There is no military doctrine on corruption in operations. The Military Doctrine of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania only refers to corruption as a factor that exacerbates asymmetrical threats, but there is no elaboration about how the Albanian Armed Forces plan to tackle it [1]. A similar reference is made in the Air Force Doctrine [2]. No reference to corruption in operations is made in other doctrinal documents [3, 4].

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable. There is no military doctrine on corruption in operations; as such, there are no transparency procedures [1, 2, 3, 4].

No evidence could be found that the Algerian armed forces have a military doctrine that addresses corruption as a strategic issue on operations, suggesting that the military does not consider corruption a strategic issue for operations. There is no military doctrine available on the website of the Ministry of Defence (1). Furthermore, there are rarely any statements made by military officials on corruption; see question 34, (2). Algeria’s strict noninterference, which does not allow any deployments of Algerian troops abroad, as noted in the country’s last assessment (3), is still written down in the constitution of 2016 (Art. 29), (4). Algeria has moved “to a more flexible stance on direct intervention” (5) but still does not deploy troops abroad. Domestically, the Algerian military operates against “terrorists and organized crime” (1), (6). No evidence could be found that the military addressed corruption during these operations.

This question has been scored Not Applicable because no evidence could be found in the military (1), (2), see the answer to question 51A, that the Algerian armed forces have a military doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue on operations, the question on transparency cannot be assessed.

There is no indication of the existence of a military doctrine addressing corruption in operations. A well-documented example for the presumed lack of a military doctrine addressing corruption in domestic operations is the endemic corruption of the military and police with the diamond-mining business, particularly in the Cuango area of Lunda Norte province (1), (2).

There is no indication of the existence of a military doctrine addressing corruption in operations. Thus, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

The Argentine Armed Forces do not have a specific military doctrine that addresses the issues of corruption in operations. There are guidelines for military operations in times of war and peace, but no specific reference to corruption. For its part, the DPDN 2018, with the aim of transparency, efficiency, and effectiveness, dictates that the Ministry of Defence must advance in the formulation of an institutional modernisation plan aimed at streamlining the administrative and bureaucratic structures of the jurisdiction. [1] In Point 9, it establishes the same for the structure of the Forces. That is, the Armed Forces of Argentina are in a process of adaptation to different operations and to the new guidelines that have transparency, efficiency, and effectiveness as the guiding principles. However, there is still no military doctrine that directly addresses corruption as a strategic issue in operations. The specialist JG Tokatlián considers that the new measures (Decree 683/2018 and DPDN 2018) introduce changes in the military doctrine that he calls the “National Insecurity Doctrine,” which considers “the current enemies as a network of interconnected actors that operate domestically as part of a dark global stalking and, therefore, the military and its firepower are needed to neutralise and eliminate them.” [2] [3]

This indicator has been scored Not Applicable. Argentina has no military doctrine that addresses corruption as a strategic threat for operations.

Armenia has a military doctrine that is universal, it does not specifically address corruption issues [1].
High-ranking military officials regularly mention the destructive influence of corruption on the defence system and the importance of combating corruption in the defence sector and armed forces. Particularly in media outlets, there are several reports on the investigation and identified corrupted cases in armed forces [2]. A comprehensive document addressing corruption issues is the Law on Corruption Prevention which encompasses all state and civil service officers in relevant state bodies. There is no separate document to address corruption as an issue in the defence sector [3]. The Military Doctrine (MD) addresses the need to strengthen legitimacy within the armed forces in Clause 47. The MD also includes provisions about transp[arent procedures for personnel recruitment and financing in Clause 51. In Article 7 clause 2 of the Law on Corruption Prevention, the detection, suppression, prevention, warning, and penalties of those responsible for their execution within the scope of their jurisdiction shall be performed by the Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Armenia, the National Security Service of the Republic of Armenia, the Police of the Republic of Armenia, the Military Police of the Republic of Armenia, the Tax Service of the Republic of Armenia, The State Customs Committee of the Republic of Armenia the State Service for the Prevention of Corruption of the Republic of Armenia, as well as other bodies established under the laws of the Republic of Armenia.

Armenia has a Military Doctrine that does not consider corruption a strategic issue [1], as such this indicator is scored Not Applicable.

Although general defence policy documents point to issues of corruption which would apply equally during operations, there is no evidence that the official military doctrine specifically addresses enhanced and unique corruption risks during operations. Publicly available doctrinal documents comment on the Australian Defence Force operating within “ethical standards”, but otherwise do not make reference to specific ethical and corruption issues [1, 2]. As elaborated in Q46A, within the Australian Military Personnel Policy Manual [3] and related Defence Instructions do contain doctrine on issues of corruption such as conflicts of interest [4] and gifts and hospitality [5]. These policies apply equally during operations (for example in the case of gift and hospitality rules, “This instruction [also] applies… when on operations” [5, p1]. However, these publicly available policy documents do not specifically mention the word “corruption,” and do not explicitly mention increased risks raised in the course of operations. There are several documents, such as the Defence Ethics Matters Handbook, which were publicly available as recently as 2015 [6] and lauded as a “strong model for a fully integrated code of conduct” by Transparency International [7], that are no longer publicly available, making it difficult to say whether other parts of the military doctrine may elaborate on corruption risks as a strategic issue on operations. By contrast, the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade makes publicly available its full Conduct and Ethics Manual [8], as well as an albeit brief Code of Conduct for Overseas Service, which specifically acknowledges that “Australian officials abroad may face dilemmas in the area of conduct and ethics which do not arise in Australia, in a range of social, cultural, financial or personal settings” [9]. One respondent said that, to their knowledge, modules on ethics (and anti-corruption as a component of ethics) were an important part of training for operations [10]).

This indicator is scored ,Not Applicable’, as there is no evidence that the official military doctrine specifically addresses enhanced and unique corruption risks during operations.

While the Australian Military Personnel Policy Manual [1] and related Defence Instructions [2, 3] are publicly available, other key policy documents – some of which were at one stage publicly released – are not. The Ethics Matters document, containing some level of detail on defence corruption-related policy, and was publicly released as recently as 2015 [4]. Whether it is still in use or has been superseded by another document was not able to be confirmed by the Country Assessor, despite multiple attempts to reach out to individual Department of Defence officials and the media team. The existence of a Fraud and Ethics Awareness Training Options document, confirmed in previous Transparency International research [5], was also not able to be confirmed. Other documents related to corruption issues, such as Defence and Industry: An Ethical Relationship, are publicly available [6], but are not directly relevant to corruption issues unique to operations.

The fight against corruption in the Military Doctrine of Azerbaijan has not been registered as a strategic issue (1). However, in the Concept of National Security, this issue has a special place (2). There is no other doctrine that defines corruption as a strategic issue.
The theory of Article 4.3.1 of the Concept of National Security notes that the government will continue its efforts on the following issues:
democratic and civilian control over all security structures,
their transparency, effective fight against corruption, increasing the responsibility of senior officials, informing the public, members of Parliament, mass media about the activities of high-ranking officials.
However, the Concept of National Security shouldn’t be regarded as military doctrine as it is an aggregate of principles and main directions of State Police in a broad sense.

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable. The Military Doctrine of Azerbaijan does not address corruption. The country has no military doctrine that considers corruption a strategic issue for operations. At the same time, the full text of the Military Doctrine (1) and the National Security Concept (2) is publicly available, it is made publicly available regardless. They have been published both on official websites of state bodies and independent websites.

Following a search on the website of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and Bahraini media sites, and verified by interviews, there is no information on this topic that is publicly available. There is no military doctrine that addresses corruption or any related issues to corruption in general [1]. Indeed, a source confirmed that there is no military doctrine to start with [2].

Following a search on the website of the MoD and Bahraini media sites, and verified by interviews, there is no information on this topic that is publicly available. As outlined in Q51A, there is no military doctrine, and therefore this indicator has been marked ‘Not Applicable’ [1, 2].

The Bangladesh Armed Forces does not have a corruption-specific military doctrine or strategy for running its peacekeeping operations. The Overseas & Plan Directorate (OPD) under the Armed Forces Division deals with peacekeeping operations [1]. The OPD issues the necessary instructions to all other relevant branches of the Armed Forces regarding the requisite preparations, which involve training, among other things. The courses offered by the Bangladesh Institute of Peace Support Operation Training do not include any modules on ‘corruption’ [2].

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’, as Bangladesh does not have a military doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue for operations [1,2].

There is no military doctrine for Belgian Defence. There is a framework in place to counter corruption within Belgian Defence but there is not enough information publicly available to discuss the extent of this framework regarding operations specifically [1, 2].

As outlined in 51A, Belgium does not have a military doctrine that considers corruption as a strategic issue for operations. As such, this indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’.

The Ministry of Defence (MoD) adopted the Integrity and Fight Against Corruption Plan of the MoD for the period 2015-2019 with four chapters (Introduction, Assessment of integrity building and corruption risks, Action Plan for Prevention of Corruption and Fight Against Corruption MoD BiH for the period 2015-2019, Final part: communication strategy and future activities). In this document it is stated that officers from Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (AFBiH) deployed have pre-deployment training in regards of anti-corruption; however, there is no specific military doctrine in regards of treating corruption problems in peace and conflict. In the action part, there are multiple measures in regards to the training of civilian and military staff on building integrity and fighting corruption (not only as pre-deployment training). These measures were already in place and are continuously implemented [1, 2, 3].

This indicator is marked Not Applicable because there is no evidence of a developed doctrine addressing corruption risks in operations in a document titled Doctrine of Training of the BiH Armed Forces [1].

As far as service strategic operations are concerned, corruption is not regarded as a major or important issue [1]. Corruption is dealt with in terms of the CECA and PPADB Act. However, section 41 of the Defence Forces Act Chapter 21:0 provides inter alia that (1) Any person subject to this Act who –
(a) steals or fraudulently misapplies any public or service property, or is concerned in or connives at stealing or fraudulent misapplication of any public or service property;
(b) receives any public or service property knowing it to have been stolen or to have been fraudulently misapplied;
(c) wilfully damages, or is concerned in the wilful damage of, any public or service property; or
(d) by wilful neglect causes damage by fire to any public or service property, shall, on conviction by court-martial or by the High Court, be liable to imprisonment or any less punishment provided by this Act [2].
Despite the above provisions, the BDF does not have any express doctrine in addressing corruption as a strategic issue on operations.

The country does not have a military doctrine that addresses and classifies corruption as a strategic military issue [1]. As such, this indicator is scored ‘Not Applicable’.

There is a general preoccupation in the forces to assess corruption risks, but they do not use the word ‘corruption’ to describe it. Usually, the words legality and probity are present in most of the relevant doctrine documents and are valid for activities that are related to administrative activities and military operations [1]. According to a recently retired military official, since the beginning of the military training in AMAN (Academia Militar das Agulhas Negras), officials are trained and indoctrinated in incorporating ‘ethics’ and ‘legality’ in their behavior; these words are literally present in many of the academy’s buildings and anthems [1]. The Army’s Guarantee of Law and Order (GLO) operations and Peace Operations Doctrines [2, 3] do not mention corruption as a strategic issue. There are no mentions of corruption, bribery or other risks.

There is no evidence that the military doctrine considers corruption as a strategic issue in operations; as such, this indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’. The available operation doctrines of the armed forces do not mention corruption risks explicitly [1, 2], but the Military Doctrine and Code of Conduct mention the words legality and probity [3, 4]. In addition, the Military Criminal Code determines the punishment for malpractices which are equally applied to routine and operation processes [5]. All of these documents are available online [6, 7, 8].

There is no evidence that Burkina Faso’s military has a doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue on operations. However, the military does recognize corruption as a strategic issue that could affect operations. For example, they know that when the recruitment process is poor and corrupt; it could lead to them fielding young men and women who are not a good fit for the job. Article 44 of Law N° 038 (2016) imposes an investigation on all the recruits and a medical check before they are accepted. Article 45 says that “recruits who are medically found unable to join the contingent are sent back home” (1). Majeed, Muhammad Tariq and Ronald MacDonald support this argument that “in the presence of the military operations (either combat or non-combat operations) one direct effect is a rise in the military budget, and that military officials manipulate the military budget for private gains” (2). Moreover, for many years, the military, deployed in Liberia and the Central African Republic (CAR) for peacekeeping operations, openly accused the military hierarchy of embezzling great parts of the funds allocated for their participation in these operations (3), (4). Furthermore, the military knows that the National Anti-Corruption Network (REN-LAC), has recently classified the Municipal Police as the most corrupted government institution (6). Finally, TI-DS (2016) says that “None of the top 25 UN troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) for peacekeeping operations, have military doctrine that addresses corruption as a strategic threat to operations.” Indeed, Burkina Faso is a UN/TCCs (6).

Since there is no military doctrine that considers corruption a strategic issue for operations, this sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

The military doctrine in Cameroon is not comprehensive. It is based on a notion known as popular defence. The document on military doctrine, which is considered highly confidential, has not been revised since 1979, when former President Amadou Ahidjo approved it [1]. However, the army has submitted a revised version of the military doctrine which is yet to be approved by the President of the Republic. This doctrine envisions five types of threat which the defence and security personnel may be called upon to address. These include: regional conflict, attacks against territorial integrity, contributions to international peace operations, natural disasters and threats against public order [2]. Neither the 1979 version nor the yet-to-be-approved military document make mention of anti-corruption as part of the package that will facilitate the objectives of the military doctrine [1] [2].

The International Committee of the Red Cross has published a number of military manuals from Cameroon and corruption is not addressed anywhere in these documents [3].

The 2017 US State Department Human Rights Report states: “In the context of the fight against Boko Haram, local sources indicated that corruption-related inefficiencies and diversion of resources from their intended purposes continued to represent a fundamental national security vulnerability” [4]. The evidence above shows the likelihood either that no part of the military doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue on operations exists, or that any such document is ineffective.

Military doctrine is consider a secret doctrine and so is not made accessible to the public [1,2]. It also does not address corruption as a strategic issue for operations, and consequently, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

While there are specific Defence Administrative Orders and Directives (DAODs) on Alcohol Misconduct, Academic Misconduct, and Sexual Misconduct in the Canadian Forces, none explicitly deal with corruption. [1] [2] The ‘Army Doctrine Centre’ provides Canadian input into joint doctrine development with international partners (i.e. NATO, which does have anti-corruption doctrines) [3] but there is nothing specific pertaining to a Canadian doctrine addressing corruption.

There is no doctrine that considers corruption a ‘strategic issue’ for operations. [1] [2] As such, this indicator is scored ‘Not Applicable’.

Although there is no unified doctrine that specifically addresses corruption in the operations of the armed forces, there are codes of conduct that, although dispersed, deal with this issue. The army has recently published the Army’s Ethos, a guideline for the valuing and behavioural training of its members [1, 2]. It develops the concept of “military honour” and calls troops to act with transparency and probity in any situation, and to be honest in the administration of resources that the army puts at one’s disposal (p.4-30). In the teaching of honour, it encourages military authorities to teach the transcendence of honesty in the personal conduct of each of the members of the army, to teach the importance of integrity to maintain the trust towards the institution and its members, and to control one’s subordinates for they being transparent in the administration resources. The army has also reported a plan of training in strategic areas in the control of corruption, among them strategic management, auditing, and probity and transparency. However, there is still no information on the practical aspects of the implementation of these learnings, nor on the policies that are being implemented by other branches, the navy and the air force.

Some aspects relevant to codes of conduct for honesty, integrity, probity, and transparency in military life are described in the book, the Army’s Ethos [1] and the Report of Social Responsibility (Ejército de Chile, 2016). However, these concepts are not developed in the disciplinary norms that rule the armed forces [2, 3].

Chile has no doctrine that identifies corruption as a strategic threat for operations, as such, this indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’.

Τhe latest version of China’s Defence White Paper clearly identifies corruption as a key issue in operations. [1] However, apart from occasioanal news reports on new inspections and audits of military officers and units, [2,3] there is no publicly available comprehensive doctrine on corruption.

This indicator is scored ‘Not Applicable’. Αs per Q51A, although China officially recognises corruption as an important issue of its National Defence policy, there is no publicly available doctrine.

Since 2011, the Colombian Army has begun a transformation process that seeks to modernize the institution’s organisation and internal structure, talent and selection processes, personnel training, equipment and technology maintenance, and military infrastructure and doctrine. It is in this process that the new doctrine “DAMASCO”, whose vision in 2030 is to have an Army or “Multi-Mission Force.” [1] DAMASCO is built under two models: one related to stability, which seeks to consolidate territories with low institutional presence, to be close to the civilian population, and to bring the institutional offer closer; and the second, which seeks to guarantee governability through social and humanitarian aid. [2, 3, 4] Some relevant principles of the new doctrine are “respect for the Constitution and the Law,” “military honor,” and “ethics in all actions.” Corruption issues are addressed in Army Fundamental Manual MFE 1.0 “The Army.” [5] This document defines the strategic design of the Institutional Transparency Policy and institutionalizes it and frames the Policy within the guidelines of the national government, current regulations, and international conventions.

It is unclear if support for political actors, contracting, interaction with local population, partnering with local forces, and security sector reform in operational contexts are adquately addressed. Further it cannot be established if guidelines on how to implement the doctrine in practice is in place.

The DAMASCO military doctrine is coordinated by the Colombian National Army Doctrine Centre (CEDOE), a unit responsible for the management of the doctrine and military publications of the National Army. [1] Its website shows all the information related to reports and news, manuals of doctrine, videos and campaigns carried out in the context of the dissemination of this. In the review of the doctrinal manuals: MFE (Army Fundamental Manual), MFRE (Fundamental Army Reference Manual), MCE (Army Campaign Manual), and MTE (Army Techniques Manual), the publication of 7 documents related to the MFE and 7 documents related to the MFRE were available. The most recently published manual is the MTE (Army Technique Manual), however, documents relating to the CEF (Army Campaign Manual) are not yet available, apart from some primers around tactics, techniques, and procedures in military campaigning, as they are not yet drafted. In order to reach the public, the Army has a mobile phone application called “DAMASCO DOCTRINE” in which publications and information related to it are located and a YouTube channel under the name of “CEDOE Army Doctrine Center,” in which trailers, projects, and training capsules regarding the doctrine are published. [3, 4] There is also a physical publication of the aforementioned manuals. It is apparent that the Colombian National Army has exhausted all means of disseminating current military doctrine to the general public.

There is no official military doctrine within the armed forces which specifically addresses corruption as a strategic issue during military operations. This does not mean that the armed forces are unaware of these issues. Military personnel in Côte d’Ivoire are required to follow Law No. 2016-1109 (Portant Code de la Fonction Militaire) of February 16, 2016, as a Code of Conduct. However, this law cannot be interpreted as a military doctrine addressing corruption issues during operations because it covers general aspects of personnel integrity and discipline for active service and reserve personnel. The law makes no mention of corruption risks during operations. Further, the types of conflicts of interest addressed by Law No. 2016-1109 are unrelated to corruption risk (1). For example, operations of active military personnel are covered in Chapter 7 (Positions statuaires), Section 3 (Positions de service détaché), Articles 90-93. Ivorian military personnel can be deployed internationally for a maximum period of five years, renewable only once. No mention is made, however, about anti-corruption guidelines that must be followed. Likewise, Title II (Réserve opérationnelle), Articles 127-14,3 applies to the army and police reserve forces that can support the Armed Forces whenever required. This section of Law No. 2016-1109 also contains no practical anti-corruption guidance for personnel (1).

In a 2017 joint report by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and ECOWAS in which delegates discussed how to integrate International Humanitarian Law (IHL) in the doctrines and teachings of the Armed Forces in West Africa, there was no mention of such a doctrine for the Ivorian Army. By contrast, the Nigerien Army was used as an example of a country in the sub-region that had developed a Handbook of IHL for its defence and security forces in 2015 (2). The executive has turned issues such as racketeering at roadblocks into a policy priority and has managed to investigate and prosecute cases successfully in 2018. This proves that political will could help mitigate the corruption risk faced by military personnel during operations, such as how to interact with the local population and partner with local forces. However, if there is political will, it has not been translated into an official MoD doctrine.

Given the absence of a comprehensive or even token military doctrine that addresses corruption during peace and conflict operations, and the subsequent lack of practical guidance for military personnel.

Côte d’Ivoire has no military doctrine stating that corruption is a strategic issue for operations. Therefore this indicator has been scored Not Applicable.

There is no Danish doctrine on corruption issues. This was confirmed by sources [1, 2]. As Denmark deploys troops within the framework of NATO, UN, Coalition and bilateral arrangements, Denmark relies heavily on contracting solutions from others. Research identified a NATO doctrine for civil-military cooperation that briefly mentions anti-corruption as a central part of NATO “Building Integrity” measures. The doctrine very briefly identifies corruption as a security risk in that it undermines public trust and confidence, wastes resources and limits the commanders’ ability to achieve operational objectives [3].

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable, as the country has no military doctrine that considers corruption a strategic issue for operations.

After reviewing and surveying all relevant laws, by-laws and media platforms, no evidence was found that the armed forces have a military doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue for operations. According to our sources, there has never been any military doctrine that considers corruption a strategic risk (1), (2), (3). However, one source mentioned that there were discussions in 2013 of issuing anti-corruption guidelines within the armed forces, this was halted in 2014 (1).

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable because Egypt has no military doctrine that considers corruption a strategic issue concerning operations.

Corruption is a topic covered by the military doctrine, but only briefly and indirectly. It does not cover corruption explicitly within the defence sector. As based on the book by Bert Chapman, National Security Concept of Estonia can be considered Estonia’s military doctrine. [1] The current National Security Concept of Estonia was approved in May 2017. It was adopted by the Riigikogu, and replaces the version published in 2010. [2] The National Security Concept establishes the objective, principles and directions of security policy. It is revised or amended depending on changes in the security environment and development of measures for ensuring Estonia’s security. The doctrine recognises that a broad security concept entails the involvement of all sectors of society. It brings out the importance of the rule of law. Corruption, according to the doctrine, must be fought by preventing and avoiding the spread of organised crime, shadow economy and money laundering. Corruption must be prevented by involving both public and private sector, paying special attention to raising public awareness and the development of crime detection and the investigative capacity of law enforcement authorities. There was criticism by a member of the Riigikogu, who emphasised that the Concept should include corruption amongst those in power also. [3]

There is an easily accessible list of the most important documents on the Ministry of Defence website. [1] One of them is the National Security Concept of Estonia. The doctrine from 2010 is published both in Estonian and in English. The same stands for the current concept. [2]

Corruption is not considered a strategic issue for operations in the Defence Forces, as research did not identify this in any relevant documents, However, when attending an international peace and/or conflict operation, the mandate of the operation and the related instructions are followed. [1] In Finland, international crisis management operations are carried out under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Headquarters of the Defence Forces did not address the question in its written response.

There is no evidence that corruption is considered a strategic issue for operations; as such, this indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’.

According to a commando soldier deployed in several external operations (Opex) from Africa to the Middle East (1), forces undergo cultural training at EMSOME (2), part of the Military School in Paris, ahead of their deployment in peace and conflict operations. This training aims to raise awareness of cultural gaps between French soldiers and locals, how to communicate with locals, avoiding cultural missteps. Among the “missteps” addressed, the interviewee said corruption issues were briefly mentioned: “backchich” money for instance, small bribes, that can be assimilated to facilitation payments. But no specific training on corruption risks was given, and no explicit doctrine exists on this subject.

This indicator is scored Not Applicable, as no explicit doctrine that considers corruption as a strategic issue for operations exists. No aspect of the doctrine is made publicly available. The 2019-2025 Military programming law shows no mention of an anti-corruption doctrine. [1]

There is no dedicated military doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue in operations. The ‘Federal Government Directive Concerning the Prevention of Corruption in the Federal Administration’ [1] also applies during deployment, taking into account special circumstances on the ground [2]. In more strategic terms, the Defence White Paper (Weissbuch 2016) mentions corruption as a contributing factor for instability in some countries, but only in passing [3]. Beyond that, there is no dedicated military doctrine addressing corruption [2]. However, Germany is currently supporting the development of a NATO Policy for Building Integrity [4].

As an additional anti-corruption measure, Joint Operations Command Germany (Einsatzführungskommando der Bundeswehr) has developed Central Service Regulation A1-110/0-8020 (‘Korruptionsprävention in Einsatzkontingenten’), which deals with the special circumstances and needs of corruption prevention during deployment. This regulation includes special information regarding anti-corruption tasks that may arise during missions as a result of the cultural characteristics encountered in the operation area [5]. However, this regulation is currently not publicly available.

This indicator has been marked ‘Not Applicable’ as there is no dedicated military doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue in operations. Both the ‘Federal Government Directive Concerning the Prevention of Corruption in the Federal Administration’ [1] and the Defence White Paper [2] are available to the public. Information on the NATO Building Integrity Policy is also widely available [3].

The armed forces are aware that corruption is an important issue for operations. For instance, corruption is often mentioned as an issue to address in public statements by the minister of defence (1), (2); senior officers in the GAF have also expressed their concerns with regards to corruption and stressed the need to build integrity to consolidate the confidence of the civilians in operations of the GAF (3), (4).

However, the GAF does not hold any specific anti-corruption training for its military. For instance, the Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College (GAFCSC), which is the GAF’s training institution, does not include anti-corruption courses in its military programmes at the senior or junior level (5).

As there is no explicit doctrine on this subject, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

Greece does not consider corruption to be a strategic issue for operations [1, 2]. Greece has no official military doctrine. There are only two relevant documents: the National Defence and Security Policy and the National Military Strategy. Both are classified.

This indicator is scored ‘Not Applicable’. Greece does not have a military doctrine that considers corruption as a strategic issue [1, 2].

Basic documents including the Hungarian National Military Strategy (NMS) [1] and the National Security Strategy (NSS) [2] adopted in 2012 do not address corruption-related issues at all. Regarding the possible risks in international mission participation, the document uses only a very general wording: “During the preparation of the soldiers special attention must be paid to make them familiar with the cultural environment.” While basic documents do not deal with the issue of corruption, a few of the recently developed military doctrines mention the problem [3]. However, there is no military doctrine focusing deeper on the issue of corruption as a strategic issue on operations. One exemption could be the new civil-military relations doctrine (CIMIC) which discusses the concept of ‘integrity’. Even if the CIMIC doctrine addresses the issue, CIMIC training does not focus on the problem, which questions the relevance of the document. However, we have not met any soldiers who have been at foreign missions, for example, in Afghanistan and was not aware of corruption as a potential risk. Overall, the Hungarian Defence Force is aware of potential corruption issues in operations, but it does not have a doctrine on it.

There is no doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue in operations. The National Military Strategy does not mention corruption at all [1], as such this indicator is scored Not Applicable.

The Armed Forces do not have a military doctrine that addresses corruption as a strategic issue. As alluded to in Q.35, each branch of the Armed Forces has an Act which governs it [1]. Herein, the code of conduct is clearly defined. Offences are delineated in depth and include corruption. In the Indian Army Act, 1950, Chapter IV states:

“53. Extortion and Corruption. – Any person subject to this Act who commits any of the following offences, that is to say :-
(a) commits extortion ; or
(b) without proper authority exacts from any person money, provisions or service; shall, on conviction by court-martial, be liable to suffer imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years or such less punishment as is in this Act mentioned.” [2]

The Ministry of Defence’s (MoD) Vigilance Division is entrusted with the task of dealing with complaints regarding corrupt practices, misconduct and irregularities in respect of employees of the MoD and the various units under it [3].

This indicator has been scored Not Applicable. As stated above, there is no core military doctrine that addresses corruption but there are laws and regulations within the branches of the military that list corruption as an offence thus indicating that the MoD is attune to the issue [1][2]. The Acts are publicly available to view on the MoD website [1][2]. Further information on each branch’s code of conduct can be found on their respective websites.

The Indonesian National Defence Forces doctrine was issued through the Decree of the Chief of TNI No. Kep/555/VI/2018 [1]. This doctrine is available for the public to download on the TNI website. The strategic doctrine (doktrin induk) is compiled as a guideline for carrying out the duties of the TNI and covers basic information about the TNI, threats and disturbances, policies and strategies, provisions, derivatives and concluding doctrines. There is only one mention of corruption in it, namely in discussion of socio-cultural threats that cause social vulnerability. However, there is no discussion of corruption as an internal military risk to watch out for. Under the strategic doctrine are the operational and technical doctrine and derivative doctrines (doktrin turunan). Among the derivative doctrines, there is a doctrine concerning general functions, which addresses supervision and examination, operations, logistics, personnel and so on. Unfortunately, these doctrines cannot be accessed to verify whether corruption has been properly addressed. Furthermore, interviewees who are active TNI soldiers stated that, although the main doctrine does not mention corruption, every chief of armed forces distribute a memorandum circular emphasising anti-corruption at the beginning of their service time [2].

This indictor is marked ‘Not Applicable’ as there is no such military doctrine. The most recent strategic doctrine [1] and the one published prior to that [2] can be downloaded from the TNI website. Under the strategic doctrine are the operational and technical doctrine (organised by level) and derivative doctrines (doktrin turunan). These doctrines are not available to public.

The armed forces may be aware of corruption as a strategic issue for operations (see example) [1], but there is no explicit doctrine on the subject [2, 3, 4].

This indicator has been scored Not Applicable, as there is no military doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue in operations..

Traditional security formations such as the army, CTS, police tend to have more explicit articulations of codes of conduct, whereas unorthodox formations, like the al Hashd al Shaabi/PMF, adhere to alternative codes as well as communication channels. There is agreement that the Code of Conduct exists, but separate command chains make it exceptionally difficult to enforce.

In April 2015, the ministry, headed at the time by Khaled al Obeidi, hosted a special seminar titled “The future vision of Iraq’s military doctrine”, attended by high ranking military staff and specialists from the military academy. More recently (1), a series of lectures were hosted across the Middle Euphrates and Babil, they focused on fighting “financial and administrative corruption” and international humanitarian laws, but there was no explicit mention of defence corruption. Before June 2014, Iraq’s doctrine combined eastern and western elements, but as a result of Mosul’s ISG takeover, it was modified. Analysts have argued that high levels of corruption, absenteeism, low standards and poor cohesiveness (2) also undermined the existing doctrine. A marketable doctrinal shift followed Ayatollah Ali Sistani’s edict; calling for a defensive jihad (holy defence) for the protection of Iraq’s shrine cities and the Iraqi nation (3). The fatwa address military preparedness, but not corruption within the military. His religious backing of the most important post-2003 military missions created the doctrinal basis for the military doctrine that Shi’i paramilitaries adopted; replete with sectarian-steeped rhetoric (4). While the doctrine is widely discussed in Iraq-related news coverage, it has not been officially published. Its absence is similarly underscored by the actions and repertoires of paramilitaries beneath the PMF umbrella, in and outside of battle. Religious and clerical actors that instruct/guide fighters in combat are also known to have instrumentalized sectarian ideologies, and some even run and finance their own institutions (independently from the state), assuming, therefore, responsibility for their security arrangements (5), (6). In conversations on the subject, corruption is widely missing, the absence of evidence suggests that corruption is not thought a strategic issue. Commentary has widely focused on sectarian rather than nationalist basis (as argued by former MP Mudhar Ghassan Shawkat Feb 2018) of Iraq’s reconstituted doctrine and Iran’s active part in reconstructing the military, which also lends itself to Iran’s military doctrine, bolstered by its long term interests in the region (6), (7).

The fatwa discussed above was declared orally (1), (2), and remains discussed in news circles. However, attention has shifted to the role and power exercised by Iraq’s PMF across various institutions of the Iraqi State (3). While the fatwa does not directly address corruption within the ranks of the PMF, leaders from Iraq’s Religious Shi’i establishment, known as Marja’iyya, comment widely on corruption with wide reference to the ruling elite but nothing explicitly condemns corruption in its ranks, the PMF or the military.

No evidence could be found of a military doctrine that identifies corruption as a strategic issue for the success of operations. The Israel Defence Forces (IDF) have an ethics code to use during war and peace (1) (2). This code is dedicated to the ethics expected of the armed forces, the values it represents and the purity of the forces during combat. These are the main issues in the code, which can be relevant for corruption as well because the code also considers universal values, but it does not have any references directed to corruption.

This indicator is scored ‘Not Applicable’ because the IDF does not consider corruption as a strategic issue for operations (1).

Corruption is identified to be a strategic issue by the Three-year Anticorruption Plan [1], but there is no comprehensive and detailed military doctrine addressing corruption issues for peace and conflict operations at strategic, operational and tactical levels, as also confirmed by the Ministry [2]. This lack seems to be confirmed by looking at the publicly available documents produced by the center for defence innovation (Centro Innovazione della Difesa) [3] [4] [5] [6]. Nonetheless, as member of NATO, one could refer to the activities of the Alliance in this field, and particularly on the Building integrity programme and related activities [2].

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’, as Italy has no military doctrine that considers corruption as a specific strategic issue for operations.

In 2013, the Japanese Cabinet adopted a document that lays out its National Security Strategy. The word corruption is not mentioned in the document. It does, however, state that Japan aims to realize “an international environment that offers stability, transparency, and predictability,” (p. 4), “to achieve economic prosperity … in a rules-based and transparent manner” (p. 21) and that “Japan’s principles and positions” are based on “fairness, transparency, and reciprocity” (p. 29) [1]. The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2019-, which provide general principles on which the Japanese Self-Defense Forces are to be founded, do not mention anti-corruption explicitly. A few guidelines for the efficient use of resources for procurement are, however, mentioned. They include measures such as the use of long-term contracts and facilitating competition among domestic and foreign companies (p. 25). These measures do not, however, amount to making corruption a strategic issue for operations [2]. Each employee of the Self-Defense Forces is, however, obliged to follow the SDF Code of Conduct, which includes injunctions against accepting bribes and other rules and stipulates penalties for misbehavior [3]. Furthermore, according to an email from a retired higher MSDF officer, who has commanded an MSDF regional headquarter [4] contracting in operations is to follow the laws and regulations, listed in the Compliance Guidance, that also apply to domestic contracting. [5]

There is no clear evidence that corruption is considered to be a strategic issue for operations for the Japanese Self-Defence Force. Therefore, this indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’.

There is no military doctrine in the Jordanian armed forces that considers corruption a strategic issue. However, JIACC considers anti-corruption efforts a strategy for the development of Jordanian institutions. The only instance that was found where corrupt activities within the defence are prohibited by law for the armed forces is Law No. 35 of the year 1966 [1]. However, this law does not constitute a military doctrine, nor does it address corruption as a strategic issue. It is important to note that corruption is not treated as a ‘military’ crime according to the Military Penal Code [2]. Corruption is generally not treated as an issue within the defence sector, nor is it scrutinised by any external entity. Despite the fact that Jordan has made major advancements in relation to corruption legislation [3], there is no evidence to support that this has been extended to the defence sector. There is no evidence of the existence of a military doctrine that addresses corruption as a strategic issue in defence operations in Jordan.

This sub-indicator has been marked as Not Applicable, as Jordan does not have a military doctrine that considers corruption a strategic issue for operations [1,2,3]. Therefore, assessing its transparency is irrelevant within this context.

The Kenya Defence White Paper alludes to corruption as one of the internal security threats in the country, as well as one of the factors that influences regional instabilities. [1]. However, corruption is mentioned in a general way, and there is no detailed information on how it impacts on defence operations or any implementation strategies. Corruption is also mentioned in Kenya’s Grand Strategy. [2] The Strategy does not however elucidate the role of the KDF in addressing corruption.

Nevertheless, there are other areas where ways to address corruption within the military for instance is articulated, such as section 124 of the Kenya Defence Forces Act which provides legistlation guidelines for corruption and economic related crimes and offences. The act notes that all offences are punished under the Penal Code, Cap 63, the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act of 2003, and the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act, 2015. [3] The KDF is also guided by the Bribery Act No.47 of 2016 [4], and the Public Officer Ethics Act No.4 of 2003. [5] However, the extent to which these laws apply to officers in all ranks of the Kenya Defence Forces is unclear, as cases of senior officers getting away with less than transparent operations cannot be ruled out, while junior officers take the fall for it. [6]

There is no specific doctrine within the defence forces that deals specifically with corruption, and as such this indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’.

The Ministry of Defence and the Kosovo Security Forces (KSF) do not yet have in place a military programme to address corruption in operations due to the fact that the KSF is still not participating in peacekeeping or in conflict operations [1]. The Integrity Plan for 2019-2022 of the Ministry of Defence acts as the principal document of the Ministry of Defence to reduce and ultimately eliminate corruption risks within the Ministry of Defence and the KSF [2]. However, this document does not explicitly address corruption in terms of a strategic issue for operations.

The Ministry of Defence and the Kosovo Security Forces (KSF) do not yet have in place a military programme to address corruption in operations due to the fact that the KSF is still not participating in peacekeeping or in conflict operations [1].The country is still in the process of building its armed forces capabilities in order to participate in future peacekeeping operations [1]. The Ministry of Defence’s Integrity Plan for 2019-2022 is publicly available at the MoD’s website [2].

The country does not have a doctrine that address corruption as a strategic issue for peace and conflict or for operations. Military leaders are aware that it is a serious issue that impacts their operations, but they do not try to fight it and they only acknowledge it in closed meetings with people close to the royal family, a police official said (1).

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable because there is no military doctrine which addresses corruption as a strategic issue.

The Military in Latvia does not have a doctrine assessing corruption issues for either peace-time or conflict. Corruption is not considered a strategic risk in operations. However, the Ministry of Defence has a Code of Ethics, which applies both to the Ministry of Defence and to the National Armed Forces. [1] The normative acts regulating the behaviour of a soldier from an ethical standpoint are the following: 1) the 2012 National Armed Forces Chaplain’s Manual approved soldier values ​​(selflessness, courage, justice, dignity, trust, love) and standards (legality, reasonableness and professionalism), [2] 2) Section 4, paragraph 1 of the Military Service Law, “Soldier’s oath”, swearing to “be loyal to the Republic of Latvia, its Constitution and the legitimate government”, [3] 3) Article 9 of the Military Service Law [3] and the Regulations of the Military Service Service, Chapter 3, “General duties of soldiers”, [4] 4) the Rules of Procedure for the Solider and National Guardsmen Military Discipline, [5] 5) On Prevention of Conflict of Interest in Activities of Public Officials – Section 7, “Special Restrictions on Combining Offices of Public Officials”. [6]

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable, since there is no military doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue on operations. It is, therefore, not possible to evaluate its transperancy.

The LAF is aware of corruption as a strategic issue at the operational level, but there is no explicit doctrine for specifying that. The LAF has conducted some workshops on combatting corruption (1). In February 2019, the head of the Directorate of Orientation the LAF’s commitment to work on increasing transparency and cooperation with international organizations (2). According to the LAF, combatting corruption is part of the institution’s life. Military personnel are reminded constantly of the laws and regulations (3).

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable, as Lebanon does not have a military doctine addressing corruption. Furthermore, Lebanon does not have a clear national defence strategy (1).

The country has a comprehensive and detailed military doctrine which was adopted in 2010 and revised in 2016. However, the country does not consider corruption a strategic issue for operations [1]. There is no mention of corruption whatsoever. There is a corruption prevention programme in the defence sector and its institutions, but it does not identify corruption risks in operations either [2]. Nevertheless, the implementation plan for the anticorruption programme in the defence sector (2017-2020) namely assigns one trained soldier responsible for anticorruption when international operations take place and there is at least one squad participating [4].

The doctrine is made publicly available and can be found online on the Lithuanian Armed Forces website [1]. However, as mentioned in question 51A, this doctrine does not mention corruption as a strategic issue and, as such, this indicator is scored Not Applicable.

Corruption is addressed as a strategic issue for operations in the Armed Forces Integrity Plan. [1] It identifies corruption risks and lays out guidelines to mitigate such risks. The Armed Forces Integrity Plan is not the military doctrine. It also does not address risks at all levels and the guidelines provided are not comprehensive. However, a senior MINDEF official shared that under the National Anti-Corruption Plan (NACP), each ministry is required to formulate an Organisational Anti-Corruption Plan (OACP) which identifies corruption risk factors and points of action. [2] The OACP is currently still in its drafting stages and therefore cannot be evaluated for the purposes of this research. [3]

Given that the Armed Forces Integrity Plan is not the military doctrine, this indicator is marked Not Applicable. The Armed Forces Integrity Plan however, is available for public consumption on the respective Armed Forces and Royal Malaysian Navy (TLDM) official websites. [1] [2] In accordance with the NACP, the OACP will also be uploaded online for public consumption. [3] [4]

Despite numerous commentators identifying corruption as a major problem within the armed forces,¹ ² ³ ⁴ ⁵ ⁶ the government does not appear to make any reference to eliminating corruption as a strategic goal in its flagship reform programme for the military.⁷ ⁸ ⁹ ¹⁰ The programme merely focuses on increasing military spending, recruiting more soldiers and buying more equipment.
A senior security governance expert agreed that the LOPM does not address corruption risks.¹⁰ The interviewee commented that “93% of expenditure was given to general administration, which makes it very difficult – even for financial experts – to trace flows of money and work out what is going on”.¹⁰ The source said the LOPM2 will be different. It will provide much clearer breakdowns of military spending to conform with a transparency initiative launched by the West African economic bloc ECOWAS.¹⁰
Moreover, a defence attaché based at a foreign embassy in Bamako said that the Malian military doctrine is still being developed.¹¹

Mali has no military doctrine that considers corruption a strategic issue for operations. Therefore this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

The Mexican Army and Air Force train and prepare military personnel to effectively carry out their general missions. The training for military operations comprises the following phases: 1st phase (individual combat training); 2nd phase (training by organic or specific function); 3rd phase (unit training). [1] However, there is insufficient information to indicate that corruption is a strategic issue in operations within the country.

Now, with regard to Mexico’s participation in peace operations, it should be noted that this is very recent and as such SEDENA just opened the Training Center for Peacekeeping Operations (CECOPAM) on 1 October 2018, in which troops and officers from Mexico as well as from other countries are trained through two courses: that of Military Experts in Mission and that of United Nations General Staff Officers. “Each of these courses lasts for three weeks and the objective is to train staff to be in a position to carry out the missions assigned to them and to have knowledge of human rights, gender, and the work of the United Nations, among other things.” [2] In this regard, there is also no evidence that corruption issues were advocated in peacekeeping missions. [3]

Details and information on the abovementioned programmes are not made publicly available and there is no public mention of training on issues of corruption in any documents or legal commentary referring to military training. All evidence points to a lack of consideration of corruption as a strategic issue.

There is no public evidence of a military doctrine that considers corruption a strategic issue for operations. As such, this indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable.’

There is no specific doctrine on corruption, [1][2] and corruption is not considered a strategic issue for operations. [3][4]

According to the MOD, the Defence Strategy and the National Security Strategy address also the issue of Corruption as a risk and need to further enhance Building Integrity. Montenegro is committed to the NATO Building Integrity Policy and also has a Capability Target within NATO Planning forces.

The Defence Strategy states: „The institutional integrity and integrity of each individual is crucial for the entire defence system. Continuous integrity enhancement ensures greater transparency, efficiency and effectiveness of the entire system, from planning, through training and equipping, to performing operations in complex security environments, while reducing the risk of corruption. The enhancement of integrity in the defence sector of Montenegro will continue through the consistent implementation of Integrity Plan measures in the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces of Montenegro and the NATO Building Integrity Policy.“ (Section 4.1. Sustainability of the defence system)

The National Security Strategy states: „Strategic interests of Montenegro are … Strengthening the capacity to counter intelligence and hybrid actions of other states, terrorism and other forms of organized violence, organized crime and corruption, and threats to economic interests… strengthening institutional capacities for strengthening integrity, combating money laundering, financing terrorism and corruption.“ (page 11)
This information does not address however corruption as a strategic issue on operations in particular.

There is no military doctrine which considers corruption as a strategic issue and, therefore, this indicator is scored Not Applicable.

Furthermore, no aspect of the doctrine is made publicly available. It is not available on the website of the Ministry [1] or of the Army, [2] and it was not provided upon request for information. [3]

No evidence was found of an explicit and written military doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue on operations. This might indicate a lack of transparency which in itself could imply corruption risks. None of the recent anti-corruption (hotline/platform, national body for the prevention of corruption) and transparency initiatives (e-gov platform) mention corruption risks within the Moroccan armed forces, let alone on operations (1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7).

In particular, no evidence was found in the two main sources detailing codes of conduct within the Moroccan armed forces:
⁃ Military Justice Code: although there are a number of rules detailing soldiers’ required behaviour, as well as a list of sanctions for those who violate these rules, there is no mention of bribery, misuse of public goods or corruption in general in the rules and the sanctions sections (8).
⁃ Regulations on general discipline of the Moroccan royal armed forces (9). There are a number of rules detailing soldiers’ required behaviour when deployed on operations. As an example, Art. 25.2 states that it is forbidden to steal from the wounded or the dead, or to raid private goods.
There is also a detailed list of the sanctions for those who violate these rules. Like in the Military Justice Code, there is no mention of bribery, misuse of public goods or corruption in general in the rules and the sanctions sections. No military doctrine in any form was found and therefore none appears to exist.

This sub-indicator is marked Not Applicable, as Morocco has no military doctrine that considers corruption a strategic issue for operations.

The Tatmadaw’s doctrines on the planning of operations are not publicly available. We do not have access to any information indicating whether the Tatmadaw addresses corruption as a strategic issue during its military operations against ethnic insurgency. There are provisions on extortion and insider trading in the Defence Services Act (1959) [1]. Based on the currently accessible information, there is no doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue.

Since there is no doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issure, this indicator is marked Not Applicable [1,2].

The Netherlands does not have a specific doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue for operations [1,2,3,4]. Indeed, despite extensively detailing the ways in which actors in the security domain can wield their diplomatic, military, informational and economic means of power in order to achieve their interests, the Dutch Defence Doctrine 2019 fails to address the risk of corruption (see pages 21-26) [1]. The Integrated International Security Strategy 2018-2022 does mention anti-corruption efforts in a general sense as part of a broader discussion on the promotion of international order [5]. The Netherlands lists fighting corruption as one of the ways in which it is strengthening rule of law abroad, but does not provide any strategies detailing how this is to be achieved (see page 38) [5]. Indeed, the broad umbrella term of ‘promoting international law’ is mentioned frequently and does signal an awareness within the Ministry of Defence of corruption and the challenges it poses to operations [6].

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’ as the country has no military doctrine that considers corruption a specific strategic issue for operations.

The NZDF has three joint doctrine publications that address aspects of corruption on operations: NZDDP-00.6 Leadership; NZDDP-3.21 Stabilisation Operations; and The Military Contribution; NZDDP-4.0 Defence Logistics (2nd Edition). NZDDP-00.6 Leadership provides general guidance for all members of the NZDF, uniformed and civilian; although “corruption” is not explicitly mentioned, the first key element of leadership in the NZDF concerns being accountable for one’s actions and serving honourably by modelling self-awareness and self-control in environments that challenge integrity and ethics [1]. Thus while “corruption” is not mentioned, the essence of the publication is one dedicated to the elimination of corruption in all forms. This is particularly relevant for leadership in logistics as the NZDF recognises that engagement with industry contractors has become commonplace, mainly because the NZDF and most other coalition partners do not have the capacity, or the potential to grow capacity, for the full spectrum of operations [2]. NZDDP-4.0 Defence Logistics goes on to state that “logisticians are expected to appreciate the strengths, limitations, and risks associated with engaging contractors to provide essential military support. Caution must be exercised when considering the use of contractors in areas of operations as they may have undesirable affiliations and relationships . . . and [their] bounds of acceptable conduct must be clearly and deliberately determined prior to their engagement” [3].

The main doctrinal publication addressing corruption is NZDDP-3.21, which comprehensively communicates the Military contribution to governance capacity building, including anti-corruption measures and the challenges this involves [4]. It also acknowledges that these initiatives exist at the political level (strategic) and at the functional level (operational and tactical) and that “a balance must be struck between these two imperatives” [4]. The NZDF Doctrine recognises that international actors have an impact on corruption, especially the uniformed variety, and emphasises that their “very presence changes the situation in unforeseen ways. Corruption takes many forms. For example, it can be a factor in local procurement, bribes being demanded on the street for safe passage or security, and non-meritocratic awards of jobs. Citizens have a pragmatic sense of what is corrupt and what is culturally acceptable. Where corruption on a grand scale is occurring under the cover of the security provided by our forces, the commander will need to make it clear to the host government that our cultural norms are being flouted” [5]. Consequently, given that the Military’s primary role traditionally centres around combat operations, addressing and facilitating governance activities should be implemented by international civilian agencies, only using the military where necessary [6].

The NZDF is especially concerned with maintaining moral legitimacy and adhering to local norms dynamically so as to develop and maintain credibility of enterprise. This means that, although the elimination of corruption is a key goal, the measures undertaken must be tempered so as to not undermine local accommodations [7]. This is a practical approach and one that is significantly appreciated by New Zealand’s international partners. Maintaining a practical approach is especially prudent in capacity-building of local forces as it ensures a unique channel to vector communications and develop future resilience in the target community. Importantly, it also supports the development of similar professional values, such as accountability, the presence of which is a prerequisite for establishing a viable governance system [8]. NZDDP-3.21 does not detail the practicalities of anti-corruption measures, but it does address them by stating what such measures may include and why.

NZDDP-D New Zealand Defence Doctrine is freely available online.[1] Other Defence Doctrine Publications may be requested from the NZDF [2].

Niger has no military doctrine that considers corruption a strategic issue for operations. Corruption in the defence sector is not addressed regularly; instead, some ad hoc measures are taken. The 2003 Military Penal Code addresses corruption in article 228 which states that officers found guilty of corruption, theft or general crime can be dismissed, demoted or imprisoned. The Code provides for a judiciary Military Police that report to the Ministry of Defence (article 46). The Military Police are responsible for investigating all infractions of the law (article 47) at all levels of the Armed Forces (article 48) (1).
Generally, the Armed Forces do not see corruption as a strategic issue; but, this is not always the case. For instance, some joint operations conducted by IGA and IGSS are kept a secret until the last moment to avoid leakage of information and to preserve the confidentiality of the planned audit. (2).

There is no explicit military doctrine that would address corruption as a strategic issue for operations. Therefore, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

Corruption is identified as a strategic challenge in military circles. The official policy is that corruption is not tolerated, and any infringement of the policy is met with disciplinary action.
While Armed Forces Decree 105 spells out corruption-related crimes and penalties, it is not a doctrine and provides neither guidance and support for soldiers and other military personnel on how to prevent corruption, nor a strategic appreciation of how corruption may impact operations. Further, in the National Defence Policy endemic corruption is identified as a strategic issue which affects national security. Operational guidelines recently shared with the public contained no reference to corruption risk in operational guidelines (1), (2), (3), (4), (5).

This indicator is marked Not Applicable because there is no military doctrine that considers corruption a strategic issue for operations.

There are no explicit military doctrines in the armed forces which addresses corruption. The strategic documents, such as the 2018 Strategic Defence Review, do address issues of corruption and highlight the zero tolerance for these instances, but there are no details on the implementation of these attitudes [1]. Within the Ministry of Defence, the 2016 Integrity Plan tackled for the first time issues of corruption, including addressing issues of deploying personnel to international missions or operations [2]. In addition, the Ministry of Defence Code of Ethics explicitly addresses the issue of corruption [3].

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable as there are no explicit military doctrines in the armed forces which addresses corruption. The Doctrine Development System does not envisage the development of such kind of doctrine, rather it should be developed and aproved as the MOD Rulebook.

The present Norwegian Armed Forces’ Joint Operational Doctrine was published in 2019 and is an updated version of the previous one published in 2014 [1]. The paragraph addressing corruption risk on operations is exactly the same as in the 2014 edition. The doctrine sets out overall guidelines for how to mitigate corruption risk, but without providing detailed and practical guidance for implementation. It states that collaboration with stakeholders in the area of operation requires a clear ethical framework, as well as cultural and social understanding. It highlights the importance of deployed forces demonstrating a great amount of transparency in contacts with state officials, private operators and other persons in authority (for example clan and ethnic leaders). This guidance applies especially to missions to places characterised by weak state structures and a fragile civil society. Deployed forces have to exercise extreme caution to avoid being implicated in corruption incidents and, as far as it is possible, to prevent corruption and bring it to light. The doctrine stresses that deployed forces should take care not to undermine their own operations by becoming involved in local power struggles or becoming implicated in corruption incidents. There is no detail given in the doctrine beyond this.

The Joint Military Doctrine is available online and can be downloaded from the website of the Norwegian Joint Staff College [1].

Oman does not have military doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue on operations. No doctrine or statements relating to procedures of the Sultani Armed Forces’ operations were identified either on the Royal Armed Forces, the Ministry of Defence or Omanuna the eGovernment portal websites (1), (2), (3). According to an army officer in Oman, there is no military doctrine or a strategy that mentions corruption by name. Corruption is not seen as a risk at all (in the country and the army) (4).

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable, because there is no military doctrine.

The sole reference to military doctrine in the Omani media is in reference to the military relationship between the Omani Sultan’s Armed Forces and the British Armed Forces, “the exercise also aims at enhancing cooperation through contemporary joint military doctrine and plans relevant to modern technology, interagency cooperation, interoperability, and strategic planning” (1).

There is no military doctrine that addresses corruption as a strategic issue. And there is not a document that addresses corruption as a strategic issue within the armed forces or security agencies (1), (2).

As the doctrine does not exist, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable. The Ministry of Interior largely performs the job of the MoD, corruption and transparency issues are included in the PACC’s main principles, mission and strategies (1), (2).

Ths defence establishment has been supportive of the executive’s anti-corruption campaign [1] but there is no specific doctrine related to corruption, only references to it in documents such as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, the Philippine Military Academy Honour System and the AFP Code of Ethics [2, 3, 4, 5].

There is no doctrine as such, and so this indicator is marked as ‘Not Applicable’ [1, 2, 3, 4].

In February 2016, the “Anti-corruption Program in the Ministry of National Defence for 2016-2019” [1] was introduced, but the program is not part of the military doctrine. It was prepared by the ministry and it related to the “Government Anticorruption Program for 2014-2019” [2]. In January 2018, the government program was replaced by a new one, for the period 2018-2020 [3]. There is no evidence, however, that any amendments to the ministry’s program have been introduced. Defence Minister decided extend the program’s activities to 2020. [4]
Another document, the “Concept of Defence of the Republic of Poland” [5] does not consider corruption a strategic issue for the defence sector. A further document, the “National Security Strategy 2014” [6] considers corruption “a barrier for the further development of Poland and a challenge for its economic security;” however, not for defence or military operations.
In May 2019 the defence minister signed decision no 71 on additional preventive anti-corruption measures for military and civilian personnel designated for foreign operations. It obligates all commanders to participate in anti-corruption e-learning course and all personnel to study rising awareness materials. [7]
To conclude, there is no evidence that the military doctrine considers corruption a strategic issue for operations.

There is no evidence that military doctrine considers corruption a strategic issue for operations, as such this indicator is scored Not Applicable.

Neither the Military Strategic Concept (MSC) [1] or the National Strategic Defence Concept (NSDC) [2] mention corruption in operations. There is no explicit military doctrine on corruption as a strategic issue in operations. The Portuguese Army’s 2020 corruption risks mitigation plan mentions army doctrine as a source [3], and the army’s strategic directive mentions corruption as a risk [4]. Neither the Portuguese Air Force [5], the Portuguese Navy [6, 7] or the joint chiefs [8, 9] mention corruption as a strategic risk in their published corruption risks mitigation plans or their strategies, nor do they use doctrine as a source in their corruption management plans.

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’ as Portugal has no military doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue for operations. While the Portuguese Army’s 2020 corruption risks mitigation plans mention army doctrine as a source [1], the two doctrines are not publicly available. As per Q51A, no branch or the joint chiefs of staff identify corruption as an operational risk, nor do they refer to doctrine.

Qatar does not consider corruption a strategic issue for its defence operations and does not have a military doctrine that suggests that. [1,2] Qatar established the ACTA to follow international standards in institutional development. [2] It has been established so far that there is very little information in the public realm about the defence sector and its operations, as they are considered secret. It has become apparent that the defence sector in Qatar does not go through any form of external auditing or scrutiny. [3] In addition to that, the defence sector is exempt from Labour law No. 14 (2004) and the Audit law No. 11 (2016) [4], which address corruption.

This sub-indicator has been marked as Not Applicable, as the country does not have a military doctrine that considers corruption a strategic issue for operations, and thus assessing its transparency is irrelevant in this context.

The Military Doctrine only mentions corruption in passing. Article 38, Clause ‘S’ (C) states that ‘to build and develop the Armed Forces … the Russian Federation deems it necessary… to strengthen orderliness, legal order and military discipline as well as to prevent and supress corruption’ [1]. The National Security Strategy also mentions corruption when describing risks to the economic and social welfare of citizens [2].
There is no explicit doctrine on corruption awareness for operations.

This indicator is Not Applicable because Russia has no explicit regulation or strategy concerning anti-corruption measures in military operations.

The KSA army has no official, publicly or internally available doctrine that focuses on corruption as a strategic issue. While the Saudi military as a body has not addressed the issue of corruption publicly, there are some indications that Saudi leaders and defence sector authorities are aware of the corruption issues and practices in the army (1). According to our sources, the lack of doctrine has led to arbitrary arrests based on tribal and political power motivations (1), (2).

According to a Gulf affairs expert, the KSA armed forces have an unofficial military doctrine “imported” from the US military, which acknowledges that corruption is an issue in operations. It exists in principle, with policies, procedures, and processes that support it, but as they are not based on official doctrine, they are susceptible to the interventions of either senior officers, or to more junior officers that make decisions in the interests of more senior figures in the military. The major vulnerability of these circumstances is that very senior figures in the military or elsewhere in the system are able to subvert anticorruption policy and practices with quiet approval from above (3).

According to David Roberts:
“Corruption is considered a strategic issue especially since the al-Yamamah arms scandal and the enormous embarrassment that went with that, and I know that from the British [defence] companies’ side they are beyond at pains to make sure that everything is done in a transparent way, because the professional risk for them is almost fatal; and now with the MBS approach, it is extremely clear that if there’s even a whiff of a perception of corruption it’s entirely possible that you will end up detained, so it’s fair to say it’s a concern on everybody’s mind (4).”

This sub-indicator is scored Not Applicable as there is no public evidence of a military doctrine. Nevertheless, evidence on whether Saudi Arabia treats corruption as a strategic issue is mixed.

There is no publicly available document which addresses corruption in operations. The military doctrine does not specifically highlight the importance of preventing corruption in operations [1]. Defence strategy, on which the doctrine is developed, does not address the issue of corruption either [2]. In any case, military doctrine was classified as restricted in 2016 [3].

The military doctrine does not specifically highlight the importance of preventing corruption in operations [1]. As such, this indicator is scored Not Applicable.

Defence strategy, on which the doctrine is developed, does not address the issue of corruption either [2]. In any case, military doctrine was classified as restricted in 2016 [3].

The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) recognise, the deleterious effects of corruption and have in place codes of conduct that espouse integrity among its many core values; these types violations are dealt with under military and civilian law. However, there is no specific doctrine that considers anti-corruption as a strategic issue for operations [1, 2, 3].

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable, as there there is no specific doctrine that considers anti-corruption as a strategic issue for operations.

Corruption is recognised as a threat to the Department of Defence (DoD) and the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), in terms of a reputational and political threat, and logically, and presumably threat of sorts to the effective conduct operations. However, there is no overt policy acknowledgement of corruption as a strategic issue on operations or a specific doctrine of addressing corruption on operations.

The Department of Defence identified the increase in fraud and corruption as an Enterprise Risk and responded with the institution of an as-yet unveiled revision to the DoD Fraud and Corruption Prevention Plan, as well as the institution of “Corruption and Fraud Awareness and Prevention Training interventions” … and a “Corruption and Fraud Prevention Plan Empowerment Program for Commanders and Financial Managers” [1].
The Enterprise Risk Management is essentially what should be military doctrine and strategy on corruption issues and measures. There is no predecessor doctrine mentioned in official DoD documents [1].

This indicator is scored ‘Not Applicable’. Corruption is recognised as a threat to the Department of Defence and SANDF, in terms of a reputational and political threat, and presumably a threat of sorts to the effective conduct of operations. However, there does not appear to be any overt or publicised policy acknowledgement of corruption as a strategic issue on operations, or a specific doctrine of addressing corruption on operations.

There is no formal military doctrine addressing corruption issues for peace and conflict operations within the Armed Forces in South Korea. The “Defence Reform 2.0”, which includes mid-term defence policy planning and military doctrine to cover the Army, Navy and Air Force, does not explain how to address corruption issues for operations. [1] [2]

This indicator has been marked_x000D_ not applicable because South Korea has no military doctrine that considers corruption a strategic issue for operations. [1]

The word “corruption” does not appear in the SPLA White Paper on Defence 2008, although there’s reference to conducting financial affairs of the military in a transparent manner in accordance with the relevant laws of the country. [1] There is no publicly available document on military doctrine to gauge this indicator.

Although the army has a docrinal development unit, the Centre for Doctrine Synthesisation and Development, located at army headquarters in Juba, there are no documents on doctrine that are publicly available to gauge commitment to anti-corruption drives. [1] The SPLA White Paper on Defence 2008, which is dated but is the only document out there that lays out some form of strategic thinking for the army, does not place corruption at the front and center of its efforts. The word corruption itself does not appear in the document. [2] As such, this indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’.

Corruption is observed as a concern in the countries where Spanish soldiers are deployed, not as an internal issue. No evidence has been found about the existence of any doctrine or strategic document addressing potential corruption within the Spanish armed forces deployed abroad. Two relevant people interviewed did not know about any instances either [1, 2]. Neither the 2020 National Defence Directive [3] nor the 2017 National Security Strategy [4] mention corruption as a threat to operations. The latter only considers corruption as a threat to the economic and financial system (p. 72) and for international governance (p. 109), but not as an internal concern for the armed forces [4]. The word “corruption” does not appear in the Doctrine for the use of the Armed Forces.

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’ as there is no evidence of the existence of any doctrine or strategic document addressing potential corruption within the Spanish armed forces deployed in operations.

No evidence could be found that corruption is addressed as a strategic issue in defence doctrine or documents or that it is indeed a top priority for military leaders on Sudan’s current Sovereignty Council. Historically, Sudan’s armed forces have not prioritised addressing corruption, but have relied on it, if not thrived on it, for decades [1]. Transitional Sovereignty Council members who are also leaders of Sudan’s defence institutions, some of whom, as Sudan expert Alex de Waal wrote in late 2019, were and likely still are prominent beneficaries of corruption [2], have not yet demonstrated any publicly visible interest in introducing anti-corruption guidance or requirements into military doctrine. In early 2020, the transitional government began reclaiming corruptly acquired assets from former Bashir regime officials, including, according to a Reuters report, the former Minister of Defence [2], who benefitted especially egregiously from corrupt practices, but so far, these few highly publicised cases have not targeted any officials in the current government’s defence sector – many of whom remain in powerful positions in the transitional government.

This indicator is marked Not Applicable as Sudan has no military doctrine that considers corruption as a specific strategic issue for operations.

Two doctrines exist for the Swedish armed forces (SAF): the Military Strategy Doctine (MSD) published in 2016 [1]; and the Operational Doctrine (OPD), published in 2014 [2]. Neither of these address the risk of corruption in any explicit sense. The SAF has a page entitled ‘Our code of conduct’ [1] on their website, which states that the SAF disassociate themself from ‘all forms of discrimination, harassment, and crime such as corruption, trafficking, and abuse. Our staff should also not abuse their position of power, neither professionally nor in other relations’. However, in the supporting document for this webpage, the ‘SAF Values and Code of Conduct – Annex 1.1 Our military profession’, adopted in 2016 [2], corruption is not mentioned at all. Moreover, two doctrines exist for the SAF: the Military Strategic Doctrine (MSD) published in 2016 [3], and the Operational Doctrine (OPD) published in 2014 [4]. Neither of these address the risk of corruption in any explicit sense.

Neither of the two SAF doctrines – the Military Strategic Doctrine (MSD) published in 2016 [1], and the Operational Doctrine (OPD) published in 2014 [2] – address the risk of corruption in any explicit sense. As such, this indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’.

No military doctrine or strategic document was identified that specifically addressed the issue of corruption. There is a “Codex” that applies to all civil servants and that addresses issues like personal gifts, invitations, favours and bribery (direct or third parties). This codex also applies to the personnel of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) [1]. In 2018 the MoD was criticised following reports in the media about abuses of expenses [2]. A report was issued with recommendations. One of the recommendations was to use the general applicable use for all civil servants and get rid of additional internal ones. None of the recommendations suggested addressed the issue on a strategic level [3].

No military doctrine or strategic document could be identified; as such, this indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’.

The issue of anti-corruption within military operations falls under the category of political warfare according to the “Outlines of Political Warfare” provided for Taiwan’s armed forces [1]. General issues and guidelines related to anti-corruption within military operations are discussed within the “Command and Application of Political Warfare Special Units” [2]. Details of the code and standard operation procedure (SOP) for anti-corruption as discussed in the “Directive of Ethics and Integrity Guidelines for Military Personnel” are also applicable to military operations [3].

Taiwan has no military doctrine that considers corruption as a strategic issue, as such this indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’. In general, most military doctrines are classified and only accessible to personnel in Taiwan’s armed forces [1, 2]. However, the directive is accessible to the general public and can be found in the public domain [3].

There is no evidence of a clearly expressed military doctrine in Tanzania, which considers corruption as a strategic issue in operations. It has not been mentioned in the proceedings of the Standing Committee for Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Security of Parliament. [1] Further, an online search using English and Swahili language terms did not provide any evidence that this existed. There is attention paid to corruption through, for example, the Code of Service Discipline, laid out in the First Schedule of the National Defence Act 1966, which specifies a range of corrupt acts specific to the military. [2] A government source indicated that such a doctrine does exist, [3] but information could not be located or verified in the public domain.

This indicator is not applicable, as there is no public evidence to suggest that Tanzania has a military doctrine that considers corruption a strategic issue in operations. [1] [2]

Corruption has been identified as an important issue for operations within military strategic documents, for example: the Strategic Plan on Corruption Prevention and Suppression of the Ministry of Defence Fiscal Year 2020; the National Strategy on Corruption Prevention and Suppression Phase 3 (2018-2021); and the Strategic Plan on Corruption Prevention and Suppression of the Ministry of Defence 2017-2021 [1,2,3,4,5]. However, there is no explicit doctrine on corruption issues for peace and conflict operations. Although the ‘Guidelines for Corruption and Conflicts of Interest within Thai Royal Armed Forces’ do identify corruption patterns and countermeasures against corruption, they do not specifically mention corruption issues during peace and conflict operations [6].

There is no military doctrine that considers corruption a strategic issue for operations specifically. As such, this indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’.

According to our sources, there is no doctrine that addresses corruption as a strategic threat as an issue that deserves resources. Another source confirms that there is a military doctrine, but it does not include corruption as a strategic issue. This doctrine is not available for the public (1,2). Furthermore, the Military Justice Code (3) and the Law on the General Status of the Military (4) do not mention corruption.

This indicator is marked Not Applicable there does not seem to be a doctrine that addresses corruption as a strategic issue. According to our sources, there may be a doctrine, but it is not available for the public. It is a basic doctrine that is not available for all units (1,2).

All interviewees unanimously suggested that Turkey does not consider corruption a strategic issue on operations and that the Turkish military does not have a specific military doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue on operations [1,2,3,4,5,6]. As explained in the Political Risk section, Interviewee 6 suggested that Turkey’s top three strategy documents are the National Security Document, the Military Strategy Document (TUMAS) and the 10-Year Procurement Document, all of which are ‘Cosmic Top Secret’ [6]. However, Interviewee 6 also said that when he saw all these documents in 2016 during his service at the Ministry of Defence, none of them contained sections with an emphasis on anti-corruption, integrity or ethics-related issues [6].

In addition, there is no specific law regulating anti-corruption and integrity-related issues within the defence/security sector. As explained before, the top anti-corruption and integrity-related document for all military and civilian personel working in the sector as civil servants is the Civil Servants Code of Conduct (2005) [7]. Interviewee 6 also suggested that this Code of Conduct is the primary ethics document for all military and civilian personnel working in the fields of procurement, finance management and internal auditing, which all personnel are encouraged to be fully aware of. He then said that there is no regulation or Code of Conduct published specifically by the Ministry of Defence, the Chief of General Staff, the force commands or the SSB for the defence/security sector [6].

When it comes to the behaviour of military personnel, Article 39 of the Turkish Military Internal Service Act (1961) suggests that ‘all military personnel should have high standards of ethics, have a proper code of conduct and should behave in accordance with the established norms of international war law and ethics’ [8].

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’ as Turkey has no military doctrine that considers corruption as a specific strategic issue for operations.

Major General Pecos Kutesa, the Director of Doctrine, Synthesisation and Development to the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF), said in an interview “doctrine is simply what you do and what identifies you” [1]. According to the Ministry of Defence and Veterans Affairs (MoDVA) [2], doctrine in the UPDF is written at three different levels that are mutually supportive: the first is the Strategic Doctrine. This is the apex of military doctrine in Uganda. It provides the strategic conceptual framework for making strategic military decisions. It establishes the rationale, articulates the philosophy and general principles that guide military activity within the UPDF; conveys understanding but not instructions, based directly on government policy and designed specifically for the UPDF. It functions to establish the framework of understanding of the approach to warfare to provide the foundation for its practical application. The second level are service doctrines. They exist at the second level and are written to guide the services operating in different theatres. They are sponsored by particular theatre or service commanders, deriving authority from the strategic doctrine. Their purpose is to give guidance to formations and units and to inform the execution of campaigns, operations and tactical manoeuvres. They may be classified to a large extent. The third and final are tactical doctrines. These are the third part of the hierarchy that provides the main body of instructions of the force. They arise from both strategic and operational doctrines, providing a common foundation on which all tactical commanders base their plans. The various field manuals and standing operating procedures provide the core of this doctrine. However, in all these levels of doctrines, there is no mention of corruption.

This indicator is marked Not Applicable, as Uganda has no military doctrine that considers corruption as a specific strategic issue for operations. While the military doctrine is a public document[1], the doctrine does not address corruption as a strategic issue.

The military doctrine of Ukraine is a comprehensive and detailed document which analyses security situation, sets goals and main objectives of the military policy of Ukraine and ways of achieving these purposes [1]. However, the doctrine superficially addresses corruption issues referring to combatting corruption as to one of the ways that would contribute to the economic dimension of securing military security of Ukraine, develop defence capabilities, and as a principle of administrative management [1]. The military doctrine considers corruption as a strategic issue for effective resource management and corruption as a phenomenon in general. There is nothing about corruption in operations in particular.

The military doctrine of Ukraine is publicly available and can be found both on the website of the President of Ukraine [1] and the VRU website [1], including its previous versions [2]. The military doctrine of Ukraine does not have any classified sections. Given that the doctrine does not address corruption as a strategic issue, this indicator is scored Not Applicable.

Although there are no explicit anti-corruption policies or an anti-corruption military doctrine, the leadership of the UAE is aware of corrupt practices and their risks, especially in offset contracts and external hiring (1), (2).

This sub-indicator has been marked as Not Applicable. The armed forces do not have a military doctrine addressing corruption, assessing the transparency of the doctrine is irrelevant in this context (1), (2).

Corruption has been identified within military strategic documents as an issue for operations, however there is no explicit doctrine on corruption in operations [1, 2, 3]. The Joint Doctrine Publication 05 recognises the risk posed by corruption in operations: ‘the ability of the armed forces to achieve mission goals – be that in defence capacity-building or military operations in complex environments – can be fatally undermined by corruption if the threat it poses is not recognised and counteracted’ [1].

Corruption is only mentioned once in the UK’s Land Operations Doctrine [2]. It recognises that ‘sustainment activities can inadvertently lead to corruption, in particular contracting and employment of local civilians, and potentially undermine longer-term political success (of operations)’ [2]. The ‘Operational Infrastructure’ guidance note (JTTP 4-05) mentions that local corruption may be encountered during operations, and recommends building and maintaining a contractor base [3]. Additionally, UK StratCom has produced a 3-year counter-fraud policy and action plan, focusing on instructions for staff and contractors to act honestly, including on operations [4]. The UK Joint Operations Doctrine, the UK Air and Space Power Doctrine, and the UK Maritime Doctrine, do not mention corruption [5, 6, 7].

This indicator is marked Not Applicable as the United Kingdom has no military doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue for operations. The Joint Doctrine Publication 05 [1] Land Operations Doctrine [2], the ‘Operational Infrastructure’ guidance note (JTTP 4-05)[3], the UK Joint Operations Doctrine [4], the UK Air and Space Power Doctrine [5] and the UK Maritime Doctrine [6] are all fully publicly available.

The overarching ‘Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States’ does not mention the word ‘corruption’ [1]. The 2018 National Defense Strategy does not mention corruption either [2]. However, corruption has been identified within military strategic documents as an important issue for operations [3, 4, 5].

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’ as the overarching United States military doctrine, the ‘Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States’, does not mention the word ‘corruption’. Nonetheless, other military strategic documents, which highlight corruption as an issue for different operations, are publicly available [1,2,3].

No white paper on corruption has been published or otherwise made available, nor has any other kind of policy document setting out strategic issues for the Venezuelan military. The only accesible documentation is the “New Strategic Map”, authored by Hugo Chávez and setting out general policy for the entire Bolivarian state [1]. A 2005 Strategic Military Concept included corruption as a threat but has since been repealed [2]. The most relevant recent document is the 2015–2019 Second Strategic Socialist Plan of the Defence Sector; it has not been updated since, but is still featured on the government’s website. It mentions corruption as a threat but does not offer much detail [3].

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’. No military doctrine or strategic document could be identified.

There is no specific military doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue in the Zimbabwean military, corruption is lumped in pre-deployment briefs as part of misconduct. In passing, soldiers are informed that any acts of corruption will be passed on to the general criminal justice system for processing. The same applies to the intelligence service, the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO), including joint operations [1, 2].

This indicator is marked “Not Applicable,” given that there is no doctrine on corruption as a strategic operational issue.