Q2.

Does the country have an identifiable and effective parliamentary defence and security committee (or similar such organisations) to exercise oversight?

2a. Formal rights

Score

SCORE: 0/100

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2b. Expertise

Score

SCORE: NA/100

Assessor Explanation

2c. Responsive policymaking

Score

SCORE: NA/100

Assessor Explanation

2d. Short-term oversight

Score

SCORE: NA/100

Assessor Explanation

Assessor Sources

2e. Long-term oversight

Score

SCORE: NA/100

Assessor Explanation

Assessor Sources

2f. Institutional outcomes

Score

SCORE: NA/100

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According to the law establishing the organization and functioning of the parliament, there is a National Defence Committee that is responsible for matters relating to national defence. The internal rules of the People’s National Assembly do not provide any additional information about any powers (1). No further information could be found in the constitution (2) or in regulations/laws that were mentioned in the internal rules of the APN, such as the Organizational Act no. 99-02 (3).

Since the National Defence Committee has no formal power to oversee national defence issues (1 and 2, and see the answer to question 2A), the responsive policymaking cannot be assessed. It is therefore scored “Not applicable”.

A list of the members of the Defence Committee could be found on the website of the APN (1). No information was found on the professional background of the members. The profiles found on the APN’s website only provided information on the party affiliation and the district of each member of parliament (2). A review of the local media provided no more information on Belkacem’s biography, only his voting behaviour (3). No information on the professional background of Deputy Chairman Lefki Mohamed was found either (4). It cannot be ruled out that some members have expertise in the defence sector (i.e., because they have served themselves), but given the patronage characteristic of the Algerian parliament and the power of the PNA (5), the ability to influence decisions is generally considered weak (see as well the answer to question 1C).

Since the National Defence Committee has no formal power to oversee national defence issues (1 and 2, and see the answer to question 2A), the responsive policymaking cannot be assessed. It is therefore scored “Not applicable”.

Since the National Defence Committee has no formal power to oversee national defence issues (1), (2), see the answer to question 2A, the question on short-term oversight cannot be assessed. It is therefore scored “Not applicable”.

Since the National Defence Committee has no formal power to oversee national defence issues (1), 2, and see the answer to question 2A), the question on long-term oversight cannot be assessed. It is therefore scored “Not applicable”.

Since the National Defence Committee has no formal power to oversee national defence issues (1), (2), and see the answer to question 2A), the question on institutional outcomes cannot be assessed. It is therefore scored “Not applicable”.

The “2nd Parliamentary Commission on Defence, Security and Veterans” is a specialized parliamentary working group with a consultative role. According to the most recent regulations enacted in 2018, the 2nd Parliamentary Commission has the mandate to conduct scrutiny on the “main activities” in the defence and security sector. However, it lacks formal powers and the independence to conduct effective scrutiny based on the limitations set by the Constitutional Court in 2013 on parliamentary oversight functions of state accounts (1), (2). Though its main task appears to be to review and assess legislation on matters of defence and national security before its submitted for a final vote in Parliament, it has very little leeway to exert the limited power of oversight and independence to conduct effective scrutiny (3). Also, its composition is dominated by the ruling party MPLA, as the makeup is based on parliamentary representation.

At least six members of the current 2nd Commission appointed in November 2017 have expertise in military matters. The number of its members is unclear: 20, according to the parliament’s website, or 21, according to a manual issued by the parliament’s secretary-general (1), (2). Its composition is dominated by the ruling party MPLA, as it is based on parliamentary representation.

Most recently, the 2nd Commission was involved in reviewing the package of bills on the armed forces that were passed in July of 2018 (1). There is no publicly available information on the proceedings of 2nd Commission meetings or ongoing oversight.

In August 30, 2016, Jornal De Angola reported on a parliamentary session, the Minister of Finance clarified to deputies on the priorities of the revised General State Budget and in the report Roberto Leal Monteiro “Ngongo” President of the Defense and Security Committee of the National Assembly recalled that “the committee he directs held several parliamentary hearings with the Defense and National Security sector and noted that the Executive had in mind to maintain a stable in the combative disposition of all the national security organs” (2).

Based on these reports, it seems that between 2016 and 2018 there have been two parliamentary hearings on defence and national security sector. However, no publicly available information, on the proceedings of 2nd Commission meetings or ongoing oversight details oversight reports, was found.

The 2nd Parliamentary Commission is a working group with only a consultative role with no effective power to exert oversight (1), (2).

The 2nd Parliamentary Commission has a merely consultative role and is dominated by the ruling party. It lacks the power to conduct investigations or exercise effective short or long-term oversight over defence policies. Its role is limited to elaborating non-public recommendations on legislation (1), (2).

There is no evidence that the 2nd Commission issues broader recommendations and no information on whether and to what extent recommendations are incorporated (1), (2).

The NA has a Defence and Security Committee called CODES (1), it is in charge of a set of issues; including military cooperation, organization of the defence and security, long term planning, recruitment law, civilian and military personnel, and justice (Assemblée Nationale 2016) (2). In addition to the decision of exercising the NA’s power of sending military contingents abroad for peacekeeping purposes (2), CODES also has an oversight function concerning laws (3), (4). However, the management system, policy planning, and arms acquisition are not under the purview of any parliamentary control, as the government rarely releases information on these issues (3), (4), (5).

The NA also has the Committee on Finance and Budget (COMFIB) (1), which has formal powers over the government budget, including that of the MoD and national security matters.

In the aftermath of the October 2014 popular uprising against the former regime, a framework for the transitional government was adopted by political, military, and civilian leaders. There were many representatives of the army within the National Transitional Council (CNT), which was serving as a parliament (1). The CODES had relevant expertise, as a “90-member transitional council was established to serve as the country’s Parliament including the military, who held key posts, within the CNT, the interior ministry and the Cabinet” (1).

The International Crisis Group (2015), indicated that “the army, the former political opposition, civil society and citizens – have agreed on the necessity of a peaceful and inclusive transition to stabilise the country,” which means that the military was sharing power with the civilians at all levels including within the CODES at the legislative branch of the transitional government, even though their voices could not influence decisions on major defence issues (2). The CNT is made up of 20 members, including retired military officers: retired Colonel Charles Lona of the Union for Progress and Change (UPC) Party, Ouedraogo Abdoulaye from the People Movement for Progress (MPP), and Sawadogo Wendyélé from the Congress for Democracy and Progress (CDP) (3), (4).

In addition to the military expertise made available for the CODES, MP’s do have “parliamentary assistants” (Assistants parlementaires) who are hired from different corps or institutions, including the defence sector to assist help with administrative tasks. Furthermore, they can hire independent experts (whose roles are merely advisory) on the occasion of special investigations committee (commission d’enquête parlementaire). As a result, MP’s who might lack competencies in several fields of defence can utilize additional expertise to assist them. These assistants and experts do not influence the work of the commission.

Saidou (2017) concludes, “launched two years ago, the reform of the army has mixed results. In substance, the reform process remains incremental, unambitious and does not induce a paradigm shift in defence policy. The army remains a taboo subject in public space. Defence policies are defined according to the “silent corporatist action” model favouring closed doors, while voices rise to demand an open and holistic process… The programmatic poverty of political parties and the lack of civilian expertise on military issues favour this decision-making model centred on the military” (4).

Policymaking and assisting with strategy development, through strong recommendations, fall under the core competencies of the CODES (1). However, it has faced oppositions within the defence sector, which often sees new policies as a threat that could undermine their advantages. Yet, the defence sector has swept out the first reform initiated by the transitional government in 2015 (2). Moreover, the low level of expertise, due to the insufficiency of defence and security experts among the members of the CODES prevents the committee from a responsive policymaking process. Consequently, the incapacity of the CODES often resulted in the transitional government to hand over the defence sector reform strategy to an external institution known as the National Reconciliation and Reform Committee (2).

Saidou (2017) concludes, “For the remainder of his mandate, and beyond the reshuffling at the head of the army, it remains to be seen whether President Kaboré will keep his election promise to revise defence policy, a policy that is outdated and unsuited to the new political context. So far, the reform has been limited to the operational aspects, without questioning the defence doctrine. However, the search for a structural response to the crisis of the army can not be done without a critical review of the texts relating to the general organization of defence and defence policy. The need for this paradigm shift is all the more urgent as the existence of an operational device contrasts paradoxically with the absence of a strategic repository” (2).

According to Burkina Faso’s Constitution, the National Assembly approves the budget and controls the government’s action (1). The CODES does exert limited oversight, notably, with regards to common defence issues, including the adoption of the budget. It performs scrutiny on the defence budget if requested by the Finance and Budget Committee (FBC). Additionally, the CODES is also limited in its oversight mission due to the strong dependence of the legislature on the executive (2), (3). Even if the CODES discovers serious irregularities in the defence budget, its dependency on the government could prevent it from further pursuing its oversight duties (2), (3).

Saidou (2017) concludes, “the army remains a taboo subject in public space. Defence policies are defined according to the “silent corporatist action” model favouring closed doors, while voices rise to demand an open and holistic process. “The major challenge is, therefore, the ownership by the actors of the concept of governance of the security sector. This is the meaning of ICG’s recommendation to the Burkinabè government in January 2016: “The new authorities should quickly commit army reform and develop a comprehensive defence and security strategy through the publication of a white paper. The reform of the army will have to be carried out under parliamentary control and the commission in charge of this one will have to integrate civilians and retirees of the security forces ” (4).

According to the 2018 BTI Burkina Faso Country Report, “the National Assembly’s authority and involvement in decision-making suffers from limitations in efficiency and mechanisms of oversight”. The report also notes that the judiciary is independent and institutionally distinct, but it is dominated and politicized in practice by the executive branch (1), (2), (3) (4).

Saidou (2017) concludes, “the army remains a taboo subject in public space. Defence policies are defined according to the “silent corporatist action” model favouring closed doors, while voices rise to demand an open and holistic process. “The major challenge is, therefore, the ownership by the actors of the concept of governance of the security sector. This is the meaning of ICG’s recommendation to the Burkinabè government in January 2016: “The new authorities should quickly commit army reform and develop a comprehensive defence and security strategy through the publication of a white paper. The reform of the army will have to be carried out under parliamentary control and the commission in charge of this one will have to integrate civilians and retirees of the security forces ” (5).

Oversight institutions, including the legislative and judicial branches, have failed to get the military and other institutions endorse their control mechanisms and recommendations. The 2018 BTI Burkina Faso Country Report elaborates on this stating “the strong role of the military and inability of the democratic institutions to control the military is a potential threat to the legislative, as became obvious in the course of the 2015 crisis” (1). After the failed September 16, 2015, military coup by the then Presidential Security Region (RSP), many recommendations were formulated, both by civil society organizations and formal oversight institutions: including the dissolution of former RSP, the removal of the military from politics, and their return to their traditional mission of defending the territory and ensuring the security of the populations and institutions, Three years after the country returned to a constitutional regime, these reforms have still not been implemented (2), (3).

The National Defence and Security Committee of the Senate is headed by Senator Bell Luc René. This Committee was constituted during a plenary session on May 7, 2018. The Committee was formed to look into matters of national defence, security, the armed forces, the national gendarmerie, military justice, and the national fire brigade [1]. In practice, this Committee has never met to scrutise any defence and security matters [2] [3].

The Parliamentary Defence Committee was set up in 2002 [4]. It rarely meets and does not have the power to exercise oversight over national defence policy, defence acquisition or defence and security administration because the President governs the defence and security sectors through decrees and not through laws voted on in Parliament [4]. In practice, the President has absolute control over Cameroon’s armed and police forces. Their deployment is not subject to any parliamentary scrutiny. The President is the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (Article 8 of the 18th January 1996 Constitution) and the Minister of Defence is answerable to the President for the implementation of defence policies (Article 1 of decree No.2001/182 adopted on 25th July 2001) [4]. For example, all the reorganisation of the armed forces has been based on 21 presidential decrees. Defence and security matters are the exclusive domain of the President [4].

However, the Defence and Security Committee conducts enquiries on the ground, e.g. visits to military schools and police academies, and sends questions to the defence and security heads requesting information on matters of abuses or the status of national crises involving Cameroon and another country or terrorist groups, such as those between Cameroon and Nigeria over the Bakassi Penisula and the fight against Boko Haram [4]. These were both reported just as formalities given the fact that parliamentarians in the Defence and Security Committee and the minister are all from the same party – the CPDM, the party of the President. Therefore, they do not scrutinise any answers given by the ministers nor contest the exclusiveness of the presidential prerogatives over defence and security [4]. The Committee also sits when the President is required to sign a military treaty. Even then, the Committee, dominated by CPDM MPs, is unlikely to go against the President [4].

Parliament examines the defence and security budget as part of its right to vote on annual budgets (budget law). The Minister of Defence and generals of the armed forces come before the Committee and answer questions to defend the annual budget allocated to the armed and police forces. However, these budgets are only based on a projection of expenses and the ministers, including the Minister of Defence, never exceed the budget they have been allocated. Therefore, there is no scrutiny of budget expenditure. MPs only consider the income and revenue, including foreign assistance, when passing a budget [4].

There is a parliamentary Appropriation Committee but it has no access to defence and security information. The Director of Budget in the Ministry of Finance controls the expenses of the armed and security forces [4].

The National Defence and Security Committee is headed by Senator Bell Luc René [1]. He was formerly the Delegate General of National Security. He is an experienced Administrator and has expertise in defence and security issues. He is a top ranking militant of CPDM, the ruling party, and a long-time loyalist and supporter of the President of the Republic. Therefore, he cannot be said to be independent, and is therefore susceptible to being influenced by the decisions of the President of the Republic, who is also the commander of the armed forces.

The Senate has 100 members – 70 are voted for by municipal counsellors and 30 appointed by the President. All the 30 senators appointed and many senators elected are older people who have lived full lives and retired around two decades ago. Most of them have held top government positions or are influential personalities and loyal to the President of the Republic or the ruling party, CPDM. Most of them are either former prime ministers, or former ministers, former government officials or traditional leaders [2]. The President has been in government since 1962, when he was appointed as Chargé de Mission at the Presidency of the Republic, and has been in government with most of these senators since then in different positions of authority and power.

The press also reports that most of the senators are not only advanced in years, but also in frail health [2], and hardly have the vitality to effectively function in their duties. That is the calibre of senator the President is noted for appointing as his 30 appointees and that is the calibre of senator the CPDM puts on the list of candidates for the 70 seats left for election. Of course, it was reported that CPDM won 63 seats out of the 70 seats in the 2018 senatoral elections [2]. Therefore, 30 plus 63 make up more than 90% of the 100 seats occupied in the Senate, from where the Committee members are nominated or elected.

The National Defence and Security Committee in the Senate was constituted on May 7, 2018 and in theory looks into matters of national defence, security, the armed forces, the national gendarmerie, military justice, and the national fire brigade [1] [2]. Since its creation, the Committee has hardly ever met to decide on policy because defence policies are made by presidential decrees and does not require the Senate’s confirmation to be implemented [3] [4].

There is a Parliamentary Defence Committee, set up in 2002, which rarely meets and does not have the power to exercise oversight over national defence policy because the President governs the defence and security sectors through decrees and not through laws passed by parliament [5] [6].

Although the Committee sits when the President has to sign a treaty on defence-related matters, the Committee has little or no power to influence policies on defence. Other functions of the Committee include queries on security issues such as the situation of the once-disputed Bakassi Peninsular between Cameroon and Nigeria and on the fight against Boko Haram, visits to military institutions, and alleged human rights abuses [6].

According to Article 8 of the 1996 Constitution, the President is the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (Article 8 of the 18th January 1996 Constitution) and the Deputy Minister of Defence is directly answerable to the President and enforces all defence policies made by the President (Article 1 of decree No.2001/182 adopted on 25th July 2001) without consultation or scrutiny from Parliament [6].

The National Defence and Security Committee in the Senate was constituted on May 7, 2018 and in theory looks into matters of national defence, security, the armed forces, the national gendarmerie, military justice, and the national fire brigade [1] [2]. Since its creation, the Committee has hardly met to decide on policy because defence policies are made by presidential decrees and do not require the Senate’s confirmation to be implemented [3] [4]. The Minister of Defence is directly responsible for implementing defence policy and the Delegate of General Security does the same for the police force.

The Parliamentary Defence Committee was set up in 2002 [5]. It rarely meets and does not have the power to exercise oversight over national defence policy, defence acquisition or defence and security administration because the President governs the defence and security sectors through decrees and not through laws passed by Parliament [5]. In practice, the President has absolute control over Cameroon’s armed and police forces. Their deployment is not subject to any parliamentary scrutiny. The President is the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (Article 8 of the 18th January 1996 Constitution) and the Minister of Defence is answerable to the President for the implementation of defence policies (Article 1 of decree No.2001/182 adopted on 25th July 2001) [5]. For example, all the reorganisation of the armed forces has been based on 21 presidential decrees. Defence and security matters are the exclusive domain of the President [5].

However, the Defence and Security Committee conducts enquiries on the ground, e.g. visits to military schools and police academies, and sends questions to the defence and security heads requesting information on matters of abuses or the status of national crises involving Cameroon and another country or terrorist groups, such as the crises between Cameroon and Nigeria over the Bakassi Penisula and the fight against Boko Haram [5]. These were all reported just as formalities, given the fact that parliamentarians in the Defence and Security Committee and the Minister are all from the same party – the CPDM, the party of the President. Therefore, they do not scrutinise any answers given by ministers nor contest the exclusiveness of the presidential prerogatives over defence and security [5]. The Committee also sits when the President is required to sign a military treaty. Even then, the Committee is dominated by the CPDM MPs, who are unlikely to contest the President’s prerogatives over defence and security matters [5]. There has never been any evidence, when any of these committees have made recommendations, of these recommendations being considered.

Parliament examines defence and security budget under the right to vote on annual budgets (budget law). The Minister of Defence and generals of the armed forces come before the Committee and answer questions to defend the annual budget allocated to the armed and police forces. However, these budgets are only based on a projection of expenses and the ministers, including the Minister of Defence, are required to spend within the budget allocated for the year. The Minister of Finance is in charge of the budget’s adjustment and preparation before it gets to Parliament. Therefore, budget expenditure is not scrutinised by Parliament. MPs only consider the income and revenue, including foreign assistance, when adopting budgetary law [5]. Each ministry spends within the annual budget allocated; consequently, there are no budget amendments in Parliament. In the 2017 parliamentary budget session, the Speaker of Parliament ended the session and unilaterally announced that the budget had been adopted without further discussion when the session ended abruptly over an incident where one parliamentarian injured the head of another. The angry MP was refused permission to speak by the Speaker [6].

The Parliamentary Defence Committee conducts enquiries on the ground, e.g. visits to military schools and police academies, and sends questions to the defence and security heads requesting information on matters of abuses or the status of national crises involving Cameroon and another country or terrorist groups, such as the crisis between Cameroon and Nigeria over the Bakassi Penisula and the fight against Boko Haram [1]. These were both reported just as formalities given the fact that parliamentarians in the Defence and Security Committee and the ministers are all from the same party – the CPDM, the party of the President. Therefore, they do not scrutinise any answers given by the ministers nor contest the exclusiveness of the presidential prerogatives over defence and security matters and activities [1].

The National Commission on Human Rights and Freedoms (NCHRF) was created by presidential decree in 1990 [2]. The NCHRF is mandated to conduct inquiries and investigations into violations of human rights abuses and to report its inquiries and investigations to the President of the Republic. It has no power to publish its investigations, but may make recommendations to the agency in question. However, the Commission’s recommendations are non-binding [2].

There is no information available to show any parliamentary defence committee’s investigations nor is there any evidence of institutional changes made as a result of any parliamentary recommendations [1].

Oversight of national defence policy is exercised via the permanent NA Commission on Security and Defence (Commission Sécurité et Défense, CSD). [The name of this Commission is inconsistent and is often referred to in Ivorian media as the CDS (Commission Défense et Sécurité). The official name as per Resolution No. 006: is Commission de la Sécurité et de la Défense]. Côte d’Ivoire has endowed the CSD with some formal mechanisms to conduct scrutiny over defence policy. But the CSD lacks the following powers:
-CSD formal rights are not extensive.
-CSD does not have the power to scrutinize any aspect of MoD performance in terms of personnel, policy or arms acquisition.
-CSD is not explicitly endowed with the capacity to require expert witnesses to appear in front of it.

The CSD was set up, in theory, as a vehicle for the NA to seek information from the executive about defence policy issues. It was established via Resolution No. 006 of 1 June 2006 (Portant modification du reglement de l’Assemblée nationale de Côte d’Ivoire) as a watchdog institution for national defence, police, immigration, national security and the prevention of internal conflict (1), (3). Chapter VI, Article 13, Section 5, of Resolution No. 006: “Commission de la Sécurité et de la Défense (Défense Nationale, Police, Immigration, Protection Civile, Prévention des conflits internes)” (3). The report by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) confirms the CSD oversight mission over national defence, including its role as a vehicle to conduct inquiries and require information on defence policy. But it notes the drawback of its composition and the fact that it reflects the numerical strength of the ruling party (RDR):

“The Security and Defence Committee has the general powers accredited to committees, i.e. of inquiry and information. The composition of the Commission reflects the numerical strength of each party in the parliament. The parliament controls national defence policy when the finance bill is being examined” (2).

The CSD is composed of 20 members of the NA who are tasked with oversight of national security, police forces, immigration, local police and internal conflict prevention. Since May 2017, the CSD is headed by Sidiki Konate, an MP from the ruling party (RDR) and political ally of NA President Guillaume Soro (1). In terms of expertise, the President of the NA Guillaume SORO is a former military leader of the Forces Nouvelles (FN; also known as Forces armées des Forces nouvelles, or FAFN) and former Minister of Defense during the post-electoral crisis of 2010-2011. He is also said to allegedly exert control over CSD President Sidiki Konate (2), (3).

There is no information available from open sources that details the proportion of CSD members who hold expertise in the defence sector, or the ability of those with the expertise to influence decisions. But according to an interview with an MP, there is little evidence the MPs of the CSD do have the technical background to monitor the Defense and Security sectors. Furthermore, the Chair of Commission is a key member of the RDR majority. The 20 members of the CSD regularly take part in capacity-building workshops, including one in Grand Bassam in July 2018, sponsored by the Commission Nationale de lutte contre la Prolifération et la Circulation illicite des Armes Légères et de Petit Calibre (ComNat-ALPC). The workshop sought to educate the CSD members about the implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty, ratified by Côte d’Ivoire on February 26, 2015 (4). According to Fratmatinfo, a delegation of CSD members flew to Berlin on October 6, 2018, to receive training sponsored by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation. They held talks with German policymakers and members of the military. The delegation included: Karamoko Diakité, Fozié Yeo, Vincent Djé, Guillaume Bi Sui Tra and Jean Jacques Gorgui (5).

Since Sidiki Konate became president of the CSD in May 2017, the commission has failed to review major defence policy decisions. Most of the activity reported by the NA website and Ivorian media is related to workshops and training sessions for CSD members. I cannot find any evidence of CSD policymaking decisions. In May 2017, Konate announced the setting up of new subcommittees within CSD on national security and public security (1). The Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) office in Côte d’Ivoire organized a workshop in Yamoussoukro from 23 to 27 May 2017 to discuss how CSD members can contribute to reforms in national security (2).

Generally, the members of the Defense and Security Committee have little influence. Most provisions are initiated by the Minister of Defense. Even during the army mutinies in 2017, the Defense and Security Committee did not take any action. Even though the parliament has the right to employ formal mechanisms to conduct scrutiny over defence policy, Article 68 of the Constitution states that the President presides over the Defense and Security Committee. It would be worth referring to Article 59 and 57 of the internal procedures of the Committees of the National assembly as they provide details of the mechanism through which Committees including the Defense and Security Committee approve or veto laws including laws on security (3). There were debates about Security and Defenses issues after the Grand Bassam attack. Although it cannot be considered a regular assessment, it can be interpreted as an attempt to give more responsibilities to the CSD.

There is no evidence that the CSD exercises short-term oversight over defence policy.

Most of the activity reported on the CSD by the NA website and Ivorian media is related to workshops and training sessions for CSD members. There is no evidence that the CSD is directly involved in this type of short-term oversight, much less in amending the defence budget regularly or in issuing recommendations to the executive.

Nevertheless, on June 15, 2015, the official blog of NA President Guillaume SORO reported that the CSD had approved a draft bill seeking to combat terrorism and control the cross-border movement of people along Côte d’Ivoire’s northern border with Mali. But this was the only source for this information (1).

“The Defense and Security Commission (CSD) of the National Assembly of Côte d’Ivoire gave a favorable opinion on Monday, June 15, 2015, to the draft law on the repression of terrorism which will be examined by the Commission…the deliberations among members of the Defense and Security Commission have been sanctioned by a convergence of views that led to a favorable opinion for the examination of the draft law on the suppression of terrorism. The debates will open to other members of parliament on 16 June in the framework of the ICAG and in the presence of the Government Commissioner” (1).

The CSD does not conduct or commission long-term investigations. The CSD mandate does not make any reference to long-term oversight. The official blog of NA President Guillaume Soro reported on June 15, 2015, that the CSD had approved a draft bill seeking to combat terrorism and control the cross-border movement of people along Côte d’Ivoire’s northern border with Mali (1). Although the CSD activities remain very limited, there is a tendency among the commission, according to an interview with an MP – mostly thanks to Donors – to be more proactive in the field of defence policies approval.

There is no evidence that the MoD of Côte d’Ivoire implemented any policy recommendations issued by the CSD. As with sub-indicators 2D and 2E above, the only evidence of the CSD approval of a draft bill is the one reported on Guillaume Soro’s blog on June 15, 2015 (1). The mechanisms require that the minister of defence takes into account suggestions made by the members of security and defence, otherwise, the provision will not be accepted (LPM 2016-2020). The laws on military programming, and the programming of internal security forces for the years 2016 to 2020 were adopted during the ordinary session by the National Assembly. In cases were legislators request additional information or clarification the minister of defence is required to explain (2). However, it appears that the MoD fails to incorporate CSD recommendations in practice.

According to our sources, there is a committee (DNSC) within the Parliament that has a mandate to oversight and scrutinize the defence and security sector. However, its role is very restricted and undermined by the military and the head of the state (1), (2), (3). The Defence and National Security Committee(DNSC) within the parliament, but its powers are very restricted given the overall restriction on parliamentary oversight mechanisms and the immense powers of the National Defence Council as explained in Q1 (4), This is part of the recent political context (since 2013) where the executive and more particularly the defence sector have immense political power over institutions that are supposed to exercise oversight (5).

According to our sources, the committee has expertise in defence and military affairs. They are mostly former members of the army (1), (2), (3). There is some expertise within the committee through a large number of former military and police officers (15 out of the 34 members, including the president of the committee and the deputy) (4). However, this large number of military officers undermines the principle of external and independent oversight, and should not count as expertise in that sense.

According to our sources, the committee has failed to review reports, data, and policy in the last five years. The committee’s work is symbolic and has never been a debate on any report (they have not received any reports from the MoD or the armed forces). Therefore there are no effective reviews by the committee (1), (2), (3). Additionally, there is no evidence in the different laws and media reports that the parliamentary defence committee reviews defence policy every five years or earlier. Given the general restrictions on the powers of the parliamentary defence committee and the wide powers of the National Defence Council (NDF) in determining and reviewing defence budgets and policies independent of parliament (4), (5), it is difficult to imagine that the parliamentary committee can exercise any real and effective reviews of major defence policies (6).

According to our sources, the committee has no oversight over the defence policy. The meetings of the committee are restricted and have never been public (1), (2), (3). Another source relayed that, the committee members have very close relations with the army and therefore, they avoid organizing committee meetings (2). According to the National Defence Council Law, the budget of the armed forces is “independent” and decided by the council itself. Article 5 of the NDC Law stipulates that “the Armed Forces has an independent budget that is listed as a single figure in the State budget. When the National Defence Council discusses the Armed Forces budget, the council is joined by the director of the Armed Forces’ financial affairs department, and the heads of the budget and defence and national security committees at the House of Representatives” (4). Therefore, no or very limited short-term oversight is exercised by the committee since the power to make budget amendments lies with the NDC.

As the information in the previous sub-sections shows, and according to our sources, there are no investigations by any commissions or committees with regards to defence policy or work (1), (2), (3). According to the National Defence Council Law, the budget of the armed forces is “independent” and the long-term defence policies are decided by the council itself. Article 4 of the NDC law that decides the powers of the council, gives, inter alia, the council the following powers:
1. determining the political-military objective;
2. Issuing the military policy document and harmonizing it with the different specialized policies especially that of foreign policy;
3. determining the military-political orientation.
All of these long-term objectives are almost exclusively determined by the NDC, and the committee is in no position to exercise long-term oversight.

According to our sources, there are no known reports with recommendations from any committee or commission that the government can then incorporate into practice (1), (2), (3). Given the balance of power, it is very unlikely that the Parliament would make any recommendations at all to the defence sector. This Parliament (and former parliaments), has never summoned the minister of defence for questioning despite summoning most of the other ministers including the minister of interior (4), (5).

The Parliament Select Committee on Defence and Interior’s task (PSCDI, 18 members) is to “examine all questions relating to defence and internal affairs” (1). Article 103 of the Constitution charges the committees with the functions of “investigation and inquiry into the activities and administration of ministries and departments as parliament may determine; and such investigation and inquiries may extend to proposals for legislation.” Their powers include “(a) enforcing the attendance of witnesses and examining them on oath, affirmation or otherwise; (b) compelling the production of documents; and (c) issuing a commission or request to examine witnesses abroad.” (2), (3).
However, the PSCDI focuses solely on the activities of the armed services (military, police, and para-military services) while the intelligence agencies (Bureau of National Investigation, Foreign Intelligence, Defence Intelligence) are excluded from parliamentary oversight (4).
The Parliament Standing Public Accounts Committee (PSPAC), which has 25 members, is provided with the formal powers of oversight and examining the accounts, audited by the Auditor-General Department, and questioning the rationale behind the usage of funds. However, since the Auditor-General Department’s top officials are appointed by the executive rather than by the parliament, the independence of the institution has been questioned (4).

Examining the composition of the PSCDI, few of its 18 members have the requisite expertise to adequately perform their oversight responsibilities (1), (2), (3), (4), (5). Moreover, the continual turnover undermines the Committee’s capability of influencing decisions (9 out of 18 members are new) (6). The committee lacks a permanent or specialized staff that could support its work with research and administrative duties (6).

The PSCDI does not engage in robust and regular debates, or reviews of major defence policies and decisions (1), (2), (3), (4). However; the committee debates on related issues on an ad hoc basis. The committee was involved in debating a controversial surveillance bill in 2016 (5), the budgetary allocation for defence in 2017 (6), and a US military co-operation deal in 2018 (7).
Thus, information on the activities of the PSCDI is available when discussing salient issues, such as the recent MoU between Ghana and the US in the field of defence cooperation (8). However, the reports on the activities of the PSCDI as well as the minutes of its meetings are not publicly available, and therefore it is impossible to assess how frequently the Committee meets, the content of its investigations, or the impact of its recommendations.

The PSCDI rarely scrutinizes defence budgets. When they do debate defence budgets, it is, almost without exception, to ask for more funds for the armed forces; not to debate, at least openly, on accountability and transparency of how funds are used (1), (2), (3), (4). The committee occasionally issues amendments to budgets and recommendations, but not regularly.

The PSCDI do not make long term strategic security projections based on gathered evidence, and as such, long-term investigations are not conducted or commissioned (1), (2), (3), (4), (5).

Although oversight by the PSCDI is weak, the committee occasionally makes recommendations to Ministry of Defence and the armed forces on mundane issues, such as how they can package their budget to obtain more funds (1), (2), (3). However, there is no indication that ministries incorporate recommendations in practice.

The Jordanian Parliament has 20 permanent specialised committees, however, none of them are specialised in exercising oversight over defence and security [1]. These committees may put forward questions to any governmental department in relation to matters that fall within their area of expertise. However, there is no evidence of any of those committees posing a parliamentary question around defence and security issues. In 2017, the financial committee proposed seventeen amendments to the state’s annual budget for 2018, but rather than scrutinising the defence expenditure, the committee proposed supporting all necessary allocations for the military and all security services [2]. The Parliament’s Integrity and Transparency Committee, however, could potentially, if mandated, exercise scrutiny over defence and security budgets and expenditure, although there are no cases of the committee posing any questions or inquiries in regard to defence and security. The committee’s mandate as it stands, does not allow scrutiny of defence and security decisions or spending [3]. There have been some attempts to grant the committee immunity and financial and administrative independence, in order to enable it to carry out its work to the highest standards [4, 5], however, this is still in the early stages.

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable because there is no defence and security committee in the Parliament [1,2]

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable because there is no defence and security committee in the Parliament [1,2]

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable because there is no defence and security committee in the Parliament [1,2]

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable because there is no defence and security committee in the Parliament [1,2]

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable because there is no defence and security committee in the Parliament [1,2]

Parliament has the Defence and Interior Affairs Committee, which has the right to scrutinise every aspect of the security sector’s performance, budget, policy and arms acquisition; and it can open a parliamentary investigation into any matter, and they can require expert testimony, according to article 112 of the constitution (1) and articles 147 and 163 of the PIL (2). Any member of this committee can also summon the Prime Minister as well as the ministers of defence and interior for questioning, according to 133 of the PIL (2).

But the committee can only summon Government experts or the Parliament’s in-house experts, who are civil servants whose loyalties may naturally lie with the Government, according to article 46 of the PIL (2). The law does not grant or deny them a right to summon independent experts. Also, article 147, as mentioned earlier, limits the power to investigate and to summon the Prime Ministers and other ministers to “matters that fall under the jurisdiction” of the Parliament — a vague term that is not explicitly defined in the constitution or the PIL as a shield from oversight by these agencies.

The committee’s powers are further limited by the vaguely worded article 120 of the PIL (2), which gives the head of the Parliament the right to ignore requests to discuss subjects he or she deemed to “inappropriate” or harmful to “national interests.” In order for the committee to force a general session to discuss their concerns, they must insist and demand a vote on the matter from the head of Parliament, who would then be forced to yield the floor if they win.

Only one of the five members of the committee has experience in the defence sector (1, 2, 3, 4, and 5). His name is Nayef Abdel Aziz al-Ajimi (5) and he used to work in the Interior Ministry, but the rest are either specialised in law, business or Islamic studies, and they don’t have experience in the defence sector.

The head of the committee, Askar Aweed al-Anzi, has a business degree and used to work in the transportation ministry and Kuwait’s municipality (1). The overwhelming majority of members do lack defence experience. The fact that some have experience in relevant fields like law does not suffice in this case.

The committee does not legally have to review defence policy every five years, but they must, like other committees, convene to discuss defence and security affairs twice a month at least, according to article 46 of the PIL (1). These meetings concern the performance and finances of these institutions, including threats Kuwait is facing and the ways the authorities want to address them, activists and officials say (2, 3, 4, 5 and 6).

The Parliament also has a long history of being fairly sensitive to public discourse so it tends to raise any issues that spark controversy and that usually happens when a new security threat arises.The evidence suggests that they do discuss defence decisions.

The committee meets at least twice a month, according to PIL article 46 (1). The committee as a whole and its members individually, like all other lawmakers, have the right to issue recommendations whenever they want, according to PIL 97 (1). The executive branch must respond within two weeks at the latest, according to article 124 and 155 of the PIL (1). If the executive branch needs more time, the Parliament must hold a vote to decide whether or not they will allow this, which is often the case.

Example: In March 2017, the Parliament agreed to postpone the questioning of the housing minister based on his request, al-Anba news outlet reported (2). It also agreed to postpone two interrogations for the Prime Minister in April, according to the state news agency KUNA (3).

The committe does open long-term investigations but they do not usually result in public conclusions. The PIL (1) and the Kuwaiti constitution (2) do not have provisions that control the length of the investigations the committee conducts or limit to parliamentary investigation to past or current issues . Article 114 of the constitution (2) and article 147 of the PIL (2) simply state that the committee can conduct an investigation into any matter and that the Government must fully cooperate.

Officials (4, 5 and 6) say that most parliamentary investigations seem to fizzle out without the chamber announcing their official end within a few months.

Both laws don’t explicitly say that the Parliament can refer cases to the prosecution, but article 30 of the PIL (1) says the Parliament can file lawsuits at any court, and the Parliament has referred cases to the prosecution in the past, like the police case of buying gifts and holding elaborate ceremonies using public funds in February 2018, according to Al Qabas, the news outlet (3).

The prosecution, however, can conduct long term investigations that can last up to 7 years or more, officials say. There is no legislation that limits their jurisdiction to a certain time frame.

Parliament rarely demands major amendments to defence policies, and all security agencies tend to ignore parliamentary recommendations, and lawmakers do not attempt to use the formal powers they have to press them, according to lawmakers and officials. There are no media reports that suggest that any serious changes have been made to defence or security policies at the request of Parliament. The fact that the security agencies moved to implement the GCC 2012 security pact signed by Kuwait’s executive branch even though it had been rejected by Parliament proves that the committee, and the Parliament in general, does not have much weight in the decision-making process inside the security agencies, officials and a member of the royal family said (1, 2, 3, and 4).

The National Defence, Interior, and Municipalities Parliamentary Committee is one of the 16 standing committees in the Parliament (1). It is responsible for studying, revising, and issuing recommendations and amendments for a bill and law proposal (2). However, it does not scrutinize the performance aspect of the MoD such as personnel management, policy planning, and arms acquisition. According to Interviewee 4, the LAF should share expenses if requested by the committee, but the latter does not ask for them. LAF representatives are present when the committee discusses defence-related matters (3).

In general, committee members are not required to have expertise in defence affairs (1). According to the Parliament’s Book, professional and academic expertise are taken into consideration (1). In reality, sectarian and political consideration influence the composition.
Currently, 5 out of the 17 current members of the National Defence, Interior, and Municipalities parliamentary committee have defence expertise and previous military service records (2). These include retired Brigadier General Walid Sukarieh, retired Brigadier General Antoine Pano, retired Brigadier General Chamel Roukoz, retired Brigadier General Wehbe Katicha, and retired Brigadier General Jean Talouzian (1). These MPs have varying levels of current interest in defence affairs (3) (4). However, these interests are subordinate to the priorities of the MPs’ sectarian political parties (3) (4). Furthermore, committee members are not required to have expertise in defence affairs.

Research found no cases of the parliamentary committee reviewing major defence policies and decisions in the past five years or when new threats arise. The parliamentary committee mainly addresses internal security and municipalities matters instead of defence issues (1). As mentioned in Q1, Lebanon does not have an official national defence strategy. However, when new defence threats or urgent related issues arise, they are addressed by the presidentially-led Supreme Defence Council (2). For example, in February 2018, the council met to discuss maritime and border violations by Israel and how the LAF would address them (3).

The committee does not regularly issue defence related amendments and recommendations (1). For example, the committee has infrequently studied the proposal to change the national defence law. In 2015, the committee was studying the changes in the defence sector (National Defence Law and structure of the Ministry of Defence) (2). In 2019, the committee looked into an amendment in the National Defence Law related to the time period for reserves and volunteers in the LAF (3). Interviewee 4 indicated that the committee does not exercise its oversight on defence issues. When revising cooperation treaties, the committee does not issue amendments because it has already been studied and approved by the LAF, the MoD, and the CoM (4).

Long term oversight is not exercised by the parliamentary committee. The Council of Ministers oversees and follows up on the implementation of the defence provisions is done by the HDC. (National Defence Law Art. 6- 7) (1). Interviewee no. 4 indicated that the parliamentary committee’s oversight role is nonexistent (2).

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable because research found no cases of major recommendations for the Ministry of Defence to incorporate or adopt (1). Interviewee 2, added that the Ministry of Defence consults the executive branch directly instead of the parliamentary committee (2).

Mali has a Defence and Security Committee (CDSPC) tasked with overseeing and scrutinising defence issues. The CDSPC examines the annual defence budget. The committee invites the directors of all the main divisions of the armed forces, the army chiefs of staff, the army joint chiefs of staff and the Minister of Defence for discussions on the mission, the annual objectives and the budgetary requirements of the armed and security forces. The committee can propose amendments to the budget or a reformulation of the objectives. Following the work in the committee, the draft budget is presented to a plenary session of the National Assembly for debate and voting. If approved, the budget estimates become the Finance Act and public dissemination of the act commences.
The committee is influential and high-profile because of president’s son being the chair⁴. A source said the CDSPC can influence but is not able to challenge the government. The committee is able to oblige people to appear before it, something which they have done several times⁴. It asks questions about government policy and produces reports that are circulated within the MDAC⁴.

The committee comprises 14 members. Six different political parties are represented on the commission: RPM, Adéma-PASJ, PARENA, ASMA, SADI and the UM-RDA.⁶ Of the 14 members, only two are from parties that are not currently in government – PARENA and SADI.⁶
The committee’s chair, its most important member, is Karim Keita, the son of president IBK. He has no qualifications for the role apart from being the president’s son. He had no prior political or military experience before taking on the role.¹ ² ³ ⁷ ⁸
The editor of a Malian national newspaper told the assessor that other members of the committee similarly have no prior defence experience.⁴ One member, Yaya Sangaré, was formerly a journalist who rose to national prominence during the overthrow of long-time dictator Moussa Traoré in March 1991. Another member, Belco Bah, reportedly rears animals for sale.⁴
A member of the committee told the assessor that the committee’s Vice-President, Aguissa Seydou Touré, was first elected in 2013, having previously had a career as a professor of education.⁶ The source said that the committee contains only one member with a defence or security background, Kissama Keita, who was formerly a police officer.⁶ The assessor found no information relating to other members of the committee.

Mali has a Defence and Security Committee (CDSPC) tasked with overseeing and scrutinising defence issues. The CDSPC and the National Assembly debated and scrutinised the government’s flagship defence policy, the LOPM. The LOPM provides for USD2.3 billion of investment for the armed forces and is set to recruit an additional 10,000 personnel between 2015 and 2019. It clearly outlines the problems facing the army and elucidates what the five-year spending plan will be.
The legislation stipulates that the equipment purchased and the recruitment of extra soldiers will better enable the FAMa to combat jihadist groups operating in the northern regions of the country. A Malian journalist and a security expert told the assessor that these aspects of the LOPM were debated in parliament before they were ratified.³ ⁴ A research assistant working for the CDSPC also confirmed that the LOPM was also debated and scrutinised by the committee.⁵

The committee occasionally issues amendments to budgets and recommendations, but not on a regular basis. The committee can propose amendments to defence legislation (including budgets) before it is passed to parliament.¹ ⁷ A member of the committee told the assessor that its proposals are sometimes integrated into the final legislation.⁷
But the president of the defence and security committee, Karim Keita, is also the son of Malian President IBK. That IBK’s son heads the committee has been widely criticised as representing a direct line of influence of the executive over the CDSPC.² The likelihood of the committee deciding to challenge the defence policy of the executive while this overt instance of patronage and nepotism remains is remote. This is especially so when only two of the 14 committee members are from parties that are not currently in government.⁶
For instance, when details of the scandal concerning the CFA40 billion overspend on a new presidential jet and overpriced contracts emerged in 2014, it was civil society organisations rather than the CDSPC that were leading the calls for accountability.⁸ Unsurprisingly, the chair of the defence committee was not among those demanding that the executive publish details of the controversial purchases.
However, the CDSPC did earn praise from domestic media outlets for its work in formulating the new General Statute for the FAMa.⁵ The new statute offers clear criteria for promotions within the armed forces. MaliActu, a news website that is often critical of IBK’s government and has published several damning pieces on Karim Keita, commended the CDSPC for making “pertinent recommendations” to the defence ministry. These included the construction of a modern military hospital, a review of the statutes concerning specific units within the armed forces and the creation of a unit of auxiliary gendarmes.⁵ So although the CDSPC is very unlikely to properly scrutinise government policy while the president’s son is chair of the committee, it does play a role in policy formulation.

There is no evidence that the committee conducts or commissions any long-term investigations into defence matters. This was confirmed by a member of the committee who told the assessor that it does not takes a long-term approach.⁴ Given the fact that the Malian army had virtually disintegrated by 2012 and that it has since been struggling to stop the spread of jihadist attacks in the north and centre of the country, it is understandable that the CDSPC is not looking at speculative threats that could arise in ten years’ time. The committee apparently produces reports for internal use within parliament and for the executive, but the source confirmed that it does not typically publish these reports.⁴

Ministries sometimes incorporate recommendations into practice, but not regularly. The president’s son heads up the committee and thus there is limited scope for the CDSPC to challenge the executive. However, the committee can propose amendments to defence legislation (including budgets) before it is passed to parliament.⁵ A member of the committee told the assessor that its proposals are sometimes integrated into the final legislation.⁵
The committee is influential and high-profile because of president’s son being the chair.⁴ The source said the CDSPC can influence but is not able to challenge the government. The committee is able to oblige people to appear before it, something which they have done several times.⁴ It asks questions about government policy and produces reports that are circulated within the MDAC.⁴
While many worry about the excessive influence of the president’s son – “more of a minister rather than a mere member of parliament” – his decision-making powers have their limits.⁷ In 2015, the Minister of Defence Tiéman Hubert Coulibaly opted to purchase six Super Tucano aeroplanes from a Brazilian company.⁷ This decision went against Karim Keita’s preference for six Gazelle planes made by a French company.⁷
The CDSPC earned praise from domestic media outlets for its work in formulating the new General Statute for the FAMa.⁶ The new statute offers clear criteria for promotions within the armed forces. MaliActu, a news website that is often critical of IBK’s government and has published several damning pieces on Karim Keita, commended the CDSPC for making “pertinent recommendations” to the defence ministry, including the construction of a modern military hospital, a review of the statutes concerning specific units within the armed forces and the creation of a unit of auxiliary gendarmes.⁶
So, although the CDSPC is very unlikely to properly scrutinise government policy while the president’s son is chair of the committee, it does play a role in formulating policies.

Article 55 Section VIII of the August 2013 Internal Regulations of the Lower Chamber of Parliament (Chambre des Représentants) states that out of the 9 current permanent commissions, one is dedicated to « Foreign affairs, national defence, Islamic affairs and Moroccan residents abroad » (1). However, little is known of the commission’s rights in overseeing the defence sector and no evidence shows that this commission has worked so far on military issues, except by drafting draft N°62.16 concerning the approval of an international agreement pertaining to military cooperation between the Kingdom of Morocco and the Popular Republic of China signed in Beijing on May 11 2016, passed on August 1 2017 by the Parliament (2). No evidence of a draft on domestic military issues was found in the list of all the drafts submitted by the Commission since 2016. On 31 March 2018, the Commission of Foreign affairs, national defence, Islamic affairs and Moroccan residents abroad of the House of Representatives in the Lower Chamber of Parliament (Chambre des Représentants) met with the Commission of Foreign Affairs, National Defence, Borders and Occupied Moroccan zones of the House of Councillors, in the presence of the Minister of Interior and the Minister of Foreign Affairs to discuss “latest developments” related to the issues in the “Western Sahara region” (3).

There is no Ministry of Defence in Morocco; instead there is a National Defence Administration (Administration de la Défense Nationale). Most members of the Commission of Foreign Affairs, National Defence, Borders and Occupied Moroccan zones of the House of Councillors have no expertise in the defence sector including the President of the Commission, Muhammad Al-Al-Ruzmah (1). Since his appointment as Head of the Commission on Foreign Affairs, National Defence, Islamic affairs and Moroccan Residents Abroad in 2016, Youssef Gharbi has publicly questioned ministers in Parliament on a number of occasions. However, none of the questions were related to the administrative staff in charge of defence issues (2).

Moreover, none of the members of the Commission on Foreign Affairs, National Defence, Islamic Affairs and Moroccan Residents abroad have specific expertise in the field of defence.

The information available on the website of the Chamber of Representatives (1) only refers to activities undertaken during the current term of office (2016-2021), which means it does not refer to any potential review of major defence policies and decisions that were taken before the last five years. Sources other than the website of the Chamber of Representatives did not confirm regular reviews of major defence policies and decisions by the parliamentary commission. The two committees may have met to discuss issues related to any threat to national defence; however little is known regarding the outcome of these meetings and to what extent they may influence defence policies and decisions.

The Commission on Foreign Affairs, National Defence, Islamic Affairs and Moroccan Residents Abroad does not exercise any short-term oversight over defence policy and is extremely limited in nature, as the summary of its activities and the detailed list of the different drafts submitted or voted showed (1)(2): none of the activities and/or drafts refer to defence policy, except the Draft N°62.16 regarding the approval of an international agreement pertaining to military cooperation between the Kingdom of Morocco and the Popular Republic of China signed in Beijing on May 11 2016. However, it is mentioned that the agreement was merely approved, without reference to a debate within or including the Commission on Foreign Affairs, national defence, Islamic affairs and Moroccan residents abroad. The same goes for the detailed list of the different bills and drafts submitted or debated by the Head of the Commission on Foreign Affairs, National Defence, Islamic Affairs and Moroccan Residents Abroad, Youssef Gharbi (3). There has been no reporting suggesting a short-term oversight over defence policy by the House of Councillors from the Commission of Foreign Affairs, National Defence, Borders and Occupied Moroccan zones. Also, the extent to which this Commission has an oversight over defence policy is unclear. No summary of the Commission’s activities nor any drafts submitted by the committee regarding defence policy could be found. Cases of amendments and discussions as reported by the Moroccan press remained of a superficial nature.

No evidence that the Commission on Foreign Affairs, national defence, Islamic affairs and Moroccan residents abroad conducts or commissions any long-term investigations over defence policy was found, as the summary of its activities and the detailed list of the different drafts submitted or voted showed.(1)

The same goes for the detailed list of the different bills and draft submitted or debated by the Head of the Commission on Foreign Affairs, National Defence, Islamic Affairs and Moroccan Residents Abroad abroad Youssef Gharbi. (2)

No other source was found supporting the contrary. The same can be said for the House of Councillors Commission of Foreign Affairs, National Defence, Borders and Occupied Moroccan zones.

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable because, although the Commission on Foreign Affairs, National Defence, Islamic Affairs and Moroccan Residents Abroad does theoretically address issues of national defence, in practice no evidence of an actual mandate on defence issues was found. As a consequence no recommendations are made to Ministries. Moreover, there has been no found reporting by the press or NGO’s suggesting an actual mandate on defence. The defence sector is regarded a “sensitive sector” in Morocco, therefore even if these commissions make recommendations to Ministries, they are unlikely to be found on the parliament website, reported by the media or NGO’s.

The National Assembly has a Security and Defence Committee that is to be set up at the beginning of each legislative cycle (Art. 30 of the National Assembly’s Internal Rules) (1). Composed of 24 members from various political parties, the committee is responsible for overseeing work of the ministries in charge of national defence and security policy (1). This includes the following areas:
1.General organisation of defence and security;
2. Defence cooperation policy;
3. State of emergency and state of siege;
4. Status of military personnel and the security forces;
5. Obligations imposed in the interest of national defence and public security on citizens in their person and their property;
6. Legislation regarding military programmes and plans;
7. National service; military service;
8. Military justice.
Though the committee has extensive formal (de jure) rights as an advisory committee, including oversight of the Police (Gendarmerie Nationale) and National Guard (Garde Nationale), and though it is entitled to request information on government security policy, it does not seem to have a clear mandate to examine the cost of arms acquisitions. 

Presided over by a lawyer, Hama Assah, the committee is composed of 24 members (1). Coming from different backgrounds, only a few of them have specialised military training (2). More generally, the NA deputies are not provided with technical support, which impacts their efficiency as a control body of governmental policy. However, since 2017 the committee has begun receiving capacity-building support from DCAF based on gaps identified during the self-assessment process. The committee set up a 2017-2021 action plan to monitor military operations. According to the committee, the plan was implemented by 38%. For example, as part of it, the committee launched a series of field missions to initiate dialogue with the media, local authorities and civil society (3). In May 2018, DCAF organised a workshop to reinforce members’ expertise on budget control. The workshop is part of the project on “Strengthening the accountability of the security sector in Niger”, funded by the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with the assistance of the DCAF (4).

The committee may have some oversight over major defence decisions if new threats arise. For instance, in February 2015, the committee authorised the dispatch of troops to Nigeria (1) and extended several times the state of emergency in the Diffa region and some departments of Tillabéry and Tahoua (2). However, given the lack of technical expertise as well as a tendency towards dependency on the executive (see question 1), the policymaking capabilities of the committee may be limited.

Chapter III of the Internal Rules document provides the Commission with the right to propose amendments (1). However, according to interviewees (2), at least during the last three years, the Commission did not issue any amendments to budgets and did not provide important recommendations that were incorporated by the executive. According to remarks of the reviewer 1, the capacity of the Commission to exercise short-term oversight over defence policy is very limited in nature.

According to article 30, line 7 of the Internal Rules, the Commission has a right to conduct investigations related to policies (1). However, according to interviewees, at least in the last two years, long-term investigations have not been conducted (2).

The National Assembly’s capacity to have an institutional impact on defence policy is limited. According to interviewees, deputies have never managed to propose a law that has been adopted (1). However, with the assistance of the DCAF, Niger has recently published a collection of laws and decrees regarding defence and security policy, which identifies existing gaps. This could provide important support for deputies’ to propose legislative projects regarding defence and security policy in the near future (2).

A defence committee exists, including a special Presidential National Defence Policy Committee, the Senate Committee on Defence, and the Parliamentary Committee on Defence and Interior, FCDA. Its powers include the initiation and consideration of bills, oversight of the executive, constituency representation, investigation of government policy initiatives and the reviewing and approval of budget and expenditure (1). The Committee has the general powers to scrutinize defence policy and often debates defence issues such as the general security situation in the country. NASS members only have the power to confirm ministers for example (2). The recent kidnapping of the Dapchi Girls was commented on by the Defence Committee. However, the Committee does not have any direct control over the technical specifications of military procurement which lies with the executive (3). Given that the executive can raise funding without legislative approval, the Defence Committee can be bypassed by the executive when secretive arms procurement deals are being made. In 2014, the South African press reported the seizure of large sums of money which the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) attempted to use to buy arms. It appears that the Senate was not aware of the attempted transaction before the attempted purchase. “The Nigerian government later admitted it was behind the arms deal, claiming it acted out of desperation for arms to defeat extremist sect, Boko Haram. An investigation planned by the Senate into the transaction has yet to begin, while the House of Representatives threw out a motion seeking a probe” (4).

Despite the NASS’s formal powers of oversight, it functions weakly because of the general lack of expertise among members of the National Assembly Defence Committee (1). There is a lack of understanding of basic defence issues, and there is instability created by the revolving nature of the members of these committees (2). Although the Defence Committee relies on the expertise of retired military personnel amongst its member’s such members rarely work against the interest of the military. Weak parliamentary control and the lack of transparency have allowed large extra-budgetary spending and revenue. A significant number of legislators in a self-assessment report rated the National Assembly’s security capacity oversight poorly. NASS members rely on staff to carry out research. However, many responded to the PLAC questionnaire and scored the NASS ‘poor’ or ‘very poor’ in relation to whether they received adequate research information and staff and other services to support their effective performance (3), (4).

A special Presidential National Defence Policy Committee was set up in 2015 to review the National Defence Policy the report of that committee has been given to the Minister of Defence and there seems to be a lack of continuity. The creation of the Presidential Committee was ad-hoc as there was not a statutory or legislative framework to guide regular reviews within a specific timeframe. The National Assembly does have committees which consider and investigates defence issues and considers budgetary allocations to the military sector (1). Despite the committee holding public hearings, there is weak citizen engagement and little evidence of CSOs’ ability to influence policymaking (2). The national defence policy has not been reviewed in the last 10 years. NASS members also scored themselves poorly concerning monitoring the implementation of laws once enacted and evaluating the validity of laws. Many noticed that executive officers were sometimes dilatory in appearing before committees during hearings relating to defence matters. The members noted that the NASS is unable to remove or impeach ministers and can only impeach the president (3), (4).

The previous administration and the current administration announced an additional $1 billion to fight the northeastern insurgency (1), (2) without any serious objection or scrutiny from the defence committees. These extra-budgetary allocations were not contained in the Medium Trem Expenditure Framework, which governs executive spending in a 3-5 year economic plan (3), (4). The Senate has also raised objections to the plans of the Buhari administration to raise finances without effective consultations with the NASS.

The available information suggests that there has not been a long-term review of the national defence policy for ten years (1). Without a long term strategic national defence policy or plan, there is no policy basis for the defence committees to scrutinize or exercise long term defence policy or expenditure oversight (2). Other issues that harm the ability of the committees to conduct long term reviews or investigations are insufficient resources and funding, absolute control by the executive over the defence and security sector, and a culture of secrecy in the defence establishment which restricts the scope of the information shared with the Committee (PLAC July 2017 pg. 4, pg. 40) (3), (4).

Given that there has been no review of the national defence policy in ten years, there is no evidence that the government incorporates some or any recommendations into practice either sporadically or regularly. As previously stated, the executive is defensive over its control of over the defence sector (1). The Nigerian National Defence Policy Committee submitted a report in 2016, the Minister of Defence Mansur Dan-Ali promised to implement most, if not all, of the recommendations and strategies of the committee. However, there has been no further information about the issue since 2016. The secrecy which surrounded the work of the NNDPC suggests that institutional outcomes are negatively impacted since not all stakeholders had the opportunity to influence the development of national policy (2).

According to the Majlis al-Shura website, there is the Department of the Defence, Security and Foreign Relations Affairs Committee, one of ten parliamentary committees; however, their mandate is not set out on the website, and neither is any information about the members of the committee (1). Standing committees should, according to the parliament’s website, follow up reports and previous recommendations of the Majlis (1). The Defence, Security and Foreign Relations Committee does not appear on the Arabic website, and no information exists about this committee (2). This signifies a clear lack of transparency concerning the work of this committee, as is evident through inconsistencies across government websites. Despite the claimed existence of the committee, all parliamentary committees lack the formal rights to scrutinise or draft legislation and are thus unable to operate effectively or exercise oversight on the defence sector, particularly as the Majlis lacks formal powers beyond social, economic, and environmental policy, as previously explained. A researcher verifies that there is a committee, but the committee is superficial and does not meet (3).

This sub-indicator has been marked as Not Applicable because, although the website of Majlis al-Shura mentions the existence of a defence committee, the committee has no presence other than the name mentioned on the English website (1), (2). Interestingly, internet-based search for the Defence, Security and Foreign Relations Committee shows no results for it in Arabic. The so-called committee does not seem to have any activities, its members unknown and its influence on policy is either non-existent, or intentionally kept undisclosed. According to many sources, the committee members are not known as the committee is inactive (3). For these reasons, Not Applicable is the most suitable for this sub-indicator.

This sub-indicator has been marked as Not Applicable because, although the website of Majlis al-Shura mentions the existence of a defence committee, the committee has no presence other than the name mentioned on the English website. According to our sources, the Defence, Security and Foreign Relations Committee has no activities and not known to the public. The committee does not seem to have any activities, its members unknown and its influence on policy is either non-existent, or intentionally kept undisclosed.

This sub-indicator has been marked as Not Applicable because, although the website of Majlis al-Shura mentions the existence of a defence committee, the committee has no presence other than the name mentioned on the English website. According to our sources, the Defence, Security and Foreign Relations Committee has no activities and not known to the public. The committee does not seem to have any activities, its members unknown and its influence on policy is either non-existent, or intentionally kept undisclosed.

This sub-indicator has been marked as Not Applicable because, although the website of Majlis al-Shura mentions the existence of a defence committee, the committee has no presence other than the name mentioned on the English website. According to our sources, the Defence, Security and Foreign Relations Committee has no activities and not known to the public. The committee does not seem to have any activities, its members unknown and its influence on policy is either non-existent, or intentionally kept undisclosed.

This sub-indicator has been marked as Not Applicable because, although the website of Majlis al-Shura mentions the existence of a defence committee, the committee has no presence other than the name mentioned on the English website. According to our sources, the Defence, Security and Foreign Relations Committee has no activities and not known to the public. The committee does not seem to have any activities, its members unknown and its influence on policy is either non-existent, or intentionally kept undisclosed.

The Rules of Procedure for the Palestine Legislative Council (PLC) specify a security committee with formal mechanisms, which implements scrutiny over security apparatuses (1). However, the committee does not necessarily have a mandate over external defence forces and has not been active since 2018 (2), (3).

The Parliament is not active, and no formal or informal oversight is exercised over the national security forces or any other semi-military forces (1), (2). Therefore this indicator has been scored Not Applicable.

The Parliament is not active, and no formal or informal oversight is exercised over the national security forces or any other semi-military forces (1), (2). Therefore this indicator has been scored Not Applicable.

The Parliament is not active, and no formal or informal oversight is exercised over the national security forces or any other semi-military forces (1), (2). Therefore this indicator has been scored Not Applicable.

The Parliament is not active, and no formal or informal oversight is exercised over the national security forces or any other semi-military forces (1), (2). Therefore this indicator has been scored Not Applicable.

The Parliament is not active, and no formal or informal oversight is exercised over the national security forces or any other semi-military forces (1), (2). Therefore this indicator has been scored Not Applicable.

In 2013, the Advisory Council created five committees, however, no defence or military committee was formed. The five committees are: 1) Legal and Legislative Affairs Committee, 2) Financial and Economic Affairs Committee, 3) Services and Facilities Committee, 4) Internal and External Affairs Committee, 5) Committee for Cultural Affairs and Information. [1,2] None of these committees is tasked with oversight of the defence sector. According to our sources, the Council has no authority or capacity to check defence related issues within the country. [3,4] There is no defence committee or similar institution that is tasked with oversight and scrutiny of the defence sector.

This sub-indicator has been marked as Not Applicable, as there is no committee or similar institution tasked with oversight over the defence sector.

This sub-indicator has been marked as Not Applicable, as there is no committee or similar institution tasked with oversight over the defence sector.

This sub-indicator has been marked as Not Applicable, as there is no committee or similar institution tasked with oversight over the defence sector.

This sub-indicator has been marked as Not Applicable, as there is no committee or similar institution tasked with oversight over the defence sector.

This sub-indicator has been marked as Not Applicable, as there is no committee or similar institution tasked with oversight over the defence sector.

The Majlis al-Shura includes The Committee on Security Affairs, which is responsible for studying several sectors and issues, including the Ministry of the Interior, the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG), national security, civil defence and military service. However, the committee has no formal oversight powers and is limited to proposing amendments and making suggestions (1). Agendas from the Committee on Security Affairs (CSA) meetings show that committee members give their opinions on annual military and defence reports, including the Ministry of Defence (2) and The Saudi Arabian National Guard (3), a branch of the country’s military. Occasionally, the CSA comments on issues central to the government’s defence policy. For instance, in 2018, the Deputy Chairman of the CSA ruled out the possibility of implementing compulsory conscription, stating that voluntary enlistment still satisfied the military’s manpower needs (4).

Additionally, in 2015, the Council of Political and Security Affairs (CPSA) was created by King Salman to replace the National Security Council, which was abolished by the king (5,6). The CPSA, chaired by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, is described in the local and international press as a policy-making and decision-making body. According to press releases from the most recent meetings of the CPSA, the body discusses regional and international developments relating to political and security affairs and makes necessary recommendations (7). The exact mandate and formal rights of the committee are unclear; although, its tasks include monitoring the performance of relevant ministries and governments bodies (8).

A meeting agenda of the Majlis al-Shura referenced a “report by the Committee on Security Affairs regarding the annual report of the Head of General Intelligence for the fiscal year 1438/1439 AH [2017/2019]” (9). This suggests some level of scrutiny of the intelligence services, though in the absence of further details.

According to an expert on Gulf affairs Kristin Smith Diwan:
“As an advisory body, the Majlis al-Shura does not have any real powers of oversight and no ability to scrutinize what have clearly been defined as “sovereign” ministries dealing with national security, including the defence ministry and agencies, their budgets, policy planning and military recruitment. Shura members may raise some general issues of concern where the Saudi leadership would find it useful to allow a more public discussion, but to my knowledge, this has rarely if ever occurred in areas of foreign policy and national defence” (10).

A number of the members of the Majlis al-Shura’s Committee on Security Affairs come from military backgrounds. Meanwhile, several of the nine members of the CPSA (see above), all appointed by the king, come from foreign security and intelligence services, while others come from Islamic affairs, civil service, and academic backgrounds. (1), (2), (3), (4). The majority, of the members, are loyal to the king and his crown prince, they have limited influence on the policies and the defence sector. According to one source, their role is superficial (5).

According to our sources, Majlis al-Shura’s defence committee and the CPSA do not conduct any major reviews of defence policies. It is not in their mandate, and they never did that (1), (2). According to an expert on Gulf affairs, “Neither body exercises independent and effective scrutiny over Saudi defence policy. The Majlis al-Shura can conduct reviews, but the terms of reference are limited, and the Shura has no teeth to make its scrutiny help. The remit of the CPSA does not include defence reviews in the traditional Western sense, it directs and shapes policy, though the final decision-making rests in the hands of the crown prince and his close advisers” (3).

The committee does not have any oversight mechanism in place on security and defence issues (1). It is unclear how many times per year the defence committee of the Majlis al-Shura meets, however, its powers are limited to studying issues relating to security, rather than exercising any formal oversight over policy (2). This is the same case for the CPSA: though it is described as a decision-making body, there is no evidence of formal policy-making and oversight, and its functions thus far appear to centre on recommendations. Saudi press sources have stated that the CPSA has played a “decisive role” in the formulation of security and political strategies (3); however, the exact nature of this role is unclear.

The council and its members are loyal to the king and his son, and therefore, they can not investigate issues that may affect the royal family (1), (2). Although there have been many corruption scandals such as Al Yammama, the council never investigated any of them (2). There are no publicly available references to long term investigations independently commissioned by the abovementioned committees and bodies (3).

The government takes no recommendations or feedback from the committee. There are no reports available, according to our sources, that contain recommendations for the MoD (1), (2). The defence policy and security strategy have not been publicly debated in the last year, nor are they debated in general in Saudi Arabia. Defence policies and strategies are rarely communicated by the authorities to the public. The government does at times make announcements, or statements on new policies or decisions, however, these are not publicly debated. Open debate about government policies is, in general, censured by the government; defence and foreign policy issues, in particular, are considered “off-limits” topics.

The central government does make public references to the Ministry of Defence’s strategy; however, it makes statements after they have been approved, there is no indication that they are debated by relevant bodies such as the Committee on Security Affairs within the Consultative Council (3).

Whereas in the past, high-ranking princes may have had more independence in crafting and leading defence policies, since 2015, Mohammed bin Salman has increasingly consolidated and centralised government authority, including in the defence sector (he serves as the country’s minister of defence as well as head of the Council of Political and Security Affairs, a cabinet established in 2015 to replace the country’s National Security Council) (1). Other key institutions such as the Ministry of Interior and the Saudi Arabian National Guard have been handed to very young royals who owe their standing to Mohammed bin Salman, and are deferent to him (2). Defence strategies appear to be almost unilaterally decided by the crown prince and his father King Salman (4).

There are two defence committees within the Assembly of People’s Representatives : i) A permanent committte named ” Organisation of the the administration and security forces affairs”. This committee is specialised in scrutinising bills related to the armed forces (1) and ii) a special committee named “Security and defence committee”. According to article 93 of the Rules of Procedure of the National Representatives Assembly, this committee monitors all files and issues related to security and defence. It also monitors the Government’s implementation of strategies in the fields of security and defence, and holds meetings for dialogue and accountability with the intervening parties in these two fields. The general wording of section 89 allows this committee to intervene in all aspects of the defence ministry (2). Parliament’s committees shall have the right to access all files, as well as to obtain all the documents required by them, and all departments, institutions and public institutions shall provide the necessary means for them to facilitate their performance (3). Within the scope of the deepening of the consideration of the subjects before it, the Committees may avail themselves of any person they deem fit (including exeperts), either by requesting written reports at specific points or by inviting them to attend hearings at the Assembly’s headquarters (4). According to our sources, there are formal rights given to the Parliament and the anti-corruption commission (INLUCC) which can question and scrutinise the performance of the defence and security agency (5).

According to our sources, most of all of the members of the Defence and Security committees have little expertise in the defence sector(1). Its members’ lack the knowledge necessary to understand technical military affairs as they are from different backgrounds such as academia, the civil service or engineering(2). This committee is made up of 22 members. Their assignment to this committee did not relate to specific professional experience in the area of security sector oversight (3).

The Ministry of National Defence organises a two-week training course for members of the Defence and Security Committee and the Committee for Organsing Administration and Affairs of Armed Forces at the Institute of National Defence (4).

The two defence committees appear to fail to review major defence policies and decisions. The review of the activity report of the committee (1) and of the minutes of the meetings held by the committee (2) show that it does not review the major defence policies and decisions. According to our resources, these committees do not have the necessary expertise and sufficient data to discuss and review major defence policies and decisions(3).

The activity of the Security and Defence committee has mostly been about questioning the Ministers of the Interior and Defence along with retired officers and conducting field visits. The review of the minutes of the meetings of the special committee for security and defence shows that the Security and Defence Committee held a session on Monday, February 12, 2018, to discuss the security situation in the country, the Ministry’s strategy and the readiness of the military establishment to achieve public security and the subject of national service (1). In a session held on Monday, February 5, 2018, the Committee discussed the necessity of asking the ministries for reports about their general policies and the status of budget execution (procurement of equipments and arms, training programs, recuitment) (2). Most of the hearings were in reaction to an emergency or a major event that generated discussion in the media and among citizens, such as terrorist attacks (3)The analysis of the activity report 2016-2017 of the committee shows that the committee issues general recommandations about its relation with the armed forces and the Assembly (4). The defence and security committee meetings are held on a regular basis (16 meetings in 2018).

According to our sources, there are no long term investigations with a focus on the defence and security sector. The reason behind that is the current situation, lack of data on the defence sector and the lack of expertise of the committees (1,2). The review of the available sources (committee reports, press articles, reports, etc.) shows no evidence of the existence of such long term investigations (3).

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable as there are no recommendations from the committee, and therefore, there is no possible way to take them into consideration(1,2). The review of the available sources (committee reports, press articles, etc.) shows no evidence of incorporation of recommendations into practice.

The FNC includes a Committee for Internal Affairs and Defence; the committee is specialised in discussing draft laws and general issues related to security and defence. The FNC is a consultative body and not a parliament that has power over policies in the country. It is not considered a fully independent legislative body, as it serves as an advisory and consultative body for the government (1), (2). This indicates that although it is a committee specialised in matters of defence exists, its role focuses on discussing the defence law without having any power over approving or amending these laws.

This indicator is marked Not Applicable because there is no defence committee with formal powers over approving or ammending legislation. As previously explained, FNC members, who were elected in October 2015 (1), include 20 appointed members and 20 elected members. In October 2017, the FNC established its permanent committees, and they include the Constitutional, Legislative Affairs and Appeals Committee and the Defence, Interior and Foreign Affairs (2), (3), (4).

This indicator is marked Not Applicable because there is no defence committee with formal powers over approving or ammending legislation. The Committee for Internal Affairs and Defence, which is composed of FNC members, does not review major defence policies and decisions every five years or earlier if new threats arise. According to the UAE Constitution, the FNC reviews legislation and proposes amendments to it, but it does not have the power to veto laws or to initiate new laws, especially those related to defence and security (1), (2). The FNC does have some powers stipulated in the UAE Constitution, but those do not extend to defence and security (3), (4). It is important to stress that the FNC is not a parliament; it is an advisory body.

The Committee for Internal Affairs and Defence, which is composed of FNC members, does not review major defence policies and decisions every 5 years or earlier if new threats arise. According to the UAE Constitution, the FNC reviews legislation and proposes amendments to it, but it does not have the power to veto laws or to initiate new laws, especially those related to defence and security. The FNC has some powers stipulated in the constitutions, but those do not extend to defence and security (1), (2). It is important to stress that the FNC is not a parliament; it is an advisory body.

This indicator is marked Not Applicable because there is no defence committee with formal powers over approving or ammending legislation. There is no evidence of the Committee of Internal Affairs and Defence, established by the FNC in 2017 (1), carrying out any long-term investigations into the defence sector. However, long-term investigations into the defence sector could be the responsibility of the State Audit Institution, which reports directly to the FNC. In theory, the State Audit Institution is responsible for improving accountability and standards of governance across all departments of the UAE’s federal government, including the defence sector. However, there is no evidence of the State Audit Institution having carried out any long-term investigations into the defence sector (2). There is no evidence of any investigations into the defence sector over the past years.

This indicator is marked Not Applicable because there is no defence committee with formal powers over approving or ammending legislation. The Committee for Internal Affairs and Defence, which is composed of FNC members, does not review major defence policies and decisions every 5 years or earlier, if new threats arise. According to the UAE Constitution, the FNC reviews legislation and proposes amendments to it, but it does not have the power to veto laws or to initiate new laws, especially those related to defence and security. The FNC has some powers stipulated in the constitutions, but those do not extend to defence and security (1), (2). It is important to stress that the FNC is not a parliament; it is an advisory body.

Country Sort by Country 2a. Formal rights Sort By Subindicator 2b. Expertise Sort By Subindicator 2c. Responsive policymaking Sort By Subindicator 2d. Short-term oversight Sort By Subindicator 2e. Long-term oversight Sort By Subindicator 2f. Institutional outcomes Sort By Subindicator
Algeria 0 / 100 NA NA NA NA NA
Angola 25 / 100 50 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Burkina Faso 50 / 100 50 / 100 0 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Cameroon 25 / 100 50 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Cote d'Ivoire 50 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Egypt 25 / 100 50 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Ghana 50 / 100 50 / 100 0 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Jordan 0 / 100 NA NA NA NA NA
Kuwait 50 / 100 0 / 100 75 / 100 100 / 100 75 / 100 0 / 100
Lebanon 25 / 100 50 / 100 0 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100 NA
Mali 100 / 100 0 / 100 100 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100 50 / 100
Morocco 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 NA
Niger 50 / 100 50 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Nigeria 50 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Oman 0 / 100 NA NA NA NA NA
Palestine 0 / 100 NA NA NA NA NA
Qatar 0 / 100 NA NA NA NA NA
Saudi Arabia 0 / 100 50 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Tunisia 100 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100 NA
United Arab Emirates 0 / 100 NA NA NA NA NA

With thanks for support from the UK Department for International Development and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs who have contributed to the Government Defence Integrity Index.

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