Are there effective measures in place for personnel found to have taken part in forms of bribery and corruption, and is there evidence that these measures are being carried out?
Japan score: 100/100
Offences are not defined; no evidence of other formal mechanisms. Or the military are exempt from law.
Bribery and/or corruption are not defined offences in law that apply to the defence sector, but there are wider legal mechanisms in place (e.g. national laws supported by policies, regulations, or other laws) used to address this.
Bribery and/or corruption are defined offences in law that clearly apply to the defence sector, but 2 or more of the following mechanisms are not provided for: offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting bribes. Sanctions exist in law, but maximum penalties constitute less than 1 year imprisonment or weak fines that would not act as a deterrent.
Bribery and/or corruption are defined offences in law that clearly apply to the defence sector, but 2 or more of the following mechanisms are not provided for: offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting bribes. Possible sanctions include criminal prosecution/ incarceration, dismissal, and considerable financial penalties.
There are a range of clearly defined offences in law that clearly apply to the defence sector. These offences cover (at a minimum) offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting of any item of value to influence the actions of an official or other person in charge of a public or legal duty. Possible sanctions include criminal prosecution/ incarceration, dismissal, and considerable financial penalties.
Two core pieces of Japanese anti-corruption legislation are Chapter XXV “Crimes of Corruption” of the Penal Code  and the Unfair Competition Prevention Act.  The Penal Code covers bribery of Japanese public officials. It does not define the term ‘bribe,’ but ‘bribe’ has been interpreted by the courts as anything that “fulfills a man’s need, greed or desire”.  Giving, offering or promising to give a bribe are offenses, with a penalty of up to three years’ imprisonment, or a fine of up to Y2.5 million. A Japanese public official convicted of accepting, soliciting or promising to accept a bribe can get a penalty of up five years’ incarceration. Only natural persons can be held liable for these corruption-related actions under this Code.  The Unfair Competition Prevention Act covers bribery of foreign public officials. The act prohibits giving, offering or promising money or other benefits to induce them to exercise their official duties, or use their influence so that the briber achieves a gain in international commercial dealings. Those who commit offenses under this Act can receive a penalty of up to five years in prison, a fine of up to Y5 million, or both. 
1. “刑法”、 [Penal Code], Act No.45 of 1907, Chapter XXV, https://elaws.e-gov.go.jp/search/elawsSearch/elaws_search/lsg0500/detail?lawId=140AC0000000045.
2. “不正競争防止法.” [Unfair Competition Prevention Act], Act No.47 of May 19, 1993, https://elaws.e-gov.go.jp/search/elawsSearch/elaws_search/lsg0500/detail?lawId=405AC0000000047.
3. “Anti-Corruption and Bribery in Japan,” Lexology, accessed February 4, 2019, 3, https://www.lexology.com.
Japan score: 100/100
There is a complete failure to investigate or prosecute, even in the face of clear evidence.
Instances of bribery or corruption are superficially investigated or rarely disclipined.
Instances of bribery or corruption are investigated but not often disciplined. There is clear undue influence in the decision making process.
Instances of bribery or corruption are investigated or disciplined through formal processes, but undue political influence is attempted and sometimes effective at derailing prosecutions.
Instances of bribery or corruption are investigated or disciplined through formal processes and without undue political influence.
The Inspector General’s Office of Legal Compliance (IGO) conducts an annual inspection of the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the Self-Defence Force (SDF). “SDF morals” is one of the items inspected, but inspection for corruption is not mentioned under this item in the IGO’s annual reports for 2015, 2016, 2017 or 2018.  High-level cases of corruption in Japan are dealt with by the Public Prosecutor (see Q10A). Corruption cases are usually first investigated by the police, and the public prosecutors thereafter conduct supplementary investigation. However, Special Investigation Departments at some District Prosecutor’s Offices investigate major corruption cases and complicated economic cases themselves. The Tokyo District Prosecutor’s Office is generally considered to have the most competent such department.  Information on the Special Investigative Departments on the relevant websites is sparse, but the Ministry of Justice has a brief presentation of the unit  and the Tokyo District Public Prosecutor’s Office has posted an organisational chart that shows that the Department exists.  Sources have not been found on how many cases the Special Investigation Department investigates each year. However, as for categories related to corruption, the Tokyo District Public Prosecutor’s Office in 2019 received 3,223 cases of fraud for consideration, out of 14,813 nationally, and 1,958 cases of embezzlement / breach of trust out of 8,387 nationally. Cases in these two categories comprised respectively 9% and 6% of all cases received by the Tokyo District Public Prosecutor’s Office that year.  The investigation by the Public Prosecutor will often move through the phases collecting and analysing clues, searching, seizing and interrogating suspects and then deciding whether to indict. Investigation and prosecution follow due process and are formally independent of political influence. Iwashita writes that, “Public prosecutors’ positions are secured by law. No arbitrary dismissal, suspension, or reduction of salary can be made. In regard to the investigation and disposition of individual cases, the Minister of Justice can control only the Prosecutor General, not each prosecutor, directly. For example, the Minister cannot directly interfere with prosecutors in charge of individual investigations and prosecutions.”  Nevertheless, the Japanese press sometimes reports possible attempts by the executive to influence the public prosecutor in questionable ways. For example, “[t]he Cabinet of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in January  changed the interpretation of the National Public Service Law to extend [chief of Tokyo High Public Prosecutor’s Office] Kurokawa’s retirement beyond his 63rd birthday in February. It was believed that move was designed to allow Kurokawa to take over as prosecutor-general.” There is a “wide perception that [Kurokawa] was a close ally” of the Abe administration.  However, no recent defence-related cases where the executive attempted to exert undue influence on the public prosecutor were identified.
1. “防衛監察本部” [Inspector General’s Office of Legal Compliance], “年度防衛監察” [Annual Defence Inspection], accessed June 28, 2019, https://www.mod.go.jp/igo/inspection/index.html.
2. Shinichi Iwashita, “Enforcement Practice against Corruption in Japan,” in Seventh Regional Seminar on Good Governance for Southeast Asian Countries (Tokyo: UNAFEI, 2014), 77-78.
3. “特捜部検事” [Special Investigation Department Prosecutor], Examination / Qualification / Recruitment, Ministry of Justice, http://www.moj.go.jp/keiji1/kenji_m27.
4. “東京地方検察庁機構.” [Organization of the Tokyo District Prosecutor’s Office], Tokyo District Prosecutor’s Office, http://www.kensatsu.go.jp/kakuchou/tokyo/page1000076.PDF.
5. “東京地方検察庁の事件受理・処理件数（平成31年・令和元年）” [Number of cases received and processed by the Tokyo District Prosecutor’s Office (2019)], Tokyo District Prosecutor’s Office, http://www.kensatsu.go.jp/kakuchou/tokyo/page1000075.PDF.
6. Iwashita, “Enforcement Practice against Corruption in Japan,” 86.
7. “Top prosecutor Kurokawa hands in resignation over gambling,” Asahi Shimbun, May 21, 2020, http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/13391391.
Compare scores by country
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|Country||35a. Sanctions||35b. Enforcement|
|Albania||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Algeria||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Angola||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Argentina||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Armenia||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Australia||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Azerbaijan||50 / 100||25 / 100|
|Bahrain||50 / 100||25 / 100|
|Bangladesh||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Belgium||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Bosnia and Herzegovina||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Botswana||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Brazil||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Burkina Faso||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Cameroon||100 / 100||0 / 100|
|Canada||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Chile||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|China||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Colombia||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Cote d'Ivoire||100 / 100||0 / 100|
|Denmark||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Egypt||25 / 100||0 / 100|
|Estonia||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Finland||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|France||75 / 100||75 / 100|
|Germany||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Ghana||75 / 100||50 / 100|
|Greece||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Hungary||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|India||75 / 100||75 / 100|
|Indonesia||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Iran||75 / 100||50 / 100|
|Iraq||25 / 100||0 / 100|
|Israel||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Italy||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Japan||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Jordan||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Kenya||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Kosovo||25 / 100||75 / 100|
|Kuwait||25 / 100||0 / 100|
|Latvia||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Lebanon||50 / 100||NEI|
|Lithuania||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Malaysia||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Mali||100 / 100||0 / 100|
|Mexico||75 / 100||25 / 100|
|Montenegro||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Morocco||0 / 100||25 / 100|
|Myanmar||0 / 100||25 / 100|
|Netherlands||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|New Zealand||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Niger||100 / 100||0 / 100|
|Nigeria||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|North Macedonia||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Norway||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Oman||25 / 100||25 / 100|
|Palestine||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Philippines||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Poland||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Portugal||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Qatar||25 / 100||25 / 100|
|Russia||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Saudi Arabia||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Serbia||75 / 100||50 / 100|
|Singapore||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|South Africa||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|South Korea||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|South Sudan||50 / 100||25 / 100|
|Spain||75 / 100||50 / 100|
|Sudan||25 / 100||0 / 100|
|Sweden||75 / 100||100 / 100|
|Switzerland||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Taiwan||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Tanzania||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Thailand||50 / 100||0 / 100|
|Tunisia||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Turkey||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Uganda||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Ukraine||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|United Arab Emirates||50 / 100||25 / 100|
|United Kingdom||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|United States||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Venezuela||75 / 100||0 / 100|
|Zimbabwe||100 / 100||75 / 100|