Under the Law on Conflict of Interests, all medium and high-level employees in public administration, the directors of directories in the MoD and the commanders of the Armed Forces are obliged to declare their interests [1].
A regulation on the implementation of the Law on Prevention of Conflict of Interest, adopted by the minister of defence provides the categories of employees that are subject to the declaration of interests, is also adds the commanders of the military commands that are spending units to declare their interests [2]. A manual on the prevention of conflict of interest in public procurement sets out the responsibilities of the public institutions during the procurement processes and gives instructions on the management of conflict of interest in procurements through a scenario-based approach [3]. The Law on Classified Information also provides for the obligation of the military and civilian personnel that have access to classified information to declare a financial interest as part of the vetting process [4]. The provisions of the Law on Conflict of Interest are obligatory for SHISH employees also and the Law on the Status of SHISH Employees orders employees to abide by the ethics rules in public administration [5].

According to the Law on Civil Servants, recruitment and promotion are based on the principle of open competition. There are no specific provisions in the law for different recruitment procedures for specific job positions [1]. However, the Law on Civil Servants provides for the transfer of an employee as a means to avoid the conflict of interest. A Decision of the Council of Ministers provides for procedures for the implementation of this legal clause [2].
Recruitment of military personnel is based on the Law on Ranks and Career in the Armed Forces [3]. The standard policies and procedures on the appointments in the armed forces layout a limited duration in a job position of two to five years, but a longer duration may be possible if needs arise [4]. Although this provision is designed to serve career purposes it provides an additional safeguard for military personnel employed in corruption-prone areas as it provides for a kind of mandatory job rotation.
Since this sub-indicator focuses on whether due attention is paid to the selection, time in post, and oversight of personnel in sensitive positions such as defence procurement, contracting, financial management, and commercial management, despite their relevance, the cases mentioned by the reviewer refer to top management positions, namely the heads of military service/branches.

The General Inspection Directorate controls the implementation of laws and regulations while the Directorate of Personnel Management and Qualification in the MoD is responsible for monitoring the implementation of appointment procedures in the armed forces, and the enforcement of the legal appointment criteria [1]. The appointment of civilian personnel is overseen by the Commissioner for Civil Service Oversight [2], while the implementation of the Law on Conflict of Interest is overseen by the High Inspectorate of Declaration and Audit of Assets and Conflicts of Interest (HIDAACI) [3]. They both report to the parliament [2, 3].
However, despite the existence of the laws and regulations, there is no particular oversight focus on the mitigation of risks associated with these job positions and no particular attention to their effective implementation [4].

Neither the Anti-Corruption Law (1) nor the Statute of Military Personnel (2) recognizes that certain positions may be more open to corruption opportunities than others. No further information could be found in this regard.

This sub-indicator has been scored Not Applicable because no evidence could be found that sensitive positions have been openly declared. There is no evidence on the Military’s website (1). Also, the Statute of Military Personnel does not stipulate that recruitments have to be open (2). There is a conflict of interest policy written in the Anti-Corruption Law of 2006 (3). However, the BTI notes that the anti-corruption legislation has not been implemented (4).

This sub-indicator has been scored Not Applicable because no evidence could be found in the Anti-Corruption Law (1) or the Statute of Military Personnel (2) that sensitive positions have to be scrutinized. Additionally, no evidence could be found that the parliament (3), (4) oversees the recruitment of these positions.

There is no evidence of any recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption opportunities than others.

There is no evidence of any recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption opportunities than others. Thus, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

The president has broad constitutional powers to appoint and dismiss senior officials of the military, police and intelligence services, and is required only to consult the National Security Council. Under Dos Santos, loyalty to the ruling party and the president were essential and conflict of interest procedures absent.

There is no evidence of any special scrutiny of personnel in sensitive positions, beyond considerations of loyalty to the president and/or ruling party. hus, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

It is necessary to clarify that the defence jurisdiction is made up of both military and civilian personnel. Based on this, the selection, permanence in positions, and supervision fall into different regulations. Similarly, positions in sensitive areas (acquisitions, contracts, financial and commercial management) are not part of a process of special attention in their selection. In the case of civilian personnel, those who occupy delicate positions are assigned by the Minister of Defence and this must be published by decree (in the case of Secretaries and Undersecretaries), and by administrative decision (positions of Directorates). [1] The permanence in the positions is therefore also a decision of the specific authority. Since 2018, a presidential decree established a ban on the relatives of ministers and members of his cabinet from occupying jobs in the national public sector without having been designated by competition. [2] According to the CIPPEC report, “a reduction in the number of professionals in the management space is observed, while at the same time a smaller proportion meet the requirements to perform in the position.” At the same time it found that the “managerial space is also subject to high turnover of its directors, which hinders government effectiveness.” [3] In the case of military personnel, internal charges are in order of merit and rotating according to the law of military personnel.

The selection processes for civilian personnel (positions of secretaries and sub-secretaries) with the broadest decision power of the defence jurisdiction are chosen by the holder of the portfolio and approved by presidential decree. Although they may be trained to fill these positions, there are no specific requirements nor is there a standardised appointment process. Although there are procedures regarding conflicts of interest within the framework of the law of ethics in the exercise of public service, [1] these are not part of the selection processes, but rather occur later. In this sense, in order to advance in the matter, in 2019 a draft of a new law on public ethics that regulates nepotism, conflict of interests, and affidavits was presented. [2] In practice, there have been cases that do not follow the rules of transparency. An example of this is the complaint made by the Citizen Power and the Civil Association for Equality and Justice in the case of a permanent assignment of a set of agents of the provincial public administration, without accrediting a procedure that guarantees the principles of equality or suitability. [3] The selection processes for positions in the Armed Forces are conferred according to the order of merit and specialty, and are of a rotating nature. [4] [5]

There is internal supervision in the Ministry of Defence to control decisions regarding appointments and promotions of personnel in general, but which generally excludes senior officials (ministers and secretaries) who are part of a political decision that is authorised by the EP. However, there is no external scrutiny of sensitive high-risk charges, beyond what ex post the OA may act ex officio. High-ranking military personnel are outside the framework law regulating public employment and their supervision is by the National Congress. [1] In the case of military promotions and designations, as of Decree 721/2016, the Chiefs of the General States of the Armed Forces decide on military personnel in promotions, positions, and destinations. [2] The procedure takes place through the Qualification Boards (Superior Board, General Boards, and Advisory Boards). By that same regulation, the Minister of Defence is only in charge of the positions of superior conduct of the Armed Forces. [3] External control, in the case of Congress, only occurs at the headquarters of the Armed Forces, leaving those referred to as delicate charges in question.

There is no recognition of certain positions within the Ministry of Defence (MoD) to be more sensitive and open to corruption opportunities than others, that is explicitly disclosed to the public through the official website or other outlets.
Taking into account the fact that the term “sensitive positions” is not interpreted as such in any legal act of the Republic of Armenia, therefore that term has not been included in the legal acts regulating personnel management of the Ministry of Defense of the RA. [1].

This indicator has been scored Not Applicable. There is no recognition that certain positions within the Ministry of Defence (MoD) are deemed sensitive

This indicator has been scored Not Applicable. There is no recognition that certain positions within the Ministry of Defence (MoD) are deemed sensitive

Although all Australian Defence positions – military and civilian – require security clearances, which focus extensively on the financial background and associated risk factors of candidates [1], there is no evidence that there is any special scrutiny of higher-risk positions. Defence procurement and contracting officials are subject to special revolving door restrictions under Defence Instructions on Notification of Post-Separation Employment [2], though these have been criticised as ineffective [3] and do not cover all risky positions. These personnel are required to notify their commander or supervisor of job offers where there may be a perceived or actual conflict of interest (defined in detail in another Defence Instruction [4]) between their role with Defence and their future duties. In general, interviewees with intimate knowledge of the military were insistent that the Defence Force was characterised by a high degree of integrity and therefore discussions of corruption as such were not a priority [5, 6]. An interviewee with knowledge of Australian public service corruption risk said that the government and Defence Force were not interested in proactively addressing corruption risk, believing that “security clearances are enough” to avoid serious misconduct, such as bribery and corruption [7]. Defence documents about procurement processes (such as the Defence Procurement Policy Manual [8]) and position descriptions for Defence jobs [9] in the field of procurement, contracting, financial management, and commercial management do not contain any acknowledgement of the increased corruption risks faced in these positions, not to mention special scrutiny to counteract these risks. In fact, some of these positions carried Baseline Vetting security clearance requirements, the lowest level of security clearance. Despite this, redacted documents have shown that these corruption risk are substantiated, with an internal Defence audit investigating accusations of “systemic” fraud in Defence procurement revealing a “instances of non-compliance with procurement policy requirements, a lack of transparency in decision making and poor records management” [10].

In the case of Defence procurement and contracting, though seemingly not recruitment, there is a keen awareness of conflict of interest risks and there exist revolving door policies, though not increased vetting, to mitigate this risk. Defence procurement and contracting officials are subject to special revolving door restrictions under Defence Instructions on Notification of Post-Separation Employment [1]. These personnel are required to notify their commander or supervisor of job offers where there may be a perceived or actual conflict of interest (defined in detail in another Defence Instruction [2]) between their role with Defence and their future duties. Defence may take several steps, up to instructing the hiring company not to give the employee work that would involve (specific types of) Defence contracts, or disallowing the company to engage with Defence “from consideration for specific contracts or activities should it employ the Defence employee/member in a related area of work” [3]. There have been criticisms that Ministers involved in Defence procurement [4] and their advisors have engaged in revolving door practices that are clear conflicts of interest because they do not have to follow the same restrictions as Defence personnel, and that the revolving door restrictions in place are not always strong enough to prevent personnel from joining lobbying firms [5]. On the selection process, the Australian Public Service Act 1999 [6] and Australian Public Service Commission policy [7] require positions to be filled based on an open merit recruitment system. However, increased vetting does not appear to be required: although all Australian Defence positions require security clearances [8], several positions related to recruitment and contracting found on the Defence Jobs website [9] required only Baseline Vetting, the lowest level of security clearance [10].

Defence policy documents, like the Defence Procurement Policy Manual [1] and Military Personnel Policy Manual [2], contain no indication that there is special internal or external scrutiny of personnel in sensitive positions. An interviewee with knowledge of Australian public service corruption risk said that the government and Defence Force were unconcerned with corruption risk involving personnel, believing that “security clearances are enough” to avoid serious misconduct, such as bribery and corruption [3]. The Defence Procurement Policy Manual [1] and other Defence Instructions [4] require defence personnel that have responsibility over procurement to act ethically, following specific rules and guidelines. This presumably triggers their chain of command to monitor them more closely, though this is not made explicit.

There are no specific decisions or laws on appointments to sensitive positions in the defence sector. Any strategy has not been disclosed. No official information is provided (1).

In many cases, non-professionals are assigned to positions. Selection of personnel in sensitive positions depends on the loyalty of the person to the ruling family rather than their qualifications for and their capability, so promotion based on personal skills may only be observed in the appointment of the lower and non-sensitive ranks and positions. There is absolutely no open recruitment for sensitive positions. For instance, the appointment of Zakir Hasanov as minister of defence was completely based on his loyalty to the ruling family (1). At the same time, various groups in the government try to see their persons in sensitive positions of military structures (2).
One opinion sheds light on the mood of the personnel in the army; after the appointment of Zakir Hasanov in 2013, Major General Rovshan Akbarov said:
“The president, the supreme commander, Ilham Aliyev, has always made very good decisions. We recognize the new Minister of Defense Zakir Hasanov as a professional, honest, clean, disciplined and good officer. I think it will work fine for our state and our army. [Every] general who want to serve their homeland, the president, the supreme commander, the opportunities for them have been created. I wish good luck to the new minister. Everyone was happy and glad to see and appoint a new minister. There is a great mood, everyone is very happy. All officers will carry out their assignments with ease. Our generals are satisfied” (3).

There is a staffing department at the Defence Ministry and at other military units as well. It nominates candidates for different positions, and then these persons are appointed by the minister. All this is formal, all decisions are taken by the ministers. There is no serious strategy and oversight about personnel in the defence sector (1).

Sensitive positions are given as gifts to someone by the king or from a person being loyal to the King Hamad bin Isa bin Salman Al Khalifa. There are no clear criteria on how these positions are distributed. These positions are not considered sensitive to corruption, but rather loyalty is a consideration [1, 2]. An online search of the websites of the Ministry of Defence (MoD), the Ministry of Interior (MoI), and the king’s office’s, as well as other official websites, revealed there is no information about the selection of personnel and oversight of personnel in sensitive positions at all.

Given the lack of procedures as outlined in 37A, and the lack of recognition that there may be corruption risks associated with particular positions, this indicator has been marked ‘Not Applicable’ [1, 2].

Given the lack of procedures as outlined in 37A, and the lack of recognition that there may be corruption risks associated with particular positions, this indicator has been marked ‘Not Applicable’ [1, 2].

Bangladesh is yet to establish Rules for the Conditions of Service under the Armed Forces (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Act, 1948 [1]. When it comes to recruiting senior officials for important positions, such as roles in procurement (which is given special attention because of corruption risks), contracting and financial management, relevant educational qualifications and length of service are generally taken into consideration. However, the appointing authority has sole discretion in this regard, meaning that position-specific conflict of interest issues cannot be ruled out.

In the absence of any publicly available official guidelines on conflicts of interest, ‘revolving door’ principles or stringent vetting processes, the possibility that significant discretion is employed in the recruitment and selection of personnel in sensitive positions cannot be ruled out. Any grievance redress mechanisms are also not disclosed in advance.

The selection of officials in sensitive positions is not questioned as there is no official oversight mechanism in this regard. Challenging these decisions is viewed as insubordination, therefore, all such decisions are unchallenged. It is worth mentioning that the government may dismiss or remove anyone from the service under Section 16 of the Army Act [1]. Section 17 of the same act also confers the same power to the Chief of Army Staff and other authorised officers [1].

Only the minister of defence decides the promotion and appointment to a position of general/flag officer, based on the advice of a committee [1]. A recent extract from the criminal record is required at every promotion round.
Direct and functional superiors can and will be held jointly liable for deontological violations committed by their subordinates when their superiors, without being co-perpetrators, nevertheless were or should have been aware of these violations [2].

Most positions in the military require security clearance, which requires a stringent vetting procedure, detailed in the law on classification and security clearance, attestations and advices [1]. The Circular on revolving doors also details procedures to mitigate conflicts of interest and sanctions in case of breach of code [2]. Moreover, personnel of Belgian Defence have to abide by a deontological code. When working directly or indirectly in procurement, they must sign a formal declaration that she or he has read and understood the code [3, 4].

Personnel in sensitive positions needs to be the holder of a security clearance at the appropriate level. Such security clearance is granted or renewed after an investigation by the intelligence services [1]. Security clearances are granted by the civil (VVSE) and military (ADIV) intelligence services. The former is external to the national Defence structure, and instead reports to the Minister of Justice [2].

In 2016, the Rulebook on Corruption Risk Assessment was adopted by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) [1]. This rulebook defines the assessment of the sensitivity of job positions in all organizational units to the corruption risk and also defines the procedures of such assessment. In accordance with Article 4, corruption risk assessments are carried out for workplaces/ formations within which the following areas of business are performed:
a) property and public funds,
b) material financial operations,
c) human resources management,
d) information management and information technology,
e) compliance with legal and contractual obligations,
f) public procurement,
g) other areas as required [2].

Following an assessment of corruption risk at the end of 2017, measures for each job position were created in accordance with the assessed level of risk. The MoD ordered the enactment of measures with the aim of risk mitigation. Job positions were classified by the risk level into five groups from G1 to G5, where positions ranked G1 have the lowest risk while job positions ranked G5 have the highest risk of corruption. The assessment included all job positions within the MoD.

There is internal oversight in the ministry of defence to scrutinise appointment and promotion decisions of personnel in sensitive positions. However, there is no external scrutiny of higher-risk sensitive positions.
The MoD General Inspectorate (GI) had the obligation to suggest additional criteria for selection of candidates for the job of inspector within the system of inspectors in the MoD and Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (AFBiH) (sensitive positions) [1]. The MoD brought the Decision of Special Criteria for Candidates for Inspectors within the System of Inspectors of the MoD and AFBiH [1]. In addition to the general criteria for appointment to formation positions under Articles 30 and 31 of the Rules on professional development and career management of professional military personnel in the MoD and AFBiH, he/she should meet the following criteria:
– That the professional military person, in the course of his/her professional military service, has not been convicted of a serious breach of military discipline under Article 161 of the Law on Service in AFBiH;
– That the professional military person’s military-disciplinary file does not contain record of a disciplinary measure currently in force [2].

In the sensitive area of management of the career of professional military personnel in the AFBiH, the ranking of persons by successfulness is performed according to clear and publically available criteria (Articles 32 and 35 and other provisions of the Rulebook on Professional Development and Career Management) [3]. Each job position requires a certain level of competence and abilities, including the clearance level to access secret data following the Law on Protection of Secret Data [3].

According to the government reviewer, there is control over the placement of military personnel in key positions. Formal legal control is exercised by the BiH Presidency, the BiH Parliamentary Assembly through the Joint Defence and Security Commission of the PA BiH, and through the parliamentary military commissioner (1). In the MoD and the AFBiH, the selection and appointment of personnel (officers and non-commissioned officers) to formation posts/posts in military intelligence are regulated in accordance with the Law on Service and Rulebook on Professional Development and Career Management. The process of appointing officers and non-commissioned officers is completely transparent and all officers and non-commissioned officers have the opportunity to object to the drafting of the Performance List, which is discussed in the second instance by the higher level of command. Also, in case of irregularities, members of the Armed Forces of BiH contact the MoD GI or the parliamentary military commissioner, who determines all the facts about possible irregularities.

There is not enough information to score this indicator. There is a lack of information to indicate whether certain positions are recognised as being more open to corruption. There is no clear evidence as to the academic and professional qualifications of the personnel serving in the Defence Procurement Units [1]. In the absence of those serving in that Unit are appointed in terms of the existing defence promotion code. In one report, some junior members of the Botswana Defence Force (BDF) have cried foul over delayed promotions following the elevation of their senior counterparts some months ago [2].
WeekendPost has gathered that it has been a while since the promotions of some most senior members of the BDF to the lucrative ranks [2].“It is a norm if not culture in the BDF that after senior officers have been promoted, then after a month or so follows the junior officers’ promotions,” a source in the lower ranking BDF Military Intelligence, who preferred anonymity for fear of being victimized told this publication [2]. He continued, “But to our surprise when our turn for promotions comes, we are told if we do not pass the physical training test, we are not going to be promoted [2]. We do agree that both physical and mental fitness for all the soldiers is necessary but remember some soldiers are handicapped since they got injured in the line of duty” [2]. According to the soldier, if they do not qualify for promotions because they cannot pass physical training test, how do they qualify for military operations, including anti-poaching exercises [2].

There is not enough information to score this indicator. It is not clear where there are specific procedures in place to limit conflict of interest. Depending on the sensitivity of the job’s nature (procurement), discretion seems to be applied not only for procurement posts, but different posts in the BDF [1]. There are two profiles on Linkedin of BDF procurement officials [2]. The first one is Kabelo Pinaemang; his profile states that ‘Experienced Supply Officer skilled in Inventory and Warehousing, Negotiation, Business Relationship Management, Risk Management, Microsoft Excel, and Microsoft Word. Strong military and protective services professional with a Level 6 focused in Procurement and Supply from CIPS [215] ‘. The other one is Tshepiso Semetse, who has been with BDF for ten years [2].

There is not enough information to score this indicator. The only known mechanism that is publicly known is through court cases. Oversight is provided by the institutions supporting democracy in particular the judiciary and DCEC [1]. This was the example in the case of MOKOKONYANE v. COMMANDER OF BOTSWANA DEFENCE FORCE and Another 2000 (2) BLR 102 (CA), where the issue of promotion and demotion was challenged by one soldier who felt aggrieved [2]. There are no other forms of scrutny for special positions other that the processes that have already been discussed.

According to the interviewees, the Brazilian Armed Forces have mapped the sensitiveness of each position, and through a very strict evaluation system, they eliminate many candidates for these positions. An interviewee from the intelligence sector of the Army stated that if a military official receives a grade lower than four, they are excluded from the most sensitive positions [1, 2].

The selection process is not clear to outsiders. However, according to a military interviewee, officials are evaluated by their superiors every six months on a regular basis, starting before and going throughout their careers. In this evaluation, a grade from one to five points is given. Strategic and sensitive positions such as personnel in contracting and budget need high scores to even be considered for these positions [1, 2]. However, there is no public document that describes which positions are more sensitive than others. The only revolving door policy in Brazil is described in the Code of Conduct of the Federal government personnel. It’s article 15 stipulates a four-month revolving door period [3].

Within the Brazilian Armed Forces, promotion and allocation criteria are internal there is no external institution that participates in the process of general oversight or oversight of the choices regarding appointees for positions of procurement, contracting and financial management [1]. Internal control exists, and the evaluation of military officials is common practice in the Armed Forces.

According to an online literature review, evidence shows that no special attention is given to personnel in sensitive positions within the defence sector. The recruitment’s criteria for sensitive positions in the MoD is not publicly available (1), (2), (3). As per Article 52 of the Constitution, the President of Burkina Faso is the suprême Head of the National Armed Forces, and presides the Superior Council of the Defence. The president appoints the Major General Head of State of the Armies. Additionally, in Article 55, the president also appoints officers of the high civil and military administration. The president is given the power appointment these positions from the Constitution (4), (5).

Because there is no evidence that special attention is paid to high-risk positions, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

Because there is no evidence that special attention is paid to high-risk positions, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

Public contracts and procurement fall under the authority of the Ministry of Public Contracts. In 2002, in order to ensure and enhance effectiveness, a circular letter from the Presidency of the Republic moved the award of contracts, which until then had been under the Prime Ministry, to the Ministry of Public Procurement [1]. According to President Biya, the reforms “seeks to step up transparency in the sector, reduce the government procurement timeframe, and ensure more efficient control and the quality of works undertaken by the State and its components’’ [1]. However, this does not apply to defence and security procurement.

According to Interviewee 1, selection to strategic positions is based mainly on personal relationships [1]. However, according to Transparency International (2015), there is no information on whether attention is paid to time in post, and oversight of personnel in sensitive positions, including officials and personnel in defence procurement, contracting, financial management, and commercial management [2]. There has been no evidence of recent change with regard to this.

No evidence has been found to show that there is any internal scrutiny of the appointment or promotion of personnel in sensitive positions in the Ministry of Defence. The President of the Republic is the Commander-in- Chief of the Armed Forces; he makes appointments and transfers, and dismisses high ranking officers of the armed forces and security officers by decree without any oversight from Parliament. For example: “The President of the Republic His Excellency Paul BIYA signed several decrees on 17 February 2016 appointing senior officers to positions in the central, external and territorial command posts in the Ministry of Defence” [1].

Articles 30 and 31 of the Public Procurement Code stipulate that contracts pertaining to defence and security are of a special nature and are therefore not made open to the public. Consequently, there is no oversight body when it comes to defence and security procurement [2].

Special attention is unlikely to be paid to selection or time in post [1] for such positions, as screening criteria are set out as a condition for employment in sensitive areas (i.e. obtaining top-security security clearance for specific roles). [2] Given this screening, it seems unlikely that further steps are taken. Also, while no explicit acknowledgement that some positions are more at risk was found, it is generally understood from within government acts and documents. as example, the Criminal Code provides special offences for “Bribery of judicial officers, etc.” in section119(1) [3]. Additionally, the Office of the Auditor General (OAG) has an extensive Fraud Risk Management Framework with a Fraud Prevention score card that includes position specific factor analysis, e.g., “mandatory vacation periods or job rotation assignments for employees in key finance and accounting control positions” and “Our code of conduct has specific provisions that address and prohibit inappropriate relationships whereby members of our Executive Committee or members of management could use their position for personal gain or other inappropriate purposes.” [4]

The selection process is largely hands off. On the civilian side, positions are filled through competitive means that largely adhere to Treasury Board of Guidelines. [1] All employees are subject to security screening in line with the type of position they fill. [2] On the Military side, positions are generally filled from within the ranks through career managers with input from the Chief of Defence Staff, as this position holds significant authority and must be widely palatable. [3] The positions of Major and above are viewed as important postings, and institutionally it is deemed important to put the best person into available jobs. Boards are held annually by the career managment office with officers of a more senior rank selected to choose from top performers for key postings.

Performance reviews for both civilian and military staff occur with regularity; however these are not subject to external oversight, nor are they directly related to the risk profile of the position (outside of regular security-clearance screening). [1] [2]

There has been a gradual process aim at increasing the attention paid to the personnel in sensitive positions, but this has occurred with few specific positions and with some (but not all) the elements listed in the question. After the fraud and corruption scandals in the armed forces, the Ministry of National Defence announced an agenda to strengthen probity and transparency in the defence sector [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6]. Among the measures announced, the agenda proposes regulations and requirements for corruption-risk positions. It raised concerns over possible conflicts of interest, improved the declaration of assets, the relationship between the armed forces and civilians working in health services (mutual societies), and proposes cooling-off standards for former military members who want to contract with the armed forces as civilians. An amendment to the Law of Public Integrity will allow the hiring of family members within the armed forces and a “cooling-off” system [7]. As this piece of legislation is still under discussion, there is no information on the details on which positions are recognised as ‘corruption-risk positions’.

The reform agenda to improve probity and transparency has openly recognized the sensitivity and risk of corruption of certain positions [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6]. A set of measures have been proposed to limit conflicts of interest and to limit the revolving door in the contracting and acquisition sector by developing standards of cooling-off and the incompatibility of hiring family members of the Armed Forces. An amendment to the Law of Public Integrity to incorporate the Armed Forces to regulations of hiring of relatives of high authorities was made. In this way, if the spouse, civil partner, or relative enters the third degree of consanguinity or within the second degree of affinity, a report must be issued by the National Civil Service Directorate (Dirección Nacional de Servicio Civil) regarding the appointment and or hiring, which must contain the candidate’s years of experience, his years of qualified experience, the knowledge associated with the function in which he is to be appointed or hired, as well as the integrity of said person. This report should be submitted to the Council of Senior Public Management (Consejo de Alta Dirección Pública) [7]. However, since the reforms are still being designed and not all agencies have followed the same degree of progress in the matter, there are no details on the specifies of the recruitment process, and the score has been awarded accordingly. Moreover, there is no clarity of the scope and the effectiveness of these measures for the defence sector in general.

The cited agenda of reforms, still under development, seeks to improve internal oversight mechanisms in the Ministry of National Defence (MDN) to scrutinise the appointment and promotion of personnel in sensitive positions [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6]. These mechanisms include the strengthening of internal audit and control agencies. In 2019, the executive proposed a new law that modernises military careers. The project seeks to increase the duration of military careers and to incorporate merit as a factor for promotion, not only seniority [7, 8, 9]. The project states that the promotion of the first grades of non-commissioned officers and officers will be carried out through factors of merit, professional and academic performance. It also proposes a requirement that has to be passed for promotion to colonel, requiring the recommendation of the Selection Board to promote. At this point, the project does not establish oversight mechanisms for sensitive or high-risk positions.

Logistics and procurement are clearly identified as high risk areas of work in the PLA. There were many cases of corruption in the former General Logistics Department, which was in charge of procurement. With the reorganisation of the CMC in 2016, the GLD lost its organisational power which demonstrates that procurement was recognised as a sensitive area of work and measures were taken accordingly. [1] Still, the revelation of these cases and subsequent prosecutions and institutional reforms is the only official recognition of problematic areas of work. In publicly available documents regarding personnel selection, there is no explicit identification of specific high risk positions. There have been more targeted reforms since 2016 in sensitive areas such as procurement.

There is no transparency regarding the selection process of personnel in sensitive positions.

There is no external scrutiny and, at least until recently, very little oversight of promotions. Although we can assume that in specific areas such as logistics and procurement, there is no heightened attention on personnel selection, there is no transparency in this regard. Until recently there were many cases of corruption in promotions. [1,2]

Special consideration is given to personnel in sensitive positions within the defence sector in the Anti-Corruption Plan and the Risk Map of the entities, [1] including the promotion of strategies for strengthening these processes and for the development of diagnostics around the reasons for excessive or exaggerated permanence of certain officials in these positions. [2] This tool recognizes that there are a number of facts that affect performance and institutional objectives. To this end, it delegates the responsibility to reduce the risks of corruption to the office of planning, budgeting and internal control, including the design, tracking, and monitoring proccesses. Four risks of corruption are outlined: 1) manipulation, omission, concealment, falsehood, information routing, or actions against third parties in order to obtain particular benefits; (2) procurement processes to promote particular interests; (3) fraud, deception, or misrepresentin an audit in order to obtain particular benefits; and 4) diversion of resources and/or favour to third parties in order to make a profit. It also identified processes in which risks occur, including sectoral strategic direction, strategic public communication, public management and good governance, budgetary and financial management, public management contracts, security and defence management, capacity management, strategy and logistics, human capital management and public force welfare, GSED management, legal matters, logistics and administrative management, human talent management, organisational communication and information, information and communications technologies for management, and management control. Most of these positions or processes are carried out by staff occupying sensitive positions within the Military Forces. [3]

In accordance with Article 2 of Law 909 of 2004, the election of public offices must respond to criteria of “equality, merit, morality, efficiency, economy, impartiality, transparency, speed and publicity.” [1] The National Commission of Civil Service (CNC), which has the responsibility of “positioning merit and equality in the income and development of public employment,” must elect public officials on merit. [2] This Law indicates that all the people who meet the requirements of the position must be able to run for the position, and it establishes the stages of the selection process as summons, recruitment, and tests. On its website it publishes public calls for merit-based jobs and also develops a process of systematisation of resumes, and selection in the first instance of candidates for public positions. [3] These jobs are defined in Decree 770 of 2005. [4] However, Law 909 of 2004 defines that public career jobs may be at a managerial, advisory, professional, technical, or healthcare level. Law 909 of 2004 establishes that the administrative career does not apply to jobs that require a certain degree of trust, for example “in the Military Forces and the National Police, the jobs assigned to the offices command, intelligence and communications units and divisions, due to the necessary intuitive confidence required in those who exercise them, given the handling that should be given to matters subject to the exclusive scope of the reserve, public order and national security, Commanders and Second Force Commanders and Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.” [1]

In the case of civilian personnel assigned to the defence sector, Law 1033 of 2006, [5] regulates the process of access to the special administrative careers, indicating that “for the connection of non-uniformed civilian personnel (…), carry out a security study of a reserved nature, for applicants to occupy positions, which must be favorable to access them,” so that it is possible to determine the degree of confidence they have in the applicant. In the case of the Military High Command, their appointments are approved by the Senate in the Second Constitutional Commission, in accordance with Article 173 of the Political Constitution [6] because the positions require a high level of degree of management, resource management, and decision making. According to data from the Public Employment Information and Management System (SIGEP), [7, 8] in the Ministry of Defence there are a total of 19,824 employees, made up of 42 managerial jobs; 1,901 consultant level jobs; 1,264 professional-level jobs; 3,255 technical level jobs; 11,530 assistance level jobs; and 1,832 other types of jobs. The SIGEP itself reports a total of 729 or 4% of personnel hired in the Ministry were on the basis of merit alone. There is an annual plan for vacancies and a forecast of human resources, [9] which defines the provision of jobs according to the needs of the entity, grouping them by name, degree, and dependency. Currently, 16 entities from the defence sector are in the selection process through a merit competition carried out through the CNC website. Each call has its rules structuring the selection process, merit competition rules, participation requirements, description of the jobs called, evaluation method, and requirements for the applicant. The defence sector has made advancements regarding merit-based public jobs to limit conflicts of interest.

The Offices of Talent and Human Resources is the entity responsible for analysing the entry, permanence, and retirement of public servants. Within public entities, there is a staff commission composed of the Secretary General, the Director of Human Resources, the Director of Internal Control, who study and make decisions regarding appointments and staffing in all positions. [1] Decisions on these issues should be taken in consultation with the CNSC, an autonomous and independent body, which is not part of any of the branches of the public authority. [2] They certify that there are no lists of eligible individuals waiting to occupy such posts (these lists are made after merit contests). [3] After verifying this information, the Committee makes a decision to appoint and/or promote staff. Although this procedure exists, public opinion demands greater internal control by the Ministry of Defence on decisions related to appointments and promotions of staff in sensitive positions, in the face of corruption cases involving these particular staff members. [4] That said, there is a functioning internal commission and an external body that validates appointments and promotions.

No evidence was found in the 2009 Public Procurement Code that special attention is paid to personnel tasked with covering sensitive or high-risk positions. The Code also does not contain provisions recognizing that some positions are more prone to corruption than others. Although a public official’s credentials and general qualifications are supposedly part of the criteria for selecting civil service personnel to cover a position involving procurement, contracting, financial and commercial management, no special provisions exist in the Public Procurement Code aimed at mitigating the risk of corruption at certain high-risk posts.

The Public Procurement Code (Code des marchés publics 2009, Decree No. 2009-259) has General Provisions describing the roles played by institutions tasked with public procurement (Articles 12-15), including the roles of civil service personnel. In the chapter dedicated to Persons in charge of procurement (Articles 35-41), the personnel include the contractor (autorité contractante), the client (maître d’ouvrage), the delegate project director (Maître d’ouvrage délégué) and the project manager (Maître d’œuvre). Articles 35-41 describe the roles of such personnel, including their decision-making power and management tasks, but not the criteria for selecting them to cover sensitive, high-risk positions (1). For example, Article 40 of the Public Procurement Code of 2009 describes the competencies and tasks of the project manager (maître d’oeuvre), as well as how he/she should be chosen. However, there is no mention of special attention to sensitive positions (1).
Section 3 of the Public Procurement Code (Autorités signataires et approbatrices), Articles 46 and 47, establishes the hierarchy of signatories to a public procurement project at the Ministry level. Though the Minister and those delegated by the Minister have preeminent rights to sign and authorize a procurement contract, there is no mention of criteria for selecting lower-ranking personnel (1). For example, Article 46, Section 2 states the following:

“Finally, Section 7 of the Public Procurement Code (Marchés de prestations intellectuelles), Article 100 (Modes de Sélection), establishes the criteria for candidates to a public procurement tender, including technical quality, cost and qualifications of the bidding candidate. But there is no provision that spells out the qualifications of the public official tasked with managing such contracts” (1).

The civil servants with autonomy and decision-making power to carry out transactions of public procurement, contracting, financial or commercial management on behalf of a ministry are not subject to special selection criteria.

As in 37A, the 2009 Code of Public Procurement does not recognize that certain ministerial positions are sensitive or especially prone to corruption. Therefore this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

As in 37A, the 2009 Code of Public Procurement does not recognize that certain ministerial positions are sensitive or especially prone to corruption. Therefore this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

There is no internal oversight at the MoD tasked with scrutiny in the appointment and promotion decisions of public officials in sensitive positions. The 2009 Public Procurement Code has established procurement bodies tasked with oversight of public contracts (organes chargés de la passation des marchés) in Section 2. However, the articles in that section are designed to monitor the quality of the bids to public tenders and not with overseeing the selection of public officials tasked with those transactions. For example, Articles 42 and 43 govern the procurement units and ministerial commissions that oversee the public tender process; there is no special scrutiny of personnel in sensitive positions by way of oversight units or commissions.

The Ministry of Defence does not operate with a category of higher-risk or sensitive positions and there is thus no special internal oversight mechanism of, or attention to, such positions [1].
According to the Danish MOD, in June 2020, the Minister of Defence launched several general initiatives to fight fraud and abuse of power. Among them, declarations of self-interest in procurement functions was launched as an initiative. The initiative presupposes that every employee who is employed with a purchasing responsibility or has a significant influence on the choice of supplier in connection with specific procurement process or a given purchase must state personal interests/self-interests.[3]

It should be noted that positions within the Danish Defence Intelligence Service fall outside the Ministry of Defence Personnel Agency’s domain. As employment within the combine of the Ministry of Defence requires a security clearance, some attention can however be said to be paid, as the more “sensitive” positions require a higher level of security clearance [2] However, as this is not related to corruption risk issues, this is assessed not to be relevant to the question.

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable, as there is no recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption than others i.e. recognised as high-risk or sensitive.

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable, as there is no recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption than others i.e. recognised as high-risk or sensitive.

The government and the executive do not recognize that some posts are more open to corruption activities than others. Indeed, senior officers and senior positions are protected and have full immunity by the leadership (head of the state) who was am army officer too (1), (2), (3). In Egypt, senior officers in sensitive positions because of their seniority, instead of being subject to special attention, are granted very high levels of impunity. For example, Law no. 161 (2018) prohibits investigating any senior officers of the armed forces for any violation committed by them before the Parliament was appointed and during the time the Constitution was suspended except after obtaining the approval of the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) (4), (5). Other than officers in senior positions, officers and personnel in defence procurement, contracting and financial management are subject to very little external oversight so in that sense there is no special attention paid to them. For example, the Tenders Law in Article 77 exempts the MOD and MMP and allows them to conduct procurement through limited or local tenders, limited practices or direct contracting (6). Moreover, Law 147 (1964), exempts all arms contracts from taxes, fees, and most importantly from financial regulation and scrutiny and monitoring by both the CAA and the Ministry of Finance (7). As for internal mechanisms, Interviewee 2 suggested that holding people accountable is more likely to be the result of political considerations or personal feuds rather than genuine efforts to combat corruption (8).

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable because, as noted in 37A, there is no recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption than others. In this regard, this indicator is scored not applicable. Law no. 232 of 1959 sets out the general selection system for armed forces officers (1). Article 12 of the law sets the pools from which the officers are selected and it is normally from military colleges or graduates of civilian colleges who have completed some formal military education. Graduating from a military college guarantees the graduate a career as an officer in the armed forces at least until becoming a colonel (‘aaqid). However, according to the same article, the minister of defence and commander-in-chief have some discretionary authority to appoint others (unspecified in the law) into the service. However, there is no evidence that this has been widely used. Article 16 of the same law sets out the rules for appointing top senior positions, and gives the president of the republic the powers to appoint: a) the commander-in-chief (CIF) of the Armed Forces b) chiefs of staffs c) heads of armies. Positions B and C are proposed by the CIF to the president of the republic. Article 17 of the law sets out the rules for appointments of officers next in seniority. These officers are appointed by the CIF. In both systems, there is significant discretion employed in the recruitment and selection of personnel in sensitive positions, and open recruitment is not the standard operating procedure.

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable because as noted in 37A, there is no recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption than others. In this regard, this indicator is scored not applicable. It is worth noting that, according to our sources, there is neither internal no external oversight or scrutiny over any of the appointments of sensitive positions. The appointments of senior and sensitive positions are based on loyalty and capacity of obedience to the executives (1), (2), (3). External scrutiny of personnel in sensitive positions is severely limited by Article 77 of the Tenders Law which exempts the MOD and MMP and allows them to conduct procurement through limited or local tenders, limited practices or direct contracting (4). Moreover, Law 204 of 1957 amended by Law 147 of 1964 exempts all arms contracts from taxes, fees, and most importantly from financial regulation and scrutiny and monitoring by both the CAA and the Ministry of Finance (5). As for internal scrutiny, the Inspection Authority is entrusted with exercising scrutiny of personnel. However, relevant laws, academic and media reports barely mention the authority. The lack of information shows that the mandate of the Inspection Authority is very unclear. Despite Interviewee 2’s close interaction with defence issues and personnel in Egypt, they were not aware of any cases the authority has brought to the court, which for him meant that its operations are either highly secretive or simply non-existent (6). Interviewee 2 suggested that holding people accountable is more likely to be the result of political considerations or personal feuds rather than genuine efforts to combat corruption (6).

Special attention is paid to personnel in sensitive positions. The Commander of the Defence Forces is one of the most powerful positions in Estonia’s defence sector. Amongst many other responsibilities, the Commander is responsible for the personnel and budgetary funds. The selection of the next Commander of the Defence Forces involves the country’s defence leadership at the highest level: the current Commander of the Defence Forces, the Minister of Defence, the government and the National Defence Committee of the Riigikogu. [1] The appointment of the Director of the Centre for Defence Investment also has a special procedure. He or she manages Estonia’s defence procurement – the Centre’s personnel and the budget. The Director is appointed by the Minister of Defence at the proposal of the Chancellor, as stipulated by the Statutes of the Centre for Defence Investment. [3] The appointment procedure as well as the result of the top defence leadership is covered by all the largest media outlets. [2,4,5]
As stipulated in the Estonian Defence Forces Organisation Act, the background check is done for all the employees of the Defence Forces every five years. [6] This includes their contacts with military and intelligence services and military forces.

The Riigikogu voted for a new law to give the Defence League more freedom for background checks making sure the person is suitable for the job. Amongst other surveillance possibilities these included conspiracy techiques. However, the President advised the Riigikogu not to approve the law and turned to the Supreme Court. In her view the new law is not compatible with the Constitution of Estonia. [7]

This issue is ongoing.

In accordance with the Civil Service Act, an official who is released from office may not become, within one year, a legal person in private law over which he or she has exercised supervision. [1] However, this legislation does not seem to always be followed in the defence sector. Sometimes, rather than qualifications, it is the characteristics of the person that are considered, as pointed out by an interviewee, a former military flag officer. [2] There have also been cases of revolving doors. For example, the director of the Centre of Defence Investment became the Head of the Estonian Defence Industry Association and then the head of a private company in the defence industry. [4,5] Another example: a serviceman who dealt with procurement in a public office now represents a major defence industry company. [6] No criticism or debate followed these cases. Based on the interview with the former military flag officer, the appointment of the Commander of the Defence Forces [3] is highly politicised.

The Chancellor of the Ministry of Defence coordinates the human resources department and their work. The human resources department develops the overall principles of the personnel policy. [1] There is no regular and formal internal scrutiny of appointment and promotion decisions of personnel in sensitive positions. [2] The Estonian Internal Security Service exercises supervision over the higher and more sensitive positions in the Defence Forces in what concerns corruption and organised crime. [3]

In its written response the Headquarters of the Defence Forces emphasises that Security Clearance Act 726/2014 has come into force on January 1, 2015. On the basis of this Act, the Headquarters of the Defence Forces has drawn up a norm expected of it by the legislation. Further amendments to the Security Clearance Act have come to force on January 1, 2018. Of these changes, the legal department of the HQ has drawn up a bulletin. The Security Clearance Act regulates, for example, on interests that may endanger state security, societal security, national defence, or Finland’s international relations, or safety and security of serving in the Defence Forces. [1] [2]

The decision to carry out a security clearance on a person is done by the Headquarters of the Defence Forces, if the person operates or is supposed to operate in the Defence Force or conduct a task given by the Defence Forces or if the security clearance relates to the operations or procurement of the Defence Forces. HQ decides upon a security clearance on company, which carries out or is supposed to carry out a task given by the Defence Forces or on a company that relates to the procurement of the Defence Forces. [3] Security Clearance may be done in standard, extensive or limited format depending on the conditions specified by the Security Clearance Act . [4] As such, whilst there are positions which require a higher security clearance, however, high risk or sensitive positions are not categorised by any mechanism other than through security clearance classification.

Furthermore, when considering the appointment of a person to a vacancy, the authority must take into consideration the impeccability of the person and to ensure that he or she does not have interests that may endanger his or her appropriate conduct in the position and that he or she has the ability to carry out his or her duties in an independent and trustworthy manner. In so doing, the authority must consider the character of the position or of the tasks, the earlier employment of the person in state positions and the accuracy at which he or she has carried out her duties, as well as the means at disposal to investigate the person’s backgound. [5]

As outlined in 37A, whilst there are positions which require a higher security clearance, positions which are more sensitive to corruption risk are not categorised. In its written response the Headquarters of the Defence Forces emphasises that Security Clearance Act 726/2014 has come to force on January 1, 2015. On the basis of this Act, the Headquarters of the Defence Forces has drawn up a norm expected of it by the legislation. Further amendments to the Security Clearance Act have come to force on January 1, 2018. Of these changes, the legal department of the HQ has drawn up a bulletin. The Security Clearance Act regulates, for example, on interests that may endanger state security, societal security, national defence, or Finland’s international relations, or safety and security of serving in the Defence Forces. [1] [2]. Act on the Defence Forces, chpt 4, section 37: In addition to what is elsewhere stated about the conditions to serve as a public authority, people recruited to the Defence Forces need to be trustworthy as their tasks require. Chpt 4, section 42: Professional soldier must both at work and on free-time behave in a way that does not endanger trust on the adequate conduct of the tasks of the Defence Forces. [3] In addition, to be selected to a military position, the person must have done his/her military service [1]. Decree on the Defence Forces, chtp 2, section 9: To be selected to an officer’s position, the person must have a Master’s degree in Military Science and occupational military education, an Officer’s degree, a Bacherlor’s degree in Military Science and occupational military education and qualifications as a pilot, a Bachelor’s degree in Military Science and at least eight years’ professional exprience in a temporary position of a younger officer. Qualifications for a younger officer’s position include a Bachelor’s degree in Military Science and occupational military education. For the position of Colonnel, Admiral or of a higher rank, additional qualifications include a General Staff Officer’s degree. For the position of Chief of Staff or the Head of Head Quarters, one must have at least the rank of General Major or Rear Admiral. Furthermore, chpt 2, section 10 provides the qualifications for Warrant Officer’s position; chpt 2, section 11 for special officer; chpt 2, section 12 and section 12 a for other positions within the Defence Forces. [4]

This indicator is marked ‘Not Enough Information’ as there is no specific information publicly available about the internal oversight in the ministry of defence to scrutinise appointment and promotion decisions of personnel in sensitive positions.

The Defence Code adapted the Ethics law in public service of April 20, 2016. It resulted in several new articles tackling conflicts of interest for officials in sensitive positions: [1] [2]
– Article L4122-2: restricting the possibility of holding multiple posts in order to avoid illegal taking of interests (article 432-12 of the Penal Code)
– Article L4122-3: recalling the ethical obligations of military personnel (similar to those of civil servants: dignity, impartiality, integrity and probity) and the action to be taken in case of conflict of interest
– Article L4122-4: protecting soldiers denouncing conflicts of interest as whistleblowers
– Article L4122-5: repeating Article 432-13 of the Penal Code to prevent the “illegal taking of interests” of soldiers leaving the Ministry for private companies. The Military Ethics Committee examines the compatibility of the member’s future professional activities with the duties he or she performed in the department; this commission (articles R 4122-14 to R 4122-24-1 of the Defence Code examine the case of the approximately 380 soldiers per year in potentially exposed situations). This independent commission reports directly to the Minister. Its President is a Counsellor of State (“Conseiller d’Etat”) and it is composed, besides general officers, of qualified people, members of the court of accounts and the General Comptroller of the Armies. The “general rapporteur” is a general comptroller of the armed forces (from the CGA).
In the opposite direction (private to public), on the ethical aspect, there is currently no text; the draft law “transformation of the public service” which is in the government scrutiny phase, provides that public officials of the Ministry (contractual, future directors of central administration, returns detachments) will be subject to an ethics control (potential conflicts of interests). For the soldiers, this will involve the Military Ethics Committee.

– The three types of declarative obligations (declaration of interests, management mandates and declarations of financial situations) are now provided for certain civilian and military officials of the Ministry to prevent conflicts of interest (declaration of interest), and to compare the heritage situations between taking and leaving office:
– Article L 4122-6: institutes “declarations of interests” according to the model of the HATVP to be filled by future managers, especially in the field of purchasing or for senior officials. They are intended to prevent conflicts of interest. Article 4122-7 concerns “management mandates” for very high authorities that do not allow those concerned to be able to give management instructions concerning their stock market portfolio. Article 4122-8 concerns the declarations of patrimonial status addressed to the HATVP for senior ministry officials.
There has been a move from a reporting mechanism related solely to the appointment of a senior official in the Council of Ministers (HATVP law) to an extensive system of patrimonial transparency concerning dozens of executives. [3] [4] [5]

Finally, a Decree on the management of financial instruments held by certain soldiers (audit agents for instance) of December 3, 2019, finalised the implementation of prevention and ethical control tools for the ministry covering the most exposed positions of responsibility. While “declarations of interest” aim to prevent any conflict of interest for the agent and “declarations of assets” prevent the risk of undue enrichment during the term of a mandate or function, this Decree supplements the existing one for certain civilians (secretary general for administration, general delegate for armements), and for certain soldiers (chief of the defense staff and government commissioners in armaments companies). It is a question of avoiding any “insider trading” by entrusting the public agent’s furniture portfolio to a manager so that he cannot interfere in the purchases or sales of his securities. [1] [6]
This decree is currently awaiting the Minister’s signature. [6]

A charter of procurement already exists within the Ministry. [7]

According to the “General rapporteur” of the Military Ethics Committee, [1] when applying for sensitive positions, applicants go through a vetting process organised by the “Ethics law in public service of April 20, 2016” (articles L4122-2 to L4122-5 of the Defence Code). Their “dignity, impartiality, integrity and probity” are assessed by the Military Ethics Committee, which also verifies that they do not hold multiple posts or have any conflict of interests. [2]
However, sensitive positions are not openly declared, so it is almost impossible to verify whether applicants’ backgrounds are seriously and thoroughly reviewed by the Ethics Committee. Likewise, it is impossible to draw conclusions on whether conflict of interest procedures are regularly followed or not, since the Committee and CGA in general doesn’t publicise its work on these issues.

According to the “General rapporteur” of the Military Ethics Committee, [1] there is internal oversight in the Ministry to scrutinise the appointment of personnel in sensitive positions. The Military Ethics Committee examines the compatibility of the member’s future professional activities with the duties he or she performed in the department (articles R 4122-14 to R 4122-24-1 of the Defence Code examine the case of the approximately 380 soldiers per year in potentially exposed situations). This independent commission reports directly to the Minister. Its President is a Counsellor of State (“Conseiller d’Etat”) and it is composed, besides general officers, of qualified personnel, members of the court of accounts and the general control of the armies (CGA). The “general rapporteur” is a comptroller general of the armed forces (from the CGA).
In the opposite direction (private to public), on the ethical aspect, there is currently no text; the draft law “transformation of the public service” which is in the government scrutiny phase, provides that public officials of the Ministry (contractual, future directors of central administration, returns detachments) will be subject to an ethics control (potential conflicts of interests). For the soldiers, this would involve the Military Ethics Committee.
However, there is no mention of promotion decisions being scrutinised. High-ranking and sensitive positions are given by presidential decree, which is done without any form of scrutiny.
Also, there is no form of external scrutiny of higher-risk sensitive positions.

The existence of high-risk positions is recognised; the ministry therefore conducts regular risk assessments to identify such positions. For instance, in a recent assessment of the 2,623 positions within the Ministry of Defence, 855 were identified as being especially exposed to the risk of corruption [1]. Staff posted in high-risk positions are selected with increased attention and care [1]. As in other parts of the Federal Administration, the rotation principle (‘Rotationsprinzip’) applies, which stipulates a five-year limit for high-risk positions [2].

There is a risk analysis mechanism in place to identify positions with a high risk of corruption [1]. The 2017 BMI Report on Corruption Prevention in the Federal Administration reports 767 work areas with a higher risk of corruption [2]. This assessment of work areas takes place every five years and follows strict general criteria. It is regarded as a key pillar of corruption prevention [1].

Personnel in high-risk positions are to be selected with additional care. Selected applicants should be checked for potential risks; relevant indicators here could be criminal records, potential ongoing charges or previous charges under labour law [1].

One increasing problem relates to the role of external advisors. Due to the increasingly frequent outsourcing of technical expertise, it is becoming common for industry representatives to assume a variety of roles that were previously reserved for public servants or members of the Armed Forces. This creates the risk that industry interests might shape core decisions, such as procurement needs [3]. This also includes sensitive positions, for example, in the case of the appointment of a former McKinsey Partner as Defence State Secretary in 2014.

A recently released sustainability report explains that a specialist unit (‘Unit R II 6’, now ‘Unit R III 1’) performs a risk analysis to identify those positions that are exposed to corruption risks due to their task portfolio [1]. Furthermore, corruption prevention is enabled through shared responsibility for decision-making in high-risk areas, which avoids critical decisions being made by one person only (‘Mehr-Augen-Prinzip’) [1]. Finally, the recently established Compliance Management unit at the Ministry itself conducted a risk assessment that included a focus on anti-corruption measures to ensure adequate prevention and oversight [2]. However, there is no external scrutiny for high-risk and sensitive positions.

According to the information made publicly available by the MOD through public communications and documentation, no special attention is given to personnel in sensitive positions within the defence sector. The recruitment’s criteria for sensitive positions in the MOD is not made publicly available (1), (2), (3).

Because no special attention is given to personnel in sensitive positions within the defence sector, this score is marked Not Applicable.

Not all positions are openly advertised, and there are significant issues around unaddressed conflicts of interest (1), (2), (3).

According to the constitution, the president, in consultation with the Council of State appoints the senior positions within the defence and security institutions (4). This includes the heads of the intelligence agencies, the Chief of Defence Staff, and the Inspector-General of Police. However, significant discretion is employed in the recruitment and selection of personnel in sensitive positions. The members of the Council of State are also appointed by the president, in consultation with Parliament (5).

Furthermore, the mandate of the Parliamentary Appointments Committee (25 members), which is tasked with accepting or rejecting the nominees of the president in Ghana’s public institutions, doesn’t include personnel in sensitive positions within the defence sector (6), (7), (8). As a consequence, no open policy or procedure is set up to limit the possibility of conflicts of interest for these positions.

Because no special attention is given to personnel in sensitive positions within the defence sector, this score is marked Not Applicable.

If there are internal mechanisms of oversight in the MOD to scrutinise appointments and promotions decisions of personnel in sensitive positions, these are not publicly available. There is no mention on the MOD’s website or in major Ghanaian newspapers over the last two years. There are also no oversight body provisions for appointments in the Armed Forces Recruitment Act, 1962 (1). The Appointment Committee, which is the main external scrutiny institution, has no oversight power over these positions (2), (3), (4).

There is no recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption opportunities than others [1].

This indicator is scored ‘Not Applicable’ as the MoD does not practically distinguish such positions from other positions in the Armed Forces.

This indicator is scored Not Applicable. The MoD has set up specific criteria for appointments (e.g., years of experience, academic and non-academic qualifications), but not for positions relating to defence procurement.

Significant attention is paid to personnel regarding procurement and resources as the assessor pointed out. However, much less attention is paid to personnel having oversight and autonomy over policies or those who make policies on it. According to the law, most ministry personnel in relevant positions (with access to sensitive information) have to undergo thorough national security screenings. The screening and its implementation are described well in the law [1]. There is a detailed description on the depth of the screening. Furthermore, personnel specified in the law have to report any changes that can have an impact on their national security status [2].

Technical competencies are necessary, but hiring rarely follows an open, transparent procedure. Not only does the example [1] prove that open conflict of interest is disregarded, but also interviewed experts suggested that open recruitment is not standard for sensitive positions [2].

Although there is not always open recruitment, and conflict of interest policies are not perfectly developed, both internal scrutiny and external scrutiny exists. External scrutiny is provided both by the national security screenings [1] and in case of a few top-level positions by a defence committee hearing. Although as we mentioned according to our evaluation the committee is not operational, the presence of opposition MPs ensures some further oversight and control [2].

There is evidence to suggest that some special attention is paid to the selection, time in post and oversight of personnel in sensitive positions. Sensitive positions are identified and rotational transfers are made as per the Rotational Transfer Policy in place [1][2]. Special attention is also paid to time in post of personnel in sensitive positions in the Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs) and the Ordnance Factory Board (OFBs) [3]. The Vigilance Division in the MoD carries out oversight across all defence departments [4]. Clearance from the Interlligence Bureau is required for appointment of top government posts [5].

There has been criticism of the government’s 2009 Command Exit Model (CEM) [1]. The Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT) had remarked that the CEM was discriminatory, with the policy deeply dividing the Army as it is seen favouring infantry and artillery officers. The government maintained that the policy which includes short term tenures was to ensure the Army remained agile.

There was some effort from the MoD in 2017 to reform promotions policy within the Army. A committee consisting of Lt General (Ret.) G.S. Katoch and Lt General (Ret.) A K Ahuja was set up to give their recommendations on changes in promotion policy and the Quantified System of Selection (QSS) for officers [2][3].

In a 2012 IDSA publication, it was stated that, “the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) noted the fact that system of acquisitions being handled by unspecialised personnel posted for three year tenures was simply not adequate. It emphasised that “defence acquisition is a cross-disciplinary activity requiring expertise in technology, military, finance, quality assurance, market research, contract management, project management, administration and policy making. ” [4]

Though posts are not openly advertised, selection for sensitive posts are made by the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet (ACC), headed by the Prime Minister [5].

The government has a number of oversight mechanisms in place in the defence sector. These include CAG, CVC and Parliamentary committees who look into aspects of defence planning, deployment and preparedness [1][2]. Promotions of government officials are based on the Annual Appraisal done at the MoD. Vigilance clearance. Clearances from the intelligence agencies are required for sensitive posts [3].

In the field of arms procurement, the case of corruption in the procurement of the AW-101 helicopters, which was investigated by the Puspom TNI, caused one of the biggest losses for the country, reaching 220 billion rupiahs. The positions most vulnerable to fraud/allegations of corruption include those related to requirements planning [1], funding [2] and the procurement committee (PPK and ULP) [3]. The Minister of Defence has never specifically mentioned certain positions/ranks that are deemed prone to corruption, but he has highlighted that the procurement of defence equipment must be carried out government-to-government to cut out brokers and intermediaries who drive prices up [4]. Meanwhile, former Chief of TNI Gatot Nurmantyo stressed the need for budget users, commitment-making officials, procurement service units and recipient officials to be consistent in their supervision and inspection duties throughout the process of procuring goods and services in order to establish good and clean governance [5]. According to Regulation of the Minister of Defence No. 17/2014, requirements planning is one of the activities that is carried out under external supervision, namely that of the DPR, but with very limited involvement of the latter [6,7].

In general, positions that are vulnerable to corruption are publicly recognised by the Minister of Defence and the Chief of TNI in response to investigations into corruption offences committed in the process of arms procurement [1]. However, this recognition is not official/structured, so there has not been any effort to provide stricter and more transparent procedures and mechanisms for selecting personnel for certain positions that are vulnerable to corruption. Positions that are vulnerable to corruption only require competency certification and an Integrity Pact, as in the case of PPK and ULP positions [2], as well as fulfilment of the supervision and inspection competency standards of the Office of the Inspectorate General of the Ministry of Defence, as the government auditor (APIP) [3]. In order to avoid conflicts of interest, the regulation on defence procurement [3] also prohibits the appointment of candidates to the roles of Head or Member of ULP if they also hold the positions of PPK, Officers for Signing of Payment Order (PPSPM), Treasurer or State Auditor [2].

Aside from the appointment of the Chief of TNI, the appointment/placement of personnel within the Ministry of Defence and the TNI does not require approval from external parties, namely the DPR. There are several positions that the President is entitled to appoint, namely middle/high-ranking leaders (Pimpinan Tinggi Madya) [1] within the Ministry of Defence and the TNI Chief of Staff [2]. Furthermore, the process of appointing personnel for corruption-prone positions, in the areas of budgeting and finance for example, is carried out similarly to other positions. It is carried out internally by the organisation, namely by the Minister of Defence (for the Ministry of Defence), the Chief of TNI (TNI Headquarters) and the TNI Chief of Staff (for each unit) [3]. Similarly, sensitive positions, such as Commitment Making Officials (PPK) and procurement committees (ULP), are also determined exclusively by the Minister of Defence, as the budget user [4]. One of the procedures for auditing procurement organisations, as detailed in the Government Guidelines for Procurement of Goods/Services issued by the BPKP, is limited to checking the accuracy of the structure and personnel and checking that there is no duplication of duties in the organisation of goods/services procurement [5]. It can therefore be concluded that there is not any special scrutiny for personnel in sensitive positions.

There is no publicly available evidence of recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption opportunities than others. There is very little publicly available information on this side of the armed forces [1, 2].

There is nothing to indicate that special attention is paid to the selection, time in post, of personnel in sensitive positions. No publicly available evidence indicates that open recruitment is the standard operating procedure. Furthermore, open recruitment is unlikely to be the standard operating procedure because individuals in positions such as procurement, contracting, financial management and commercial management when discovered are often put on the US sanctions list. For example, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctions list of 12 December 2013 [1, 2]. There is no evidence of conflict of interests policies. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) general’s and commanders are often also managing director’s of Iran’s defence in the sources, see, for example, the profile of Brigadier-General Seyyed Mahdi Farahi [3].

There is no publicly available evidence indicating special scrutiny of personnel in sensitive positions. There is nothing to indicate any form of oversight in this regard.

A report by the Baghdad-based Bayan Centre (1) offers in-depth commentary into the lackadaisical application of military laws. It raises the need “for parliament to consider the adoption of explicit legislation that criminalises proxy appointments”, which weakens the application of military legislation. Similarly, technical suitability of officers due to a patronage-oriented approach to military appointments, including posts sensitive to corruption overriding checks and balances is problematic. The Bayan Centre’s findings (1) reveal that “when a military division commander is Shia, his deputy is often Sunni” which speaks again to an erosion of formal laws. Iraq’s Military Service and Retirement Laws (2) make clear that army candidates must have clean criminal records, which has been overlooked and undermined due to ‘Damj’; a process of amalgamation of militias and federal security personnel into security structures (3). They do not refer to the penalisation of recruiters as far as high-risk posts matter. Currently, Baghdad is working towards reining in rogue militias guilty of war crimes, but the latest phase of protests (October 2019) infiltrated by snipers marks out future challenges(4). A tweet from opposition figure Moqtada al Sadr (5), who in the past commanded rogue militias, recently tweeted “no to secret voting, no to dividing booty, no to sectarian and ethnic quotas, no to old faces, no to foreign hegemony and no to corruption and the corrupt” condemning the corrupt system. To summarize, “Problems within the military in Iraq stem from the failure of commanders to anticipate crises, plan, allocate resources and legislate anti-corruption” (4). Corruption-risks are equally absent from logistical planning, contracting and decision-making.

As noted in 37A, there is no recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption than others. In this regard, this indicator is scored not applicable. Evidence of the existence of procurement terms of appointment within the MoD could not be found. The bureaucratic environment exacerbates reliance of informal selection processes based on political affinity and loyalty [1] — a practice whose rise corresponds with the political ascent of Iraq’s Dawa party. This problem combined with weak legislative checks on procurement appointments, fuels the problem of conformance in relation to contracting. Transparency, predictability and fairness undermine procurement practices, including selection.

As noted in 37A, there is no recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption than others. In this regard, this indicator is scored not applicable. There is no independent parliamentary oversight of procurement personnel, against what the constitution advises.. The political blocs that control of Iraq’s security and defence institutions, which remains pending as ministerial posts remain vacant, determine that staff that preside over financial administration and contractual deals and obligations. While senior and high-ranking defence officials require parliamentary approval, the criteria is opaque as is oversight. “Oversight” an Iraqi lawyer corroborates “is a pertinent challenge in procurement activities” [1]. Bureaucracy often stands in the way of transparency and oversight expectations which, as press coverage reveals, are not always met, whether it’s speed or the complete deliverance of a product or service. The latest BMI report places Iraq 26.2 out of 100 for its bureaucratic environment. Contractual agreements may suffer as a result of complicated bureacratic procedures and ineffeciently upheld laws [2].

The IDF High Command Instruction 3.0228 “Commissioned Ranks – Principles of Promotion in IDF Ranks – Regular Service” (1), authorized by the MOD, as well as General Staff Directive 32.0202 “Principles of Promotion of Commissioned Ranks in the IDF – Regular Service” (2), along with the relevant policy of the IDF Manpower Directorate, determine the required criteria for promotion within the IDF. Such criteria include seniority in service, required academic degrees, security clearance, commander references and relevant courses and training. Additionally, specific positions may require supplementary requirements such as tests or dedicated training. Generally, senior positions are staffed in the framework of an open process, the details of which are transparent to all candidates. This transparency is especially important regarding sensitive positions. Although there is some information, some of it is confidential due to security issues (3) (4). But some information on the selection processes including criteria and protocol for officers promotions as well as in the bidding system of the Ministry of Defence exist (5)(6). However, there appears to be no explicit recognition that some positions are more vulnerable to corruption than others.

Alongside this, a conflict of interests examination is conducted with regard to senior and sensitive positions, as well as a criminal record and a disciplinary charge record check. General Staff Directive 06.103 “Avoidance of Conflict of Interests within the IDF” forbids being in a situation where there may be a conflict of interest between the personal affairs of a person or his relative, or another public interest of a person, and his military position (7). This instruction specifies positions for which an examination of conflict of interests shall always be conducted. For instance, all positions ranked colonel and above and also certain positions in ranks of up to lieutenant colonel, require a conflict of interests’ examination. Moreover, the directives include review and enforcement mechanisms the purpose of which is to minimize the risk of conflict of interest. According to the Government reviewer, there is another General Staff Directive, which is currently in advanced stages of authorization and approval, which will regulate background checks and the limitations of terms for personnel in sensitive positions.

Conflict of interests examinations are conducted with regard to senior and sensitive positions, as well as a criminal record and a disciplinary charge record check. General Staff Directive 06.103 “Avoidance of Conflict of Interests within the IDF” forbids being in a situation where there may be a conflict of interest between the personal affairs of a person or his relative, or another public interest of a person, and his military position (1). This instruction specifies positions for which an examination of conflict of interests shall always be conducted. For instance, all positions ranked colonel and above and also certain positions in ranks of up to lieutenant colonel, require a conflict of interests’ examination. Moreover, the directives include review and enforcement mechanisms the purpose of which is to minimize the risk of conflict of interest. In addition, when complex legal questions arise regarding selection and conflicts of interest, the Department of the Deputy Attorney General (Administrative Law) is consulted. The Attorney General has two sets of guidelines regarding this matter. The first are guidelines regarding the required cooling-off period for public officials transitioning to the private sector, aimed at ensuring that there will be no conflict of interests of public officials who are interested in working in a particular company or organization after their service is completed (2). The second are guidelines regarding conflict of interest arrangements in the public sector (3)
According to the Government reviewer, there is another General Staff Directive, which is currently in advanced stages of authorization and approval, which will regulate background checks and the limitations of terms for personnel in sensitive positions. However, aside from senior positions, there are few details on specific sensitive positions. The enforcement of conflicts of interest checks for these positions appears more irregular. Moreover, not all sensitive positions are openly declared, yet, standard appointment/recruitment processes are followed for positions with particular technical competencies (4) (5).

There is internal oversight in the Ministry of Defence to scrutinise appointment and promotion decisions of personnel in sensitive positions (1). Oversight is provided by the IDF Manpower Directorate and the Deputy Attornye General in relation to complex conflict of interest questions (2). Yet, there is no evidence to suggest that higher risk and sensitive positions are always subject to this external scrutiny or if this is done only in extreme cases. Documents related to these selection processes are internal and not available to the public.

Both the Code of Conduct for the personnel of the Ministry of Defence and the three-year anticorruption plan pay special attention to personnel working in sensitive positions. The former defines what the personnel working in such positions are expected to do in order to ensure a good performance and impartiality of the Administration (from art. 18 to art 22) [1]. Requirements range from the knowledge of all risks related to the position they cover, to the performance of specific training sessions, to declaration of absence of conflict of interests.

The three-year anticorruption plan identifies special areas of risk, like all those areas related to acquisition, progression, training, mobility, appointment, economic treatment and allowances of personnel, legal affairs and disputes, military inspecting activities, financial and promotional activities, asset management, research & development & testing (section III.2), and obligation for the personnel (section III.6.3) [2].

Subsection III.6.3.2 of the three-year plan specifies the criteria for the maximum appointment for both the military (max. 5 years) and civilian personnel in high-risks area (max. 7 years for public officials and max. 5 years for civilian personnel). Should rotation of appointment not be possible, subsection III.6.3.3 specifies eventual alternative measures, like for example personnel sharing, segregation of functions or additional transparency requirements.

Pantouflage (revolving doors) is also regulated by the three-year anticorruption plan (section III.6.7), according to which the personnel of the ministry cannot accept working positions, for a period of three year from the termination of employment in the Ministry, in private enterprises on which he/she exercised authoritative or negotiating power during his/her appointment in the Ministry [1]. For some of the high-risk positions, the Ministry publishes specific vacancies, with specific selection criteria that vary depending on the vacancies [2]. Moreover, section III.6.11 of the Three-year anticorruption plan foresees specific additional activities for selection and training [3].

Internal oversight for high-risk positions is done annually once a year. Nonetheless, should there be any reporting of illicit activities, immediate proceedings are carried out. Measures of corruption preventions are specified in the annual report of the Anticorruption Supervisor (section 6.b) [1]. Corruption countermeasures are the rotation of managerial positions after a prefixed amount of time and annually reports on performance by the anti-corruption officer. Furthermore, in the process of appointing, personnel for high-risk positions is subject to internal evaluation committees, which consider the promotion to those positions. Moreover, the personnel have to satisfy requirements of Legislative Decree 8th April 2013, n. 39 indicating causes of incompatibility and exclusion of assignment (inconferibilità e incompatibilità degli incarichi) [2]. It is not apparent that any external oversight occurs.

An examination of rules that apply to personnel with decision-making power in various fields indicates that awareness of the danger of corruption is greatest within procurement. The circular “Relating to businesses for staff working with procurement” applies to both civil servants in the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and Self-Defence Force (SDF) officials (uniformed personnel). [1] They must treat all businesses that they deal with fairly and report to the head of their institution if they are exposed to pressure to favour a specific company (see Q65A). [1] The circular applies to financial and commercial aspects of procurement as well. The Inspector General’s Office (IGO), the Inspector General’s Office for each service branch and inspectors at each regional district headquarter of the different service branches give general supervision of the work by the SDF. With regard to procurement, there are checks of the calculation of cost prices and checks of tender bids. A list of important laws and ordinances that stipulate how these checks are to be carried out are found in the Compliance Guidance. [2] Rules about the authority to appoint personnel to positions as SDF officials and a majority of the civilian positions in the MOD are described in the Self-Defence Forces Law. [3] Several senior positions in defence, both civilian and military, are appointed by the Minister of Defence. [3] Appointment is to be based on personnel assessment, which includes assessment of compliance with laws and regulations (see Q37B). [4] The “Instructions on the right to appoint” explain in detail who has the right to appoint personnel to which positions, and although it does mention personnel assessment, it does not emphasise any measures that have been explicitly designed to prevent the development of corruption. [5] However, civil servants in Japan generally rotate to new positions after 2-3 years. Such a practice prevents them from developing personal ties that can provide incentives for corruption. [6] A retired former Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) officer with experience from the inspector general system for the MSDF explained that whereas personnel affairs are conducted with fairness in general, there is no special system for appointing staff that work with procurement, contracting or recruitment. However, personnel who have broken rules in the past will most probably be excluded from positions in which it is necessary to exercise fairness. [7]

On the website of the Ministry of Defence, the most extensive information on the selection process for sensitive positions is found in laws and ordinances. However, detailed rules are not available for some aspects of the selection process. The guiding legislation for appointment in the SDF is article 31 of the Self-Defence Forces Law. [1] Instructions have been made that explain some items in this article more comprehensively. However, detailed rules are not found for all aspects of appointment to sensitive positions. Instructions exist that cover topics such as general rules for the appointment and dismissal of SDF personnel [2] and personnel assessment. [3] A circular explains the basic principles for the recruitment and promotion of SDF personnel [4] and states that corresponding principles that apply to civil servants in the ministries cover civil servants in the Ministry of Defence as well. [5] The “Instructions on the right to appoint” refer to several articles in the SDF Law, including article 31. [6] A retired former MSDF officer with experience from the inspector general apparatus for the MSDF said that there is no special system for appointing staff that work with procurement, contracting or recruitment (see Q37A). However, a committee with several members will run checks during appointment to such positions by assessing appointment exams, interviews, etc. [7] This corresponds with the above legislation, including the circular “On the basic principles for the recruitment and promotion of SDF personnel,” [4] and “Basic principles for recruitment and promotion” from the Cabinet Secretariat, [5] which state that the national public servants they cover must possess a sense of mission and morality, but give no rules for the selection of personnel to sensitive positions. Candidates are vetted by examining records of personnel assessment, which article 31 of the Self-Defence Forces Law states is to be emphasised in personnel affairs and is to be fair. [1] Formal personnel assessment of both ability and work performance, of both SDF personnel who work as civil servants and uniformed SDF officials, [3] is conducted at least annually by a person in a supervisory role to the person being assessed. [8] All personnel are assessed according to the same basic criteria, although the specific items that are examined will be different for different categories of personnel. The assessment of ability includes assessment of compliance with morals, [9] which also covers compliance with laws and regulations designed to prevent corruption. [10] The “Instructions on the right to appoint,” which explain in detail who has the right to appoint persons to positions as SDF officials and most categories of civilian positions in the MOD, mention personnel assessment but do not emphasise it, and do not explicitly mention other rules that have been designed to prevent conflict of interest. [6] The MOD has, however, introduced some rules to prevent corruption, most of which apply to broad categories of employees, that should have a beneficial effect for sensitive positions as well. According to the circular “On the basic principles for the recruitment and promotion of SDF personnel” [4] and the “Basic principles for recruitment and promotion” from the Cabinet Secretariat [5] there are harmful effects when national public servants (i.e. civil servants and SDF officials) occupy the same position for a long time. Therefore, national public servants in Japan generally rotate to new positions after 2-3 years. Such a practice prevents them from developing personal ties that can provide incentives for corruption. [11] Restrictions on the reemployment of retired civilian ministry officials and SDF officials are also meant to prevent them from favoring specific businesses (see Q65A).

Rules regarding appointment and promotion are described in article 31 of the SDF Law, but neither this article nor the ordinances that are based on it give rules for the appointment or promotion to sensitive positions. Nor is there any committee with an explicit mandate to conduct oversight of Ministry appointments and promotions in a list of committees on the Ministry’s website. [1] However, it is worth noting that the Defence Personnel Review Board in the Ministry of Defence has a mandate to deal with the issues of remuneration of employees, employee relations with private companies and post-separation employment for the great majority of SDF officials. [2] In addition, reemployment of SDF officials of a rank corresponding to general and higher executive civil servants in the MOD is monitored by the Reemployment Monitoring Committee in the Cabinet Office. [3] The Inspector General’s Office of Legal Compliance does not examine appointments. [4] However, there is oversight of appointment and promotion to some categories of positions, and some positions in these categories will be sensitive. With regard to external scrutiny, the Chief Cabinet Secretary is to screen candidates for executive civil service positions in order to examine whether they have the skills and knowledge that the position requires, and the Minister of Defence shall consult with the Prime Minister and the Chief Cabinet Secretary about the candidates’ conformity with the government’s general principles for personnel before making an appointment decision. [5] While this arrangement may be used to find candidates who will maintain integrity when faced with corruption opportunities, one scholar argues that it is also used to assess the political suitability of candidates. [6] In addition, at regular intervals, the Minister of Defence and the ATLA Commissioner are to report to the Prime Minister about appointments to middle rank civil service positions in the Ministry of Defence and ATLA, respectively, and the Prime Minister can request improvements to such appointment practices. [7] With regard to internal oversight, personnel assessment is to be conducted at least annually for both civil servants and SDF officials in the Ministry of Defence, and compliance with ethical codes and laws is among the items assessed (see Q37B). Given the importance of personnel assessment for determining appointments and promotion, it is significant that personnel assessment done by an assessor is subject to checks by a higher ranked colleague. Furthermore, the employee can make use of a complaints mechanism if they dispute the result of the assessment. [8] In addition, a retired commanding officer of the MSDF said at interview that checks are consistently run during appointment processes to ensure that personal considerations do not have an effect on who is appointed. [9] Thus, while no information has been found about an arrangement designed for the scrutiny of sensitive positions in particular, there is external and internal oversight of some categories of appointments and promotion that include sensitive positions. Hence, there will be some oversight of sensitive positions.

The official webpage of the Jordanian Armed Forces includes some general information about the selection criteria for soldiers and officers [1], however, the website includes no information on attention being given to personnel in sensitive positions, such as those related to procurement, recruitment, contracting, financial and commercial management. There is also no evidence of any recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption than others. Nonetheless, all personnel within the defence sector, and that includes the General Intelligence Department, must obtain a security clearance and must not have been convicted with either criminal or civil offences [1, 2]. A document dating to 1999 includes some information on how the Jordanian Armed Forces prevent misadministration [3]. The document states that within the Jordanian Armed Forces some measures such as rotation, in terms of duration and location, for sensitive positions is a technique used to reduce chances of corruption. The rotation includes all units’ committees in the armed forces, including the financial and procurement department [4]. The selection of senior positions reflects the tribal society as well. Senior positions in the armed forces are distributed to keep the balance between tribes and powers within the kingdom [5].

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable because the selection process is not available to the public. The website of the Jordanian Armed Forces specifies the qualifications needed for soldiers and officers to join the army [1]. To join the intelligence directorate, for example, candidates must possess educational qualifications and must pass a security check [2]. However, the selections are based on two combined factors: the tribe and the merits. High ranks officers are selected based on their tribes, but must have a specific technical qualification to keep the professionalism of the armed forces [3,4,5].

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable because, as noted in 37A, there is no recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption than others. In this regard, this indicator is scored not applicable. There is some evidence that internal oversight takes place in relation to the rotation and appointment of personnel in high-risk positions. The oversight begins with the committee of promotions that propose several names and suggestions to the Commander-in-Chief, who selects which applicants will fill senior positions. They are selected in consultation with the Minister of Defence and the King’s office [1,2,3,4,5,6,7].

Appointments, time in post and oversight of top KDF positions are governed by the KDF Act No.25 of 2012. Special attention is paid to the positions of the Chief of the Defence Forces, the Vice Chief and three Service Commanders. All these appointments are made by the President from recommendations made by the Defence Council section 9. [1]

In addition, their tenure in office is clearly defined within the KDF Act section 24. On the other hand, appointments to other sensitive positions in procurement, contracting, financial and commercial management is at the descretion of the KDF. However, the Supply Chain Management Services Division oversees procurement processes in the KDF. [2] Other procedures relating to contracting, financial management and commercial management are done internally at the discretion of the KDF.

There are specific procedures for selecting sensitive state-officer positions (Chief, Vice and three service Commanders of the Defence) that are laid out under the KDF Act. [1] Other non-state sensitive positions are done by the Defence Council. Section 28 (2) indicates that the Defence Council is mandated to develop the criteria for the recruitment, promotion and transfer of these positions, in consultation with the Public Service Commission. However, there is no known published policy on how recruitment should operate.

Moreover, court documents show that members of staff who have been dismissed have raised concerns on this process especially on dismissal procedures. [2] This is an indication that while there are procedures in place they may be weak, prone to conflict of interest or generally not followed. Nevertheless, for non-sensitive civilian positions, MOD openly advertises the position on its website and other government website including mainstream media channels. The advertisements include both requirements for the positions, job-group and salary range for these positions and at times short-listed candidates after the review of applications has been done. [3, 4] However, there are no known open recruitment procedures or position-specific conflict of interest procedures.

The Defence Council is a constitutional oversight body established under Article 241 (6) of Kenya’s constitution. The council has an oversight role in the operations of the KDF. The KDF Act in section 20 stipulates one of the roles of the Defence Council as advising the President on matters relating to the KDF. [1]

This role can be presumed to include oversight in the appointment and promotion of officers in sensitive positions. However, the KDF Act does not state explicitly whether the Defence Council oversees appointment of officers in sensitive positions, as it does in the appointment of the Chief of Defence Forces, the Vice Chief, and three Service Commanders. [1]

The Integrity Plan (2019-2022) of the Ministry of Defence recognises risks to institutional integrity on some aspects of the Ministry of Defence and Kosovo Security Forces; however, this recognition is superficial [1]. The Plan states that the issues of procurement, finance, logistics and human resources may present risks to institutional integrity. The Integrity Plan stipulates that civilian staff within the fields of procurement, finance, logistics and human resources can diversify their skills in order to increase efficiency and enhance professional capacities [1, 2], similar to in the military, where staff of the Kosovo Security Forces can be transferred from one duty station to another [1]. However, neither the Integrity Plan nor the Regulation No. 03/2018 on Career Development of members of the Kosovo Security Forces [2] determine which positions may be more exposed to corruption and institutional integrity risks.

According to the government reviewer, based on the Law on Classification and Security Verification No. 03/L-178, the Ministry of Defense has drafted the document – List of official positions that have access to Classified information no. 40/2015 – according to which each member who has access to Classified information is subject to the Verification procedure at the levels provided by the positions; Top Secret, Secret and Confidential. Regulation on the Review of the Figure Cleanliness (background check) of MKSF-KSF Employees, No. 03/2015 according to which each member who becomes part of the MoD/KSF is subject to the Figure cleanliness process which means that he must be worthy of it served in the MoD/KSF, not to have legal problems with state institutions or criminal offenses.

The current legislation and policy documents in place, published on the website of the Ministry of Defence, do not reference sensitive positions within the Ministry of Defence and the Kosovo Security Forces. Moreover, these positions are not openly disclosed, so it is difficult to identify which positions are sensitive, and which procedures are followed for such positions.
In general, the conflict of interest within the public sector in Kosovo is generally addressed through the Law No. 06/L-011 on Prevention of Conflict of Interest in Discharge of a Public Function [1], while the Ministry of Defence follows its Regulation No. 04/2019 on Secondary Employment for Members of the Kosovo Security Forces (KSF) [2], adopted in July 2019 by the Minister of Defence. The regulation states that the KSF members are not allowed to engage in other secondary employment outside the Ministry of Defence or the KSF that may inhibit his/her performance and affects the execution of KSF objectives [2]. With regards to conflicts of interest, the Regulation determines that secondary employment will not be allowed if it constitutes genuine or apparent conflict of interest with formal duties, private or financial interests, or negatively influences in any way the member’s ability to perform duties and responsibilities [2]. However, neither Regulation addresses sensitive positions within the defence sector. Nonetheless, the Integrity Plan (2019-2022) of the Ministry of Defence foresees revision to the Regulation No. 04/2019 on Secondary Employment for Members of the KSF, in order to address issues of secondary employment within the defence sector [3]. The Plan states that procedures will be established to prevent the misuse of professional know-how by military and civilian personnel of the Ministry of Defence and the KSF during and after their employment.

During the selection procedure of personnel, enrolment in the KSF can only be confirmed after the vetting process and security clearance has been confirmed [4]. Failure at any stage of this recruitment process results in the dismissal from the KSF [4]. Furthermore, according to the government reviewer, based on the legal provisions of Law no. 06 / l-011 on the prevention of conflict of interest in the exercise of public office, as well as the request of the Kosovo Anti-Corruption Agency, the Ministry of Defense has appointed two MoD officials as officials responsible for handling and resolving conflict situations. Also, the Ministry of Defense has the List of official positions that have access to Classified information no. 40/2015, according to which the classification of positions (military and civil) is done in terms of the level of verification. Positions that have higher sensitivity have a higher level of verification. Verification is a necessary condition of recruitment and promotion which is described in Regulation no. 02/2013 on Recruitment in the KSF and also in Regulation NR. 03/2018 on Career Development of KSF Members.

The Integrity Plan (2019-2022) of the Ministry of Defence introduced a new rule for digital recordings in spaces where recruitment and promotion processes are conducted for board and committee positions, and military and civilian personnel [1]. This would increase transparency, thus strengthening the internal oversight of these processes, and it aims to promote meritocracy in recruitment, selection and promotion processes within defence institutions [1]. According to the government reviewer, the Ministry of Defense is in the process of finalizing the new Recruitment Regulation, which provides for digitalization, respectively recording of interviews (video and audio). Also, in the Action Plan for 2020, it is planned to provide conditions for the digitalization of the spaces where the recruitment and promotion processes take place. However, there is no reference in this Integrity Plan, the Regulation No. 02/2013 on Recruitment into the KSF [2] or the Regulation No. 03/2018 on Career Development of the KSF Members [3] of recruitment processes for sensitive positions within the Ministry of Defence and the Kosovo Security Forces (KSF).
The Ministry of Defence states that there is external scrutiny for sensitive positions of the Ministry of Defence and the KSF [4]. However, there was no evidence provided for this confirmation.
The Rules of Procedure of the Kosovo Assembly are vague when listing the responsibilities of the Committee which oversees the KSF [5]. This committee is responsible for reviewing legislation and conducting investigations of issues relating to organisation, financing, hiring personnel, supply and distribution to the bases of the KSF [5]. The European Commission reported that the Committee’s oversight of the KSF has generally been insufficient in recent years [7].

There is no legislation that shows that the Kuwaiti authorities recognise that more areas, especially sensitive ones like the ones in the arms procurement departments, might be more open to corruption, and there is no set criteria for these posts. Officials and activists say they are usually given to Government loyalists, and the CSC says it is often not given reasons even for civilian personnel hirings. A senior CSC official said that sometimes auditors do not even ask for reasons because they know they will not receive them (1, 2, 3, 4 and 5).

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable because there is no recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption than others. Virtually all sensitive positions are not openly declared and there is no legislation that explains the steps the ministries take to make sure that there is no conflict of interest, but articles 4, 5, 8 and 9 of the law to combat conflict of interest in the Government say that defence and security employees, like other Government employees, should never have a financial conflict interest that could benefit in any way from their work (1). Even the families of these officials cannot run or own a business that might benefit from their connection to the Government. The police law is especially specific about this, saying it would allow officers to run businesses so long as it is on behalf of first, second, third or fourth degree relatives — and the law against the conflict of interest narrows down the fields in which these businesses could be.

Those found guilty would receive a sentence of at least one year in prison, which can go up to five, along with a fine that cannot be less than about 1000 USD, according to article 11. The decision they benefited from is also automatically reneged.

The above process is carried out by public prosecutors.The conflict of interest act was passed in March 2018, so not much can be said about its efficacy at the moment.

There is no clear recruitment process for technical competencies, according to officials and an analyst focused on Kuwait (2, 3, 4).

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable because there is no recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption than others. However, there is an internal process that is carried out by the internal auditors of these institutions, according to state auditors and an analyst focused on Kuwait said (1, 2 and 3).

ACA and SAB officials say selections are made more based on political loyalties and less on merit. The finances of the candidates are superficially examined by internal auditors and often obvious points of conflict of interests are ignored.

The internal process is unreliable because the internal auditors are controlled by and dependent on the very security chiefs they should be investigating.

Attempts, by the ACA and SAB to examine these internal process often fail due to lack of cooperation from the side of the institutions and the political interference of the executive branch described in the answer to Q 25B.

The oversight agencies, along with Parliament, often fail to shame or pressure these organisations into cooperating, because they have the ear of the Emir who can dissolve both the Parliament and the Government, according to articles 107 and 56 of the constitution (5).

The Regulations of the Cabinet of Ministers No.630, approved on October 17, 2017, introduce an obligation for all public institutions to elaborate internal control systems to prevent risks of corruption and conflict of interest. The head of the public institution is responsible for identifying the areas, functions, positions and processes most exposed to corruption risks. According to the Regulations of the Cabinet of Ministers, the head of the institution has to elaborate the order in which an employee has to act if they want to report possible fraud, including corruption. The reporting process has to include activities to ensure the anonymity and protection of the reporter. The internal control system with the above mentioned provisions had to established by the end of 2018. [1] The MOD has a list of high-risk positions and selection criteria. The at-risk personnel are the deputy state secretary responsible for procurement, the director of ICT division, the head of ICT project management and planning department, the head of ICT management department, and the head of the Private law department. The list of concrete risks is specified as well, mostly including actions related to classified information and issues of state secret. [2]

The employment of any personnel linked to the defence sector – militiamen, civil servants, contract employees, reserve soldiers, reservists and soldiers – takes place in two phases. In the first phase, recruitment, society is informed about the possibilities of work, information about the potential candidates is gathered, and the most adequate candidates are put through to the second phase, the selection process. During the selection process, each candidate is evaluated individually, taking into account the needs of the structure and the competences of the candidate, as well as the limitations (e.g. former employment, legal proceedings). In civilian institutions, besides the open selection procedure or rotation, a candidate’s competences (education, experience in the field) are taken into account. The personnel of the National Armed Forces is identified and aggregated at the National Armed Forces Joint Headquarters level. Based on the personnel dynamics indicators and staffing limits set in the planning documents, the recruitment request for the recruitment and selection of responsible bodies is provided centrally. NAF Recruitment Requests define certain requirements according to which, in addition to the general eligibility for professional service, candidates will be selected for service in specific positions. [1] [2] [3]

The MOD has introduced an oversight system, which is based on a division of responsibilities and “four eye” principle, and does not allow unilateral decisions; an internal control system oversees the process. However, there is no external scrutiny of higher-risk sensitive positions. No second source available. [1]

First and second-degree posts in the LAF are allocated on a sectarian basis (1). Although competencies are looked for when picking personnel for sensitive posts, sectarian issues play a fundamental role in the selection process (2). LAF Command and DMI consider positions with budgetary, procurement, and financial management prerogatives (such as J4) as sensitive posts (3), (4), (5). Thus, selections are carefully vetted internally (3), (4), (5). LAF Command adopts a “trust but verify” approach to the decisions related to officers in these positions (3), (4).

The sectarian element overrules competencies and is a precondition to an appointment (1). Heads of political parties are continuously involved in the nomination of military personnel to key posts that are allocated to their respective sect (2).

The Military Council is responsible for approving the promotion and appointments of military personnel before sending them to the minister of defence (1). High ranking appointments, such as that of the chief of staff, deputies to the CoS, and members of the Military Council are approved by the CoM in a form of decree based on the proposal of the defence minister (2). Although the CoM has to oversee and approve the appointment of highly sensitive posts, it is done based on political and sectarian considerations (3).

There is an established system based on pre-set criteria for appointing military personnel. Military officers are appointed by the Defence Minister after they receive recommendations from the internal Commission which is organised each time in those institutions that have opened a recruitment round new staff members [3]. The composition of the Commission depends on what kind of position the Institution is looking to fill and whether this position is executive or not. Each candidate is considered according to specific criteria [1]. There is no special attention paid to corruption risks when appointing staff, except for some specific roles, such as the Head of the newly established Defence Resource Agency responsible for centralised procurement [2]. However, staff policy emphasises that it focuses on the values of each candidate and this might play a role when choosing whom to employ [1]. No positions are classified as “high-risk”.

Given that there is no recognition that certain positions are more at risk to corruption than others, this indicator is scored Not Applicable.

The selection process is regulated by the Law on Public Service and the Government decree for organising the selection for incoming officials [1,2]. The information about the recruitment process and competition is publicly available on the Civil Service department portal. Moreover, candidates can submit online the documents required for the application. The selection process is implemented according to predefined conditions and criteria. According to the government reviewer, each candidate is considered at a certain Commission depending on the candidate’s rank. The candidate is considered according to specific criteria [4]. During the selection process, the appointing institution receives recommendations and conclusions from the internal Commission, which examines and evaluates the candidate’s suitability for a given position. Yet, not all positions are open and it is unclear how conflicts of interest are avoided during the selection process, and if procedural rules are always followed by the Selection Commission.

Given that there is no recognition that certain positions are more at risk to corruption than others, this indicator is scored Not Applicable.

The policy regarding national defence system personnel foresees the essential principles of recruitment, training, activity evaluation, tasks and functions of personnel [1]. The concept foresees that during the recruitment process, internal and external information about possible candidates is gathered and collected. Appointment and promotion decisions are based on pre-determined criteria, collected information, candidate education, selection commission recommendations and conclusions. The final decision on the appointment or promotion is confirmed by top officials. There is no external or special scrutiny for higher-risk or sensitive positions. The recruitment and promotion process for all positions is implemented following the same process [2].

The decision to place an officer in a ministry is under the purview/power of Public Service Department (PSD). There is recognition within the government and MOD that specific positions within the Ministry and MAF are critical and sensitive. Therefore, there is always an effort by HR to rotate these officers. The PSD will try its best to rotate these officers between agencies, for example to other ministries or organisations. The maximum period any officer can occupy a post is three years, which can be extended by up to six months if there is specific request of the head of the department. [1] The PSD has never allowed an officer to stay longer than the period stipulated. However, in practice, many of these officials stay in a specific role for longer than expected due to their technical expertise, subject matter specialism or due to political reasons. In one example, an officer remained in the defence industry department for more than 20 years. Her stay was extended due to her technical expertise. [2] She eventually left the ministry for family reasons.

Selections for any post are based on seniority and experience in the administration. There are no specific requirements that an officer be placed in a certain ministry for his or her technical expertise. For instance, an engineering officer can be placed at the Ministry of Home Affairs although his educational background is more suitable to a place in the Ministry of Public Works. Furthermore, although the PSD never claims never to allow an officer to stay longer than the period stipulated, there was an exceptional case whereby an officer in the ministry (who was in defence industry department) stayed in the same department for more than 20 years. [1] Significant discretion is employed in the recruitment and selection of personnel in sensitive positions. Her stay was extended due to her technical expertise. [1] There are many other cases like this where an officer has retired in the same place they were hired in after more than 20-30 years of service, due to their subject knowledge and the fact that the department does not want to lose their experience. The HRM department within MINDEF conducts screening of employees and will avoid placing individuals where they have personal interests with the Malaysian Armed Forces or contractors, but there is no publicly availaible evidence of a policy or procedure to assure this. [2]

Appointment and promotion decisions of personnel in sensitive positions in the Ministry are decided by the PSD. There is no internal mechanism to monitor it. The PSD, however, may seek comments and recommendations from the Ministry’s secretary general when making decisions. [1]

There is strong evidence showing that there is no recognition within the government that certain areas of the armed forces are more at risk of corruption than others. Rather than operating under even stricter conditions, military accountants are typically subject to fewer controls than their counterparts in other state departments.
For example, military accountants, unlike other public sector accountants, are not appointed by or with the agreement of the Minister of Economy and Finance and do not take a professional oath (as is required by the 1996 public accounting act for all other public sector accountants). They are thus not accountable to the Minister of Economy and Finance.²
Another weakness in the military sector is that accounting positions are not divided into principal and secondary accountants, as is the case in all other ministries. Instead, commanders of administrative centres have a dual role with implementation (authorisation of funds) and accounting functions similar to those of principal accountants in the civilian administration.² There is no evidence that the procedures have changed since the SIPRI study identified this weakness in 2006.
The prevalence of nepotism and political bias in public appointments in Mali encourages situations in which key technical decisions are informed by political interests that often contradict formal principles, planned budget objectives and accounting norms.²

Because no special attention is paid to personnel in high-risk positions, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

A defence attaché working in Bamako says that people are generally appointed to the appropriate positions according to their skills and qualifications,⁴ i.e. those with procurement training work in procurement positions. However, as a RAND study from 2017 emphasises “it is challenging to understand systems for promotion, salary payment, career management, and pension absent a developed human resources system”.¹ This assessment was confirmed by a security expert, who said that the human resources department within the armed forces is “very weak”.⁵ According to the source, staff databases are “outdated and incomplete”.⁵ EUTM is helping to introduce a biometric database for all military personnel, but it is not yet functional.
The widespread recruitment through patronage rather than a merit-based system throughout the public sector, including the armed forces, dominates concerns about corruption risks. TI’s report from 2016 notes that such recruitment practices undermine competence levels within the armed forces and contribute to “weaknesses such as patchy or non-existent management systems, frequent lack of basic provisions and delays in the payment of salaries”.² This confirms the findings of the SIPRI study that states that the prevalence of nepotism and political bias in public appointments in Mali encourages situations in which key technical decisions are informed by political interests that often contradict formal principles, planned budget objectives and accounting norms.³

Because no special attention is paid to personnel in high-risk positions, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

The appointment of Ibrahim Dahirou Dembélé as Inspector General of the Army in February 2018 illustrates the lack of external oversight in the selection process for critical defence roles (see Q41 for more information on this case). Dembélé, who was previously Chief of Staff under Captain Sanogo’s junta in 2012, was appointed despite the fact that he had been on probation and awaiting trial since March 2014 in connection with alleged assassinations that took place on Sanogo’s watch.¹ ⁴ ⁵
The appointment was made by the Council of Ministers, which accepted the nomination of the Minister of Defence.⁶ Dembélé was appointed a mere 15 days after a court in Bamako had lifted his probation status.¹ The assessor found no evidence to indicate that the controversial appointment was subject to any external scrutiny or parliamentary discussion despite the nomination being heavily politicised.¹ ⁴ ⁵
Similarly, there is little information available specifically detailing what kind of external scrutiny M’Bemba Moussa Keita was subject to when he was appointed the armed forces new chief of staff in 2017.² ³
Finally, when several officers spoke out against Captain Amadou Sanogo promotion to 4-star General without any clear process of approval or oversight in 2013, they were arrested.⁷

In coordination with the National Anticorruption System, the dependencies and the internal control bodies must pay special attention to all public servants, regardless of their position. [1]

This indicator is scored ‘Not Applicable.’ By legal mandate, the hiring and selection process for delicate positions in defence institutions – such as heads, comptrollers, magistrates, commanders, among others – [1] [2] falls to the Executive branch, for which reason specialists point out that said process can present significant levels of discretion [3] [4] [5], and there are no conflict of interest policies.

This indicator is scored ‘Not Applicable.’ There is no special scrutiny for the appointment of personnel in these positions in SEDENA. Although the Senate is responsible for ratifying these, [1] [2] [3] this power is not considered as a measure of external scrutiny.

The government claims that all persons employed in the Ministry are scrutinised by the National Intelligence Agency, and special attention is given to those that are provided with permission to access secret data. [1][2][3] However, sensitive positions, that may be more open to corruption opportunities than others, are not identified. [4][5]

According to the MoD reviewer, on governmental level, special attention is paid to personnel in sensitive positions that includes decision-making competences in procurement, recruitment, contracting, financial and commercial management. This information could not be verified.

Within the Ministry of Defence there is a control mechanism — the General Inspection Department and Intelligence and Security Directorate — that oversees the work of employees of the Ministry and the Armed Forces of Montenegro, including officials who deal with the above-mentioned areas.

General Inspection Department and Intelligence and Security Directorate (former Department for Military Intelligence and Security Affairs) control work of personnel on sensitive (higher-risk) position within Ministry of Defence of Montenegro.
According to the Rulebook on Internal Organization and Sistematization, General Inspection Department conducts, among other: internal control over the performance of military-intelligence, counter-intelligence and security affairs in the Ministry and the Army; internal control over the measures taken on the basis of all forms of unethical and illegal behavior of employees in the Ministry and the Army (control and instructional activities in cases of suspected illegal behavior of employees and measures taken to determine the responsibility of employees in the Ministry and the Army in case of suspicion or violation of official duties. (Article 11 of the Rulebook) [6]

Law on Military Intelligence and Security Affairs: Military intelligence and security affairs, which are performed in the Ministry of Defence, include: …. performing security checks and determining security issues for employees and persons employed on any basis in the Ministry, persons serving in the Army and persons employed on any basis in the Army. (Article 5, paragraph 1 item 8) [7]

Not all sensitive positions are openly declared; instead, many personnel are initially employed through short-term contracts. [1] There is no information about the implementation of conflict of interest policies, but the EU underlines that strong political will is still needed to effectively address the de-politicisation of the public service, [2] while local NGOs underline that in a captured state, the most important positions are filled on the basis of political criteria. [3][4][5]

The Minister decides on the appointment and promotion of all personnel including those in special positions, upon proposals of the Head of the Army or Head of Departments, and has a discretionary right to accept or refuse the proposals. [1][2][3][4][5] The Parliament does not review these decisions nor is there any external scrutiny over them. [6]

Interviewees argue that there is special attention paid to the selection, time in post, and oversight of personnel in sensitive positions, including officials and personnel in defence procurement, contracting, financial management, and commercial management. However this oversight is internal, non-transparent and subjective. It serves two objectives:
⁃ Prevent senior officers from gaining too much power and challenging the King’s legitimacy and authority, as happened during the 1971 and 1972 military coup attempts.
⁃ Ensure lower ranking officers do not personally benefit from corruption without the approval – and in some cases participation – of higher ranking officials (1)(2).

No evidence was found pointing to the recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption opportunities than others.

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable because, as noted in 37A, there is no recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption than others. Article 49 of the Constitution excludes the nomination of senior military personnel from holding the appointment powers of the Council of Ministers (1).
Article 53 states that « the King is the Supreme Leader of the Armed Royal Forces. He appoints military personnel and can delegate that right » (1).

No evidence of regulations was found in process of recruitment and selection of personnel in sensitive positions by the King or delegates (2). Due to lack of evidence and the lack of control exercised by counter powers over the King’s actions or decisions, it appears that open recruitment is not the standard operating procedure. There is no evidence of conflict of interest policies.

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable because, as noted in 37A, there is no recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption than others. Interviewees argue that there is special scrutiny of personnel in sensitive positions, including officials and personnel in defence procurement, contracting, financial management, and commercial management. However this oversight is internal, non-transparent and subjective. It serves two objectives:
⁃ Prevent senior officers from gaining too much power and challenging the King’s legitimacy and authority, as happened during the 1971 and 1972 military coup attempts, as well as preventing collusion with the intelligence services of countries such as Algeria.
⁃ Ensure lower rank officers do not personally benefit from corruption without the approval – and in some cases participation – of higher ranking officials (1)(2).

Elements concur to show that there is no transparent and objective scrutiny of personnel in sensitive positions.

The Directorate of Procurement is directly responsible for defence procurement [1], but the military rarely makes the appointment process public. MEHL and MCP also contribute to the military’s budget [2]. There is some evidence that senior generals are linked to these businesses, [3] but the assessor could not find any further information on whether the position of director in these corporations is paid any special attention or not [2, 4].

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’. The Directorate of Procurement is directly responsible for defence procurement, but the military rarely makes the appointment process public [1]. MEHL and MCP also contribute to the military’s budget. The governance structure of both MEHL and MEC lacks transparency [2].

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’. Military personnel enjoy immunity from the Anti-Corruption Law[1]. There is no special officer appointed in regiments to oversee personnel in sensitive positions, but there are respective scrutiny officers in the headquarters tribunal [2].

Special attention is paid to government personnel in sensitive positions. The Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD) investigates (potential) employees for possible indications of illegal or improper behaviour to ascertain whether the person in question is fit for a position that requires confidentiality and integrity [1]. The level of investigation (A, B or C) differs depending on the sensitivity of the function, but all defence employees must receive a Certificate of No Objection from the MIVD [2,3]. Recruitment processes for senior positions within the Ministry of Defence, i.e. those which involve decision-making in procurement, recruitment, contracting, finance or commerce, are part of the General Administrative Service [4]. Over 1,400 government management positions on Scale 15 or higher within the national government have been designated as General Administrative Services and are subject to special hiring processes [4]. There is further separation within the General Administrative Service, which is subject to the Bureau’s ‘Top Management Group (TMG) vacancy process’ [4]. There are special integrity rules for the TMG, as it is seen to be most at risk of ‘financial conflict of interest or improper use of price-sensitive information or the acquirement of financial interests that they are not allowed to own’ [5].

Recruitment processes for senior positions within the Ministry of Defence, i.e. those which involve decision-making in procurement, recruitment, contracting, finance or commerce, are part of the General Administrative Service [1]. Over 1,400 government management positions on Scale 15 and higher within the national government have been designated as General Administrative Services and are subject to special hiring processes [1]. Recruitment processes for most senior positions within the Ministry of Defence are subject to the government General Administrative Service Bureau’s ‘Top Management Group (TMG) vacancy process’ [2]. The TMG vacancy process involves numerous stages, including the establishment of selection criteria, against which candidates are evaluated during the interview, preselection, shortlisting, assessment and selection stages [2]. The General Administrative Service states that candidates are placed according to the profile of the position on the basis of knowledge, experience and competencies [2]. Before appointment, the Business Unit of the AIVD is responsible for screening and vetting candidates and advising relevant ministers on the viability of shortlisted candidates [2]. Further, the revolving-door policy applicable to ministers was tightened in 2017 when a two-year ban on lobbying was enforced for former ministers and state secretaries on matters regarding their former policy area [3]. There is also a ban on conducting business with the MoD within two years of leaving the MoD.

The recruitment, scrutiny and appointment of personnel in high-level, decision-making positions in defence (on or above Scale 15) are conducted by the government General Administrative Service Bureau, with input from the MoD and the Military Intelligence Service (for vetting) [1]. The General Administrative Service Bureau is overseen by the Secretary General and Director General of the General Administrative Service, not the Ministry of Defence [1]. Higher-risk and sensitive positions that are part of the Top Management Group are subject to an enhanced process. As part of this process, after interviews, the candidate’s profile is submitted to the TMG Preselection Committee (VSC), which monitors the objectivity of the preselection phase in accordance with the selection criteria [2]. The VSC is chaired by a professional with extensive management development experience at the top level who is outside of national government [2]. Based on the advice of the VSC, the selection list of one or more candidates is sent to the Minister of Defence and the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations [2].

The Public Service Act 2020 (formally the State Sector Act 1988) provides the statutory framework for employment in departments, including the Ministry of Defence [1]. This includes statutory requirements for Standards of Conduct, Chief Executive’s responsibility for ensuring compliance with the standards, and recruitment and selection [2, 3]. All staff of the Ministry of Defence, including the Chief Executive, are public servants and are subject to the Public Service Commissioner’s Standards of Integrity and Conduct [4, 5]. According to the Model Standards for managing conflicts of interests, senior members are expected to set an example and are held to a higher account “given their level of influence on decisions about matters of public significance or value and their higher public profile” [6]. In support of these requirements, prior to commencing work, all persons employed by the NZDF and MoD must obtain an appropriate level of security clearance that includes ascertaining if there are any past convictions, and factors that would make the person open to bribery, corruption, or acting illegally [7]. Sensitive positions require a higher security clearance and therefore a higher threshold of oversight in the vetting process. There are very few people with the autonomy detailed in the question indicator, and those that do undergo a special selection process (See Q41 and Q42). In addition, all project management staff involved in procurement at the Ministry of Defence are made aware of the Government Rules of Sourcing, which are incorporated into the Ministry’s Procurement Policy. [8] All staff must sign the Ministry Code of Conduct and disclose any conflicts of interest as part of their employment contract. [9] In the NZDF, the Defence Commercial Services (DCS) have a role in ensuring correct processes and transparency are maintained when engaging civilian contractors, awarding contracts for work and the like. This includes the review of contracts by an independent Board prior to the contracts being awarded [10]. All chief executives are subject to post-employment restrictions through their contract of employment with the Public Services Commissioner – though the official stance adopted by the Commissioner is that except in certain cases “former public employees should otherwise be free or not unduly or unreasonably inhibited in their employment pursuits” [11, 12].

In the MoD there are stringent conflict of interests policies and procedures to which all staff, especially those in senior positions, must abide. MoD policy requires the personnel recruitment process to be open, consistent, fair, and merit based [1, 2]. NZ Police background checks, or Ministry of Justice checks, for past convictions are compulsory and security vetting is dependent upon a position’s duties and responsibilities; many senior positions within the MoD are required to have some of the highest security clearances – a process undertaken by the NZSIS [3, 4]. All appointments and recruitments must follow the principles (politically neutral, free and frank advice, merit-based appointments, open government, stewardship) and values (impartial, accountable, trustworthy, respectful, and responsive) of the Public Service [5.] The MoD did not specify whether revolving door policies are in place for sensitive positions.

At the most senior level of the NZDF, the appointment of the Chief of Defence Force (CDF) and Service Chiefs is a Public Services Commission process, aligned to the appointment processes for any chief executive across the public sector. The selection process itself is managed to ensure independence and transparency. The CDF is a panel member of the Service Chief process [6]. Postings, both temporary and permanent, have clear timeframes with the former being no more than 18 months duration in New Zealand and more than six months but less than 10 months overseas. The latter comprises no less than 18 months in New Zealand and no less than 10 months overseas [7]. All members of the NZDF require security clearance, though security clearances are generally only to be applied for to the level required for an individual to do their role [8]. Given the rotational policy this minimises security vetting efforts and makes for more efficient use of resources. Specialists are not given preferential treatment, and in general, the same standards are applied – though their recruitment selection, and promotion may deviate from “regular” personnel. For example, minimum qualifying time for promotion may be reduced for specialist officers [9]. Further information on the selection process can be found in Q41.

At the very highest level, the Public Service Commissioner provides guidance on applicants for the Chief Executive positions such as that of the Chief of Defence Force, and promotes integrity, accountability, and transparency through the State Services [1, 2]. Moreover, the Commissioner is not subordinated to the minister and must act independently when making a decision about public service chief executives though this does not apply for matters of appointment, reappointment, transfer, conditions of employment, and removal from office of chief executives [3]. Importantly, the commissioner retains strong independence when undertaking performance reviews of chief executives. [4] The ministry’s Governance, People and Executive Services Division undertakes audits and assessments of Human Resource policies, but this is not independent [5].

The NZDF operates the Three Lines of Assurance Model to assure effective management of risk, including bribery and corruption risk, and the maintenance of internal controls. The First Line of Assurance is the NZDF’s own management functions which have ownership, responsibility and accountability for directly assessing, controlling, and mitigating risks. The Second Line of Assurance consists of activities covered by several components of internal oversight (i.e. governance, financial management, security, risk management, quality, information technology and compliance). This line of assurance monitors and facilitates the implementation of effective risk management practices and assists risk owners in reporting adequate risk related information up and down the organisation. Internal Audit operates within the Third Line of Assurance. The function, through a risk-based approach to its work, provides independent assurance to the CDF, the NZDF Advisory Board, and executive management on the adequacy and effectiveness of internal controls operated by the first and second lines of assurance [6]. Regardless, there is no oversight of these positions beyond general management, and no independent oversight.

The assessor found no evidence of a clearly defined procedure in the military/defence establishment to select personnel covering higher-risk positions. According to conducted interviews, it seems there may be an implicit awareness that some positions are more sensitive than others (1,2).
Although outdated, the ICG Report on Niger from September 2013 (3) characterises the Nigerien Armed Forces (FAN) as favouring the ethnic Djerma population when recruiting. This is attributed to the top of the military hierarchy, according to that report. It also adds that the political connections to FAN by members of the government have been historically ‘clientelist’ in nature:
“Rather than ethnic criteria, it seems that more than anything, personal connections within the army strongly distort the procedure for promotion and provoke imbalances and frustration…As military interference is common in Nigerien politics, politicians have also sometimes managed to establish close clientelistic relationships with officers. Civilian governments must, therefore, take account of the security forces and have learned they sometimes need to form alliances with them…” (3).

No evidence was found regarding a clearly defined procedure in the military/defence establishment to select personnel covering higher-risk positions. Therefore this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

According to the World Bank public expenditure report from 2017 (1), the selection process for personnel in Niger’s security sector revealed that the country lacks a genuine sectoral strategy with clear priorities, among other staffing shortfalls. The report stated:
“Personnel expenditure continued to comprise a large portion of the budget that same year, while funding for operations was reduced. However, the public expenditure report found the accuracy of Niger’s security budgets to be precarious… Numerous supplementary budget laws since 2009 revealed a lack of spending predictability, although this is justified by the deteriorating security situation. Overall, the PER determined Niger lacked a genuine sectoral strategy that sets clear priorities… Among the particular shortcomings of the multiyear sectoral estimates were the failure to include appropriations to compensate increased staffing levels; the absence of a detailed, transparent breakdown of security sector spending; the multiplicity of objectives and lack of forecasting of total costs; and a disconnect between the armed forces’ estimates of their requirements and the formalized sector strategy” (1, p.34).

However, it should be noted that this quote refers to a 2013 World Bank report (p.34, p.59). As of August 2018, no more recent analysis was found by the assessor. It is likely that since 2013, Niger’s management of human resources has improved in the context of growing insecurity and the need to respond to the threat (2). There is also a clear formal framework for the recruitment process that is referred to in detail in question 42. Recent nominations on top management level (January 2018), also quoted in question 41, respond in general to technical competencies required for the positions (3). Therefore, it is difficult to assess with precision the extent to which the recruitment process is followed for technical competencies, especially when it comes to personnel in sensitive positions.

No evidence was found regarding a clearly defined procedure in the military/defence establishment to select personnel covering higher-risk positions. Therefore this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

Niger’s Ministry of Defence lacks an internal oversight body to scrutinise the appointment and promotion of officers. As per the Constitution of 2010, oversight could be qualified as tacit because the president is also the supreme commander of the armed forces. Furthermore, the Superior Council of National Defence can act as an advisory body in the appointment of high-ranking military positions and the promotion of officers.

Article 63 states, “the President of the Republic is the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.” While Article 64 states, “the Superior Council of National Defence advises on the appointment to high-ranking military positions and the promotion of officers, and any other military matter brought before it.”
(Consultant translation French to English)

No evidence shows that the selection process of personnel in sensitive positions, like procurement in the defence and security sectors, receives special attention. Although procurement is a high-risk area, the failure to fully implement the PPA 2007 suggests insufficient attention is paid to protect the selection process for its personnel. The failure to implement the Procurement Council sections of the act does not provide for an independent decision-making process concerning the procurement process. Other priorities, such as a relationship with the ruling party or ethnic background, are important in the selection process (1).

No evidence shows that special attention is paid to personnel in high-risk positions. Therefore this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

No evidence shows that special attention is paid to personnel in high-risk positions. Therefore this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

Laws and By-laws specific to the defence sector (such as the Law on Defence, the Law on Service in the Armed Forces, the Collective Agreement of the Ministry of Defence) regulate the selection, service period and oversight of personnel in all positions, including sensitive roles like in Procurement, Contracting and Finance). Procurement-related posts are explicitly regulated by the Law on Public Procurement (LPP) [1]. Enforcing this Law are members of the Public Procurement Committee (Article 29), who notably award the appropriate certificate to a public procurement staff-member for passing an exam (Article 29a-1). this Committee also confirms through a compulsory statement the absence of any conflict of interest (Article 62). However, the LPP does not limit the terms for any member of the Public Procurement Committee. As such, the length of a member’s service is mainly regulated in accordance with the Code of Conduct for the conduct of public procurement (Article 29a-4). This Code specifies the professional and ethical duties of the public procurement staff member, underlining the respect for the principles of conflict of interest and prohibits any bribery, accepting gifts, and abusing the position for personal gains [2].

According to the Law on Public Procurement, procurement personnel need to have a certificate to show the completion of organised by the Public Procurement Biro, which lasts for three years before needing to be renewed [1]. In general, the selection process, appointments and time in post are executed according the provisions of the Law on Army Service in the Republic of Macedonia [2].

The Law of Public Procurement only outlines the general principles of procurement and the overall selection procedure for members of the procurement committees. Nonetheless, it has been confirmed that the procedures to protect conflicts of interest are in place and strictly followed [3].

The oversight of procurement procedures, in particular of the Ministry of Defence, and the appointment and promotion of personnel in confidential positions in this sector, are regulated by the Ministry of Defence’s internal Guideline on the Manner of Implementation of Public Procurement Procedures in the Ministry of Defence [1]. The oversight of the process of appointment and promotion of personnel in all other sectors is regulated by the Law on Army Service [2] and also the Law on Civil Servants [3]. Both Laws stipulate procedures for selection, appointment and promotion of public service personnel. In terms of procurements, the selection process for the President and members of the Ministry of Defence’s Public Procurement Committee are organised and overviewed by the Unit for Management and Procurement and the Department for Logistics (Article 4.1) [1]. Based on this, the decision for public procurement, including the selection of respective committee members, is approved and signed by the Minister of Defence (Article 4.2.9) [1]. The final decision is submitted to the Finance Department, the President and the members of the Public Procurement Committee, upon which a report is deposited in the archives of the Ministry (Article 4.2.10) [1]. External scrutiny exist only for the public procurement process but not for the selection of Public Procurement Committee members.

Generally, employment regulations are the same for the whole defence sector [1]. The Ministry of Defence and the Defence Staff make a continuous assessment on which positions have to be covered by specific procedures limiting conflict of interests [2]. The appointment system for the selection of defence personnel is described in the Instruction For Personnel Management in the Ministry of Defence and Subordinate Agencies and the Regulation on Service For Military and Civil Personnel in the Ministry of Defence and the Subordinate Agencies [3, 4]. Other regulations like rules of impartiality or revolving door limitations are specified in the Act on Duty of Information, Revolving Door Limitations and Conflict of Interests and the Employee Handbook for the Norwegian Armed Forces [2, 5]. Although there is no evidence of a comprehensive process that would identify sensitive positions, there are a range of specific procedures in place which limit conflicts of interests for personnel in defence procurement, contracting and financial and commercial management.

Most positions in the military require security clearance. Vetting of candidates for positions in the defence institutions is regulated by the Regulation on Security Clearance [1]. Investigation of the candidates is normally conducted by the hiring panel appointed by a section or an agency which employs [2]. For officials and personnel in defence procurement, contracting, financial management, and commercial management, it is necessary to be eligible for secret clearance (clearance of the candidate and the spouse or live-in partner). According to the existing regulations on revolving door limitations may apply for a period of up to 6 months, while prohibition to work with certain kinds of issues may apply for a period of up to 12 months [3, 4]. In addition, the Defence Acquisition Regulation states that special attention ought to be paid to sellers who for the past 2 years have been employed within the Armed Forces [5]. Apart from these procedures, standard recruitment processes are followed. The Ministry of Defence and the Defence Staff decide continuously which positions should be covered by the regulations [3]. Consequently, it is possible to argue that there is some recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption than others, but there are no specific procedures which would regulate this.

While there is some recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption than others, there are no specific procedures which would regulate this and it is up to the Ministry of Defence and the Defence Staff to decide which positions should be covered by the regulations revolving door limitations or prohibition to work with certain kinds of issues [1]. The Internal Auditor Unit of the Ministry of Defence may scrutinise all appointments in the defence sector, through both process audits and a sample of individual promotions. The Internal Auditor Unit functions as an external unit for the subordinate agencies under the Ministry of Defence. The Office of the Auditor General may also scrutinise appointments in the defence sector [2]. However, it has not been a regular practice in recent years because the appointment system is not considered to be an area of corruption risk [3].

There is no recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption opportunities than others when employed in the defence and security sectors. An officer or a senior commander may stay in his position for decades without change (1), (2). There are no details of clear structures within the Ministry of Defence, Royal Police of Oman, or the Royal Armed forces (3), (4), (5). The selection process of the minister responsible for defence affairs and head of the Internal Security Services is not transparent, and names are announced by the sultan through royal decrees, and there is no recognition of changeovers or limited terms of employment due to sensitivities around these jobs (6).

This indicator is marked Not Applicable because there is no recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption opportunities.

There is significant discretion in the recruitment procedure of sensitive positions or conflict of interest policies. The senior positions are filled based on loyalty to the sultan and the tribal connections. These positions are not advertised (1), (2). As discussed above career paths and job positions in the security and defence sectors are not publicly available on institutional websites, neither is the recruitment, selection or final candidates declared (3), (4), (5). Though there is an active job portal on the Ministry of Defence website currently advertising two pilot positions, no further explanation is available about the selection procedures or ranks within the ministry (6).

This indicator is marked Not Applicable because there is no recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption opportunities.

Sensitive positions in defence and security are not recognized externally, thus no special scrutiny system is in place. Scrutiny around procedures of selection, the time in the post, and oversight of personnel in this sector is not posted on institution websites (1). Moreover, the sultan has the sole power to appoint those in the highest ranks (and often those who are at the most at risk of corruption) and announces these appointments through royal decrees, which are then published in state media (2), (3). According to multiple sources, there is no special oversight or scrutiny over the appointments of senior commanders within the armed forces and the MoD (4), (5).

There is no recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption opportunities than others (1). Corruption in appointing personnel in sensitive positions is widespread. Criteria may include being loyal and being from the same region/city, or tribe (2). PA senior positions are based on political affiliation and loyalty to the executive (3).

As noted in 37A, there is no recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption than others. In this regard, this indicator is scored Not Applicable.

Open positions are filled by appointments, not through announced procedures or open competition (1). The standard way this is done is through nepotism and patrimonialism (2). Significant discretion is employed in the recruitment and selection of personnel in sensitive positions (3). Open recruitment is not the standard operating procedure, and conflict of interest policies are absent (4).

As noted in 37A, there is no recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption than others. In this regard, this indicator is scored Not Applicable.

The executive and commanders are usually powerful enough to block scrutiny over the appointment of personnel despite the presence of a law that administers the process (1), (2). Therefore, no oversight or scrutiny should be done by the PLC, SAAB, and ACC, as well as the military-intelligence apparatus (3).

There is no recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption opportunities than others. On several occasions, the President has admitted his penchant for appoiniting ex-military in decision-making roles because he believes them to be honest and industrious [1, 2, 3]. This is despite reports that some of them have been involved in corrupt practices in previous positions [4, 5].

The executive can appoint individuals to sensitive positions and Duterte has a penchant for appointing members of the military and police to key civilian government posts; recruitment processes are absent and the revolving door policy is often abused [1]. A third of the President’s cabinet is composed of retired military and police generals [2, 3] because he believes they are likely to obey orders [4]. Whether the secretary of defence agrees with the president’s appointee or not is insignificant. With the Commission on Appointments, whose members are composed of a legislative that has been largely compliant with Duterte perogatives, only limited scrutiny has taken place of these appointed officials [5]. However, this indicator is not applicable as there is no recognition that certain positions are more at risk of corruption.

This indicator is not applicable as there is no recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption than other. There is no internal oversight in the Defence Department to scrutinise appointment and promotion decisions; further, the Commission on Appointments which provides external oversight is composed of legislative members who have largely complied with the executive’s perogatives [1].

Where there is a civil service post at risk of corruption, appropriate information is included in the vacancy announcement. However, standard military position descriptions, as well as civilian position descriptions outside civil service, do not contain information on corruption risks [1, 2, 3].
Military positions that are involved in procurement processes or contract implementation are recognised as sensitive in the Article 122a of the Act on Professional Military Service which limits revolving door phenomenon (for 3 years after leaving the military service) [4].

Although some positions in civil service and military are directly or indirectly recognised as sensitive [1, 2, 3] no special selection process is in place. In cases of high profile management positions, there is a good practice procedure of additional ad-hoc scrutiny by intelligence services before a formal appointment, which may include conflict of interest and corruption issues.

Sensitive positions in the defence sector are the subject of periodic or ad-hoc scrutiny by the military counterintelligence agency. There is no additional internal unit responsible for the supervision of recruitment and promotions for the aforementioned positions [1, 2].

Risk is not assigned to positions. Instead, it is assigned to tasks performed by specific departments, as is the case with procurement in the Ministry of Defence (MoD) [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. However, there are no specific provisions on defence-related positions.

Conflicts of interest are not adequately regulated under the law by the Council for the Prevention of Corruption’s own admission [1], and there is no specific legislation for defence-related positions nor specific procedures for conflict of interest-related offences. Sensitive positions covered by the indicator are generally regulated under law, and malfeasance by civilian [2] and or military [3] is sanctioned, but no screening process beyond regular selection procedures are applied [4].

Regarding military personnel, scrutiny is limited to military discipline and rank supervision [1], and in regards to civilian personnel, applicable legislation regulates all public workers [2].

There is no recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption opportunities than others within defence institutions. It is important to note here that, as a tribal country, Qatar’s political system is reliant on the most powerful families and tribes, and for this reason, the majority of senior positions are given to members of the most powerful families. Al-Thani has been the ruling family in Qatar since the 19th century, and members of the al-Thani family are often granted powerful ministerial positions in the country. [1] The al-Attiyah family, who are related to the al-Thani family, have also historically been granted positions within defence and security sectors. Most of these appointments are done through Emiri decrees. In 2016, ministers were shuffled through Emiri decree, making Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al-Thani Foreign Minister, and moving al-Attiyah, who was the Foreign Minister at that time, to the position of Minister of Defence Affairs. There is evidence that the culture of ‘wasta,’ or nepotism and favouritism, is prevalent in Qatar, particularly in relation to attaining positions within the government. [2,3]

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable, because there is no recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption opportunities than others (see Q37A).

Open recruitment is not the standard procedure, and conflict of interest policies are absent. As previously explained, appointments take place through Emiri decrees, and selection for senior positions is often based on family affiliation. [1] There is no evidence of there being a ‘fair’ and transparent process to recruit people within the defence sector. Qatar’s political system relies heavily on granting senior positions to members of the most powerful tribal families. In most cases, such positions within the defence sector are distributed to the most loyal. [2,3]

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable, because there is no recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption opportunities than others (see Q37A).

There seems to be very little, if any, oversight over the selection and appointment of personnel in sensitive positions within the defence sector. [1,2] The defence sector does not go through any type of scrutiny and/or oversight, as it falls under the direct command of the Emir. Senior positions are filled through Emiri decrees and the majority of these posts are granted to members of the most powerful tribes in Qatar. [1,3] There seems to be no special scrutiny of personnel in sensitive positions, and recruitment relies heavily on favouritism, nepotism and connections.

According to Presidential Decree No. 557 of May 18, 2009, the heads and deputy heads of all services and department within the MoD are obliged to provide detailed reports about their personal and family income to eliminate conflicts of interest [1]. In accordance with Section II, Clause 3 of the Decree, the list of positions that are subject to assets declaration is based on a list of positions with high corruption risk [1]. In addition, Minister of Defence decree No. 175 reiterates that all high-ranking positions within the Ministry, as well as within organisations created to fullfil the MoD’s tasks, require a detailed report on candidates’ incomes [2].

In 2016-2017, there was an internal analysis of MoD functions in order to identify the most prone to corruption. According to the performance report, 199 such functions were identified [3].

Developing and updating the list of posts exposed to high corruption risk is one of the tasks detailed in the MoD anti-corruption plan for 2018-2020 (see Task 15) [4].

The list of sensitive military positions, for which candidates are required to declare their income and assets, is openly presented in MoD Decree No. 175 [1]. The MoD anti-corruption unit has issued instructional guidelines on appointments to these positions [2].

However, not all military vacancies are openly declared. Recruitment for military positions is conducted via general conscription and promotions are conducted internally, based on length of service or on merit [1]. The MoD special commission checks candidate’s potential conflicts of interest and requests reports of personal and family incomes [3].

Vacancies for civil positions at the MoD are publicly available, though with limited description [4]. All candidates are tested for their knowledge of anti-corruption legislation and technical skills and are required to provide an income report to prove the absence of any conflicts of interest [5]. Shortlisted candidates take a test and undergo an interview [5]. According to Interviewee 2, the Federal Security Service conducts a full background check of all candidates for sensitive positions, including their family and criminal history [6].

The MoD Main Personnel Directorate scrutinises the appointment and promotion of all personnel, including those in sensitive positions [1]. In order to check potential candidates for conflicts of interest, the Directorate cooperates with the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Federal Tax Service [1]. In addition, there is a special commission that checks whether the requirements to prevent conflicts of interest are being met [2]. This commission meets whenever there is a claim about potential corruption within the Ministry [2,3].

There is no information about any external bodies tasked with scrutinising higher-risk sensitive positions.

While the government does not make public its selection criteria for military or defence personnel, our sources confirm that authorities do not recognize the corruption risks inherent in certain positions. According to two senior sources, who work closely in the field, senior positions are held by people loyal to the royal family, and members of the royal family and their allies (4), (5). Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s arrest of the head of the Saudi Arabian National Guard in November 2017 on corruption charges appears to show some acknowledgement of the corruption risks evident for high-ranking officials in the defence procurement industry (1). However, there is no indication that any measures were subsequently implemented to insulate such positions from those risks.

According to Gulf security and military strategy expert David Roberts:
“Though it’s difficult to give a broad answer for all the Saudi military branches, the short answer is there is not much evidence that there’s a real prioritisation of a meritocratic rationale for the appointment of military personnel. The lack of evidence does not mean it’s not there, and you typically find a lot more meritocratic appointment in niche organisations like the special forces, etc. But with the general armed forces and air forces, I think there is less of a meritocratic system of appointment” (2). According to another Gulf affairs expert, “special attention is not paid to the selection, time in post, and oversight of personnel in sensitive positions in the defence sector. These considerations do not form part of HR policy” (3).

This sub-indicator is scored Not Applicable as there is no recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption opportunities than others.

According to our sources, there are no open calls for the recruitment of high-ranking positions. Nepotism and neopatrimonialism prevail in the process where allies and members of the royal family and tribes are appointed by royal decree (1), (2). Recruitment decisions for high-ranking or sensitive positions are, on the whole, made unilaterally by King Salman alongside his son, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who has been increasingly centralizing decision-making authority in all government sectors, including defence (3). There has also been an increasing trend by the king and crown prince appointing close allies to senior or sensitive positions, including in the military and security services. This has sometimes involved the appointment or promotion of allies who have relevant experience, for example, the appointment of Major General Ahmed al-Asiri as an advisor to the Office of the Minister of Defence in April 2017 (4). At other times, however, such appointments appear to be made with no consideration of merit or relevant experience. One example is Khaled bin Hussain al-Biyari being named as assistant defence minister in February 2018, Biyari spent his entire career in the telecommunications industry, most recently as CEO of the publicly-traded mobile and internet service provider Saudi Telecom Co (3). In February 2019, the brother of the crown prince, Khalid bin Salman, was reshuffled from his role as ambassador to the US to the deputy defence minister, he previously held roles in the military and Saudi defence sector, ultimately as a senior civilian advisor at the Ministry of Defence (5). Furthermore, other key institutions such as the Ministry of Interior and the Saudi Arabian National Guard have been handed to very young royals who owe their standing to Mohammed bin Salman and are deferent to him (6).

This sub-indicator is scored Not Applicable as there is no recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption opportunities than others.

According to our sources, there is no special scrutiny or oversight for personnel in sensitive positions; such mechanisms do not exist as the appointments are done by royal decree and not through administrative or meritocratic committees (1), (2). The government does not publicize details of the internal workings of its ministries, including that of the defence ministry.
According to an expert on Gulf affairs, “as minister of defence the crown prince, encouraged I believe by the Abu Dhabi crown prince and de facto ruler of the UAE Mohammed Bin Zayed, unilaterally took decisions, including to commence the Yemen war, without engaging the opinions of the military. Equally, with regard to the intelligence services, he has relied on loyal cronies like Saud Al Qahtani rather than the established structures to deliver his diktats. He has also hired retired intel officers from Egypt (reportedly on the suggestion of MBZ) both to advise him and to carry out actions such as the Ritz Carlton shakedown of senior royals and of members of the merchant elite” (3).

According to the overview of the integrity plan for 2017, a list of sensitive positions within the MoD exists [1], however, the list is not made public. The overview clearly states that the Human Resources Sector updated and distributed the list to all the organisational units within the MoD and SAF in December 2017 [1]. Nevertheless, the MoD responded to the BCSP questionnaire that the Human Resources Sector has not determined the list of sensitive positions, neither for its own or for other organisational units in the MoD and SAF [2].

It is not clear whether the list of sensitive positions within the MoD and SAF has been determined due to the contradictory information provided by the MoD on its website and in the response to a request for free access to information of public importance. Nevertheless, if established, the list is not publicly available and therefore, the selection process and oversight cannot be evaluated. As such, this indicator is scored Not Applicable.

It is not clear whether the list of sensitive positions within the MoD and SAF has been determined due to the contradictory information provided by the MoD on its website and in the response to a request for free access to information of public importance. Nevertheless, if established, the list is not publicly available and therefore, the selection process and oversight cannot be evaluated. As such, this indicator is scored Not Applicable.

There is evidence that special attention is given to the selection and performance of high-ranking personnel and/or individuals in sensitive positions with at least three known levels of scrutiny for personnel who have been put forward for promotion [1]. The first is the Promotions Recommendations Board (PRB) which ranked officers from the subordinate unit, followed by the Promotion Council (PC), which is a checking mechanism which investigated the merit of PRB recommendations by performing checks such as random interviews). Finally, the PC-approved list is provided to the Promotion Authority (PA), who signed-off on the approved list [1]. Regular audits of procurement have proven to be capable of detecting irregularities or suspicious activity and have resulted in criminal convictions [2].

The Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) and the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) maintains a policy of job rotation as part of its anti-corruption processes [1], with senior officers typically serving in any given role for around three to four years on average [2]. Postings are also subjected to collective panel decisions to minimise subjectivity and safeguard against inappropriate practices [3]. While there are stringent vetting procedures, as well as limitations regarding job rotation (as mentioned earlier), there is no evidence to indicate that there are any revolving door limitations in place [1].

There is evidence by independent analysts that appointments are carefully scrutinised and approved by panels of top officials and human resource specialists to ensure job fit and security [1]. There are also public announcements as well as open reporting on high-level postings or departures [2], although there is no evidence that there is external scrutiny of personnel being assigned to sensitive roles (as opposed to top ranks such as service chiefs which must be approved by the executive).

Neither the Department of Defence nor the South African Defence Force (SANDF) have publicised any information detailing the attention paid to appointments for sensitive positions. While it is likely that sensitive positions undergo some manner of vetting, including background checks, there is no evidence in the public domain to illustrate this [1].

This indicator is scored ‘Not Applicable’ as there is no evidence pointing to the recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption than others. In fact, it is unclear whether selection processes are defined and strictly followed to any degree of reliability.

This indicator is scored ‘Not Applicable’ as there is no evidence pointing to the recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption than others. While unclear, the Department of Defence’s mandate does include provision for good HR practices. Whether these are followed in practice is not adequately disclosed [1].

The Military Personnel Management Act includes the selection process for important positions, including Vice Chief of staff and commanders of specific units. [1] Personnel in defence procurement is managed by the Defence Acquisition Program Act, and competencies and requirements for each role are specified. [2] The Act on Members of the Ministry of National Defence and Organisations Affiliated specifies roles and selection criteria for defence personnel, covering those in the Ministry of National Defence, Daejeon National Cemetery, Defence Media Agency and Defence Computing Information Agency. [3]

Military personnel and those in defence procurement are recruited following standard processes and technical competencies under the terms of the Military Personnel Management Act and the Defence Acquisition Programme Act. Article 6 of the Defence Acquisition Program Act requires a person who performs defence acquisition programs to submit a pledge of integrity. [1] [2]
However, the objectivity of the selection process and conflicts of interest at the higher level is questionable, according to a defence journalist. [3] The Minister of DAPA is appointed by the President and is not subject to the parliamentary scrutiny, indicating the lack of objectivity and rigorous screening process. [4] After reviewing relevant policies, including the Regulation on DAPA and relevant institutions, no specific procedure has been identified to limit conflicts of interest with regards to recruitment for sensitive positions. [5] [6]

The Office of Personnel and Welfare within the Ministry of National Defence is responsible for establishing the military and civilian personnel management policy, as well as reviewing the promotion decisions for general officers. [1] The Director for Organisation and Personnel Management Innovation at the DAPA oversees appointments and promotions of military personnel and officials registered at the DAPA. [2] However, there is no external oversight with a focus on scrutinising higher-risk sensitive positions in the defence sector.

There is no recognition that some positions in the Ministry of Defence may be more susceptible to corruption than others. The fact that army leaders accused of corruption are promoted to positions of leadership, reinforces this point. [1] Moreover, the reluctance to investigate allegations of corruption against senior generals also supports this assertion. [2]

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’ because there is no recognition that some positions in the Ministry of Defence may be more susceptible to corruption than others. The fact that army leaders accused of corruption are promoted to positions of leadership, reinforces this point. [1] Moreover, the reluctance to investigate allegations of corruption against senior generals also supports this assertion. [2]

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’ because there is no recognition that some positions in the Ministry of Defence may be more susceptible to corruption than others. The fact that army leaders accused of corruption are promoted to positions of leadership, reinforces this point. [1] Moreover, the reluctance to investigate allegations of corruption against senior generals also supports this assertion. [2]

Specific training and definitions of responsibilities suggest that special attention is paid to personnel in sensitive positions. Advanced training exists that is aimed at specialising the personnel who will be responsible for the formalisation of everything related to public procurement [1]. But there is no evidence regarding specific oversight mechanisms regarding personnel in sensitive positions. The specific question of whether special attention is paid to personnel in sensitive positions was posed to the Ministry of Defence through the Portal of Transparency [2] and in an interview [3], but answers did not provide clear evidence on such special attention.

An internal document of 2011 concluded that there was a “lack of expert capacity in management” in procurement processes and that processes were dominated by the General Barracks (“Cuarteles Generales”) and the main contract companies of the Ministry of Defence. The report showed deficiencies including the lack of external mechanisms of oversight, lack of independence, ignorance about the exact number of offices of programmes, a very limited information flow and severe problems of coordination, and competencies and redundancies that provoked delays and ran over cost, with responsible people not being held accountable. It also stated that privileges prevailed over technical, economic, and cost-efficiency criteria [4]. The reaction by the Ministry of Defence has probably improved the situation, after the approval of Instruction 72/2012 of the Secretary of Defence, on the regulation and management on procurement [5]. Problems persist in certain areas, both in procurement and in other sensitive areas, including “too many” appointments freely made by the official in charge, excessive lack of transparency (abuse of the “official use” category within non-classified information, with less use of the “public use” one), and revolving doors and conflicts of interests [6]. Instruction 72/2012 does not refer to corruption or any associated word, but it clearly states that the programme leader should have the necessary professional capacities and must complete, before or soon after the appointment, the official course (or another course deemed equivalent) [5].

According to the Ministry of Defence, regarding specific procedures in place limiting conflicts of interest for these sensitive positions and with reference to the standard appointment/recruitment processes, “the appointment of military personnel who occupy positions that involve decision-making, is based on the principles of equality, merit, ability and publicity,” according to the provisions of Law 39/2007 on the Military Career (which includes how all evaluation and promotion considers the military history and military performance) and Royal Decrees 168/2009 (Regulations for Evaluations and Promotions), 456/2011 (Regulations for Destinations), and 1111/2015 (Regulations for Acquisition and Loss of Military Status) [1]. Conflict of interests are regulated by the recent Instruction 23/2020, of 4 June, and Instruction 42/2019, of 15 July 2019 [1], but both just focus on procurement. However, Law 3/2015, of 30 March, regulates conflict of interest for high-up personnel in the entire General Administration of the State [2].

There are specific examples of procurement [3], but there are reportedly weak practice limiting conflicts of interest and revolving doors for sensitive positions. This includes a lack of transparency and “too many” appointments freely made by the official in charge [4].

Control procedures are internal, the audits and the judicial system itself being subject to the military hierarchy (and discipline), “which puts independence of those who have to act is in question” [1]. Whilst operational and strategic aspects are said to be in the hands of state institutions, internal control and administrative management “continue in the hands of the general barracks” (“Cuarteles Generales”) [1]. A report internal to the Ministry of Defence of 2011 already admitted that any mechanisms of external oversight did not exist [2]. Additionally, Instruction 42/2019, of 15 July created an Advisory Committee of the ethical code of the purchasing function of the Ministry of Defence, reporting directly to the Secretary of State for Defence, “to guarantee the application of the ethical code of the purchasing function, as well as its adequate interpretation, monitoring and evaluation” [3]. For major and general issues, the external control may be exercised (a posteriori) by the General Intervention of the Defence and, very occasionally, by the Spanish Court of Audits.

To the extent that the government recognises that certain positions may be more open to corruption opportunities than others, the fact that Sudan’s government operates through a kleptocratic model [1,2] suggests that there might be perverse incentives at play with regard to whether a leader or commander prefers to have an ethical or an unethical but loyal subordinate in a particular role; an individual’s ability to use a ‘sensitive’ position to facilitate corrupt transactions in a way that is effective and beneficial to the individual or organisation employing them might motivate a rent-seeking individual to hire them.

This indicator is marked Not Applicable. To the extent that the government recognises that certain positions may be more open to corruption opportunities than others, the fact that Sudan’s government operates through a kleptocratic model [1,2] suggests that there might be perverse incentives at play with regard to whether a leader or commander prefers to have an ethical or an unethical but loyal subordinate in a particular role; an individual’s ability to use a ‘sensitive’ position to facilitate corrupt transactions in a way that is effective and beneficial to the individual or organisation employing them might motivate a rent-seeking individual to hire them. Thus, it is not surprising that Global Integrity’s 2019 Global Integrity Index for Sudan indicated a score of zero against the statement ‘In practice, civil servants are appointed and evaluated according to professional criteria’ [3].

This indicator is marked Not Applicable. To the extent that the government recognises that certain positions may be more open to corruption opportunities than others, the fact that Sudan’s government operates through a kleptocratic model [1,2] suggests that there might be perverse incentives at play with regard to whether a leader or commander prefers to have an ethical or an unethical but loyal subordinate in a particular role; an individual’s ability to use a ‘sensitive’ position to facilitate corrupt transactions in a way that is effective and beneficial to the individual or organisation employing them might motivate a rent-seeking individual to hire them. It therefore makes sense that there is no evidence that defence and security sector officials in sensitive positions are subject to special scrutiny or oversight.

In the selection of employees for sensitive positions in the areas of defence procurement, recruitment, contracting, financial and commercial management, there seems to be no special recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption opportunities than others [1]. It is likely to assume that employees are vetted, but it could not be verified if this is done specifically for risks of corruption. In addition, several investigations from the Swedish Peace and Arbitration Society (SPAS) [2] [3] and the media [4] [5] [6] have shown that the regulation and oversight of the movement of personnel in high-level or sensitive positions between the public and private sectors has been significantly lacking for many years, as no post-separation employment rules such as a formal ‘period of restraint’ for public officials are in place in the defence sector (see also Q47A).

As outlined in 37A, there is no recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption opportunities than others. Therefore, this indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’.

As outlined in 37A, there is no recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption opportunities than others. Therefore, this indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’.

There are general legal provisions that apply to all employees of the confederation and that are summarized in the code of conduct. This includes issues like corruption and conflicts of interest [1]. In a 2013 report, the Control Committee (CC) criticized that for senior positions the Personensicherheitsprüfung (individual security vetting) was often only done after the people were hired and sometimes without a personal vetting interview [2]. An issue that the committee confirms as resolved in a recent follow-up report [3]. The vetting process is in place for everyone handling classified information and is regulated in an ordinance [4, 5]. In 2012 the Federal Council laid out how to prevent conflict of interests for federal employees with explicit reference to GRECO [6]. Part of that report consisted of a survey within the federal administration to take stock of measures taken to avoid such conflicts. The Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport (DDPS) explicitly identified Armasuisse as a high corruption risk entity and that for that reason, the employees receive special training [7]. Most organizations, including the DDPS, did not have waiting periods or similar measures except, sometimes, for senior positions [6]. The anti-corruption strategy adopted in November 2020 lists the increased use of waiting periods for individuals moving between public and private functions as a measure to mitigate corruption risk [8].

Initially triggered by a problematic appointment with the Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport (DDPS), in 2013 a report of the Control Committee of the National Council reviewed the nomination and appointment process for senior positions and the progress made [1]. It issued another progress report in view of the 2013 document in 2019. The report finds progress, as almost all positions are now publicly advertised and exceptions are rare, there are search committees established, and assessments conducted. There are also still some unresolved issues, for example, related to the justification on the final decision that should be provided to the Federal Council. The committee was generally satisfied but sees still room for improvement and plans a final follow up in 2021 [2]. In 2012 the Federal Council laid out how to prevent conflict of interests for federal employees with explicit reference to e Group of States against Corruption (GRECO). Part of that report consisted of a survey within the federal administration to take stock of measures to avoid such conflicts. These range from the public advertising of jobs to codes of conducts and the obligation to declare potential conflicts of interests. Most agencies, though, did not publish declared conflicts due to data protection concerns. The DDPS identified Armasuisse as a high corruption risk entity and that for that reason, the employees receive special training to reduce these risks [3, 4]. Most organizations, including the DDPS, did not have waiting periods or similar measures to avoid effects of revolving door practices, except sometimes for senior positions [3]. In practice, especially for senior employees who leave the federal administration, this continues to be an issue [5]. The head of the State Secretariat For International Finance who left his job to work for the Swiss Banker association is just the latest in a string of high profile cases of senior officials who changed to the private sector or interest groups they used to regulate [6]. One of those cases directly linked to the defence sector is when the former Secretary-General of the Federal Department of Economic Affairs, Education and Research became the director of Swiss association of mechanical and electrical engineering industries (SWISSMEM), an industrial interest group, which is the partner organization for the administration when it comes to offset deals [7].

Employees of the federal administration have an obligation to report illegal activities to their superior or the Swiss Federal Audit Office (SFAO). Whistleblowers are protected by law from reprisals [1, 2]. The new and recent internal directive on corruption prevention at the DDPS confirms this obligation, emphasizes the possibility of anonymous reports and prohibits the creation of internal whistleblowing units [3, 4]. The internal audit has oversight functions concerning hiring and vetting process and has reported on them in the past [5]. The Parliament has oversight functions and uses them also as far as the DPPS is concerned as the 2013 report and its 2019 follow-up report show [6, 7].

The commissioning of military personnel is generally regulated by the “Act of Commission for Officers and Non-commissioned Officers of the Armed Forces” [1]. However, no specific requirements are requested in the “Enforcement Rules of Commission for Officers and Non-commissioned Officers of the Armed Forces” for personnel in sensitive positions who have significant autonomy over personnel, resources, policies, or plans [2].

Roles or positions involved in the procurement process or decision-making in the public sector are recognised as being at high risk of corruption by the “Government Procurement Act” [3]. Attention has been paid to personnel in the procurement sector by the “Government Procurement Act” [3]. Measures are well developed in Taiwan for the governance of government procurement processes from the perspectives of discretionary power, qualification, regulation, monitoring, or job tenure in accordance with the “Enforcement Rules of the Government Procurement Act” [4].

According to the “Directions for Implementing Military Integrity Education”, the MND recognizes the high risk positions, including human resource, procurement, comptroller, and logistics. Special attention is continuously paid to integrity education of such personnel. [5]

The term “conflicts of interest” referred to in the “Act on Recusal of Public Servants Due to Conflicts of Interest” indicates that the public servant obtains interests by him/herself or persons related to him/her either directly or indirectly through any act or omission in the course of performing his/her official duties [1]. Conflicts of interest in Taiwan’s public sector, which includes the security and defence sectors, are regulated by this act [1]. In addition, chief officers and deputy chief officers above the rank of colonel in the military agencies (entities) at all levels are subject to this act [1].

Specific procedures are in place which limit conflicts of interest for these sensitive positions, especially, procurement or personnel, in accordance with the “Enforcement Rules of the Act on Recusal of Public Servants Due to Conflicts of Interest” [2]. Particular technical competencies required for standard appointment or recruitment processes in the procurement sector are under the regulations of the “Regulations for Qualification, Examination, Training, Certification and Management of Professional Procurement Personnel” and the “Regulations Governing the Organisation of the Procurement Evaluation Committee” [3, 4]. Collective decision-making is often employed as a prevention mechanism for vetting procedures not in place and for preventing mis-use of discretionary powers [5, 6]. However, there are still examples of manipulations of collective decision-making mechanisms for other purposes [7].

The procurement and construction (logistics) officers, within three years after their resignation, shall not hold positions directly related to their positions within five years preceding their resignation, under the “Civil Servant Work Act”. The MND scrutinizes those personnel proactively and reports the information in the “Reporting Meeting of Ethics” regularly. [8,9]

The internal oversight mechanism of the Ministry of National Defence to scrutinise appointment and promotion decisions of personnel is provided by the “Personnel Reviewing Board” in accordance with the “Act of Military Service for Officers and Non-commissioned Officers of the Armed Forces” [1]. However, scrutiny schemes for specific positions are yet to be devised [2, 3, 4].

With regard to external scrutiny, the “Special Investigation Regulations of Civil Servant Involving National Security or Vital Interest” regulates that there are 30 military positions that should be checked by the Investigation Bureau, the Ministry of Justice before the assignment. The results of the investigation are the references to the personnel evaluation committee. However, the number of positions is limited and the external scrutiny focuses on counter-intelligence security – not on conflict of interests or corruption. [5]

There is not enough information to score this indicator. Not much is known about selection in the defence sector. However, in general terms, attention is usually paid to personnel holding sesnsitive positions. [2] The standing orders for public service (2009) is clear on this, in that all avenues of employment in the public service shall be open to all based on merit. [1] This information from the defence personnel, however, could not be independently verified.

There is not enough information to score this indicator. Again, not much is publicly known. That said, it is expected that the selection process would consider attainment of minimum qualifications and vetting as is the case for all senior civil servants. [1] Also, depending on the type of employment, use of government organs which deal with recruitment is considered; for example the use of the National employment and promotion board which deals with such issues as recruitment and employment in general. The National Employment and Promotion Service Act of 1999 states that it shall be lawful for the Service to accord preference to citizens and in making such nominations the Service shall regard educational qualifications, the background, the character and antecedents of the nominee, and the national economy, and accord preference accordingly. [2] Nevertheless, numerous senior positions are the gift of the president, including the Permanent Secretary for all ministries including Defence, and the Chief of Defence Forces. [3]

There is not enough information to score this indicator. An interviewee indicated that oversight does exist. [1] However, in the absence of transparency it is difficult to ascertain this information.

According to the Regulations of Prime Minister Office on Procurement Administration 1992, Article 11, the Committee for Procurement is responsible for monitoring procurement management. Article 10 of the penalties section of the regulations states that committee members found to be involved in corruption activities shall be subject to the penalties defined in the Civil Service Act [1]. Furthermore, Army Order 1255/60 also stipulates that personnel in sensitive positions such as accountants or procurement officers are not allowed to join the Committee for Procurement [2]. However, the nature of this type of business is highly opaque and mostly done in a closed-door manner as there is behind-the-scenes lobbying to finalise the promotion of commanders of the army, air force and navy [3]. Also, key positions in the armed forces usually require the approval of the palace [4].

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’, as there is no recognition that some positions are more at risk to corruption. As stated in Army Order 1249/60, the selection of procurement committee members must be conducted in accordance with the Public Procurement Act and personnel in sensitive positions, such as accountants or procurement officers, are not allowed to join the Committee for Procurement in order to limit conflicts of interest for these sensitive positions; however, no specific procedures are made publicly available [1]. Furthermore, there was a workforce shortage among the operational-level officers in the procurement department and most of the officers did not have adequate knowledge or experience in the procurement process. Many procurement officers could not be trained with the Comptroller General’s Department due to a lack of qualifications, illustrating the problems with recruitment standards [2]. Moreover, open recruitment is not conducted in the standard operating procedure since there are is behind-the-scenes lobbying to finalise the promotion of commanders of the army, air force and navy, and key positions in the armed forces usually require the approval of the palace [3,4].

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’, as there is no recognition that some positions are more at risk of corruption. The decisions regarding the appointment and promotion of personnel to sensitive positions in the Thai armed forces are monitored by the Office of Internal Audit. For the Committee for Procurement and the roles of procurement officers in the defence sector, these decisions are also scrutinised by the State Audit Office [1]. However, it was revealed that both the Office of Internal Audit under the Royal Thai Armed Forces Headquarters and the State Audit Office rarely take into account the area of procurement and have different contextual interpretations when scrutinising matters related to public procurement [2]. More importantly, key positions in the armed forces usually require the approval of the palace instead of special scrutiny being conducted for personnel in sensitive positions [3,4].

According to our sources, there is no formal recognition that some positions are more open than others, but it is known informally that some positions can be more open to corruption such as border control officers (1,2). Through a review of the legislation applicable to the Ministry of Defence personnel, evidence of special attention to personnel in sensitive positions could not be found (3). The Ministry of Defence did not communicate information about this issue on its website (4). Furthermore, media reports on the issue could not be found (5).

This indicator is marked Not Applicable because public recruitment is not the norm for sensitive and senior positions. Therefore the selection of personnel is usually the same in most cases (through promotions and appointments)(1,2). No public recognition that some positions are more vulnerable to corruption than others was found (3,4,5).

This indicator is marked Not Applicable because there is no recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption than others. According to our sources, there is no special scrutiny of personnel in sensitive positions. There are no mechanisms or regulations on this matter either (1,2,3).

Interviewee 3 emphasised that some attention is paid to personnel in sensitive positions, i.e., individuals with significant authority over personnel, resources or the policies/plans that determine them within the Ministry of Defence, the General Staff and the Army, Air Force and Navy Commands. However, as an informal norm, all appointments within the SSB – the primary procurement agency of the government, directly attached to the presidential palace – are politically influenced and directly controlled by the presidential palace itself [1]. So, despite the fact that there is no written regulation about this, the big defence industry contracts are considered to be the private domain of Erdogan’s presidential palace.

Interviewee 4 emphasised that there is still a small amount of expertise and, to some extent, meritocratic processes are prioritised within the SSB. However, he underlined that, in the past two years, there has been a dramatic level of politicisation within the SSB [2]. In their scholarly article examining the effectiveness of the internal and external financial auditing mechanisms in the military, Meltem Keskin Koylu, Tülay Tellioglu and Naciye Gokce assert that the lack of proper education, the mismanagement of the personnel policies of internal auditors and the fact that auditors are not provided with legal and administrative autonomy, along with politicisation, are the primary factors preventing the establishment of effective internal auditing mechanisms in the fields of procurement, financial management and commercial management [3]. In his Master’s thesis, Gendarmerie Finance Officer Lt. Col. Yilmaz Karahan agrees with Keskin Koylu, Tellioglu and Gokce, suggesting that there is not enough attention paid to financial auditing education, the selection process of the personnel in charge or defence procurement, and that the Turkish Ministry of Defence has a lot to do to achieve effectiveness in these areas [4].

The appointments of personnel working in the fields of defence procurement, contracting and financial & commercial management within the military are, to some extent, merit-based and subject to oversight. Please note that there is a specific military branch entitled ‘Military Finance’ within the Turkish military and, as emphasised by Interviewees 3 and 4, the military education provided at the Finance Schools of the Army, the Air Force and the Navy to the newly graduated lieutenants and NCOs, who are trained there for a period of one year just before being deployed to the units, is of a high quality [1]. Please also note that almost all military finance personnel know one another personally, creating informal monitoring mechanisms through which rumours/cases of corruption/bribery can easily be heard. This tendency hinders whistleblowing.

However, as emphasised above, at the strategic/political level, where all actors operate under the full control of the presidential palace, all finance-related decisions are politicised and and grey zones emerge in terms of monitoring/oversight and law enforcement in cases of corruption and bribery. In his Master’s thesis, Yilmaz Karahan complains about the weakness of the institutionalisation of the internal auditing mechanisms and oversight of sensitive positions at the Ministry of Defence [2]. According to Interviewee 6, there are some merit-based standards for appointments to sensitive positions in defence procurement and financial management at the Ministry of Defence, but he said he cannot guarantee this at the Presidency of Defence Industries, which is directly attached to the presidential palace [3].

Despite these pitfalls, the appointments of personnel working in the fields of defence procurement, contracting and financial & commercial management within the military are, to some extent, merit-based and subject to oversight. Brain drain is believed to be slowing down development in some critical areas. The vast majority of people leaving are young, highly educated engineers, often with considerable experience in the defence sector. According to an SSB survey, many of those who left the sector cited ‘limited chances of promotion and professional progress’ as the primary reason, followed by low salaries [4].

Interviewee 4 noted that to some degree, there is internal oversight in the Ministry of Defence to scrutinise appointment and promotion decisions regarding personnel in sensitive positions relating to defence procurement, contracting and financial management. He also emphasised that the military finance officers are a small community who all know one another personally. He therefore underlines that, in this community, everybody knows who is taking responsibility for which contracting processes and financial management roles. This technical-transparent environment creates an oversight mechanism over those personnel working at the finance departments in the Ministry of Defence, the General Staff and the Army, Navy and Air Force Commands [1]. Interviewee 6 suggested that the Financial Audit Department is in charge at the Ministry of Defence [2].

Many factors are considered when making appointments. Article 8 Section J of the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) Act 2005, grants the commander-in-chief of the UPDF – the current president, the power to appoint officers of the UPDF to head departments of services, who shall be responsible to the relevant service chief of staff for the management of the departments. Whether these appointments are well thought through or not, the law allows the commander-in-chief to appoint them. For example, in the last appointments, the commander-in-chief of the UPDF mentioned the outcomes of his decision to the appointment, transfers and promotions in the UPDF as reported on the Uganda Media Center site. These appointments, transfers or promotions, in general, include all positions of responsibility in the UPDF are made following Article 55 of the UPDF Act.

The President of Uganda has the powers to select and appoint any officer to any rank at any time as he so wishes. Therefore, the selection process are best known to the President, who is the appointing officer who is the commander in chief. According to one MP[1], there are cases of accelerated promotions without any clear justification.

Like all the other government ministries, the Minsitry of defence is subject to parliament’s Appointment Committees which scruitinize sensitive appointments most especially if these are political appointment in nauture[1]. According to Lt. Col Deo Akiiki[2], the ministry of defence has its own appointments and promotions board.This committee is headed by the Speaker or the deputy speaker of Parliament and is dominated by the ruling party which makes it hard to carry out proper checks and balances.

Ukrainian legislation provides different procedures for the selection of heads of state-owned enterprises (selection process organized by the executive authority who runs this particular enterprise) and heads of state-owned enterprises which are key for the economy (selection process organized by the CMU) [1]. Additionally, there is a procedure for conducting a special examination of individuals who are applying for top positions with increased corruption risks [2]. According to the legislation, the positions which involve taking high responsibilities particularly include positions held by high-ranking military officers, judges, prosecutors, President of Ukraine, Prime Minister of Ukraine [2]. Positions with increased corruption risk include Head of Administration of the President of Ukraine, heads of state-owned enterprises etc. [3]. Besides specific selection procedures, there are also specific requirements for public service positions of category “A” [4], “Б” and “В” [5]. It is worth noting, that positions with powers in procurement, recruitment, contracting, financial and commercial management are those of categories “Б” and “В”, but there are no requirements envisaged by Ukrainian legislation specifically for these positions. The National Corruption Prevention Agency also defined the list of positions with high risks for executive bodies, but it is too general.

There is a recognition that certain positions are sensitive [1, 2], and there are general provisions for all public service positions limiting conflict of interest [3]. Appointment/recruitment processes are followed for particular technical competencies depending on the position for which recruitment takes place [4, 5]. Additionally, MoD vacancy announcements are followed by inter alia qualification requirements [6, 7]. There is also the MoD High Appraisal Commission which considers candidates for high-ranking military officers positions, candidates for positions which should be appointed by the President, etc. [8]. However, the Commission is only an advisory body. Moreover, Ukrainian legislation does not have different requirements for public service positions concerning the business profile (procurement, HR, etc.).
The selection process in the MoD where nearly 80% of staff are civil servants is done according to the new Law on civil service which is considered to be efficient and well balanced including in the selection process [9]. The principle of revolving doors is not practised in Ukraine

There is a Commission on Issues of Senior Public Service Positions which is comprised of the CMU, the President of Ukraine, the VRU, the NAPC, the National Agency for Civil Service and NGO representatives. It holds a competition for vacant positions in the civil service of the category “A” [1]. In the ministries such as the MoD, the head of the public service unit assigns the citizens of Ukraine who have passed the competitive selection to vacant positions in the public service of categories “Б” and “B” as well as dismisses them from these positions [1]. There is no provision for any external oversight over the process appointment and promotion of public service of categories “Б” and “B”. However, the National Agency for Civil Service considers complaints coming from public servants of categories “Б” and “B” regarding acceptance, passing and termination of their public service [1]. Within the MoD, there is a High Appraisal Commission with advisory functions only, which inter alia considers candidates for high-ranking military officers positions, etc. [2]. However, there are no provisions for any kind of special external or internal oversight specifically for sensitive positions such as procurement and HR personnel.

As the UAE is a rentier state monarchy, sensitive positions are held by particular people who are loyal. However, there is no restriction on time of service too. Procurement is seen as a sensitive area, and therefore, almost all senior officers and officials in the department are Emirati and loyal to the Crown Prince (1), (2).

Open recruitment is not the standard operating procedure, even though conflict of interest policies are existent. As previously explained (Q37A), appointments and selection for senior positions take place through Emiri Decrees. There is no evidence of there being a ‘fair’ and transparent process about recruitment within the defence sector (1), (2), (3), (4).

There seems to be very little, if any independent oversight, over the selection and appointment of personnel in sensitive positions within the defence sector. The defence sector generally does not go through any type of scrutiny and/or oversight. The UAE president fills sensitive positions with royal Emirati Decrees. The Crown Prince is the Deputy Supreme Commander according to the Armed Forces Law 8, and therefore the highest military commander after the president, and his office proposes the names of people who will fill sensitive posts (1), (2).

Personnel in sensitive positions are vetted to ensure operational effectiveness, and mitigating corruption risk falls within scope of this objective. However, there is limited clarity as to when and how special attention may be applied. According to one of the interviewees, where posts require it, personnel are vetted appropriately by the Cabinet Office. Selection of personnel is mainly conducted during staffing employment boards [1].

Additionally, Ministry of Defence line management and command structures are required to identify posts where protracted occupancy, particularly of sensitive posts, may provide opportunity for the risk of irregularity, fraud, theft and corruption. Where, in light of risk assessment procedures, line managers decide that it would be prudent to move an individual to another post such action can be undertaken through the use of post rotation. Where, on the other hand, compelling business reasons exist to support an individual remaining in post beyond a period where risk assessment ordinarily suggests the need for a move, the continued occupation of the post by the incumbent must be approved at a level of seniority sufficient to ensure a consistent and equitable approach [2].

There are also multiple levels of assurance and protection. Staff must be screened to the appropriate security clearance required for any assignment. The security clearance of staff is re-assessed at set periods, and if circumstances change. Moreover, all DE&S staff are required to complete a declaration of outside interests statement annually, and risk assessments are made as appropriate for their current assignment, and when they move assignments [2].

MoD fraud prevention mechanisms include “the rotation of staff through posts, the separation of duties between those authorising and paying for work and well-established procedures for contracting for services and products”, according to a Public Accounts Committee on fraud risk in MoD property management [1]. Its is not clear if these mechanisms are regularly followed.

Army personnel must sign Values and Standards documents, to which their behaviour is bound [2]. Moreover, the selection process for staff in specific roles is based on clearly defined selection processes with appointments based on merit and fair competition. Employees involved in selection process are trained – there is minimum mandatory training for all panel members and additional mandatory training for Panel Chairs. Records of process available under the DPA/Subject Matter Access request by individuals but interview feedback is provided as a matter of course. The selection process is described in the government-wide civil service policy [3].

DE&S runs CE chaired Function Performance panels which provides top level oversight of the effective operation of the Functions. In DE&S the Function matrix approach provides multiple routes for issues to be escalated by staff with any concerns. The HR function provide both pan-organisation selection processes and wholly independent selection panel members with an escalation route to HR if they believed processes or principles were not being followed [1].

However, research did not identify any evidence of special scrutiny of personnel in sensitive positions in DE&S, outside the scrutiny that takes place within the chain of command.

The Office of Personnel Management runs the ‘Position Designation Automated Tool’ (PDT), which establishes risk levels for positions where the duties and responsibilities may have a material adverse effect on national security. The Position Designation System (PDS) assesses the duties and responsibilities of a position to determine the degree of potential damage to the efficiency and/or integrity of the service from misconduct by the holder of that position [1]. As such, the PDS focusses on the national security requirements and public trust requirements, which together is termed ‘suitability’. There is no authoritative list of sensitive positions, however, those who have ‘fiduciary responsibilities in support of activities with national security impact’, which includes the procurement of funding for goods/services in excess of $50 million annually, or the control of items with the equivalent value, are deemed ‘Automatic Critical-Sensitive/High Risk’. Any position that procures funding for goods/services that have a monetary value material to national security, or controls such, are designated ‘Non-Critical Sensitive’. These positions also have corresponding High Risk and Severe/Moderate Impact for public trust. The combined sensitivity of national security and public trust is calculated to give the final position designation [2]. The PDS also includes positions which have access to information systems which include personnel data; positions which conduct internal or external investigations, audits or inquiries; positions which involve national security policy making or determining; positions which involve significant financial management [2]. The DoD has implemented the PDT, and has further guidance on the ‘Personnel Security Program’, which outlines the procedures for individuals holding national security positions [3,4].

There is not enough information to score this indicator. Although it is assumed that more stringent vetting processes would take place, no clear policy has been found on recruitment to higher-risk positions as determined by the PDT. The DoD Manual 5200.02 outlines some procedures, but these are not with regards to PDS positions rather all national security positions [1].

The Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCAS) undertakes investigations to determine suitability for positions, but the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) is the Suitability Executive Agent in charge, meaning that they are responsible for overseeing the correct enforcement of the PDT [1,2]. It is not clear whether further external scrutiny is provided for positions designated as ‘Critical-Sensitive’ or higher.

The Organic Law of the Bolivarian National Armed Forces (LOFANB) provides the forms and procedures for the nomination and appointment of military officials to positions in which they are given command or hold direct responsibility for public administration functions. It does not include any explicit identification of positions that might involve a higher risk of corruption, nor any considerations to prevent such risks.

The law does not provide specific considerations for monitoring autonomy and command capacity of positions such as commander of the Strategic Operational Command of the National Bolivarian Armed Forces (CEOFANB), Chief of the Joint Defence Staff, and commanders of the Strategic Integral Defence Regions (REDI), the Integral Defence Operational Zones (ZODI), and the Integral Defence Areas (ADI). These appointments depend directly and exclusively on the president [1]. For positions that likewise hold broad decision-making capacity, specifically in the management of public resources, the law does not include particular controls for the election and supervision of actions beyond the general assessments that apply to military officials [2].

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’. There is no recognition that some positions are more at risk of corruption. Procedures for appointments to positions with significant command responsibility, or responsibilities handling resources within public administration, involve high levels of discretion. Most of these appointments depend directly and exclusively on the president or executive branch officials. Likewise, neither LOFANB nor the Organic Law of Public Administration (LOAP) includes measures to mitigate conflicts of interest or constraints to avoid the permanence of officials in senior administrative positions [1, 2].

The appointment of military officers to public service positions, according to the needs of the department, comes under the exclusive authority of the president [1]. The Office of the Comptroller General of the National Bolivarian Armed Forces (CONGEFANB) and the Defence Sector Procurement Committee (CCSD) are specific examples where positions directly relating to fiscal control, and to the power to organise contracting and acquisitions, are occupied by military officers. For the election of the comptroller the law stipulates the need for a competitive process prior to the president’s nomination, while the composition of the CCSD is designated by the Minister of Defence [1].

Recent military high command appointments have been criticised for the fact that open support for the regime keeps the same group of officers at the senior level, without consideration for the conflicts of interest that this creates [3]. Criticism also centres on the militarisation of the state through the appointment of military personnel to the executive cabinet, which heads up 13 of the 32 ministries, and due to the reality that 60 of 576 state-run companies are managed by military personnel [4, 5]. This militarisation has taken place through the discretionary appointment of military personnel to sensitive positions both within the defence sector and in other state institutions.

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’. The Ministry of the People’s Power for Defence (MPPD) does not have an agency directly responsible for the supervision of officers who occupy positions of leadership or public administration, nor do the LOFANB or the Military Discipline Law provide specific controls [1, 2]. The lack of monitoring is not only clear within the sector but also in the blocking of vetting by the legislative branch, which cannot object to the executive’s appointments or demand to monitor and supervise these appointments as part of its political oversight responsibilities [3].

The Constitution of Zimbabwe provides term limits for military generals for military commanders of each service and the commander of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces who can only serve for a maximum of two terms, not exceeding five years each [1]. Besides the service limit placed on the commanders of the military services, there is no recognition of sensitive risk positions, including in procurement. However, in respect of policy, the Constitution of Zimbabwe states that military commanders must operate through the policy directives of the minister of defence, who get their authority from the president [1]. The act of deploying individuals to different areas or units lies with the discretion of the command after consulting the minister, notwithstanding the different levels of the risk [2].

This indicator is marked “Not Applicable,” as selection processes of individuals serving in sensitive units in the Zimbabwe Defence Forces are at the discretion of the commanders, after consulting the minister of defence. The Zimbabwe Defence Forces command has the power to not only deploy but establish units and even disband them as they see fit [1]. The recruitment process is partially described in the Defence Act, though with a lack of specificity and particularity to vetting [1]. Promotions are sometimes announced in the press after the fact, but the process is not open to public scrutiny [2].

This indicator is marked “Not Applicable,” as promotions of commissioned officers in the Military are done by the president, who is the commander in chief of the Zimbabwe Defence Force, getting advice from the minister of defence, who in turn gets recommendations from the commander of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces [1, 2]. There is no external role from the Parliament or the National Security Council in these appointments.