Are there independent, well-resourced, and effective institutions within defence and security tasked with building integrity and countering corruption?
8a. Mandate and resources
New Zealand score: 100/100
There are no compliance or ethics units in place and no effort to establish them.
There is no evidence of such units, but there is evidence that the country is making proactive efforts to establish them.
Compliance and ethics units in the defence sector are in place. But there are extensive weaknesses in both staffing and funding, and expertise or their mandate is unclear.
There are identifiable compliance and ethics units within defence and security that are mandated to handle integrity and corruption in defence, but there are some weaknesses either in staffing and funding, or expertise.
There are identifiable compliance and ethics units within defence and security that are mandated to handle integrity and corruption in defence, and they are suitably staffed and funded.
Intel/Security – The Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security conducts independent oversight of the New Zealand intelligence agencies . The appointment, functions, duties, and powers of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security is mandated by the Intelligence and Security Act 2017, Part 6 . There were eight permanent staff members with an expenditure of $1.470 million in 2018/19. The previous Acting Inspector-General has stated that, under current conditions, funding is appropriate, but hinted that provision for growth would need to be included in future budgets . Conversely, the Inspector-General was not aware of any specific training which may or may not occur within the intelligence agencies on corruption risks, however all departments are cognisant of the risks of corruption. This is reflected in both the GCSB and NZSIS having internal compliance and legal teams to ensure adherence to New Zealand law, and internal policies .
The NZSIS and GCSB must report to the IGIS on “compliance” breaches within their organisations. This, however, is usually understood to cover compliance with the law or internal policy on how they undertake “operational” activities . While the IGIS’s oversight does not usually cover more corporate matters, such as the agencies’ approach to fiscal or HR risks or corruption, the IGIS is familiar with how their general training systems work. Agency staff must complete various training modules, which include the recording of details of who has undertaken certain mandatory training modules and the issue of certificates to confirm successful completion. This adds a further level of security and contributes to an awareness against corruption. Parallel to these efforts, both agencies have risk and audit committees and legal compliance functions which complement the training initiatives . Typical of the relative lack of corruption in New Zealand Defence and Intelligence sectors, the IGIS has not received a report of corruption from within the agencies . To reinforce this, the IGIS can reveal that no use of protected disclosure legislation has ever occurred for matters of corruption . In the case that corruption could be a sign of foreign malfeasance (which could blur the line between the agencies’ counter-intelligence responsibilities, and integrity oversight of the legality/propriety of their internal activities by IGIS) the respective Director-General would inform the IGIS as a matter of course. However, in the first instance the responsibility for investigation would fall under the purview of the agencies . If signs of corruption within the office of the IGIS were detected by the intelligence agencies, especially the misuse of classified information, this would result in IGIS being notified by the agency . To mitigate against this, all staff within the IGIS and within the agencies undergo a “reasonably comprehensive induction process” . IGIS access to classified information is capable of being reviewed by a specialist team within the intelligence agencies, and all IGIS staff have the highest level of clearance. Despite the relatively small size of the IGIS office, nine personnel, its resources have been sufficient to date and have improved slightly over the last few years .
Defence – The Secretary of Defence is empowered by Defence Act 1990, Section 24(2)(e), to arrange for the regular assessment of the Defence Force . Till July 2020, the Ministry’s Independent Review unit conducted assessments and audits of the NZDF, as well as procurements by the MoD . This unit could also commission independent reports into the NZDF, such as the Independent Review on the New Zealand Defence Force’s Progress on the Action Plan for Operation Respect . At least five major reviews were conducted from 2015 to 2020, suggesting that the institution has sufficient resources to fulfil its mandate . A decision was made in July 2020 to move to a model whereby reviews were conducted by external specialists and subject-matter experts, supported by staff in the Ministry’s Governance, People and Executive Services Division . Despite this, there is no Inspector-General of the Defence Force, although this is likely to be created in the near future, based on the recommendations of the Burnham Inquiry  .Corruption is a crime under the Armed Forces Discipline Act 1971, a large part of which is monitored by the Military Police, though it is estimated that anti-corruption activities comprise an extremely small part of their duties .
1. Office of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Annual Report 2018/19, p. 4, https://www.igis.govt.nz/assets/Annual-Reports/Annual-Report-2019.pdf.
2. Intelligence and Security Act 2017, Part 6: Oversight of Intelligence and Security Agencies, accessed 1 July 2020, http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2017/0010/latest/DLM6920823.html.
3. Office of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Annual Report 2018/19, 27.
4. Interview with a member of the New Zealand Intelligence Community, 30 September 2020, via email.
5. Interview with the Inspector General of Intelligence and Security and the Deputy Inspector of Intelligence and Security, 12 August 2020.
6. Defence Act 1990, Section 24(2)(e), http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1990/0028/latest/DLM206017.html
7. Ū AROMATAWAI INDEPENDENT REVIEW, https://www.defence.govt.nz/who-we-are/our-structure/knowledge-evaluation-and-assessment/
8. Debbie Teale, and Carol MacDonald, Independent Review on the New Zealand Defence Force’s Progress on the Action Plan for Operation Respect (Wellington: Ministry of Defence, June 2020).
9. For a list of reviews and audits see “Assessing the Defence System”, https://www.defence.govt.nz/what-we-do/assessing-the-defence-system/
10. See Recommendation 2 of the Report of the Government Inquiry into Operation Burnham and related matters (July 2020), p. 33, https://operationburnham.inquiry.govt.nz/assets/IOB-Files/Chapter-1.pdf
11. Armed Forces Discipline Act 1971, Section 54, http://legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1971/0053/latest/DLM402741.html.
12. Defence Careers, “Military Police”, https://www.defencecareers.mil.nz/army/careers/browse-roles/military-police/.
13. Ministry of Defence (New Zealand). Comments on Government Defence Integrity Index (GDI) 2020.
New Zealand score: 100/100
The institutions/ units are under political control or they are misused. The work of the institutions can be shut down by other defence and security institutions.
The institutions/ units may be in the chain of command of the defence and security institutions that they oversee. However they can not be shut down by these institutions.
The institutions/ units are not in the chain of command of the defence and security institutions which they oversee. They report directly to a senior member of the Ministry of Defence (e.g. Chief of Staff).
Intel/Sec – The Office of the Inspector-General of intelligence and Security is an independent statutory officer appointed by the Governor-General on a recommendation from the House of Representatives (Part 6 of the ISA) [1, 2, 3]. This provides the Office with a high-level of independence.
Defence – till 2020 The MoD’s Independent Review unit submited its report, audit, or assessment directly to the Secretary of Defence for submission to the Minister. Since 2020 audit and assessment function have been conducted by Expert review group consisting of independent external specialists .
On giving the report, audit, or assessment to the Secretary the person in charge of the report, audit, or assessment shall give a copy to the Chief of Defence Forc . This system provides for sufficient independence as the Secretary is mandated to provide the report to the Minister. However, the Government inquiry has recommended that a fully independent Inspector-General of Defence be established .
1. Inspector-General of intelligence and Security, “About”, accessed 1 July 2020, http://www.igis.govt.nz/about/
2. Intelligence and Security Act 2017, Part 6, http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2017/0010/latest/DLM6921166.html
3. Interview with a member of the New Zealand Intelligence Community, 30 September 2020, via email.
4. Defence Act 1990, Section 24(2)(e)(i) and (ii), http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1990/0028/latest/DLM206017.html
5. See Recommendation 2 of the Report of the Government Inquiry into Operation Burnham and related matters (July 2020), p. 33, https://operationburnham.inquiry.govt.nz/assets/IOB-Files/Chapter-1.pdf
6. Update on Expert Review Group, MoD website, accessed 23 August 2021, https://www.defence.govt.nz/publications/publication/expert-review-group-progress
New Zealand score: NEI/100
These institutions or units are not even aware of corruption risks within their institution.
Staff within the units understand the corruption risks specific to their institutions, but they fail to prepare an effective action plan with appropriate mitigation measures which address the risks.
Staff within the units understand the corruption risks specific to their institutions, but they are not able to address risks appropriately or adequately, either through their own work or by compelling others.
Staff within the units understand the corruption risks specific to their institutions, and are able to address some risks independently. But they are not able to ensure other departments address risks adequately.
Staff within the units understand the corruption risks specific to their institutions. They are able to address risks independently and to ensure that other departments or units handle risks appropriately. Actions to handle risks may include training, oversight, or policy recommendations.
There is not enough information to score this indicator.
Intel/Sec – The Office of Inspector General of intelligence and Security regularly publishes annual reports on inquires and reviews, and matters of cooperation such as with the Christchurch Royal Commission . However, the Inspector-General has no efficiency or effectiveness mandate “when overseeing the activities of the intelligence and security agencies and has no intelligence research, collection or analysis capability that might support such a mandate” . Ordinarily, the IGIS does not conduct oversight over the corporate activities of the agencies, as the IGIS tends to focus on operational legislative compliance, however the office could do this if the need arose and if the corporate activity involved issues of legality or propriety that the IGIS was well suited to inquire into . The Office does not review the effectiveness of agencies generally and does not review the efficiency of agency functions . As such the Office cannot direct other departments or units to handle risks in a certain way if that is part of their own respective operating mechanisms and has not caused or could be a cause of improper conduct relating to an inquiry or investigation.
Defence – The findings of the Operation Burnham Inquiry indicate that an increased system of effectiveness is required for developing integrity within the NZDF. Operational integrity is still of a very high order; however, the bureaucratic workings have revealed shortcomings in accurate reporting of information . Owing to a lack of evidence on corruption activities within the NZDF to assess this indicator, it is not scored.
1. See “Annual Reports” page, http://www.igis.govt.nz/publications/annual-reports/, accessed 2 July 2020; “Current Inquiries”, http://www.igis.govt.nz/publications/current-inquiries/, accessed 2 July 2020; and “Royal Commission consultation with eth Inspector-General”, http://www.igis.govt.nz/publications/cooperation-with-christchurch-royal-commission/, accessed 2 July 2020.
2. Office of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, “Royal Commission consultation with the Inspector-General”, c. June 2019.
3. Interview with the Inspector General of Intelligence and Security and the Deputy Inspector of Intelligence and Security, 12 August 2020.
4 Office of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, “Royal Commission consultation with the Inspector-General”.
5. Report of the Government Inquiry into Operation Burnham and related matters (July 2020), pp. 360-363, 365-366.
Compare scores by country
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|Country||8a. Mandate and resources||8b. Independence||8c. Effectiveness|
|Albania||100 / 100||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Algeria||0 / 100||NA||NA|
|Angola||0 / 100||NA||NA|
|Argentina||100 / 100||50 / 100||75 / 100|
|Armenia||75 / 100||75 / 100||75 / 100|
|Australia||75 / 100||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Azerbaijan||25 / 100||25 / 100||25 / 100|
|Bahrain||0 / 100||NA||NA|
|Bangladesh||75 / 100||25 / 100||25 / 100|
|Belgium||75 / 100||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Bosnia and Herzegovina||100 / 100||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Botswana||25 / 100||50 / 100||50 / 100|
|Brazil||100 / 100||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Burkina Faso||50 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Cameroon||50 / 100||0 / 100||50 / 100|
|Canada||75 / 100||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Chile||50 / 100||25 / 100||50 / 100|
|China||75 / 100||0 / 100||75 / 100|
|Colombia||NEI||75 / 100||75 / 100|
|Cote d'Ivoire||50 / 100||25 / 100||25 / 100|
|Denmark||75 / 100||50 / 100||50 / 100|
|Egypt||50 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Estonia||75 / 100||50 / 100||50 / 100|
|Finland||100 / 100||50 / 100||NEI|
|France||50 / 100||50 / 100||75 / 100|
|Germany||75 / 100||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Ghana||50 / 100||0 / 100||25 / 100|
|Greece||0 / 100||NA||NA|
|Hungary||75 / 100||25 / 100||50 / 100|
|India||75 / 100||50 / 100||50 / 100|
|Indonesia||75 / 100||25 / 100||25 / 100|
|Iran||50 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Iraq||50 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Israel||75 / 100||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Italy||75 / 100||75 / 100||100 / 100|
|Japan||75 / 100||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Jordan||50 / 100||50 / 100||25 / 100|
|Kenya||75 / 100||50 / 100||50 / 100|
|Kosovo||75 / 100||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Kuwait||25 / 100||0 / 100||25 / 100|
|Latvia||75 / 100||75 / 100||100 / 100|
|Lebanon||50 / 100||50 / 100||25 / 100|
|Lithuania||75 / 100||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Malaysia||100 / 100||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Mali||50 / 100||NEI||0 / 100|
|Mexico||100 / 100||50 / 100||NEI|
|Montenegro||75 / 100||25 / 100||25 / 100|
|Morocco||0 / 100||NA||NA|
|Myanmar||25 / 100||0 / 100||0 / 100|
|Netherlands||100 / 100||50 / 100||50 / 100|
|New Zealand||100 / 100||100 / 100||NEI|
|Niger||50 / 100||25 / 100||50 / 100|
|Nigeria||50 / 100||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|North Macedonia||75 / 100||75 / 100||75 / 100|
|Norway||100 / 100||75 / 100||75 / 100|
|Oman||0 / 100||NA||NA|
|Palestine||50 / 100||0 / 100||25 / 100|
|Philippines||50 / 100||0 / 100||50 / 100|
|Poland||75 / 100||50 / 100||50 / 100|
|Portugal||75 / 100||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Qatar||0 / 100||NA||NA|
|Russia||50 / 100||25 / 100||75 / 100|
|Saudi Arabia||25 / 100||NA||NA|
|Serbia||50 / 100||25 / 100||NEI|
|Singapore||75 / 100||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|South Africa||75 / 100||50 / 100||NEI|
|South Korea||100 / 100||75 / 100||50 / 100|
|South Sudan||0 / 100||0 / 100||NEI|
|Spain||50 / 100||NEI||50 / 100|
|Sudan||0 / 100||NA||NA|
|Sweden||100 / 100||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Switzerland||75 / 100||75 / 100||75 / 100|
|Taiwan||100 / 100||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Tanzania||50 / 100||25 / 100||NEI|
|Thailand||100 / 100||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Tunisia||50 / 100||50 / 100||NEI|
|Turkey||0 / 100||NA||NA|
|Uganda||50 / 100||50 / 100||50 / 100|
|Ukraine||75 / 100||0 / 100||75 / 100|
|United Arab Emirates||0 / 100||NA||NA|
|United Kingdom||100 / 100||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|United States||100 / 100||25 / 100||100 / 100|
|Venezuela||0 / 100||NA||NA|
|Zimbabwe||50 / 100||100 / 100||25 / 100|