Political Risk:
Critical
Score:
12/100
Defence and Security Policy and Policy Transparency
Q1
33/100
Is there formal provision for effective and independent legislative scrutiny of defence policy?
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As enumerated in Article 48 of Iraq’s 2005 Constitution (1) federal legislative powers are reserved for the Council of Representatives and the Federation Council,…
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The veto is infrequently exercised to contest or revise defence policies. The passing of the Popular Mobilization Law that grants members of the umbrella…
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As established above, the Parliament’s formal rights and authority have been undermined by quasi-state actors emboldened to operate outside the bounds of constitutional and…
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Q2
21/100
Does the country have an identifiable and effective parliamentary defence and security committee (or similar such organisations) to exercise oversight?
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At the legislative level, members exercise advisory powers, hosting and establishing relations with a wide range of actors beyond defence including foreign ambassadors and…
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While the committee lacks formal rights and its mandate extends to political/legislative oversight, its focus aligns with matters that concern powerful security actors, including…
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Articles circulated on official government platforms offer firm evidence of consistent discussions between the parliamentary security and defence committee, over defence policies and laws,…
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While evidence of meetings headed by the committee are available online, there is little evidence of the application of changes or policies advised by…
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The committee’s decisions do not appear to unfold in line with a grand strategy, but discussions with high ranking defence officials are commonplace but…
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There is no evidence to suggest that the committee exercises legislative oversight, as far as defence policies are concerned. Hakim al Zamili, former chairman…
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Q3
31/100
Is the country’s national defence policy or national security strategy debated and publicly available?
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In previous years, Iraq’s NSS developed in coordination with the UNDP-I, was widely discussed and praised as invaluable to wider NSS reforms in the…
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Reaching a full and accurate understanding of the scope of debates committee members are engaged in is improbable, as the only available evidence is…
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Evidence of wide-spanning and inclusive discussions can be found concerning the country’s preceding security strategy 2010 – 2015 (1), and the security strategy before…
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Through largely limited press reports and governmental publications, transparency on defence developments exist; however, with regards to the NSS, these efforts have done little…
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Q4
0/100
Do defence and security institutions have a policy, or evidence, of openness towards civil society organisations (CSOs) when dealing with issues of corruption?
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There is no policy in which the state must commit to protecting the work that CSOs do. International NGOs are ramping up their efforts…
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The freedom to outwardly criticise the government is not a right exclusively reserved for CSOs with existing legislation. While Iraq’s protest movement captures the…
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There is very little interaction between CSOs and security actors, based on primary and secondary data. As one civil society activist said (1), there…
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Q5
25/100
Has the country signed up to the following international anti-corruption instruments: UNCAC and the OECD Convention?
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Iraq is not a defence exporter. The country’s legislature approved and ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption UNCAC, on March 17, 2008, in…
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The UNCAC covers the following areas that signatories are required to engage and ultimately fulfil; prevention, criminalization, international cooperation and asset recovery. Compliance is…
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Q6
38/100
Is there evidence of regular, active public debate on issues of defence? If yes, does the government participate in this debate?
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Outside government, we find evidence of public debate that engages with defence affairs and pertinent issues in the form of media reports, exposé and…
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Government officials, representatives and security actors engage in regular debate, largely with the media, and some academic circles, on issues of defence (1), (2),…
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Q7
13/100
Does the country have an openly stated and effectively implemented anti-corruption policy for the defence sector?
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While no anti-corruption policy tailored towards the defence sector exists, Iraq’s National Anti-Corruption Strategy (2010-2014) provides a guide (1), and tangentially addresses defence corruption.…
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The policies and operational activities within the defence sector are not formulated with the aim of fighting/reducing corruption risks. The government’s top priority is…
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Q8
17/100
Are there independent, well-resourced, and effective institutions within defence and security tasked with building integrity and countering corruption?
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Matters of integrity and corruption matters are handled by a range of national authorities and watchdog groups. The Inspectors General System was set up…
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Under CPA Order 57 (2007), inspector generals are charged with a legal mandate to perform and initiate investigations, including financial audits, associated procedures, across…
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The overall effectiveness of Iraq’s anti-graft bodies has been called into question. As NATO notes, “even when corruption is acknowledged as a strategic challenge”…
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Q9
NS/100
Does the public trust the institutions of defence and security to tackle the issue of bribery and corruption in their establishments?
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Iraq’s fourth parliamentary elections held in March of this year drew the lowest voter turnout since elections were first held in 2005 (1) Attracting…
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Q10
0/100
Are there regular assessments of the areas of greatest corruption risk for ministry and armed forces personnel, and are the findings used as inputs to the anti-corruption policy?
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There is no evidence in Arabic and English sources of published reports by defence officials or bodies measuring or assessing high corruption risk in…
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No evidence was found to support the claim that scheduled risk assessments are enforceable by Iraq’s security and defence establishment. This is all the…
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In the absence of a national anti-corruption strategy and compliance programmes, it cannot be proven that corruption risk assessments are conducted or scheduled, although…
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Defence Budgets
Q11
0/100
Does the country have a process for acquisition planning that involves clear oversight, and is it publicly available?
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Acquisition plans for defence requirements are not published by defence institutions or their online platforms. Details on costs, scheduling and management are similarly absent…
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There is not a high degree of transparency within the field of acquisition planning. Its absence may imply that plans do exist but are…
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Since there is no process for acquisition planning, this sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable.
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Q12
13/100
Is the defence budget transparent, showing key items of expenditure? And it is provided to the legislature in a timely fashion?
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The defence budget and its allocations cover more than Iraq’s MoD, allocations are distributed among the following security actors, the CTS, PMF, MoI and…
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The federal budget and the government’s ability to deliver it on time to the legislature, without delay, is dependent on the ability power-sharing parties…
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Q13
38/100
Is there a legislative committee (or other appropriate body) responsible for defence budget scrutiny and analysis in an effective way?
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Q14
0/100
Is the approved defence budget made publicly available? In practice, can citizens, civil society, and the media obtain detailed information on the defence budget?
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The defence budget is not proactively publicised, only scant information provides an overall summary of allocations. The 2018 budget stood out as the largest…
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Defence expenditure is often given as a ballpoint figure in the annual Budget Law (2018) (1), but the contents are not comprehensive and disaggregated…
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No evidence of MoD specific email contacts where formal information requests can be submitted to the relevant department are available online. Available email contacts,…
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Q15
0/100
Are sources of defence income other than from central government allocation (from equipment sales or property disposal, for example) published and scrutinised?
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Additional sources of defence income generated or received are not recorded online by Iraq’s defence institutions (1). All that is made available are budgetary…
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The MoD and its ancillary branches do not upload data relevant to overall operational expenses or additional income, separate to funds earmarked by the…
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Public scrutiny of defence income by the press and CSOs is common, it is also debated in parliament. For example, in a parliamentary session…
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Q16
6/100
Is there an effective internal audit process for defence ministry expenditure (that is, for example, transparent, conducted by appropriately skilled individuals, and subject to parliamentary oversight)?
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As stipulated within the republic of Iraq’s Internal Audit Guide (FBSA) the objective of reducing administrative and financial corruption is contingent on the processes…
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Iraq’s Central auditing body, The Federal Board of Supreme Audit, is responsible for reporting on expenditure budgets and also deliberates on emergency expenditure (1),…
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External scrutiny is exercised by Iraq’s oldest auditory body — the FBSA — and while some performance reports are delayed or unavailable, those which…
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Audit findings, as available MoD content online shows, are managed by the ministry’s ‘Meera’ division — that is attached to the Central Audit Directorate;…
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Q17
13/100
Is there effective and transparent external auditing of military defence expenditure?
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The Federal Bureau of Supreme Audit is mandated to review defence spending, its executive powers were revived in 2003 under CPA Order 77 in…
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The abilities of external bodies such as the FBSA to conduct its duties of investigation hinge on the access the respective ministry/minister grants to…
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There is no evidence of an external audit on the defence/military expenditures (1).
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Insufficient information regarding the results of what the IG’s Office has accomplished makes it difficult to assess the office’s effectiveness. Although there is no…
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Nexus of Defence and National Assets
Q18
0/100
Is there evidence that the country’s defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation and, if so, are these interests publicly stated and subject to scrutiny?
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A thorough look at legislation and constitutional law show an overemphasis on the exploitation of oil (1). It stipulates that Iraq’s oil belongs to…
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While verifiable information is hard to find, allegations circulating online offer evidence that state-back armed forces in the paramilitary and officials are benefitting from…
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There are weak legal constraints against natural resource exploitation. However, media coverage lacks details, but a critical article reported on the exploitation of oil…
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These interests are not publicly declared and as one interviewee noted; “you won’t find much as the case involves powerful actors such as Ameri.…
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Scrutiny of businesses associated with natural resource exploitation (from oil to hydrocarbons) falls under the Law on Combating the Smuggling of Oil and Natural…
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Organised Crime
Q19
0/100
Is there evidence, for example through media investigations or prosecution reports, of a penetration of organised crime into the defence and security sector? If no, is there evidence that the government is alert and prepared for this risk?
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Organized crime is a problem and is not restricted to the latest Iraqi administration (1), (2). Before the ascent of the PMF, organised crime…
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Organised crime is intimately connected with heavily armed paramilitary groups that are within the PMF and with the decentralisation of power and arms nationwide.…
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Q20
0/100
Is there policing to investigate corruption and organised crime within the defence services and is there evidence of the effectiveness of this policing?
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There is not a single department inside the MoI whose functions include the detection and prevention of corruption. Unethical activities, particularly giving or receiving…
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Structural gaps (1) remain and continue to be exploited throughout the police, from local forces, border police and the national police force. The Badr…
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Investigations led by police may appear in one-line citations across local press, but the details of these are not made public. Given that corruption…
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Control of Intelligence Services
Q21
25/100
Are the policies, administration, and budgets of the intelligence services subject to effective and independent oversight?
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Within the structure of the MoD, the National Security Council is responsible for intelligence policies, programmes and budgetary planning (1). Other intelligence structures also…
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There is little evidence of transparency and of intelligence oversight beyond the INIS charter which places IG’s in charge of oversight. However, It is…
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Q22
8/100
Are senior positions within the intelligence services filled on the basis of objective selection criteria, and are appointees subject to investigation of their suitability and prior conduct?
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There is no evidence of selection criteria, applied in determining the best candidates for intelligence service positions. It’s unlikely that one exists when studying…
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Iraq’s post-2003 intelligence apparatus has undergone various changes and massive restructuring (1),(2) which is not directly responsible for ‘selection bias’ but has certainly erected…
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It’s doubtful that a vetting process exists, but appointments are approved by the PMO. The pattern of recruitment over the past 6 years suggests…
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Export Controls
Q23
0/100
Does the government have a well-scrutinised process for arms export decisions that aligns with Articles 7.1.iv, 11.5, and 15.6 of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)?
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Iraq has not yet signed or ratified the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), despite recent calls by Amnesty International (1), urging the GoI to “immediately…
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Iraq is not an exporter of military equipment or arms. The equipment Iraq is currently manufacturing is undergoing tests and further development. A legal…
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Iraq is not an arms exporter.
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Lobbying in Defence
No specific information came up in extensive online searches tying defence actors to lobbying efforts which is a clear indication that that type of…
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This indicator has been scored N/A as Iraq does not have legislation that regulates lobbying in the defence sector.
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No lobbyist registration system is legislated nor exists.
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Lobbying activities of the nature concerning the questions raised here are not common in Iraq, or its defence establishment.
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