Depending on the nature of the deployment and the size of the contingent, some forward planning is made which defines roles of the Military Police and the Defence Intelligence and Security Agency (DISA) concerning the operation. However, this is the case only for a few operations and not treated as a strategic issue [1, 2].

Planning is not conducted based on corruption risks, but rather on the broader risks that the contingent may face [1]. More recently, efforts have been made to include corruption as an issue at the strategic level, and also operational and tactical levels [2].

No information could be found on the forward planning of operations in general. On its website, the Defence Ministry only retrospectively informs about operations against terrorists or organized crime (1). No additional information on the planning of operations could be found in the magazine of the military. In the magazine, the military publishes the results of its operations monthly (2). The Algerian context, where corruption is a “system of governance” (3), makes it very likely that corruption is not considered a strategic issue in the forward planning of operations.

There is no evidence that corruption has been considered a strategic issue in the planning of operations (1), (2). No evidence could be found that Algeria takes part in peace operations (3).

There is no indication that corruption issues are taken into account in forward planning.

There is no evidence that corruption issues are considered in the planning and execution of operations, mishandling by officers during deployment is likely to occur.

There is Not Enough Information to score this indicator. No publicly available information could be found on the processes of military operational planning and whether this includes consideration of corruption as a strategic issue.

There is Not Enough Information to score this indicator. No publicly available information could be found on the processes of military operational planning and whether this includes consideration of corruption as a strategic issue.

The Anti-Corruption Council and the government’s anti-corruption strategy, approved by the Government Decision 1141-N, it did not include the defence sector among the priority spheres of anti-corruption programs [1]. That is, during the presidency of Serzh Sargsyan, the government did not demonstrate the political will to eliminate corruption in the field of defence and corruption was not specifically addressed for the planning of operations. However, after the Velvet Revolution, the issue of corruption in armed forces has been and is addressed as a strategic one [2]. The vision of the incumbent minister of defence is as follows: “To reduce and manage corruption risks and enhance integrity norms in the defence sector and armed forces, it is necessary to develop transparent procedures for management -i.e. planning, procurement, consumption, control and accountability- of material and technical resources” [3].

In an attempt to eliminate corruption in the defence sector, as well as to strengthen integrity and good governance in the defence sector the Ministry of Defence went through a NATO Building Integrity (BI) Self-Assessment Questionnaire. This fundamental step was completed by Peer Review Visit (February 2016) and the drafting of a BI Peer Review Report providing an analysis of national current structures, good practices and capacities as well as recommendations to further strengthen the management of the defence establishments [1, 2].

While anti-corruption initiatives are often highlighted in Australian aid packages and training offered in recent areas of operations, such as Afghanistan [1] and the Solomon Islands [2], there is only some circumstantial evidence that corruption issues are considered in the forward planning of operations. While military personnel are bound by military doctrine related to corruption issues during operations (for example in the case of gift and hospitality rules, the policy explicitly “applies… when on operations” [3]), none of the limited numbers of documents public available which relate to forward planning [4, 5] indicate that corruption or, indeed, ethical issues are identified as a strategic issue which needs addressing. There is some circumstantial evidence that corruption is considered in forward planning of operations. For example, Australia negotiated with the Solomon Islands that it could make arrests for crimes, including corruption, during the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) operation. The Australian Federal Police and Defence Force made several arrests of corrupt senior Solomon Island officials [6].

It is unclear how large a role corruption as a strategic issue plays in forward planning of operations, however, a series of stories on alleged misconduct which may rise to the level of war crimes by Australian special forces soldiers in Afghanistan paints a bleak picture of how any corruption issue safeguards may be applied in Defence. A variety of special forces units have been accused in official reports, in leaked documents, and by investigative journalists of misconduct involving serious violations of the laws of war, including summary killings [1-3]. Some of this alleged misconduct was reported to have been covered up through the use of planted weapons on unarmed civilians, a technique “borrowed from the police corruption playbook” [3]. Defence’s public response to these reports and investigations of misconduct has been to charge former personnel with leaking and investigate the journalists and media outlets reporting on these issues [4-6], rather than to put more focus on anti-corruption efforts and ethical field conduct, though a secretive and much-delayed official inquiry into the war crimes accusations is ongoing [7].

Corruption in military legislation in Azerbaijan is not a strategic issue. Only national security concepts contain text about anti-corruption steps. According to the experts, Corruption is not considered as a key factor in the planning of operations. There is no information on corruption as a strategic issue in real military operations (on the line of contact between the Armenian and Azerbaijani armed forces), as well as during the planning of foreign peacekeeping operations. The Ministry of Defence’s (MoD) website did not provide any information on this. At the same time, there are no official reports by the MoD about anti-corruption discussions in NATO training sessions (1). But according to the Building Integrity Newsletter (September 2017) representatives of the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defence invited and participated an executive seminar (Building Integrity seminar) for senior leaders of the MoD and the GAF which organised by the Georgian MoD in 2014 (2). Officially Baku still has not joined NATO’s program – Building Integrity, which intended to strengthen tools against corruption and does not disclose its reasons (3).

There is no official information that corruption issues are taken into account during the planning and execution of operations. The MoD does not provide any information on this issue.
The MoD is currently involved in operational planning in two directions: first, the line of contact between the Azerbaijani and Armenian troops, and the second – peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan.
According to Minister of Defence Zakir Hasanov, 60 per cent of the military personnel, or more than 50,000 servicemen, are serving in the front line (1). Azerbaijan has been participating in NATO’s Resolute Support Training, Advice and Assistance Mission (RSM) in Afghanistan since January 1, 2015. Currently, 120 servicemen are serving within RSM (6 officers, 2 military doctors, 112 soldiers) (2). According to the expert, corruption is not considered as a strategic issue during the planning and execution of operations. The expert believes that the risk of corruption in peacekeeping forces has always been great, as the resources allocated there are great (3).It should be noted that information on corruption scandal in peacekeeping forces was published in the Azerbaijani press. In 2007, colonel-Lieutenant Rasim Muradov was arrested for reporting corrupt crimes at the Defense Ministry’s Peacekeeping Battalion (4).
Ministry of Defense has anonymous reporting mechanisms such as “Trust line” and “Trust Mail” in military units (5). But it is always questionable to ensure the safety of the person reporting the crime in the army.

There is no planning that takes corruption as a serious and strategic issue. Interviewees state that corruption is considered a non-important and insignificant issue within the Bahraini Defence Force [1, 2]. An online search and consultations with media personnel found no information on the subject.

Corruption issues are not considered significant and are not taken into considerations in operations, or execution of planing of forward planning [1, 2]. Following a search of websites of the Ministry of Defence (MoD), the Ministry of Interior (MoI), the king’s office and Bahraini media and verified by interviews, there is no information on this topic publicly available.

There is no evidence that corruption issues are taken into account at all in forward planning for military operations.

There are no publicly available official records suggesting that corruption issues are considered in the planning or execution of peace operations [1].

The 1999 Law on the Suppression of Corruption covers all corruption of federal staff and institutional offenses under the law as “crimes and misdemeanors against public order, committed by persons holding public office” which includes the military [1].

However, there are no references to specific anti-corruption training or guidelines provided for military operations in other countries. This is to a large extent because corruption has never proven to be a structural issue in operations [2].

There is no evidence that corruption as a strategic issue is considered in the forward planning and execution of military operations [1].

The Ministry of Defence’s response during the preparation for peacekeeping operations training on the Code of Ethics and Anti-corruption is organized for those who will be sent on international missions [1]. There is no available and reliable information on whether corruption risks are included in the planning of operations. There are also no traces of developed doctrine addressing corruption risks in operations in a document titled Doctrine of Training of the BiH Armed Forces [2].
The number of personnel deployed at one moment in 2017 was 66 (with 1222 deployed in peace support operations since 2001) [3], and due to the low number of deployed personnel, there is no forward planning. The MoD and AFBiH personnel are always under the command of a partner country in peace support operations (PSOs) [4].

According to the government reviewer, the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces of BiH do not conduct trainings in ethics, professionalism and the fight against corruption solely with personnel deployed to missions abroad. On the contrary, training in ethics, professionalism and the fight against corruption encompass all personnel in the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces of BiH. In March 2019, the Inspectorate General of the MoD BiH drafted a new Training Program on Ethics, Professionalism, Integrity and Anti-Corruption in the MoD and AFBiH. Training in this area has existed before, but with the new Program, training has been expanded, unified and better organized. The program specifies training topics, the number of classes, training providers, the obligation to conduct training with all staff, the training provider training literature, the obligation to report on the training delivered, and the centralization of training data. The number of this document is 05-03-32-1127-1/19 and the document has been in use since March 28, 2019. In addition to the training provided for in this program, additional training is provided with personnel deployed to missions abroad. During 2019 training in ethics, professionalism, integrity building and anti-corruption training were conducted with 6221 members of the AFBiH. This information was presented by the inspector general at the 14th Annual Conference of the Inspectorate General of MoD BiH and inspectors of the AFBiH. Data on the number of persons with whom the training was conducted and the topics on which the training was conducted were drawn precisely from the records described above.

Moreover, the importance of training in ethics, professionalism, integrity and the fight against corruption indicates that this issue is of strategic importance in the MoD and AFBiH. The Peace Support Operations Center (PSOTC BiH) is part of a network of NATO countries and partner countries that has been developed to provide training in the field of integrity and anti-corruption in peace support operations. PSOTC BiH is listed as one of NATO’s accredited Integrity Training Centers in NATO’s Building Integrity Discipline Alignment Plan 2019 dated April 24, 2019 (page 5). The document is a product of the NATO Integrity Building Conference held in March 2019 in Washington (NATO Building Integrity Conference in Washington (USA) from 5 to 7 March 2019) [5]. The subject training is also listed in heading 51A.

Bosnia and Herzegovina does not conduct significant operations and, therefore, this indicator is marked Not Applicable.

The AFBiH has not conducted any major military operations overseas, in particular those that would require the implementation of procurement procedures. In its military missions performed abroad, AFBiH relies on partner countries for logistical support and does not conduct procurement procedures on their own. The MoD’s Office of the Inspector General does not evaluate these operations but can conduct an independent investigation into the irregularities that might be reported in connection with the operations both in the country and abroad, or if the involvement of the Office was requested by the Minister of Defence [1].

As explained in previous questions, corruption is not officially stated as a strategic military issue. Botswana does not have a National Security Strategy and is not involved in any military operations. Instead, the BDF relies heavily on the legislative instruments in the form of the respective Acts of Parliament pertaining to Defence, Public Safety, Justice, Intelligence etc [1]. The Vision 2016 and these legislative instruments have since formed the national core points of entry for any strategic considerations [1]. These pieces of legislation have been found wanting over time, hence the need for a comprehensive national security strategy became evident in the quest for an effective and accountable security architecture [2]. There are no operations ongoing at the moment. There are no public documents that discuss forward planning. As such, it follows that there is no public evidence that corruption is included in forward planning processes.

There is no evidence that corruption as a strategic issue is considered in the planning and execution of military operations [1].

The assessor found no evidence of corruption being a specific topic in foward planning of operations, but this concern is present through other terms, such as probity. The military doctrine emphasizes the righteous conduct of all its members, affirmation which tackles corruption tangentially. The assessor found no direct mention of corruption problems and risks in operations; however, the very structure of functions in the military allows for corruption prevention. The process of public acquisitions within the Army, for example, forbids that the same person be responsible for (a) the operationalization of the bidding (b) the contracting formalities and (c) the payment execution [1], which consist in mechanism of checks and balances [1]. The Integrity Plans of the Ministry of Defence and single forces do not mention corruption risks of operations directly [2, 3, 4, 5, 6]. The main focus is in the internal control of general processes, which includes operations.

Mitigation occurs through internal and external control mechanisms, but not regarding the term ‘corruption’. Terms such as nepotism, conflict of interest, and undue use of power are the most used terms. Internal and external control mechanisms work relatively well in Brazil, although it is common to hear about fraud in simple material acquisitions [1, 2]. Internal and external controls work properly in checking if the formal legalitic processes are correct within operations. However, the ability of these control systems to detect more complex frauds in operations is uncertain. In spite of the overly formalistic approach of internal control mechanisms, the military is frequently re-shuffling troops during deployments in order to minimise the risk of being corrupted (e.g. by drug traffickers in Guarantee of Law and Order (GLO) operations) [3].

Transparency International’s Defence and Sceurity Programme (2016) declared that “10 out of the top 25 TCCs are in band ‘F’ for preparing their troops to control corruption and behave with integrity in military operations, 8 are in band ‘E’ and 5 are in band ‘D’” (1). This shows corruption is not seen as a strategic issue, and it is not taken account in forward planning. Again, the law that applies is Law N° 038 (2016), as well as the current military policy (2), these do not mention this issue, not only about corruption in general but also about integrating corruption in forward planning. The Law of Military Programming, mentioned earlier, was passed to address the needs of the armed forces, including capacity building (3), but there is no evidence that it considers corruption as a strategic issue that needs to be integrated into forward planning operations (4).

There is no evidence that corruption is address in forward planning. Thus, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

Information garnered from training institutions indicates that corruption is not considered a strategic issue in forward planning of operations [1] [2]. In addition, the overall absence of mitigating controls over corruption risk (i.e. no evidence of a military doctrine addressing corruption, or of risk assessments being carried out, the lack of a code of conduct addressing corruption, and limited training that addresses corruption) suggests that corruption as a strategic issue is unlikely to be considered in the forward planning of operations.

This indicator has not been assigned a score due to insufficient information or evidence.

Most of the focus for forward planning of missions, is the emphasis Canada places on training partner military organisations. Canada has had a strong footprint in providing training to foreign militaries (i.e. Afghanistan, [1] Ukraine, [2] Iraq [3]). The doctrine that explains the Operational Planning Process (OPP) makes no mention of “corruption”, “bribe” or “fraud”, though “Integrity” is listed among key military values. [4] Corruption is generally framed, at least in public-facing documentation, as something the Canadian Forces can assist in rectifying abroad; [5] however, the effectiveness of this in the long-term is yet to be seen. It does ask planners more broadly if the planned Course of Action (COA) “comply with approved CF doctrine, applicable policy, regulations, legislation and guidelines?” [5]

As noted in 53A, most references to corruption in the forward planning of operations are framed as something the Canadian Military can teach others not to do. [1] [2] It is unclear whether there is any introspective assessment of the potential for corruption of Canadian forces abroad, despite the potential for such activities on deployment in specific areas where corrution may be a prolific part of political life (i.e. Canada’s involvement in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)). [1] [3]

Forward planning often takes into account strategic, technical and operational issues, but there is no evidence that corruption concerns are part of the decision-making criteria for defining such operations [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. Descriptions of planning of operations in the army, the air forces, and the navy do not mention corruption as a matter of concern. The Ministry of National Defence (MDN) has made efforts to incorporate mechanisms to address corruption in its probity agenda, but there is no clarity around how these measures strengthen the control of corruption in the forward planning of operations.

There is no evidence that corruption concerns or specific training in handling corruption problems are applied in the field. There could be an emerging awareness regarding the attachment to institutional values, including probity and integrity, manifested in the recent publication of codes of ethics (for example, in the army) and the probity agenda in the MDN [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. However, there is no information about how this code could be implemented, if at all, or how the values and codes translate into guidelines for deployment and operation planning.

There is not enough information to score this indicator. There is no public information on any aspect of forward planning in PLA deployments abroad. Since the creation of an 8,000-strong standby peacekeeping force, the PLA has announced that there will be more emphasis on comprehensive strategic planning of peacekeeping operations (PKOs) but this is still in its infancy. [1]

There is not enough information to score this indicator, as no information on this matter coud be accessed. Further, no cases of corruption involving Chinese personnel in UN PKOs are identifiable.

Corruption is regarded as a strategic issue within the Military Forces, and there are multiple documents in which seek to combat it, such as the Damascus Doctrine and the Manual of Ethics and Morality. [1, 2] The Military, in compliance with Colombian Anti-Corruption Regulations, implements actions such as the Anti-Corruption and Citizen Care Plan that includes preventative corruption planning. [3] This document includes the risk map that identifies 40 types of risks. Those related to military operations are: administrative corruption in reserved expenses; operational information leakage; obtaining personal benefits from organised Armed Groups in units in the development of military operations, in exchange for criminal benefits; receipt of any personal benefit on the occasion of the conclusion of a contract; transport of illegal material and substances; unjustified loss, allocation, or diversion of material in warehouses; loss of material in Mobile Maintenance Units, warehouses, and workshops; deviation of fuel items; and information uploaded, modified, or deleted illegitimately in the Logistics Information System of the Defence (SILOG) Sector. [4] Although such planning actions exist, it is evident within the Military Forces’ guidelines related to operational planning that corruption may still take place. This was reported in the New York Times in May 2019, which found that the issuance of operational guidelines through the 2019 Objective Approach Document, developed by the Army’s General Command and by Colonel Nicacio Martínez, asked Commanders to do anything to increase combat outcomes, even if it raised the possibility of allying with armed criminal groups to obtain information on targets. Officers and soldiers offered incentives such as extra vacation for the increase in combat deaths. [5] This publishing caused the Army to withdraw the Guideline, with the aim of carrying out a new one that would allow the offensive against the armed groups to be raised, despite original approval of the Minister of Defence. [6] Thus there are clear allegations about the high risk of extrajudicial executions in alliance with other armed groups.

The Military Forces are considered in compliance with the procedures stipulated in Law 1474 of 2011 [1] when there is issuance of an Anti-Corruption Plan, a Corruption Risk Map, and an Improvement Plan resulting from findings related to internal and external audits. These documents can be found on the website of the different Military Forces. It is evident that when military operations are planned, possible acts of corruption are identified. However, this instrument and the methodology used to build them do not take into account the complexity and multiple risks of operational corruption in a country with high levels of territorial conflict, so mitigation actions are unclear. This particular point was evident in the rapid and unplanned response of the Minister of Defence and the National Army to the New York Times over allegations of operational guidelines that incentivised or rewarded military officers for extrajudicial executions. The scandal led to the withdrawal of the Guideline, in addition to the opening of various investigations by control entities such as the Attorney General’s Office, who opened a preliminary inquiry against the Commander of the Army and other officials for this case. [2, 3] Human Rights Watch denounced the appointment of at least nine Generals by the Government of Colombia who were linked to extrajudicial executions between 2002 and 2008, citing that it generated a negative message for soldiers and officers, and was ignorant of the victims of these events. [4] The Special Justice for Peace (JEP) is responsible for the application of justice for extrajudicial executions. It has received multiple statements from Colonels and soldiers regarding the events in military operations in which civilians were killed. Colonel Gabriel de Jesús Rincón gave testimony in the JEP that General of the Army, Mario Montoya, ordered an increase in the number of fights and deaths, in exchange for promotion, prizes and so on. [5]

There is a total absence of corruption as a strategic issue during the forward planning stages of military deployments (pré-déploiement opérationnel). For example, the training that Ivorian commanders and soldiers have received at military academies in Morocco recently has been focused on combatting terrorism and not in integrating corruption issues, as shown by Aline Leboeuf in the IFRI report of October 2017, she writes:

“It is important to note the role played by Morocco and South Africa in this respect. Since 1969, the Royal Military Academy of Meknes has provided training to Senegalese officers and many other African countries have sent their troops for training there, notably Côte d’Ivoire. Morocco’s training focusses these days on combatting terrorism…” (1).

There is no evidence for the integration of corruption as a strategic issue in the forward planning of military deployments in theory or in practice (1).

Research indicates that corruption as a strategic issue is taken into account in the forward planning of operations in relevant missions and to some degree. The Danish engagement in Aghanistan is part of the NATO Resolute Support Mission, but a country policy paper for Afghanistan 2018-2020 lays out a so-called three year plan for the Danish military and civilian efforts in Afghanistan [1, 2]. The country paper resides within the remedy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and presents the strategic goals and focus areas. Counter-corruption is mentioned several times as a key priority and as a foundation of the Danish support, most notably in relation to the civilian part of the effort. However, the Danish contribution to RSM includes, according to the policy paper, a Danish lead on corruption prevention through transparency, good governance, supervision and control within the RSM HQ [3]. Altogether this means that, as part of the Danish comprehensive approach in Afghanistan, anti-corruption appears to be taken into account in the forward planning of operations in the civilian part, under the auspices os the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, the military part is generally referred to NATO level where corruption as a strategic issue appears more vague and remains at the general level in operations planning, where it is e.g. placed as a general notion within the “good governance” NATO training of the Afghan security forces [4]. At the end of 2020, Denmark will take over the leadership of the NATO Mission Iraq (NMI) which is a non-combat training and advisory mission. Research could not find information on the operation planning [5].

As mentioned above (Q53A), Danish military engagements are usually conducted as part of a NATO mission. Hence, the Danish contribution is a very small part of a larger effort. In turn, in Afghanistan the Danish military contribution is part of a comprehensive approach where the civilian part is significant. A 2017 report evaluated the robustness and vulnerabilities to corruption in Denmark’s aid funding modalities in Afghanistan [1]. Research could not identify evaluations of the application of the military’s anti-corruption activities [2]. The Danish Defence does not have the function of an Inspector General, but Danish senior officers mentored Afghan Inspector Generals within the Afghan ministry of defence, the Afghan general command, the ministry of the interior as well as within the presidential staff [3]. Based on the fact that Danish officers receive no training on anti-corruption issues as part of their pre-deployment training [4] (see Q52), and on the fact that corruption appears to be taken into account in planning for operations only on the more general level (see Q53A), there is not much “knowledge” to be applied in the field, as the questions refers to. As mentioned in Q52, Danish officers are sometimes trained and deployed as anti-corruption specialists [3] (see Q52), and so it can be said that these specialists are able to execute the application of anti-corruption measures in operations.

Having surveyed all relevant laws, by-laws and media platforms, there is no evidence that corruption issues are taken into account in forward planning or that commanders apply anti-corruption knowledge in the field. Moreover, according to interviews, corruption in the process of preparation of operations and acquisition processes has not been taken seriously and not considered a severe problem (1), (2), (3).

According to our sources, corruption is not taken into account in any of the operations conducted by the Egyptian army (1), (2), (3), (4). The main exercise the Egyptian military hosts and co-organizes is Operation Bright Star, which it conducts jointly with the US military. There is no evidence that corruption issues are taken into account during the exercise operation (5). As for peacekeeping forces, Egypt has 3000 personnel deployed around the world in peacekeeping forces which means it has the 7th largest peacekeeping operation in the world (6). It is understood that the UN Peacekeeping forces consider anti-corruption to a certain extent in the forward planning of its operations (7). However, there is no evidence whatsoever that anti-corruption is considered in forward planning of general military operations, namely against insurgency in North Sinai which is the major actual battle the military is currently involved in.

Tackling corruption is not considered a priority in the forward planning in the defence sector, based on the government’s strategy. [1] Part of the preparation for operations includes the description of the environment of the place where the mission will be conducted, which could also include corruption. [2] Otherwise, corruption is not a prevalent topic in those training sessions and, therefore, this is also reflected in the overall defence strategies. [3]
As a European Union member state, Estonia also follows the EU Defence Strategy. The strategy, ratified by the European Council, lists corruption as one of the risk factors. [4]

One of the biggest missions where Estonian Defence Forces’ units were deployed was in Afghanistan. [1] According to an Estonian colonel’s assessment, corruption as an issue is not tackled with the right approach. Many other international and Estonian analysts have emphasised corruption as the main problem in Afghanistan. [2] The fight against corruption unites international forces and Afghans, it has been concluded. Corruption in Afghanistan was also a topic that was covered in training in Estonia before the deployment. [3] However, there is no evidence that corruption is being prioritised during military operations nor that it is considered in every mission.

Corruption is not considered a strategic issue for operations in the Defence Forces. However, when attending an international peace and/or conflict operation, the mandate of the operation and the related instructions are followed. [1] In Finland, international crisis management operations are carried out under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Given the fact that corruption is not considered as a strategic issue in the forward planning of operations, it is unlikely that corruption-sensitive guidelines are implemented. The Headquarters of the Defence Forces also did not address the question in its written response

As explained by an anonymous commando soldier, [1] some practices of corruption like facilitation payments, small bribes, or “backchich” can be addressed during cultural training given to soldiers ahead of deployment abroad, but corruption is not considered a strategic issue.
Corruption issues may be taken into account in the forward planning of some operations, when dealing with local authorities or heads of militias, for instance, but no systemic process exists.

Corruption is taken into account in planning for very few operations. As such, mitigation approaches are not implemented consistently during deployments. [1] No record was found in the press of either well-managed or mismanaged situations of corruption during Opex.

The Strategy and Operations Department is in charge of planning, preparing and implementing Germany’s participation in operations and missions abroad. The procurement of services and material for deployment is executed by the individual Armed Forces Administration Offices (‘Einsatzwehrverwaltungsstellen’) in accordance with the applicable procurement provisions [1].

Procurement related to the planning of operations is strictly based on the German procurement provisions. Hospitality provisions occurring through contact with the local population (advancing affected people in the local population, establishing a contact network, mediating cultural conflict situations, etc.) is also regulated [1].

While corruption prevention is considered in the planning of missions, it is not mentioned as a strategic issue. During the 2016 Anti-Corruption Summit in London, Germany made a commitment to strengthen its anti-corruption training for military personnel in preparation for deployment [2]. Moreover, corruption prevention is perceived as a ‘leadership task’ (Führungsaufgabe), so it is questionable whether officers of all ranks are acquainted with anti-corruption issues beyond the most basic training on the topic during induction [3].

There are dedicated staff concerned with the issue of corruption prevention during missions: the ‘contact points for corruption prevention’ (Ansprechpartner für Korruptionspävention – AKP). AKPs are supported by the corruption prevention unit within the Central Operation Command (J8 EinsFüKdoBw). Regarding operation-related procurement, purchases are subject to the Federal Procurement Law and overseen by specially trained staff [1]. While there are some mechanisms in place to respond to corruption issues during missions, the evidence does not suggest that corruption mitigation is consistently part of the planning of operations.

The AKP is tasked with advising commanders on issues of corruption. Furthermore, AKPs are involved in awareness-raising activities, compliance with reporting obligations, offering support with regard to questions about the acceptance of rewards and gifts, processing sponsorship applications, the identification/analysis of positions with a high risk of corruption, risk analyses and ensuring that the ‘Mehr-Augen-Prinzip’ (‘multiple eyes principle’) is applied. These tasks of the AKP are specified in the corruption prevention provisions issued by the Armed Forces Operations Command [2].

Corruption is not considered a key variable that informs the strategic calculus of the forward planning formula of operations (1), (2), (3), (4). Ghana has several institutions that are mandated with training military personnel before operations. In particular, the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center (KAIPTC) provides training for civilian, police, and military personnel in areas of conflict prevention, conflict management and resolution, preparing them for their duties in regional and continental operations, such as Peace Support Operations (PSO) and Election Observation Missions (5).

The KAIPTC runs the pre-deployment courses for military personnel involved in peacekeeping operations. In 2017, 2400 officers were trained in peacekeeping. However, despite including corruption in its academic programmes the KAIPTC doesn’t address corruption as a strategic issue during the pre-deployment courses (6).

The Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College (GAFCSC) runs the courses for the GAF’s officers and delivers academic programmes in collaboration with the University of Ghana (7); while the Military Academy and Training Schools (MATS) offers basic military training to officer cadets from the GAF. Neither of these institutions covers corruption as a strategic issue.

Ghana participates in several UN peacekeeping operations. As of June 30, 2018, Ghana has 2603 military and police personnel deployed and ranks 10th for their troop and police contribution (1). However, corruption issues are not taken into account in the planning or execution of operations (2), (3), (4), (5).

There is no evidence that corruption as a strategic issue is considered in the forward planning of operations [1,2].

Corruption issues are not taken into account in planning or execution [1, 2]. There is no information regarding corruption issues during deployment since the Greek Armed Forces rarely operate outside the country.

Corruption risks, as well as other risks, are considered during preparation for foreign peace supporting missions [1]. Soldiers are briefed about the main problems to tackle, and for certain positions (such as CIMIC officers) where more direct contact is made these briefings are deeper [2]. However, anti-corruption training is not part of the forward planning of operations [1]. Overall, corruption is taken into consideration in the preparation for operations, but it is not perceived as a strategic issue.

As examples in 53A suggest the issue of corruption as a threat in the local environment in Kosovo, Afghanistan or Iraq is well noted and part of many analyses prepared by military experts; however, no inspector general is appointed to deal with these issues, no mitigation plan is prepared to tackle the problem either. Source 4 and 7 suggested that at the leadership level soldiers are well aware of the problem, and they were successful in managing this threat in foreign operations [1, 2].

As discussed in Q.51. and Q.52, the Armed Forces do not have a military doctrine that addresses corruption as a strategic issue. Each branch of the Armed Forces has an Act which governs it [1]. Prescribed codes of conduct as per the Acts from each branch of the military serve as the foundation for training [2]. Given that as per the Acts, corruption is a punishable offence and there is evidence of anti-corruption training workshops for all personnel- it is plausible that corruption could be an issue that is being considered in forward planning of operations [3]. However, there is no tangible evidence at present to support this as documents are classified. According to a retired Army colonel, corruption is not considered in the forward planning of operations; but it could be considered in administrative planning [4].

As discussed above, there does not seem to be evidence that corruption is an issue that is being considered in forward planning of operations [1][2].

There is insufficient evidence to score this indicator; as such, it is marked ‘Not Enough Information’. Corruption in the Indonesian military is said to be an important strategic issue. At the 2017 Legal Technical Coordination Meeting (Rakorniskum), the Chief of Armed Forces himself explained that corrupt practices in the military environment were leading to the inadequate procurement of defence equipment [1]. However, the consideration of corruption at an operational level does not seem to have been highlighted very much. Efforts to check this claim has been hampered by lack of access to military regulations at the level of integrated (Mabes TNI) and service headquarters (Mabes Angkatan). Online browsing found only one example of chief of armed forces regulation concerning planning health support to operation and exercise in the armed forces [2]. While oversight and control are regulated with aim to “guarantee the conduct of operation and exercise as planned, uniformed, and consistent” , there is no mention of corruption risk.

There is insufficient evidence to score this indicator; as such, it is marked ‘Not Enough Information’. It is unclear whether corruption risks are taken into consideration in operational planning and operations-related activities. There are two types of military operations, war and other than war (according to Law No. 34/2004 there are 14 types of military operations other than war, e.g. counterterrorism, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, support to local government, support to police), which the TNI can carry out independently or in cooperation with other institutions in a leadership or assisting capacity. In the TNI’s independent operations, internal supervision is carried out by the Inspectorate General [1]. In joint operations, for example, the counterterrorism operations with police and intelligence agencies, there is an external oversight function which, according to the law, must be carried out by a supervisory team from parliament/the DPR [2].

Other forms of military operations other than war may have escaped public and parliamentary oversight. For example, in the Ministry of Agriculture and Army’s paddy field preparation cooperation programme, there were internal and external audits that both revealed allegations of fraud. The government had resolved to prepare 129,096- and 72,033-hectare areas of new paddy fields in 2016 and 2017, with a budget ceiling of 2.06 trillion rupiah and 1.18 trillion rupiah respectively [3]. Ombudsmen and parliament objected to the involvement of the TNI, which took place on the basis of a Memorandum of Understanding instead of a decree by the President, as mandated by law. In 2017, the BPK suspected that there was risk of a state financial loss, which could affect the fairness opinion of the relevant ministries [3]. In April 2018, the army agreed to suspend the programme until the evaluation by the army inspectorate was completed [4]. The BPK described the loss figure as ‘enormous’ but somehow, reporting on this case did not continue. Based on the said case, it can be concluded that although corruption issues are likely not taken into account in planning or execution, the existing oversight mechanism could fill in the absence. However, in the case of suspicion of corruption occured in military operation, there was no significant action taken to investigate and charge the perpetrator.

No evidence was found to indicate that corruption issues are taken into account in planning or execution [1, 2, 3, 4].

In view of the example above (see 53A), it would appear that corruption issues are not taken into account in planning or execution, and are regularly mishandled by officers during deployment [1, 2, 3].

No evidence could be found showing proactive incorporation of ‘corruption’ as a strategic issue in the planning of operations. Forward planning is generally lacking and intelligence formulation similarly lacks a definitive decision-making nucleus. Various deficiencies and cracks within the ISF is partly a symptom of “absent training … such as collective training programmes” at military bases (1). These operational shortfalls are likely to extend to the integration of corruption as a strategic issue. Defence contracts/arms procurement remain an area of high-risk, but there appears to be no relevant arms sales-related code, as a knowledge raising exercise to inform and warn future cadets of these risks.

Evidence suggests the contrary; that corruption risks are not considered important as far as military operations are considered, as a retired military officer (2) told TI. In some situations, military operations have been launched by PMF factions, independently of Baghdad, substantiates the claim that there is unregulated planning of operations. As a state priority, corruption ranks relatively low among commanders, several of whom over the years have been suspected but not convicted of engagement in corrupt activities. A source interviewed disclosed the rise of unlawful revenue-generating activities among security actors in light of the country’s severe cash deficit, across various parts of the country during deployment (2).

Sunni MP Mishaan Jabouri famously pointed to corruption cases concerning asset disposal, commenting on misspending, Jabouri, said that the GOI spent $1bn on warplanes that never arrived, and courthouses in Tikrit, post-liberation, “that have never been built” (3). As Jabouri explained, there appear to be no incentives to prevent the exploitation of situations that encourage profiteering and contractual fraud. These experiences underscore the lack of legislative scrutiny over defence contracting (at the operational level), the risks that security forces and civilians may face, and asset-disposal related risks (4). A score of ‘0’ is chosen to reflect the evidence uncovered.

A workshop held in August of this year in Baghdad invited coalition intelligence officers to present a workshop raising “awareness of the challenges facing intelligence operation centres and military intelligence schools” (1). The effectiveness of this training cannot be commented at such an early stage, but steps towards enhancing operations are being taken (1) NATO’s less than-year old agreement in response to the GoI (2), (3) to assist with security sector reform is further evidence of active moves to reform military institutions. An earlier source, however, contradicts the state narrative, stating that the agreement came “after a U.S. call for the alliance to help” stabilise Iraq and professionalise its army (2). Similar training efforts/workshops, with a focus on curbing corruption and operation performance, have been provided by Iraq’s international allies (4). In spite of progression, corruption as a strategic issue is largely absent in the planning of deployments and the general effectiveness of the ongoing NATO-led training programme is too early to show.

There is no evidence that corruption as a strategic issue is taken into account in the forward planning of operations. While operations are planned in line with IDF directives, including relating to conflicts of interest (1), they do not cover corruption as a strategic issue. There were several examples in the past few years, which indicate that such issues are not receiving the attention they warrant in the military (2) (3).

There is no evidence that corruption issues are taken into account in planning or execution for military operations, aside from implicitely as part of the Code of Ethics and IDF Spirit (1) (2) (3).

Among the several activities related to the forward planning of operations, aspects specifically related to corruption as a strategic issue are not included [1].

There is no evidence that corruption is taken into account in the planning or execution of military operations. The only anti-corruption guidance is given in the MoD’s anti-corruption plan, however it is not specifically tailored to operations. [1].

In the core Japanese defence documents, there is no explicit doctrine on corruption as a strategic issue (see Q51A). In line with this approach, a retired higher Marine Self-Defence Force (MSDF) officer, who commanded an MSDF regional headquarters, stated that when forward-planning operations, he did not think that corruption is taken into account as a strategic issue. This is because preventing corruption is considered important, with no distinction, at all stages from ordinary operations during peacetime to emergency situations, according to him. [1] Implementation plans for peacekeeping operations do include a statement to the effect that the head of the operation may request the cooperation of non-state actors in transferring or loaning goods or providing services. However, the brief text in these plans do not elaborate on the potential for corruption that such acts entail. [2]

Plans for how to avoid corruption are not presented explicitly in the implementation plans for two peacekeeping operations from the timeframe of this research that are found on the website of the Secretariat of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters in the Cabinet Office. The plans do, however, contain a statement that relevant Japanese agencies will assist the operations by providing goods and work. In addition, plans for the donation of goods and provision of services to parties in the theater of operations are stated. [1] [2] Reports of such operations after they have been concluded are posted on the same website and include a statement about what goods and work the personnel provided. [3] [4] A retired higher MSDF officer stated at interview that such operations are inspected by the inspection organisations, beginning with the Board of Audit and the Inspector General’s Office, and that the achievement of non-corruption can be judged by the number of matters pointed out (items in need of improvement but not at the level of breaches of law) and the number of matters found to be in breach of the law. [5] This evidence indicates that anti-corruption measures are implemented in the part of such operations that takes place in Japan. However, the sources do not provide evidence that special measures are taken to mitigate corruption risks in such operations abroad as well.

Corruption is not treated as a strategic issue within the defence sector generally, and there is no evidence to support that it is. In fact, evidence points towards it not being treated as a strategic issue in forward planning of operations. As demonstrated in Q51A, the armed forces do not have a military doctrine that considers corruption a strategic issue. Moreover, other than public statements and commitments to countering corruption made by very senior officials associated with the defence sector, including those by the King and the Prime Minister [1, 2,3], there is no evidence of corruption issues being considered at all in any operation. In addition to that, the defence sector does not publish any information about its operations, and most of defence matters are considered state secrets and are classified under Jordan’s Protection of State Secrets and Documents Provisional Law No. 50 [4,5,6]. There is no transparency in relation to defence operations generally, and there is no evidence to support that corruption is taken into consideration in the forward planning of operations.

Corruption is not treated as a strategic issue within the defence sector. In addition to that, there is no information available about defence operations and planning in general. Jordan provides military and police officers to seven UN Peacekeeping missions [1], however, there is no information available about whether corruption issues are taken into account in planning and execution. Due to this lack of evidence, as with the lack of information on forward planning, it is not possible to assess its application in planning and execution.

The Grand Strategy, which identifies threats to national security, outlines corruption as one of the threats to Kenya’s survival alongside other global, regional and domestic security challenges. [1] The strategy argues that, like the other challenges, corruption needs to be securitised, meaning the state views corruption as a threat and a vulnerability of the State. The strategy notes that corruption is a hindrance to economic and social development. Although the strategy regards KDF as one of the instruments of national power and consideres KDF as the final guarantor of Kenya’s national security, this role is only limited to physical security.There is limited or no evidence that corruption as a strategic issue is taken into account in forward planning of KDF operations.

The KDF openly condemns acts of corruption during recruitment exercises, warning recruitees against falling prey to individuals asking for bribes in order to secure them placement in the KDF. [2] In other operations of the KDF, it is challenging to find evidence of forward planning with regard to corruption, which can be attributed to the classified nature of operations within the military. Moreover, KDF has in the past requested for external entities to assist in monitoring corruption risks in recruitment processes. [3] Although this in KDF terms intends to project transparency it could also imply there is lack of internal mechanisms to deal with corruption.

All KDF personnel deployed into various operations are guided by the existing laws that govern their conduct, including on issues of corruption and economic crimes, as stipulated in section 124 of the Kenya Defence Forces Act No.25 of 2012. [1] Recently there were reports that the KDF has formed partnership with Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission for training and partnership in strategies in combating corruption.[2] However, there is limited evidence to indicate that KDF integrates issues of corruption while planning for missions or operation, while the KDF has previously been accused of corruption in operations. [3]

The Ministry of Defence and the Kosovo Armed Forces have not yet established a military approach to anti-corruption operations due to the fact that the Kosovo Security Forces is still not participating in peacekeeping operations [1]. No information is available to suggest there are any anti-corruption guidelines within the civil relief efforts.
The Integrity Plan for 2019-2022 of the Ministry of Defence mainly aims to strengthen the integrity and anti-corruption culture within the Ministry of Defence and the Kosovo Security Force by identifying, analysing and assessing risks, as well as by planning and addressing these through adequate measures and actions [2]

This indicator has been scored Not Applicable.
The Ministry of Defence and the Kosovo Armed Forces have not yet established a military approach to anti-corruption operations due to the fact that the Kosovo Security Forces is still not participating in peacekeeping operations [1]. The Kosovo Security Forces have participated in some civil relief humanitarian operations in Kosovo and abroad (mostly in Albania) [2, 3], and in a number of field trainings [3]. No information is available to suggest there are any anti-corruption guidelines within the civil relief efforts. The Ministry of Defence’s Integrity Plan outlines five key strategic objectives: advance the human resource management system; prevent conflicts of interest; enhance the procurement and contracting system; improve the material, financial resources and asset management system; and strengthen internal control mechanisms [4].

The Kuwaiti authorities are starting to take corruption into consideration in the defence and security realm however, there are no examples of corruption being considered in the forward planning of military operations. In March 2018, Parliament passed the conflict of interest act, which necessitates that officials who stand to gain personally from their position in any way (by, for exampling, having a spouse who owns a business that deals with the Government) disclose their conflicts of interests, and resolve them by either quitting or abandoning their private ventures. (1)

This, along with the facts that security leaders have been meeting with anti-corruption activists and auditors, shows that the security agencies in Kuwait are at least feeling the need to appear like they are taking corruption into consideration, a police official said. (2)

High-ranking officials have put corruption on the agenda in the planning of all operations by pushing forward the conflict of interest law, and there are older laws in place that show awareness of the issue, but when it comes to the day-to-day planning of military and security planning, officials don’t discuss corruption as an issue (1, 2 and 3). They do not punish or investigate the many instances in which their staff flouts anti-corruption laws by, for example, neglecting to report that they have received a commission from a weapons company to help push through an arms procurement deal and refusing to disclose their finances to the ACA, officials and an activist close to the Government said (4, 5, 6 and 7). It was not possible to acquire more information on the matter due to sensitivity.

It is also important to note that Kuwait is not involved in any conflicts, except marginally in the war to reinstall the internationally recognised Government of Yemen (8). Most of Kuwait’s military has no battlefield experience, officials and analysts said (9, 10, 4, 5 and 6).

Corruption is only partly considered a strategic issue. More attention is paid to procurement of ammunition than to training of presonnel. Forward planning of operations is regulated by the “Procedure for the formation, financing and preparation of the Latvian National Armed Forces contingent participating in international operations and rapid reaction forces” [1] and the “Regulations on supply conditions, norms and procedures for the provision of professional service soldiers, spare soldiers and guardsmen with material and technical means and return them or compensate them for their residual value”. [2] Each year, according to the anti-corruption plan of the Ministry of Defense, corruption risk assessments are implemented and the anti-corruption measures plan accordingly updated. The anti-corruption measures plan of the Ministry of Defense sets out preventive measures to minimise the risks of corruption, aimed at reducing direct contact through non-personalised procedures, thus preventing the possibility of influencing the decision maker, while ensuring the availability of information.

Even if corruption is not treated as a strategic issue, commanders follow the anti-corruption plan of the MOD. Before operations and after finishing an operation, a comprehensive analysis, including of corruption risks, is discussed. [1] [2]

The LAF’s DoO indicated that the Lebanese Army does not have specific corruption training, thus corruption issues are not taken seriously in forward planning operations (1). Furthermore, LAF does not conduct major operations regularly (2).

There is no evidence of corruption considerations for procurement or related aspects linked to operations’ execution (1). This also applied during LAF exercises with UNIFIL deployed in the South of Lebanon (2). As previously indicated, the LAF’s anti-corruption measures are integrated within its laws and rules which military personnel are continuously reminded off, according to the LAF DoO (3).

The 2016 Military Strategy of the Republic of Lithuania does not mention corruption as a strategic issue in any way. The National Security Strategy (last updated in 2017) mentions corruption as a threat, and emphasises the necessity to take anticorruption measures. However, the strategy is focused on public security and the public sector [1]. There is no clear link to the forward planning of operations.

The Action Plan for the Anti-Corruption Programme of the System of Defence 2017-2021, Action 2.5, states that the deadline for the informing the Department of Strategic Communication of the Ministry of Defence about the anti-corruption actions taken during international operations should be submitted every six months, (1) yet such information is not publicly available.

According to the government reviewer, the liability for corruption-related offences is provided for in the job descriptions of the commanders of military units participating in multinational operations (National Support Element and Special Operations Squadron). Lectures on corruption prevention are included into the preparation for multinational operations [2].

Although corruption is not highlighted as a strategic issue in the forward planning of operations per se, it is outlined as a strategic issue in the Armed Forces Integrity Plan, [1] which encompasses all operations of the military. Corruption is also highlighted as a strategic issue in overall operations in anti-corruption training and seminars. [2] The Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) is also in the process of drafting a comprehensive Organisational Anti-Corruption Plan (OACP) in line with the National Anti Corruption Plan (NACP). [3]

The planning of operations takes into consideration general corruption risks and follows guidelines set out in the Armed Forces Integrity Plan. [1] Corruption and its mitigation are also highlighted in anti-corruption training and seminars, [2] although they are not for any one particular operation per se. The way that corruption mitigation efforts are implemented in such miliary operations cannot be ascertained.

The government does not appear to make any reference to eliminating corruption as a strategic goal in its flagship reform programme for the military.¹ ² ³ ⁴ The programme, which is scheduled to run from 2015 to 2019, merely focuses on increasing military spending, recruiting more soldiers and buying more equipment. It will involve a financial commitment of 1.23 trillion CFA and should enable the armed forces to recruit an additional 10,000 troops over the five-year period.¹ However, one source warns of the danger and the folly of investing so much in the armed forces without first addressing corruption as a strategic issue, especially when the misuse of military funds often results in troops not even having enough fuel for their vehicles.⁴
A senior security governance expert agreed that the LOPM does not address corruption risks.⁴ The interviewee commented that “93% of expenditure was given to general administration, which makes it very difficult – even for financial experts – to trace flows of money and work out what is going on”.⁴ The stakeholder said the LOPM2 will be different. It will provide much clearer breakdowns of military spending to conform with a transparency initiative launched by the West African economic bloc ECOWAS.⁴ A security expert working with the Malian authorities confirmed that they had seen so evidence of the MDAC identifying corruption as a strategic issue.⁵

Corruption issues are not taken into account at all in forward planning or planning for operations.

The Military Education System fosters a culture in anti-corruption matters taking into account principles such as legality, honesty, loyalty, impartiality, and efficiency that all public servants must observe in the performance of their job, position, commission, or function. [1] It is inferred that commanders at all levels are transmitted such knowledge, but little is known about advance operations planning. [2]

The general planning of policies that respond to internal and external threats that affect national security and defense are contained in the Joint National Defence Military Plan, which contains reserved information: “The document contains the strategies and content necessary for execution of the missions of the Mexican Army. There are also hypotheses based on the foreseeable threats that the country may face. It contains the war plans, that is, how the country would respond with its different resources to be able to deal with an aggression.” [1]

Although there is insufficient information to indicate whether corruption is taken into account in operations planning, it follows that field commanders are aware of the risks of corruption, especially if the type of operations they carry out are taken into account, such as the so-called war on drug trafficking (seizure of drugs and weapons, combating money laundering, arrest of members of cartels, etc.). [2]

Corruption issues are not taken into account at all in forward planning, [1] and the only document targeting the issue is the Integrity Plan, [2] which does not deal with operations. [3]

According to the MOD reviewer, Montenegro is a small country whose contribution relies on participation in NATO, EU and UN-led operations (with limited personnel – from 1 or 2 (UN,EU) up to 20 – Afghanistan). Therefore, the Operation Plans for these operations are done in the respective HQ’s and all of them recognize corruption as a strategic risk. Montenegrin Armed Forces implement these Plans, therefore are obliged to respect the NATO, EU and UN rules. All military personnel, including commanders apply the knowledge gained in the pre-deployment training. Information could not be verified on corruption being accounted for in forward planning.

Corruption issues are not taken into account in planning or execution, [1] and the only document targeting the issue is the Integrity Plan, [2] which does not deal with operations. [3]

As mentioned in Q52, over the past decade, a number of initiatives have been launched to fight corruption and promote transparency in the public and private sectors in Morocco, such as the adhesion to the 2003 United Nations Convention Against Corruption in 2007 (1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7) the creation of the ICPC (National Commission for the Fight against Corruption) in 2015, and its transformation into a National Body for the Fight Against Corruption, the creation of an e-gov platform (8) and the creation of a corruption vigilance platform and hotline in 2018 (9).

As Q52 explains, no evidence was found that Morocco’s civil and military authority consider corruption as a strategic issue in the forward planning of operations, including in anti-corruption, human rights and governance NGOs reports (10)(11)(12).

Such lack of evidence might indicate a lack of transparency which itself could imply corruption risks.

No evidence was found that corruption issues were taken into account in planning or execution, or were regularly mishandled by officers during deployment.

There is not enough information to score this indicator, as the Tatmadaw’s doctrines on the planning of operations are not publicly available. The assessors do not have access to any information indicating whether the Tatmadaw addresses corruption as a strategic issue during its military operations against ethnic insurgency. There are provisions on extortion and insider trading in the Defence Services Act (1959) [1]. One interviewee indicated that professors from foreign and domestic universities give lectures about corruption to commanders of the Tatmadaw [2]; but this could not be verified through public sources. Regardless, the military’s planning of operations is not publicly available and there is no information clarifying whether corruption is considered a strategic issue in the forward planning of operations.

There is not enough information to score this indicator, as the Tatmadaw’s planning of operations is not publicly available.

There is evidence that the armed forces are aware of corruption as a strategic issue. This is exhibited by the inclusion of anti-corruption courses in pre-deployment training, which focus on the increased corruption and integrity risks posed by operational environments abroad (particularly in illicit economies) [1]. However, public strategy documents (those which detail overall defence strategy, as well as specific strategy documents for missions) lack any mention of corruption as a strategic issue for operations [2,3,4,5]. Though there is anti-corruption training provided in pre-deployment exercises and most mission-related documents do include the topic of corruption, corruption as an operational risk is addressed in these training events and documents as a potential problem that exists in the country of operation and which might hinder the operation in some way. Corruption insofar as it relates to the Netherlands’ own people during an operation is not addressed. For example, in Afghanistan, the Netherlands set up anti-corruption projects and an ‘Anti-Corruption and Justice Centre’ but the reports on such projects frame corruption as an Afghan problem that the Netherlands can help with, rather than a risk for the Dutch military in operations which should be planned for [6].

The presence of clear codes of conduct for all personnel, which apply in all operational settings, suggests that corruption is taken into account during the execution of operations [1]. For operational needs such as procurement, special legal provisions exist [2,3]. Independent evaluations of missions do exist but are classified and therefore their coverage of corruption issues is unknown [4]. A multi-year strategy document for Afghanistan, one of the Netherlands’ largest missions in recent years, explicitly shows planning for corruption risks and details instruments to manage this risk, including by engaging local civil society [5]. Media articles and analyses detail the challenges posed to the Netherlands by corruption in the operational area [6,7].

During the planning phase for any operation, logistic concepts are formulated in accordance with Defence Force Orders and Instructions that are designed to mitigate against corruption. Situational awareness and understanding underpins the formulation of campaign planning. Planners must consider all aspects that may influence campaign designs and impact operations, including corruption. Headquarters Joint Forces New Zealand Standard Operating Procedures specifically address areas more prone to corruption such as contract management, management of assets and consumable items, and financial procedures for cash and credit card transactions [2, 3]. Specific Operational Level of Capability training for deploying individuals is prescribed to ensure they have the requisite skills, and depending on the mission assignment and area of operations, includes avoidance of corruption [4.] One example of this is the Operational Contract Management Course (OCMC) conducted before deployment [5].

Logistic planners also complete some of the same training, which they apply during the mission planning process. Common issues such as double billing or fraudulent invoicing are mitigated against by having in-theatre personnel authenticate invoices before being approved for payment. As a matter of practice, monthly reconciliation of all accounts is conducted by HQ NZDF Finance for every mission to confirm the use of funds is both appropriate and necessary and provides mitigation against corrupt practises. [6] All expenditure is subject to review by the Controller and Auditor-General, and anyone involved with the collection, receipt, custody or expenditure of public money or stores may be examined and audited. The voluminous DFO Vol. 4 – Support Matters addresses matters of internal control, audit and assessments for operations but corruption is not addressed specifically [7].

NZDDP-3.21 Stabilisation Operations clearly notifies operational planners of the importance of being vigilant during deployment, especially as it is almost unavoidable that contractors will have to engage in supporting mission deployment [1,2,3]. There have been no further large-scale deployments since the NZDF withdrawal from Afghanistan (the NZDF deployment to Iraq, as part of the international effort to counter ISIS, was a training mission) and as NZDF Doctrine advises that good governance initiatives be led by civilian agencies, there has been limited operational examples within the last five years. Separate independent evaluations by an Inspector-General or similar body are not usually undertaken, unless it is specifically requested. Anomalies identified during the annual audits or concerns raised by external parties could be sufficient reason to initiate a separate review – as occurred for the Government Inquiry into Operation Burnham, but this related to operational conduct and reporting and not to corruption [4]. No separate independent evaluations conducted on the application of NZDF anti-corruption measures were identified within the period relevant to this assessment.

The assessor did not find any evidence that would suggest corruption is considered a strategic issue in the forward planning of operations (1).

No policy regarding the matter has been identified. Therefore, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

Corruption is not identified in operational plans, corruption is not seen as an operational issue which requires contingency planning at the operational planning phase. Periodic briefings, on corruption-related issues, do occur (1). “The Defence Headquarters has recently organized a three-day procurement awareness seminar for the various personnel of the armed forces responsible for procurement operations.” The seminar’s theme was “Understanding Public Procurement Policy Towards Efficient Defence Procurement in Nigeria,” was declared open by the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), Air Marshal Alex Badeh, who was represented by Air Vice Marshall A.A. Iya, Chief of Policy and Plans at the Defence Headquarters (2), (3).

There is no evidence that corruption risks are planned for during operations. Soldiers in the field are significantly hampered by corruption which manifests in poor pay and service conditions. The guidelines on corruption are not always effectively implemented in the field. This fact has been reported in the media by various personnel who describe how poor equipment and a lack of supplies affects operational efficiency (1), (2), (3).

Following the 2016 Integrity Plan which explicitly addressed issues of corruption during deployment in international missions, corruption has been seen as a strategic issue and is taken into account in the forward planning of operations [1]. Prior to the implementation of this Plan, it is unknown to what extent the planning of missions addressed issues of corruption. Since MoD anticipates risk of corruption in operations as very low, it cannot be expected that forward planning would include more than share of lessons learned, guidance on best practices and education for financial matters (procedure for purchases of small items like printer). [2]

Anti-corruption rules are strictly followed during deployment abroad. Staff officers are introduced to the financial issues of the mission while the Chief of the Mission, usually a Colonel, reinforces the anti-corruption policy. Each procurement abroad requires approval from the Chief of the Mission but also from officials from the Ministry of Defence back in Macedonia. Given the small scope and of these missions abroad, which are limited both in terms of personnel and means, and incorporated within a multinational logistics framework, no large procurements take place abroad; hence the risk of corruption is minimal [1].

Corruption as a strategic issue is taken into account especially in the forward planning of operations in high risk areas, i.e. places characterised by weak state structures and a fragile civil society [1]. Although recognising cultural and social settings, the planning process focuses on making the deployed personnel aware of the risk and setting requirements for an action plan in order to avoid implication in corruption incidents at a local level [2]. To conclude, corruption as a strategic issue is taken into account mainly in the forward planning of operations in high risk areas, and not in all operations.

Corruption as a strategic issue is taken into account mainly in the forward planning of operations in high risk areas, and not in all operations [1]. In the last decade 2 larger operations have been evaluated: in 2014 and in 2017, the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee recommended the evaluation of Norwegian military operations in Afghanistan and Libya respectively [2, 3]. The initiative came from the committee but the Government was formally in charge of appointing independent working groups. The committee was consulted on both the mandate and the composition of these working groups [4]. The report on Norway’s engagement in Afghanistan demonstrates that the Norwegian Government has a good general understanding of corruption risks in Afghanistan, but this awareness is primarily focused on risks external to the mission and how Norwegian development aid could fall prey to corruption. Corruption as a strategic issue in execution of actions is treated marginally in the report [2]. Similar observations may also apply to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) as a whole [5]. The report on Norway’s commitment during the military intervention in Libya in 2011, where the Royal Norwegian Air Force deployed six F-16AM fighters to participate in NATO’s bombing of the country, mentions corruption only as a background factor for the political situation in Libya [3]. There is no publicly available information to enable us to conclude to what extend corruption as a strategic issue is taken into account in the execution of particular actions during operations [6]; this being said, it should be noted that evaluations of larger missions have been conducted by independent commissions.

As outlined in Q51, there is no military doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue in operations, therefore there is no evidence to support that corruption issues are taken into consideration in the forward planning of operations. It is difficult to discern if corruption issues are taken into account in forward planning, due to the lack of transparency around operational planning on the Royal Armed Forces and Ministry of Defence websites (1), (2). There is a lack of accountability regarding operational procedures with little media coverage apart from Omani-British joint exercises and natural disaster emergency operational plans (3), (4). No details are made publicly available on forward planning and the lack of transparency and accountability justify a score of zero for this sub-indicator. According to our sources, there is no forward planning that takes corruption as a risk. Although there is little forward planning (more than a year), corruption is never mentioned as a major risk factor (5), (6).

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable, because corruption is not taken into consideration in forward planning.

The Omani Royal Armed Forces do not conduct significant operations, nor do they provide personnel for UN peacekeeping forces (1). The sole operation found relates to an emergency meeting on how to deal with a tropical cyclone (Mekunu) held by the Sultani’s Armed Forces’ Military Committee for Management of Emergency Situations (2). However, no reference is made to corruption risks in the media, no follow up articles were found discussing details of the operation (2), (3), (4). According to our sources, there are no major operations run by Oman’s armed forces and no deployment anywhere of the sultan’s forces; therefore, no corruption risks are taken into consideration (5).

The issue of corruption has never been taken seriously in either strategic or forward planning by the Palestinian Authority in general and the armed forces and security in particular. Further, most of the plans (forward plans) are routine plans that have no significance on the operations of the agencies. Nevertheless, corruption is not included or considered an issue within any plan. According to a senior officer, forward operation plans do not exist within the security apparatus, in term of operations.

Corruption issues can be taken into consideration in the planning of operations concerning recruitment and procurement. However, there are cases where junior officers break the Code of Conduct and are prosecuted. The absence of clear plans provides opportunities for corruption (1). Major corruption issues occur when recruiting new soldiers (nepotism) and in procurement (buying goods, food, equipment, etc). These issues are rarely taken into consideration at senior levels.

A 22-officer Palestinian training team trained to build integrity and transparency in the security establishment was formed within the project program in cooperation with the Anti-Corruption Commission, a British support team and the Royal Academy of Defence (2).

Adopting the Performance Governance System, the Armed Forces of the Philippines Transformation Roadmap (AFPTR) is a strategy that aims to transform all AFP services into a strong and credible institution built on good governance. AFPTR is the establishment of the Army’s Risk Management Framework (PARM) that provides guidance to commanders, staff, civilian leaders, and soldiers on managing risks within the implementation of strategies or conduct of operations including disaster response and peacekeeping deployments [1]. PARM is applied from the Army’s headquarters to major units at the operational level, down to the brigades, battalions, company and even squads at the tactical level [2]. PARM is also used to enhance internal controls and strengthen the Army’s internal audit process [2]. It has identified corruption as one of the risks identified in the Army’s risk dictionary categorized as Policy, Process, and People. In its Sail Plan 2020, the Navy, recognizing corruption as a strategic issue, developed a program for accountability in resource management and financial responsibility involving sailors of all ranks [3,4].

As noted in 53A, corruption is taken into account in planning for operations but are not consistently implemented during deployments [1, 2]. On several occasions, military-issued guns and ammunition have been found in the hands of rebels [3, 4]. According to a study on the gun trade in the Philipines, the regular transfers of guns between various police and military units, and the loose stockpiling of licit and illicit weapons, opens the door to further malfeasance [5]. In 2018, a senator shared that his sources from the Army revealed of a massive corruption in the AFP modernization procurement process [6].

Corruption is taken into account in military activities, but there is no evidence that it is considered a strategic issue in the forward planning of operations. In February 2016, the “Anti-corruption Program in the Ministry of National Defence for 2016-2019” [1] was introduced. It identifies corruption risks in operations as a threat. It was prepared by the ministry and related to the “Government Anticorruption Program for 2014-2019” [2]. In January 2018, the government program was replaced by a new one for 2018-2020 [3].
As background information, in 2016 Poland sent about 1,400 soldiers into six foreign operations, and in 2017 about 2,500 soldiers into 10 foreign operations [4]. There is no publicly available information on cases of corruption during these operations. In January 2017, the media disclosed that over 1000 individuals were interrogated in connection to corruption during the qualification process for soldiers participating in foreign military operations [5].
Since 2015 level of corruption risk in operations is generally law, as Polish contingents spent relatively small amount of money locally. They are generally supplied from Poland and do not implement local CIVIC or international assistance projects. On operational level corruption is taken into account in planning activities of Military Police and Military Counterintelligence Service personnel deployed in operations. [6]

As noted in 53A, corruption is not recognised as a strategic issue in military operations.

As background information, in 2016 Poland sent about 1,400 soldiers into six foreign operations, and in 2017 about 2,500 soldiers into 10 foreign operations [4]. There is no publicly available information on cases of corruption during these operations. In January 2017, the media disclosed that over 1000 individuals were interrogated in connection to corruption during the qualification process for soldiers participating in foreign military operations [5].

Since 2015 level of corruption risk in operations is generally law, as Polish contingents spent relatively small amount of money locally. They are generally supplied from Poland and do not implement local CIVIC or international assistance projects. On operational level corruption is taken into account in planning activities of Military Police and Military Counterintelligence Service personnel deployed in operations. [6]

The Ministry of Defence (MoD) and branches were contacted to provide information concerning corruption as a strategic issue in operations but were not forthcoming. However, on the basis of existing descriptions of procedures in place with regard to training [1] or logistics planning [2], there is no evidence that this is the case, as they make no mention of risk mitigation or corruption as strategic issues. There is no evidence that forward planning includes corruption as a strategic consideration.

The MoD and branches were contacted in order to provide information concerning corruption as a strategic issue in operations but were not forthcoming. Existing accounts of operational implementation concerning logistics suggest that corruption is not taken into account as a risk [1], but in regards to the Central-African Republic deployment, some goods and services are procured by UN Structures [2], suggesting at most inconsistent consideration of corruption issues in operations, if a recent evaluation of peacekeeping operations including MINUSCA is to be considered [3].

Corruption issues are not considered to be strategic issues within the defence sector overall (Q51) and there is no evidence of them being factored into plans. Corruption is not an issue that the armed forces or the MoD take into consideration in their various activities. [1,2] Defence and security issues are treated as confidential and secret, and both advanced planning and corruption are not part of the conversation on defence in the country. Whereas there is a general expressed Government commitment to combatting corruption as a strategic issue, these commitments do not extend to the defence sector. [3] For instance, communication on behalf of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that Qatar needs to strengthen coordinated cooperation to address corruption. [4] However, none of these references to corruption are related to forward planning.

During operations and activities, the Qatari armed forces and the MoD do not take corruption issues into consideration. The commanders do not usually have guidelines or take practical measures on corruption during operations. [1,2]

The most significant military operation of the last five years is the so-called ‘Mission in Syria’ [1]. There is no evidence that any anti-corruption training was included in the forward planning or strategic of the Russian troops before sending them to Syria [1]. The operation was launched within hours of the Federation Council permitting the use of Russian troops abroad on September 30, 2015 – without any proper forward planning [2]. There have been no other military operations carried out by Russia abroad since then. The Military doctrine stipulates nothing about anti-corruption measures[3], while defence plan is never disclosed to the public[4].

There is no publicly available evidence that corruption issues were taken into account while planning or executing the Russian mission in Syria [1]. There were, however, no publicly available reports about corruption crimes committed by the Russian military during the military mission in Syria. In 2019, journalists reported that Russia initiated the formation of an anti-corruption committee in the Syrian regular army [2]. This suggests that the Russian military command might be taking the problem of corruption in the army into account.

As for UN peacekeeping operations, Russia has sent 34 military observers and 7 military officers for 8 of 14 current UN peacekeeping operations [3]. The Russian Federation Armed Forces Combined Arms Academy provides training to all military officers who are sent for UN peacekeeping operations [4]. There are no publicly available details about any specific anti-corruption training [4].

Although KSA has no publicly available military doctrine, they try to consider corruption issues and risk in forwarding planning when it comes to large purchases, to avoid corruption scandals and bribes (1), (2). Therefore, there is no consistent system to take corruption issues into account when forward planning (1).

According to our sources, Saudi Arabia is engaged in operations in Yemen, Bahrain, Lebanon, and other small operations elsewhere, but there are no indications, internally or by the experience of the sources of anti-corruption measures being in effect (1), (2). Corruption issues are not taken into account either in strategic planning or during the execution of operations within the Saudi military.

According to a Gulf affairs expert:
“Corruption as a strategic issue is likely to be considered in the forward planning of operations when time and capacity permit. There is a doctrine and indeed, a blueprint to support the planning of operations, but it rarely functions in practice, for two main reasons: capacity issues (in the broadest sense; capabilities, competence, diligence); and poor chain of command issues. There is little evidence to suggest that commanders at all levels apply knowledge in this field owing to the factors mentioned above, plus poor discipline, planning itself and intervention from more senior figures in the armed forces” (3).

Participation in multinational operations planning is conducted on through the laws in the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, the Law on SAF and the Law on the Engagement of the SAF and other Defence Forces in multinational operations [1]. Due to a National Assembly decision, the government adopts the Annual Plan of Engagement of SAF and other Defence Forces in Multinational Operations. Neither of these documents addresses corruption issues in operations.

Participation in multinational operations planning is conducted on through the laws in the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, the Law on SAF and the Law on the Engagement of the SAF and other Defence Forces in multinational operations [1]. Due to a National Assembly decision, the government adopts the Annual Plan of Engagement of SAF and other Defence Forces in Multinational Operations. Neither of these documents addresses corruption issues in operations.

There are clearly stated and strict legislation and regulations against corruption in the Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) and the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) and its associated agencies including the Defence Science and Technology Agency (DSTA) [1], although there is no information or evidence to suggest that such measures have been taken into account during forward planning for training operations or deployments [2].

There is no evidence of systematic planning in corruption issues for commanders other than occasional participation in seminars (internally or by external parties such as the UN and NGOs) [1]. There is also no publicly available information on whether corruption issues have been encountered during overseas training missions and operations, and how these challenges have been handled [2].

According to interviewee 4, Defence Intelligence actively addresses the issue of corruption on deployments and conceivably conducts some forward planning. The extent to which this is done was not known, however, and is not publicly disclosed [1]. The Department of Defence has not made public any policies or regulations that would apply to corruption in the field.

It is reasonable to believe based on interviewee 4’s information that Defence Intelligence would place corruption mitigation as a significant issue in whatever planning may be conducted before a field operation. The Department of Defence has not made public any policies or regulations that would apply to corruption in the field. Given the lack of information on this issue, this indicator is marked ‘Not Enough Information’ and is not scored.

It is difficult to find evidence that corruption is considered as a strategic issue considered in the forward planning of operations in South Korea. The “Defence Reform 2.0”, which includes mid-term defence policy planning and military doctrine to cover Army, Navy and Air Force does not explain how corruption is taken into account for operations. [1] South Korean armed forces are likely to focus on human rights issues in operations, rather than corruption issues. For instance, the Department of Defence Veterans Affairs is a division at the ACRC handling complaints and corrupt practices in the defence sector, but its primary role is the handling of complaints and cases regarding human rights issues in the military service (see Q7B). [2]

As mentioned above, it is difficult to find evidence that corruption is taken into account in planning for operations in South Korea. The “Defence Reform 2.0” does not address the implementation of mitigation approaches. [1]

No publicly available data exists to score this indicator; as such, it is marked ‘Not Enough Information’. Sources contacted were not knowledgeable about the subject. Furthermore, as a long time observer of the South Sudan, the military culture in South Sudan (steeped in secrecry and national security considerations) ensures that such initiatives, even if available, would hardly reach the public.

South Sudan is not engaged any significant operations, nor joint exercises or peace operations. The SPLA White Paper on Defence has aspirational language that envisages the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) being involved in international peace-keeping operations, but that has not materialised. [1] As such, this indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’.

No evidence has been found in the review of documentation and in interviews [1, 2, 3] that corruption is observed as a strategic issue in the forward planning of operations. Corruption is an issue of concern in the countries where Spanish soldiers are deployed, and numerous references, analyses, and reports have been produced about corruption in these countries, as a quick search at the website of the Ministry of Defence’s Institute for Strategic Studies demostrates [4]. This interest may be an indicator that corruption may be expected in the planning of certain operations, however there is no direct evidence to support that.

Spain has been significantly involved in military operations abroad (NATO, EU, UN). No evidence has been found that corruption is taken into account in planning and execution for operations, as outlined in 53B. No evidence is found either on mishandling of corruption issues during deployment.

No evidence could be found suggesting that Sudan’s military commanders or senior police officials aim to incorporate any principles or activities for corruption prevention into their forward planning of operations. On the contrary, corruption is inherent to regular business, especially pervading forces that have separate command structures from the SAF; for years, these forces have widely sanctioned, ignored or informally institutionalised corrupt practices in Sudan’s defence and security sector (see examples cited [1,2,3]). As well documented by many research and media sources, including Sudan expert Alex de Waal, Reuters and Global Witness [1,2,3], the head of Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF), who also serves as arguably the most influential of the five military leaders who are party to the transitional Sovereignty Council, has funded the RSF with the support of off-the-books financial flows issued by Sudan’s former President and resources obtained through opaque engagements with foreign governments.

No evidence could be found suggesting that Sudan’s military commanders or senior police officials mitigate corruption during the implementation of operations. Instead, for years, corruption has been widely sanctioned, ignored or informally institutionalised in Sudan’s defence sector (see examples cited [1,2,3]). As well documented by many research and media sources, including Sudan expert Alex de Waal, Reuters and Global Witness [1,2,3], the head of Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF), who also serves as arguably the most influential of the five military leaders who are party to the transitional Sovereignty Council, has funded the RSF with the support of off-the-books financial flows issued by Sudan’s former President and resources obtained through opaque engagements with foreign governments. The International Budget Partnership’s 2017 Open Budget Survey for Sudan scored Sudan’s transparency 2 out of 100, its public participation 0 out of 100 and its budget oversight 31 out of 100 [4]. Sudan’s security and defence activities are exceptionally secret and opaque.

Corruption is taken into account in the planning for international operations. However, it is important to note that corruption is not explicitly taken into account as a strategic issue for the Armed Forces’ (SAF) forward planning in neither the Military Strategic Doctrine (MSD) [1] nor the Operational Doctrine (OPD) [2].

Corruption is taken into account in the planning for international operations. Here, mitigation includes a general pre-deployment training of staff aiming to enhance their ‘cultural understanding’ of the mission area, including potential occurrence of corruption therein [1] (see also Q55B). No cases have been noted of corruption issues being mishandled during the studied time period. On a number of SAF blog sites, commanders and personnel describe their work during international deployments and how they apply anti-corruption measures and cooperate with local actors [2], but detailed information on the implementation of mitigation approaches is otherwise unavailable. Since corruption is not otherwise explicitly taken into account as a strategic issue in the Armed Forces’ doctrine [3], mitigation approaches must in sum be seen as inconsistently implemented in the SAF organisation (see also Q51A and Q53A).

There is not enough evidence to score this indicator. Historically Switzerland’s neutrality prevented the Swiss Armed Forces’ involvement in major operations. Since the early 1990s, Switzerland has sent a few unarmed observers in support of UN missions abroad. There are currently six of these missions underway with a total of 26 Swiss officers. The biggest contribution is to the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization with 12 swiss officers [1], followed by the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUMSMA) in Mali with 7 officers. All other operations have only one to three officers deployed [2]. For the European Union Force Bosnia and Herzegovina, (EUFOR) in Bosnia Herzegovina Switzerland is present with 16 officers. The by far biggest operation support is for the Kosovo Force (KFOR) with the Swiss Armed Forces in Kosovo (SWISSCOY) currently deploying up to 165 Swiss personnel. Supporting Kosovo in the fight against corruption is part of the mandate of that operation [3]. It is however not clear if corruption is part of the forward planning for those operations, as no supporting evidence except for the mission mandate could be found.

There is not enough evidence to score this indicator. The only operation outside Switzerland is the support to KFOR with SWISSCOY. Even that operation is currently limited to a maximum of 165 people and is still a minor operation [1]. SWISSCOY is part of the yearly Financial Statements provided by the Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport (DDPS) and is subject to the same rules and auditing [2]. Members of the SWISSCOY are subject to the same rules, codes of conduct and compliance enforcement like other members of the armed forces [3, 4]. SWISSCOY also publishes annual reports, including a financial statement [5]. There is little public information about whether corruption mitigation measures are applied by commanders during deployments or training exercises. The DDPS did not respond to the assessor’s request for information regarding this.

Corruption is not considered to be a strategic issue for the operation plans of Taiwan’s armed forces [1, 2]. Anti-corruption is regarded as a tactical issue in political warfare.

Issues of corruption are categorised as civil-mil interactions in military operations at the company level. Instructions are based on the political warfare operation plan and issued to low-ranking officers, NCO, and soldiers [1, 2]. Tactical issues of anti-corruption political warfare are strategized and translated into operation planning at the company or battalion level to instruct officers, NCO, and soldiers as to how they should manage resources, property, and materials obtained during operations [1].

A review of open source online documentation revealed no evidence of corruption being considered as a strategic issue in forward planning. This included material from the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau, and Tanzania People’s Defence Force, and United Nations peacekeeping materials, as well as Google searches of relevant terms in English and Swahili. This therefore suggets that corruption is not properly taken into account when planning operations.

A review of open source online documentation revealed no evidence of corruption being considered as a strategic issue in the planning or execution of operations. This included material from the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau, and Tanzania People’s Defence Force, as well as Google searches of relevant terms in English and Swahili.

According to the Masterplan under the National Strategy on Anti-Corruption 2018-2037, state agencies, including the military, should conduct corruption risk assessments in order to plan ahead before organising any state mega-projects and to develop countermeasures against corruption within the public sector in the future [1]. Correspondingly, according to the Guidelines for the Prevention of Corruption and Conflicts of Interest, implemented by the Department of Border Affairs under the Royal Thai Armed Forces Headquarters, auditors at both executive and operational levels should examine the causes of corruption in order to assess corruption risks and plan ahead regularly and annually in order to prevent future corruption issues in the defence sector [2]. Though, it is unclear whether there is any forward planning of military operations specifically in terms of corruption, since there is no regulation on this issue, the general level of ant-corruption awareness and corruption mitigation planning carried out by the Armed Forces indicate a degree of preparation around these issues which could extend to operations.

In 2018, 273 Thai soldiers were deployed for a one-year mission to join the United Nations peacekeeping mission in South Sudan, where they mainly participated in the repair and rebuilding of public infrastructure, such as the roads and bridges connecting cities [1]. As of October 2020, Thailand has had personnel in three UN Peacekeeping missions, UNMOGIP, UNMISS (South Sudan and UNAMID, comprising 295 police, experts and other personnel, almost all of whom (97%) were in South Sudan [2]. According to the Indo-Pacific Defence Forum, the Peace Operations Center under the Royal Thai Armed Forces is fully responsible for pursuing peace operations in a holistic manner, by which the troops deployed to U.N. peacekeeping operations are selected, generated, equipped and trained in accordance with U.N. standards. However, there is no specific training on corruption issues in the Center’s training programme for peacekeeping operations or civil relief efforts [3].

It should be noted that the country is not at war, so there are no significant operations except for deployment in the conflict-ridden southern parts of Thailand. At present, there is a gradual draw-down in the level of deployment for the latter mission, totalling 800 soldiers from the Thai armed forces, due to the shifting of security responsibility to local armed groups, who are not part of the regular armed forces but are locally recruited and superficially trained by the Thai Army [4]. Therefore, it is very unlikely that corruption issues are formally taken into account by officers in planning or execution during deployment.

No evidence to support the claim that corruption as a strategic issue is considered in the forward planning of operations could be found (1). According to our sources, corruption is not taken into consideration during forward planing. Corruption is not a strategic issue within the armed forces and that’s why it is not taken into consideration during the forward planning or operations (2,3).

According to our resources, corruption issues are not taken into consideration when conducting operations or in planning. Besides that, there is no written and published evidence to support that corruption as a strategic issue is considered in the planning of operations (1,2).

Interviewees 1, 2, 3 and 4 all unanimously suggested that corruption issues are not taken into account at all in forward planning [1,2,3,4]. The assessor’s 17 years of field experience within the Turkish military, involving both domestic deployments and deployments abroad to Iraq, Afghanistan, Kazakhstan and Kosova, confirm this suggestion.

Please note that the Turkish military currently has a military presence in more than 20 countries across the globe, including Afghanistan, Somalia, Qatar, Kosova, Bosnia, Azerbaijan, Sudan and some Central Asian countries, for operational and training purposes. However, as emphasised by Interviewees 3 and 4, corruption issues are not taken into account in the planning or execution stages as a principal factor that may impact the planning and conduct of the operations [1,2].

The assessor was not able to find a single report or opinion piece on online sources from the past two years that mentions the ‘corrupt’ activities of military or civilian personnel or the detention/arrest of military personnel due to corruption or integrity-related issues.

Under the UPDF Act (2005) [1] the code of conduct in section 117 subsection 5(f) warns aganist any form of corruption by the army at any point in time. However, there is no evidence to ascertain whether corruption issues are taken into account in all forward planning and execution. There are, though, examples of where action was taken against corrupt peacekeepers. For example in 2016, nine Ugandan soldiers serving as peacekeepers in Somalia were jailed for running a fuel racket. According to the then field commander, Brig. Gen. Dick Olum, prosecution proved all the accusations of pursuing personal interest and endangering operational efficiency beyond reasonable doubt [2]. Such cases could indicate a lack of planning for corruption risks and an absence of appropriate safeguards in operations.

There is no clear evidence of the application of strategies to counter corruption on operations. [1 ][2].

Operations planning of the AFU is regulated by classified MoD orders [1]. However, there was no evidence that the military takes corruption into account. Also, there is a kind of support of military operations called moral and political support (or “MPZ”) [2]. Moral and political support guides the formation and maintenance of the high morale of the army, the moral and psychological state and discipline of the personnel, military law and order and aims at combatting looting and corruption as well [2]. Normally, the unit commander is responsible for the moral and political support of his personnel.
Moreover, forward operational planning of AFU takes some elements of corruption into account in the form of moral and political support; plan of material-technical support; plan of CIMIC; plan of guard and defence of military objects; plan of troops’ readiness control and others. For example, the Plan of the Military Law-Enforcement Service activities in the Sector of Operation includes measures concerning possible troops’ involvement in corruption and organized crime during deployment and participation in the operation. The senior operations commander personally considers all mentioned plans in detail and approves them.

No formal provisions state that corruption is to be taken into account in planning for operations as well as in the execution of operations [1]. However, particular actions (like procurement for military units) are subject to anti-corruption legislation. There is no inspector general or body in place to conduct an independent evaluation. However, there is the Main Inspection of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, which is authorised to conduct compliance inspections with the requirements of the legislation in the Armed Forces of Ukraine [2]. The unit does not carry out control on an ongoing basis, but can do so should anything happen [1].
Moreover, MoD and AFU personnel have well-developed knowledge to generate paperwork (plans, programmes, reports, etc.). However, the implementation phase is lacking. There is evidence of the discrepancy between planning and implementation, which is intrinsic to the existing military culture. For instance, the planned material-technical support mentioned above usually includes measures to avoid embezzlement of material resources, particular fuel. In the reality; however, oil theft is not an exception in the AFU [3, 4, 5, 6]. In practice, normally the officers from MPZ are assigned as representatives of their military unit who are responsible for informaing staff about anticorruption legislation, novelties and all other related to this topic issues. Normally these officers are ones who are assigned to participate in anticorruption mobile courses organized by MoD Corruption detection and prevention unit and BITEC from National Defence University. After receiving new information about building integrity and fighting corruption they are supposed to inform their commanders and other officers and soldiers in their units. This information is received from the reports provided on the MoD Working group #5 devoted to corruption prevention and detection activities in MoD [7].

Generally, forward planning is usually conducted in coordination with the Office of the Crown Prince; it does not take corruption into account (1), (2). It has been demonstrated that corruption is not considered a strategic issue in operations, as there is no evidence to support that it is, whether in terms of having military doctrine (Q51) or having an anti-corruption unit (3) or in terms of internal communications within the armed forces (Q34A). Despite the fact that the lack of evidence could be potentially related to secrecy in dealing with matters related to the defence sector, this lack of evidence also reflects a lack of transparency concerning the operations of the armed forces in general.

Corruption has not and never has been taken into account during planning. There is clear evidence by international institutions that the UAE armed forces are committing corrupt practices in their war in Yemen (1), (2).

The UK Armed Forces, especially the 77th Brigade, have co-operated with Transparency International to build up the evidence base for integrating corruption risk mitigation in operational planning, in a move that indicates a willingness to include corruption mitigation in the planning of future operations [1]. The Joint Doctrine Publication 05, ‘Shaping a Stable World: the Military Contribution’ also suggests that corruption issues are taken into account in forward planning [2].

The number of operations where corruption is taken into account during forward planning, however, is not clear. According to one of the interviewees, from an operational to tactical level, the extent to which corruption is taken into account in planning would be mission-specific. In preparation for any deployment, analysis of the human environment would be conducted in order to determine if corruption is a driver and/or a consequence of conflict or instability. Equally, awareness would be provided in the sense of internal practices: e.g. provision of in-country contracts for services, through to the susceptibility of partner forces to corruption [3].

According to one of the interviewees, from an operational to tactical level, the extent to which corruption is taken into account in planning would be mission-specific. In preparation for any deployment, analysis of the human environment would be conducted in order to determine if corruption is a driver and/or a consequence of conflict or instability. Equally, awareness would be provided in the sense of internal practices: e.g. provision of in-country contracts for services through to the susceptibility of partner forces to corruption [1].

The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR)’s lessons learned report entitled ‘Corruption in Conflict’ states that ‘The U.S. government should make anti-corruption efforts a top priority in contingency operations to prevent systemic corruption from undermining U.S. strategic goals’ (see page 75) [1]. This would suggest that, as of 2016, corruption was not considered a top priority in the forward planning of contingency operations. The report also recommended that an interagency anti-corruption strategy is developed for contingency operations. Following this, Section 1279 of the 2018 National Defense Authorization Act calls for the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to develop an anti-corruption strategy for reconstruction efforts [2]. The NDAA states that the strategy should be developed no later than 180 days after the NDAA is passed [3].

In 2018, the Department of State, USAID, and the Department of Defense published a report ‘Stabilization Assistance Review: A Framework for Maximizing the Effectiveness of U.S. Government Efforts to Stabilize Conflict-Affected Areas’ which among others highlights anti-corruption and ‘outlines a framework to systematically apply lessons from the past [and] to strategically and selectively direct […] resources’ [4]. The report identified the need for the DoD, Department of State and USAID to be more disciplined in assessing the risks of prematurely providing certain types of assistance during stabilisation operations in conflict-affected environments, before appropriate governance mechanisms and anti-corruption safeguards are in place [4]. Other military strategic documents also suggest that corruption may be taken into account in the forward planning of operations such as counterinsurgency [5,6].

While the 2018 Stabilisation Assistance Review, has provided a framework for operational planning that includes corruption related issues [1], it remains unclear to what extent the framework has been applied in practice as the framework remains quite recent. A similar assessment can be made for the 2018 Joint Publication 3-24 [2]. Prior to 2018 however, as noted by SIGAR, anti-corruption was not considered key to the success of contingency operations and was not included as a strategic issue in forward planning [3]. Even when it became clear that corruption presented a strategic threat to the mission, US anti-corruption efforts and mitigations approaches focussed overwhelmingly on technical fixes rather than high-level efforts to address the political roots of corruption and had only a limited impact [4]. It should also be noted that the Joint Planning publication, which provides the doctrinal foundation and fundamental principles that guide the armed forces in planning joint campaigns and operations does not include any reference to corruption, ‘fraud, waste and abuse’ or ‘conflict of interest’ [5]. Moreover, an Army War College document on campaign planning also does not include references to corruption or fraud, waste and abuse [6].

Overall, the evidence suggests that corruption issues are being taken into account in an increasing number of operations. Yet, based on recent evidence, mitigation measures remain inconsistently applied and have had only a limited impact in addressing corruption issues during deployments, although it remains to be seen how the implementation of the 2018 doctrine and SAR framework could impact the application of anti-corruption measures on operations.

There is no evidence indicating that corruption has been taken into account in the strategic planning of internal operations deplyoments in which National Bolivarian Armed Forces (FANB) has participated.

No information directly relating to corruption issues was found in the little information screened by press sources and civil organisations about the Zamora Plan, neither amongst the problems to be addressed so as to stabilise order, nor as a factor that could affect the administrative management of the operation [1]. The operation’s justification, outlined in the strategic plan, presents organised crime and criminal groups as enemies that threaten internal order. However, actions included for combatting this kind of enemy do not take into account the influence of corruption within the network of organised crime. On the other hand, the strategy document makes no mention of any management considerations that commanders of mobilised units should implement, thus precluding corruption as an internal issue for prevention.

In the National Security Law, articles referring to the deployment of FANB modules do not mention a need to prevent or avoid corruption-related practices [2].

There is no evidence in FANB and security agencies’ strategy formulations or deployment implementations to suggest that corruption issues are taken into account. The National Security Law, which establishes the guidelines for the deployment of force, does not include any particular considerations to mitigate risks of corruption during the planning or execution of operations. In terms of management and oversight of deployment resources, Article 31 alone indicates that expenses generated by mobilisation are considered to be “inherent to the security of the nation” and that to this effect the president will take measures to adjust the expenditure budget to the exceptional circumstances [1].

The management of recent operations in which FANB members have been deployed has been strongly challenged by civil organisations, mainly as these are not auditable and due to the commission of violations of the law and of human rights [2]. There is also evidence that Venezuelan troops deployed in the border regions with Colombia and on anti-narcotic operations have colluded and worked with drug traffickers and organised crime groups. This has even led to competition between some officers for access to preferred trafficking routes [3, 4]. There has been no response from government or the military to these allegations.

According to sources in both the military and the intelligence services, the kind of operations which are routinely carried out by both the Zimbabwe Defence Forces and the intelligence services do not require much forward planning, specifically in respect of operations. The sources say even if the operations were to involve forward planning, corruption is not considered a strategic issue [1, 2

The Zimbabwe Defence Forces are involved in major operations, which include civil relief efforts. For instance, the recent Cyclone Idai disaster that killed thousands, not only in Zimbabwe, but in Mozambique and Malawi as well [1]. According to military and intelligence sources even though there was the risk of corrupt behaviour, there was no consideration of corruption as a strategic issue [2, 3].