Q7.

Does the country have an openly stated and effectively implemented anti-corruption policy for the defence sector?

7a. Anti-corruption policy

Score

SCORE: 0/100

Assessor Explanation

Assessor Sources

7b. Effective implementation

Score

SCORE: NA/100

Assessor Explanation

Assessor Sources

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Algeria has an official anti-corruption policy, but it is unclear whether it applies to the defence sector. There is also no evidence that the government is in the process of developing an anti-corruption policy that explicitly applies to the defence sector. There was no significant change to the situation in 2015.

Algeria’s anti-corruption policy was based on the National Anti-Corruption Law (Law No. 06-01 of February 20, 2006, relative à la prevention et à la lute contre la corruption) (1), which was finalized by Presidential Decree (No. 06-413) in November 2006 (2), and then amended and supplemented by another Presidential Decree (No. 12-64) in February 2012 (3). The anti-corruption policy enumerated in the law is broad and makes no reference to corruption in the defence sector. Instead, the code of conduct applies to, “the state, elected assemblies, local authorities, institutions and bodies governed by public law, as well as public companies engaged in economic activities” (Art. 7 of Law No. 06-01/2006). The law refers to public procurement and the private sector.

Algeria has several agencies that are mandated to fight corruption or review suspicious transactions but their missions do not explicitly include the defence sector.

Law No. 06-01/2006 mandates the National Body for the Prevention and Fight against Corruption (ONPLC) with the implementation of the national strategy on corruption (1). There is also the Central Office for the Repression of Corruption (Office central de répression de la corruption, OCRC), which is governed by the presidential decree of December 8, 2011, and is part of the Ministry of Finance. The central mission of OCRC is to: collect, centralize and exploit all information within its jurisdiction (Art. 5). The office includes officers of the Judicial Police under the Ministry of National Defence (Art. 6, 4). Finally, there is the Financial Intelligence Processing Unit (Cellule de Traitement du Renseignement Financier, CTRF), which processes financial information collected through suspicious transaction reports from financial institutions; as well as, non-financial professions including notaries and lawyers. The CTRF was created by Decree no. 02-127, on April 7, 2002 (5).

It is unclear whether Algeria’s anti-corruption policy applies to the defence sector, and no action plan could be found on the Ministry of Defence website (1).

Scholars have emphasized that corruption is an essential part of the Algerian system of governance. Political corruption can pay for the loyalty of high-ranking regime members, and can be used against competitors (2). Therefore, political corruption can be considered as a tool to monitor and regulate conflicts in the Algerian government (3). Since any real anti-corruption efforts would destabilize the system, their implementation is very difficult (2). Against this background, the Algerian leadership, including the military, aims to maintain the status quo, and it is doubtful that any anti-corruption initiative will be implemented effectively. The BTI notes that the anti-corruption legislation has not been implemented (4).

Currently, no specific defence-sector anti-corruption policy exists. The 1994 Law on Military Crimes establishes that corruption-related offences are punishable under civilian law. The Angolan authorities have been working on a draft bill of a new Military Criminal Code in cooperation with the Brazilian Military Justice authorities, which reportedly will include corruption-related offences (2).

The 2018 IMF notes on Governance and Economic Performance in Angola, states “Since the end of civil conflict in 2002, Angola has implemented a legal framework for supporting good governance and combating corruption, Despite these efforts, Angola did not catch up with peers in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and continues to underperform in many areas of governance. This reflects several factors, including remaining deficiencies in legal and regulatory frameworks, patchy law enforcement, and the lack of independent and well-resourced anti-corruption institutions” (3). This shows that though the legal framework addresses national corruption, it reflects the weak environment of anti-corruption measures in the defence and security sectors.

There is no action plan to implement a defence-specific anti-corruption policy since no such explicit policy exists. Thus, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

Military members are subject to civil law for corruption-related offences. Since João Lourenço took office, the pace of prosecution of public servants and senior officials on corruption charges appears to have sped up, though it’s too early to judge whether these are temporary and selective measures or part of a sustained policy that would also include the defence sector (1).

After publicly announcing in April that Chief of Staff of the Angolan Armed Forces, General Sachipengo Nunda, was named a formal suspect of criminal association in a $50 million scam led by a Thai businessman, the attorney general later apologized claiming his announcement was a “mistake”, and the Supreme Court later dropped the charges. Angolan media have interpreted the announced prosecution of General Nunda as politically motivated (for being a former UNITA general), rather than the result of a sustained anti-corruption policy (2).

There is no anti-corruption policy specifically targeting the defence sector. However, several state institutions and CSOs have issued anti-corruption policies and strategies that also apply to the defence sector (1), (2), (3). These include the ASCE-LC, which has a nationwide mandate (1), the Ministry of Civil Service, Employment and Social Welfare (MCSESW) (2), and the BNAF. The National Anti-Corruption Network (REN-LAC), subscribed to the Partnership for an Open Government (POG): 2017-2019 National Action Plan of the MCSESW. These anti-corruption policies usually apply to the defence sector, through an information session, workshops and training (1).

Effectiveness in the implementation of anti-corruption policies within the defence sector is limited, as the government does not engage fully with anti-corruption institutions, as well as CSOs committed to effectively eradicating the phenomenon (1). Severe criticism against the government has often taken place in the media and other public forums for not disclosing its information to enable effective implementation of anti-corruption policies (2), (3). For example, the Open Government (POG): 2017-2019 National Action Plan of the Ministry of Civil Service, Employment, and Social Work applies to the defence sector, like any other ministry. However, its implementation is more likely to face a lack of collaboration and information sharing (2), (4).

In 2010, the Government of Cameroon elaborated a National Strategy to Fight Corruption that had been established by Decree No. 2006/088 (in French) on 11 March 2006 by the President of Cameroon [1]. This organ has units in some ministerial departments but not all [2]. The Cameroon’s Anti-Corruption Status Report officially presented to the public on 27 June 2016 reported that the Ministry of Defence and the General Delegation for National Security were among the ministries that regrettably did not implement any of the Rapid Results Initiative elaborated in the National Strategy to Fight Corruption [2].

In the same assessment report of 2014-2016 the Commission stated clearly that “The National Anti-Corruption Strategy validated by the Government and its Technical and Financial Partners in February 2011 is the National Policy document for the fight against corruption in Cameroon; consequently, its application is obligatory to all administrations and citizens, without exception” [2]. The Strategy is an anti-corruption policy to fight general corruption, including that in the defence and security sectors [2]. However, there is no evidence of the anti-corruption strategy being addressed in the defence and security sectors [3].

The National Anti-Corruption Commission stated in its assessment report of 2014-2016 that the defence and security sectors are included in its National Strategy to Fight Corruption although these two ministerial departments “regrettably” did not implement any of the Commission’s Rapid Results Initiative elaborated in the National Strategy to Fight Corruption [1].

Although the National Strategy to Fight Corruption has a general anti-corruption strategy, informants from the Ministry of Defence say that the Ministry of Defence has an anti-corruption unit which oversees issues of corruption at the level of the ministerial department [2] [3]. However, there is no evidence to state how effective this unit is because defence institutions are not subjected to external scrutiny [2] [3] [4].

There is a general anti-corruption policy, but also a lack of an explicit anti-corruption framework for the defence sector. The existing anti-corruption mechanisms apply only nominally to the defence and security establishment.

The National Plan for Good Governance and Anti-Corruption (Plan national pour la bonne gouvernance et la lutte contre la corruption) was established by the Ouattara administration in 2013 as a broad-based anti-corruption plan. In turn, it led to the setting up of the Haute Autorité pour la Bonne Gouvernance (HABG) in 2014. The HABG oversees one of Côte d’Ivoire’s main anti-corruption initiatives: an asset declaration scheme that affects 4,600 senior politicians and managers at state-owned enterprises.

The Anti-Corruption Brigade (Brigade de lutte contre la corruption, BLC), launched in 2012, and the Anti-Racketeering Unit (Unité de Lutte contre le Racket), implemented since 2012, are additional examples of anti-corruption policy that extend to the security sector. The Anti-Racketeering Unit seeks to end bribes extorted by police agents and their higher-ranking officers at roadblocks in isolated areas. Additionally, the government has established reporting mechanisms for citizens to denounce corrupt acts among the police. However, the effectiveness of such mechanisms appears to be questionable (1).

According to the 2018 Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI 2018), anti-corruption has featured prominently in President Ouattara’s agenda. But some of the anti-corruption mechanisms such as HABG lack teeth and cannot effectively sanction corrupt practices, much less in the highly sensitive defence sector where certain former rebel leaders, known as the COMZONES, have accumulated wealth and power in their local bastions (2). Here is an extract from BTI 2018:

“A National Plan on Good Governance and the Fight Against Corruption was launched in 2013 together with a new institution, the High Authority for Good Governance (HABG, operating since 2014). The government had also planned to create a Special Tribunal for the Fight Against Corruption, a plan not implemented yet. The institutions meant to oversee the utilization of public funds (Inspecteur General des Finances, Cour des Comptes) are understaffed and thus not effective in preventing abuse and corruption.”

TThe anti-corruption policies and their associated measures have not been effectively implemented. The reasons include institutional weakness, but also the fact that despite a prominent anti-corruption agenda, the defence establishment remains a threat to national reconciliation. Corruption allegations could, therefore, be perceived as politically destabilizing elements.

As part of Côte d’Ivoire’s 2016-2018 first action plan to improve governance and as a result of its participation in the Open Government Partnership (OGP), the government published a partial self-evaluation report in September 2017 to gauge the effective implementation of transparency agreements, including anti-corruption mechanisms (1).

The report revealed that most ministries had been involved in the self-evaluation (Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Justice, Minister of Economy & Finance, Budget Ministry, Ministry of Industry) except for the Ministry of Defense. The report also highlighted the number of transparency initiatives that had been adopted:

-Order No. 2013-660 of September 20, 2013 (Prévention et Lutte Contre la Corruption et les Infractions Assimilées)
-Order No. 2013-661 of September 20, 2013 (Fixant les attributions, la composition, l’organisation et le fonctionnement de la Haute Autorité pour la Bonne Gouvernance)
-Law No. 2013-867 of December 23, 2013 (Accès à l’information d’intérêt public)
-Decree No. 2014-462 of August 6, 2014 (Portant attributions, organisation et fonctionnement de la Commission d’Accès à l’Information d’intérêt Public et aux Documents Publics, CAIDP)
-Decree No. 2014-787 of December 11, 2014 (Portant nomination des membres du Conseil de la Commission d’Accès à l’Information d’intérêt Public et aux Documents Publics, CAIDP)

However, the performance report did not mention Côte d’Ivoire’s implementation action plans to make the anti-corruption and transparency measures in the defence sector effective. The measures had an implementation timetable that concluded on June 30, 2018 (1).

Furthermore, the military court, general security section of police services, the ministry of security and defence and the Military Civil Committee regularly meet to discuss security issues (2).

Furthermore, the anti-racket unit together with gendarmes conducts field operations to detect and prevent corruption. Security forces caught in the act of corruption are tried by the military court, the anti- racket unit is intensifying the fight through social media platforms. Security forces caught in acts of corruption were given a 3 months suspension (3).

According to our sources, there are no anti-corruption policies that apply to the defence sector. There are no institutions that have the authority to oversee or issue laws and policies that target the defence sector or the armed forces (1), (2). The Central Auditing Organization, formerly under the control of the Parliament, was effectively taken over by Sisi in July 2015, when he decreed the appointment of its new director, giving him the capacity to fire, appoint and imprison the executives of auditing and monitoring institutions (3), (4), (5).

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable because Egypt has no anti-corruption strategy that tackles the defence sector (1) (2) (3).

Ghana ratified the ECOWAS Protocol on the Fight Against Corruption (ECOWAS Protocol) in 2003 (1), the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) (2), the African Union Convention Against Corruption in 2005 (3) and subsequently adopted in July 2014 its own National Anti-Corruption Action Plan (NACAP) for 2015-2024 (4), (5). However, although there is an openly stated anti-corruption policy, this does not include the defence sector (6), (7), (8), (9), (10). The Armed Forces Act of 1962 bans bribery but does not elaborate on more complex corruption rules (11).

The NACAP identifies institutional weaknesses as one of the prominent causes of corruption in Ghana, together with “poor ethical standards including limited commitment to the values of integrity and self-discipline, skewed incentives structure, and insufficient enforcement of laws within a patrimonial social and political context” (1), (2), (3), (4).

The government has shown a formal commitment to the implementation of the NACAP. For instance, government representatives participated in the Anti-corruption week and National Anti-Corruption conference organized in Accra on December 2017 (5). The NACAP is implemented by the Office of the President while the CHRAJ is the coordinating and monitoring agency (6).

The implementation of the NACAP started in 2015 and thus far two progress reports have been published, at the end of 2015 and 2016. However, they are not publicly available. According to the policy outcome indicators and targets identified in the CHRAJ Medium Term Economic Framework (MTEF) Estimate for 2017, 20 per cent of the NACAP has been implemented in 2017 (70 per cent target for 2021) (7). For the 2016 Independent Reporting Mechanism (IRM) of the Open Government Partnership (OGP), the implementation has been coded as “substantial” (according to OGP’s criteria, the completion of a commitment can be coded as “not started”, “limited”, “substantial”, “completed”) (8).

There is an openly and publicly stated anti-corruption policy, and it is applied to all governmental institutions. However, the policy spectrum for the defence sector is unclear [4]. According to Article 16(a) of the JIACC Law, the Commission can prosecute all acts or omissions that are prejudice towards public funds, abuse of power and nepotism in the public administration [1]. Furthermore, the Integrity and Anti-Corruption Commission exercises some oversight on the defence and security services. In its 2016 Annual Report, it indicates the number of grievances received against the Jordanian Armed Forces, the Public Security Directorate, the General Intelligence Directorate and General Directorate of the Gendarmerie, with some of these complaints still under investigation, although none have been exposed explicitly as related to corruption [2]. Additionally, in the National Strategy for Integrity & Anti-Corruption 2017-2025, JIACC sets an objective of establishing a partnership with security institutions to enhance anti-corruption performance [3, 5, 6].

This indicator has not been assigned a score due to insufficient information or evidence.

It is not clear if defence institutions have anticorruption action plans that relate to the anticorruption policy [1].

The ACA (1) and SAB (2) all have an openly stated policies that explicitly tackle corruption and apply to all state institutions, including the security and defence institutions.

Article 4 of the ACA’s law says that its job is to “fight corruption” in general; “protect state bodies from bribery, trading influence and abuses of power” and “freeze and retrieve money and proceeds produced by” corrupt practices. But ACA can only investigate if it received a tip or complaint, or if there was public anger over something.
The SAB is based on a number of laws that explicitly fight corruption. One of these laws is Law no. 31 of 1970 for crimes (3), outlaws the embezzlement of public funds. Article 44 says that any public servant, including the ones in the security services, can be sentenced to at least three years in jail if they are caught embezzling state funds; if they have stolen services or documents that belong to the Government; or if they are profiteering from them any of the above in any way. To leave no room for doubt, article 2 of Law no. 25 of 1996 (4) for state transaction explicitly gives the SAB the right to review all defence and security agreements, including arms acquisition contracts.

However, this is undermined by article 78 of the SAB’s law (2) which is problematic because it allows the head of the body to reduce the amount of records that would be reviewed in any Government body by up to 50 percent during emergency situations — but the article does not explain what qualifies as an emergency. The only saving grace is perhaps that the SAB is not allowed to tell the agencies which one is getting less scrutiny.

The damage caused by the former article might be mitigated by article 80 of the SAB’s law (2) which says that ministries with secret projects must deliver a report to the SAB every three months, written by the minister himself, which should say how much money has been spent on these projects and the minister must sign a statement vowing that the funds were spent on approved matters only.

Parliament also has openly stated anti-corruption policies but the text does not use the word ‘corruption.’

Article 171 (5) says Parliament must monitor the revenues and expenditure of each state body, and article 163 says state funds cannot be spent on anything without parliamentary consent.

There is an action plan, officials said (1, 2, 3 and 4). The finance departments of each defence and security institution is meant to keep records of all its financial transactions, which are to be reviewed once a month by an auditor from the Finance Ministry. If the internal auditors or the Finance Ministry auditor suspect anything, they can report it to the ACA or SAB anonymously, who would refer the case to the prosecution if their own investigation concludes that there has been foul play, they said. SAB auditors review the finances of the security and defence institutions, like other Government agencies, once a year anyway in compliance with the SAB’s law (5).

The SAB actually reviews spending on secret defence and security projects more regularly given that article 80 of its law says that ministries with secret projects must deliver a report to the SAB every three months, written by the minister himself, which should say how much money has been spent on these projects and the minister must sign a statement vowing that the funds were spent on approved matters only.

This is somewhat counteracted by article 78, which allows the head of the SAB to reduce the amount of records that would be reviewed in any Government body by up to 50 percent during emergency situations — but the article does not explain what qualifies as an emergency. The only saving grace is perhaps that the SAB is not allowed to announce which Government agency is getting less scrutiny.

On paper, the plan is sufficient, auditors say, but in practice, it reveals institutional weakness. For starters, the finance departments in these institutions are only as strong as the minister, their boss who controls their income, allows them to be, and so their reviews can be extremely shallow (1, 2 and 3). There is nothing in place in these ministries that address this weakness, but the state appears to be trying to address it through the ACA, SAB and Parliament.

Virtually all ACA and SAB officials and reports acknowledge the weakness of the internal auditing process and try to address it by continuously raising the issue with the leaders of the executive branch; and demanding the information that the finance departments are too afraid to ask for.

Although there is a general political agreement to combat corruption, Lebanon does not have an official anti-corruption strategy. In May 2018, Lebanon launched the “National Anti-Corruption Strategy” and its executive plan in collaboration with UNDP and the Office of the Minister of State for Administrative Reform (OMSAR) (1). The ministerial statement of the new government, from January 2019, included the aim to approve the anti-corruption strategy. (2) However, the government decided to revise the strategy due to the harsh language it adopted. (3) The strategy, however, does not include the defence sector nor the Lebanese Army (4). Although the LAF does not have a policy for anti-corruption per se, anti-corruption measures are integrated into its laws and regulations, according to the DoO (5).

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable because, at the time of undertaking the GDI research, Lebanon did not have an official anti-corruption strategy. However, combating corruption is one of the main concerns the Government of Lebanon is trying to address (1). CEDRE donor countries are offering investment funds that will only be given if serious and effective measures for combating corruption are adopted (2). In September 2018, the Lebanese parliament passed several laws related to combating corruption (3). Although, the LAF does not have an anti-corruption policy, but anti-corruption measures are integrated into the laws and regulations which military personnel are consistently reminded of, according to the DoO (4).

The present government has taken measures to combat corruption, but has not formulated a dedicated plan as such. In 2014, the government enacted a law that requires all civil servants, including military personnel, to declare their assets.⁵ ⁷ The maximum punishment for corruption offenses is 20 years’ imprisonment or fines. However, members of parliament and their children are exempt from the declaration requirements.
State employees were supposed to comply with the law by 2017, but following strike action by civil servants, the government agreed to suspend the application of the law and revise the text.⁸ The government has subsequently limited the application of the law to certain categories of civil servants, meaning that now only about 1,500 people will have to declare their assets.⁷ Consequently, the vast majority of military officials (if not all) are now exempt from the law.
In addition, contracts concluded by the Ministry of Defence and Veterans’ Affairs and military outlays are not subject to the procurement rules of the Public Procurement Code. Indeed, a security expert working with the Malian authorities confirmed that they had seen no evidence of the MDAC formulating or adopting an anti-corruption policy.⁴

Mali does not have an anti-corruption policy that applies to the defence sector. Therefore, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

The general anti-corruption policy is vague and shows shortcomings in its implementation. No evidence shows that it applies to the defence sector, as it does not appear in the list of sectors addressed by this general anti-corruption policy, which consists in the elements referred to below:

– In 2015 a law was passed to replace the Central Body for the Prevention of Corruption or ICPC (Instance centrale de prévention de la corruption) by the National Body for Probity, Prevention and Right against Corruption or INPPLC (Instance nationale de probité et de lutte contre la corruption) (INPPLC) (1)

– This law was by followed by a series of announcements such as the adoption of a project to fight nationally against corruption; the signing of a framework agreement of ten programmes relating to 239 projects between various sectors; and relevant institutions joining forces for the creation of the Commission Nationale Anti-Corruption. None of them neither explicitly nor implicitly refer to the armed forces or defence as part of the sectors concerned (2)(3)(4)

Moreover, it appears that the National Body for Probity, Prevention and Right against Corruption has not yet been formally recognised.(5) Additionally, the government announced that the National Anti-Corruption Commission was to become an institution in its own right. However, no action has been taken so far in this regard (6)(7)

Morocco does not have an anti-corruption policy that also applies to the defence sector. Therefore this sub-indicator is Not Applicable.

There is an anti-corruption policy – National Strategy to fight Corruption and its Action plan – adopted in January 2018 by the Council of Ministers (1, 2). The Presidential Renaissance programme for 2016-2021 includes fighting against corruption in the security and defence institutions as part of the improving security governance strategy (3). Nevertheless, specific provisions regarding the implementation of the strategy in the defence and security sectors were not identified by the assessor. However, the 2003 Military Penal Code addresses corruption: art. 228 states that officers found guilty of corruption, theft or general crime can be dismissed, demoted or imprisoned (see question 35 for details) (4).

The National Strategy to Fight Corruption provides an action plan for dealing with the issue (1,2). In April 2018 a steering Committee for the National Strategy was put in place (3). It shows that there is a willingness to implement the strategy. However, it is not clear to what extent the strategy and action plan directly apply to the security and defence sectors. 
On a broader level, Niger has developed a large number of instruments to fight corruption.
One of the most important includes the High Authority Against Corruption and Similar Crimes (HALCIA), created in 2011 (4). It is responsible for the following tasks: “monitoring and evaluating the government’s anti-corruption programme; registering, centralising and acting on any complaints or offences filed with it regarding any practice, deed or act of corruption or similar offences; conducting any studies or investigations, and proposing any legal, administrative or practical measures that are liable to prevent or curb corruption; disseminating and publicising legislation relating to the fight against corruption; identifying the causes of corruption and proposing to the competent authorities any measures liable to eliminate those causes in all public and semi-public institutions; and accomplishing any other task conferred upon it by the President of the Republic” (5). In December 2016, the Niger government adopted a new anti-corruption bill (6), which granted the HALCIA greater powers (among the most important powers, it has acquired a right of self-referral; the lifting of bank secrecy; the direct transmission of reports to the Public Prosecutor and the opening of a judicial inquiry). In April 2017, the government of Niger had recovered more than USD 5 million in bank accounts, real estate and property.
Therefore, even though it is not entirely clear how the action plan of the National Strategy to Fight Corruption (SNLC) applies to the defence and security sectors, authorities have put in place instruments to fight corruption on a broader level.
The action plan of the SNLC, a broad-based toll, was adopted in January 2018. It is not specific to the defence sector. At the time of the assessment, it was not publicly available and it is too early to comment on its effectiveness or its implementation.
This sub-indicator seeks to determine effective implementation at the level of the Ministry of Defence or Ministry of Interior. The SNLC is not tailored to each ministry and cannot be implemented effectively for questions such as high-level arms procurement.

IIt is not clear how the National Anti-Corruption Strategy relates to the military sector as there is no specific reference to the military sector in that document. Similarly, the Procurement Act does not apply to the military sector. The implementation of the National Anti-Corruption Strategy (NACS) is still being discussed (1). The reccomendations in the document suggests that organisational heads should implement the action plan within ministries and departments, including the Ministry of Defence. The strategy identifies who is responsible for dealing with anti-corruption within government ministries, and states what types of actions should be taken to address corruption including the monitoring and evaluation of the success or failure of such policies. It also emphasizes the need for mainstream ethical considerations within government processes and the importance of sensitization and training concerning corruption issues (1), (2),(3).

The National Anti-Corruption Strategy sets out the broad vision and goal, and it is left to the individual units to develop an action plan to implement the strategy within individual units of the Ministries Departments and Agencies (MDAs) (1).
For example, the plan states “within each ACA, MDA, State and Local Government, a Strategy/Change Management Committee [SMC] will be established to drive the implementation of provisions of the NACS. It is recommended that the same change management team will also be responsible for the implementation of the Open Government Partnership Action Plan and other Reform initiatives of the government of Nigeria. This SMC will aim to develop an action plan to implement the strategy within individual units of the Ministries Departments and Agencies [MDAs] [1]. The strategy sets out the very broadest of objectives, and it is left to the MDAs to develop their action plans in the defence sector (1), (2).

The specific target of the NACS relevant to the defence sector includes the objective to “Strengthen the ICPC Anti-Corruption and Transparency Units in MDAs [ACTUs] through professionalization, training/certification, better staffing and more independent funding sources 12 months [4.1.4]; Enforce sanctions for MDAs that do not comply with ACTUS, Freedom of Information Requests” [NACS pg.29] (3). Other elements of the NACS relevant to the area of procurement will also have an impact on the defence sector. The NACS sets out an intention to “Strengthen the implementation of the Public Procurement law by the Bureau for Public Procurement and enforce non-compliance within 12 months” (3). However, the strategy sets out the very broadest of objectives but it is left to the MDAs to develop their action plans in the defence sector.

There is no evidence to the degree of the existence of commitment within the defence sector to realise the objectives identified in the general strategy document. Furthermore, there exists no action plans/implementation strategy specifically that has been developed or published for the military sector.

Military law is a primary source for anti-corruption policy, but it does not include all forms of corruption and does not state corruption per se (Law 110/2011), but XXX the misuse of power and mishandling of resources. There is up to three years in prison for accepting or asking for money in exchange for public services (1), (2). The State Audit Institution is linked to combatting corruption; though the website has not been updated since 2017. The focus of this institution is to “eliminate all criminal acts of corruption” in collaboration with the international community (3). The Oman Penal Code (Royal Decree No.7/74) and the Law for the Protection of Public Funds and Avoidance of Conflicts of Interest (Royal Decree No.112/2011) is the legislation used when combatting corruption (4). The Penal Code stipulates government officials are liable for up to ten years in prison, and a fine that is at least equivalent to the bribe they accept or demanded (5). Anti-corruption legalisation is primarily directed at the public sector; however, it is extended to the private sector when the government has a 40% share in the company (5). Furthermore, in November 2015 a court dedicated to public funds was founded to address cases of financial and administrative corruption (4). It is illegal to give gifts to official, and bribery according to the penal code is termed as follows, “Any person who accepted a bribe for himself or for another person, be it in cash or a present or a promise or any other benefit for performing a lawful act of his duties, or for forbearing to do it or delaying its execution.” (5). The law for combatting money laundering and terrorism financing (Royal Degree 79/2010 and 30/2016) is the sole piece of anti-corruption legislation which deals with security issues. There is nothing in the document addressing the military or defence ministry. Only security authorities, along with the judiciary, are considered “competent authorities” to combat money laundering (6). There is no mention that this legislation acts to scrutinise the defence or security sector, but rather these sectors scrutinise other ministries, groups and individuals. Despite anti-corruption policy in place, there is no clear demonstration of its extension to the defence and security sectors. There is no explicit mention of the defence sector in the legislation nor on government websites.

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable because there is no anticorruption policy for the defence sector.

According to UNCAC’s assessment report in 2015, Oman has failed in implementing many anti-corruption measures and has no feasible action plan to do so (1). According to our sources, the lack of an action plan is a result of the strong belief that corruption is not a strategic issue (2).

There is an anti-corruption law that was ratified by the president in 2005 that includes some points in a few articles that mention security agencies (in general) and their work (2). There is also a National Anticorruption Strategy for 2015-2018, which has not been re-evaluated, and is therefore not in force (3).

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable, because no anti-corruption policy (that is currently in force) exists in Palestine.

There is no public evidence of Qatar having an anti-corruption policy that applies to the defence sector. The only document available online to the public in Arabic is Decree no. 31 of 2006. This decree is only relevant to the Qatari Civil Defence, not to the armed forces [1]. Article 127 of the document, which is also only relevant to Civil Defence, briefly discusses bribery and the subsequent punishment. However, this article is lacking in depth. According to our sources, there is an internal abstract anti-corruption guidelines document within the different branches of the armed forces. [2,3]

This sub-indicator has been marked as Not Applicable because Qatar does not have an anti-corruption policy that applies to the defence sector. If we consider the guidelines ( which are not a policy) as an anti-corruption policy, then it is has no action plan. [1,2]

Saudi Arabia does have laws and a framework in place to combat corruption and has established bureaucratic agencies and regulations designed to identify and prosecute cases of corruption – most notably the National Anti-Corruption Commission, commonly known as Nazaha. Nazaha is tasked with investigating financial and administrative corruption in the public sector (1). According to the comments of a Saudi-based academic and consultant, Nazaha is “legally not prohibited to work towards more transparency in the defence sector and may be active with the defence community in ensuring best practices and conduct, though this is a “minor role” in the grand scheme of things (2).” A Gulf-based consultant who has worked with the defence sector stated that “while Nazaha’s mandate technically covers the defence sector, whether this happens in practice is a different matter” (3).
According to sources in the MoD, the anti-corruption policy is the same as for the other ministries, and the MoD does not have an anti-corruption policy (4).
Since February 2015, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has been restructuring the traditional networks of procurement in the Saudi defence sector, which was typically predicated on specific personalities or family branches and their relationships with foreign defence companies, for example, businessmen Salah Fustok, according to the French publication Intelligence Online (5), (6), (7). In November 2017, Mohammed bin Salman arrested the commander of the SANG, Miteb bin Abdullah – son of late King Abdullah and the maternal nephew of Salah Fustok – as part of a widespread self-proclaimed anti-corruption purge. This sweep was spearheaded by a newly-formed anti-corruption committee led by the crown prince, with authority to investigate, arrest, issue travel bans and freeze the assets of those it found to be corrupt (8). The committee included heads of several Saudi government bodies, such as the Control and Investigation Board; the National Anti-Corruption Commission; the General Auditing Bureau; the Presidency of State Security; and the Attorney General at the Public Prosecutor’s Office (9).

Charges against Miteb include embezzlement and awarding fake defence contracts to his firms; he later paid a USD 1 billion settlement relating to these charges (8), (10). In addition to Miteb, according to a senior Saudi official, Saudi authorities also arrested 14 retired military officers who previously served in the Ministry of Defence, as well as two, retired SANG officers, on suspicion of involvement in financial contracts which were allegedly corrupt (11). Despite covering aspects of corruption in the defence sector, the anti-corruption drive, in general, appears to be a personal initiative from the crown prince and it is unclear whether these moves have translated into a codified anti-corruption policy.

According to our sources, despite the presence of Nazaha and anti-corruption law, there is no action plan that is available publicly or implemented within MoD (1), (2). According to a Saudi journalist with knowledge of the defence sector, “Nazaha’s mandate includes all government dealings, which should include the MoD. Whether that happens in practice is a different matter” (3).

A regional consultant who has worked with the Saudi defence sector stated that part of the recent changes in the Saudi military and procurement process is intended to “ring-fence” between foreign defence contractors and government/MoD officials so as to restrict potential corruption, though the consultant added there is as yet no evidence of how this has worked in practice through SAMI and GAMI (4).

Tunisia adopted a national strategy for good governance and fighting corruption (2016-2020) and an action plan (2017-2018) in December 2016 (1). The charter of this strategy was signed by the President of the Government, the President of the Anti-corruption Authority, the Vice-President of the Judiciary Authority and the President of the Journalists Union (2). The action plan of this strategy contains measures concerning security (establishment of islands of integrity in the security sector) and states that a sectorial action plan in the security sector will be established (1). However, this strategy and its action plan does not explicitely mention the defence sector nor the Ministry of Defence (3,4).

According to our sources, there is an action plan within the Tunisian National Strategy for Good Governance and Fighting Corruption. The action plan, whilst it does not mention the defence sector, it does apply to it as part of the state’s department(1,2). This plan is unclear how it will be implemented within the MoD(1)

On 18 June 2019, a cooperation agreement was signed between the supervisory structures of the Ministry of National Defence and the High Instance for Administrative and Financial Control, which operates under the supervision of the Presidency of the Republic of Tunisia (3). The Ministry of National Defence has implemented the provisions of the Government Decree No. 1158, dated August the 12th 2016, on the Establishment of Governance Cells and their Control. Tunisia has adopted the action plan of the SNAC 2 project adopted by the European Union, through which the Tunisian State seeks to harmonise its national legislation with the European standards in the field of combating corruption. (4) The General Inspection of the Armed Forces follows a program with respect to the integrity assessment of the armed forces in cooperation with NATO (5). A cooperation and partnership agreement was signed with the National Anti-Corruption Commission on 17 September 2018 (6).

In accordance with Article 2 of the Federal Law, the SAI is considered a federal committee within the FNC, responsible for detecting fraud and financial corruption and auditing public funds. However, there is no evidence that the SAI has the power to audit the defence sector (1). The Anti-Corruption policy available on the SAI’s website includes anti-corruption policies; however, there is no explicit mention of defence, and there appears to be no history of the defence sector being audited by the SAI before. According to our sources, the anti-corruption policies of the SAI do not apply to the defence sector (2), (3).

This sub-indicator has been marked as Not Applicable, as there is not an anti-corruption policy that applies to the defence sector. The penal code contains regulations that prohibit bribery, and deem it an offence. In 2015 the legislation was amended to cover foreign as well as domestic bribes, as well as the public sector, international organisations and the private sector (1), (2), (3). However, this does not explicitly apply to the defence sector, and for this reason, assessing implementation is irrelevant for this sub-indicator.

Country Sort by Country 7a. Anti-corruption policy Sort By Subindicator 7b. Effective implementation Sort By Subindicator
Algeria 50 / 100 0 / 100
Angola 0 / 100 NA
Burkina Faso 100 / 100 25 / 100
Cameroon 100 / 100 25 / 100
Cote d'Ivoire 100 / 100 0 / 100
Egypt 0 / 100 NA
Ghana 50 / 100 25 / 100
Jordan 50 / 100 NEI
Kuwait 75 / 100 50 / 100
Lebanon 50 / 100 NA
Mali 0 / 100 NA
Morocco 25 / 100 NA
Niger 100 / 100 25 / 100
Nigeria 50 / 100 25 / 100
Oman 0 / 100 NA
Palestine 0 / 100 NA
Qatar 0 / 100 NA
Saudi Arabia 25 / 100 0 / 100
Tunisia 100 / 100 50 / 100
United Arab Emirates 50 / 100 NA

With thanks for support from the UK Department for International Development and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs who have contributed to the Government Defence Integrity Index.

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