government had obtained financing from the ATT Secretariat to bolster the capacity building of lawmakers, including those in the NA Commission de Sécurité et de Défense (CSD). Implementation of ATT provisions is complex because it involves legislative and procedural harmonization on the circulation of arms and ammunition. Côte d’Ivoire is still working on the harmonization of its legal framework (1), (2).

Though it is not an arms exporter, the circulation of small arms is widespread in Côte d’Ivoire as a result of the last period of civil conflict (post-electoral crisis of 2010-2011). This poses a challenge for ATT compliance. A UN Security Council arms embargo was in effect from November 2004 through April 2016. However, there is ample evidence that the UN embargo was violated repeatedly during this period, according to the ATT Monitor. The ATT Monitor reported cases of non-compliance, in some cases with government complicity. It alerted to arms smuggling along the border with Mali and Liberia. Additionally, the UN Group of Experts revealed that under the former regime of Burkinabe President Blaise Compaoré, arms stocks were diverted to Côte d’Ivoire from Burkina Faso, thus violating the terms of the UN embargo. For example, in August 2012 Brazil authorized the export of munition for arms that were not in stock in Burkina Faso. The munition was later found among the soldiers of the Forces Nouvelles (FN). Similar cases were reported from arms exporters based in Bulgaria and Albania (3). “For example, in August 2012, Brazil authorized exports of ammunition for weapons of a type that Burkina Faso did not have in its stockpiles, and which were later found in the hands of the Forces Nouvelles (FN) combatants” (3).

Côte d’Ivoire is not an arms exporter. Therefore, the NA does not hold debates about upcoming arms exports, and this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

Still, members of the NA Commission de Sécurité et de Défense (CSD) and high-ranking members of the armed forces are regularly trained in issues related to ATT compliance. The NA Commission on small arms (Commission Nationale des Armes Légères et de Petit Calibre, ComNat-ALPC) together with the Conseil National de Sécurité (CNS) organize regular workshops and training sessions to strengthen the capacity of members of the NA Commission de Sécurité et de Défense (CSD) on issues of compliance with the ATT. For example, on July 9, 2018, Abidjan.net reported on a workshop in Abidjan for CSD members (1). Another workshop for CSD members took place in Abidjan on October 4, 2017, to validate the results of an evaluation of tools and procedures for the control of arms and ammunition (2). A regional conference seeking to create synergies with ATT and similar treaties was held in Abidjan on 29-30 September 2015 (3).

Egypt has neither ratified nor signed the ATT (1).

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable because Egypt has neither ratified nor signed the ATT (1).

According to our sources, Egypt has no mechanism of scrutiny over arms exports. The Egyptian military industry is immune from scrutiny. The Arab Organization for Industrialization, which is based in Egypt and exports arms to the region has not been under any scrutiny or oversight at all (1), (2). There is no evidence in Egypt of clear and consistent parliamentary scrutiny of arms exports, and arms trade, in general, is immune to external scrutiny and is the “exclusive mandate” of the NDC (3), and given the broad exemptions from external oversight granted by Law 204 (1957), which states that “The financial rules and instructions stated in laws and regulations do not apply to the Ministry of Defence when making and executing the above-mentioned contracts (arms-related)” (4).

Ghana signed the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) on September 2013 and ratified it on December 2015. The treaty entered into force 90 days later. The Ghana National Commission on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) is the coordinating agency for the implementation of the ATT. The Commission operates under the authority of the Interior Ministry (1).

The initial report of the measures undertaken to implement the Treaty, which should be submitted to the Secretariat within the first year, has not been provided (2). As a consequence, it is impossible to very if Ghana failed or not to comply with Articles 7.1.iv, 11.5, and 15.6 of the ATT.

Ghana also participates in the EU Arms Trade Treaty Outreach Project (ATT-OP), which is currently in its second phase (ATT-OP II). The First Roadmap Activity for Ghana under the ATT-OP II was held in Ho, Ghana on December 13-14, 2017. During the event experts and national stakeholders discussed the outcomes of the third Conference of State- Parties (CSP3) of the ATT, the establishment of a national firearms register and the detection of illegal arms trafficking within the country (3). The Second Roadmap Activity for Ghana will be held on the 10-11 of July in Accra, Ghana.

Ghana has a project approved within ATT VTF Funding for the adoption of the national control list and capacity building of the implementing agency (4). The programme is implemented in partnership with UNDP.

This indicator has not been assigned a score due to insufficient information or evidence. It’s not been possible to find the initial report of measures Ghana has undertaken to implement the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). (A State Party’s initial report should be submitted to the ATT Secretariat within the first year after entry into force of the Treaty). As a result, it is impossible to verify Ghana’s compliance with the three ATT articles: 7.1.iv, 11.5, and 15.6.

Ghana does not manufacture arms in its territory. As a result, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

However, illicit circulation and production of SALWs are widespread and trending upwardly, according to a survey in 2015 by the Small Arms Commission of Ghana, there has been an increase in the circulation of unregistered arms in the country of 850 per cent from 2004 (1).

The Ammunition Act, 1962 (Act 118), which was amended by the Arms and Ammunition Act, 1972, (NRCD 9) regulates the import and export of arms (2), (3). However, both these acts are outdated.

Iraq has not yet signed or ratified the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), despite recent calls by Amnesty International (1), urging the GoI to “immediately accede to the global” ATT, after arms manufactured by America, European states, Russia and Iran, fell into the grasp of paramilitary militias for committing atrocities (2), (3). Amnesty International’s (1), (4) report further notes that poor quality regulations and lax controls enabled the ISG to acquire a “large and lethal arsenal”. No active steps have been taken to remedy irresponsible arms trade, to prevent weapons from falling into the hands of terrorists and armed groups. The only evidence available indicative of Iraq’s interest in ratifying the treaty dates back to a 2012 UN ATT Conference in which Iraq expresses support of the treaty (5). While expressing its support in acceding to the ATT its raised reservations over the rights of signatory states under the convention, iterating the right of states to voice their doubts or preferences in arms dealing. Additionally, the GoI voted in favour of adopting the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and in July 2017 (6). Iran’s militia proxy forces have acquired advanced weaponry from Tehran, and America has investigated the Iranian govt. in the past for striking up arms trade deals with Iraq, in violation of US sanctions against it (3).

Iraq is not an exporter of military equipment or arms. The equipment Iraq is currently manufacturing is undergoing tests and further development. A legal military expert interviewed for this assessment stated (1), items being manufactured amount to nothing more than light equipment, including unmanned drones and light rockets. “Iraq does not export any of these but the problem of porous borders has enabled the smuggling of weapons via Iran to Syria.” Important supply routes lack adequate oversight. One source notes that “the Iraqi Police Service (IPS) is incapable of providing any level of security in the country … overstretched, underfunded and ill-equipped” (2). Iraq’s Law of Arms stipulates that licenses are issued by an issuing authority, but parliamentary scrutiny has fallen short of investigating illicit trade of weapons (3).

Iraq is not an arms exporter.

Jordan is not signatory to ATT [1].

Jordan is not signatory to ATT [1] and for this reason this sub-indicator has been marked at Not Applicable.

As previously explained, Parliamentary oversight over the defence sector is almost non-existent, due to the lack of an effectual Ministry of Defence, [1] and because the King, constitutionally, has the final say on matters of defence [2]. There is also evidence of Jordan gradually becoming a first-hand arm exporter through King Abdullah II Design and Development Bureau [3, 4]. However, the official page of the Jordanian Parliament has no mention of any news about arm exports [5]. The Jordanian Parliament has 20 permanent specialised committees but none of them is specialised in exercising oversight over defence and security [5]. There is no evidence of any debate in the Parliament around arm exports.

Kuwait has neither signed nor ratified the Arms Trade Treaty (1).

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable because Kuwait has not signed up to the Arms Trade Treaty (1).

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable because Kuwait is not an arms exporter. It is still worth noting that Kuwait has a very small military and extremely limited national capabilities in the defence sector. Security agencies have to get pre-purchase approval from the Parliament, according to 163 of the PIL. They also have to get pre-purchase for any deal that costs $330,000 or more, according to SAB decree no. 3 of 1999 (1), so one can say with confidence that some of the deals are at least reviewed before they are made. But Parliament has limited powers because it can be dissolved by the Emir, according to 107 of the constitution (2).

This makes lawmakers less likely to cause a stir over anything for fear of losing the chamber — and with it their posts. Also, the Emir passed a law in 2016 that banned politicians who have been found guilty of insulting him, which includes virtually all of the opposition, from running for office, so the current chamber is full of his supporters and they tend to approve all of his plans, in exchange for money or favours from the executive branch, officials, activists, and media reports say (3, 4, 5, 6 and 7).

In September 2018, the Parliament approved the treaty and Lebanon officially became the 102nd member of the Arms Trade Treaty in May 2019 after submitting its ratification instruments (1),(2). The treaty will enter into force in August 2019 (3).

Lebanon officially became the 102nd member of the Arms Trade Treaty in May 2019 after submitting its ratification documents (1). The treaty will enter into force in August 2019 (2). As it’s early to assess compliance, this sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable, as Lebanon is not an exporter of conventional arms identified by Article 2.1 of the Arms Trade Treaty. However, the research found no evidence of parliamentary debates about weapons other than approving the Arms Trade Treaty (1). According to a source, Lebanon does not have the provisions to monitor weapons entering and leaving the country. Furthermore, the treaty did not pass the parliamentary committee (2).

Mali voted for the adoption of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), signed on 3 June 2013, and ratified it on 6 December 2013 (1).

It has complied with each of the three ATT articles it is required to. Mali does not manufacture or officially export arms. It is not considered an exporting State Party, therefore it is not required to comply with article 7.1.iv. of the ATT. It has thus not taken any steps to address Article 7.1.iv. Nevertheless, the proliferation of arms, particularly Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), remains a major problem across the Sahel region and in West Africa more generally.
Illicit flows of arms in and out of Mali are widespread. The government is demonstrably taking steps to stem this flow of arms across the region. First of all, the government has established a National Commission for the Fight against the Proliferation of Small Arms (CNLPAL). In 2018, the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (UNREC), via CNLPAL, organised a training workshop on standard operating procedures (SOPs) for the physical security and stockpile management of weapons and ammunition in Bamako (1). The workshop trained officials directly involved in the management of weapons and ammunition storage sites, as well as officials from security services such as the army, the gendarmerie, the police, customs and institutions in charge of the environment (2).
Mali is also cooperating with other West African countries, as stipulated in articles 11.5 and 15.6 of the ATT, to tackle the illicit flow of arms in the region. In 2015, Malian authorities, supported by the UNODC, marked more than 300 firearms belonging to state officials to reduce the risk of them being sold or trafficked illegally (3). Mali is also a leading member in the G5 Sahel Force, comprising troops from Mali, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad. The force is in the process of becoming operational and is designed to improve security and tackle arms flows along the many national borders in the region (5). Troops from Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have already begun conducting joint patrols (4). The five countries, along with Nigeria, also participated in a UN-led workshop in 2016, designed to help improve the six states’ abilities to combat the flow of arms across the region’s borders (6).

Mali does not manufacture arms for export, thus there is no precedent of parliament deliberating an upcoming sale of arms by the state. Therefore, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

As of September 2018, Morocco had not yet signed the Arms Trade Treaty (2013), or the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls and Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies (1996) (1)(2).

No evidence could be found of effective scrutiny of arms exports by governmental or non-governmental bodies. This lack of transparency may indicate a risk of corruption.

This sub-indicator is scored Not Applicable as Morocco has not signed up to the ATT. (1)

This sub-indicator is scored Not Applicable as Morocco is not an ams exporter according to SIPRI data for 2015-2018.

Niger ratified the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) on July 24, 2015 (1).

This indicator has not been assigned a score due to insufficient information or evidence.

Niger, which is not an arms exporter, has failed to comply with at least 2 ATT articles: submission of an initial assessment and an annual report for activities undertaken in 2016.  ATT states parties can demonstrate that their arms transfer decisions comply with their ATT obligations by providing an initial and an annual reports as stated in Art. 13 of the Treaty (1). States parties can decide to make their reports private or publicly available on the ATT Secretariat’s website. However, by October 2017, Niger has not submitted its first ATT annual report that was due by May 31, 2017 (2). The initial report has not been submitted (3).
Article 1 of the ATT explicitly mentions that the objective of the Treaty is to “prevent and eradicate the illicit trade in conventional arms and prevent their diversion”. Niger has also signed and ratified the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms, Light Weapons in 2006 (4, 5). Nevertheless, given the complicated geopolitical situation due to growing insecurity on its borders with Mali, Nigeria and Libya, the country is facing practical challenges in tackling illicit arms transfers. The difficulties in ensuring the systematic control in neighbouring border areas make the fight against trans-border insecurity challenging (6,7).

Niger has no domestic arms manufacturers and SIPRI has no record of arms exports from Niger (1). Therefore, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

SIPRI shows that Niger’s defence expenditure in constant USD has increased steadily:
2013: 88.6 million
2014: 122.8 million
2015: NA
2016: 166 million
2017: 198 million

Nigeria signed and ratified the treaty on August 12, 2013. However, the treaty must be confirmed in the National Assembly to become law. An attempt to pass the treaty into law failed [United Nations Convention on Arms Treaty Ratification and Enforcement Bill 2017 sponsored by Senator Lynda Chuba Ikpeazu] (1). This bill is currently at the first reading stage (2). Therefore, the treaty is not yet law in Nigeria, and its provisions cannot be implemented.

Nigeria signed and ratified the treaty on August 12, 2013. However, the treaty must be confirmed in the National Assembly to become law. An attempt to pass the treaty into law failed [United Nations Convention on Arms Treaty Ratification and Enforcement Bill 2017 sponsored by Senator Lynda Chuba Ikpeazu] (1). This bill is currently at the first reading stage (2). Therefore, the treaty is not yet law in Nigeria, and its provisions cannot be implemented. This indicator is scored Not Applicable.

Nigeria is primarily an importer and not an exporter of arms. As according to the ECOWAS Parliament-DCAF Guide for West African Parliamentarians: “The central law for the regulation of SALW in Nigeria is the Firearms Act of 1959, which makes provision for regulating the possession of and dealing in firearms and ammunition, including muzzle-loading firearms, and for matters ancillary thereto.” (1, pg118). With regards to arms exports, however, Parliament has no formal powers to scrutinise exports. Scrutiny is limited to retroactive questioning with regards to arms export licenses (1, 2).

Oman has not signed or ratified the Arms Trade Treaty according to the website of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (1). In GI 2015 Oman, a peer reviewer highlighted that two of the major exporters to Oman, the USA and UK, are signatories of the Arms Trade Treaty convention and this is important to highlight since Oman is ranked 16th in the world for importing weapons (2), (3).

Oman has not signed or ratified the Arms Trade Treaty according to the website of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (1), thus this indicator is marked Not Applicable. In GI 2015 Oman, a peer reviewer highlighted that two of the major exporters to Oman, the USA and UK, are signatories of the Arms Trade Treaty convention and this is important to highlight since Oman is ranked 16th in the world for importing weapons (2), (3).

The al-Shura Council does not discuss issues relating to defence or security (1). No information on the al-Shura website relates to either security or defence issues, including arms exports (2). No media report found discusses Oman’s arms exports (3). Although Oman is not a major arms exporter, according to the World Bank, Oman sold $7,000,000 of arms in 2017 (4). No further information is available such as what weapons were sold and to whom (most likely Yemen) (5), (6).

According to the ATT website (1), the Palestinian Authority has signed and acceeded to the ATT.

The Palestinian Authority does not produce any arms or weapons as agreed in the Oslo Accords. Thus, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

The Palestinian Authority does not produce any arms or weapons as agreed in the Oslo Accords. Thus, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

As there are no arms exports, there is no parliamentarian scrutiny. According to the ATT website, there is no information available on any scrutiny mechanisms.

Qatar has neither signed nor ratified the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) [1,2].

This indicator is marked as Not Applicable, as Qatar has neither signed nor ratified the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) [1,2].

Upcoming arms exports are not debated by the Advisory Council, which functions as a semi- parliamentary body [1,2].

The country is not a signatory to the ATT (1), Saudi Arabia is a major arms importer and does not thus far have a local arms export industry.

This sub-indicator is scored Not Applicable because the country is not a signatory to the ATT (1), Saudi Arabia is a major arms importer and does not thus far have a local arms export industry.

As there is no parliament in KSA, there are no measures or mechanisms to scrutinize any arms export or import process. As mentioned above, Saudi Arabia does not yet have a formalized arms exports industry. Furthermore, based on the modus operandi of the government in other areas of defence and security, it is unlikely that any future exports would be subject to scrutiny or oversight by independent bodies (1), (2), (3), (4).

Part of Mohammed bin Salman’s broad reform program includes localizing and expanding the domestic arms industry, with aims for half of the Saudi procurement to be done locally by 2030, up from approximately 2% today (5). According to the website of SAMI, the military industry body formed in May 2017, these goals include acting as a platform to provide “military products and services to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and its allies,” with the value of exports expected to be SAR 5 billion (approximately $1.3 billion) by 2030 (6). It is unclear whether Saudi Arabia has launched any formal processes for its intended arms export industry.

Additionally, Saudi Arabia has historically acted as a conduit for arms transfers by purchasing weapons on behalf of allied governments or groups that are unable to purchase the weapons themselves. Most recently, a report by UK-based investigative body Conflict Armament Research (CAR) documented arms provided by the US and Saudi Arabia to Syrian opposition groups active in that country’s civil war, which a substantial number of which regularly ended up in the hands of terrorist organization Islamic State. According to the report, a large number of these items were traced back to exports from Bulgaria to Saudi Arabia, which themselves were subject to non-retransfer clauses that in theory should have barred them from being supplied to parties in the Syrian war (7).

Tunisia has not signed the ATT (1).

This indicator is marked Not Applicable as Tunisia has not signed the ATT (1).

This indicator is marked Not Applicable as Tunisia does not export any arms or military equipment (as shown through SIPRI data) (1) and there are no discussions on the topic.

The UAE has signed up to the ATT, but has failed to ratify it. The country signed up to the ATT on July 9, 2013, but has not ratified it since its signature (1).

This indicator has been scored ‘Not Applicable’, as the UAE has not ratified the Arms Trade Treaty.

The FNC does not have any power to scrutinise matters related to the defence sector or the military as it is a consultative body and not a parliament (1), (2), (3). News reporting on the FNC demonstrates that most parliamentary debates focus on economic, cultural, environmental, health, communications and labour matters (4). There is no evidence at all to show that UAE arms exports are subject to any form of parliamentary scrutiny, as no defence matters are discussed within the FNC.

Country Sort by Country 23a. Signatory and Ratification Sort By Subindicator 23b. Compliance Sort By Subindicator 23c. Parliamentary scrutiny Sort By Subindicator
Algeria 0 / 100 NA NA
Angola 50 / 100 NA 25 / 100
Burkina Faso 100 / 100 NEI NA
Cameroon 100 / 100 NEI 0 / 100
Cote d'Ivoire 100 / 100 25 / 100 NA
Egypt 0 / 100 NA 0 / 100
Ghana 100 / 100 NEI NA
Iraq 0 / 100 NA 0 / 100
Jordan 0 / 100 NA 0 / 100
Kuwait 0 / 100 NA NA
Lebanon 100 / 100 NA NA
Mali 100 / 100 100 / 100 NA
Morocco 0 / 100 NA NA
Niger 100 / 100 NEI NA
Nigeria 100 / 100 NA NA
Oman 0 / 100 NA 0 / 100
Palestine 100 / 100 NA NA
Qatar 0 / 100 NA 0 / 100
Saudi Arabia 0 / 100 NA 0 / 100
Tunisia 0 / 100 NA NA
United Arab Emirates 50 / 100 NA 0 / 100

With thanks for support from the UK Department for International Development and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs who have contributed to the Government Defence Integrity Index.

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