Senior State officials and senior civil servants such as central directors of the administration, members of army staffs, directors-general, directors and managers of the customs, police and water and forestry departments, directors of state offices and companies, project directors/coordinators, financial directors, accountants, chairmen of administrative commissions, administrators of public works or property belonging to the state domain, presidents of courts, judges, prosecutors and court clerks and, more generally, any authoriser of expenditure of any public body or any public-law corporation, administrators, directors, accountants and auditors of public companies were obliged to declare their assets on taking up and leaving office under the 2011 Law on corruption but this law was repealed in 2020 [1]. In practice, people in these sensitive positions are called upon to be examples of probity [2]. During the period under review, the government adopted a zero-tolerance policy towards corruption [3]. No financial scandals are reported within the defence and security institutions, and people are aware that if they are involved in corruption, they will not be protected [4].

The national legislation merely defines the criteria for eligibility. A morality investigation is generally required before appointments are made to certain sensitive positions, particularly in the supply chain [1]. Apart from this vetting requirement, and for the other positions, the appointing authority (the President of the Republic or the Council of Ministers) has discretionary power to make appointments to sensitive positions [2]. Criteria of competence, qualification and experience are set. The authorities respect these criteria when making appointments. They have set up a national file of executives eligible for appointment to positions in the public expenditure chain [3]. However, this is done for the top-level positions (directorate of financial affairs of Ministers and Procurement Specialists) and some appointees are not on this national file.[3]

Apart from the legislative requirements for all public staff in sensitive positions, there is no special scrutiny ofdefence personnel [1][2].

No special attention is paid to the selection of authorities occupying sensitive positions in order to reduce the risk of corruption [1]. On the one hand, this can be due to cronyism in appointments to these posts [2]. People who are close to them, loyal to them or friends of them, are only placed in these positions, where they can draw on State funds and pay part of the money to the higher authority that appointed them [2]. On the other hand, significant political power is concentrated within a single party dominated by military generals. Decisions can be carried out through negotiations with loyalists, while attempts to incorporate opposing forces may achieve limited success. Consequently, the hierarchy of power seems to be dictated more by personal relationships and loyalty than by other selection methods [3].

No special attention is paid to the selection of authorities occupying sensitive positions in order to reduce the risk of corruption. Therefore, this indicator is marked Not Applicable. [1][2][3]

No special attention is paid to the selection of authorities occupying sensitive positions in order to reduce the risk of corruption. Therefore, this indicator is marked Not Applicable.[1][2][3]

In Cameroon, the Ministry of Defense does not explicitly recognizse that certain positions, particularly in defence procurement, contracting, financial management, and commercial management, may be more prone to corruption opportunities. While there are legal frameworks intended to regulate appointments and tenure in these positions, they are poorly enforced and often circumvented. Appointments to sensitive posts are typically based on political loyalty rather than professional qualifications or ethical standards, which increases corruption risks as appointees may prioritize personal or political interests over their duties [1] [2]. Furthermore, oversight mechanisms such as the National Anti-Corruption Commission (CONAC) and the Ministry of Finance, which are tasked with monitoring the defense sector, are limited by political interference, which undermines their independence and effectiveness. As a result, they fail to hold officials accountable for corruption within defense procurement processes. High-ranking officials are often appointed based on political allegiance, and this lack of merit-based selection and oversight makes sensitive defense positions particularly vulnerable to corruption [3]. Unofficially, there is a clear acknowledgement that certain positions may be more susceptible to corruption than others because these “juicy” positions are often perceived as opportunities for rent-seeking behaviours, through which superiors reward their relatives, political allies, or individuals belonging to the same ethnic group [4][5].

In Cameroon, the selection, tenure, and oversight of personnel in sensitive positions, particularly in defense procurement, contracting, financial management, and commercial management, are significantly influenced by political patronage. High-ranking officials are often appointed based on political loyalty rather than merit, especially in the defence sector. This suggests that the standard operating procedure does not always prioritizse open recruitment, which raises concerns about transparency and accountability. However, while political loyalty plays a significant role, legal frameworks and certain institutional structures aim to regulate appointments and ensure the integrity of sensitive positions. These include provisions intended to manage conflicts of interest, although their application is inconsistent and often weakly enforced [4]. The National Anti-Corruption Commission (CONAC) and the Ministry of Finance are tasked with monitoring sensitive sectors, but their ability to act independently is hindered by political influence, limiting their capacity to oversee the appointment process and ensure that potential conflicts of interest are addressed effectively [3] [1].
This indicator is marked Not Applicable.

Despite the existence of oversight institutions like the National Anti-Corruption Commission (CONAC) and the Ministry of Finance, these bodies face significant political influence and lack the independence and resources needed to effectively monitor sensitive procurement activities and personnel appointments [3] [1]. As a result, procurement contracts in defence and contracting sectors are often awarded to politically connected companies with minimal scrutiny, leading to inflated costs and misuse of public funds [2].
The oversight mechanisms, while formally in place, lack the capacity to hold personnel in sensitive positions accountable. The National Anti-Corruption Commission and similar institutions are constrained by political pressures, which undermines their ability to enforce transparency and ensure effective governance [3]. The selection of personnel often reflects political considerations rather than merit, further weakening oversight and accountability in these sectors [1].
This indicator is marked Not Applicable.

Officially, no position is recognised as being particularly exposed to corruption, but this aspect is taken into account at the time of appointment. Promotions and appointments within the forces follow certain criteria, including qualifications, training, seniority, etc. In addition to these relatively objective criteria, appointments to certain positions also take into account personal considerations, such as proximity to certain senior leaders or even to the political authorities. Naturally, positions related to finance, procurement and, more generally, those with significant influence fall into this category [1, 2].

All these positions are filled on a discretionary basis [1, 2].

In principle, internal control is ensured by inspections (army, gendarmerie and police) [1, 2, 3].

The criteria for appointing individuals to positions in the military are not publicly disclosed. An interview with a senior military officer revealed that rank and capability, including previous command experiences, are some factors influencing appointments to sensitive positions within the military. However, recent allegations and research have also highlighted elite machinations by politicians and political patronage as factors contributing to such appointments (1). A November 2023 statement reinforces concerns about political interference in military appointments. The article refers to the then Chief of Army Staff and blocking a planned reshuffle within the military’s leadership structure to potentially protect allies. This provides some insights into the machinations that occur within the military in respect of appointments to certain positions (2).

At the top management level, there are parameters available for selecting or appointing personnel. Chapter 11 (11.01) of the Armed Forces Regulations Act (Volume 1) establishes the specific parameters required for promotion at the top managerial level. (1) The cabinet, with the advice of the Armed Forces Council, determines the promotion of personnel equivalent to or above the rank of colonel. Article 212(4) of the 1992 Constitution vests the power to appoint sensitive positions within the GAF in the hands and discretion of the president. (2) As a result, this recruitment process does not include procedures to limit conflict of interest.

There are neither formal internal nor external review processes available for the oversight of sensitive defence sector appointments since this is made at the discretion of the president in accordance with Article 212 of the Constitution (2) of the 1992 and Chapter 11 of the Armed Forces Regulations Act (1), which makes room for such a determination by the cabinet. Changes in government typically trigger a review process, yet public discussion of these issues typically remains limited (3).

Special attention is paid to personnel in sensitive positions, i.e., individuals with significant autonomy over personnel, resources, and the policies/plans that determine them. This includes decision-making power in procurement, recruitment, contracting, financial and commercial management. In particular the MoD pays close attention to one’s qualifications, length of time in a position, and their integrity. They transfer staff after every three years. As such the first year is for learning the ropes, the second for performing, and the third for transfer especially in sensitive areas [1]. Promotions are carefully considered and merit based [2].

While the KDF has established procedures for personnel selection and oversight in sensitive positions, the implementation presents a complex picture. The military employs structured vetting and appointment processes, especially for roles involving defence procurement, contracting, and financial management. These include revolving door restrictions and rigorous vetting protocols to manage conflicts of interest [1]. Yet, the effectiveness varies across different levels. While positions requiring technical expertise generally follow standardised recruitment processes, the consistency of these protocols across all sensitive positions remains variable [2]. Despite institutional efforts toward greater transparency, structural challenges continue to affect conflict of interest management [4]. Section 12(1) of the Public Officer Ethics Act provides the legal framework for conflict of interest guidelines [3]. The military maintains ongoing oversight through annual vetting processes, lifestyle audits, and procedural compliance checks, with investigations initiated upon suspected violations [4].

There is internal oversight in the Ministry of Defence to scrutinise appointment and promotion decisions of personnel in sensitive positions. Higher risk and sensitive positions are also subject to external scrutiny.
The KDF rank system is hierarchical, indicating a soldier’s expertise, responsibility, and authority. The system is divided into Officers and Service Members. Officers, commissioned by the Commander-in-Chief, range from Second Lieutenant (lowest) to General (highest, four-star). Only one four-star General serves as Chief of Defence Forces at a time. Officers’ ranks are displayed on the shoulder. Promotions are based on merit, requiring exams, discipline, and integrity [1].
The appointment of the CDF is handled by the Defence Council, also known as Board One. This council consists of six members, including the Defence Cabinet Secretary as the chairperson, and is responsible for recommending suitable candidates for presidential appointment. Other members include the Defence Principal Secretary and the commanders representing the Army, Air Force, and Navy. The council also has a secretary, who is a public officer, or a member of the military appointed by the council. The role of the secretary is to communicate the Council’s decisions. As per the KDF Act, 2012, a General (four-star) must retire at 62, a Lieutenant-General (three-star) at 61, a Major-General (two-star) at 59, and a Brigadier at 57 years. The CDF, VCDF, and Service Commanders, according to the Act, shall serve a single term of four years or until they reach the mandatory retirement age, whichever comes first. The guiding principle for selecting a new CDF outlines that the position should be held on a rotational basis among the three services [2]. For other Snr promotions, there is a committee that evaluates how you handle command, experience, qualifications, integrity issues, and makes recommendations to Board 2. This board then makes recommendations to Board 1, which is the Defence Council. At the Defence Council, the CS Defence reviews it before it goes to the president. Many considerations, including ethnic background, are considered [3].

Liberia’s legal framework does not contain provisions that explicitly mandate enhanced oversight of sensitive defence posts such as procurement officers, financial managers, or contracting officials. The Public Financial Management Act (2009, amended 2019) outlines broad responsibilities for public officials in areas of budgeting, procurement, and auditing,[1] and the Public Procurement and Concessions Act (PPCA, amended 2023) specifies requirements for procurement committees and due process in contracting.[2]
Procurement rules require conflict of interest declarations and recusals for committee and panel members, and allow removal where a conflict of interest exists.[3]. However, it’s not a bespoke regime for individual of high-risk positions. The vetting process applies mainly to political nominees, not the technically sensitive posts.[4]
Although accountability institutions such as the General Auditing Commission have expanded their oversight capacity at the national level,[5] there is no legal framework requiring that individuals in sensitive defence positions be subject to additional monitoring or reporting obligations beyond general civil-service regulations.

Liberia applies general conflict-of-interest and merit-based hiring rules,[1] but there is no documented, defence-specific regime that imposes revolving-door limits, enhanced vetting, or standardised technical-competency appointment procedures uniquely for sensitive posts.[2][3]
As there is no recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption than others, this indicator is marked Not Applicable.

The only oversight that can be referenced in this regard is the General Auditing Commission (GAC) Reports of the defence sector.[1] Even though there has been regular audit conducted, implementation and hearings by the appropriate oversight committees to scrutinise personnel in certain positions cannot be found.[2] As there is no recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption than others,[3][4] this indicator is marked Not Applicable.

Generally, three entities are considered to present the greatest risk of corruption. First, human resources. Given that the public administration provides a significant portion of employees, a significant portion of the population wants to join it. Some are ready to pay to join the armed forces to ensure a certain professional future [1]. The second entity with a high risk of corruption is the Directorate in charge of public procurement [2]. Finally, the third sensitive entity is the Service dealing with heritage management [3]. Other services are certainly considered subject to corruption but with less risk. However, despite the recognition there are no special treatment for these high risk positions [4].

Management positions within a ministry are generally awarded according to political criteria, including human resources which are nevertheless considered sensitive to the risks of corruption. Changes have been made in recent years to combat corruption and cronyism. The State has launched calls for applications but proximity to the regime in place remains an important criterion [1]. On the other hand, appointment to the services in charge of public procurement, while responding to political criticism, is also made on a technical basis. Indeed, public procurement requires specific skills in this area [2]. In general, recruitment within the Ministry of National Defense meets the same criteria as recruitment in other ministries, even if specificities exist (the same applies to all ministries) [3]. There is an internal assignment committee which decides on the positions in relation to the agents and their skills, characteristics and the criteria required for the position.

Concerning the appointment to sensitive positions, internal control exists, particularly in the departments dealing with public procurement, asset management and finally human resources management [1]. But in reality, such monitoring is not too restrictive and no external control exists [2].

Appointments for most positions, especially sensitive positions fall within the discretionary power of the supervisory authorities. For the defence and security sector, most appointments to sensitive positions fall within the “intuitue personae” and the sole discretion of either the President or the Minister .There is no official framework for calling for applications for these positions. Appointments are made based on proposals from the supervising minister or directly from the presidency. It happens that, sectors considered to present a high risk, particularly public procurement and others, individuals with necessary prerequisites, who understands the complexities and risks involved are chosen despite the choice being based on the discretionary power of the appointing authority rather than a clear transparent procedure.[1] Positions related to the management of public markets, supplies and those related to recruitment are recognised as presenting a high risk of corruption.[2]

Recruitment and selection of staff for sensitive positions are carried out in a highly discretionary manner. Open recruitment is not standard operating procedure, and position-specific conflict of interest procedures seem absent.[1][2][3]

The General Inspectorate of the Armed Forces and Services [1][2] carries out a general mission of internal controls on issues related to the army. Moreover the Direction des Ressources Humaines de l’Armée au Mali (DRHA) is responsible for the management of military personnel, the administration of human resources and the application of personnel policies within the Malian Armed Forces. However, they are attached to the Ministry of Defence and do not necessarily have the vocation or the possibility of examining the decisions of appointments and promotions of personnel occupying sensitive positions. Appointments are the responsibility of the Head of State, the Minister or the Chief of Staff. Promotions theoretically follow a formal process and according to a promotion table,[3] but it is not always respected.

In terms of coverage of sensitive and high-risk positions, special attention is given to personnel in these positions, including officials and personnel in defence procurement, contracting, financial management, and commercial management, individuals with significant autonomy over personnel, resources and the policies/plans that determine them [1]. Personnel with decision-making power in procurement, recruitment, contracting, financial and commercial management also receive special attention [1]. All of them are appointed on the basis of political trust, taking into account their technical competence [1]. There are a number of incompatibilities for the Inspector of National Defence: while on active duty, he/she may not simultaneously hold another management function in the Ministry of National Defence or Command in the Armed Forces [2].

In the selection process for positions and supervision of personnel in sensitive positions, including officials and personnel in defence procurement, contracting, financial management and commercial management, there are specific procedures that limit conflicts of interest for sensitive positions [1]. According to the internal regulations of the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces and the legislation on the functioning of public administration services [2], these procedures are strict, but are not regularly followed because they are often determined by issues of political trust [3]. However, regardless of the issue of political trust, standard appointment/recruitment processes are followed for specific technical competencies [1].

There is internal oversight in the Ministry of Defence to scrutinise appointment and promotion decisions of personnel in sensitive positions [1]. Higher risk and sensitive positions are also subject to external scrutiny, by Parliamentary Committee on Defence, Security and Public Order [2]. The Parliamentary Committee on Defence, Security and Public Order formally ought to implement extenral scrutiny of sensitive high-risk positions. However, this role is not effective due to several issues such as influence of political groups in parliament, lack of financial resources for inspection activities and weak technical knowledge on these issues [3].

In Niger’s defence and security sector, there is no systematic recognition that certain positions, such as procurement, contracting, financial management, and commercial oversight, are particularly vulnerable to corruption. The absence of a strong regulatory framework, coupled with limited transparency and oversight mechanisms, has allowed corrupt practices to persist, especially in defense procurement.
Furthermore, following the military coup of July 26, 2023, existing oversight mechanisms have weakened, and the military leadership has taken full control of financial and procurement processes. A decree of February 23, 2024 abolished all public oversight of defense expenditures, meaning that military procurement is now exempt from standard financial controls and public accountability measures [1]. This further reduces transparency and increases the risk of corruption in sensitive positions without any mitigation efforts.
Additionally, past reports have documented the role of key defense officials in fraudulent arms deals, including the use of offshore shell companies and fictitious contracts to siphon funds meant for military equipment purchases [2]. Despite these high-profile corruption cases, there is no evidence that personnel assigned to sensitive roles are subject to enhanced scrutiny, vetting, or oversight.

Given that there is no official acknowledgment that certain positions are high-risk for corruption, this sub-indicator is marked as Not Applicable. [1] [2]

Given that there is no official acknowledgment that certain positions are high-risk for corruption, this sub-indicator is marked as Not Applicable. [1] [2]

There are no publicly available information indicating that special attention is given to both the selection and oversight of personnel in sensitive positions such as procurement or financial management in Nigeria’s defence sector. However, alleged or proven cases of corruption in Nigeria’s defence sector point to the high risk of fraud or sleaze in defence procurement and spending (financial management and personnel deployment) [1]. In June 2022, for instance, the Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre and Transparency International urged then President Muhammadu Buhari to spare no effort in probing the defence sector, noting that “diversion of defence and security funds to private pockets through procurement process constitutes a serious threat to Nigeria’s Defence and Security sector and services; and has left [the nation’s] security operatives ill-equipped, poorly remunerated and demoralised in spite the persistently increased Defence budgetary allocation and spending from 2011 to date [2]. A military court in June 2020 ordered that a Nigerian general who authorised the transportation of a large sum of money that was reportedly stolen by soldiers who conveyed the cash, be demoted and dismissed. The general court-martial found Hakeem Oladapo Otiki, guilty of disobedience to service orders, theft of public property, diverting operational money and engaging in private businesses [3].

No evidence shows that special attention is paid to personnel in high-risk positions. Therefore, this indicator is marked Not Applicable.

No evidence shows that special attention is paid to personnel in high-risk positions. Therefore, this indicator is marked Not Applicable.

The Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (ARMP) in Senegal is a unit created by Decree no. 2009-510 of 29 May 2009, which sets out the recruitment procedures, status and powers of ARMP staff responsible for investigating the regularity of procedures for awarding and executing public procurement contracts, public service delegations and partnership contracts. The said decree lays down the conditions of appointment and obligations of the members of the unit, as well as its composition and powers, and also describes the conduct of the investigators’ missions. In addition to the character and oath tests, the members of the unit are bound by professional secrecy with regard to facts, acts and information of which they may have knowledge by reason of their duties. [1] Article 9 of DECREE no. 2003-447 of 18 June 2003, which repeals and replaces decree no. 79-113 of 1 February 1979 setting the conditions for the practice of surveillance, guarding and escorting of private property, stipulates that the beneficiary of the authorisation is responsible for the physical and moral fitness of his agents. Before recruiting their staff, they may have a character investigation carried out by the relevant authorities. [2] .

President Bassirou Diomaye Faye and the Supreme Judicial Council (CSM) had initiated a morality investigation into magistrates being considered for certain sensitive positions. [1] The president intends to extend this procedural system to all public sectors, including the army. The purpose of these character investigations for sensitive positions in the defence sector and elswhere, is, over and above the person’s technical skills, to ensure that he or she has the values and ethics to limit conflicts of interest. Prime Minister Ousmane Sonko has conducted a morality inquiry into the appointment of ministers to his government. This administrative enquiry is an internal enquiry and a set of investigations aimed at verifying the character of potential candidates and their compatibility with the position of minister of the republic. [2] .

In Senegal, any appointment or promotion to a higher grade that is not exclusively intended to fill a vacancy on a regular basis is prohibited unless, after an administrative enquiry, the person fulfils the conditions. [1] The appointment of generals by the President of the Republic is made after a long and thorough morality investigation of all eligible persons. Appointments to certain posts are made exclusively by the President and Head of the Armed Forces, without any control by an external body. He can, however, make inquiries before appointment. Not everyone is aware of this investigation. [2]
The Army of the Republic is at the service of the Nation. Its mission is to prepare and ensure, by force of arms, the defence of the homeland and the higher interests of the Nation. Certain sensitive positions therefore require a spirit of self-sacrifice, even to the point of supreme sacrifice, discipline, availability, loyalty and neutrality. The duties of these positions and the hardships they entail mean that the people who occupy them must be properly trained and investigated to ensure that they have the intellectual, technical and, above all, moral capacity to occupy these positions. [3] .

Senior Management, Middle Management and other prescribed members including finance and procurement officials are required to disclose their financial interests in the government’s eDisclosure system. [4]. The system allows designated public servants from level 9 to level 16 to disclose annually, (for senior management service members) and bi-annually (for non-senior management service members) to disclose their financial interests [1].
The Auditor-General (AGSA) reported in 2023 that recruitment and contracting officers alongside procurement staff could not be verified for compliance due to incomplete declarations or missing files [2]. The Public Service Commission audit (2022) noted staff in planning, finance, and commercial functions often omit disclosures [4] The government introduced a system of lifestyle audits to verify financial disclosures in recent years. However, the Department of Defence is non-compliant with implementing lifestyle audit requirements. [3].
While policies exist, oversight application is inconsistent across sensitive areas, with procurement highlighted but recruitment, contracting, and financial posts receiving little to no follow-up. Consequently, only procurement is audited by external bodies; other high-risk positions are less monitored

Although conflict of interest disclosure requirements are in place, there are known issues such as senior officials failing to submit disclosures on time, as well as issues noted by the Auditor-General on apparent non-compliance with regulations on financial and conflict of interest disclosures related to procurement [1]. Likewise, the Department of Defence is non-compliant in the implementation of lifestyle audits. In South Africa, significant discretion is provided to line departments in performing recruitment and selection functions and known issues with the politicisation of the public sector undermine merit-based hiring practices and compliance with human resources policy [2].

There is no known substancial internal or external oversight of appointment and promotion decisions of sensitive positions [1]. In February 2025, the minister responsible for arms control barred MPs from visiting the Directorate for Conventional Arms Control, also preventing SANDF involvement, an act deemed undermining transparency and oversight [2]. A May 2025 SIU investigation revealed an uncompetitive R257 million software contract awarded without due process, yet no senior procurement or contracting personnel have been held accountable, prompting calls from the DA for disciplinary action [3].
The absence of consequences shows a lack of oversight on those in sensitive roles.

There is no special recognition that some positions are more vulnerable to corruption than others within the defence ministry. Such classification does not feature in the SPLA Act, 2009 [1] nor has there been any public communication through the media stating that certain positions are given more attention on matters corruption. Corruption is seen as a broader evil affecting all levels of the South Sudanese Society. [3]

The absence of recognition that certain positions within the South Sudanese military are more susceptible to corruption than others make it difficult to evaluate the selection process in terms of safeguarding against corruption risks. Without acknowledging the varying levels of sensitivity or vulnerability attached to specific roles, there is no framework to assess whether preventive measures are being applied where they are most needed. Moreover, the ongoing integration of former opposition or rebel fighters into the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF) as part of the peace agreement significantly undermines the efficacy of any merit-based selection processes [1] [2][3][4].
This political manoeuvring dilutes efforts to create a transparent and corruption-resistant military structure, as the selection of personnel becomes more about fulfilling political agreements than maintaining high ethical and professional standards within the defence forces. [3] This process not only circumvents conventional military recruitment protocols but also introduces individuals whose primary allegiance may not align with professional military conduct, further increasing the vulnerability of these positions to corrupt practices. [4] Consequently, this approach exacerbates the systemic corruption challenges that continue to affect South Sudan’s defence sector. The result is a military apparatus that is not only politically fragmented but also prone to ethical compromise, limiting its capacity to function as a coherent and accountable institution.
This indicator is marked Not Applicable.

There is no special recognition that some positions are more vulnerable to corruption than others within the defence ministry. Such classification does not feature in the SPLA Act, 2009 [1] nor has there been any public communication through the media stating that certain positions are given more attention on matters corruption. Thus, it is difficult to assess the oversight since some positions are not considered more open to corruption than others. It is noteworthy that Public Finance Management Oversight Committee (PFM-OC) was established under the R-ARCSS to oversee public finance management. However, the tasks of the PFM-OC are not confined to a particular institution but mainly to the provisions of Chapter 4 of the R-ARCSS.
This indicator is marked Not Applicable.

Article 8, Section J of the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) Act 2005, establishes a crucial power dynamic within the military structure by granting the Commander-in-Chief the authority to appoint officers to head key departments and services. This provision extends to sensitive positions, signifying the direct involvement of the Commander-in-Chief in the selection of personnel who will manage critical aspects of the UPDF. [1]
These appointed officers are then held accountable to the relevant service chiefs of staff for the effective management of their respective departments. This structure creates a chain of command that emphasises both centralised controls from the top and delegated responsibility through the service chiefs. While these provisions establish a hierarchical and structured career progression system, they do not explicitly include anti-corruption safeguards or specific provisions that address the unique risks associated with high-risk posts [1].
Furthermore, Article 55 of the UPDF Act provides the legal framework for appointments, transfers, and promotions, including positions of responsibility within the UPDF. This article formalises the processes by which officers advance through the ranks and take on greater leadership roles. It underscores the importance of a structured and regulated system for personnel management, ensuring that appointments are based on merit, experience, and the needs of the defence forces. Article 55 reinforces the power of the Commander-in-Chief, granted in Article 8, to place specific individuals in charge of vital departments. This combination of articles allows for both strategic appointments by the Commander-in-Chief and a regulated system for career progression within the UPDF. While the legal framework within the UPDF grants the Commander-in-Chief significant authority over appointments to sensitive positions, the practical application of special attention to these personnel regarding corruption risks is a complex issue.
Furthermore, the Leadership Code Act of 2002, which applies to public officials, including those in the military, mandates the declaration of assets and liabilities. While this promotes transparency, it does not explicitly address corruption or bribery. Additionally, the Act does not address critical integrity safeguards, such as conflict-of-interest screening for defence-specific posts or post-service employment restrictions [2]
The persistence of corruption allegations and the perception of uneven enforcement, particularly concerning high-ranking officials, raise questions about the practical implementation of robust oversight. This suggests that oversight remains inconsistent and insufficiently tailored to high-risk defence functions.

Officials are required to disclose potential conflicts of interest, and clear procedures are in place to resolve such conflicts. This includes prohibiting officials from having financial interests or involvement in organizations relevant to their defence work.
The Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) conducts recruitment based on projected population figures from each district or city, forming the basis of recruitment quotas. The list of successful applicants is published, and shortlisted candidates are invited for final interviews at designated recruitment centres.[2]
However, concerns persist regarding the recruitment and appointment of personnel to sensitive positions. While formal procedures exist, examples suggest that political influence may play a role in the selection process.
A notable example of is the pattern of promotions within the UPDF. In 2021, a significant number of high-ranking promotions raised questions about the National Character of the UPDF, with 8 out of 11 full generals reportedly coming from the Southwestern region. For instance, promoted 2 Lieutenant Generals to full General; 10 Major Generals to Lieutenant General, one of whom was his son Muhoozi Kainerugaba; 18 Brigadiers to Major Generals and 38 Colonels to Brigadier.[2] The ethnic and regional composition of the generals raised a lot of concern and dust among Ugandans while the overall composition of the UPDF has also raised plenty of concern and disquiet among Ugandans of goodwill.[3]
These concerns highlight the need for strengthened oversight and merit-based selection mechanisms in appointing personnel to positions that handle sensitive resources and decision-making within the UPDF.

The UPDF High Command oversees the appointment process, ensuring adherence to guidelines and regulations while the Leadership Code Act of 2002 mandates the declaration of assets and liabilities. The Defence Forces Council is a statutory body that advises on senior appointments and promotions. The Parliamentary Committee on Defence and Internal Affairs exercises oversight over UPDF appointments ensuring transparency and accountability.[2] However, they have no power to change appointments made by the Commander in Chief.[3] Appointments especially for top positions ultimately rest with the Commander in Chief, who is also the President. This raises concerns about the extent to which merit, institutional checks, and oversight mechanisms influence senior appointments within the UPDF.

The military commanders and Generals positions are defined by the Constitution of Zimbabwe under section 216(3)(4)(5), which indicates that each of the service chiefs’ commanders serve a period of five years renewable for another five years only [1]. The president makes such appointment of all service chiefs: army commander, Police commission, Prison Commission, Air Marshal and Director General of the Central Intelligence Organisation [2]. The president does such appointment in consultation with the Minister of Defence [1]. The defence Act does not define any of that certain position are more open to corruption opportunities than others [2].

The discretion for such appointments rest with the president as stated in the Defence Act [1][2][3]. Therefore, this indicator is marked Not Applicable.

The discretion for such appointments rest with the president as stated in the Defence Act [1][2][3]. Therefore, this indicator is marked Not Applicable.