Internal audits in public institutions Albania are regulated by law [1]. The laws provide for the scope of activity and competences of the Internal Audit Units. To ensure their independence, the activity of the Internal Audit Units is coordinated and monitored by the Ministry of Finance and Economy (MoF). The MoF has the competence (a) to adopt the policies, manuals, procedures and regulations on internal audits, (b) appoint and dismiss the members of the board in charge of certifying the internal auditors and report to the Council of Ministers on the annual report on the internal audit. The Board of Public Internal Financial Control, is the body responsible for the harmonisation of the internal audits in the MoF and for approving the annual report before it is adopted by the minister of finance and then reported to the Council of Ministers [2]. The Manual on Internal Audit, produced by the MoF, provides Internal Audit Units with the methodical guidelines, standards, unified procedures and methodology for conducting the internal audits [3].
MoD regulations provide for the detailed competences of the Internal Audit Directorate that include: to review, evaluate and provide recommendations on internal control systems; to propose remedies, administrative and disciplinary measures when violations, irregularities and economic damage are confirmed [4].
The MoD does not publish its Internal Audit reports but there is evidence of its activity in the annual reports on the functioning of the public internal financial control system produced by the MoF.
According to the MoF 2017 report the Internal Audit Unit in the MoD has scored in the fourth position (495 out of 600 points). The reports show an improvement of the performance of the MoD’s Internal Audit Unit over the last five years (performance is measured based on a scoring system generated through 13 indicators) [5]. In 2013, it ranked in the 14th place [6].
However, there are limitations regarding the assessment of the effectiveness of the performance of the Internal Audit Units based on this report as the indicator provided by the MoF report is limited to the performance on timely submission of invoices, unauthorized procurement procedures, and risk management. Out of the 20 indicators, only one refers to the performance of the internal audit Unit – and that indicator concerns the timely submission of the report [5, 6].
Regarding the capacities, the MoD Internal Audit scored all points in 2017, as it is composed of nine certified and trained auditors who have attended all training organised by the MoF during the year. Similarly, the MoF report contains information on the performance of the SHISH Internal Audit which findings show that Internal Audit in SHISH has adequate human resources and expertise [5].

The overall performance of the Internal Audits is assessed by the SSAI, which has the competence to audit the internal audit systems. The law on SSAI stipulates that the SSAI will take in consideration the findings of the Internal Audits only when such audits are conducted in line with the standards set by SSAI and the international standards [1].
In the 2017 report, the SSAI noted that “Internal audits have seen significant developments but are still at the level of preparation of basic documents and the establishment and development of professional audit capacities, remaining thus far from obtaining concrete and expected concrete outcomes from the internal audit function in public sector entities.
Functional independence of the internal audit is not fully ensured. Although steps have been taken in terms of separating structures and separating audit activity from other entity activities, further steps should be taken to formulate reports, recommendations and their implementation” [2]. However, there is no evidence that the internal audit reports are requested and used in the proceedings of the relevant parliamentary committee; therefore, there is no enabling oversight of the internal audit function of the expenditure of the MoD [3].

The MoD’s internal audit reports are not published nor presented to the parliament [1, 2]. However, the internal audit reports are available to the SSAI, which also evaluates their performance based on those reports [3]. Nonetheless, the only communication channel between the parliament and the MoD on internal audits are the SSAI reports, which only provide general assessments on their performance [4].

No disaggregated data exists on the role and institutional outcome of the Internal Audit in security and defence institutions. MoF annual reports do not present the implementation of the recommendations issued by each Internal Audit units; rather they provide aggregated figures on the overall implementation by all the spending units.
Overall, the implementation of recommendations by the central governance units in Albania has hovered around 40-60% over the last years (in 2014, 8469 recommendations issued, 3822 implemented; in 2015, 7459 recommendations issued, 4652 implemented; in 2016, 7629 recommendations issued, 5183 implemented; in 2017, 8341 recommendations issued, 4625 implemented) [1].
The SSAI’s 2017 report underlines that from the audits conducted in 2017 it has identified inefficiencies of the internal control systems, which have led to spending inconsistent with the legal requirements and low effectiveness in spending budget funds.
Financial irregularities and violations in 2017 amounted to 85.8 million euros and violations of financial discipline with a negative impact on the performance of public funds spent at approximately 692.1 million euros, in total 825.64 million euros [2].
The financial irregularities for an amount that exceeds six per cent of Albania’s GDP (Albania’s GDP was 12.9 million USD in 2017) and the SSAI’s assessment on internal audits reveal that the Internal Audits institutional outcomes are generally poor. The EU Report on Albania also highlights that the rate of implementing internal and external audit recommendations remains low [3].

No information could be found on whether the Defence Ministry audits its expenditures internally, which was also the result of the country’s last assessment (5). No information could be found on the Ministry of Defence website (1). Also, no further information could be found in a review of decrees issued by the Ministry of Defence published in the official gazette (2). As has been outlined before, the defence sector generally operates in an opaque way and even the civilian audit unit, the Court of Auditors, has a very limited possibility to audit the defence expenditure. The Ministry of National Defence, for example, has not been very cooperative in providing information to the auditors (3), see a detailed answer in question 17. The Open Budget Survey of 2017 confirms that the Court of Auditors is weak in overseeing the budget (4).

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable because no information could be found on whether the defence ministry audits its expenditures internally, i.e., on the Defence Ministry website (1), or in decrees issued by the Ministry of Defence (2). The Court of Auditors has a very limited possibility to audit the defence expenditure. The Ministry of National Defence has, for example, not been very cooperative in providing information to the auditors (3, see a detailed answer in question 17). The Open Budget Survey of 2017 confirms that the Court of Auditors is weak in overseeing the budget (4).

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable because no information could be found on whether the defence ministry audits its expenditures internally, i.e., on the Defence Ministry website (1), or in decrees issued by the Ministry of Defence (2). The Court of Auditors has a very limited possibility to audit the defence expenditure. The Ministry of National Defence has, for example, not been very cooperative in providing information to the auditors (3, see a detailed answer in question 17). The Open Budget Survey of 2017 confirms that the Court of Auditors is weak in overseeing the budget (4). In light of this, it is not possible to assess the question and it is scored “Not Applicable”.

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable because no information could be found on whether the defence ministry audits its expenditures internally, i.e., on the Defence Ministry website (1), or in decrees issued by the Ministry of Defence (2). The Court of Auditors has a very limited possibility to audit the defence expenditure. The Ministry of National Defence has, for example, not been very cooperative in providing information to the auditors (3, see a detailed answer in question 17). The Open Budget Survey of 2017 confirms that the Court of Auditors is weak in overseeing the budget (4). In light of this, it is not possible to assess the question and it is scored “Not Applicable”.

There is no evidence of any internal audits having ever been carried out in Angola’s defence sector. According to the 2010 State Budget Framework Law, Parliament and the Audit Court are responsible for the external controls, and the presidency for the internal control of the state budget (Law 15/10, Art. 63) (1). However, the presidency does not release detailed and disaggregated information on the budget of the president’s auxiliary bodies, including the President’s Security Office, the presidential guards, nor does the Ministry of Defence.

In March 2018, UNITA’s parliamentary group submitted a formal request for a parliamentary audit into the public debt, the first since 2003, which was denied by the parliament’s president for being unfounded (2), (3), (4).

There is no evidence of any internal audits having ever been carried out in Angola’s defence sector. Thus, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

According to the 2010 State Budget Framework Law, Parliament and the Audit Court are responsible for the external controls, and the presidency for the internal control of the state budget (Law 15/10, Art. 63) (1). However, the presidency does not release detailed and disaggregated information on the budget of the president’s auxiliary bodies, including the President’s Security Office, the presidential guards, nor does the Ministry of Defence.

In March 2018, UNITA’s parliamentary group submitted a formal request for a parliamentary audit into the public debt, the first since 2003, which was denied by the parliament’s president for being unfounded (2), (3), (4).

There is no evidence of any internal audits having ever been carried out in Angola’s defence sector. Thus, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

According to the 2010 State Budget Framework Law, Parliament and the Audit Court are responsible for the external controls, and the presidency for the internal control of the state budget (Law 15/10, Art. 63) (1). However, the presidency does not release detailed and disaggregated information on the budget of the president’s auxiliary bodies, including the President’s Security Office, the presidential guards, nor does the Ministry of Defence.

In March 2018, UNITA’s parliamentary group submitted a formal request for a parliamentary audit into the public debt, the first since 2003, which was denied by the parliament’s president for being unfounded (2), (3), (4).

There is no public record of audits having been carried out in the defence sector as such nothing can be ascertained about whether findings were addressed by the ministry. Thus, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

As state media reported in 2017, the Audit Court conducted 44 audits and six investigations though no details were provided as to whether military defence expenditure was subject to any audit (1).

The internal audit unit of the Ministry of Defence, although it starts from that Ministry, is under the coordination of the SIGEN, that is, the EP. [1] Even the internal auditor is appointed by the General Union of the Nation. Its work programme is coordinated with the SIGEN. This body supervises and coordinates the internal audit units of the Ministry of Defence and also of the Major States of each Force and the jurisdictions dependent on the Defence area, as is the case of the National Geographic Institute, the National Defence University, General Directorate of Military Manufacturing, Fábrica Argentina de Aviones SA, among others (Article 96 and 100 of Law 24,156). [2] This unit of the Ministry presents audit reports and evidence on the web, for example it published 89 reports in 2016 and 69 in 2018 on different agencies of the defence jurisdiction, which vary in their content, some being more complete than others. [1] However, it is not possible to show whether the Ministry of Defence always values its conclusions.

Congress has the formal powers to scrutinise issues of all kinds, including those that are sensitive and crucial, through the request for reports or requests for hearings from the authorities of the executive branch. [1] The supervision of the audit units is the responsibility of SIGEN. [2] This is the governing body of internal control and the control activity is carried out by the Internal Audit Units (UAI) which, coordinated by the former, are made up of agents and officials subordinated to the ministerial unit, body or entities subject to control. To do this, the rules and methodology to be used in all jurisdictions are determined. In addition to being able to do these audits and control reviews, you can apply prior or concomitant control mechanisms when special standards so require. All reports that may become investigative due to corruption or poor performance of functions are referred to the Anti-Corruption Office for consideration and respective criminal complaint. [3] [4] [5]

Internal audit reports are sometimes made available on the Ministry’s website (only 2016 and 2018 were recently made available). When this happens, external scrutiny agencies, mainly the AGN and the Anti-Corruption Office, may access these results. These agencies have the power to scrutinise but, particularly in the case of the defence jurisdiction, this is not done regularly. For example, the AGN, allows for the verification of the control carried out by the Ministry of Defence through its website. It is not clear what happened in the years when the reports were not made public and if the external agencies still have access to the reports for those time periods. Other agencies have also been supervised and produced two reports on Military Manufacturing in 2017 (related to the 2013 and 2015 fiscal years), ten reports on the financial statements of the TANDANOR from 2016 to 2019, one report on the National Meteorological Service in 2016 (for fiscal year 2014), and two reports in 2018 on a 2016 investment account on the Joint General Staff and the Institute of Scientific and Technical Research for Defence (CITEDEF). [1]

Occasionally, the incorporation of the conclusions of the audits can be seen in the media, such as when an internal audit detected unusual expenses in an Army foundation, which a summary revealed. [1] However, there is no further evidence that the Ministry addresses audit findings in practice. [2]

The Internal Audit Department is an independent separate entity within the Ministry of Defence (MoD) that ensures the implementation of audit in all divisions of the MoD, the companies working under MoD umbrella. It is regulated by the Law on Internal Audit and other decisions and decree by authorized institutions [1, 2, 3]. As stated in the Law on Internal Audit, the institution should base its audit planning on risk assessment and should count on internal audits and three year strategic and annual plans developed by the internal audit department. The audit program should consider institutions’ long term perspectives, and challenges identified by the internal audit department. The staff of the department should qualify the criteria set up by the Law on Internal Audit [4]. The revision of financial spending of the MoD is a managerial function and the responsibility is borne by the relevant manager (responsible subdivision, financial officer, etc.). According to the legislature on the internal audit, the Internal Audit is responsible for assessing the organization’s management processes, while internal audit can not be involved in the design and implementation of those processes. The Internal Audit Department of the MoD evaluates the organization’s managerial functions and provides the management with information about the risks and risk control [4].
The revision of the annual Internal Audit Program is regulated by the RA Law on Internal Audit and other legal acts. The annual program can be modified only after modifying the strategic plan. According to this law, annual, strategic programs should be reviewed at least once a year. The annual, strategic and work programs of the Internal Audit Department have been revised over the year as suggested by the minister, the Internal Audit Committee, and the Internal Audit Department.
According to the Law on Internal Audit, the Authorized Body (the Ministry of Finance) annually organizes continuous professional training for the staff of the Internal Audit Department, at the end of which testing is conducted to verify the knowledge gained from the training [4]. The entire internal audit team has so far overcome the required threshold. However, the experience and knowledge of the Internal Audit Department staff are not the same, so when forming a working group, managers take into consideration the experience, capabilities, and knowledge of each employee.
From 2017 to April 2019, the MoD hired ten employees and three employees left the Audit Department: staff leakage is conditioned by the advancement of employees [5]. According to the Law on Internal Audit, the minister is the Director of the Internal Audit Department. Therefore, the minister evaluates the Internal Audit Department’s managerial staff, also at the end of each audit, the working groups are assessed by the audited units and the results are submitted to the minister [4].

The internal audit reports are not submitted to any other institution for oversight of sensitive issues. The Parliament gets the executive summaries at the annual discussions of the overall activities of the MoD. As explained by the Interviewee 4, in case any major or sensitive findings are observed by internal auditors (corruption, bribery, etc.) the issues are reported to the minister and to the Prosecutors Office. In cases that do not involve offences, internal procedures are applied [1].
IAD reports are used by state Audit Chamber during its audits.

Legally, the Audit Chamber and Authorized Body oversee the MoD Internal Audit activities [1]. The Internal Audit Department was reviewed by the then Control Chamber and currently by the Audit Chamber. The Audit Chamber has always had the opportunity to examine all the reports of the Internal Audit Department of the MoD, and the sample and form of the study were determined by the head of the auditing group․ Recently the Audit Chamber has studied about 40 reports [2].

The MoD regularly addresses the findings of the internal audit through overseeing the activity reports by those divisions where the audit was conducted. The internal audit report is submitted directly to the minister upon whose approval the suggestions by the Internal Audit department are addressed to the divisions accordingly. The divisions initiate activities to eliminate or improve the activities mentioned in the report and submit a report outlining the status of audited sections. The Internal Audit department goes through the report and evaluates the quality of the measures undertaken to eliminate erroneous activities. Based on the recommendations, they follow up on the issue [1]. The Annual Report of the MoD’s Internal Audit Department is submitted to the Authorized Body (Ministry of Finance). Additionally, there is also a part related to the Internal Audit Department in the Annual Report of the Ministry of Defence submitted to the government [2].
However, many corruption cases [2, 3] in the defence sector that is being exposed under the new government indicate that the internal audit findings were not always taken into account. Moreover, even the newly appointed minister of defence said a speech that there are serious corruption risks in the army [4].

The Defence Audit and Fraud Control Division (AFCD) and specifically its Audit Branch are active, although its level of expertise and respect for its findings is unclear because of its opaqueness. The Defence Annual Report indicates that the Internal Audit Work Program carried out by AFCD delivered 26 audit reports and 2 “management-directed tasks” [1]. In previous years, the Annual Report indicated that the Work Program was “endorsed by the Defence Audit and Risk Committee and approved by the Secretary and the [Chief of Defence Force]. The program [was] developed in consultation with all Group heads and Service chiefs” [2]. The description of this process indicates significant autonomy to develop the Work Program, but it is unclear if this is still the method the Department of Defence (DoD) uses, since it is not mentioned in more recent Annual Reports [1]. The First Assistant Secretary Audit, at the head of AFCD, reports directly to the Secretary Department of Defence [3], its highest-level non-political civilian official, indicating findings are likely appreciated at the highest levels of the DoD. Repeated attempts to reach out to AFCD and DoD media officials by the Country Assessor were not responded to. Taken together with a lack of information in DoD documents [4], it is impossible to speak to the level of staffing, expertise, and turnover within AFCD, nor the effectiveness of the audit process,

Defence carries out internal audits on defence expenditure, including on sensitive issues such as corruption and fraud control. These are reflected in the Defence Annual Report [1], which is submitted to Parliament and scrutinised in parliamentary committees [2, 3]. However, the information the Defence Annual Report is highly aggregated, and given the lack of access defence-related committees have to classified information, the robustness of oversight by Parliament on sensitive defence expenditure issues is limited [4, 5].

Because internal audits are generally considered classified and at the very least non-public, only the external auditor that has systemic access to this kind of information – the Auditor-General supported by the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) [1] – can provide external scrutiny. This outside oversight is only sporadically present, given the demands and resource constraints on ANAO. The Office carries out less than 10 performance, assurance, and financial audits on Defence per year (based on calculations from the Annual Reports of the past 3 years [2, 3, 4]). The last time an ANAO audit related to Defence internal audit processes was carried out was in 2013 [5]. A 2005 paper outlined the close working relationship government internal audit units had with the ANAO, including on matters of information sharing [6]. Repeated attempts to confirm this information with Defence Audit and Fraud Control Division officials by the Country Assessor were not substantively responded to.

Whether the ministry addresses internal audit findings in its practices is unclear, given that internal audit reports are entirely non-public [1], only rarely released in redacted form in response to Freedom of Information requests [2]. However, a 2013 Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) report found serious shortcomings in how thoroughly and timely Defence responded to recommendations from internal and external auditing bodies, though the internal recommendation tracking system was fairly robust. These shortcomings included reporting audit recommendations as addressed when they were not fully implemented [3]. While it is unclear if Defence has improved responsiveness to audit recommendations overall, a more recent ANAO report indicated that Defence continued to report recommendations as addressed when they were plainly not [4].

An internal audit law was adopted in Azerbaijan in 2007. This law applies to entities working on the territory of the Azerbaijan Republic and subject to statutory audit, irrespective of patterns of their ownership and business organization (1). However, its application in various official institutions is questionable. In particular, there is no information on the application of the law in the Defence Ministry and other military structures. No information on the functioning of any relevant audit structure in the Defence Ministry. Experts believe that due to the lack of internal audit, some problems (non-statutory cases, abuse the position, corruption and bribery) remain unresolved (2).

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable, as there is no internal audit of defence ministry expenditure.

A law on internal audits was adopted in Azerbaijan in 2007. This law applies to entities working in the territory of Azerbaijan and they are subject to statutory audit, irrespective of patterns of their ownership and business organization (Article 2.1). However, its application in various official institutions is questionable. In particular, there is no information on the application of the law in the Defence Ministry and other military structures. No information on the functioning of any relevant audit structure in the Defence Ministry system. Experts believe that due to the lack of internal audit, some problems (non-statutory cases, abuse the position, corruption and bribery) remain unresolved (1).

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable,, as there is no internal audit of defence ministry expenditure.

A law on internal audits was adopted in Azerbaijan in 2007. This law applies to entities working in the territory of Azerbaijan and they are subject to statutory audit, irrespective of patterns of their ownership and business organization (Article 2.1). However, its application in various official institutions is questionable. In particular, there is no information on the application of the law in the Defence Ministry and other military structures. No information on the functioning of any relevant audit structure in the Defence Ministry system. Experts believe that due to the lack of internal audit, some problems (non-statutory cases, abuse the position, corruption and bribery) remain unresolved (1).

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable, as there is no internal audit of defence ministry expenditure.

A law on internal audits was adopted in Azerbaijan in 2007. This law applies to entities working in the territory of Azerbaijan and they are subject to statutory audit, irrespective of patterns of their ownership and business organization (Article 2.1). However, its application in various official institutions is questionable. In particular, there is no information on the application of the law in the Defence Ministry and other military structures. No information on the functioning of any relevant audit structure in the Defence Ministry system. Experts believe that due to the lack of internal audit, some problems (non-statutory cases, abuse the position, corruption and bribery) remain unresolved (1).

There is a very limited internal audit that has the appropriate staff and personal to conduct transparent and appropriate reporting on defence expenditures. The office’s sole responsibility is military expenditure [1, 2]. The auditing process is basic and focuses on paying salaries, procurement, and annual stock taking mostly on logistics, such as vehicles and food quantities. Decree-Law 16 of 2002 on the Office of Financial Supervision (whose National Audit Court produces a yearly report for the legislature to scrutinise), makes it clear that the Ministry of Defence (MoD), the Ministry of Interior (MoI), the National Guard and the National Security Agency (NSA) are all excluded from the purview of the remit of the office [3].

According to the available information, internal auditing is almost entirely absent, and there is no enabling of internal oversight and auditing functions. Reports are kept internally with no access outside that auditing unit [1, 2].

There is no external scrutiny of the internal auditing unit [1, 2]. Extensive online and offline searches, as well as other resources, show there is no more information available on this subject.

There is not enough information available to score this indicator, as such it has been marked ‘Not Enough Information’. Either there are no reports from the internal auditing unit, or it is incredibly difficult to find any reports or recommendations [1, 2]. Extensive online and offline searches, as well as the utilization of other resources, show there is no more information available on this subject.

Bangladesh has a Defence Audit Directorate (DAD), which is tasked with overseeing receipts and public spending in order to ascertain whether defence expenditures have yielded value for money. The Controller General Defence Finance (CGDF) is the supervisory body of the DAD. The DAD has full-time professional staff who are obliged to follow a Code of Ethics and operate under the Defence Audit Manual of 2007. The DAD’s input to the CGDF is forwarded to the Comptroller and Auditor General of Bangladesh (CAG) to be placed before Parliament. The DAD’s website has no information on compliance, issue-based or financial audit reports [1].

There are no official or media reports suggesting that the DAD’s report has ever been discussed at the meetings of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Ministry of Defence. However, the effectiveness of the DAD’s input is evident from the inclusion of various defence sector irregularities in the periodic reports of the CAG [1,2], which are placed before Parliament.

The Ministry of Defence is not known to have shared the audit report with the Anti-Corruption Commission, nor there is any information in this regard available in its annual reports [1].

The Ministry of Defence has an audit department mandated to oversee audit findings. However, there is no public or official information suggesting that it has addressed these audit findings, either intermittently or regularly [1].

The Inspectorate General is the internal auditing body of Belgian Defence [1]. However, it is not responsible for military expenditure. Since 2016, as the government wished to centralize all federal internal audits, this responsibility lies with the Federal Interal Audit (FIA) [2]. It carries out in yearly audit programs, based on an annually updated risk assessment, but also takes into account requests by Public Services and Defence.

Within Belgian Defence, there is also frequent monitoring by the DG Budget and Finance to keep expenditures aligned with previously agreed predictions [1]. DG Budget and Finance reports directly to the Chief of Defence, who in turn reports to the Minister of Defence. As Belgian Defence struggles with funding and personnel issues, staff expertise may be affected, yet this has not been proven.

FIA carries out in yearly audit programs, based on an annualy updated risk assessment. By its very nature, this will include sensitive or critical issues. The body reports directly to the minister of the service or body the audit focuses on and the Audit Committee of the Federal Government (ACFO, Auditcomité van de federale overheid) [1].

Reports on Belgian Defence thus go directly to the Minister of Defence. The Commission of Defence and the Commission of Defence Purchases have the right to request these reports [2, 3].

The Audit Committee of the Federal Government (ACFO, Auditcomité van de federale overheid) audits FIA to ensure the independence of the body [1]. It reports once a year to the Minister of Defence and to the Council of Ministers [2]. Moreover, the Court of Auditors performs yearly financial controls, and may perform additional audits on finances or performances on its own initiative [3].

There is evidence that the ministry regularly addresses audit findings in its practices. In 2017, for example, political debate arose on inconsistencies regarding the procurement of the F-35 fighter aicraft. Based on an in-depth internal and external audit, which included investigating correspondence, interviewing the individuals involved, and hearing expert witnesses, a Special Commission of Defence was held to evaluate the results of the internal audit and take the appropriate next steps [1, 2].

Under Article 4 of the Rule Book on Internal Audit in the Ministry of Defence, the head of the Internal Audit Office is obliged to prepare an annual work plan of revision based on risk assessment and the adopted action plan and, after the annual work plan of revision is approved by the Minister, the head of the Internal Audit Office secures its implementation [1]. When the audit report is finalized, following Article 9, paragraph 12 of the Rule Book, has to be submitted to the minister, the minister deputies and the secretary of the ministry. The internal audit was established and operates following the applicable primary and secondary legislation. Methodology and legal basis for the operations of internal audit in the institutions of BiH are made of:
• Law on Internal Audit of Institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina, published in the “Official Gazette of BiH”, Nos. 27/08 and 32/12,
• Code of Ethics / Code of Professional Ethics of Internal Auditors, published in the “Official Gazette of BiH”, No. 82/11,
• Internal Audit Charter, published in the “Official Gazette of BiH”, No. 82/11,
• Internal Audit Manual with Internal Audit Standards, published in the “Official Gazette of BiH”, No. 82/11,
• Decision on the criteria for establishing internal audit units in the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina, published in the “Official Gazette of BiH”, Nos. 49/12 and 69/17,
• Rules on recruiting internal auditors in the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina, published in the “Official Gazette of BiH”, Nos. 81/12 and 99/14,
• Training and certification programme for internal auditors in the institutions of BiH, published in the “Official Gazette of BiH”, No. 7/15,
• Decision on the method of scoring, recording and reporting on continuing professional education of internal auditors in the institutions of BiH, published in the “Official Gazette of BiH”, No. 56/17,
• Instructions on the continuing professional education of internal auditors in the institutions of BiH, published in the “Official Gazette of BiH”, No. 97/15,
• International Standards for Professional Practice of Internal Auditing in Institutions of BiH, published in the “Official Gazette of BiH”, No. 93/17 [2].

Based on the above regulations, the Internal Audit Office was established as an independent organisational unit that adopts a (three-year) Strategic Plan as well as an Annual Work Plan, where it defines audits to be performed in the given fiscal year, which means that the approved plans constitute the basis for the work of internal audit. Over one year, each internal auditor performs an average of six to seven audits (depending on the scope of the audit as well as his/her experience) [2].
The Yearly Consolidated Report of Internal Audit for 2017, published by the Ministry of Finance and Treasury of BiH, shows that there were 25 planned and 25 realized regular and subsequent internal audits by the internal audit of the MoD [3]. The report for 2018 shows 16 planned and 16 realized internal audits [4].

There is an internal audit office within the Ministry of Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina and, in accordance with Article 10, paragraph 1, of the Rule Book on Internal Audit in the Ministry of Defence, the head of the internal audit office is obliged with 60 days after every fiscal year is ended to issue an annual report in which all reports of the internal audits that have been issued during that fiscal year are explained [1, 2]. Pursuant to Article 10, paragraph 4, the copy of the annual report should be delivered to Minister of Defence and the Central Unit for Harmonisation of the Ministry of Defence but not to any other enabling oversight body [1]. The Law on Internal Audit in Article 19, paragraph 5, states the yearly report will be submitted upon request to any legislative, executive or judicial oversight body and relevant state auditor [2]. There is no legal obligation to directly submit the report for any parliamentary oversight, and there is no evidence that the Parliamentary Assembly has requested the report.

The Internal audit reports are not delivered to external audit bodies without a prior call of those external audit bodies, according to Article 19 of the Law on Internal Audit [1]. This is also confirmed in Article 12, paragraph 2, of the Rulebook of the MoD where it is stated that the Internal Audit is obliged to cooperate with the external audit and to provide it with all information related to the content of internal audit [1, 2].

Per the 2016 Annual Consolidated Report of Internal Audit, the Ministry of Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, out of the total number of the recommendations issued by the internal audit in 2015 and 2016 enacted 13.7% in 2015 and 12.2% in 2016 [1, 2]. For 2017, it was 21.7% and for 2018 3% issued, and outstanding recommendations were enacted [3].

BDF has a fully functional Internal Audit that was established in 2008. The operational issues of the BDF Internal Audit Department and its publications are not available to the public [1]. To get an insight of the work of the Internal Audit Department, one has to rely on the work the Auditor General, which is published annually cutting across all the Government Minsitrses and Departments [2]. At its inception in 2008, the Internal Audit had 12 members of staff. Currently, the number of staff members in the audit department is not known. In addition, the structure of the current department in terms of its operations and funding modalities are not available.

Auditor General is among the external institutons that exercise oversight in summary form only [1]. In addition, the Portfolio Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence, Justice and Security also has access to some sensitive or critical issues raised by the Internal Audit. One report notes that: ‘Highly placed sources have revealed that the army is currently conducting an audit on some of the equipment that was procured in the past 10 years through Seleka Springs -a company related to former BDF Commander, Ian Khama [2]. BDF Director of Protocol and Public Affairs Colonel Tebo Dikole said like any other organisation, BDF reviews its inventory from time to time based on operational requirements and needs. “Failure to do so would be tantamount to dereliction of duty, as it would not address the security needs of Botswana,” he said [2]. The Auditor General provides aggregated Reports. The Reports contain only targetted areas of the audit and are not always detailed.

Auditor General is among the external institutons that exercise oversight in summary form only [1]. In addition, the Portfolio Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence, Justie and Security also has access to sensitive or critical issues. In addition, the following institutions provide additional scrutiny Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC), Directorate of Public Service Management (DPSM), Office of the Ombudsman, Independent Electoral Commission, Office of the President, Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Board (PPADB), Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MFED), Financial Intelligence Agency (FIA), Bank of Botswana, Botswana Unified Revenue Services (BURS), Non-Banking Financial Regulatory Authority (NBFIRA), Police Service, Administration of Justice, Directorate of Public Prosecutions (DPP), Attorney General’s Chambers and Competition Authority [2]. National audits are conducted once a year by the Auditor General. In other words, audit are not conducted regularly. No reports are published regarding the audits.

The Ministry of Defence, Justice and Security sometimes address issues raised by both the Internal Audit and the Portfolio Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence, Justice and Security [1]. In one report, it has been stated, “In 2017 BDF started receiving second hand Land Rover 110 Defenders from a British company Witham (Specialist Vehicles) Ltd [2]. Although at the time it was claimed that BDF procured the vehicles to the tune of P161.9 million, sources within the army have revealed that the vehicles were donated by the British army [2]”. “Those Land Rovers were not bought, but rather the British army donates to armies in developing countries [2]. The beneficiary has to pay for shipment and other expenses and that cannot shoot up to P161.9 million,” revealed a former senior army officer [2].

The Federal General Comptroller (CGU) is not the organization responsible for the Ministry of Defence’s internal control within the federal government. For this sector, there is another institution which is specialized in defence and is allocated within the Ministry of Defence, called the Secretariat for Internal Control (CISET) [1, 2]. The unit has the flexibility to build its own work programme for the year. Regarding the personnel allocated in CISET, there are representatives from the CGU – which are specialised in control, and other civilians ‘donated’ to the Ministry of Defence. Generally, the personnel allocation within the Brazilian Defence institutions follow specialisation criteria [3, 4]. There are also officials from the Navy in the internal control unit, which necessarily means that they have a maximum of four years in the position – military personnel rotate their positions every four years.

Legislative committees can have access to all the documents they want, and even when internal control reports are insufficient, they can ask for the External Control Court to investigate specific issues [1, 2]. The question does not adhere to what really harms oversight in Brazil; which is the lack of demand and analysis of those processes by the legislature and the media.

Available audits can be found in the Ministry of Defence website [1]. On this page, all accounts and administrative audits are available in pdf format, starting from 2017 to present. All the writing of the Ministry of Defence’s audit report refers to the Court of Auditors (TCU) control requirements. Henceforth, the internal control sector has the freedom to formulate its own audit agenda, but it will mainly respond to the TCU’s requirements. The external control body, the TCU, audits all reports and can ask for explanations regarding missing requirements and quality of results.

The audit findings are valued and implemented by the minister of defence regularly. Firstly, because the internal control acts as a special advisor in the structure of the armed forces; and secondly because if corrections from the TCU are ignored, there can be problems for the annual budget of the institution, and programs can suffer embargoes. This is due to the internal control being like a mirror for what the TCU asks [1].

There is no formal internal audit process in the defence ministry expenditure. According to the Constitution, the audit of government institutions, including the Ministry of Defence, falls under the duties and responsibilities of the Court of Accounts (1). The ASCE-LC has just been granted a constitutional right to investigate and prosecute by performing regular audit of government institutions but has not yet carried out such work in the defence sector (2). The last two annual reports it issued did not concern the MoD (3). In any case, the defence sector’s budgets have remained out of control (4).

Because there is no formal internal audit process of defence ministry expenditure, this indicator has been scored Not Applicable.

Because there is no formal internal audit process of defence ministry expenditure, this indicator has been scored Not Applicable.

Because there is no formal internal audit process of defence ministry expenditure, this indicator has been scored Not Applicable.

According to the Open Budget Survey (Jan 2018) “The legislature and supreme audit institution in Cameroon provide weak oversight of the budget” [1]. There is no evidence that the defence and security sectors in Cameroon are subject to internal audits [2] [3]. This is because the Constitution places matters of defence and security under the purview of the government, and scrutiny of these institutions is at the government’s discretion (Article 35 of the Constitution) [4].

There is no evidence that an internal audit process exists within the defence ministry [1]. Therefore, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

There is no evidence that an internal audit process exists within the defence ministry [1]. Therefore, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

There is no evidence that an internal audit process exists within the defence ministry [1]. Therefore, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

The Department of National Defence (DND) publishes yearly reports on its activities to include expenditures. [1] These reports follow a typical template and thus have little flexibility in determining the work agenda. The Chief Review Services, however, an in-house independent agency, carries out multiple audits and investigations per year and can set its programme in accordance with perceived needs. [2] However, there are often internal protocols that prevent internal audits from being shared externally, and within the Privacy Act, there are specific sections that discuss the ability to disclose personal information that may reside in such reports. For example, section 8(2)(h) of the Act notes that such information can be shared with relevant employees of the government institution. [3] However, public access to such documents would have to be sought through an Access to Information request which would produce a redacted version of the audit. The Chief of Review Services, also known as the ADM (Review Services), with its 160 or so staff, is mandated to provide “independent, objective and timely assurance services” to DND and CAF. [4] In accordance with Treasury Board Directives, ADM(RS) publishes a “Key Compliance Attributes of Internal Audit” [5] and is required to act in accordance with the Treasury Board’s “Policy on Internal Audit” [6] and “Directive on Internal Audit”. [7] The “Key Compliance Attributes” show that the overall usefulness of audits is “good” or “exellent” as rated by senior management (ADM or equivalent). [5]

Audits are carried out by Departmental Audit Committees, who, by statute, are independent members appointed by the deputy head of department and the Comptroller General jointly. [1] Reports are given to the deputy head of the Department and to the Treasury Board. It is unclear whether parliamentary committees access complete or synopsised reports. [2] Oversight bodies, including parliamentary committees have access to full reports and can also access expert testimony from the auditors of the OAG. [3] Some gaps or redactions appear in recent reports, [4] [5] though a search of 2015 to 2020 reports indicate fewer than in past reports. [6]

The Office of the Auditor General reviews internal DND audits and reporting. In FY 2017-18, the only statement of a federal organisation (out of 69) that did not meet its standards was from the DND, and involved a failure to retain documents that would enable the Auditor General to assess its self-audit. [1] This indicates a high level of scrutiny from agencies detached from the DND. In the past decade, the Auditor General has carried out 10 specific audits of elements of DND operations flagged as being of high concern. [2]

While the DND frequently responds to recommendations from the CRS in particular, it does not always do so to the satisfaction of subsequent CRS reviews, and there is no obligation on its part to respond or adapt in the wake of CRS findings or recommendations. [1] [2] There is a general practice of responding as effectively as possible regardless of the official obligation to do so, meaning that the ministry does address recommendations fairly regularly.

The Internal Audit Unit engages actively in the reviewing of ministry expenditures and there is a formalized process for this. However, institutional outcomes based on audit findings are still unclear. To begin with, the internal audit function in the Ministry of National Defence (MDN) relies on the chief of internal control and audit of the ministry staff and the Division of Audit of the sub-secretary for the armed forces [1]. The chief of internal control and audit oversights all the matters relative to the preventive financial and functional operations in the MDN elaborates internal ministry audit plans, coordinates compliance with the observations made by the General Comptroller (CGR), coordinates and provides technical advice to the audits performed by the internal audit units of the institutions of the defence sector, performs internal audits in coordination with the Division of Audit, and proposes to the minister periodic reports prepared by the presidency and the General Audit Council of Government (CAIGG) [2]. The MDN, through the Division of Audit of the sub-secretary for the armed forces, develops the annual plan for the Ministry Objectives of Audit in the Defence Sector, which takes into account technical guidance prepared by the CAIGG [3, 4]. In 2018, this plan incorporated by-annual audits to administrative contracts and services that belong to both the Law of Public Budget (Ley Num. 19.886) and the Restricted Law of Copper (Ley Num. 13.196), covering the institutions of the armed forces, El Estado Mayor Conjunto (EMCO), and other services related to the defence sector. The same year, the Ministry of National Defence signed an agreement with the General Comptroller’s Office for 231 audits of the armed forces and related institutions, including the army, the air force and the navy. In terms of human resources, the Division of Audit has the smallest staff of the units of the sub-secretary. From 2016 to 2018, the Division of Audit operated with 18 members (three less than in 2015), but the percentage of goal accomplishment was 100 per cent for 2016 and 2018, and 92 per cent for 2017 (Balance de Gestión Integral, 2018). The findings of audits are valued in the MDN (2017), but the institutional outcomes derived from them are still unclear [5, 6].

After two legal cases involving irregular payments to arguably false invoices for military acquisitions and services (Causa Rol N°575-2014 and Causa RUC N°1400687387-2), the MDN put forward measures to strengthen the internal audit process and to guarantee the normative compliance with rules and regulations for acquisitions and exchanges with providers [1]. An analysis of the 2018 Audit Plan of the MDN shows 18 audit processes, several of them associated with critical areas, including an audit of the processes of accounts and treasure (ASEG-2), an audit to the expenditures related to prevision services (ASEG-3), an audit to the administrative probity and transparency (ASEG-4), an audit to the sub-process of management of consumption goods (ASEG-5), an audit to the processes of (consesiones maritimes y borderlands costar) (ASSEG-6), an audit to the examination of the internal financial and non-financial control system (ASEG-7), a following-up audit to the process of acquisitions (SEG-2), a following-up audit to management of medical leaves (SEG-4), and a preliminary review of the annual financial accounts of the Welfare Service of the Armed Forces (RUT-1) (Oficio ORD N. 012-2017) [1]. The presentation of findings to the Permanent Commission of Defence in Congress is a summary and, according to an interviewee, not always detailed [2].

The external scrutiny of the audit process is performed regularly by the CAIGG. The MDN, through the sub-secretary for the armed forces, submits to the CAIGG its Annual Audit Plans, which have to be consistent with the Government Audit Goals and other dispositions about the use of resources in the public sector [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. Internal audit processes subject to review include programs of assurance to the public procurement process; reports of compliance with the instructions on austerity, probity and efficiency in the use of resources; evaluation of the internal control systems, pondering observations and recommendations of the CGR; actions and activities associated with the Risk Management Process; and the plans of internal audit (Ordinario No.21). The submission of audit plans has been a regular occurrence, but there is no information about other reports and instruments. In addition, the CAIGG cannot be considered a unit external to the MDN, so there is a concern about the autonomy with which external controls are exercised [6].

Since the last corruption scandals, the MDN has highlighted the implementation of internal audit processes [1]. However, the analysis of the institutional outcomes in the Management Improvement Programs (PMG) shows some nuances. In relation to compliance with audit commitments, in 2016, out of a total of 82 commitments, 31 were implemented (that is, 38 per cent of compliance) [2]. In 2017 there was a significant improvement, with a compliance rate of 74 per cent out of a total of 189 audit commitments [3]. However, in 2018, the compliance rate was only three per cent [4]. Without further explanation of the differences in the rate of achievement, institutional outcomes based on internal audits express a lack of regularity.

The Central Military Commission has a specialised division for internal audits, the CMC Audit Office（军委审计署）. In the last 7 years, high-profile cases of corruption have been revealed, involving top generals in the Chinese army. The audit system appears to operate better during periods of anticorruption campaigns, previously implemented approximately every 3-4 years since the 1980s. Since 2012 there is a clear intensification of audits. According to the Ministry of defence, in the period 2012-2019, the Audit office audited “39,000 units and 13,000 PLA and PAP officers in positions of leadership at and above regiment level”, which is indicative of the more committed and routine approach to anticorruption under Xi and the CMC’s greater attention to audit reports. [1,2,3] The CMCAO publishes news reports but these do not provide detailed information on its activities and outcomes. It needs to be noted though, that these reports demonstrate that the CMCAO is active and its institutional capacity is increasing. [4] Given the significant increase of corruption cases in the PLA that have been exposed in the last 6 years, the CMC appears to pay attention to audit reports.

This indicator is marked Not Applicable, as there is no oversight of the internal audit function.

There is no external scrutiny of the internal audit function.

Information on institutional outcomes is not scrutinised so this evaluation depends on the numbers provided by the PLA. In the most recent version of its White Paper series, the Ministry of defence reported that in the period 2012-2019, the CMC Audit Office (CMCAO) audited “39,000 units and 13,000 PLA and People’s Armed Police (PAP) officers in positions of leadership at and above regiment level.” [1] In addition to this, audits have taken place as part of the investigation of senior army officers that revealed cases of major corruption in recent years. [2]

The Office of Internal Control in the Ministry of Defence is in charge of carrying out internal audits and permanent controls on spending. There is also the general inspection of the Army, the general inspection of the National Army, the general inspection of the Air Force, and the general inspection of the Police. The role of the General Inspector is that of an independent evaluator, carrying out analysis, follow-ups, and audits of processes within the organisation. The General Inspector is also responsible for promoting active public management for good governance, which implies improving the design of planning instruments. [1] According to Article 8 of the Anti-Corruption Statute, [2] the Head of Internal Control will be elected by the President of the Republic, implying independence from the entity supervised, but without ignoring that the individual must make decisions that allow the annual audit program to be coordinated. The person in charge of internal control must submit and publish a report on the state of the entity’s internal control and report acts of corruption to the control agencies (the Attorney General’s Office and the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic) every four months. [3, 4, 5 ,6] Therefore, the existence and activity of the Internal Control Office is evidenced, as is the existence of management balances released to the public by the Ministry of National Defence.

The supervision and application of the internal audit process by the internal control office develops actions for all corruption-related issues within the Ministry of Defence and its affiliated entities. The results of these audits are systematised in an internal programme of the Ministry, which allows for traceability of findings. The selection of the cases to be supervised takes place through repetitive complaints or follow-up processes. However, the supervision information entry system is classified, so there is no public access. [1] The office delivers periodic reports on its actions and once a year it publishes the reports, although there is no evidence of the institution’s audit and expenditure reports for the year 2018-2019. For its part, the Congress of the Republic makes a report on budget execution and progress of public policy on defence. Only the report for the year 2015-2016 is published on the website of the Ministry, [2] and there is no evidence of the report for the year 2017-2018. The Congress of the Republic has the power to carry out political control over the actions of the Ministry of Defence and its affiliated entities, and makes subpoenas and requests specific reports on the issues it wants to monitor and supervise. In these subpoenas, the Minister and the military leadership can request a reserved and non-public summons, arguing that the topics may contain classified information. The members of Congress can reject this proposal, but information presented in that case has specific omissions. [3]

As per the Law of Transparency, all reports made by the internal control office are public and easily accessible. Therefore, civil society organisations or oversight bodies can access such information and generate their own audit processes. Public improvement plans and responses to citizen requirements are published on the Ministry’s website. [1] However, the Ministry’s management reports, accountability reports, follow-up reports to the anti-corruption plan, internal control self-assessment reports are not updated. Reserved information is also not online, so it makes it difficult for external scruitiny. The external scrutiny carried out by the Comptroller General of the Nation is characterized by the realisation of a strategic control planning plan, the Fiscal Surveillance and Control Plan (PVCF). [2] This Plan identifies the sector to be audited, the executing unit, the tax control subject, the type of audit, the objective of the audit, and the start and end date of the process. [3,4] These audits generate institutional commitments that force audited entities to generate an improvement plan, which is regularly monitored by the internal control offices. However, external audit planning is not necessarily regular year-on-year but there is continuity in monitoring improvement plans.

The findings of the control offices are disseminated in management reports, reports on the evaluation of the internal control system, reports of self-assessment by internal control, and in detailed reports of the state of internal control. [1] The Ministry of Defence website hosts all management reports from 2007 to January 2019. The internal control office, following the recommendations of the findings derived from the external audits carried out by the Comptroller General of the Republic, carries out an institutional improvement plan, a tool that collects improvement actions. The extent to which the findings are addressed comprehensively however, is unclear. There are also other institutional documents that relate to continuous improvement such as: training and reinduction plans, integrity plans, corruption prevention plans, etc. [2] The results of internal audits also generate more thorough investigations in conjunction with state control bodies, such as the Attorney’s Office or the General Comptroller’s Office, which can result in sanctioning actions or the elimination/restructuring of any unit or department. To this end, the controls carried out by the media are essential, since they put pressure on public entities to carry out their actions faster and more exhaustively, thus generating substantial transformations within the entities. [3, 4, 5]

The Comptroller General at MoD (Contrôle Général de l’Administration et des Finances de la Défense, CGAFD) monitors the proper functioning of departments and agencies within MoD. It is tasked with oversight of administrative, financial and technical issues, among others. This structure, like the IGA, is under the direct authority of the MoD (1).

Additionally, there is a Direction des Finances (Article 13 of Decree No. 2016-257), but it is not tasked with auditing or oversight. Instead, its mandate is to prepare and execute the defence budget, including the payment of salaries and services (2).

The IGA mandate is to serve as an oversight body for the armed forces and to inform about operational capacities. It can undertake its studies or inquiries autonomously. However, there is little evidence that the IGA is particularly active or subject to any type of NA scrutiny (1), (2).

On July 26, 2016, the Ivorian Press Agency (AIP) reported that Brigadier General Detoh Letoh (also spelt Letho) had been appointed the head of the IGA by the Minister of Defense Alain-Richard Donwahl. In statements to local media, the Brigadier General said he would contribute to the government’s modernization effort of the Armed Forces by bolstering the IGA’s powers. The position of IGA director had been empty for 10 years, according to AbidjanTV.net (3), (4).

In October 2016, the AIP reported on a meeting between State Inspector General (Inspecteur Général d’Etat) Gnamien N’Goran and the newly appointed IGA director Detoh Letoh in which they discussed how to train IGA personnel so their auditing tasks were more efficient. The state inspector general is attached to the presidency and the IGA, as mentioned, is part of MoD. The meeting suggested that IGA agents may not be appropriately skilled and require training (5), (6).

As per Decree No. 2016-257 (Portant Organisation du Ministère de la Défense) of May 3, 2016, there is no evidence that the IGA, CGAFD or the Direction des Finances are subject to the enabling oversight of NA committees such as the Commission de Sécurité et de Défense (CSD).

According to their mandates in Articles 4 and 6 of Decree No. 2016-257, neither the IGA nor the CGAFD is required to provide reports of any kind to enabling oversight bodies (1).

IGA, CGAFD and Direction des Finances internal audits are not subject to external audit bodies, including anti-corruption organizations. The mandates of these internal audit mechanisms, as per Articles 4, 6 and 13 of Decree No. 2016-257, do not mention any external scrutiny requirements. The IGA and CGFAD are directly attached to the cabinet of the Minister of Defense (1). In terms of the IGA, the Ivorian Press Agency (AIP) reported in October 2016 about a meeting between the State Inspector General (Inspecteur Général d’Etat) Gnamien N’GORAN and IGA director Brigadier General Detoh Letoh, who had been appointed to his post by the Council of Ministers in July 2016. Colonel Adam Seka, who also attended the meeting, described the IGA’s mission and stated that a new position of ombudsman was being considered (2).

There is no evidence in open sources of the existence of IGA, CGAFD or Direction des Finances audit reports being forwarded to the minister of defence, perhaps because they are considered highly confidential (secret defence) and only circulate within MoD.

Since the appointment of Hamed Bakayoko, as minister of defence on July 19, 2017, there is no evidence that Bakayoko has addressed audit findings submitted by the IGA or CGAFD.

For example, there is no mention that the decision by the Ministry of Defence to reduce the number of soldiers to 4,000 by 2020 as part of an early retirement program was based on the findings of IGA or the CGAFD. Instead, the decision was part of the Loi de Programmation Militaire (LPM) 2016-2020. On May 6, 2018, La Tribune Afrique reported the Bakayoko had handed out checks worth USD 30,000 to individual soldiers as part of the early retirement program (2).

The early retirement program was conceived as a way for the Ministry of Defence, and by extension, the administration of President Ouattara, to get rid of former rebel leaders who pose a threat to political stability. However, the amount of money the former rebel leaders were offered also convinced numerous lower-ranking officers to opt for early retirement, thus undermining the Ministry’s plans. At no point in either the IGA or CGAFD mentioned as proposing the early retirement plan (3).

The Defence Internal Audit Office reviews the accounts of the entire domain of the Ministry of Defence (including all underlying agencies (“styrelser”) such as the Defence Command and other authorities (“øvrige myndigheder”) such as the Ministry of Defence Military Prosecution Service) [1, 2]. The Defence Internal Audit conducts regular annual budget/accounts reviews in accordance to the closing of the financial year as well as ad hoc reviews and tasks on a number of different subjects [3]. The office works from three prioritised focus areas: the correctness of the accounts (financial revision), the legality of the budget disposals (critical legal revision) and whether the administration is made with due regard to economic consideration (“skyldige økonomiske hensyn”), i.e. revision of administration.
The Defence Internal Audit operates from an annual revision plan, but this can be adjusted during the year as need arises. The annual revision plan, or work schedule, is based on inputs from the other authorities and agencies within the Ministry and is finally approved by the Permanent Secretary of State for Defence [4]. This means that the office does not have full autonomy to build its work programme.
As noted in Q8, research indicates a potential high degree of effectiveness of the audit: the office regularly identifies critical errors and bad practices within the Ministry of Defence.
The board of directors of the MOD is given a monthly status regarding audits of The Defence Internal Audit Office and the Danish National Audit Office. The MOD also conducts a biannual follow-up on finalized audits of both The Defence Internal Audit Office and the Danish National Audit Office in order to make sure that the Ministry and its underlying agencies address the findings of the audits. Thirdly, MOD holds monthly meetings with The Defence Internal Audit Office in order to address their audits. Finally, MOD has an audit board, which also attend to the audit findings. [10]
However, recent media revelations about the auditing practices within the Ministry of Defence have shown that the Ministry of Defence have not reacted to the several highly critical warnings made by the Defence Internal Audit [5, 6, 7]. This clearly illustrates that the findings are not valued by the Ministry leadership (it has not been able to determine at which level). In 2016-2017 the staffing of Defence Internal Audit was reduced from 13 to 8 people [8] and increased to 11 servants in 2020.[10] The Ministry of Defence Accounting Agency handles accounting tasks for the MoD and agencies and authorities pertaining to the ministry including financial controlling tasks [9].

Reviewing the governance paper of the Defence Internal Audit Office, there are not stipulations to dictate that the Defence Internal Audit report to a parliamentary oversight committee. Reporting is made to the relevant ministerial agencies and a copy is sent to the Agency of Ministry Operation and Economy (Koncernøkonomi- og Drifstafdelingen) while an orientation of the Deputy Permanent Secretary of State for Defence for Strategic Management and some ministry and agency leaders [1, 2] is provided for. Since 2017, it is no longer a requirement that the report has to be in written form (however, the auditor has to be able to document his results in working papers) [3]. However, the parliamentary Defence Committee conducts parliamentary oversight of policies and issues related to the defence domain (see Q2). Research found no evidence to determine if audit reports are scrutinised by the committee and netiher the degree to which potential reports are classified/redacted, but the committee does have the possibility to review information in a classified manner in special cases [4, 5, 6]. The Danish Defence Intelligence Service is audited by the Danish National Audit Office (and not the Defence Internal Audit) while a parliamentary committee, Committee on the Intelligence Services, exists specifically for the intelligence domain (for more information on this, see Q21).

Internal audit reports are not made public and no evidence suggest that internal audit reports are pro-actively released to legitimate external audit bodies [1]. In 2016, the so-called §9 agreement that regulated cooperation between the Danish National Audit Office and the ministries’ internal audit offices was terminated [2, 3]. The agreement ensured a systematic collaboration where the internal revision, in this case the Defence Internal Audit, functioned as the Danish National Audit Office’s “extended arm into the ministeries” [3]. The current state of collaboration between the Danish National Office and the Defence Internal Audit appears non-transparent at the moment. The governance paper of the Defence Internal Audit does, however, note that the termination of the collaboration agreement will cause an increase in the number of “direct” external audits of the Ministry of Defence made by the National Audit Office – and not by way of the Defence Internal Audit [5]. As the Danish National Audit Office reviews the entire state budget, the Defence Internal Audit can be said to be subject to external scrutiny to some, but minor, degree. However, recent investigations into the issue of the internal audit of the Ministry of Taxation (Skatteministeriet) reveal that following the termination of the §9 agreement, the Danish National Audit Office does not systematically or actively receive or use the Tax Internal Audit Office (Koncernrevision) reviews, critiques and recommendations to the ministry leadership [4]. Concerning this case, one expert said that the Danish National Audit Office no longer addresses whether the internal revision is actually working and whether the internal the office is “doing a good job or not” [5]. As the termination of the §9 agreement also covers the Defence Internal Audit, the case suggest that a similar development may have taken place within the defence domain as well.

As mentioned several times (see Q8, Q16A), research indicates a potential high degree of effectiveness of the audit: The office regularly identifies critical errors and bad practicies within the Ministry of Defence. However, recent media revelations about the auditing practicies within the Ministry of Defence have shown that the Ministry of Defence have not reacted to the several highly critical warnings made by the Defence Internal Audit [1, 2, 3]. Only when the same warnings were made public in an external audit did the Ministry react to the case. In general, it is difficult to assess whether the ministry adresses audit findings in its practice since internal audit reports are not made public. mentioned in Q8C, media investigations in relation to the fraud case within the Ministry of Defence Estate Agency reveal that the Ministry of Defence Accounting Agency were aware that breaches of administrative rules for purchases were made within the institution, but covered up the incidences during internal control activities (4). Such practices – when they occur – of course hinder any institutional outcomes. Meanwhile, research (Q17) indicates that the MoD does sometimes incorporate Danish National Audit Office recommendations in it pracitces. It is difficult to determine the degree to which the practices outlined above is the deviation rather than the norm, but there is simply very little general transparency in how the MoD follows up on its internal audit.

The Financial Authority of the Armed Forces is formally entrusted with auditing the defence ministry expenditure, but there is very little information or evidence as to whether this process is effective (1). There is also an internal unit within the MoD and the intelligence agency. Although these units exist, their role is minimal and not effective. It is bureaucratic routine work without a serious mission, when they do internal auditing, it is superficial (2), (3), (4). There is also a unit called the Inspection Authority of the Armed Forces, which has the formal power to scrutinize public expenditure. However, relevant laws, academic studies and media reports barely mention these authorities (5).

Having reviewed relevant legal and non-legal sources and consulted relevant experts, there is no evidence that oversight bodies, namely the parliamentary committee, are provided with any reports about internal audit functions of defence expenditures (1).

The two bodies that might have some formal oversight powers over the military are the Parliament and the CAA. This Parliament has very limited powers compared to the National Defence Council (1), (2). This Parliament has never summoned the minister of defence for questioning despite summoning most of the other ministers including the minister of interior (3). As for the CAA, it is very unclear the extent to which internal defence audits are subject to external audits, but the complaints of the former chief auditor Hisham Geneina shows that whatever formal legal powers the CAA might have over the defence sector, it does not translate to real power. Geneina in April 2013 before the military power takeover said: “the economic projects, companies, social clubs and hospital of the ‘sovereign entities’ are not subject to the scrutiny of the CAA.” (4). This statement was indeed given in 2013 before the current reporting period, but all the developments since indicate that the CAA has fewer powers in auditing military defence expenditure, especially with the increasing power of the president and the executive over the CAA, which manifested in the law passed by al-Sisi granting himself the power to remove the head of the CAA (5).

According to our sources, there are no auditing reports to view. Therefore, there are no recommendations, and that is why the MoD cannot address something that does not exist (1), (2).

According to the Statutes of the Ministry of Defence, [1] the Audit and Development Department in the Ministry of Defence offers an objective evaluation of the institutions under the Ministry’s field of competence, including how lawful, efficient and economically sound their decisions are. The job descriptions and work programmes of internal audit at the Ministry of Defence are not publicly available. However, according to e-mail correspondence with the head of the unit, [2] the leadership of the Ministry of Defence reviews the expenses of the institutions under the supervision of the Ministry of Defence and compares them to the defence budget on a quarterly basis. The Ministry’s internal audit unit is involved in that procedure as well. In addition, the unit builds its own annual internal audit plan based on risk analyses. According to an interviewee, the internal audit unit oversees if and which public procurement tenders have been announced, which stage they are at, and what the results are. Most of the expenditures in the defence sector are made up of procurements and therefore reviewing the process makes up most of the audits’ work.
Moreover, there was a major change in staff in 2017. With the arrival of the new director of the audit unit all previous employees left. At the moment, only the director works for the Audit and Development Department. This is presumably a temporary situation. Before this incident, the staff turnover rate was low – people would work in the department for five years on average. The unit would be comprised of three to five employees. In addition to the internal audit unit in the Ministry of Defence, there are internal audit units in every other institution in the sector too, except for in the Defence Resources Agency. All the audit findings are submitted to the National Audit Office that puts additional pressure from the outside to ensure that the Minister of Defence considers the internal audit’s findings. There are cases when audit findings are not considered, however, as not all audits are of a high quality. [3]

The internal audit unit’s activities are scrutinised by the National Audit Office which the unit closely cooperates with. The National Audit Office annually presents their report to the Riigikogu’s committees: the National Defence Committee and the State Budget Control Select Committee. The discussions at the Riigikogu are detailed and thorough. The reports which the internal audit unit itself compiles are neither published nor disclosed to the Riigikogu. The unit’s main purpose is to evaluate and give advice to the leadership of the Ministry of Defence and the leadership of the other institutions under its supervision. Which issues are sensitive and critical are decided within the internal audit unit. The internal unit submits a report about its activities to the Ministry of Finance twice a year. [1][2]

The National Audit Office and the Ministry of Defence’s internal audit unit organise regular meetings and cooperate closely, but the Ministry of Defence’s internal audit reports are meant for internal use only. [1] They are not fully submitted to any external audit body. Only the short summaries of the internal audit reports are submitted to the National Audit Office.
There has not been an external auditing of the Ministry of Defence’s internal audit unit, although there is a plan to conduct one in the future. [2] The internal audit bodies report to the Ministry of Finance. They submit annual reports on the effectiveness and the quality of their activities. The Ministry of Finance also organises regular meetings (usually up to three meetings a year). [3]

All the audit’s recommendations and the implementation of those recommendations are reviewed by the leadership of the Ministry. Either a post-audit report will be released or the suggestions will be added to the work programmes. If the audit findings are not implemented then an explanation will be provided. [1] Sometimes the explanation is that there is not enough time and capacity for implementing a recommendation, or that the recommendation is unreasonable or unnecessary. The leadership of the Ministry regularly works with the remarks provided by the internal audit unit. More important notes can become central discussion points during the leadership’s coordination meeting and during the Minister’s meetings. [2]

Both the MoD and FDF have internal auditors, separated from the line-organisation, as according to the Decree on State Budget, chpt 9, section 70 [1]. They provide the internal audit and fulfill the requirement in the constitution that authorities ensure their work is done correctly, legally etc. The Defence Forces put together a public financial statement and a public management report on its activities and use of resources annually. The MoD monitors the implementation of the state budget, performance and the use of resources and provides the Defence Forces with written interim feedback and a written statement at the end of FY on the fiscal statement and management report, which all are public documents. MoD and the HQ of the Defence Forces have also arranged internal auditing The task of internal auditing is to elucidate to the leadership the appropriateness and sufficiency of compliance as well as to carry out the inspections ordered by the leadership. In the activities of internal auditing, IIA professional standards are followed [2,3]. The reports are reviewed by the National Audit Office, which writes up a report for a range of actors including the Finance Ministry and relevant parliamentary committees [4,5].

Further, according to a written response from the Ministry of Defence, MoD annually negotiates the achievement targets for the Defence Forces as part of the implementation of the state budget granted by the Parliament. The achievement agreement also entails how the Defence Forces implements accountability through reporting on performance and the use of resources in the fiscal year to the Ministry of Defence. [2]

The Defence Forces puts together a public financial statement and a public management report on its activities and use of resources annually. The achievement agreement also entails how the Defence Forces implements accountability through reporting on performance and the use of resources in the fiscal year to the Ministry of Defence. The Ministry of Defence reports on the implementation of the state budget and the performance within the administrative sector to the Parliament in the Government’s annual report.[1] The National Audit Office of Finland (NAO) inspects legality and performance of financial management, as well as compliance with the state budget, in accordance with the Consitution of Finland, chpt 7, section 90 [2] and the Act on the National Audit Office (676/2000) [3,4]. As noted in 16A, the reports are reviewed by the National Audit Office, which writes up a report for a range of actors including the Finance Ministry and relevant parliamentary committees [5,6]. NAO also inspects the reliability of information on governmental finances and financial management provided to the Parliament as well as that the rules of financial policy are followed. NAO implements its misson stated in the Constitution of Finland through auditing, legality inspections, performance inspections, and inspections of financial policy.

The National Audit Office has access to all material from the MoD when they do audit; this includes classified material.[1] They also can (and do) ask for all material relating to a topic, without having to specify document numbers, classifications etc; not handing it over would risk a major crime by the MoD/FDF, so there’s no reason to believe they would hide material (and an electronic audit trail exists for every document, who has read it, modified etc, so that too would come out in the main audit itself).

In auditing, the ISSAI standards are based on the international ISA auditing standards. These standards are supplemented with instructions on legality inspection, performance inspection, and inspection of the financial policy. In addition to external auditing and inspections, MoD and the HQ of the Defence Forces have arranged internal auditing according to the Decree on State Budget, chpt 9, section 70. [2, 3] The task of internal auditing is to elucidate to the leadership the appropriateness and sufficiency of compliance as well as to carry out the inspections ordered by the leadership. In the activities of internal auditing, IIA professional standards are followed. [4, 5, 6, 7]

The MoD addresses audit findings, with the best example being the follow-up report published in 2020 of two separate audits; the NAO notes that many changes were made but also indicates areas where additional changes are required or suggested [1]. The MoD also monitors the implementation of the state budget, performance and the use of resources and provides the Defence Forces with written interim feedback and a written statement at the end of FY on the fiscal statement and management report, which all are public documents. In auditing, the ISSAI standards are based on the international ISA auditing standards. These standards are supplemented with instructions on legality inspection, performance inspection, and inspection of the financial policy. In addition to external auditing and inspections, MoD and the HQ of the Defence Forces have arranged internal auditing according to the Decree on State Budget, chpt 9, section 70 [2]. The task of internal auditing is to elucidate to the leadership the appropriateness and sufficiency of compliance as well as to carry out the inspections ordered by the leadership. In the activities of internal auditing, IIA professional standards are followed. [3, 4]

There is an internal audit service called “Audit Centre of the Armed Forces” (C2A).
The C2A reports to the Major General of the Army (MGA) and its field of competence is strictly limited to the armed forces, directoriates and services (ADS). It is a tool for decision-making support through the control of these activities. Regarding its audit methodology, the C2A division is certified by the French Institute of Audit and Internal Control (IFACI). The C2A auditors are military personnel. They are trained within the division, in the audit methodology certified IFACI. The C2A division’s audit missions focus mainly on processes that are very rarely financial, but C2A does not have jurisdiction over the fight against corruption.

The entity that overviews the actions of the Ministry of the Armed Forces is the General Control of the Armies (CGA). The Defence Code specifies [1] in article D. 3123-1 and following, that the CGA “assists the minister in charge of the armies in the direction of its ministry by checking, in all the organisms subjected to its authority or its supervision, the observance of laws, regulations and ministerial instructions as well as the timeliness of decisions and the effectiveness of results in view of the objectives set and the good use of public funds. In all these organisations, it safeguards the rights of individuals and the interests of the state”.

The members of the CGA act as direct delegates of the Minister. A commission signed personally by the minister attests to this delegation. So, theoretically, whatever their rank, they are independent of the military leaders. They are authorised by law, without any restriction, to penetrate, in all places, built or not built, under the authority of the Minister of Defence. They may carry out unannounced inspections and no obstacle can prevent their investigations.

The CGA intervenes either “a posteriori” or preventively, both at the central government level and at the level of decentralised institutions and services.

According to “contrôleur général des armées », general « rapporteur » of the Military Ethics Committee (2), this positioning, this independence, these skills and these conditions of execution make the CGA a contributor to the fight against fraud within the Ministry.

First of all, in the framework of the control of the regularity and the conformity of the administrative acts of the ministry, the CGA instructs on a regular basis missions which can directly allow the discovery of fraud (44 missions of regularity were thus carried out in 8 years – see latest example with the externalisation contracts for Barkhane operation in Sahel (3)). As part of the monitoring of good practices, the CGA monitors anti-fraud practices. In 2015, a report by the CGA focused on the comparative analysis of anti-fraud investigation practices.
Then, in the framework of the follow-up of serious events related to cases of fraud in the Ministry, the CGA seizes as much as necessary the concerned authorities in order to receive the necessary clarifications on the facts reported in the messages of report, without ever refrain from conducting or requiring the same authorities to carry out further investigations.
In addition, in the context of denunciations (anonymous or not) received or suspicions from open sources, the CGA investigates the most appropriate follow-up, from the prior assessment of the denunciation to the conduct of ad hoc missions (for example, on the suspicion of the offense of favouritism or the conditions for awarding public contracts).
Finally, in the context of missions not specifically dedicated to regularity / compliance but where discoveries or suspicions related to fraud can be made, the CGA drafts warning notes or triggers a specific mission in parallel with the main mission (this happens at least twice a year).

Reports of the CGA can be overviewed by the Defence Committees of the Senate and National Assembly upon request, provided their members are granted access should the findings be classified “secret-défense”, which is not always agreed, depending on the sensitivity of the information.
Another oversight body is the Cour des comptes. It does review CGA findings, though not on a regular basis. For instance, in February 2019, Cour des comptes published a public report questioning the efficiency of the control exerted by the CGA on externalisations in Opex. [1]
Cour des comptes judges have a “secret-défense” clearing and can request the declassification of sensitive documents, but their findings are then not publicly published and are addressed to the sole attention of the Minister of the Armed Forces.

Documents produced by the CGA are intended for the information of the Minister of the Armed Forces, not for the information of the public, the media or CSOs. Most of these documents are covered by the rules of national defence secrecy, according to the general procedures applicable to administrative documents. [1] There is little external scrutiny of the internal audit function of defence ministry expenditure. As noted in 16B, the Cour des Comptes provides scrutiny to some extent, however this is not on a regular basis and any concerns are addressed directly to the Ministry of the Armed Forces without publication.

The ministry has no obligation to act upon CGA recommendations.
It tends however to react to Cour des Comptes findings because of the impact in the media of Cour des Comptes’ publications. But again, Cour des Comptes recommendations are not constraining in any way, and the Ministry is not compelled to take them into account. It can do so sometimes, but the Ministry doesn’t communicate about it, so it is hard to draw conclusions on a pattern of accountability. [1]

The internal audit unit conducts ongoing audits of the Federal Ministry of Defence’s expenditure and has the flexibility to structure its own work programme for the year. The unit staff have the appropriate expertise. The unit’s findings are evaluated by the Minister of Defence. Within the Federal Ministry of Defence, the ‘Budget and Controlling Division’ supervises military expenditure and represents the Ministry of Defence to the Treasury. Military expenditure is indirectly subject to parliamentary oversight, as it is included in the annual Federal Budget voting process. Additionally, the Bundestag’s Budget Committee is responsible for overseeing all government budgetary activity. It is parliamentary custom for the Budget Committee to be chaired by a member of the largest opposition parliamentary group.

There are two functions that can be considered relevant to the internal audit process. Firstly, the BMVg ‘Stab Organisation und Revision’ (officially translated as ‘Organisation and Internal Audit Staff’) coordinates ‘organisational and structural affairs’ in support of the executive level of the ministry [1]. Secondly, the Compliance Management team constitutes a new function within the ministry that handles the assessment of corruption risks, among other things. While this unit focusses primarily on corruption prevention, it also works in close coordination with the above-mentioned audit unit. It primarily serves a prevention function [2].

The BMVg audit unit provides heads of department with a mechanism to support their control and supervisory functions. Its audits regularly include financial risks relating to the ministry’s expenses. However, the BMVg audit unit does not fully examine all of the ministry’s expenses. The audits themselves are based on the ‘International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Audits’, as well as on the recommendations of the Federal Audit Office and the Federal Ministry of the Interior. The BMVg audit unit has sufficient qualified personnel available [3].

The Federal Audit Office conducts a comprehensive review of the budgetary and economic management of the Federal Government. Pursuant to Section 95 of the Federal Budget Code [1], it is entitled to have all documents which it deems necessary for the performance of its duties submitted to it on request, uncensored and within a certain period. The BMVg audit office is not subject to any institutionalised control. In individual cases, the tasks and results of the BMVg audit are included in audits by the Federal Audit Office or parliamentary investigations/inquiries [2]. The Federal Audit Office provides oversight over the ‘Budget and Controlling Division’.

Internal control/audit department:

Some military defence expenditure is also subject to internal auditing. The auditing process is outlined in internal procedures and carried out by appropriately skilled auditors [3]. The ‘Stab Organisation und Revision’ (officially translated as ‘Organisation and Internal Audit Staff’) is specifically concerned with internal audit functions, however, there is no indication that findings/reports are forwarded to Parliament. The staff of this unit might, however, serve as witnesses. The newly added compliance body is primarily concerned with corruption prevention, but due to its expertise, it can also serve as an oversight authority [4].

There is very little external scrutiny of the internal audit function of defence ministry expenditure. The BMVg audit unit has not been checked by external auditors thus far, and there are currently no concrete plans or announcements to that effect. Audit reports or summaries by legitimate external review bodies can be provided upon request. In individual cases, the tasks and results of the BMVg audit are included in audits by the Federal Audit Office or parliamentary investigations/inquiries [1].

The ministry sometimes seems to address audit findings in its practices, but not regularly. While it is highly likely that the Government takes its findings into account, no clear evidence of this was found. The BMVg audit reports are, however, discussed regularly with the specialist departments as part of adversarial procedures and then submitted to the management for a decision. The recommendations that are derived from the audit reports and approved by the management are directed to the specialist departments for implementation. The audit results are therefore regularly taken into account in the BMVg’s practices [1].

The MOD’s Audit Committee was established in August 2017 and it is composed of five members. Three members are appointed by the Internal Audit Agency (IAA) and the Institute of Chartered Accountants, and two by the Principal Account Holder (1). The Audit Committee prepares annual statements showing the implementation status of recommendations contained in internal audit reports, parliamentary decisions, and the Auditor-General’s recommendations. In 2016 and 2017 respectively, two Audit Committee meetings were held; in the future, the MOD plans to hold quarterly meetings (2).

The MOD has established an Internal Audit Unit (IAU) in compliance with the Public Financial Management Act, 2016 (Act 921) (3). According to Act 921, the IAU “shall appraise and report on the application of system of controls, evaluate effectiveness of risk management, provide assurance on the efficiency, effeteness, and economy in the administration, and evaluate compliance” (Art. 83.3), and “prepare the annual audit work plan of the activities” (Art. 83.4). The annual work plan is submitted within 30 days after the beginning of the FY and is followed by quarterly reports on its execution. The unit is in the Department of Plans and Programmes and reports to the Principal Spending Officer as well as the Audit Committee. Its staff receives the consultancy services of the IAA, which provides its expertise in the set-up of the unit. The IAA was established by the Internal Audit Agency Act, 2003 (Act 658) (4) and has powers of coordination, facilitation, and supervision of the IAUs activities in MDAs and MMDAs.

However, there is a concern that internal auditors are generally ineffective because they are easily intimidated by management and/or political superiors. In some cases, they are suspected of participating in financial malfeasance (5), (6).

The PSCDI and the PAC are responsible for oversight of the MOD’s activities, including defence military expenditure. According to Standing Order 184 (1), the committee “shall examine all questions relating to defence and internal affairs”. However, the effectiveness and concrete impact of the committees has been questioned. The PSCDI does not engage in robust and regular debates or reviews of major defence policies and decisions. When they do debate defence budgets, it is almost without exception to ask for more funds for the armed forces; not to debate, at least openly, on accountability and transparency of how funds are used (2), (3), (4), (5).

While the PSCDI has the legal mandate to scrutinise defence expenditure, information on critical expenses is not available to all members (6), (7).

As mandated by the Public Financial Management Act (1), the activities of the IAU are coordinated, facilitated and supervised by the IAA which provides external scrutiny of the internal audit function. However, information on the effective implementation of the Public Financial Management Act as well as the effectiveness of both the IAU and IAA is very limited (2), (3).

Since the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) of Parliament started subjecting the management of Ministries Departments and Agencies (MDAs) to a high level of scrutiny, MDAs have started incorporating audit findings into its practices (1), (2). However, the Ministry of Defence has not addressed audit findings. According to the last publicly available Report of the Auditor-General on the Liabilities of Ministries Departments and Agencies from December 2016 (3), the MOD’s management had failed to respond to 16 out of 20 audits.

The Independent Office of Preventive Audit, subordinated directly to the Director General on Defence Equipment and Investments, is responsible for conducting the precautionary audit, provided by the provisions of article 80 of Law 721/70. [1].
The internal audit unit engages in ongoing reviews of defence ministry expenditures and has the flexibility to build its own work programme for the year. Staff expertise is appropriate (e.g. there is low staff turnover rate) [2].

Oversight occurs for sensitive or critical issues. Enabling oversight bodies (e.g. the Committee on Armaments Programs and Contracts) are provided with reports that may contain some gaps or they are in summary form only [1, 2].

Internal audit reports are sometimes released to legitimate external audit bodies and the internal audit process is subject to sporadic or superficial reviews by external auditors [1].

The ministry sometimes addresses audit findings in its practices, but not regularly [1, 2]. There are no publicly available sources which illustrate this.

There is an internal audit office [1]. However, all expenditures are supervised by another internal Ministry of Defence (MoD) Department, which was established at the recommendation of the Supreme Audit Office. No official report can be found on public sites. However, integrity reports of the ministry are available. None of the integrity reports refers to defence ministry expenditure and controlling tasks, but its explanations suggest that the department prepares internal reports and it is fully trusted/ supported by the leadership.

The most important oversight bodies would be the State Audit Office (SAO) and the Defence Committee. The SAO is regularly accused of being partisan and led by a former Fidesz MP and opposition MPs on the Defence Committee often complain not having access to information. A letter attached to the annual budget of 2019, by opposition MPs complained about not being given any information on any of the major procurements; no opportunity is provided them to check newly purchased equipment [1]. The same document proves that the Fidesz dominated committee proposes no modifications to the budget.

The only external scrutiny of the internal audit is undertaken by government bodies such as the SAO, which is by law independent, but may not be deemed independent in practice [1, 2, 3]. The bigger issue is that the last SAO report about the Hungarian Ministry of Defence was published in 2009 [4]. There have been no overarching independent audits in general and specifically about the expenditures in particular regarding the Hungarian Ministry of Defence for more than a decade, even though it had been done every four to five years before that [5, 6].

As we are not aware of any independent audit findings (at least audits that are publicly available) we cannot evaluate if the ministry would implement these findings. Even the SAO findings are not available. Between 2015-2019, the SAO did not report separately on the Ministry (only checked the Budget plans in the time period). At least there is no report published on their website [1].

The Comptroller General of Defence Accounts (CGDA) is head of the Defence Accounts Department (DAD) and undertakes the internal audit of the Ministry of Defence’s (MoD) defence expenditure. The DAD corresponds broadly to the organisation of the three branches of the Armed Forces, Ordnance Factories, Defence Research & Development Organisation (DRDO), Canteen Store Department, Coast Guard, Border Roads Organisation and Inter-Service Organisations [1]. The Audit conclusions/findings relating to serious irregularities are submitted to the Secretary (Defence Finance)/Financial Adviser (Defence Services) and Defence Secretary in the form of Internal Audit Report. An Annual Audit Certificate is rendered by the CGDA for inclusion in the Appropriation Account, which are countersigned by CAG and placed in Parliament. Appropriation Accounts of the Defence (Civil) and Defence Pensions are prepared by the office of the CGDA and signed by the CGDA [2].

The Secretary (Defence Finance)/Financial Adviser (Defence Services) performs an advisory role and discharges the responsibility for payments and internal audit of defence expenditure through the CGDA [3].

Financial Advisor (Defence Services) is responsible for the preparation of the Appropriation Accounts of the Defence Services and for their submission to CAG and the Director General of Audit, Defence Services [4]. The internal audit unit engages in ongoing reviews of defence ministry expenditures.

There is no evidence to suggest staff expertise is not appropriate. Staff turnover figures are not available. It is unclear if the internal audit units have the flexibility to build their own work programme for the year. Audit is guided by principles laid down in the Defence Audit Code, instructions in Local Audit Manuals of each branch, with instructions periodically reviewed with reference to risk assessment and mitigation of the risks in the prescribed procedures [5]. Under the New Functional Paradigm for Internal Audit in the Defence Accounts Department (DAD) introduced in 2016, each organisation is to have an “internal audit and risk management” framework [6].

There has been some criticism that internal audit has at times been weak. This was evident in the Ex-Servicemen Contributory Health Scheme where there were discrepancies in the internal audit of medical bills [7][8].

Internal audit processes are comprehensive and according to procedures, full reports should be available to oversight bodies such as the Standing Committee on Defence and CAG [1]. There is evidence of external scrutiny by the likes of CAG and at times the CBI. In 2010, the CBI had started a crackdown on the CGDA office and arrested defence accounts officials on charges of bribery and loss to the exchequer on a few separate occasions [2][3][4]. One cannot ascertain the extent of inclusion of sensitive issues as internal audit reports are not publicly available to peruse.

As alluded to above, there is evidence of external scrutiny by CAG and the CBI [1][2]. External audit and oversight agencies can examine the internal audit reports. It is not clear if internal audit reports are available to external anti-corruption organisations. Given the secrecy of the MoD, it is unlikely.

At times, audit findings are recognised and at times, inadequacies are overlooked. AK Saxena former Additional Controller General of Defence Accounts (CGDA) at the time of his retirement in May 2016, wrote letters to the Prime Minister, Finance Minister and Defence Minister “lamenting the state of affairs in the country’s defence establishment.” He highlighted that widespread mismanagement, wasteful expenditure and lack of transparency was eating away at public funds allocated for defence each year and that despite submitting many system studies, no institutional action had been taken [1].

Later that year a Committee of Experts (CoE) was constituted by the MoD under the chairmanship of Lt Gen (Retd) DB Shekatkar to recommend measures to enhance combat capability and rebalance defence expenditure of the Armed Forces [2]. The Committee was mandated and conducted a comprehensive internal audit. The findings of the report within the term of reference of the Committee were implemented according to a government press release in 2018. In total 188 recommendations were made and 99 were accepted by the MoD [3][4].

According to Minister of Defence Regulation No. 7/2013 concerning Supervision and Inspection in the Ministry of Defence and the Indonesian National Defence Forces, internal supervision and inspection activities within the Ministry of Defence and the TNI are carried out by a team of Internal Control Officers consisting of the Ministry of Defence Inspectorate General, TNI Inspectorate General and Treasury, Army Inspectorate General, Navy Inspectorate General and Treasury and Air Force Inspectorate General and Treasury [1]. In the Ministry of Defence, in addition to financial audits, the Inspectorate General can conduct operational audits, performance audits and Investigations with a Specific Purpose (PDTT). The Ministry of Defence Inspectorate General conducts internal and financial oversight through auditing, reviewing, evaluating, monitoring and other supervisory activities using pre- and post-audit methods, as well as methods carried out during audits. Minister of Defence Regulation No. 7/2013 also stipulates that internal auditors within the Ministry of Defence and the TNI must meet the competency requirements for auditors, which have been defined in accordance with statutory provisions [1]. Minister of Defence Regulation No. 36/2013 concerning Standard of Auditors for Government Internal Supervision in the Ministry of Defence and the Indonesian National Defence Forces stipulates that auditors should continuously improve their technical and methodological capacities. It also lists sufficient standard of educational and professional education requirements for the auditors [4]. The auditors have the status of Civil Servants/TNI, so it can be assumed that the turnover rate is quite low. As they are part of an internal monitoring mechanism, the activities and documents resulting from the supervision and inspections that will be and have been carried out by the Inspector General of the Ministry of Defence are determined as exempt information in the Ministry of Defence, meaning that public access is limited. Supervision and inspection of financial management by the Inspector General of the Ministry of Defence is carried out at least once a year, at the end of each fiscal year. In addition, the Inspectorate General also conducts year-round monitoring of the progress of the work programme and follows up the results of supervision. In addition to the Inspectorate General, the government’s internal oversight function is also carried out by the Financial and Development Supervisory Agency (BPKP) [2]. In contrast to the Inspectorate General, which oversees the performance and finance of ministries and related institutions, the BPKP audits cross-sectoral activities. If the Inspector General is responsible to the minister or head of the relevant institution, the BPKP reports directly to the President. In 2017, the BPKP conducted a study, one of whose findings revealed administrative problems in the use of satellites leased from a British company. The BPKP’s findings prevented the Ministry of Finance from disbursing the budget to finance the satellite rental. The polemic resulted in a lawsuit filed by Avanti Communication against the Indonesian government [3].

According to Minister of Defence Regulation No. 14/2019 concerning the Organisation and Work Procedure of the Ministry of Defence, the Inspectorate General of the Ministry of Defence is under and responsible to the Minister of Defense. Therefore, there is no obligation for the Inspectorate General to submit the results of its inspection report to the DPR RI’s Commission I. However, according to the rules, as part of its supervisory function, Commission I has the right to request reports from the Inspectorate General. But these cases rarely occur, except for sensitive and critical issues.. Commission I of the DPR RI, realising that the Inspectorate General is under the Minister of Defence, tends not to be overly dependent on the results of the Inspectorate General’s inspection report for its considerations. In addition to financial management issues, the internal control system within the Ministry of Defence and the TNI also conducts audits relating to other topics, such as the use of state property and the management of non-tax state revenue in a number of public service agencies within the TNI [1,2]. Compared to the previous period, the internal control system within the Ministry of Defence and the TNI began to conduct more surveillance activities and take action against cases of budget misuse during the 2016-2018 period. However, its oversight function tended to avoid sensitive issues. Even when it touched on sensitive issues, such as the procurement of military goods and services, and took into account the potential for corruption within the Ministry of Defence and the TNI, supervision and enforcement activities are thought to have only addressed the tip of the iceberg.

Law No. 15/2004 concerning the Audit of Management and Responsibility of State Finances regulates that, when carrying out audits of management and responsibilities of state finances, the BPK, as an external government audit institution, can utilise the results of examinations of internal control apparatus, in this case the Ministry of Defence Inspectorate General. If requested, the Inspectorate General is obliged to submit the results of its inspection to the BPK. In practice, the cooperation between internal and external supervisors has still not been effective, particularly in the defence sector. The BPK itself felt that the use of reports on internal control results and the collaboration between the BPK and internal government supervisors in conducting audits still need to be improved [1]. On the other hand, this cooperation also allows the BPK to use auditors from internal government oversight agencies, in this case the Ministry of Defence, who work for and on behalf of the BPK [2].

Generally, internal audit unit recommendations are addressed by the Ministry of Defence. In 2017, for example, the Ministry of Defence Inspectorate General conducted an audit at one of the General Public Service facilities within the Ministry of Defence and the TNI, namely the Cilandak Marine Hospital. The audit produced 14 findings with 22 recommendations. All of them have been followed up by the relevant institutions [1]. In addition to recommendations of audit results focussing on non-sensitive issues, the Ministry of Defence and the TNI also tend to be more open to pre-audit input. At the end of 2018, for example, the Ministry of Defence Inspectorate General conducted a pre-audit of the Ministry of Defence Work Plan and Budget for the 2019 fiscal year. The pre-audit produced a number of recommendations for work units within the Ministry of Defence and the TNI in order to improve the preparation of the Ministry of Defence RKA [2]. However, it should be noted that, with respect to the effectiveness of internal supervision within the Ministry of Defence and the TNI, which still needs to be improved, the recommendations of internal audit results also tend only to touch upon aspects that are considered non-sensitive.

There are no reports whatsoever of audits of the defence ministry’s expenditure being audited in practice. One interview from the 2015 assessment maintained that anything owned by the military is not subject to annual public audit. Traditional thinking says that as the armed forces fall under the constitutional authority of the Supreme Leader, the government does not have the right to monitor or tax these institutions [1]. However, according to other notable scholars on Iran, the Supreme Leaders Office has its own Supervision and Audit Bureau [2].

Furthermore, the supreme leader’s website speaks of “Supervision over the Leader”. It says:
“No one is above supervision. Even the Leader is not above supervision, let alone the organizations linked to the Leader. Therefore, everyone should receive supervision, including those who govern the country. Of course public and governmental organizations must not be afraid of audit. Therefore, it is not the case that the organizations linked to the Leader are exempt from supervision” [3].

This indicator is marked Not Applicable, as no evidence was found of enabling oversight of an internal audit function, by, for example, parliamentary committees, although there is a National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, as well as a Planning, Budget, and Audit Committee, all of which could be utilised for the purpose [1].

No evidence was found of external scrutiny of the internal audit function [1].

This indicator is marked Not Applicable, as there is no evidence of any audit findings, which the ministry could take incorporate into its practices [1].

As stipulated within the republic of Iraq’s Internal Audit Guide (FBSA) the objective of reducing administrative and financial corruption is contingent on the processes of the internal audit and their effectiveness (1). This is a question widely debated among universities and Iraqi PhD candidates but rarely in the context of Iraq’s security and defence institutions, possibly due to the impossibility of obtaining audit files on defence expenditure. Spending has increased over the years in response to expanding security threats (2), few activities covered online offer evidence of effective internal audits. Political push-back from powerful parliamentary blocs and militias many of whom have come-up in local investigations covered by press outlets as beneficiaries of the climate of corruption that harms defence performance hamper internal audits. IG offices have now been assigned to the Popular Mobilization Forces Commission while little evidence of collaboration between the PMF and FBSA makes it unlikely to be effective (3). One source raises concerns over potential foul play behind the appointment of a former militia commander as the PMF IG stating that the figure in question “has no previous administrative or military experience in the Ministry of Defence”.

FBSA Audit findings must be approved before they can be distributed among associated agencies and the COI (4). This erodes the IG’s audit capabilities regardless of their undertaking and strips their independence. While Iraq’s international partners have assisted Iraq in the formation of risk management systems, no evidence exists to enable a comment of their effectiveness. The MoD’s Directorate of Central Audit plays a major role in auditing and monitoring military contracts (5), (6). In addition to the IG, the MoD’s Central Audit Branch is said to compile annual inventories and spot-checks on army units and departments. The effectiveness of this agency is undermined by non-transparent arrangements and the diversion of government funds earmarked for defence expenditures. Internal audit agencies, while they exist, have a limited capacity to trace expenditures and collect reliable data.

Iraq’s Central auditing body, The Federal Board of Supreme Audit, is responsible for reporting on expenditure budgets and also deliberates on emergency expenditure (1), (2). The MoF disburses funds allocated for defence expenditures as specified in the federal budget, but spending more than the amount specified is prohibited. According to the Iraqi Parliament’s Rules of Procedure (3), the Committee on Security and Defence is not tasked with oversight of the internal audit function.

External scrutiny is exercised by Iraq’s oldest auditory body — the FBSA — and while some performance reports are delayed or unavailable, those which are accessible on the watchdog’s official website, underscore economic malfeasance in the form of inflated costs versus real operational costs, lack of transparent use of money earmarked for major, yet anonymised defence projects (1). Speeches delivered during parliamentary hearings (2) by the PM and Commander-in-Chief of Iraq’s armed security forces, which includes quasi-state actors backed by Iran, acknowledge that bigger threats of corruption or malfeasance arise from large budgets and contracts but has fallen short, as far as accessible parliamentary minutes indicate, of the aim of fighting corruption for private/personal gain. As far as parliamentary scrutiny is concerned, legislative debates have not debated specific findings raised within FBSA’s auditory findings. Attempts to challenge, scrutinise or raise wider objections to findings that expose rampant violations, whether in the form of price-fixing or contractual fraud, are non-existent within parliamentary settings. AAM proposed in a recent parliamentary session the formation of a centralised contracts committee inside ministries at great risk of corruption including the ministries of defence and interior among others. “Elected members”, the PM emphasised, must be ‘qualified and competent’, listing oversight and scrutiny as the twin objectives of this committee, but this does not address the fact that the proposal itself overlaps with the jurisdictions of other intergovernmental and external auditory bodies (1). This raises doubts over the extent to which parliament, and by extension, the commander-in-chief, are able and committed to support the FBSA in its mandate and place security and military forces under scrutiny and issue customary penalties. The evasion of scrutiny and resistance to it also points to a culture of impunity which protects security actors especially those that made enormous strides in recent elections, namely Iran-backed groups (3). As one analyst writes (4) AAM “need[s] to appease Iraq’s different centres of power to avoid renewed violence could come at the expense of real policy change”.

Audit findings, as available MoD content online shows, are managed by the ministry’s ‘Meera’ division — that is attached to the Central Audit Directorate; the body overseeing defence spending. Coverage is void of critical findings (1). Fraud detected by Iraq’s Parliamentary Integrity Committee has resulted in little more than admonishments (2). No evidence exists suggests that the findings of internal auditory bodies embedded within the MoD lead directly to prosecution or other institutional outcomes. Some arrest warrants have been issued, but the officials in question have walked away free. Coverage further underscores, the absence of audit reforms (3), and professionally trained auditors; which makes any positive correlation between audit findings and institutional outcomes the less likely. Annual reports could not be referenced in support of the above assertion, but widely circulated reports (4), (5), the evidence they present depicts a security ministry plagued by corruption and financial irregularities punished by institutional outcomes that reflect a broader mission or vision to incorporate these findings.

The Defense System Comptroller inspects, audits, and advises the defense system, and updates the Minister, the Director-General, and the IDF Chief of General Staff on his findings, that may address any of the general condition, capabilities, and preparedness of the Ministry, and the reasonableness and legality of actions taken by the military and civilian defense systems (1). The units audited include offices in charge of economic, administrative, organizational, and operational matters within the IDF and the Ministry, civilian defense-system offices, and other entities that the Ministry supports or in whose management it participates. The internal comptroller is usually a high-ranking veteran officer of the IDF, thus having an in depth knowledge and acquaintance with both the military and the MOD (2). While the unit can build its own work programme for the year, it needs to signed off by the Defence Minister who can modify the programme as they see fit (3). However the Defence Comptroller’s reports are not easily accessible and there is little additional information publicly available relating to its staffing and activities.

There is parliamentary oversight for sensitive issues and the legislature is given access to reports, although it is unclear what level of detail they contain or how systematically reports are provided to legislators. For instance, the Defence System Auditor submits reports to the Subcomittee on Prepardness and Security (1). In the past, this has then informed the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence’s actions in initiating investigations into specific aspects of defece policy (2). The budget is detailed and available to the public (3). Further reports can be found on the Knesset site.

There is little publicly available information on the external scrutiny of the MOD Comptroller. However, the State Comptroller is charged with overseeing the work of internal audit bodies, including defence (1). According to the MOD, information-sharing mechanisms between the two are formalised and internal audit and annual reports are shared with the State Comptroller on a regular basis. In addition, the Head of Audit of Defence Matters at the State Comptroller’s Office meets with representatives of the internal audit bodies at least twice a year to discuss issues of importance to the proper auditing of various bodies within the defence establishment (2).

Drafts of internal audit reports are reviewed by the relevant departments within the MOD, which also submit their comments with regard to its findings. In accordance with MOD Internal Instruction regarding Internal Comptroller audit reports, which implements the provisions of the Internal Audit Law of 1992, such finding are to be discussed by the management of the MOD, and its decisions shall be reported to the Minister of Defense within 45 days of receipt of the report (1). The discussions regarding the finding are conducted by a “deficiency correction team”, defined under the Instruction, which shall submits its recommendation to the MOD DG and to the Minister of Defense. By law, the DG and Minister of Defense shall accordingly decide upon appropriate reforms in the relevant fields, Heads of the applicable MOD departments shall beare responsible for following up of the implementation of such reforms. While the deficiency correction team does not pulish its activities, the MOD’s Freeodm of Information reports contain information on implementation of MOD Comptroller recommendations. In the 2020 report for instance it is stated that deficiencies revealed by MOD Comptroller audits have been addressed and will be subject to follow-up audits (2). This is largely supported by interview data which underlined how the ministry sometimes addresses audit findings in its practices, but not regularly (3).

Legislative decree 28 December 1998, n. 496 initially created a Consulting Committee in order to ensure a faster, transparent, and rightful contractualisation of purchases of the Ministry [1]. The Consulting Committee has then been included in the Presidential Decree 90/2010 [2] that assigned the Committee the task of auditing contracts with a value beyond the threshold (5million euro) indicated in Legislative decree n. 163/2006. Legislative decree 90/2010 also created the Central Office for Administrative Inspections (ISPEDIFE), that has, among others, the duty to carry out administrative and accounting inspections. Its composition and attributions have been further regulated by Ministerial Decree 16 January 2013, n. 20 [3]. ISPEDIFE is composed by a civilian director, a Deputy director from the military and inspectors, colonel or managers of the respective category if civilian, and it is under the direct control of the Minister of Defence.

ISPEDIFE is guaranteed a certain flexibility and independence to execute its job, in terms of controls and audits. Duties and functions are defined by law, but according to the “Inspectors Vademecum” the flexibility of the organ is guaranteed [4]. Nonetheless, they have to respect regular periodic controls, as well as exceptional ones which are performed by this office on a timetable fixed by the Ministry of Defence. From the information available on the committee work, it is not possible to determine whether the findings are valued by the Minister of Defence.

For what concerns control over armament acquisition, parliamentary committees provide their opinion on the scheme of the Ministrerial Decree before the acquisition might be approved. Although the parliamentary committee does not have access to the unredacted reports, in the matters of acquisition or update of the military systems, the commission can initiate a fact-finding investigation. During the investigation, it is possible to audit experts from the academic world, businessmen, representatives from NGOs, and military personnel [1].

The reports of ISPEDIFE are only published on the intranet of the administration, thus they are not accessible to the public [1]. According to art. 18 of Presidential Decree n.3 of 10 January 1957 [2] the civilian employees working in public administrations have to report rule violations and illegalities they might be aware of. This article applies to the personnel of ISPEDIFE as well. Moreover, should an illegality be ascertained during the performance of duties of the office, the person responsible for the inspection has to directly report the fact to the Attorney General of the Court of Auditors. If the illicit action involves a General Director of the Ministry of Defence or the head of a service directly reporting to the minister, it is the minister that has to report the matter to the Attorney General [3]. In addition, according to Art 540 (DPR 15 March 2010, n, 90) should an an illegality be identified, the inspector can send the Ministry of Economy and Finance a report on the illicit action and request an inspection.

There is not enough information to score this indicator. Internal audit results are proactively communicated to the inspected office or person, as indicated in the Inspectors Vademecum [1], that is a sort of handbook for the Inspector. Nonetheless, since they are published in the private Archimede portal, it is not possible to assess whether or not the ministry takes into account findings of internal audit [2].

Ministry of Defence (MOD) instructions on internal audit are clear, but little information has been found on relevant homepages on the level of this activity. The MOD Instructions on Audit Inspection set forth rules for the internal audit of the MOD. [1] According to Article 3 of the instructions, the aim of an audit is to ensure that accounts and government property are managed in accordance with the principles of law, instructions, budgets and accounting and that projects are managed effectively and efficiently. The Minister of Defence is to ensure that an audit of the Ministry is conducted annually, and the Chiefs of Staff are to ensure that there is an annual audit of their service branch (articles 11 and 12). The official conducting an audit is to report results to the Chief of Staff, when inspecting a service branch, and to the head of the institution, when inspecting another institution within the MOD. The Chief of Staff or head of the institution must send a copy of the report to the Minister of Defence (article 15). In 2015, ATLA was established with a 25-member internal inspection, audit and assessment unit. One of its assignments was to conduct internal audit of project administration, R&D, procurement and accounts. [2] However, an Internet search for information on the expertise of staff working with internal audit of defence spending and how their findings are valued found no information on these topics in the mainstream national newspapers Asahi Shimbun [3] and Yomiuri Shimbun, [4] or on the homepages of the Japan Ministry of Defence, [5] the two Houses of the Diet, the House of Representatives [6] and the House of Councillors, [7] or of the Board of Audit. [8] Nor was information on these topics for the same timeframe found in a search of the homepages of ATLA [9] or of the annual defence white book Defence of Japan. [10] Thus, there is evidence that internal audit is conducted, but there is not sufficient information to determine the level of its activity. As explained in the answer to Q15B, there are good grounds to believe that the results of internal audit are classified as secret.

An Internet search for information on enabling oversight of the internal audit of defence spending found no information on such oversight in the mainstream national newspapers Asahi Shimbun [1] and Yomiuri Shimbun [2] or on the homepages of the two Houses of the Diet, the House of Representatives [3] and the House of Councillors [4] or of the Board of Audit. [5] Nor was any mention of enabling oversight of such internal audit found in a search of a one year cycle of the meetings of five Diet committees. The proceedings from all the meetings in 2019 of the Diet committees that handle defence or audit were searched for the word internal audit (会計監査), but it was never mentioned. The Security Committee and the Committee on Audit and Oversight of Administration of the House of Representatives as well as the Committee on Foreign Affairs and defence, the Committee on Audit and the Committee on Oversight of Administration of the House of Councillors were searched for Diet sessions 198 (January 28 – June 26, 2019), 199 (August 1 – 5, 2019) and 200 (October 4 – December 9, 2019). [6] This indicates that the Diet does not conduct any enabling oversight of the internal audit of defence ministry expenditure.

There is not enough information to score this indicator. The MOD Instructions on Audit Inspection, which give the rules for internal audit, also refer to the duty to submit documents to the Board of Audit, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications when subjected to audit by these institutions. [1] The Board of Audit writes in a brochure that by conducting research and analysis on the internal control, including internal audit and internal checks, of the institutions that it audits, and by holding liaison conferences for the persons in charge of internal audit in each of the agencies, it is making efforts to perfect, strengthen and encourage the implementation of internal audit and related measures. [2] An Internet search for information on external scrutiny of the internal audit of defence spending found no information on this topic in the mainstream national newspapers Asahi Shimbun [3] and Yomiuri Shimbun, [4] or on the homepages of the Ministry of Defence, [5] of the two Houses of the Diet, the House of Representatives [6] and the House of Councillors [7] or of the Board of Audit. [8] Nor was any information on external scrutiny of the internal audit of defence spending by the Ministry of Finance [9] or the Ministry of Internal Affair and Communications [10] (which are internal to the Government of Japan but external to the Ministry of Defence) found for the timeframe of this research on the webpages of these agencies. Thus, there is evidence that the internal audit is externally scrutinised, but there is insufficient information to measure the extent of scrutiny. There are grounds to believe that the results of internal audit are classified as secret (see Q15B).

There is not enough information to score this indicator. The MOD Instructions on Audit Inspection entitle the Minister or a Chief of Staff to instruct an institution to take corrective measures if an internal audit has uncovered faulty practices. Conversely, the officer who has conducted the audit may commend an institution if the result of the audit was very good. [1] An Internet search for information on institutional outcomes of the internal audit of defence spending found no information on this topic in the mainstream national newspapers Asahi Shimbun [2] and Yomiuri Shimbun, [3] or on the homepages of the Ministry of Defence, [4] the two Houses of the Diet, the House of Representatives [5] and the House of Councillors, [6] or of the Board of Audit. [7] Thus, there is evidence that there is an internal audit, but not sufficient information to measure the extent to which audit findings are addressed in ministry practices. There are good grounds to believe that the results of internal audit are classified as secret (see Q15B).

There is an internal audit within the Ministry of Defence and in the office of the commander in chief. They edit, albeit irregularly, all financial and expenditure records. They have a structure and defined processes for auditing expenditures and assets [1,2,3].

The Jordanian military expenditures are audited by the Jordanian Armed Forces internal auditors, and by personnel of the Ministry of Finance. In addition, the Audit Bureau has 13 auditors permanently stationed at the General Headquarters of JAF where they monitor financial accounts and report any irregularities to the General Staff stationed at the General Headquarters [1,2,3]. There is no enabling oversight of the parliament over internal audits of military expenditure.

There are no external bodies that scrutinize and oversee the armed forces expenditures. Although the Ministry of Finance have permanent auditors in the JAF HQ, they do not submit detailed reports to the Ministry of Finance or other external bodies [1,2,3].

This sub-indicator has been marked as not applicable for several reasons: (1) there are no comprehensive audit reports, whether external or internal, around defence expenditures, (2) the majority of reporting on defence expenditure is descriptive financial reporting and does not include sections on recommendations or best practices, and (3) most importantly, due to the lack of an effectual defence ministry, even if recommendations and best practices were made available, there is no actual entity that could potentially be responsible for addressing the findings and putting the recommendations into practice [1,2].

The Ministry of Defence notes on its website that the internal audit division carries out its activities independently. [1] This division notes that its practices are guided by the standards of the Institute of Internal Auditors Global, of which Kenya is a member. [2] Despite this, their processes are difficult to evaluate. For instance, other than the staff profile of the deputy internal auditor general, other senior staff are not published.

Furthermore, the terms of reference and process guides for the internal audit division are not published. Previous audit reports by the auditor general found gaps on how financial reporting is done and information provided to the auditor-general is often limited and sometimes not provided, even for non-security senstive projects. [3] There is no evidence that the internal audit conducts ongoing reviews of defence expenditure.

Despite having parliamentary committees, such as Public Accounts Committee and the Budget Appropriation Committee, which have the mandate of oversight of the appropriation of funds passed by Parliament for public expenditure, oversight of security institutions, including expenditure within the Ministry of Defence, is challenging. [1] There are both legal barriers and lack of transparency from the MOD. For example, section 40 0f the Public Audit Act No. 34 of 2015 enables the defence ministry to redact any information from its reports that it deems as sensitive and that could jeopardize national security. [2]

MPs have often raised concerns over a lack of aggregated nature of defence budgets, which lacks clarity on how money is allocated. [3] Nonetheless, one of the roles of the Security Divisions of the Internal Auditor General Department (IAGD), under the National Treasury and Planning which oversees security institutions including MOD, is to ensure that the ministry establishes an independent Audit Committee for the purpose of, among other functions, promoting the integrity and quality of internal and external reports. [4] It is not clear either from IAGD, mandated by the Public Finance Management Act, 2012 to review the governance mechanisms for transparency and accountability in ministries and government entities, whether MOD has a functional independent audit committee.

The internal audit division of the Ministry of Defence states that it publishes and submits periodical reports to the Office of Auditor General (OAG), National treasury and Parliament, intended to ensure that expenditure is in line with budget allocation. [1]

The Kenya Defence Forces Act also provides for the safeguarding of all accounts of the ministry and the submission of reprots to the Auditor-General within three months of the end of every financial year. MOD publishes reports as required by the act and according to the stipulated time. [2]

The OAG is an independent body that conducts audits MOD in accordance to ISSAI’s and according to the latest audit, OAG has reported that they are provided with sufficient and appropriate information for the audit. [3]

However, there are times reports from the MOD are not fully transparent as various parliamentary committees have noted in the past. The MOD has been accused of lack of accountability on expenditure by providing vague reports that do not clearly indicate exactly how money was spent. [4] Moreover, ministry of defence has at times blocked auditors from reviewing questionable contracts at the ministry. [5]

The Ministry of Defence sometimes addresses audit findings especially when tasked by parliament to accout for expenditure and accountabilty of public funds allocated to the ministry. The Public Accounts Committee has on several occassions summoned the Ministry of Defence to appear before it to explain irregular expenditure, or failure to adhere to the requirements of the Auditor-General to access the ministry’s accounts for auditing. [1]

Based on the Law No. 06/L-021 on Public Internal Financial Control, the Internal Audit Unit (IAU), which operates within the Kosovo institutions, including the Ministry of Defence, is established as a public sector entity in accordance with the criteria adopted by the Kosovo Government [1]. Their function involves providing independent and objective assurance to the Head of a Public Sector Entity on the adequacy and effectiveness of the financial management and control system, and also provides advice for improvement [2]. The IAU is legally required to provide an independent assessment of governance, risk management, and control processes of the relevant Public Sector Entity [2]. In addition, the Kosovo Government’s Regulation No. 01/2019 lays out specific criteria for the establishment and implementation of internal audit functions within public sector entities [3]. Public sector entities generally follow this regulation (4). This sub-legal act stipulates that any Head of a Public Sector Entity must establish an internal audit unit, which will cover the whole entity [5].
With regards to the IAU within the Ministry of Defence, all activities, data, management, and control systems of the Ministry of Defence and the Kosovo Security Forces systematically go through internal audits to fully comply with provisions laid out in the Law on Public Internal Financial Control, and those in the plan approved by the Minister of Defence [6]. The IAU of the Ministry of Defence conducts internal audits in line with rules, policies, manuals and guidance, codes of ethics and professional standards approved by the Minister of Defence in line with the Law on Public Internal Financial Control. Furthermore, this IAU receives, reviews and uses in unlimited manner all technical, economic and financial data, as well as information and documents owned or controlled by the public sector entity undergoing the audit [6]. The regulation states that the IAU reports to the National Audit Office on all internal audits and their outcomes [6]. Finally, the Head of the Internal Audit reports to the Minister of Defence [6].
The Internal Audit Unit is staffed by three members, including a Head and two auditors [7]. The Unit had prepared an annual and strategic plan based on risk assessment and priorities. In 2018, it conducted eight regular audits – five of which were high risk, and three of which were medium risk. These audits mainly addressed procedures and activities in key departments such as procurement, finance management, vehicle management, and the certification of payments [7]. The IAU is evaluated based on its compliance with the Law on Public Internal Financial Control and reports to the Minister of Finance [7].

The current Rules of Procedure of the Kosovo Assembly do not imply any duty or responsibility of the respective parliamentary committee to oversee internal audits of expenditures within the Ministry of Defence [1].

The National Audit Office (NAO) determines whether internal controls and internal audit functions (notably within the Ministry of Defence) are appropriate and efficient [1]. In its 2018 audit report on the Ministry of Defence, the NAO stated that the Internal Audit Unit (IAU) of the Ministry of Defence has consistently demonstrated a high quality of work, through which it evaluated the functioning of the Ministry of Defence [1]. The NAO ensured that the work plan for the IAU within the Ministry of Defence was fully implemented in 2018 [1]. The IAU reports are not publicly released; but the NAO reviews and assesses internal audit processes in its annual review [1]. However, information provided by the NAO in its annual reports do not reveal in depth the operations of the IAU [1].

According to the government reviewer, the assessments of NAO have shown that the work of the IAU is of high quality and their reports have high performance. This is evidenced in their work that comes twice a year. Also, the review of the work in terms of standards is done by the central harmonizing unit at the Ministry of Finance, where it also evaluates the quality of the IAU in the MoD. This information could not be indepndently verified.

The Law No. 06/L-021 on Public Internal Financial Control stipulates that the Chief Administrating Officer of a public sector entity (for instance, the General Secretary in the case of the Ministry of Defence) is responsible for the implementation of financial management and control systems at all levels of the public sector entity structures, activities, and processes – in compliance with the sustainable financial and transparency management principle [1]. More precisely, the Chief Administrating Officer of any public sector entity ensures that actions are implemented to improve systems in compliance with recommendations from internal audits, external audits and other analyses. However, apart from any findings published in National Audit Office (NAO) reports, there is little information surrounding the recommendations from the Internal Audit Unit of the Ministry of Defence because its reports are not publicly released to the public.
IAU reports are qualitative, and IAU management provides information on the level of efficiency and effectiveness of the operation of internal controls, as well as specific recommendations for future improvement [2]. It is important to highlight that the National Audit Office found that a number of recommendations given by the IAU of the Ministry of defence in 2018 were not implemented throughout that year. Furthermore, the NAO highlighted that out of 39 recommendations in total given by the IAU, only seventeen of them were fully implemented, eleven were in the implementation phase and a further eleven were not implemented at all [2]. The reason given for not implementing the recommendations of the IAU was that the management of the Ministry of Defence had no monitoring capacity for the implementation phase, and therefore did not address any recommendations [2]. Following this, the NAO pointed out that the Ministry’s failure to fully address the recommendations of the IAU increases the risk of repetition of errors and shortcomings identified in the functioning of internal controls [2]. Consequently, the NAO recommended that the Minister of Defence should increase the responsibility at all levels within the Ministry of Defence management so that audit recommendations are prioritised and implemented [2].

In compliance with article 76 and 147 of the PIL, the internal auditing process is subject to parliamentary oversight, which is not particularly comforting in Kuwait’s case given that the Parliament is filled with Government supporters, activists said (1, 2, 3 and 4). Also, the staff in these departments can often lack the accounting and law degrees they need to effectively do the job, according to a senior official from the CSC, which oversees salary payments and hiring decisions, among other things, in all Government agencies (5). “They are usually not qualified or interested enough to do their work and no one cares about the reports they file,” the official said (5).

Since article 24 of the police law (6) and article 27 of the military law (7) enable the ministers to determine exactly how the funds of these organisations will be spent, monitored and retrieved or ignored if they get lost or stolen, these units tend to be weak. They are not allowed to build up their own work program. They simply implement the system that the minister arbitrarily chooses.

As a result, their work tends to be fairly superficial and their findings are not valued by auditing agencies or by the minister, the senior official from the CSC and other auditors said (5, 8 and 9).

These departments only provide oversight bodies with summary reports, Kuwaiti auditing officials said (1,2,3). In order to get more details, auditors or lawmakers would have to pressure the minister himself into releasing it — which rarely happens. Many auditors and lawmakers fear the security agencies too much to raise the alarm when they refuse to provide information or comply with Kuwaiti’s anti-corruption laws. The security agencies are the military arms of the Emir, who does not view fighting corruption on a large scale as a priority, officials say, because he does not take punitive actions against these measures (1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6).

Some auditors and lawmakers are themselves abusing the powers afforded to them, so they do not have much interest in cracking down on activities that they themselves engage in. They sometimes even threaten to use their oversight powers to extort favours out of officials in these ministries, a member of the royal family said (7).

Internal audit reports are conducted every month and sent to state auditors at the SAB, in compliance with article 41 of Law no. 31 of 1978 for the general budget, officials said (1, 2 and 3). These reports are always in summary form, despite the SAB’s request for more details. SAB auditors do not follow up on their own requests, however.

Officials and a royal say there are three reasons for this (2, 3 and 4): 1) Some auditors fear upsetting these ministers and other leaders of the executive branch, who might retaliate (by firing the auditor, accusing him/her of some vague crime like undermining national security, or by pressuring the SAB into demoting the auditor or canceling plans for promotions and raises). 2) The auditors themselves are accepting payments or favours to look the other way. 3) Some auditors are incompetent or ambivalent about their jobs — since Government posts are well paid, especially in the SAB, sometimes they attract individuals who are more interested in enjoying the prestige that comes with the post than in actually carrying out their duties.

The Ministry regularly addresses minor internal or external audit findings but they do not comply with major findings. These minor changes include regrading the salaries of junior or mid-level staffers to match their qualifications, cracking down on unnecessary business trips or trips abroad for medical treatment which employees take regularly as a form of paid leave, state auditors said. However, larger issues that have to do with the legitimacy of their acquisition plans or travel expenses of their senior staffers are off the table.

The external auditor, the State Audit Office, has a good and effective cooperation with the Internal Audit Department and Inspection Department of the Ministry of Defence [1].The MOD Audit and Inspection Department carries out regular audits in accordance with the Internal Audit Law as well as the approved AM Internal Audit Strategy and Internal Audit Plan. Auditors working in the MOD Audit and Inspection Department regularly improve their knowledge in compliance with the Internal Audit Law, according to which the auditor is obliged to regularly update knowledge and improve professional skills, while the head of the audit unit and the secretary of the Ministry promote the improvement of the internal auditor’s qualifications. [2] [3] Since January 30, 2014, the Law of the Internal Audit, section 12, part 1 indicates that “An internal auditor has a duty to supplement his or her knowledge and improve professional skills regularly. The head of an internal audit unit and the State Secretary or the head of an institution shall provide an auditor with a possibility to improve his or her qualification”. [4] However, sometimes the lack of professionality among the auditors still causes issues, e.g. delays in submitting the internal audits. According to the evidence, the Ministry takes into consideration the recommendations of the audits and pays regular attention to them. However, several shortcomings persist in the opinion-giving process of the internal auditors accross all Latvian ministries, namely: several internal auditing units lack the financial means to execute their auditing strategy, the inner control mechanisms are not evaluated and therefore it is unclear if they match their purpose, and the inner auditing process is still often characterized by systematic shortcomings. [5]

According to the government reviewer, the development of audit strategies, annual audit plan, as well as the implementation of audits takes place in accordance with Cabinet Regulation No. 385 “Procedures for Performing and Evaluating Internal Audit”, which stipulates that low-priority systems may be audited less than 5 years or deferred to free up average priorities for audits. In some cases, audits are carried over to the next year for several reasons: unforeseen absence of auditors, overly optimistic plans, performance of unplanned tasks (consultations, inspections), which is a high priority management task received at that time.

The external auditor, the State Audit Office, has a good and effective cooperation with the Internal Audit Department and Inspection Department of the Ministry of Defence. [1] In accordance with state regulatory enactments, the MOD Audit and Inspection Department annually prepares and submits to the Ministry of Finance an activity report on the performance indicators of the internal audit system, the most important findings in the defence field, and also gives an opinion on the internal control system. This report specifies the scope of the audited systems in whole defence system, the audit environment, planned audits for the next five years, the description of the audited systems and subsystems, and the internal audit strategy as well. [2] There is no evidence that the parliament takes specific interest in or debates the findings of internal audit.

The external auditor, the State Audit Office, has a good and effective cooperation with the Internal Audit Department and Inspection Department of the Ministry of Defence, which allows to monitor achieved goals. Every year the State Audit Ofice produces the Report on the effectiveness of the defense spending including a list of recommendations to be implemented. [1, 2]

The external auditor, the State Audit Office, has a good and effective cooperation with the Internal Audit Department and Inspection Department of the Ministry of Defence. [1] The MOD Audit and Inspection Department carries out regular audits in accordance with the Internal Audit Law. [2] [3] According to the Ministry of Justice, in 2012, the Ministry of Defence had the smallest percentage of implementation rate among ministries – only 65% (the average across ministries is 80%). Furthermore, the regularity of implemention of the recommendations is impeded by the fact that the internal auditors are late with their informative reviews in 50% of cases.[4]

The Directorate for Financial and Administrative Affairs audits expenditures related to the salaries of military personnel and civilians in the LAF (1). The Directorate for Financial and Administrative Affairs is currently directed by an officer with expertise in “defence resources management” (1). Although it might not be able to develop its own programme, according to a source, there is a strict oversight in expenditure and everything is documented (2).

The General Directorate of Administration (GDA) oversees the LAF spending (1). The Directorate for Financial and Administrative Affairs sends detailed reports of the spendings to the GDA and monthly reports to J5 (2). Moreover, the LAF generally provides the Ministry of Finance with budgets proposals that are more detailed and granular than the defence budget made public under the state budget. However, from a MoF perspective, there is more of an interest in controls of the overall budget size than an oversight. Thus, the LAF has marginal confidence in the MoF to offer credible and enabling oversight (3). On the other hand, the research found no evidence of the LAF sharing those reports with parliamentary committees (4).

It is unclear whether the LAF shares the audits with external bodies, although two interviewee’s (1), (2) indicated that the LAF shares information and coordinates with the CoA. Furthermore, the audit bodies have praised the high level of transparency in the LAF (3).

This sub-indicator has not been assigned a score due to insufficient information or evidence.

It is unclear whether the Ministry of National Defence addresses audit findings due to the lack of information and the availability of reports (1). A source indicated the LAF has a strict audit process that operates efficiently (2). In 2019 the CoM debated over 20 sessions austerity measures for 2019 state budget (3). The minister of defence consulted the LAF command to reduce the defence budget (4).

The Ministry of National Defence has a centralised internal audit department that analyses and assesses how effectively financial and material resources are used. The audit department prepares internal audit reports and recommendations as well as the annual work programme and activities report [1]. Functions for each auditor are listed publicly as well as their job descriptions, including computer literacy, higher education and work experience [2]. There is no information regarding ongoing audits.

Military defence expenditure is subject to parliamentary oversight by the Committee for National Security and Defence [1]. It is also subject to internal auditing for both sensitive and critical issues. The latest audit of dthe efence sector carried out by the Supreme Audit Office is available online in full [2]. Internal audits not publicly available.

Internal audit reports are released to legitimate external audit bodies (e.g. National Audit office, the Parliamentary Committee). The internal audit process is subject to in-depth but not necessarily regular reviews by external auditors [1].

There is not enough information available on addressing audit findings in practice that will allow this indicator to be scored. It is worth noting that, the Minister of Defence, in a meeting with the National Audit Office, highlighted the importance of the audit findings and the recommendations provided in being used in reforming the public procurement system in the area of defence [1].

An Internal Audit Unit is an essential requirement in every ministry and government agency in Malaysia. The government, through the Ministry of Finance, has outlined the structure, function and operation of an internal audit unit. The unit has an independent function to monitor and ensure transparent and systematic governance. The unit is entrusted to monitor the financial system, internal control, and financial record of the department, or government agencies. The Chief of Internal Audit must send, through the head of the department, a yearly report to the Ministry of Finance. The report is subject to evaluation and examination by the Auditor General Office that would issue a yearly report to the Parliament, released for public consumption. [1] [2] The Ministry of Defence (MINDEF)’s internal Audit section is known as Bahagian Audit dalam dan Siasatan Am (Internal Audit and General Investigation Unit). The unit is headed by the Division Secretary office that acts as a secretariat to 106 agencies and divisions under MINDEF and the three major branches of the armed forces. Each agency is headed by a principle Assistant Secretary. The unit conducts “financial management audits of a current year based on the three-year cycle” on MINDEF agencies and the three branches of the armed forces. [2]

Oversight previously was not possible since there was no special parlimentary committee for defence and security; however, a committee was set up in December 2018 by the Pakatan Harapan government [1]. Previously, given the absence of a defence committee, members of parliament were less informed on defence reports. Furthermore, there was limited time for all members of parliament to discuss the National Audit Report. There were no parlimentary sub-committees to scrutinise the report before it was brought before Parliament. [2] The function and effectiveness of the committee remains to be seen given that the change of government in 2020, which was followed by a period of political instability that continues until today, and has hampered the progress of the committee. There is no evidence that the committee has met between 2018 and the end of 2020. In November 2020, the parliament approved a motion to establish nine special select committee’s for the 14th parliamentary sitting following a change of administration to replace the ten special parliamentary committees formed under the Pakatan Harapan administration [3]. The previous Special Select Committee for defence and security is replaced by the Special Select Committee on Security under the current administration. It remains to be seen whether this committee will exercise effective and meaningful oversight of the MINDEF internal audit process.

The process requires internal audit reports to be made available and submitted to the Ministry of Finance every year. The reports are examined by the Auditor General Office (AG). [1] In turn, the AG office would publish its own auditing findings by highlighting some suggestions, improvements or actions to be taken. The AG office may also higlight some irregularities. It is hinged upon the Defense Ministry to take action based on the report either to initiate internal actions or to report the case to the anti-corruption agency.

Although the audit findings have highlighted several issues in the reports, the Ministry’s response appears to have been selective and purposely slow, especially when it implied political favouritism and connections in the procurement. Cases like the purchase of Scorpene submarines and the maintenance of the aging Sikorsky S-61 helicopter show the problems. [1] [2]

According to the World Bank’s 2013 report on financial management in Mali’s security forces, Mali’s expenditure chain is highly formalised, but provides little autonomy to the technical directorates to exercise managerial authority. It is based on the French model, with a four-step procedure: expenditure commitment, validation, payment order, and payment.¹
In this system, only the public accountant can handle funds or securities. The public accountant is under the oversight of the Ministry of Finance and is personally and financially responsible for funds or securities missing from his or her till. The only senior account manager is the Minister of Finance; in the security sector, the only delegated secondary account manager is the director of the Finance and Equipment Directorate (DFM).
The SIPRI study indicates that each unit of the armed and security forces has a director of administration and finance who is directly responsible for the implementation of the unit’s budget. This role of the unit director is complemented by commanders of administrative centres in each military region, who are responsible for financial operations within their region.²
However, military accountants, unlike other public-sector accountants, are not appointed by or with the agreement of the Minister of Economy and Finance and do not take a professional oath (as is required by the 1996 public accounting act for all other public-sector accountants). They are thus not accountable to the Minister of Economy and Finance.²
Instead, the Minister of Defence is responsible for the authorisations made in the MDAC by all other officials and also for the actions of the accountants. These other officials are nonetheless subject to disciplinary, penal or civil procedures, so they do have an impetus to control the financial operations of the units for which they are responsible.²
The weak budgetary system and heterogeneity of management methods does not facilitate optimal allocation of maintenance funds. Allocations are often channelled to other uses, exacerbating the degradation of material. Overall, the inadequacy of follow-ups and funds for effective upkeep and maintenance threatens the usability and sustainability of new investments provided for in the Ministry of Defence’s budget request.¹
Another weakness of the accounting practice in the military sector is the lack of a division of accounting positions into principal and secondary accountants, as is the case in all other ministries. Instead, commanders of administrative centres have a dual role with implementation (fund authorisation) and accounting functions similar to those of principal accountants in civilian administration. Similarly, military accountants are not required to be accredited to an official with power to authorize payments. Thus, the principle of separation of authority between officials who authorize payment and those who oversee how money is spent is compromised, with the consequent implications for accountability.²
The World Bank study notes that the maintenance of a special account for operations in the country’s “Northern Zone” is a major source of vulnerability.¹ This account has no de facto spending ceiling, the purpose and operating conditions of the special account are not adhered to, budget charges display anomalies and lack transparency, and the controls performed on expenditures from the special account are less rigorous than the country’s normal budget procedures.¹

Officially, the authorities should exercise control on aspects of public administration related to the management of public resources. There are three categories of control: administrative, judicial and parliamentary.

Administrative control
The armed forces are nominally subject to the authority of the Director for the General Control of Public Service, who ensures that expenditure is kept within approved limits.

Judicial control
According to rules of the West African Economic and Monetary Union and national laws requiring good governance and transparency in the management of public administration, all public accounts must be collated by the Director of the National Budget and submitted to the Supreme Court for auditing.
The accounting division of the Supreme Court checks these accounts and authorises the annual auditing bill, called the projet de loi de règlement. The auditing bill certifies the accounts of the financial year and approves any variation from the original Finance Act. This bill forms the audited accounts of the government. It is required to be submitted to the National Assembly no later than one year after budget implementation. However, it can take several years to prepare and sometimes never gets to the National Assembly.

Parliamentary control
The National Assembly currently exercises control through its accounting division. When irregularities are noted in the report of the accounting division of the Supreme Court, the National Assembly can establish a commission of inquiry. When necessary, the National Assembly can invite witnesses, such as ministers, for oral and written questioning.

In practice though, this does not occur. According to the World Bank’s 2013 financial management assessment, Mali’s military and internal security forces are in practice not subject to external oversight. All of the external monitoring bodies avoid using their oversight powers for issues related to the security forces.

The World Bank stresses that the Bureau du Vérificateur Général (BVG), created in 2004, has never carried out a compliance verification with the Ministry of Defence, despite its large size and the fact that all other important departments have been subjected to such scrutiny.
The BVG publishes annual reports evaluating the government’s various spending programmes. The last published report came in 2015 and made no mention of defence spending.⁴ The failure to publish any subsequent reports or to address the defence budget highlights the lack of external oversight.
One year after the World Bank’s 2013 report, the BVG did conduct an audit of the controversial purchase of a new presidential jet, but only at the behest of the IMF. During this exceptional audit, the BVG determined the cost to be CFA19 billion (roughly USD40 million), of which CFA1.4 billion were commissions and fees paid to a broker linked to the president’s friend, Michel Tomi. Moreover, the BVG never received access to the plane’s operating contract, highlighting the limited ability of independent and external audit bodies to perform their functions in the face of opposition from the executive. In 2016, Mali’s authority for regulating public sector contracts and spending (ARMDS) found that it was wholly unable to audit the Ministry of Defence’s finances for 2014 because of the lack of documents provided by the ministry⁶.

The absence of any meaningful or regular internal or external audits, as shown in 16A, 16B and 16C, indicates that the ministry is not responsive in this area.

At SEDENA there is a unit called Inspection and Comptroller General of the Army and Air Force, an administrative body responsible for the supervision, evaluation, control, and internal audit of the Secretariat’s human, animal, material, and financial resources.

Said body prepares its own annual audit plan which is approved by the SFP, [1] [2] and the results of these are presented to the head of SEDENA. The SFP also designates the head of this area.

Based on the information above, it is possible to conclude that SEDENA – which would be considered the Ministry of Defence – does possess this internal audit sector in charge of all inspections, including an annual internal audit as mandated by law. However, there do not appear to be any legal requirements for appropriate staff expertise or flexibility for the work programme, but the findings are presented to the head of SEDENA (which would be considered the Defence Minister).

The results of the internal audits are presented to the SFP. However, there is insufficient information to know whether SEDENA presents complete reports or summary versions of its expenses.

According to investigative documents, there is evidence that the General Comptroller of the Army and the Air Force provides supervision in delicate or crucial cases on irregularities in expenses, [1] [2] although there are not many. [3] [4]

Internal audit reports are not proactively disclosed. However, since ASF has the power to conduct external scrutiny, it receives internal audit reports.

Information can be obtained through the transparency system. In this regard, the research documents publish information contained in these. [1] [2]

The content of the internal audit reports is not public knowledge, and therefore it is not possible to indicate precisely whether SEDENA addresses their conclusions in its practices.

However, journalistic investigation documents mention acts of corruption related to SEDENA (for example, the construction of the NAIM), detected from internal audits by other agencies, [1] and even indicate that irregularities in military spending they have motivated internal audits, although more detail is not provided on these. [2]

This shows that internal audit reporting is possibly not being addressed effectively.

Internal revision is established in the Ministry of Defence, but the reviews of defence ministry expenditure are irregular and superficial. [1][2][3][4] Some procedures for internal audit are lacking, and in some cases the implementation of prescribed procedures is missing. [5]

Also, according to the State Audit Institution report, only one person is employed as an internal auditor, which brings the capacity to perform internal audits into question. [5]

According to the MoD, the Internal Audit Department has the competence to control the financial management within the Ministry of Defence. It is an organizational unit of the Ministry of Defence which independently and objectively determines the accomplishment of the tasks and functions of the Ministry and the Armed Forces of Montenegro, warns of irregularities and non-compliance with legal and other regulations that determine the business and proposes measures to eliminate them and to improve business. The Internal Audit Division performs internal audit according to the methodology of work prescribed by the Ministry of Finance in accordance with internationally recognized principles and standards of internal audit, and the code of ethics for internal audit. [6]

According to the Ministry of Defence, the Internal Audit Department within the Ministry continuously examines and evaluates the validity and appropriateness of internal control systems, management controls and accounting systems, verifies and tests the credibility, appropriateness and legality of financial transactions and processes, etc. The Committee for Security and Defence in accordance with the Law, supervises and reviews the work of internal audit.

However, there is no oversight of the internal control for sensitive or critical issues. A few controls are planned on an annual basis, and even those are frequently not conducted. [1] Members of the parliamentary Committee for Security and Defence are provided with general information about internal control, as part of the annual report of the Ministry, and they do not use their oversight powers to obtain more information about this matter. [2][3][4][5]

Internal audit reports are provided to the State Audit Institution only when under revision, which has occurred only once. [1] On that occasion, the State Audit Institution provided various recommendations, but only a few are confirmed to have been implemented in practice by the Ministry. [2][3]

There is not enough information available on the practice of addressing audit findings that wlll enable this indicator to be scored. It is worth noting that the Ministry claims that it addresses recommendations about its internal control, [1] but its annual reports show that the internal control has not made any important findings that need to be addressed by the Ministry. [2][3][4][5]

This indicator has not been assigned a score due to insufficient information or evidence.

No information about internal audit of defence ministry expenditure is disclosed by the Moroccan authorities.(1)(2)(3)

Neither CSOs nor the media are given access to information about internal audit of defence ministry expenditure either directly/indirectly or officially/unofficially. (4)(5)(6)(7)

It is therefore unclear whether internal audit of defence ministry expenditure exists.

This indicator has not been assigned a score due to insufficient information or evidence.

There is no internal audit of the defence ministry’s expenditure.

This indicator has not been assigned a score due to insufficient information or evidence.

There is no internal audit of the defence ministry’s expenditure.

This indicator has not been assigned a score due to insufficient information or evidence.

There is no internal audit of the defence ministry’s expenditure.

The military has its own audit body under the Ministry of Defence called the Account Department (KaKaNgwe). The position of Head of Department is held by the Major General. Under the Account Department, there are sub-departments at every division. Most of the personnel are not from the Defence Service Academy, but are graduates from the University of Economics who entered into the military [1]. The sub-department audits defence expenditure monthly and the Account Department of the Ministry of Defence audits the expenditure every fiscal year [2]. According to interviewees, there is regular auditing in the defence sector. But members of Parliament always criticise its effectiveness because of a lack of transparency [3].

The Union Auditor General Office has no authority to investigate or scrutinise defence spending and there is nothing about the defence sector in the annual report submitted by the Union Auditor to Parliament [1]. MPs criticise the fact that they cannot scrutinise the Myanmar military’s budget or defence procurement effectively [2]. Therefore, the legislative and executive branches have no powers of oversight.

After completing its audit, the Account Department has to submit it to the C-in-C of the Defence Services. After that, the responsible person at the Ministry of Defence explains the spending to Parliament [1]. Major-General Myint New, Deputy Minister of Defence, explained the defence expenditure for the 2019-2020 fiscal year but did not offer any details on spending for the salaries of personnel or regarding specific equipment that the military plans to purchase [2]. The report by the Account Department on the Ministry of Defence is not available to the public. U Aung Hlaing Win, Member of Parliament, said that MPs did not know the exact expenditure of the defence sector [3] and the Office of the Auditor General lacks the power to scrutinise defence spending [1].

The responsible person at the Ministry of Defence explains defence expenditure regularly every fiscal year, although the explanation lacks adequate and specific information. The explanation provided by the Deputy Minister of Defence for the 2019-2020 fiscal year did not offer any details on spending for the salaries of personnel or regarding specific equipment that the military plans to purchase [1]. MPs always argue that the expenditure of the military needs to be more transparent [2]. Although there is an internal audit body, the specific outcomes of the audits are never published [3]. The Ministry of Defence has never made a public statement regarding the findings of the Account Department or defence expenditure and there is no public knowledge of the Ministry of Defence addressing the findings of the internal audit body.

The Central Government Audit Service (ADR) is the independent internal auditor of the Dutch government, including the Ministry of Defence [1]. The Government Accounts Act of 2016 stipulates that the ADR provides assurance on the financial statements within the annual reports of each ministry and conducts research into their budget management, financial management and material management [2]. The ADR publishes reports with the departmental annual reports of all ministers, as well as reports on other topical investigations. For example, the Court of Audit’s recent report ‘Out of Sight’ questions the effectiveness of the internal financial control organisation and sheds lights on the MoD’s failure to implement budget cuts [3]. Given the requirements listed for the job vacancies, staff expertise is at a high level and there is no evidence of inappropriate or inadequate advice from the unit [4]. The ADR can carry out investigations on an ad hoc basis and offer policy advice, but it can only do so on request [1]. The ADR is demand-driven and cannot determine its own work programme and assignments.

Reports written by the Central Government Audit Service (ADR) are publicly disclosed [1]. The Minister of Finance sends an overview to the House of Representatives every six months with the titles of reports issued by the Central Audit Service [2]. This overview is also published online. For example, in September 2020, an ADR report on the progress of the F-35 acquisition project was sent to the House of Representatives and released online [3].

The Netherlands Court of Audit is an independent, external organisation that audits all ministries and other public organisations, including the Central Government Audit Service (ADR) [1]. In accordance with the Government Accounts Act 2016, the Court of Audit has the right to access all relevant information needed to perform this task, including confidential information and data on the revenues and expenditures of ministries [2]. The Court of Audit has the power to determine its own mandate [1]. The Court of Audit works actively to improve the performance, quality and reliability of internal audits completed by the Central Government Audit Service (ADR) [3].

The Ministry regularly addresses audit reports in discussions and implements findings. For instance, the Central Government Audit Service’s (ADR) 2019 audit of the Ministry of Defence was accompanied by a five-page response letter from the Ministry [1]. This response details a number of implementation measures to address the findings. For example, in response to the ADR’s findings on financial management, the Ministry of Defence stated that the Director General for Policy and the General Director of Finance and Control would work jointly to improve this, adding that improvements could be achieved by promoting chain awareness, enhancing monitoring and taking extra care during December [1]. More generally, the response also mentions meetings that are held to further discuss progress for each finding/deficiency and to create concrete action plans that include the delegation of responsibilities and a clear timetable [1].

The MoD regularly engages in reviews of the adequacy and effectiveness of internal controls including procurement policy, authority to commit the Ministry (Delegations) policy, budgeting and financial reporting, management of cash and bank accounts and offshore bank account procedures, conflicts of interests policy, secondary employment policy, sensitive expenditure and gifts policy, travel policy, protected disclosures procedures, the Speaking Up Policy, and recruitment policy. [1] Nothing further was received from MoD as to its internal audit processes. Internal Audit activity for the NZDF is more thoroughly detailed, however. In March 2017, the NZDF commenced a ‘transformation journey’ with the aim of improving assurance value from the Internal Audit function. To achieve this, changes to the target operating model were implemented to enable a step change to keep pace with the NZDF’s evolving risk profile, and stakeholder demand for modern Internal Audit support. Within the new operating model, an Audit Intelligence Unit was established to provide data-led audit capability. [2]

According to the NZDF, this delivered significant improvements to both fraud detection and the efficiency of contemporary audit engagements. Another key aspect of the new operating model has been the creation of a strategic co-sourcing partnership for NZDF Internal Audit with three independent suppliers. This ensures ongoing access to specialist resources and skills when required, and provides knowledge transfer to lift the competency of the in-house Internal Audit team. It is the aim of the NZDF Internal Audit to provide meaningful and insightful internal assurance services for the NZDF, so as to look beyond compliance and be a valued partner for continuous improvement. [3]

NZDF Internal Audit operates as the Third Line of Assurance within the NZDF Risk Management Framework and, in accordance with the Institute of Internal Auditors International Professional Practices Framework (IPPF), provides independent and objective assurance to the Chief of Defence Force (CDF) and executive management. Internal Audit adds value as an enabler of the execution of the NZDF strategy by 1) Auditing the right things; providing assurance over the areas that matter by aligning the annual Audit Work Plan to the NZDF Risk Profile and Appetite. 2) Using the best methods; applying best practice by bringing a systematic, disciplined approach to evaluating the adequacy and effectiveness of internal controls. 3) Being a trusted advisor; helping colleagues to put the right controls in place, by seeking opportunities to identify improvements to internal controls, enhancing efficiency, cost effectiveness and effective risk management. [4]

For independence reasons, the NZDF Chief Internal Auditor reports to the Vice Chief of Defence Force (VCDF). VCDF retains the right of access to the CDF and is also responsible for directing investigations of allegations of fraud. The CDF approves the annual Audit Work Plan. The Chief of Defence Strategy Management (CDSM) has official oversight for administrative purposes but does not direct the execution of the annual Audit Work Plan. The NZDF Risk and Assurance Committee (RAC) retains governance oversight, endorses the content of the annual work plan prior to CDF’s approval, and monitors the overall performance of the function. The new operating model has enabled the RAC to monitor performance of the Internal Audit function against contemporary key performance indicators (annual audit hours, utilisation rate, risk coverage, and audit lead time). To reinforce independence, the Chair of the Risk and Assurance Committee and CDF also have an active role in the performance and evaluation of the Chief Internal Auditor, in line with the Charter. The NZDF RAC presently has three independent members and is chaired by an external member of the NZDF Advisory Board, Mr Murray Jack. [5, 6] A representative of the Ministry of Defence attends the NZDF RAC, however the scope of the committee is limited to NZDF matters. The Internal Audit function’s priority is to ensure maximum assurance value is delivered during every financial year. A key enabler to this is the delivery of a robust audit planning process aligned to the NZDF risk appetite and strategic risks. To achieve this, high assurance impact areas are identified, after considering the risk framework, previous audit findings, and the outputs from face-to-face meetings with senior leaders. According to the NZDF, since completing the ‘transformation journey’, the Internal Audit function has been recognised by senior leadership as delivering value through a wider range of review types than previously seen. These include business process reviews, consulting/advisory work, supporting unanticipated project risk events, as well as spearheading targeted improvements to the NZDF Fraud Control Framework through the multi-year Arai Tinihanga (‘to prevent Fraud’) programme. [7, 8, 9, 10]

As per the Standing Orders (S196), papers and records relevant to proceedings must be provided to the FADTC if requested [1]. The redaction of certain sections of the report would be subject to security clearances of the recipients; however, given that a number of officials in The Treasury, Public Service Commission, and Audit NZ have the required clearance, this would be unlikely [2]. Nonetheless, based on the contextual evidence examined for this assessment, it seems unlikely that the FADTC would request such a document unless specifically recommended by the OAG’s annual report briefing. This being said, the FADTC did question the Minister of Defence as to how many evaluations of policies or programmes were to be completed in the 2016/17 financial year, and how many monitoring, evaluation, and auditing programmes or initiatives were to be delivered under Vote in 2016/17 [3]. Similar questions were posed to the NZDF, to which satisfactory answers were received [4, 5]. As such there is no reason to believe that such reports would be withheld from the FADTC if requested. Moreover, the OAG reviews internal procedures and processes as part of its normal audit function.

The OAG assesses and grades the MoD and NZDF management control environment and refers to any relevant audit and inquiry work as part of its assistance to the FADTC [1, 2]. In 2017, the OAG noted several deficiencies relating to inventory obsolescence, but acknowledged the internal work of NZDF to improve its financial management and review its internal audit and risk management functions, suggesting that they were aware of Internal Audit functions improvements underway at that time [3].

The ministry does address audit findings regularly but without further clarification its application appears inconsistent, or rather, there are appears to be no discernible pattern to their selection and implementation. Annual Report briefings provided to the FADTC by the AOG for the years 2015/16, 2016/17, 2018/19 acknowledge this [1, 2, 3]. The OAG 2017/18 Annual Report briefing to the FADTC was not available on the Parliament website.

The Defence Ministry’s internal oversight body is called the Office of the Inspector General of the Armed Forces (IGA/Inspection Générale des Services) (1). It is responsible for ensuring that all relevant administrative, financial and budgetary rules and standards are applied and respected and that public resources are managed in a transparent, efficient and cost-effective manner (see also question 8 for further details regarding IGA). However, the assessor found no information on the effective control of the defence ministry expenditure conducted by the IGA (1). Within the Ministry of Defence, there is also the Office of the Inspector General (IGS, Inspection Générale des Services), which acts as a control structure of internal administration of the Ministry (1). Its equivalent also exists in other ministries. However, the assessor found no information on the effectiveness of the control of the IGS.

There is no evidence on the effective control of the defence ministry expenditure conducted by the IGA. Therefore this indicator is marked Not Applicable.

The National Assembly’s standing committee on defence and security is responsible for overseeing the work of the ministries in charge of national defence and security policy (see question 2 for details) (1). According to conducted interviews, at least in the past three years, the committee was not provided with a detailed report of an internal oversight body that audited the Ministry of Defence’s expenditures (2). Committee members were provided with a report of the National Audit Office. However, it is not clear to what extent the report examined the Ministry of Defense expenditures (2) .

There is no evidence of the effective control of the defence ministry expenditure conducted by the IGA. Therefore this indicator is marked Not Applicable.

There is no evidence of the effective control of the defence ministry expenditure conducted by the IGA. Therefore this indicator is marked Not Applicable.

Although internal audit units exist, their operations are mired in secrecy. The Directorate of Finance and Administration is responsible for internal audits at the Ministry of Defence. Audits cover records of revenues and expenditure, cash and store, accounts kept by other units and formations of services, and the civil department of the MOD. The audit team are also tasked with detecting and identifying fraud and waste in the ministry (1). But no evidence of technical competency. There is a history of delay with the production of audit reports, is exacerbated by a large number of abandoned projects commenced each year and replaced by new projects in the following year (1).

The Office of the Auditor-General is an external oversight body. The AGO is the Audit Unit of the Ministry of Defence; it does not cooperate as it should; it does not comply with the requirements to submit an annual report to parliament. Reports have not been issued for several years (2).

The National Assembly does not play a key role in military expenditure, particularly defence expenditure concerning weapons procurement contracts (1). The NASS has a closer relationship with the Office of the Auditor-General (OAuGF) than with internal audit units of the MOD (2).

Given the infrequent nature of reports by oversight bodies such as the Office of the Auditor-General, the NASS is less inclined to have an interest in the internal audit process of the Ministry of Defence. Concerning the internal audit process, the Auditor-General’s Office acts as a buffer between the internal audit process and the parliamentary oversight institutions, although in theory, their powers extend to investigating the internal audit processes as well (2).

The auditor general’s report is in most instances released late. For example, the auditor general’s report for 2015 was submitted to the National Assembly in 2017 (1). The legal framework governing the office of the Auditor General of the Federation is inadequate. Although the law required report should be submitted by 31 May of the following year (2), (3), this is rarely observed in practice (1). The late delivery of the report indicates that there was no oversight or external scrutiny between 2015-2017 (4). Following the release of the report, there is little public debate or engagement with the content of the report.

Given the delay in the processes surrounding the report, there is little evidence of monitoring and evaluation results incorporated into the next budget cycle. Audit reports are incomplete and have not been submitted or available for many years before 2016 (1). The PLAC capacity assessment report noted that legislators identified deficiencies in the monitoring capacity of the NASS (2). These deficiencies include a lack of technical capacity in the NASS. The inefficient use of the committee system also contributes to the failure to adequately monitor audit bodies. This situation is further exacerbated by a lack of technical capacity within internal audit units in the Ministry of Defence.

The Law on Public Internal Financial Control shapes the legal framework for internal audit processes [1]. In accordance with the Law, the Internal Audit Department (IAD) performs financial, compliance, internal control systems, performance IT audits [2]. Specifically, the IAD provides insights and audits of the costs incurred through the activities undertaken under the scope of the audit. The IAD has the flexibility to build its own work programme; it follows strategic and annual internal audit plans, drawn up on the basis of an objective assessment of the risks to which the Ministry of Defence and the Army of the North Macedonia have been exposed [3]. In addition to this, there are separate units within the Ministry of Defence’s Finance Department, which control the Ministry of Defence and the Army of the Republic expenditures and monitor if there is any anonymous reporting for possible irregularities [4]. The IAD, according to a high official from the Ministry of Defence, is staffed with well-trained, experienced personnel drawn from different sectors: finance, logistics, law, labor relations, [2]. However, staffing is incomplete and this shortage hinders the effectiveness of the unit. According to the current organisational set-up, the IAD is staffed at only 39% capacity, with internal auditors accounting for 50% [3]. Therefore, the IAD works to only 50 % or less of its predicted capacity.
The Ministry of Defence’s Finance Department, upon approval by the Minister of Defence, submits an annual financial report to the Ministry of Finance. Composed of 6 parts, this also includes a report on the internal audit activities and a statement by the Minister of Defence on the quality of the Ministry of Defence’s internal audits [3]. For example, in 2018 three regular and three ad-hoc audits were performed. [4] Based on this, action plans for eliminating irregularities listed in IAD reports are being developed. The IAD also receives quarterly reports illustrating the actions taken based on IAD recommendations listed in the reports for the previous period [2]. In sum, there is a sound legal framework for taking the IAD findings into account and, accordingly, for regularising the work of the Ministry of Defence and Army departments. For reference, please note the following example – Audits in the past have identified an occasional missing link between spending and strategic documents. In response in January 2019 a new Rulebook on PPBS was adopted. [4]

Despite not being explicitly stated in its responsibilities [1], the parliamentary Committee on Defence and Security may oversee and review the Ministry of Defence’s finances and expenditures. This includes the review of internal audit reports [2]. However, minutes from previous Committee on Defence and Security meetings show that none of the findings from the Internal Audit Department were presented to the Committee [3] nor did the Committee oversee the internal audit processes of the Ministry of Defences’ expenditure [2].

Legally, there is no external oversight of the audit work carried out by the Internal Audit Department (IAD); there is as such no obligation to send IAD reports to the Committee on Defence snd Security or to the State Commission for the Prevention of Corruption (SCPC). If required, audit reports can be submitted to the aforementioned entities upon their request (not as a regular practice), if prior consent is granted by the Minister of Defence and if the request is in accordance with the Internal Audit Charter [1]. However, no requests for IAD reports can be traced from any Committee on Security and Defence meeting minutes [2].Moreover, there is no public record of SCPC requests related to IAD findings.

The IAD’s work is indirectly supervised by the Ministry of Finance [3]. The IAD submits audit reports and reports within the framework of the Annual Financial Report, which the Ministry of Defence is legally required to submit to the Ministry of Finance no later than May 10 each year for the previous year [1].

The Ministry of Defence prepares action plans to eliminate any irregularities in operations stated in the audit reports from the Internal Audit Department (IAD). Quarterly reports are thus submitted back to the IAD to outline response to recommendations stated in the audit reports from the previous period [1].
IAD recommendations have lead to such improvements, as:
– adoption of new Rulebook on PPBS, [2]
– amendments to the Army Service Law;
– adoption of a New Acquisition Manual; [3]
– adoption of new Guidelines on Public Procurement;
– revision and update to the Guidelines for the implementation of financial processes;
– preparation of a Defense Assets Assessment Plan and an ongoing process of analysis and update of the records of the actual MOD Assets;
– measures to correct certain irregularities in the field of office work etc.
However, despite the positive outcome, details of this practice are not advertised publicly.

The Internal Auditor Unit of the Ministry of Defence conducts internal audits for the whole defence sector except for the Intelligence Service [1]. Its main tasks are to provide support to the ministry’s senior management in controlling and managing subordinate departments and agencies; assess whether the internal control arrangements are appropriate, adequate and effective and whether the arrangements are being implemented as intended; undertake the provision of consultancy and advice; participate in development work; and assist departments in their own risk assessments. The Internal Auditor Unit of the Ministry of Defence is the biggest internal auditor unit in the Norwegian public sector. Staff consist of professionals with relevant university degrees. Exceptions to degree requirements may be given to highly qualified data experts. There has been very low staff turnover recently [2]. The Internal Auditor Unit of the Ministry of Defence works under the instruction of the Secretary General (Departementsråd) of the Ministry of Defence and in accordance with the IIA international standards. The Norwegian defence sector operates with 2 models for internal audit [3]. The Internal Auditor Unit of the Ministry of Defence has separate agreements with the heads of the Defence Materiel Agency, the Defence Construction Agency and the Defence Research Establishment. It has also a controlling function for the subordinate agencies. The Armed Forces use another model. The Chief of Defence’s own Internal Auditor Unit contributes to the control and management of the Armed Forces. It is also responsible for managing the Armed Forces’ reporting channel. The unit is outside the chain of command.

The Internal Auditor Unit does not submit its reports to the Parliament on a regular basis, but the Standing Committee on Scrutiny and Constitutional Affairs may request and gain access to the non-redacted reports. The reports may also be released to individuals or organisations in accordance with the provisions of the Norwegian Freedom of Information Act and the Security Act [1].

The reports of the Internal Auditor Unit of the Ministry of Defence are proactively released to and regularly reviewed by the Office of the Auditor General [1]. In 2017 the internal audit review process was reviewed by the Institute of Internal Auditors Norway (IIA Norway), a member of IIA Global and the European Confederation of Institutes of Internal Auditing (ECIIA). In 2019 a review on whistleblowing provisions was conducted [1].

The Internal Auditor Unit of the Ministry of Defence works under the instruction of the Secretary General (Departementsråd) of the Ministry of Defence and in accordance with the IIA international standards. On receiving a report, the Secretary General instructs the subordinated agencies as to how to handle an issue. The Internal Auditor Unit conducts a follow-up audit [1]. It is difficult to assess to what extent the Ministry of Defence takes the findings of the internal audit unit into account. However, there are established robust procedures on how to address audit findings in practices. The Internal Auditor Unit has regular meetings with the Office of the Auditor General. Representatives from the Office of the Auditor General confirm that communication between the Ministry of Defence and the Internal Auditor Unit is good and there is no indication that the ministry does not address audit findings in its practice [2].

There is an internal auditing unit within the Ministry of Defence and the armed forces (1). This unit reports to the financial department and engages in irregular and superficial auditing process with regards to delivery, procurement and also stock auditing. However, it has very limited, and in most case, no say in the expenditure auditing process or decision making (2), (3). No legislation has been passed since the 2015 GI report of Oman legislating on auditing of the Ministry of Defence expenditure. Furthermore, the State Audit Institution posts news items on audit training with various ministries, including the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of the Interior; however, there is no mention of similar training with the Ministry of Defence.

The internal auditing unit has no authority over MoD expenditures. It is solely a bureaucratic unit that delivers reports on deliveries and financial assets; it has no power to alter or even provide recommendations (1), (2), (3).

There is no external oversight over the internal auditing unit. These units (external) do not exist (1), (2), (3).

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable because the reports of the internal units do not include any recommendations. Therefore, there is no way to address something that does not exist (1), (2), (3).

The Internal Audit Unit engages in irregular and superficial reviews of national forces, security agencies, and intelligence expenditure (1). However, this process is symbolic and routinely conducted as a symbolic practise (2). The process and reports are not considered a reliable source of auditing.

There is little enabling oversight of the internal audit function of national forces expenditure (1). This is a requirement of the MoF, which need to submit their reports to international donors (1), (2).

There is the external audit from the MoF, and also the State Audit and Administrative Control Bureau (1). The internal reports are never released and not available to the public or other ministries and departments (2), (3).

In some cases, when grave issues are found, the armed forces and security agencies symbolically address the issue to distract the public or to uncover the mishandling of the case of corruption (1), (2), (3).

The Internal Audit Unit does not review ongoing defence expenditures; instead, its role is to evaluate whether or not internal control components are well-designed and properly implemented [1]. The Internal Audit Unit is able to advise the defence secretary on issues related to management control and operation audits, but it does not have the flexibility to build its own programme [1]. Still, the secretary values the Internal Audit Unit’s findings, based on an investigation that revealed corruption within the military medical centre and the Veterans Federation of the Philippines [2, 3].

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’ as the Internal Audit Unit does not review ongoing defense expenditures [1].

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’ as the Internal Audit Unit does not review ongoing defense expenditures [1].

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’ as the Internal Audit Unit does not review ongoing defense expenditures [1].

Internal audits in the defence sector are conducted by the MoD’s Internal Audit Unit (from 2018 it is a part of the Department of Inspections) or by Department of Inspections itself. The Internal Audit Unit did not perform the expenditure audits in 2017 or 2019 [1, 2].
The Department of Inspections performs expenditure audits which include the Ministry of Defence and subordinated units and entities. In 2017 it detected a range of irregularities and submitted requests for punishment or further investigation by relevant bodies (including four notifications to the Financial Disciplinary Committee) [1].
For both units, the programme should be approved by the minister or the MoD director-general. The auditor’s expertise is appropriate [2].

Relevant external bodies (as. low enforcement agencies and the Financial Disciplinary Committee) are provided with the audit reports only in cases where irregularities or illegal activity are detected. Other external bodies, like the parliamentary committees, do not obtain report copies [1].

Internal audit activities are the subject of scrutiny by the Supreme Audit Office through the annual budgetary audit. Internal audit reports are used by the SAO as one of the information sources. The SAO assess and may formulate recommendations. In the 2017 annual budget execution report, the SAO recommended budgetary audits by the internal control unit [1].
The activities of the internal audit unit are subject to semi-external oversight by the MoD Audit Committee, which consists partially of independent members [2]. At least once every five years the internal audit function is subject to an external assessment by an independent auditor [3].

The chamber report on the budget implementation in 2017 states that the inspection department had 19 recommendations for the minister. It is not clear how many of them were addressed and implemented. The case of the chamber’s recommendation shows that usually only certain parts of the recommendations are implemented.

The Inspectorate-General of National Defence (IGND) is the internal audit unit of the MoD [1]. It is tasked with monitoring Ministry of Defence (MoD) expenditure and is afforded significant autonomy. However, the inspector-general, who heads the IGND, is designated by the minister of defence and reports to the incumbent [2]. It is comparatively poorly staffed [3], as detailed in Q8A, and its audit capacity is limited [4].

While Parliament is entitled to access within legal constraints, anecdotal evidence suggests that MPs are unlikely to receive IGND reports without requiring mediation by the Minister of Defence, as suggested by the “Tancos: Factos e Documentos” file sent by the incumbent minister to the Parliament in 2018 [1]. The file includes IGND audits that were classified at the time. MPs do not report significant redactions in accessed documents, but there is evidence of significant limits on their access [2, 3]. Furthermore, as the IGND operates under the authority of the Minister of Defence, its audit parameter varies according to the stated needs of the Minister [4, 5].

The IGND reports directly to the minister of defence [1] and there are no provisions for external audit of its operations beyond legally mandated Supreme Audit Institution (SAI) monitoring. This is illustrated by the IGND’s Framework of Evaluation and Accountability [2, 3, 4], which is sent annually to the minister of defence and validated by the incumbent.

Existing SAI reports suggest that IGND audits are not regularly taken into account by the Ministry of Defence [1, 2], while the IGND itself may be called into action after issues with expenditure arise [3]. Furthermore, a recent audit by the IGND on travel-related expenditure during the former minister of defence’s tenure, who now a plaintiff in the Tancos court case, suggests issues with real-time audit capacity [4].

There is an internal auditing unit within the MoD and the armed forces. However, the unit is understaffed and mostly focuses on financial auditing with superficiality and irregularity [1,2]. The Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of State and Defence Affairs, and any matters related to security, defence and the armed forces are explicitly excluded from the State’s Audit Bureau’s [3].

The internal auditing unit has limited power and oversight. It works only with procurement and other minimal purchases that have no significance within the Ministry. Therefore, this unit has no significant oversight of the expenditure [1,2].

The internal Auditing Unit has no external scrutiny. It is an internal unit that is managed directly within the Ministry of Defence, and its work, reports, and briefs are not available outside of the unit and its officials [1,2].

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable because the internal Auditing Unit has no external scrutiny (see Q16C).

The internal unit does not make its reports public, and they are only superficial. These reports have no recommendations [1,2,3]. The defence sector in Qatar is not audited by the State Audit Bureau, and it is extremely difficult to assess institutional outcomes because the Qatari government does not reveal any information regarding the defence sector. The websites of the Ministry of Finance and the Government’s Communication’s Office include no information about defence expenditure and budgets, and there is not an official website for the Ministry of Defence in either English or in Arabic [4,5].

The MoD has financial audit units for its territories (in West, South, Central, and East military command regions) [1] and several departments with auditing functions. These include the Departments of Financial Procurement [2], Financial Planning [3], Social Guarantees [4], Military-economic Analysis and Prognisis[5], Financial Monitoring of GOZ [6] and the Department of Internal Financial Control and Audit [7]. The latter is specifically tasked with organising and implementing financial controls and audits. However, there is no information about the regularity or comprehensiveness of the work it has done. Like the webpages of other MoD financial units, the webpage of this department provides only prescribed tasks and the contact information of its head, without any details on staff expertise [7].

In December 2017, the MoD Department of Internal Financial Control and Audit was granted full powers to oversee critical financial procurement issues within the MoD [1]. The department can initiate administrative and criminal investigations by sending the findings to appropriate federal executive and law-enforcement agencies [1]. However, there has been no information about the department’s auditing activities. Instead, in 2017 and 2018, two high-ranking officials of the department were arrested for accepting a major bribe [2,3].

The Accounts Chamber is the main external auditing agency tasked with overseeing the MoD’s financial activities. It conducts annual, in-depth assessments of the effectiveness of the administration of the state-allocated budgets. In 2017, the Accounts Chamber reported that 544.5 billion rubles were ineffectively spent by the MoD. The very few major violations to be announced publicly included overpricing for state orders and failure to organise a registry of housing resources for military personnel. No further details were provided, however, due to apparent state secrecy classification [1,2]. Comment: according to Interviewee 1, the Accounts Chamber conducts its own audit, leaving the revision of the internal audit reports to internal MoD scrutiny [3].

No details were found as to whether and how the MoD addresses the results of internal audits. However, there are details on how the MoD addresses the external audits by the Accounts Chamber. If we assume that the extent to which it addresses the internal audits is similar to the extent to which it addresses the external audits, we can conclude that the Ministry responds to audit findings neither fully nor regularly. Indeed, in 2017, the Accounts Chamber reported that it forwarded a total of 40 orders and only 18 of them were complied with by the Ministry [1]. In 2018, the Accounts Chamber forwarded 11 inquiries to the MoD, only 4 of which were answered [2]. The Accounts Chamber issued commentaries about 16 MoD projects, but only 10 of them were amended accordingly [2]. There is no public information providing details of how the MoD addressed the orders either in 2017 or 2018.

Interviewee 1 argued that the MoD has probably been taking the audit reports seriously since the grand corruption scandal of 2012 and tries to solve the uncovered problems. However, it is impossible to prove how effectively the MoD reacts to findings [3].

According to Saudi Arabia’s Basic Law of Governance of 1992, each government agency is subject to an internal auditing process (1). This includes the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defence, the latter of which has a director-general of Internal Audit (2). Foreign defence contractors also appoint auditors such as PwC to comply with international standards and the laws of their host countries with regards to Saudi government contracts (3), (4). According to our source, there is an internal auditing unit and process but the unit conducts irregular and superficial reviews during audits; they are not effective (5).
Though internal auditing processes take place in the MoD, there is no evidence that these occur for arms sales. The MoD’s website publishes details of its updated organizational structure, outlining an audit and inspections unit that falls under the purview of the Military Court (6). No further details were published relating to the nature of the internal audit process, or whether the activities of this unit are subject to parliamentary oversight. Furthermore, auditing processes are likely to be superficial when it comes to sensitive areas of defence expenditure, and government staff responsible for auditing may only be active on civilian aviation projects. Nor does it appear that staff tasked with these auditing functions are appropriately skilled. For example, the former Director-General of Audit Bader bin Fahad al-Othman is a retired major and aviation pilot in the Saudi armed forces who later held senior appointments in military operations, but had no apparent experience in financial auditing (2), (7). That being said, the current Director-General Abdulaziz Abalkhail, in his position since October 2018, appears to have more relevant senior auditing experience at Saudi state-owned entities, according to his LinkedIn profile (8).
In July 2018, PwC was reportedly finalizing a contract with the Saudi government to transform the MoD. This included consulting on reshaping processes for recruitment, resourcing, performance management, and strategic workforce planning (9).

According to a Gulf scholar who focuses on the political economy of the GCC, “It is very possible that the government itself has itemized budgets for defence expenditure, but there are also special accounts for expenditure that may not be directly under the Ministry of Defense, but spread through other government bodies” (10). According to David Roberts, an expert on Gulf security and military strategy, “there almost certainly will be auditing procedures set up given [historical] the US and UK involvement in the Saudi military and Ministry of Defence. There’s a basic rubric for all these kinds of institutions which come from a Western template, but the question is whether they are effective. My assumption is yes the procedures are there, but they are also likely opaque and their effectiveness is open to question” (11).

There is no evidence that internal auditing takes place for sensitive or critical issues within military and defence expenditure. In the current administration, the MoD and its operations are highly centralized under the control of Crown Prince and Minister of Defence Mohammed bin Salman, and this most likely extends to its defence expenditure (1). According to our sources, there is no enabling oversight over any of the MoD’s expenditures. As a financial officer claims, “oversight is superficial and never been exercised” (2). It is unlikely that auditors are given access to details of sensitive purchases or military arms sales, or that enabling oversight bodies such as the Consultative Council’s Committee on Security Affairs are provided with any reports of internal audits that do take place.

According to our sources, there is no externally enabled scrutiny mechanism or body that is mandated with oversight over the MoD expenditures, it does not exist.

Information regarding auditing processes and findings are not made publicly available. According to our sources, such findings are taken into account and addressed because of the political influence (executive or members of the royal family). As far as is clear from the public domain, Saudi government institutions do not have a tradition of implementing rigorous and thorough internal audits.

The Internal Audit Unit performs tasks of organizing, implementing and reporting on the results of internal audit within all organizational units of the MoD. Four out of five positions allocated by the Rulebook on the Systematization of Workplaces in the Internal Audit Unit are currently filled. Hence, the unit consists of the three internal auditors and Head of the unit. The Internal Audit Unit is active within the MoD. From January 2015 to March 2018, it conducted 21 audits in the following areas: internal rules and procedures, planning, income, procurement, employees’ salaries and allowances, payment and transfer of funds [1]. The Internal Audit Unit reports directly to the minister of defence and is obliged to establish cooperation with the Central Harmonization Unit of the Ministry of Finance [2]. Internal auditors are security cleared; however, their certificates do not enable them access to all data, only data classified as “secret” [1].

The internal audit results are contained in the quarterly reports on the MoD’s work submitted to the DIAC; however, they have not been thoroughly discussed during the current convocation [1].

There are no records of external scrutiny over the work of the Internal Audit Unit by the State Audit Institution [1].

There is no evidence that internal audit findings influence executive decisions.

The Internal Audit Department (IAD) performs risk assessment throughout the year and produces an annual report [1], but there is no known schedule of its operations.
IAD performs audits and reviews on behalf of the MINDEF Audit & Risk Committee (MARC), chaired by MINDEF’s Permanent Secretary (Defence Development). Besides conducting audits and reviews on behalf of the MARC, the IAD director may initiate audit projects at any time, and decide the scope, approach and extent of each audit. [3]
The IAD aids MINDEF/SAF in the conduct of internal audits, and is qualified to do so as a corporate member of the Institute of Internal Auditors. The majority of IAD staff have also attained at least one or more professional designations, such as Chartered Accountant (Singapore), Certified Internal Auditors and Certified Information Systems Auditor. [4]
Although there is no public report on the satisfaction of the defence minister on its performance, he has alluded to Singapore’s strong standing in global corruption perceptions which could be an indication of his satisfaction [2].

The Internal Audit Department performs audits and reviews on behalf of the MINDEF Audit & Risk Committee (MARC), chaired by MINDEF’s Permanent Secretary (Defence Development).[4]
The Auditor-General’s Office (AGO) conducts independent annual audits of ministries, including the Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) and the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) expenditure and submits annual reports to the President, who shall present the report to the Parliament. However, matters of defence and security of Singapore may be excluded from presentation to the parliament. Public Reports of the Auditor-General for Financial Year 2019/20 does not contain information on audits of MINDEF, whereas 2018/19 report contains information on two audits on non-sensitive issues. [5,6,7]
The AGO’s independence is enshrined in the Constitution, and there has been no evidence of it being partial in its audits [1]. Government expenditure is also examined by the Public Accounts Committee (PAC), which makes its reports available for public consumption [2]. The findings of the AGO and the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) have led to criminal investigations as well as disciplinary measures against military officers, as well as remedial action for flawed processes [2]. There is some evidence that the AGO has been provided with expenditure data for non-sensitive or critical issues, but it is unknown if this scrutiny extends further to include pertinent matters such as weapons procurement [3].

Independent external audits of MINDEF/SAF expenditure has been carried out by the AGO on an annual basis [1] as well as by the PAC on an as-needed basis [2], with summaries of these reports made available to the public. There is no evidence that this is done proactively on a more regular or routine schedule, and it is unknown if this scrutiny extends further to include pertinent matters such as weapons procurement [3].

There is evidence that the MINDEF acknowledges and performs remedial action on irregularities found by internal and external agencies such as the AGO and the newly set up SAF Inspector General’s Office [1, 2, 3]. As noted in the AGO’s latest 2018/2019 report, the MINDEF has recognised and addressed several shortcomings in its IT access and overpayments, while the organisation and its top leadership has also demonstrated responsiveness to addressing internal audits in other aspects in recent events [3, 4].

The Department of Defence Internal Audit Division (IAD) is tasked with “adding value by improving operations and reviewing different activities as a management control that functions by assessing the adequacy and effectiveness of other managerial controls” [1].

In practice, the IAD performed the following tasks in the 2017/18 period:
• Review of the process for the Management Performance Assessment Tool within the Department of Defence (DoD).
• Procurement of goods and services and use of consultants in the DoD.
• Review of cash management at the Finance Accounting Service Centres and Finance Accounting Satellite
Offices in the Department.
• High-level review of Annual Financial Statements for the General Defence Account for FY2017/18 [2].

The performance of the IAD was reportedly poor in the 2017/18 period, as reported by the Internal Audit Committee, which performed a self-evaluation, noting that the IAD conducted just six of 31 planned internal audits [3]. Incidentally, the Internal Audit Committee met six times in the 2017/18 period. Of the six Audit Committee members, two members attended only one meeting each.

From the research undertaken, it does not appear that IAD functions are made available for external overisight.

Internal audit reports appear to be subject to analysis by the Audit Committee, within the DoD, but are not then passed on for external scrutiny.

The IAD reported that ‘management’ agreed to 90 out of the 119 recommendations made to address the internal control gaps identified in audit reports in the 2017/18 period, commenting that “It remains a management prerogative to accept recommendations made by the Internal Audit Division” [1]. Specific details on what changes were recommended agreed to, or ignored are not available.

Two internal audit units overseeing defence and military expenditures exist within the Ministry of National Defence (MND) and the Defence Acquisition Programme Administration (DAPA). The Inspection Bureau within the MND functions to review defence ministry expenditures, while the Inspector General within DAPA focuses on overseeing expenditures in procurement. [1] [2] Given that both internal audit units work under the MND, they have a limited level of flexibility to build their own work programmes. In addition, staff expertise remains unknown as there is no information available to assess audit officers’ expertise. The frequency of the internal audit is also unknown. While the role of the internal audit officer is clearly described by the MND’s Directive of the Self-audit and Inspection, the qualification of staff does not appear in the Directive. [3]

The oversight mechanism for defence ministry expenditures functions on a regular basis. The parliamentary committee, the National Defence Committee, conducts an annual parliamentary audit for reviewing expenditures and defence policy. [1] MND and relevant defence institutions are required to report annual expenditure to the National Assembly according to the National Assembly Act. The National Defence Committee are provided with reports with full detail every year. [2] [3]

While the MND can be required to submit internal audit reports by the National Assembly, there is no legal obligation to provide these reports to an anti-corruption organisation, such as the ACRC. [1] [2] Although the BAI has the power to request internal audit reports, it is difficult to find evidence of reviews of internal audit reports on defence expenditures. [3]

There is not enough available information to score this indicator. Due to the limited access to internal audit reports, it is unclear whether the audit findings are applied in practice. [1]_x000D_
_x000D_

Any internal audits of off-budget income at the Defence Ministry should be reflected in the annual national audit of government accounts by the Auditor General. But the last audit was released more than ten years ago and only for the accounts of pre-independent South Sudan. To date, no audits of South Sudan after independence in 2011 are publicly available to enable an understanding of the Ministry’s internal audits. [1] Additionally, although the Security Committee in the National Legislative Assembly has a mandate to review budgets, it does not monitor off-budget funding. [2]

The Ministry of Defence has an internal audit unit. [1] Its role is to conduct “unrestricted audits,” establish procedures and guidelines, conduct internal audits and endorse payments. [2] However, there is no publicly available information about its composition, role, achievements etc., and as such it is not possible to score this indicator. This indicator has been marked ‘Not Enough Information’.

From previous literature, we know that the army has resisted handing over documents to the Auditor General for auditing purposes. [1] The last audit report of government business, which was released in 2008, said that “the SPLA for the fourth year frustrated the efforts of National Audit Chamber to subject the expenditure of SPLA, out of public funds to legislative scrutiny. The audit of SPLA is all the more significant since 60% of the pay roll expenditure of GoSS is in SPLA and only 7 out of 40 divisions shared the pay roll details with Audit. The authorities at the Ministry did not give any reason but it is not difficult to construe their concerns for confidentiality. Unfortunately, the shield of security can also cover illegitimate transactions. In any event, the continued refusal to submit to legislative audit constitutes a constitutional challenge.” [2]

No audits by the Ministry have been made public and there there is no publicly available information to score this indicator. As such, it is marked ‘Not Enough Information’. Overall, no audits of government departments have been made available since 2012. [1] These were delayed audits of the autonomous government of pre-independent South Sudan. Since South Sudan became independent in 2011, no audits of government departments have ever been made public. [1]

The department in charge of the auditing function, permanent financial control, and the public audit in the Ministry of Defence is the General Intervention of Defence and the General Accounting Subdirectorate of the Ministry of Defence, which is functionally dependent on the General Comptroller of the State Administration [1]. It is regulated by Law 47/2003 [2]. Its staff are regulated through the Basic organic structure of the General Defence Intervention [3]. Thus, General Intervention of Defence depends on the IGAE. In the opinion of an expert in defence and a consultant of the Defence Commitee, the Ministry of Defence cannot hide information and the IGAE can access directly, for instance on the salaries of the military [4]. The findings of the IGAE must be taken into account by the defence minister because the General Intervention of Defence is a part of the Ministry of Defence.

There is no continuous oversight based on internal audits because IGAE reports on the Ministry of Defence’s expenditures are rarely debated in Parliament [1]. However, there is the possibility of launching investigations on critical issues on defence expenditure, such as armament programmes [2], which allows parliamentary committees to conduct investigations when there is political will from the committee [3]. Nevertheless there is no evidence on whether parliament receives full, summarised, or redacted reports from the IGAE.

The General Intervention of Defence and the General Accounting Subdirectorate of the Ministry of Defence release reports regularly to the IGAE so that on some occasions, although not regularly, they can be the object of study and review by the Court of Audits, and the review process itself can be scrutinised [1].

There is limited evidence on how the Defence Ministry implements internal audit report findings and to what extent the ministry values the auditor’s findings. To some extent this is done, considering that the Minister of Defence can appear to speak on a specific issue when required and at their own request. For example, the Minister may be called to explain the annual report on operations abroad, armaments programmes, or any other issue related to defence expenditure [1]. Still, there have been cases where members of the Defence Commission have raised questions about critical budgetary issues without receiving any response [2].

A review of the Ministry of Defence’s website [1] and an interview with an expert on Sudan’s defence sector [2] indicated that there is no internal audit entity or activity within the Minsitry of Defence. The closest approximation to an internal audit mechanism in the defence sector does not lie within the Ministry of Defence, but has been self-assigned to the military members of the transitional Sovereignty Council – who have volunteered to undertake security sector reform. In a phone interview, an expert on Sudan’s security sector stated that he believes this is a manoeuvre to prevent others from meddling in military affairs and will probably not lead to any significant changes in the way defence funds are spent or in the oversight thereof [2]. The Ministers of Defence and Interior have very little ability to affect defence expenditures but, to its credit, the Ministry of Finance has attempted to improve payment tracking for payroll, administrative and operational costs that fall under the Ministries of Defence and Interior. An expert on Sudan’s defence sector said that the Ministry of Finance attempted to introduce a unique electronic receipt system to give it visibility on all revenue distributed to employees of the Ministries of Defence and Interior, but the Minister of Interior protested [2].

There is no internal audit of Ministry of Defence expenditure, nor is there currently a legislature in Sudan, so there is no parliamentary committee oversight of internal audits of the defence sector [1].

There is no internal audit of Ministry of Defence expenditure, so there is no external scrutiny of such a function [1].

There is no internal audit entity to conduct audits of Ministry of Defence expenditure, so no audits are conducted [1].

The government’s internal auditing is carried out by the National Financial Management Authority (ESV) [1] which engages in ongoing reviews of all state expenditures. As a government agency sorted under the Ministry of Finance, its staff expertise is appropriate, and no reports by the external auditing body NAO indicate that it is insufficiently resourced [2]. Beyond the government’s annual ordinance letters outlining the agency’s general scope and assignments [3], ESV has the flexibility to build its own work programme for the year. ESV findings are respected by all actors within the defence establishment, and their findings are regularly implemented (see Q16D). In line with the government’s internal auditing regulation [4], agenices like the Armed Forces must also operate their own internal auditing units [5].

Oversight occurs for sensitive or critical issues. ESV produce reports on state expenditures that are non-redacted and made publicly available [1], which allow decision makers to be effective in their oversight role. However, the internal auditing regulation [2] only obliges internal auditing units within agencies to report to their director or management board. This system prevents MPs from fully scrutinising agencies, as parliamentary oversight becomes more reliant on external audit reviews provided by the National Audit Office. NAO have themselves pointed out this flaw, and recommended changes to the system [3].

As the government’s internal auditing function, the ESV, is a separate agency under the Ministry of Finance, and is therefore regularly scrutinised by the external auditing institution, NAO [1]. However, as mentioned in Q16B, the NAO and the parliament are restricted from scrutinising the agencies’ own internal auditing units, as these are only obliged to report to their director or management board in line with the internal auditing regulation [2]. NAO have themselves pointed out this flaw, and recommended changes to the system [3].

The government and defence minister regularly addresses ESV findings in their practices [1]. For instance, in 2017, ESV recommendations urged the government to initiate reforms of the Armed Forces’ and Defence Material Administration Agency’s financial regulation models [2]. The proposal in 2015 to overview and update the defence logistics system was also based in part on ESV assessments [3].

The Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport (DDPS) has an internal audit unit (Internal Audit DDPS). The unit reports to the general secretariat of the DDPS [1]. According to the DDPS website, the internal audit is an “autonomous and independent verification and audit team that conducts audits for the head of the DDPS” (Article 11, FKG) [2, 3]. The unit shares its reports with the Swiss Federal Audit Office (SFAO) and can proceed without being directed to do so. This reform was introduced following a recommendation from the 2014 Geschäftsprüfungskommission der eidgenössischen Räte (Executive Commission of the Federal Assembly) (GPK) report on an IT project undertaken by tax authorities [4]. The report at the time suggested increasing the independence and autonomy of the internal audit in the federal administration. A subsequent revision of the Finanzkontrollgesetz (FKG) followed these recommendations [5, 6]. There are some high profile cases when the defence minister asked for a specific audit and followed through with the recommendations [7, 8]. There is no publicly available number on staffing. The address registry of the administration lists at least nine employees; however, the registry does not always list all employees of a unit [9].

The reports of the internal audit unit are sent to the head of the DDPS. Some of them are also published on the website of the DDPS [1]. The unit provides an annual report to the head of the DDPS and the Swiss Federal Audit Office (SFAO) including information on focus areas, conclusions and the state of implementation of its recommendations (Article 11.3 FKG). Specific reports are shared with the SFAO, and the SFAO has to approve the internal audit unit’s rules of procedures and verifies periodically the unit’s effectiveness. The SFAO also promotes the training and capacity building for the units (Article 11.5 FKG). [2] The Security Policy Committee (SPC), as well as a sub-committee of the Control Committee of the Federal Assembly, have oversight functions when it comes to the DDPS and full access to all audit reports [3, 4]. However, it is up to the SFAO to coordinate with the relevant oversight committees (GPK and FC) (Article 14 FKG) [2], and the committee typically does not deal with the lower levels of the federal administration [5].

Internal audit reports are proactively released to the DDPS and SFAO, which receives annual reports and information on focus areas, conclusions and implementation of recomendations (Article 11.3 FKG) [1].

The Internal Audit of the DDPS does also report on the implementation of recommendations from previous reports. These evaluations, are also published on the website of the DDPS. A search for implementation reports for the period 2016 to March 2020 yielded 99 reports (17 for 2016; 20 for 2017; 31 for 2018; 27 for 2019 and four for the first three months of 2020) [1]. There clearly is a process of following-up on the recommendation of previous reports, and the DDPS is transparent about the findings.

The Comptroller Office under the direct supervision of the Minister of National Defence is the major internal audit authority for Taiwan’s armed forces which engages in ongoing budgetary, accounting, and statistics (BAS) of defence expenditures under the MND’s orders and regulations [1]. In addition, the Comptroller Office under the direct supervision of the Minister of National Defence has to build its own work programme with the minister’s consent & direction [1]. Under the situation that the Minister of National Defence takes the full political responsibilities for the Comptroller Office, advises and suggestions from the Comptroller Office are valued by the Minister [2]. The Comptroller Office is also staffed with both military and civilian personnel who have speciality or expertise concerning policy planning, budget planning, finance, general accounting, and internal audit [3]. In addition, IT systems are well equipped for budgetary, accounting and statistics operations across the entire military, and which play a crucial role in both internal and external audit activities [4].

Oversight occurs for sensitive or critical issues under the direct command of the Minister of National Defence by the Comptroller Office [1]. As enabling oversight bodies, the LY’s Foreign and National Defence Committee and CY’s Committee on National Defence and Intelligence Affairs are provided with reports which are produced and revised by the Office of the Minister of National Defence [1, 2]. However, legislators from the opposition parties still challenge these reports do not often provide enough information and are redacted [3, 4].

External scrutiny is in place with Executive Yuan’s Directorate General of Budget, Accounting, and Statistics and Control Yuan’s National Audit Office. Internal audit reports compiled by the Comptroller Office are required to be released to legitimate external audit bodies for every fiscal year; e.g. LY’s Budget Centre and CY’s National Audit Office [1].

The internal audit process conducted by the Comptroller Office is subject to regular and in-depth reviews by external audit bodies of both Executive Yuan’s Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics and CY’s National Audit Office [2].

The MND regularly addresses audit findings in its practices through its chain-of-command by advisory or directives through subordinate units of budgetary, accounting and statistics, which are established in the Military Service Commands, Combatant Commands, and other subordinate units within the hierarchical architecture of Taiwan’s armed forces, in order to implement better functions of financial managements and BAS affairs [1].

According to a senior military officer, [1] there are internal audit units in every sector of the military, which have the independence and flexibility to build their own programme of work. These units comprise staff who are experts in the field of auditing and they are military personnel. The audit reports from the sectorial units are presented quarterly to the Chief Inspection General (CIG) and Comptroller General, who are military personnel in the military headquarters office. From there, the compiled report is presented to the Commander of Defence Force for further action. By law, all auditors, including those in the defence sector, ought to be Certified Public Accountants (CPA) which is the highest professional certification of accountants in the country.

While an internal audit takes place, [1] the full findings are not presented to parliament. This applies across the public service. The Controller and Auditor General (CAG) presents consolidated reports on Central Government (including security and defence sector), local government, and public authorities. It is these reports that are the subject of parliamentary scrutiny and public debate. [2]

External scrutiny of the defence budget for internal audits is provided by the CAG [1] and the parliament, [2] as provided for in the Public Audit Act 2008. However, while an internal audit takes place, [2] the full findings are not presented to parliament. This applies across the public service. The Controller and Auditor General presents consolidated reports on Central Government (including security and defence sector), local government, and public authorities. It is these reports that are the subject of parliamentary scrutiny and public debate. [3]

According to a senior officer in the Defence Ministry, [1] sometimes audit findings arising from an internal audit are taken into consideration. However, the only potential evidence of that is in the annual Central Governmment reports of the Controller and Auditor General, and reports of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Security. The most recent reports from these bodies give no detail on follow up on internal audit issues. [2]

The Office of Internal Audit, Ministry of Defence, generally conduct reports on defence ministry expenditures in regards to the risks of corruption and conflict of interests within the ministry annually. According to the Internal Audit Policy of the Thai Ministry of Defence, the risks and objectives of every project must be assessed in order to practically increase effectiveness [1]. The defence sector must follow the guidelines implemented by Ministry of Finance in terms of reimbursement, spending and reporting via e-finance systems and the military officers in the internal audit unit must be proficient in data collection and expenditure evaluation [2]. In general, the annual internal audit reports submitted by the Ministry of Defence to the executives include Financial Auditing, Compliance Auditing, Operational Auditing, Performance Auditing, Information Technology Auditing and Management Auditing [3]. The Office of Internal Audit, Ministry of Defence, generally produces annual reports on Ministry of Defence expenditure with regard to the risk of corruption and conflicts of interest within the ministry. Each year, the internal audit officers must attend the anti-corruption training organised by the Royal Thai Armed Forces Headquarters in accordance with the Ministry of Finance’s standards. These reports are further scrutinised by the State Audit Office [4].

However, off-budget funds are exempt from public disclosure and scrutiny by the Lower House. There is no information provided by the ministry about who is authorised to use the military’s off-budget funds or precisely how it will be spent. The FFP leader revealed that the Financial and Fiscal Discipline Act of 2018, passed by the former military regime’s lawmakers, provides a loophole for the Ministry of Defence to seek an exemption from the Ministry of Finance, which enables this budget to bypass compliance with the laws and regulations that apply to all other government agencies. Therefore, the Ministry of Defence’s regulations enable this kind of budget to be subject solely to internal audit [5].

During the NCPO’s regime between 2015 and early 2019, there was no oversight of sensitive or critical issues conducted by the parliamentary committee. After the general election in 2019, oversight of sensitive or critical issues was raised in parliament a few times, such as the oversight of the military budget in June 2020, but in the end, the significant documents were taken back from the parliamentary committees by the MoD, which claimed that the documents contained some sensitive information about arms purchases and acquisitions. This resulted in the committee meeting being called off due to a lack of reports and information required for the oversight [1]. It is rather extraordinary that military officers were able to interrupt parliamentary committees to obtain documents prior to the end of deliberations. The fact that budget documents are considered top secret is a clear indication of the attitude towards oversight.

It should be noted that the Office of Internal Audit, Ministry of Defence, is generally required to conduct audit reports on Ministry of Defence expenditure and report solely to the State Audit Office in summary form [2]. Moreover, according to the Regulations of the Prime Minister Office on Public Secret Budget 2003, the secret budget, as well as expenditure on procurement related to national security, must be directly reported to the Prime Minister by the internal committee within a state agency (in this case, the Office of Internal Audit under the MoD) [3,4]. In other words, in many cases, there was a lack of reporting and information provided to the parliamentary committees or no form of report whatsoever, so the military clearly lacks trust in parliamentary scrutiny.

According to the Internal Audit Policy of the Thai Ministry of Defence 2010, the Comptroller General’s Department under the Ministry of Finance allows the Ministry of Defence expenditure to be solely subject to internal audit [1]. The Office of Internal Audit, Ministry of Defence, generally conducts reports on Ministry of Defence expenditure and submits it to the State Audit Office for further scrutiny on an annual basis. The law does not require the agency to deliver these reports to the NACC [2]. Furthermore, in some situations, for example in the case of the secret budget, the report submitted by the Office of Internal Audit to the State Audit Office may exclude information about secret items since it is solely subject to the Prime Minister’s scrutiny (in terms of external scrutiny) [3].

According to the Internal Audit Policy of the Thai Ministry of Defence, the audit findings must be provided in the form of recommendations in case any problems are found [1]. For instance, the executive summary of the annual internal audit in the Ministry of Defence 2019 identified some problems in the ministry’s accounting based on the audit findings, such as problems with 16 accounting activities, 1 budget allocation activity, 15 procurement activities and 1 information technology activity. In addition to identifying the problems, the report also provided some recommendations on each problem area. Nonetheless, the audited items tend only to be minor expenditure rather than major deals [2]. However, there is no available evidence on the implementation of recommendations by the Ministry of Defence.

According to our sources, there are two types of internal auditing process: the general inspector of the armed forces, and the auditing unit of the armed forces. Both of these two institutions have a moderate level of expertise in auditing other than financial auditing(1,2). Since 2017, these two have been the target of training and human capacity advancement. Internal auditing is ensured by the General Inspection of armed forces. This inspection has independent auditors from other Organisms of the Armed Forces (3). The General Directorate of financial and administrative affairs also has an active service specialised in financial auditing (3,4).

According to our sources, there is a very limited oversight mechanism in place for sensitive data, and most of the active oversight is related to administrative and logistical financial auditing. Reports with abstract form and limited data are produced and sent to legislative and to the office of the First Minister. (1,2)

This indicator has not been assigned a scoe due to insufficient information or evidence.

According to our sources, there is a high probability (not yet realised) that the anti-corruption agency LIUCC has the mandate for oversight and to scrutinise these internal auditing units. (1,2) By law, the General Inspection of the Armed Forces is meant to submit annually the results of its administrative and financial inspections to the Supreme Authority for Administrative and Financial Control (3). However, neither this practice, nor its regularity, has been comfirmed. Therefore, there is no clear evidence of external auditing / oversight over internal auditing functions or reports.

According to our sources, the MoD tries to meet the recommendations and to change according to critique, but it is not always able to do that. (1,2)

The central government defence budget has three main parts: the Ministry of Defence Budget, the Ministry of Internal Affairs Budget and the Presidential Covert Fund. The Ministry of Defence Budget may be split into two parts: the Defense Industry Support Fund, which the SSB has full authority to use for procurement, and the defence budget allocated for the Ministry of Defence’s personnel salaries, personnel social security payments, administrative expenses and urgent expenses, particularly for counter-terror needs [1].

The internal audit is conducted by account inspectors from the Financial Audit Department, affiliated with the Ministry of National Defence, following the applicable rules.

Interviewee 3 suggested that the Financial Audit Department at the Ministry is in charge of auditing the budget. Interviewee 3, who worked at this department for three years in the early 2000s, suggested in the interview that the Ministry of Defence has pretty strong and deterrent auditing mechanisms within the ministry over more than 300 military markets in military facilities, more than 35 military housing sites in different cities and more than 12 military resorts in tourist areas [2]. Interviewee 6 suggested that, for those procurements carried out by the Ministry of Defence, this department is an effective executive oversight mechanism that can conduct internal investigations on any defence tender on behalf of the Minister [3].

It should be noted that there is no open source content available about this department, such as an official website, corresponding regulations or legislation that guides the work of this department, recent examples of audit reports, etc. This department operates under strict secrecy and away from legislative oversight and public monitoring. Regarding the work routines of the department, Interviewee 6 suggested that the department publishes an annual auditing report, which is presented to the Minister of Defence every September, just before the initiation of talks about the central budget of the subsequent year. He also emphasised that the department has routine inspections/checks of the contract files delivered to the Ministry of Defence by the force commands. If/when the department runs into a case of violation of integrity-related issues or if/when information is delivered to the Ministry of Defence through online applications, letters or phone calls, the department starts an administrative financial investigation for this particular case. However, this investigation is run as a case/actor/context-specific one [3]. Unfortunately, there are no secondary sources available to on the existence of the internal financial unit via legislation/online presence/reports.

As explained above, the Turkish Armed Forces’ (TAF) internal audit is conducted by internal auditors of the Ministry of National Defence (MSB) working in the Financial Audit Department. Interviewee 3 suggested that the Ministry of National Defence has a directive for financial activities, issued in 2002, and an Internal Audit Directive, issued in 2010 (neither of which are available to public) [1]. He then stated that these regulations are in accordance with the Public Financial Management and Control Act No. 5018 as well as international and domestic audit standards.The only State institution that can conduct an investigation within the Ministry of Defence however, is the Presidential Supervisory Board. Interviewee 6 noted that parliament has no legislative oversight/monitoring mechanism for an internal auditing process, and there is no evidence of the legislature being provided with internal audit reports [2].

The Ministry of Finance has an Auditing Board formed under Law No. 5018 but, according to the law, the Ministry of Defence expenditure is outside the authority of this board [1]. This means that the Ministry of Finance has no authority to review the work of the Ministry of Defence’s Financial Audit Department. The CoA undertakes this scrutiny, but not in a comprehensive or continuous fashion.

Interviewee 6 suggested that officers who are assigned to the Ministry of Defence as internal auditors are then appointed to other posts at headquarters or units after their audit mandate ends. In fact, they are likely to serve as the subordinates of the same chiefs of the troops that they audited over time, revealing a situation that casts a doubts over the standard of independence [2]. Interviewee 6 emphasised that auditors should not be associated with another hierarchical level other than top management in order to preserve their independence during the audit duties pursuant to the Ministry of National Defence Inspection Services Directive. Internal auditors can also take part in various administrative activities after leaving the audit unit. However, he underlined that it is very common practice for auditors to be assigned as subordinates to the units of those military commanders they had inspected before. He then argued that, in general, the military does not respect the autonomy and indepedence of the internal auditing mechanisms or the personnel [2].

As explained above, the Financial Audit Department produces reports of the results of annual internal audit activities, which the department conducts in an on-call fashion, in September and delivers these reports directly to the Minister of Defence. It is then the job of the Ministry of National Defence to respond to these reports (or not, if the Minister does not want to) or to make the suggested changes accordingly. One may therefore suggest that the department operates as the personal financial advisory/supervisory mechanism of the Minister of Defence and that the department has no direct connection with either the CoA or parliament [1]. The Minister therefore has the power to either proceed accordingly or to just ignore the reports. Interviewee 6 emphasised that the Financial Audit Department of the Ministry of Defence has nothing to do with parliament and that there is no direct connection between them. No evidence was found through open-source research of the Minister addressing these reports in parliament or delivering an official response [1].

The unit is called internal audit department and the process is done every year. It is hard to prove or confirm whether or not these findings are also valued by the defence minister since it was not easy to meet him. According to military sources, all the staff in internal audit are qualified and knowledgeable to perform their tasks[1]. The Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Authority carried out the procurement and disposal audit of Ministry of Defence and Veterans Affairs. The audit covered a representative sample of forty (40) procurement transactions carried out during the Financial Year 2016/17[2]. The audit involved a review of procurement systems, procurement processes, asset disposal processes, and the procurement performance indicators following the Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets Act, 2003 and PPDA Regulations, 2014. All the relevant departments, including the Head of internal Audit and his staff took part in this procurement audit, and had no audit queries raised aganist them.

The Defence and Internal Affairs Committee receives reports that are heavily redacted. Alleged cases of corruption are widespread in the accounting and budgeting systems of the Ugandan defence sector. There is a lack of independent financial audits and poor monitoring and oversight. This means that many cases of corruption go undetected. In the 2016/2017 budget, defence spending rose steeply to Shs1.9 trillion ($500m). Later, lawmakers on the Defence and Internal Affairs Committee revealed that, while reviewing the non-classified part of the defence budget, they unearthed an unauthorised transfer of Shs500 billion from the national treasury to the MoDVA without the approval or knowledge of Parliament [1]. According to some MPs [2, 3], “the politics of numbers” in oversight committees and Parliament, in general, makes their oversight roles sometimes to be meaningless.

The Auditor General is mandated by the constituion to carry out audit functions of any government entity including revewing the internal audit processes. Many times, his staff are deployed to the different ministries to scrutnise how internal audits are going about with their work with the aim of ensuring compliance and professionalism. The internal audit report is released to the Office of the Auditor General on annual basis for the purposes of carrying out the audit report [1]. However, sometimes the internal audit does not provide the required documents to support their findings. According to the Auditor General, the audit was conducted accordance with International Standards of Supreme Audit Institutions (ISSAIs). He also noted that he was independent of the Ministry of defence in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda (1995) as amended, the National Audit Act, 2008, the International Ethics Standards Board for Accountants Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants (Parts A and B) (IESBA Code), the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI) Code of Ethics and other independence requirements applicable to performing audits of Financial Statements in Uganda . He further fulfilled his other ethical responsibilities in accordance with the IESBA Code, and in accordance with other ethical requirements applicable to performing audits in Uganda.

The MoDVA answers audit findings usually every year, but some findings have not been answered for close to two years. In his report from 2016/2017, the auditor general cited irregular payment of rental dues of UGX.2,202,257,187, which was paid to an advocate being rental arrears for National Housing and Construction Corporation Ltd (NHCCL) for the 25 Housing units at Bulime Estate at Entebbe Municipality [1]. He noted that this matter had been brought to the attention of Parliament in his report for the year ending on 30 June 2015, in which he advised the MoDVA to cross-check records before committing government funds, which never happened. [1]

The Internal Audit Department is an internal MoD unit that audits the financial and material resources of the MoD to prevent the illegal and ineffective use of resources [1]. The Internal Audit Department carries out regular audits and publishes its findings [2] as well as providing information on the plan of its future activities [3]. There is also evidence that the staff of the Internal Audit Department increased their qualifications in the field of internal audit according to international standards [4] and they participate in capacity building courses conducted by foreign advisors [5, 6]. Ukrainian legislation does not stipulate that audits are to be published. However, the MoD Internal Audit Department provides those non-redacted audit reports following requests [7]. The staff turnover in the MoD Internal Audit Department is low [7]. However, some NABU investigations against MoD officials could indicate that the MoD Internal Audit Department might lack effectiveness [8]. Moreover, according to a source, in private conversations with officials from the Department of internal audit in MoD, they state that the department is under constant pressure from the minister.

With 64 bn. UAH, the MoD budget for 2017 [1, 2], the Internal Audit Department managed to audit 81 bn. UAH worth of assets in the same year as well as it identified violations worth 466 million UAH, managed to reimburse loss of 102 million UAH and prevented violations for the amount of 60 million UAH [3]. However, there is no information on specific issues which have been objects for such audits. MoD officials say they conducted more than 500 audits per year including those on sensitive issues [4]. According to the White Book 2016, the Internal Audit Department`s recommendations are considered by the ministry despite alleged pressure on behalf of the minister [5]. Ukrainian legislation does not stipulate that audits are to be published. However, the MoD Internal Audit Department provides those non-redacted audit reports upon requests [4]. However, there are still some cases of alleged corruption in the MoD which are detected by other auditing bodies when there was no similar detection of these cases by the Department of internal audit, at least in public [6].
Enabling oversight by the VRU Security and Defence Committee exists in theory. However, this practice is not implemented by the committee, and the audit reports were not considered in 2017 [7].

There is no evidence for anticorruption CSOs being provided with internal audit reports; however, the Internal Audit Department regularly publishes general findings and statistics on its activities on the MoD website [1]. Furthermore, the Internal Audit Department provides its audit reports to external oversight bodies upon requests (there is no legal norm saying that the Department has to provide external bodies with its reports automatically right after the end of an audit) [2]. The Ministry of Finance of Ukraine is the authority empowered to review the Internal Audit Department`s methodology (audit process) and provide recommendations [3]. According to the MoD officials, the Ministry of Finance of Ukraine regularly reviews the audit process of the Internal Audit Department [4].

Implementation of the Internal Audit Department’s recommendations in 2016 made before the adoption of management decisions provided additional income and prevented unnecessary costs of almost 489 million UAH [1]. In the same year, 2016 internal auditors’ recommendations provided additional revenues and savings for the amount of 57 million UAH (in 2015 – 51 million UAH) [1]. The White Book also states there is systemic monitoring of the status of implementation of audit recommendations [1]. According to MoD officials, the MoD regularly addresses audit findings in its practices [2]. Some of the recommendations can be implemented in the short-term perspective, some of them only in long-term perspective; the success of some of the recommendations depends on other public authorities and thus their realization may be delayed [2]. Institutional outcomes of the Internal Audit Department’s activities are also confirmed by foreign auditors [3].
However, some cases illustrate that the MoD does not always address audit findings in its practices, such as the Concern “Viisktorhservis” (VTS) of the Ministry of Defence. Legislative violations in VTS activities, as well as ineffective control over the VTS by the Ministry of Defence, were noted by Ukrainian state audit bodies in 2009 [1] and 2014 [1]. In March 2015 an operational audit of all MOD state enterprises’ operational activities has been implemented because of the minister of defence’s decision to prevent losses, financial and other violations, to improve management efficiency and to reduce corruption risks. This provided mandatory MoD internal audits of all agreement drafts with an expected value of over UAH 50,000 as well as management’s decisions on the leasing and disposal of assets, and land transfer, receivable and payables accounts write-off etc. [4]. Two and a half years after this decision, VTS’s audit has been finally conducted by the State Audit Service of Ukraine (SAS). Numerous serious Ukrainian law violations have been identified during the audit including financial losses in 2015 and 2017, as well as ineffective MOD control over VTS economic activity [5, 6]. According to audit results, criminal proceedings of power abuse have been opened by the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office [7, 8].

There is an internal auditing unit within the defence sector. However, it conducts irregular, bureaucratic and superficial auditing and reviews of the expenditure. This unit is linked directly to the office of the crown prince and the commander in chief (the head of the state) (1), (2), (3).

The UAE armed forces do not allow any oversight or internal audits of defence ministry expenditures. The majority of employees in this department are civilian employees who are affiliated with the crown prince’s office (1), (2), (3).

There are no internal reports produced by an internal body, and there is no external body that has oversight power over the armed forces or its expenditure (1), (2), (3).

This indicator is marked Not Applicable because there has not been any internal report with recommendations on the risks of corruption. Therefore, one can say that there is a failure to address such issues seriously based on the fact that such reports do not exist (1), (2), (3).

The MOD have a Defence Internal Audit (DIA) function which provides internal auditing across the MOD. With the exception of Military Operations, all business systems, processes, functions and activities within the MOD may be subject to internal audit work [1]. The work of DIA is governed by Public Sector Internal Audit Standards, and individual auditors comply with the professional standards of the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA). There is, however, very little publicly available evidence regarding the DIA’s work. According to the MOD, the DIA has a staff of 65 in house personnel who work according to a three year audit plan from which annual plans are derived and signed off by the Defence Audit and Risk Assurance Committee (DARAC) and the Permanent Secretary [2]. According to a 2017 internal audit report that was released after an FOI request, the DIA planned to conduct 218 audits in 2016/17, including 165 planned audits and 53 follow-ups [3]. This points to consistently high levels of activity with 196 audits conducted in 2015/16 and 199 in 2014/15 [3].

There is also a Defence Audit and Risk Assurance Committee (formerly the Defence Audit Committee), which is a sub-committee of the Defence Board [4]. It supports the Board and Accounting Officer in their responsibilities for risk control and governance by reviewing the comprehensiveness, reliability and integrity of the Ministry of Defence’s (MOD) risk assurance framework [4]. Similar to the DIA, there isn’t much publicly available evidence relating to the work of this body. In the absence of information about the nature of the activities of these bodies, a score cannot be assigned at this point.

DIA reports are shared with DARAC along with progress reports and updates [1]. However, there is no evidence that the parliamentary defence committee uses DIA report findings in its oversight work. A review of committee minutes between 2019-2021 did not reveal any reference to DIA work or reports [2].

The role and position of DIA is subject to review and comment by the NAO as part of their comments on the overall Governance Statement in the Annual Report and Accounts [1]. The Government Internal Audit Function also maintains oversight on internal audit functions in each government department, setting policy and performance indicators, and the DIA shares its annual report and key performance metrics when required [2]. According to the MOD, individual reports are shared with the NAO, however this could not be independently verified [3].

DIA completes close to 200 internal audits per year [1]. Individual reports including opinions are shared with the relevant entity owners, the DARAC, individual TLB audit and risk committees and the NAO. Although DIA reports are not publicly available, the 2016/17 report has been released under an FOI request. It shows how follow-up audits conducted by the DIA found that 44% of audit recommendations showed a lack of implementation [1: p. 4]. Recommendations related to strengthening the management of contract extensions by the MOD and DE&S’ management of assets had not been implemented at all [1: Annex B].

The Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General (DoD OIG) conducts oversight of the department and, as part of its mandate, produces internal audits [1]. In addition, the DoD OIG is the principal auditor for the DoD Agency-Wide Basic Financial Statements. The DoD OIG website publishes announcements of the audits of the financial statements but, beyond this, there is no further evidence of the audits [2,3]. The external financial audit in FY 2018 was widely cited as the ‘first ever agency-wide financial audit’, so it can be assumed that, prior to FY 2018, neither the DoD OIG nor any other organisation had undertaken a comprehensive audit of total defence expenditure across the Department of Defense in its entirety [4].

However, there is evidence that the DoD OIG does undertake performance audits regularly, as well as financial audits of components and specific programmes within the DoD [5,6]. The audit branch of the DoDIG has four directorates: Acqusition and Sustainment Management (ASM), Contract Management and Payment (CMP), Financial Management and Reporting (FMR) and Readiness and Cyber Operations (RCO). The Defense Contract Audit Agency also provides auditing and financial services to the DoD, with a focus on acquisition and contract administration [7,8]. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has continuously identified DoD Financial Management as a High Risk issue since 1995 due to its long-standing inability to accurately record its expenditure and assets [9,10]. The GAO has published multiple reports on the financial management issues within the DoD, which suggests that the auditing undertaken by the DoD OIG is not effective. With regard to the staffing and funding of the DoD OIG, in the Fiscal Year 2020, the OIG was appropriated $387,753,000 in the DoD budget [11] and it employs over 1,500 members of staff [12].

As outlined in 16A, until FY 2018, no agency-wide financial audit had been undertaken by an internal or external audit body. As such, this indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’. Although there is no specific interest taken by Congress in the internal audit activities of the DoD OIG, Congress has taken interest in DoD financial audit issues more generally, particularly as they relate to the external audit (covered in Q17).

As outlined in 16A, until FY 2018, no agency-wide financial audit had been undertaken by an internal or external audit body. As such, this indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’. There is evidence that the internal audit reports are released to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), as the GAO produces its own reports on DoD financial management practices, which reflect the work conducted within the internal audits, for example [1]. It is not clear how formalised this practice is.

As outlined in 16A, until FY 2018, no agency-wide financial audit had been undertaken by an internal or external audit body. As such, this indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’. However, the DoD OIG has a ‘Compendium of Open Recommendations’ and these include recommendations relating to finance and accounting [1].

According to the Organic Law of the National Bolivarian Armed Forces (LOFANB), the Office of the Comptroller General of the National Bolivarian Armed Forces (CONGEFANB) is the entity in charge of surveillance, monitoring and control of the defence sector revenues, expenses, and assets [1]. This entity is part of the National Fiscal Control System, and has the autonomy over the establishment of its strategic plan, work plan, and the development of its operating budget development [1]. While the CONGEFANB remains active, it is difficult to evaluate its acts of internal control due to lack of clarity in its action plan regarding audits and technical visits, and due to the difficulty in the accessing the results of these procedures.

CONGEFANB has published its Strategic Plan for 2014–2019, which sets out the objectives of “strengthening the exercise of fiscal control in the defence sector” and “strengthening procedures for determining administrative responsibility in the defence sector” [2]. These objectives are consistent with the Patria Plan, which states that efforts will be made to punish public officials who engage administrative inefficiency, as part of the fight against corruption [3]. However, the tracking of these objectives is not evident within the concrete goals presented in the organisational and work plans. The 2016 Work Plan, the lastest to be published, does not specify which goals relate to the realisation of audits in the different defence sector units. Most of the plan focuses on goals and actions relating to the improvement of staff education and the provision of training in public resource management to entities attached to the defence sector [4]. In line the latter goal, CONGEFANB keeps manuals for carrying out audits in force and in the public domain [5].

Several private military companies and entities attached to the Ministry of the People’s Power for Defence (MPPD) have published recent information on technical visits carried out by CONGEFANB [6, 7, 8]. However, it is not possible to determine how many audits have been carried out in recent years, to which entities, or what conclusions these audits and visits have drawn. The limited and opaque control exercised by CONGEFANB has worsened in recent years due to the increase in military enterprises and the oversight exercised by the defence sector over the productive apparatus [9]. These military companies and military-controlled state companies have not been held accountable, and CONGEFANB has not made the existence of any controls or audits public [10].

The Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic and of the System of Fiscal Control (LOCGRSCF) states that the CONGEFANB forms part of the System of Fiscal Control, which is governed by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (CGR). According to article 33 of this law, the CGR can carry out external controls on the work of the CONGEFANB [1]. However, this possibility of supervision has been reduced, particularly in recent years, since the Supreme Court issued a judgment in 2017 conferring oversight of military companies and entities attached to the MPPD exclusively to the CONGEFANB, acting as a “sui generi” control [2]. According to analyses by civil society organisations, this decision contravenes the constitution and leads to self-monitoring of the defence sector by CONGEFANB [3].

The block of external oversight is compounded by failure to submit audit reports to the National Assembly’s Defence and Security Committee and a lack of evidence of reports to the Constituent National Assembly [4].

Even in controversial situations such as the presence of Russian military personnel in Venezuela – justified by the fulfilment of military-technical contracts, according to authories – it is not possible to access documents that review these contracts. There are also no lists within which it is possible to verify when these contracts were procured or for what kind of technical services.

The Supreme Court decision to confer exclusive oversight over entities attached to the MPPD to the CONGEFANB [1] also affects the possibility for civil organisations to scrutinise CONGEFANB activity. The Venezuelan constitution establishes the right of citizens to access information on public administration [2]. However, Transparecia Venezuela has condemned the fact that both specifically within the defence sector and across the administration more generally, petitions for information on audits and budget implementation are constantly denied [3]. Moreover, these denials are endorsed by the Supreme Court when civil organisations seek to challenge them by filing protective action appeals. [4]

There is no evidence with which to assess whether the MPPD incorporates the findings of CONGEFANB audits, visits, and other actions into its plans. In the 2016–2019 Defence Sector Strategic Plan, “failures in the control, supervision, and auditing of the implementation of awarded budgetary resources” are considered weaknesses, so one of sector’s strategic objectives for the period is “to improve the system of administration, contracts, auditing, and budgetary control of the defence sector” [1]. However, the plan does not specify concrete actions to carry out this objective, nor have any other planning documents regarding the MPPD’s work been made public with which to assess how it intends to carry out this objective.

Beyond acknowledgement of CONGEFANB’s work by the Minister of Defence [2], there are no current documents evidencing work meetings or coordination of activities between the MPPD and the CONGEFANB.

There is an internal audit unit within the Ministry of Defence (MoD) that carries out internal audits of defence expenditure [1], but this is mostly within the MoD, it sometimes extends to military units. This raises questions of effectiveness, largely due to a lack of internal capacity to carry out extensive internal audits across all military units [2, 3]. The levels of staff expertise and whether the MoD values the unit’s findings is not available.

The work of the internal audit units is usually for the benefit of the MoD and the commander of the defence forces as well as for the Defence Commission, audits may also be reported to the accountant general and the accounting officer of the Ministry of Defence [1]. Internal audits reports are not submitted to the parliamentary Committee on Defence and Security [2].

Internal audits are submitted for review to external auditors, specifically the Office of the Auditor General Zimbabwe, as required by the Public Finance Management Act [1, 2]. However, the process can be deemed to be superficial given that the auditor general receives aggregated financial data on military expenditures, and the auditors cannot review specific disaggregated financial data [3].

The MoD addresses recommendations or queries from both its internal audit unit as well as from the auditor general [1]. However, there is a perception that this is superficial given that the military sector is opaque and its dealings are sensitive such that civilians from the MoD might not have the powers to action some of the recommendations from internal audit units or the Office of the Auditor General Zimbabwe especially when they relate to expenditures directly under the control of military units [2].