Skip to sidebar Skip to main

Q23.

Does the government have a well-scrutinised process for arms export decisions that aligns with Articles 7.1.iv, 11.5, and 15.6 of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)?

23a. Signatory and Ratification

Score

SCORE: 50/100

Assessor Explanation

Assessor Sources

23b. Compliance

Score

SCORE: NA/100

Assessor Explanation

23c. Parliamentary scrutiny

Score

SCORE: 0/100

Assessor Explanation

Assessor Sources

Compare scores by country

Please view this page on a larger screen for the full stats.

Relevant comparisons

Albania has ratified the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) in January 2014 (1). The trade of weapons, military materiel and dual use technologies has been regulated since 2007 by the Law on state control of the import and export activity of military goods and dual-use goods and technologies adopted in 2007 (2).

According to the Arms Trade Treaty-Baseline Assessment Project (ATT-BAP) Albania has complied with all the ATT articles (1).

Regarding parliamentary scrutiny, the 2007 law established the legal bases of the export control policy while the Council of Ministers drafts and implements the state policy on export control [1]. However, there is no evidence of involvement of the parliament in the decision making the process of the export control policy as defined by the 2007 law [2]. In the 2018 law, this capability of the parliament has been removed, and the law vests both, the competence of policymaking and policy implementation on arms import-exports to the Council of Ministers [3].

Algeria has not signed the ATT (1). According to the SIRPI Arms Transfers database, Algeria has not significantly exported arms (2).

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable because Algeria has not signed the ATT (1). According to the SIRPI Arms Transfers database, Algeria has not significantly exported arms (2).

This sub-indicator has been scored ‘Not Applicable’ as SIPRI has not recorded any arms exports from Algeria since 2015.

Angola signed the ATT on September 24th, 2013, it is not yet ratified (1). Angola is mainly an arms importer.

Because Angola has not yet ratified the ATT, this indicator is marked as Not Applicable.

Although there are no upcoming arms exports, they may be subject to parliamentary debate; however, Parliament has a limited ability to influence decision-making in general, including in the defence sector (1).

Argentina signed and ratified the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) in 2014. [1] [2]

Regarding article 7.1 on the evaluation of exports; article 11.5, on providing information on measures to avoid deviations; and article 15.6, on international cooperation in this area – the latest report submitted by Argentina, [1] available online, indicates that the Government has a decision-making process aligned with international regulations.

Regarding to article 15.6 on international cooperation, participates in State of the Wassenaar Arrangement, [2] and adopted criteria and guidelines on the control of exports of war material, technology, and sensitive and dual-use goods. Argentina is also part of the Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking of Firearms, Ammunition, and Other Related Materials. [3]

Internally, the issue is under the supervision of two agencies: the National Commission, composed of the Ministers of Defence, Foreign Affairs and Economy, is charged with the control of sensitive exports and war material; [4] the Nuclear Regulatory Authority (ARN), the National Space Activities Commission (CONAE) of the Institute of Scientific and Technical Research of the Armed Forces (CITEFA), and the National Customs Directorate also have related competencies. The National Commission controls exports of weapon related materials and intervenes where necessary. Regarding small arms and light weapons, the control of imports, exports, and international transit falls, since 2015, to the ANMaC, the National Agency for Controlled Materials (formerly RENAR, National Weapons Registry) within the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights. Finally, the RENAR 36/16 Provision, [5] establishes procedures to ensure that importing states have issued the corresponding export authorisations and that the transit states have granted the relevant permits.

Arms exports are not debated in Congress. It has only been involved in the sanction of the framework laws and in the Disarmament Plan that was extended until the end of 2019. [1] The agencies for its control, approval, and monitoring are those already mentioned: for war material, the National Commission for the control of sensitive exports and war material, and with respect to the remaining weapons, the National Agency for Controlled Materials. [2] Regarding the export of weapons, the procedure begins with a prior registration by a Legitimate User, licensing by the Commission or the ANMaC after consultation on convenience with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, export certificate with a ban on re-export, customs control, a certificate of verification, and export registration. The movements of firearms are controlled by an online system called SIGIMAC (System of Integrated Management of Controlled Materials), which allows users to interact with the body in order to monitor the movements of these materials in real time. [3] However, the Argentine Network for Disarmament points to the lack of control over the firearms market in Argentina. Along the same lines, the news agency Chequeado notes that there is a lack of control in the field of firearms trade, as well as a small budget and insufficient staff within the Agency. [4] According to Álvarez Velasco, civil society in Argentina has been much more active and deeply involved in the control of firearms, which has given the policies a social base and a way of operating from the bottom up. [5] [6]

Armenia is not a signatory to the Arms Trade Treaty [1].

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable because Armenia has not signed the ATT.

Armenia is not a significant arms export country. However, whenever the opportunity presents itself, the issue is debated at the joint meeting of the standing Defence and Security and Financial-Credit and Budgetary Affairs committees within wider budgetary discussions. Clause 6 of Article 117 of the Rules of Procedures of the National Assembly states that joint meetings of the standing committees are to discuss secret budget items at closed meetings [1, 2, 3].

Australia signed up to and ratified the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) on 3 June 2014 [1].

Australia seems to be complying with Articles 7(1)(b)(iv), 11(5), and 15(6). Australia has a robust process in place for arms export control. Parties that wish to export dual-use or military-purpose goods on the Defence and Strategic Goods List (DSGL) must apply for a permit. This permit undergoes rigorous assessment by the Defence Export Control Office (DECO) [1], according to its Export Control Policy [2] and relevant legislation and international agreements. Australia has been considered a leader in international arms control agreements, convening the Australia Group to help mitigate the spread of technology that could be used for chemical and biological weapons manufacturing [3] and being instrumental to the push for the ATT, including by ultimately presiding over important negotiations that resulted in the final text [4]. All available evidence points to full compliance with the 3 above-named articles. The DECO Export Control Policy specifically points to “Whether the DSGL technology or the goods may be used for mercenary activities or a terrorist or other criminal activity” as a point of evaluation for export permits [2], indicating compliance with ATT Article 7(1)(b)(iv). While there is limited evidence of specific information exchange mechanisms, DECO states on its website: “Another important element [of international export control regimes] focuses on information exchange. Participating states agree to exchange general information on risks associated with transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies, in order to consider, where necessary, the scope for coordinating national control policies to combat these risks” [5]. Given the open acknowledgement of the importance of information exchange and Australia’s path setting role in Australia Group and other export information exchange mechanisms, it can be presumed that Australia complies with the information-sharing obligations under ATT Article 11(5) and 15(6).

Parliament has the formal authority to scrutinise and block future defence exports as part of its wider power to scrutinise ([1, 2], see Q2A), but does not have access to in-depth information about defence exports, leaving it to rely on media reports, leaks, and other informal sources to obtain information about future defence exports and making oversight efforts ineffective [3]. The defence-related parliamentary committees do not have access to classified information [4]. Because details about arms exports – destination countries, quantity and dollar amounts, etc – are often made secret using the commercial-in-confidence justification [5], the defence-related parliamentary committees have no way of knowing about the majority of defence export decisions before they are made. Media reports in late 2018 revealed publicly that the Australian government had approved large-scale arms exports to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which are involved in a controversial military intervention in Yemen [6]. Before these reports were released, Senators had unsuccessfully attempted to force the Australia government to produce documents on approvals of military supplies to Saudi Arabia, over which the government claimed commercial-in-confidence [7]. The revelation caused consternation among some Senators [8], but has not lead to any new documents being produced before parliament or new restrictions put into place by parliament as of September 2019.

Azerbaijan has not signed the Arms Trade Treaty (1). Until 2014 Azerbaijan regularly reported its arms imports to the United Nations (2).
According to experts, Azerbaijan began to export military products in 2013. Exports to the foreign countries were $123 million in 2013 and $10 million less in the following year. Exports figures for the year 2016 have exceeded $120 million. Azerbaijan exports arms to several countries in Turkey, Russia, Belarus, South Korea, South-East Asia, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Pakistan and the United States of America (US)” (3).
In 2018, Azerbaijani president İlham Aliyev said that there are 1200 types of military products produced. At the same time, Azerbaijan was already starting to export military products (4). Defence Industry Minister Yaver Jamalov said in 2017 that the export of Azerbaijani military products is being carried out by the relevant agencies of more than 10 countries. “At present the cost of concluded contracts is 101 million US dollars. $ 57 million of this amount is in force, and the remaining $ 44 million will come into effect after end-user certificates are issued” (5).
According to an expert, Azerbaijan is striving to increase military exports, while decreasing imports of weaponry from other countries. While much of Azerbaijan’s military production is attributed to joint ventures—especially with Israeli, Turkish and South-African companies— 31 domestic production sites currently produce entirely homegrown technology (6). However, there is not a well-scrutinised process for arms export decisions (7).

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable, as Azerbaijan has not signed the Arms Trade Treaty (1)

There is no domestic or international control mechanisms for arms exports (1). There is no accountability, the parliament is not informed about the process (2). Local NGOs and the media are not informed about the arms export strategy. As such, the risk of corruption increases considerably (3).

Bahrain signed the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) in 2013, but has yet to ratify it [1].

As the country has not ratified the ATT, this indicator has been marked ‘Not Applicable’ [1].

As the country is not a significant arms exporter, this indicator has been marked ‘Not Applicable’ [1].

Bangladesh signed the Arms Trade Treaty in 2013 [1], however, it is yet to ratify it [2].

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’ as Bangladesh has only signed, and not ratified, the ATT [1].

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’, as Bangladesh does not export arms [1].

Belgium signed the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) in 2013 and ratified it in 2014 [1].

As stated in the Initial Report submitted 23 December 2015, Belgium has complied with each of the 3 ATT articles [1].

Arms export in Belgium is a regional competence [1]. It is handled by the Flemish, Walloon or Brussels government. Two exceptions are Belgian Defence and the Federal police, which are handled on a federal level. In these cases, the entity concerned needs to request a licence to export at the Service of Licences of the Federal Public Service of Economics (‘FOD Economie’).

For exports to non-EU or NATO member states, or a restricted list of other countries, advice is given by the Federal Public Service of Foreign Affairs (FOD Buitenlandse Zaken) for all other countries. This advice is generally followed. The federal law on Foreign Arms Trade (1991) requires the government to report yearly to its parliament on provided and declined licences [2], and regional laws have been established since.

Arms export licences are debated in parliament but this is a posteriori. Debates on this topic are generaly superficial and brief, but this has more to do with the character of the arms exports than with a lack of processes or external influences.

Bosnia and Herzegovina signed and ratified the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) on September 25, 2014, agreeing to comply with the whole treaty [1, 2].

Bosnia and Herzegovina fully complies with the three articles of the ATT. The articles of ATT are used for state strategies, and Bosnia and Herzegovina regularly reports to the ATT secretariat [1, 2].

According to Article 5 of the Law on Control of Foreign Trade Traffic of Weapon, Military Equipment and Special Purpose Goods, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations of Bosnia and Herzegovina issues individual and global permits which, regulate export, import and the brokering of weapons. Consequently, and as per Article 33 of the law, the ministry is obliged to submit, to the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a report on the permits issued once in six months [1]. The Ministry of Defence regularly carries out its statutory obligation and reports to the Parliamentary Assembly following the Rules of Procedure of the House of Representatives of the Parliamentary Assembly (“Official Gazette of BiH”, Nos. 33/06, 41/06, 81/06, 91/06, 91/07 and 87/09)[2, 3].
The Law on Control of Foreign Trade Traffic of Weapon, Military Equipment and Special Purpose Goods was adopted in 2016 to be in line with the European Union directive which increases control of arms trade [4].

On 7 June 2019, Botswana deposited (Accession) the Instrument to become a Party to the ATT. The ATT came into force on 5 September 2019, and it is due to report on 31 May 2021. As accession carries the same legal effect as ratification, Botswana has both signed up to and ratified ATT. [1,2].

There is not enough information to score this indicator. The country has only recently deposited the ATT Instrument, therefore, it is too soon to meaningfully measure compliance [1,2].

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’ because Botswana does not manufacture or export arms aside from one isolated case in 2013 [1,2]. The circumstances under which the 2013 export deal was concluded are not clear. According to SIPRI, Botswana was one of very few states to show a deterioration in transparency [3]. Recently in Botswana, official budgetary reports have become increasingly difficult to obtain, there is a lack of a national defence policy and almost no government information or dialogue exists on issues such as arms procurement. ‘While these issues are worrying, the main cause for concern is the decreased public engagement on military-related matters,’ says Dr Tian. Botswana had the third highest percentage increase in military spending between 2014 and 2017. Military spending grew by 60 per cent (or $182 million) in that period as part of several military procurement programmes involving France and Switzerland. ‘This military spending increase has occurred despite the fact that Botswana is located in one of the least conflict-prone areas of Africa and is one of the few states in sub-Saharan Africa to have never been involved in an armed conflict,’ says Dr Tian.[3]

Brazil ratified the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) in August 2018 [1], the ratification included the whole Treaty (no articles were omitted from the ratification) [2].

The ATT was ratified in 2018, and it was enacted by Decree 9.607/2018, in December 2018. This decree established the National Policy of Import and Export of Defence Products [1]. The assessor found no evidence of any compliance measures surrounding the three articles.

According to a Human Rights NGO, by the time the ratification occurred, ‘Saudi Arabia was one of the largest of Brazil’s arms and ammunitions buyers and is currently involved in the worst humanitarian crisis in the world, due to the war in Yemen’ [2]. Indeed, in October 2015 some reports accused Brazilian company Avibras of exporting cluster ammunition used in Yemen war. That ammunition, apparently SS-60 and SS-80 3000mm roquettes, are fired from the ASTROS series, an MLRS made by Avibras. The company ensures that the ammunition has a system of auto-destruction, preventing unexploded ordinance. In any case, the ASTROS by Saudi Arabia date back to 1992. Other importers of ASTROS are Indonesia, Qatar and Malaysia [3]. In 2018, the main importers of Brazilian armaments were Pakistan, Indonesia and Lebanon [4]. However, according to a response to an FOIA request sent to the Ministry of Defence, there were no practical changes after this decree was enacted; no countries have been denied access to the Brazilian arms market so far [5].

One year after the enactment, the assessor could not find any assessments in the media nor any discussion in the legislature (both chambers) regarding parliamentary scrutiny of the correct implementation of Decree 9.607/08 and ATT related issues.

Burkina Faso has signed up and ratified the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) on June 3, 2013, and June 4, 2014, respectively (1), (2).

This indicator has not been assigned a score due to insufficient information or evidence.

This provision does not apply to Burkina Faso, as it is not an exporter of arms (1), (2), (3), (4).

Cameroon signed the Arms Trade Treaty in December 2014 and ratified it in June 2018 [1] [2].

This indicator has not been assigned a score due to insufficient information or evidence.

Data from the Stockholm International Research Institute between 2017-2018 suggest that Cameroon is not an arms exporter [1] [2]. It imports arms, from several helicopters received from China and Russia, to armoured vehicles from China, South Africa, Ukraine and the Czech Republic [3]. Parliament has no powers when it comes to the export of weapons.

Canada has ratified the ATT, which came into effect on September 17, 2019. [1] Following the introduction of Bill C-47 (which received Royal Assent on December 12, 2018), the updated ‘Order Amending the Export Control List (Arms Trade Treaty)’ has come into full force and complies with the ATT in addition to bringing violations under the purview of the Export and Import Permits Act as a mechanism for sanctioning violations. [2] [3] [4]

The updated ‘Order Amending the Export Control List (Arms Trade Treaty)’ covers the ATT’s articles pertaining to its purpose, scope, and limitations on Ammunition/munition. [1] [2] As noted in 23A, violations of the ATT can be prosecuted under the purview of the Export and Import Permits Act as a mechanism for sanctioning violations. [3] [4] Compliance with the ATT is found to be inconsistent, as reported by media and civil society [5] [6].

Upcoming arms exports are not subject to parliamentary approval, but the amended Export and Imports Permit Act and the Criminal Code provision to implement the ATT requires that “no later than May 31 of each year, the Minister shall prepare and cause to be laid before each House of Parliament a report of the operations under this Act for the preceding year and a report in respect of arms, ammunition, implements and munitions of war, that were exported in the preceding year under the authority of and in accordance with an export permit issued under subsection 7(1)”. [1] There is extensive media coverage, House Committee hearings, and parliamentary debate about arms sales, including to Saudi Arabia and Turkey, and there is evidence that this debate can, but is not guaranteed to, influence decisions on arms sales. [2] [3] [4]

Chile signed up the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) in June 2013 and ratified it in May 2018 [1, 2]. In January 2019, the Ministry of Foreign Relations enacted the ATT [3].

According to the Chilean National Report on the implementation of the Programme of Action on weapons and the International Tracing Instrument [1], the country shows effective laws, norms, and administrative procedures for the control over the exportation of weapons. According to the Ministry of National Defence (MDN) [2], the country has complied systematically with commitments on transparency in submitting information on spending, acquisitions and inventories related to weapons through international organisations (OEA and UNASUR).

Congress does not have an explicit role in the approval of exports of weapons and arms. Instead, the MDN has an Advisory Committee on Exports of Weapons and Arms that scrutinises all export requests for weapons and war material and ensures that these operations comply with international commitments [1]. The committee is formed by the sub-secretaries of Defence, armed forces, foreign relations, the vice-chief of El Estado Mayor Conjunto (EMCO), and the general director of national mobilisation.

China signed up to the ATT and completed its accession to the ATT in July 2020. [1] Despite having domestic regulations on arms exports, the Chinese government has been accused of exporting weapons to war zones, of non-compliance with the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and of transferring nuclear weapons-related material and technologies to Pakistan. [2,3]

This indicator is scored ‘Not Applicable’ as the treaty only entered into force on 6 July 2020, so it is too early to measure compliance.

The National People’s Congress does not debate arms exports. This is entirely controlled by the executive with no parliamentary scrutiny whatsoever. (Articles 13-19)

In 2013, Colombia signed the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), [1] but has not ratified it to date. As such, there is no regulatory body to guide state action in this area, despite the fact that it is one of the Latin American countries severely affected by arms diversion and armed violence. [2] In 2016, Law 1782 was issued, [3] which sought to approve the Arms Trade Treaty. However, it was declared unenforceable through the ruling C-047 of 2017 by the Constitutional Court, citing that there was the existence of an insurmountable error as a result of not having the approval of the Law in the Plenary Session of the Senate with the regulatory quorum and the simple majority required by the Constitution. [3] For CERAC, the implementation of the treaty would bring Colombia new opportunities in a post-conflict context. There are studies that advance the positive aspects that it would have for the post-conflict, including more information on imports and exports; greater transparency in the market for legal and illegal weapons; implementation of international cooperation mechanisms for regulation; and the implementation of systems and procedures for controlling transfer. While Colombia is an arms producer whose industry is monopolised by the defence industry via INDUMIL, it remains primarily weapon importer, fueled by the decades-long armed conflict. [5]

In Colombia, only the State can export and import weapons. In the export process, the government has a consolidated military industry that allows it to produce and market them. INDUMIL, a commercial and industrial company of the State, assumes these functions through the consolidation of three business lines: production of weapons, explosives, and military elements such as bombs and mortars. According to the general manager of INDUMIL, after the signing of the Peace Agreement, the internal demand for orders and supplies from the military forces decreased, which meant increasing arms exports, creating an export strategy, closing the year with a record of exports for USD $ 40 million. Now, this entity is supervised and monitored by the General Comptroller of the Nation, the Office of the Attorney General of the Nation, the General Audit of the Nation, the General Accounting Office of the Nation, the Public Function, ICONTEC international, and Transparency for Colombia. [1, 2] It is not clear beyond this if there is any involvement by Parliament with regards to oversight of arms exports. There is no evidence of parliamentary debate in media sources.

Côte d’Ivoire signed the ATT on June 3, 2013. It ratified it on February 25, 2015. The date of effect of ATT ratification is officially listed as May 27, 2015 (1), (2).

Compliance and implementation of the ATT in Côte d’Ivoire are being tracked by the NA Commission on small arms (Commission Nationale des Armes Légères et de Petit Calibre, ComNat-ALPC) together with the Conseil National de Sécurité (CNS). Compliance involves harmonizing laws with ATT provisions and revising the tools and procedures for the transfer of arms and ammunition.

As of 2017, the government had obtained financing from the ATT Secretariat to bolster the capacity building of lawmakers, including those in the NA Commission de Sécurité et de Défense (CSD). Implementation of ATT provisions is complex because it involves legislative and procedural harmonization on the circulation of arms and ammunition. Côte d’Ivoire is still working on the harmonization of its legal framework (1), (2).

Though it is not an arms exporter, the circulation of small arms is widespread in Côte d’Ivoire as a result of the last period of civil conflict (post-electoral crisis of 2010-2011). This poses a challenge for ATT compliance. A UN Security Council arms embargo was in effect from November 2004 through April 2016. However, there is ample evidence that the UN embargo was violated repeatedly during this period, according to the ATT Monitor. The ATT Monitor reported cases of non-compliance, in some cases with government complicity. It alerted to arms smuggling along the border with Mali and Liberia. Additionally, the UN Group of Experts revealed that under the former regime of Burkinabe President Blaise Compaoré, arms stocks were diverted to Côte d’Ivoire from Burkina Faso, thus violating the terms of the UN embargo. For example, in August 2012 Brazil authorized the export of munition for arms that were not in stock in Burkina Faso. The munition was later found among the soldiers of the Forces Nouvelles (FN). Similar cases were reported from arms exporters based in Bulgaria and Albania (3). “For example, in August 2012, Brazil authorized exports of ammunition for weapons of a type that Burkina Faso did not have in its stockpiles, and which were later found in the hands of the Forces Nouvelles (FN) combatants” (3).

Côte d’Ivoire is not an arms exporter. Therefore, the NA does not hold debates about upcoming arms exports, and this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

Still, members of the NA Commission de Sécurité et de Défense (CSD) and high-ranking members of the armed forces are regularly trained in issues related to ATT compliance. The NA Commission on small arms (Commission Nationale des Armes Légères et de Petit Calibre, ComNat-ALPC) together with the Conseil National de Sécurité (CNS) organize regular workshops and training sessions to strengthen the capacity of members of the NA Commission de Sécurité et de Défense (CSD) on issues of compliance with the ATT. For example, on July 9, 2018, Abidjan.net reported on a workshop in Abidjan for CSD members (1). Another workshop for CSD members took place in Abidjan on October 4, 2017, to validate the results of an evaluation of tools and procedures for the control of arms and ammunition (2). A regional conference seeking to create synergies with ATT and similar treaties was held in Abidjan on 29-30 September 2015 (3).

Denmark signed and ratified the Arms Trade Treaty on 02 April 2014 [1, 2].

The Minister of Justice provides licences for the production and export of arms and war materials [1, 2]. As an EU member, Denmark subscribes to the EU Common Position on export of military technology and equipment [3], where export permissions must be expected to be made with a view to these guidelines. This includes Article 6(a) of the Common Position which states that member states must take into account the record of the buyer country with regard to its support for or encouragement of terrorism and organised crime. This covers ATT Article 7.1.iv. Concerning the ATT Article 11.5 on information sharing to prevent diversion, this is a priority on EU level. It is already covered by the EU Common Position, where each member state has committed to assessing diversion as a risk in arms exports [3]. Further, the EU Working Group on Effective Implementation of the ATT identified diversion as a key issue for future work [4]. This was repeated in the 21st annual report on the EU Common position implementation activities [5]. Concerning Article 15.6 of the ATT on cooperation of conventional arms becoming subject to corrupt practices, it serves to mention that, in support of the EU opneness policy, all Danish exports are made public by the Ministry of Justice (in value and volume) [6, 7]. The fact that Denmark participates in working groups on implementation of ATT at EU level is the only indication that Denmark complies with ATT Article 15.6 [5]. In general, research found no indications of Danish national efforts to further compliance with this or any of the other articles, but this may be due to the fact that it is generally referred to the EU level as also specificed in the Common Position [3]. The Danish position in the EU clearly states that the country found no instances where existing law needed to be modified in order to live up to the Common Position, since the criteria of the Common Position are taken into account as a minimum standard in the assessment of licence applications [5]. This indicates that Denmark regards itself as complying with all articles of the ATT. However, in a testimony to the Parliamentary Defence Committee, Oxfam Ibis has criticised the Danish licensing practices and legislation for being rather loose. This critique is aimed at the fact that Denmark does not require end-user documentation when exporting to EU or NATO countries. This creates a loop hole “which allows Danish companies to have export deals with EU and NATO-based manufacturers regardless of whether those same companies will integrate Danish company components into products subsequently exported to countries in violation of Danish law (and the EU Common Position)” [8]. Further, the NGO has criticised the issuing of permissions of export licenses of dual-use products (this specifically falls under the authority of the Danish Business Authority (Erhvervsstyrelsen) in coordination witht the Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Foreign Affairs) as being informal and non-transparent [12]. In general, Oxfam Ibis recommends a strengthening of Danish legislation in line with the EU Common Position on military exports. This recommendation is in direct opposition with the official Danish position as outlined above.

Denmark does export arms and military equipment [1, 2]. Research found no indications that upcoming arms exports are subject to parliamentary approval or oversight. By law, approval of licenses resides with the Minister of Justice [3, 4]. Since 2016, very few instances of debate on arms exports have taken place in Parliament and these were only initiated by one party (Enhedslisten) [5]. Oxfam Ibis has recently critized this lack of parliamentary oversight and has put forth recommendations on how to mitigate this issue [6].

Egypt has neither ratified nor signed the ATT (1).

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable because Egypt has neither ratified nor signed the ATT (1).

According to our sources, Egypt has no mechanism of scrutiny over arms exports. The Egyptian military industry is immune from scrutiny. The Arab Organization for Industrialization, which is based in Egypt and exports arms to the region has not been under any scrutiny or oversight at all (1), (2). There is no evidence in Egypt of clear and consistent parliamentary scrutiny of arms exports, and arms trade, in general, is immune to external scrutiny and is the “exclusive mandate” of the NDC (3), and given the broad exemptions from external oversight granted by Law 204 (1957), which states that “The financial rules and instructions stated in laws and regulations do not apply to the Ministry of Defence when making and executing the above-mentioned contracts (arms-related)” (4).

Estonia signed the ATT in 2013 [1] and ratified the Treaty in 2014. Urmas Paet, Estonia’s Foreign Minister at the time of the signing, stated that Estonia was one of the co-initiators of the ATT. He claimed that Estonia has strongly supported the creation of the treaty from the very beginning, because it is the only global treaty that regulates the arms trade. Estonia acted as a vice-president of the final round of negotiations. It helped to set up control systems for the arms trade in different smaller countries in transition. [2]

A report from 2015 on measures undertaken to implement the ATT concludes that Estonia’s national control system includes a risk assessment procedure. It also states that Estonia has taken measures to prevent, in cooperation with other countries, the transfer of conventional arms covered under Article 2 of the Treaty becoming subject to corrupt practices. [1]
Article 11.5 encourages countries to share relevant information with one another on effective measures to address diversion. Estonia, as a member of Interpol, is required to share relevant information to fight and prevent crime. [2]

Estonia is not a major arms exporter. [1] Arms exports from Estonia are barely a subject of discussion at any level. However, at the beginning of May 2018 a new governmental bill passed the first reading in the Riigikogu. [2] It covered the amendment of the Weapons Act, the Strategic Goods Act, and the Explosives Act. The purpose of the draft is to create a legal basis for handling weapons, ammunition and munition for the local defence industry. The draft was perceived to allow the local defence industry to expand their activities and offer their products outside Estonia. Overall, the sentiment towards the draft law was positive from politicians and defence experts, even though there was not much reaction from the public.
However, the Riigikogu does not have to approve the arms exports. The information about upcoming arms exports are sent to the Strategic Goods Commission that is formed within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Strategic Goods Commission makes the decision to either allow export or not. [3]

The Commission consists of representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence, the Security Police, the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications, the Tax and Customs Board, and the Police and Border Guard Board. The Commission may involve representatives from other authorities and experts in its work.

The background check is done by the Police and Border Guard.

Supervision is exercised by the Security Police, the Tax and Customs Board, and the Police and Border Guard Board. [4]

Finland signed the ATT on June 3, 2013 and ratified it on April 2, 2014 [1,2].

It can be considered that Finland has complied with article 11.5., but failed to do this with regard to articles 7.1.iv and 15.6. The latter requires the state to carry out national measurements to prevent corruption and cooperate internationally, but Finland e.g. lacks an anti-corruption strategy and there is an acknowledged lack of awareness and expertise, well-resourced agencies and suitable structures, transparency and up-to-date legislation. [1] Similarly, according to an expert opinion, the weakness in Finland’s arms export control is that only defence equipment export permissions are granted in the all-round evaluation process lead by the Ministry of Defence, whereas export permissions to small arms can be received through a lighter process lead by the National Police Board [2].

Military equipment exports permissions are granted by the Ministry of Defence and, when the question is evaluated as significant enough to require the approval of the entire Government, by the Government.

The evaluation ‘significant enough’ is defined in the Act on the Export of Defence Equipment, chpt 4, Section 20, as:
If the product is included in the list of items provided in chapter 1, section 3, groups 1—10 or 12 of the act, the export is of significant value, or the foreign and security policy implications so required. In the Ministry of Defence, the decisions are carried out by an expert group on defence equipment exports which includes representatives from the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Headquarters of the Defence Forces, the Finnish Security and Intelligence Service, the National Police Board, and the Customs.

Permission is not granted if the export contradicts Finnish foreign and security policy and/or endangers Finnish national security. Decisions are made on a case based overall consideration and the foreign and security policy evaluation is carried out by the Exports control group of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. [1]

Permissions for exports of dual-use equipment are granted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Export Control Unit) and export permissions to civilian arms and ammunition are granted by the National Police Board of Finland (Firearms Control Unit). [2, 3] The Parliament discusses arms exports, which can be seen, for example, by searching on the documentation provided by the Parliament on its website, but it has a limited ability to influence decision-making in the aforementioned units. [4]

France signed the ATT on June 3, 2013, and ratified it on April 2, 2014. [1]

There is not enough information to score this indicator. France signed the ATT in 2013, and ratified it in 2014. However, since the French Ministry of Defence does not publish the full and detailed extent of all arms exports, it is impossible for CSOs, MPs, journalists or citizens to assert with complete certainty that France has been in compliance with the mentioned articles of the treaty. A report is published every year by the Ministry of Defence to the attention of the Parliament, about French arms exports of the past year. [1] The information in the report is vague and no precise data is available to MPs to double check whether France is indeed in compliance with the ATT, [2] be it in terms of humanitarian law, human rights, or the fight against corruption and organised crime.

The Inter-ministerial committee for the export of war material (CIEEMG) is the authority granting export licences to arms manufacturers. It is placed under the authority of the Prime Minister. [1] The CIEEMG grants exports licences, and only afterwards is the Parliament advised of the arms exports of the past year, through the release of the “Report to the Parliament about French arms exports” by the Ministry of Defence. Parliament is not involved in any debate prior to the decision to export arms.
This lack of transparency and weak role of the Parliament is currently questioned by many. [2] In Parliament, numerous MPs are now asking for a reform of the arms export control process. There is an information mission currently underway on this topic, to identify possibilities and processes for a better control by the Parliament. [3] The April 2018 resolution proposal from MP Sebastien Nadot on French arms exports to Saudi Arabia and the UAE in the war in Yemen is still pending at the time of writing, [4] waiting for the head of the foreign affairs commission to put it to a vote.

Germany signed the ATT in 2013 and deposited its instrument of ratification with the United Nations on 2 April 2014 [1]. Furthermore, arms exports are regulated by Art. 26(2) of the Basic Law, the ‘Aussenwirtschaftsgesetz’ (Foreign Trade and Payments Act) and the ‘Kriegswaffenkontrollgesetz’ (War Weapons Control Act). These provisions set out the restrictions and approval process for arms exports [2]. Provisions against the export of small arms were further strengthened in 2019 [3]. Moreover, Germany is participating in the 1996 Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies [4] and is also subject to the EU Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment of 2008 [5].

Although there are appropriate legal provisions in place, Germany’s arms export practice has been frequently criticised. Weapons exports, especially those to countries with questionable human rights, are debated in the media, especially exports to Saudi-Arabia [1]. A 2018 report by the European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights criticises arms transfers in the context of relations between German companies and their subsidiaries in third countries, as well as in cooperative ventures – thus highlighting potential shortcomings in the obligations under the ATT [2]. This indicates a lack of compliance with some provisions of Article 7, including 7.1.b.i & ii, although there is no evidence of non-compliance with Article 7.1.b.iv. There is also no evidence of non-compliance with Articles 11 and 15.

According to Art. 26(2) of the German Constitution (Grundgesetz), the authority to grant or reject applications for export licences lies exclusively with the Federal Government [1]. However, within this constitutional framework, the Federal Parliament (Deutscher Bundestag) still has important functions and rights, which shape, rationalise and control the Federal Government’s decision-making process.

These functions and rights include:
1) the creation and development of the statutory parameters within which export decisions are made, including e.g. requirements for obtaining and withdrawing export licences, the system of control and supervision for the use of such licences and questions of civil and criminal liability in cases of misconduct by arms producers, traders and involved government officials;
2) the preparation and definition of the government’s budget in matters of export control;
3) the parliamentary right to scrutiny and control concerning exports: even in cases that are decided in camera by the Federal Security Council, the Federal Government informs the Federal Parliament about the type of arms or item that will be exported, the destination and the financial volume of every authorised export.

In addition, independent and impartial oversight is exercised by the Federal Constitutional Court, which may be invoked by MPs, especially those from the opposition parties, in case the Federal Government violates its duties towards Parliament.

In practice, there is a dedicated body, the ‘Bundessicherheitsrat’ (Federal Security Council), which decides on weapons exports by majority voting and Parliament is not involved. The members of this Council are members of the Cabinet as well as the Chancellor. Meetings are held behind closed doors [2]. However, the Government informs Parliament about export decisions [3]. Finally, parliamentarians have the right to submit requests for information to the Federal Government, which frequently relate to weapon export decisions [4].

Ghana signed the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) on September 2013 and ratified it on December 2015. The treaty entered into force 90 days later. The Ghana National Commission on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) is the coordinating agency for the implementation of the ATT. The Commission operates under the authority of the Interior Ministry (1).

The initial report of the measures undertaken to implement the Treaty, which should be submitted to the Secretariat within the first year, has not been provided (2). As a consequence, it is impossible to very if Ghana failed or not to comply with Articles 7.1.iv, 11.5, and 15.6 of the ATT.

Ghana also participates in the EU Arms Trade Treaty Outreach Project (ATT-OP), which is currently in its second phase (ATT-OP II). The First Roadmap Activity for Ghana under the ATT-OP II was held in Ho, Ghana on December 13-14, 2017. During the event experts and national stakeholders discussed the outcomes of the third Conference of State- Parties (CSP3) of the ATT, the establishment of a national firearms register and the detection of illegal arms trafficking within the country (3). The Second Roadmap Activity for Ghana will be held on the 10-11 of July in Accra, Ghana.

Ghana has a project approved within ATT VTF Funding for the adoption of the national control list and capacity building of the implementing agency (4). The programme is implemented in partnership with UNDP.

This indicator has not been assigned a score due to insufficient information or evidence. It’s not been possible to find the initial report of measures Ghana has undertaken to implement the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). (A State Party’s initial report should be submitted to the ATT Secretariat within the first year after entry into force of the Treaty). As a result, it is impossible to verify Ghana’s compliance with the three ATT articles: 7.1.iv, 11.5, and 15.6.

Ghana does not manufacture arms in its territory. As a result, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

However, illicit circulation and production of SALWs are widespread and trending upwardly, according to a survey in 2015 by the Small Arms Commission of Ghana, there has been an increase in the circulation of unregistered arms in the country of 850 per cent from 2004 (1).

The Ammunition Act, 1962 (Act 118), which was amended by the Arms and Ammunition Act, 1972, (NRCD 9) regulates the import and export of arms (2), (3). However, both these acts are outdated.

Greece signed the ATT in June 2013 and ratified the treaty in May 2016 [1, 2].

The country has complied with each of the three ATT articles [1, 2, 3].

Upcoming arms exports are subject to parliamentary debate but Parliament has limited ability to influence decision-making [1, 2]. In 2017, for example, Parliament discussed the possibility of exporting ammunition to Saudi Arabia [3]. No other debates since then have focused on export decisions. There is no legislation governing Parliament’s involvement in arms exports.

Hungary signed the treaty in 2013 and ratified it in April 2014; the treaty formally entered into force for the state on 24 December 2014 [1].

The Hungarian position was evaluated by Amnesty International [1].
According to the Arms Trade Treaty-Baseline Assessment Project, the country complies with the ruling of the treaty [2]. Detailed descriptions of government bodies responsible for arms control, legal background and practice are accessible on the project’s website [3]. Hungary also regularly submit its National Report on the Implementation of the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons (PoA) and the International Tracing Instrument (ITI) [4]. The annual report on compliance is also available [5].

Although the Hungarian arms export and defence industry is negligible, the processes for parliamentary oversight are non-existent. While arms export profits are 50 million EUR, Hungary’s exports of dual-use items such as goods, software and technology amount to 900 million EUR annually. These export would also require some sort of oversight mechanism. As the government already started programs to strengthen the industry, the lack of these mechanisms should be noted.

India has neither signed up to nor ratified the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) [1][2].

India has not signed or ratified the ATT [1][2]. As such, this indicator has been scored Not Applicable.

India though not a signatory to the ATT, has a well-scrutinised arms control process as stated earlier. Chapter IVA of Foreign Trade (Development & Regulation) Act, 1992 was incorporated by way of amendment in 2010 to regulate the export of specified goods, services and technology which have applications as WMDs and aligning it with the provisions of The Weapons of Mass Destruction and their Delivery Systems (Prohibition Of Unlawful Activities) Act, 2005 [1].

At present, defence exports are regulated by two departments- the Directorate of Foreign Trade (DGFT) and the Department of Defence Production. Dual-use items containing those on the updated SCOMET (Special Chemicals, Organism, Materials, Equipment and Technologies) list, export licences are granted by the Directorate of Foreign Trade (DGFT) based on the Inter-Ministerial Working Group set up by the DGFT. For military stores, No Objection Certificates (NOCs) are issued by the Department of Defence Production [2][3][4].

The current government has simplified the Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) and will be put in the public domain to increase transparency. The government plans to constitute a Defence Exports Steering Committee (DESC) under the Chairmanship of Secretary, Department of Defence Production. The Committee will comprise of representatives from the Armed Forces, DRDO, PIC Wing, Acquisition Wing, MEA, DGFT. The functions of the DESC will include consideration and taking decisions on cases of export permissions particularly of export of indigenously developed sensitive defence equipment, monitor the progress in defence exports and make suggestions to boost exports [5]. Though Parliament does not scrutinise every arms export, it has the power to question them.

The Indonesian government has chosen to abstain from the ATT since its adoption in 2013. There are several parts of the ATT deemed to have been contrary to the country’s national interests at that time, namely the MEF fulfillment priority programme and the development of the defence industry as detailed in President Regulation No. 5/2010 concerning National Medium-Term Development Plans (RPJMN). The ATT prohibits arms exports to countries that are considered to violate human rights or experience internal conflict or are sanctioned by the UN Security Council. Given Indonesia’s past experience with human rights violations and internal conflict, the government is concerned that adopting and ratifying the ATT will limit its strategic sovereignty when it comes to arms imports and exports. With regard to the control and export of strategic and conventional weapons as well as other dangerous goods, Indonesia is a signatory to 14 of 24 multilateral conventions. Since Indonesia is not a signatory to the ATT, it is not required to comply with Articles 7.1.iv, 11.5 or 15.6. In principle, these three articles require states to consider the impact of the transfer of weapons on transnational organised crime, encourage information sharing with other countries and take necessary steps to prevent conventional arms transfers that indicate corruption. The current arms export regulations have tackled some of these issues. Some regulations that govern arms exports in Indonesia are Law No.16/2012, which states that export and import permits must be sought from the Ministry of Defence [1], and Minister of Defence Regulation No. 6/2017, which stipulates the requirements and procedures for arms production and export permits [2]. The Directorate General for Defence Potential (Ditjen Pothan) is responsible for issuing arms production and export permits. Only companies with defence industry status and arms production permits can apply for an arms export permit and this procedure is lengthy and time-consuming. The procedure starts with the company submitting an arms export application to the Ministry of Defence, in this case the Directorate General of Defence Potential (ditjen pothan). The Ministry of Defence then forwards the application to the Assistant for Intelligence to the Chief of Armed Forces (Asintel Panglima TNI) for security clearance (SC). The Asintel Panglima TNI then requests confirmation regarding the legality of the application documents from the Indonesian defence attaché in the export destination country or from a representative of the importing country. Based on result of this confirmation, Asintel Panglima TNI will either grant or refuse SC. There are three other state institutions involved in the execution of arms exports: the Ministry of Trade (kementerian perdagangan), the Strategic Intelligence Agency (BAIS TNI) and the Directorate General for Customs (Ditjen Bea Cukai). The Ditjen Bea Cukai is responsible for physically checking the military equipment to be exported. Alternatively, this authority can also be given to an independent surveyor. The BAIS TNI is responsible for checking the military equipment [3].

Indonesia has neither signed nor ratified the ATT, therefore this indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’ [1]. However, some of its domestic regulations do actually incorporate articles that regulate corruption in arms exports and prevent exports that contribute to transnational organisation crime. Although information on weapons is a form of information that is exempt from public access, the government usually announces weapons purchases to the press. In terms of implementation, it is not easy to acquire an arms export permit when exporting goods and financial support limited. From 2015 to 2018, Indonesia exported USD 284.1 worth of weapons, most of them produced by state-owned enterprises. The government observes international arms export considerations, as proven by the rejection of a state-owned defence company’s application for a permit to export arms to a Middle Eastern country engaged in civil war [2]. In 2017, Indonesian export trade was tainted by one corruption case pertaining to the export of a Strategic Sealift Vessel (SSV) to the Philippines, which revealed the involvement of brokers and a kickback paid to state officials [3]. The case began with the KPK’s arrest operation (Operasi Tangkap Tangan, OTT) and ended in court, where the giver and recipient of the bribe were sentenced. In terms of implementation, the government has handled a corruption case related to arms exports involving state-owned ship-building enterprise PT Pal and a private agent used in the sale of SSV to the Philippines [3]. The Director of PT Pal, along with the Treasury General Manager, was sacked, tried and sent to prison for accepting a kickback amounting to 1.25% of the procurement contract value. The private agent was also tried and served time in prison.

Minister of Defence Regulation No. 6/2017 does not mention anything about parliamentary involvement in the process of arms exports [1]. One interviewee confirmed that arms exports are not subject to robust parliamentary approval [2].

Iran has not signed up to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) [1].

This indicator is marked Not Applicable, as Iran has not signed up to the ATT [1].

Iran is under an arms embargo; therefore, its arms exports are considered illicit. They are not debated by Parliament [1]. However, according to SIPRI’s international arms transfers database, Iran exported weapons as recently as 2017 [2]. There are also reports of potential weapons transfers by Iran in the UN secretary general’s reports on the implementation of Resolution 2231 [3].

Iraq has not yet signed or ratified the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), despite recent calls by Amnesty International (1), urging the GoI to “immediately accede to the global” ATT, after arms manufactured by America, European states, Russia and Iran, fell into the grasp of paramilitary militias for committing atrocities (2), (3). Amnesty International’s (1), (4) report further notes that poor quality regulations and lax controls enabled the ISG to acquire a “large and lethal arsenal”. No active steps have been taken to remedy irresponsible arms trade, to prevent weapons from falling into the hands of terrorists and armed groups. The only evidence available indicative of Iraq’s interest in ratifying the treaty dates back to a 2012 UN ATT Conference in which Iraq expresses support of the treaty (5). While expressing its support in acceding to the ATT its raised reservations over the rights of signatory states under the convention, iterating the right of states to voice their doubts or preferences in arms dealing. Additionally, the GoI voted in favour of adopting the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and in July 2017 (6). Iran’s militia proxy forces have acquired advanced weaponry from Tehran, and America has investigated the Iranian govt. in the past for striking up arms trade deals with Iraq, in violation of US sanctions against it (3).

Iraq is not an exporter of military equipment or arms. The equipment Iraq is currently manufacturing is undergoing tests and further development. A legal military expert interviewed for this assessment stated (1), items being manufactured amount to nothing more than light equipment, including unmanned drones and light rockets. “Iraq does not export any of these but the problem of porous borders has enabled the smuggling of weapons via Iran to Syria.” Important supply routes lack adequate oversight. One source notes that “the Iraqi Police Service (IPS) is incapable of providing any level of security in the country … overstretched, underfunded and ill-equipped” (2). Iraq’s Law of Arms stipulates that licenses are issued by an issuing authority, but parliamentary scrutiny has fallen short of investigating illicit trade of weapons (3).

Iraq is not an arms exporter.

Israel has signed up to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), but hasn’t still ratified it. (1)

This indicator is marked Not Applicable as Israel has not ratified the ATT. Israel Ambassador to the United Nations Ron Prosor signed the Arms Trade Treaty on behalf of the State of Israel in New York on Thurday, December 18, 2014 (1) (2). The Defence Export Control Agency (DECA) is one of the focal directorates in the Israeli Ministry of Defence, holding the responsibility for the implementation of the Israeli Export Control Act. Decisions made by the organisation are based on a process the combines other Ministry of Defence directorates, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other agencies. Export decisions involve risk assessments and information exchanges with bilapteral partners to evaluate risk levels (3). However, Israel’s government has often been critised for its non-transparent process for arms export decisions (4) (5) and for its regular exports to governments with extremely poor human rights records (6).

it is in charge of conducting a risk assessment before granting licenses for marketing and export of defense articles, data or services. In this framework, DECA takes into account the identity of the parties involved in each transaction (end and intermediate users) and takes into consideration factors such as the internal and regional stability of the country of destination, preservation of human rights, potential of diversion to unauthorized users etc.Regarding exchange of information with other member states, DECA conducts regular bilateral discussions with various export control authorities of several countries, which are aimed, inter alia, to exchange information and discuss matters of mutual concern. These discussions include exchange regarding export control issues.

Upcoming arms exports are subject to parliamentary debate, but influence on decision-making is limited (1). The government depends on the parliament for all the secondary legislative actions and ordinances given. Yet, this law does not seem to outline any obligatory procedures related to informing the parliament on specific decisions, meaning that parliamentary scrutiny is not always guaranteed. The parliament and its committees have general powers to ask for information from the government including about its decisions. In fact, the Knesset only has to be informed about arms export decisions of the government and is not required to approve them. According to the “Defense Export Control Law, 5766-2007” (1) (article 47, see also article 48 and 49) “A procedure overseeing defence exports pursuant to an agreement between the State of Israel and another state, outside the scope of section (a), shall be set forth in a government decision; the minister of defense shall notify Knesset foreign relations committee on that procedure. (c) Defence exports pursuant to an agreement between the State of Israel and another state, of a scope to be determined in regulations, shall be submitted by the Minister of Defence for the approval of a sub-committee of the ministerial committee for national security; chaired by the Prime Minister and with the membership of the Minister of Defence, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Fustice and the Minister of Finance” (1). Furthermore, Israel’s arms exports over past four years have been at their highest levels ever (2) and the Defence Ministry is actively seeking to expand Israel’s arms exports (3) (4).

Italy has signed the ATT [1] on 3 June 2013 and ratified it with law 4 October 2013, n. 118 [2].

As far as application of the Treaty is concerned, Italy experiences some application issues. According to Art. 7.1.iv of the ATT [1], when agreeing an arms export, state parties should take into account the potential employment of the armaments, among others, in transnational organised crime. According to the 2019 annual report presented by the government to the Parliament on arm exports [2], Italy also exports arms towards countries whose stability is at risk and that might have connections with ongoing conflicts. This has also been underlined by several media reports and investigations [3]. With regards to arms exports that can be used in the conflict in Yemen, the Parliament presented a motion to limit further export to the countries involved in the conflict [4].

The ATT treaty has become an integral part of the EU legislation. As such, the Union sponsors several projects and promotes a proper application of the Treaty, as restated in Council conclusions of 18 November 2018 [5]. Among the projects, the ATT Outreach Project II [6] supports the effective implementation and universalisation of the ATT. Monitoring activities and information sharing to counter diversion risk (art 11.5 of ATT) is the object of the EU-funded iTRACE project [7] carried out by Conflict Armament Research (CAR). It is relevant to note that Italy is actively involved in none of these projects, appart in the form of financial contribution, since they are EU-funded projects.

Nonetheless, the Senate is preparing the draft law (disegno di legge) n. 1049, that modifies the Italian legislation on arm export. This draft law takes into account several adjustments in order to ensure a more proper compliance to international agreements and standards [8]. No evidence is given on the occurrence of actions to prevent the breach of Art. 15.6 of ATT.

Upcoming arms exports are generally not subject to robust parliamentary approval and debate. Article 1(6) of law 185/1990 foresees a parliamentary opinion on arms export towards countries in a conflict situation [1]. Recently, there have been requests from NGOs and civi; society organisations [2] to start parliamentary hearings and debate [3] over the export of two Italian frigates to Egypt, prior to the approval of export, but the final decision remains in the hands of the government.

Japan signed the Arms Trade Treaty on June 3, 2013 [1] and ratified it on May 9, 2014. [2] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs explained to the Diet that no new domestic legislation or fiscal measures were necessary to implement the obligations in this treaty. [3] These were covered by the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act, [4] the Three Principles on Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology adopted by the Government in 2014 [5] and implementing guidelines for the three principles adopted by the National Security Council in the same year. [6] [7]

The Three Principles on Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology adopted by the Government of Japan in 2014 [1] have implications for the status of the ATT. The first of the three principles makes exports of weapons and technology to a wide area illegal, including exports banned in treaties that Japan has ratified. The ATT is listed as one such treaty. [2] Under item 7.1.iv in the ATT, a state shall assess the risk that arms exports can contribute to transnational organised crime. An official representative of Japan has stated, in an evaluation of Japan’s compliance with the ATT, that Japan does conduct such risk assessment. [3] Furthermore, the third of the three principles introduced in 2014, requires that the importing country has control over the end user. The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, which handles export license applications for defence equipment, emphasises the need to have control over the end user. [4] Moreover, a Japanese lawyer who has specialised in the ATT stated that the authorities consider Article 7 before granting export licenses. [5] Item 11.5 encourages states to share information with other state parties on illicit diversion of conventional arms. The ATT Assessment Project, which has a website, does not cite a confirmation from a Japanese official representative that Japan follows item 11.5. However, a Japanese official representative has stated that Japan does share information on diversion. It is therefore reasonable to believe that Japan complies with item 11.5 as well. [3] Item 15.6 encourages states to implement national measures and to cooperate with other states to prevent arms transfers becoming subject to corrupt practices. Here, the ATT Assessment Project quotes an answer to the effect that Japan is not currently involved in measures to prevent corruption and neither does it intend to pursue cooperation with other states to prevent corruption. [3] This may reflect that there were no corruption issues to deal with at the time when the report was written, but without further evidence, it cannot be concluded that Japan is complying with item 15.6.

The National Security Council (NSC) and Japanese Cabinet approved three principles on the transfer of defence equipment and technology in 2014. The first principle prohibited the export of weapons and weapons technology to certain categories of countries, including countries under an arms embargo decided by the UN Security Council, while the second principle permitted such export to other countries if it furthered international peace and cooperation or Japanese security, and the third principle required the importer to guarantee that the weapons and technology would not be used for other purposes than the intended or transferred to a third party. [1] These principles have the legal status of implementing guidelines for the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Law. [2] Under this law, which took effect in 1949, [3] Japanese arms exporters must apply to the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry for permission to export weapons and weapons technology. This Minister is constitutionally responsible for decisions to approve or reject such applications. [4] The “Three Principles” replaced “Three Principles on Arms Exports,” declared by Prime Minister Sato in 1967 and later supplemented with clarifications and exceptions. However, the Diet has never enacted a single law prescribing arms export, according to a scholar in 2008. [5] A search of one Diet report on key topics in defence policymaking for each year covered by this research [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] showed that the terms arms export (武器輸出) or transfer of defence equipment (防衛装備移転) were mentioned in two cases. [6] [8] The first was during debate about the government-supported bill that would establish ATLA, which was on the agenda for a meeting of the Security Committee on April 24, 2015, where the Minister of Defence and government informants answered questions about how ATLA could strengthen the defence production base so as to increase the potential for Japanese enterprises to participate in the co-development of arms with other countries. [12] The bill was approved by the Security Committee and thereafter by the whole Diet. [13] The second case was during debate in the Security Committee and the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee about a government sponsored bill submitted in 2017 that would permit the transfer of Japanese defence equipment that had gone out of service to the militaries of developing countries. [14] The bill received a majority of the votes. [15] The legislation passed in 2017 also included articles that would allow the transfer of weapons and weapons technology to the UK. [16] In addition, the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Law was revised several times to implement an arms embargo against North Korea. [17] The export or transfer of Japanese manufactured arms or defence equipment was mentioned at 10 meetings of the Security Committee other than the ones discussed above. [18] Upcoming arms exports are subject to approval by the Minister of Economy and Industry, who is constitutionally responsible to the Diet for such decisions. The searches of the Diet proceedings did not turn up any cases where the Diet threatened a vote of non-confidence in the Minister for their handling of arms exports. Examples were found of the Diet approving legislation to allow new categories of arms export, voting to strengthen an arms embargo and supporting the establishment of an institution whose mandate included promoting the transfer of defence equipment. While the government’s proposals were usually supported, no cases were found where the government did not follow proper legislative procedure. The Diet briefly discussed arms export when dealing with legislation on this topic. In addition, it occasionally held short debates about arms export that were not related to the consideration of legislation.

Jordan is not signatory to ATT [1].

Jordan is not signatory to ATT [1] and for this reason this sub-indicator has been marked at Not Applicable.

As previously explained, Parliamentary oversight over the defence sector is almost non-existent, due to the lack of an effectual Ministry of Defence, [1] and because the King, constitutionally, has the final say on matters of defence [2]. There is also evidence of Jordan gradually becoming a first-hand arm exporter through King Abdullah II Design and Development Bureau [3, 4]. However, the official page of the Jordanian Parliament has no mention of any news about arm exports [5]. The Jordanian Parliament has 20 permanent specialised committees but none of them is specialised in exercising oversight over defence and security [5]. There is no evidence of any debate in the Parliament around arm exports.

Although Kenya voted to support adoption of Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) in 2013, it has not – according to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms – signed the treaty and nor has it ratified the treaty. [1]

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’ as Kenya is not a member of Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). According to United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, it has neither signed nor ratified the treaty. [1]

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’ as Kenya is not an arms exporter. [1]

Kosovo has neither signed nor ratified the Arms Trade Treaty [1].

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable, as Kosovo has neither signed nor ratified the Arms Trade Treaty [1].

This sub-indicator has been scored Not Applicable because Kosovo does not export arms [1]

Kuwait has neither signed nor ratified the Arms Trade Treaty (1).

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable because Kuwait has not signed up to the Arms Trade Treaty (1).

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable because Kuwait is not an arms exporter. It is still worth noting that Kuwait has a very small military and extremely limited national capabilities in the defence sector. Security agencies have to get pre-purchase approval from the Parliament, according to 163 of the PIL. They also have to get pre-purchase for any deal that costs $330,000 or more, according to SAB decree no. 3 of 1999 (1), so one can say with confidence that some of the deals are at least reviewed before they are made. But Parliament has limited powers because it can be dissolved by the Emir, according to 107 of the constitution (2).

This makes lawmakers less likely to cause a stir over anything for fear of losing the chamber — and with it their posts. Also, the Emir passed a law in 2016 that banned politicians who have been found guilty of insulting him, which includes virtually all of the opposition, from running for office, so the current chamber is full of his supporters and they tend to approve all of his plans, in exchange for money or favours from the executive branch, officials, activists, and media reports say (3, 4, 5, 6 and 7).

Latvia signed and ratified the ATT on April 2, 2014. [1]

Latvia has openly submitted available annual compliance reports since 2015. [1]
There is no evidence to show that Latvia does not comply with any of the articles of the ATT.

This indicator is marked Not Applicable as Latvia is not a significant arms exporter and thus the Parliament does not debate arms exports.

In September 2018, the Parliament approved the treaty and Lebanon officially became the 102nd member of the Arms Trade Treaty in May 2019 after submitting its ratification instruments (1),(2). The treaty will enter into force in August 2019 (3).

Lebanon officially became the 102nd member of the Arms Trade Treaty in May 2019 after submitting its ratification documents (1). The treaty will enter into force in August 2019 (2). As it’s early to assess compliance, this sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable, as Lebanon is not an exporter of conventional arms identified by Article 2.1 of the Arms Trade Treaty. However, the research found no evidence of parliamentary debates about weapons other than approving the Arms Trade Treaty (1). According to a source, Lebanon does not have the provisions to monitor weapons entering and leaving the country. Furthermore, the treaty did not pass the parliamentary committee (2).

On 2nd of April 2013 in New York, Lithuania, along with other 66 countries, signed the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) [1]. The Parliament of Lithuania unanimously ratified the ATT in its original text on 2nd of December, 2014 [2]. What is more, The Weaponry Fund of Lithuania has received exact guidance for international cooperation to stop the illegal exportation and abuse of arms. The Fund exchanges stored data with other states and other institutions in Lithuania, in order to combat the circulation of illegal firearms. The policy to cooperate internationally in order to stop illegal arms trading stems (as stated on the website of the Weaponry Fund of Lithuania) from the policy and documents of the United Nations, the E.U. and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe.

There is no clear evidence from open sources that the country takes special measures with regard to making concrete assessment of the countries to which it exports weapons with regard to corruption. However, as a member of number of international conventions, including ATT, Lithuania provides reports on the issue to export of military equipment and licences issued for the export of such equipment. For example, in accordance with the Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment, Lithuania provided a detailed report in which it stated that Lithuania’s system of export control of strategic goods operates in line with the standards fo the export control of the European Union. An effective export control includes legal provisions, lists of controlled goods (weapons and military equipment), licencing procedures, co-operation among countries, international non-proliferation agreements and international cooperation. The report explicitly refers the commitments undertaken by the ATT and provides a detailed list of licences issued for military exports which are closely monitored in line with the international standards [1].

Lithuanian business statistics indicate that arms exports have been increasing since 2016 data (for instance, 18 more exports were tracked to the USA and Angola in 2017, compared to 2016) [1]. However, there are no laws which require parliamentary scrutiny prior to the export of arms. The government’s annual report to the Seimas (unicameral Parliament) Defence and Security Committee covers only arms and ammunitions that are not on the Strategic List (the less sensitive ones). This report does not account for the volume of arms, their country of origin, or their destination, nor the details of those involved and their activities, which are protected by commercial confidentiality laws [2]. Nevertheless, according to Article 67 of the Constitution, the Parliament has the right to verify the state budget, which means that the Parliament also has the right to approve the annual budget for the Ministry of National Defence [3]. However, Parliament has a limited ability to influence decision-making in exports as upcoming arms exports and public procurement are subject to the Ministry of National Defence and the military.

Malaysia signed the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) on September 26, 2013, but has yet to ratify it [1].

Malaysia has yet to ratify the ATT, which it signed on September 26, 2013. [1] As such, this indicator is scored Not Applicable.

Malaysia does not produce or export arms. [1] As such, this indicator is scored Not Applicable.

Mali voted for the adoption of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), signed on 3 June 2013, and ratified it on 6 December 2013 (1).

It has complied with each of the three ATT articles it is required to. Mali does not manufacture or officially export arms. It is not considered an exporting State Party, therefore it is not required to comply with article 7.1.iv. of the ATT. It has thus not taken any steps to address Article 7.1.iv. Nevertheless, the proliferation of arms, particularly Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), remains a major problem across the Sahel region and in West Africa more generally.
Illicit flows of arms in and out of Mali are widespread. The government is demonstrably taking steps to stem this flow of arms across the region. First of all, the government has established a National Commission for the Fight against the Proliferation of Small Arms (CNLPAL). In 2018, the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (UNREC), via CNLPAL, organised a training workshop on standard operating procedures (SOPs) for the physical security and stockpile management of weapons and ammunition in Bamako (1). The workshop trained officials directly involved in the management of weapons and ammunition storage sites, as well as officials from security services such as the army, the gendarmerie, the police, customs and institutions in charge of the environment (2).
Mali is also cooperating with other West African countries, as stipulated in articles 11.5 and 15.6 of the ATT, to tackle the illicit flow of arms in the region. In 2015, Malian authorities, supported by the UNODC, marked more than 300 firearms belonging to state officials to reduce the risk of them being sold or trafficked illegally (3). Mali is also a leading member in the G5 Sahel Force, comprising troops from Mali, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad. The force is in the process of becoming operational and is designed to improve security and tackle arms flows along the many national borders in the region (5). Troops from Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have already begun conducting joint patrols (4). The five countries, along with Nigeria, also participated in a UN-led workshop in 2016, designed to help improve the six states’ abilities to combat the flow of arms across the region’s borders (6).

Mali does not manufacture arms for export, thus there is no precedent of parliament deliberating an upcoming sale of arms by the state. Therefore, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

Mexico signed the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) in 2013 and ratified it in 2014. [1]

An expert on the matter points out that the United Nations reports indicate that Mexico has generally complied with the provisions of the Treaty, but in reality diversions of arms occur from the legal to the illegal market [1] and that they end up in places where there are conflicts. [2] It is not possible to determine which articles have been adhered to. As such, this indicator is not scored and is marked ‘Not Enough Information.’

Arms exports are not debated in Congress, and specialists point out that the instances that could participate in the debate do not really have knowledge on the subject to carry out an in-depth analysis. [1] In this regard, there is no official information available regarding the exact numbers of weapons that have been exported, much less the content of the contracts. [2] [3]

Montenegro has signed and ratified the ATT. [1]

This indicator has not been assigned a score due to insufficient information, as there are no available assessments of compliance with the ATT. All the same, it is worth noting that government officials indicate the country is in compliance. [1]

This indicator has been scored Not Applicable, as SIPRI did not record any arms exports for Montenegro between 2015 and 2018. [1] However, arms exports have not been debated by Parliament since July 2016 when the law was changed and all authority was given to the Government. [2][3]

As of September 2018, Morocco had not yet signed the Arms Trade Treaty (2013), or the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls and Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies (1996) (1)(2).

No evidence could be found of effective scrutiny of arms exports by governmental or non-governmental bodies. This lack of transparency may indicate a risk of corruption.

This sub-indicator is scored Not Applicable as Morocco has not signed up to the ATT. (1)

This sub-indicator is scored Not Applicable as Morocco is not an ams exporter according to SIPRI data for 2015-2018.

Myanmar has not signed or ratified the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) [1].

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’ as Myanmar is not a signatory country of the ATT [1].

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’ as Myanmar has never participated in an official arms export [1]. According to Brigadier General Zaw Min Htun, the Myanmar military has plans to sell its weapons overseas if there are official government-to-government or military-to-military contracts in the future [2]. Even if there were arms exports in the future, Parliament would not be able to intervene in military contracts because of Article 20(b) of the Constitution, which grants the military the power to manage its affairs independently [3].

The Netherlands was one of the first countries to sign and ratify the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) [1]. It was signed on June 3, 2013, and ratification was certified by the UN on December 18, 2014 [2]. According to Article 93 of the Dutch Constitution, international treaties are immediately and fully applicable in national courts without the need for implementation by national laws [3].

The Netherlands’ export licensing criteria adhere to the ATT principles of compliance with international embargoes, non-cooperation in violations of international humanitarian law or human rights and mitigation of the risk of diversion of conventional arms to the illicit market or for unauthorised use [1]. The Netherlands must comply with EU arms export agreements and the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) therefore does not add any additional requirements for the arms export policy of the Netherlands. Article 7.1.iv of the ATT is reflected in Criteria 6(a) of the EU Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP, which states that Member States shall take into account, inter alia, the record of the buyer country with regard to its support for or encouragement of terrorism and international organised crime (see pages 7 and 24 of the report by the Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation and the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the export of military goods) [2]. The first arms export licensing criterion of the Netherlands is: ‘Respect for the international obligations and commitments of member states, in particular the sanctions adopted by the UN Security Council or the European Union, agreements on non-proliferation and other subjects, as well as other international obligations’ [2]. This criterion shows adherence to Article 7.1(iv) of the ATT. Article 11.5 of the ATT is addressed in Criterion 7 of the EU Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP, which seeks to combat the risk that such technology or equipment might be diverted to an undesirable end-user or for an undesirable end use [3]. Further efforts to use information sharing to prevent diversion and illicit use were legislated in 2019 under Article 1 of the EU Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/2191 [4]. In addition, the Netherlands made a contribution to the second Conference of States Parties in 2018 in Tokyo, as well as the working group meetings held in Geneva [2]. The Netherlands also frequently contribute to the Sponsorship Programme, which enables low-income countries to attend ATT meetings, exhibiting further commitment to sharing information and best practices [5]. In a self-reporting survey submitted to the ATT Baseline Assessment Project, the Netherlands affirms that it is currently involved in measures to prevent corruption and is pursuing international cooperation in this field (Article 15.6). In fact, Article 15.6 of the ATT was already legislated under Criterion 1 (the requirement to comply with international obligations), Criterion 3 (the requirement to survey the internal situation in the country of final destination) and Criterion 8 (the obligation to consider the compatibility of strategic goods with the technical and economic capacity to receive such goods) of the EU’s Common Position 2008/944/CFSP [1,3].

The Netherlands has a well-scrutinised process for arms export decisions. The export licences are only granted by the Minister of Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation if the transaction meets several criteria that ensure the goods are not misused. The government publishes annual reports on the export of military equipment, which list all the export transactions conducted in the year in question [1]. The government must notify Parliament of new exports over 2 million euros within two weeks of issuing the licences for complete systems, unless one of the following countries is receiving the systems: Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland and EU or NATO member states (see page 9) [1]. These notifications are accompanied by an explanatory note that addresses the eight export criteria that licences must adhere to. In 2018, three notifications of this kind were sent (see page 9) [1]. Though these exports are subject to (written) parliamentary scrutiny, the decision to license exports lies solely with the executive. Additionally, for many export licences, such as those that are worth less than 2 million euros or that constitute parts of a system as opposed to a complete system, the government is not required to notify Parliament. However, there is an indication that parliamentary scrutiny of arms exports is strong [2,3,4]. To increase transparency, the government publicly uploads details of military exports on a monthly basis. These reports include information on which goods are involved, what the end use is, what the goods are worth and the country of origin and destination [5]. In 2020, a batch of small arms worth over 168,000 euros was sold and Parliament was not informed [6]. The Ministry of Defence claimed that the House of Representatives did not need to be informed because the weapons were not ‘main weapon systems’ and the Dutch company to which the government sold the arms was subject to extensive international and national law [6]. The trade was highly controversial and actively criticised by civil society and the House of Representatives because the arms ended up in the Maltese arms trade and for sale online [6]. Robust parliamentary debate is still ongoing regarding this case. The score reflects the fact that arms exports are subject to parliamentary debate, but Parliament has limited ability to influence decision-making and the approval process before the fact.

New Zealand supported the ATT throughout its negotiation and was among the first countries to sign the ATT on 3 June 2013 and ratified it on 2 September 2014 [1].

New Zealand has complied with all three relevant articles of the ATT. New Zealand is not a major exporter of arms, as it contains minimal heavy industry of the type required to produce such items. Indeed, New Zealand does not appear on the Stockholm International Pease Research Institute’s (SIPRI) searchable list of national arms exporters [1]. Nonetheless, according to the SIPRI, New Zealand has exported $17 million worth of arms to three countries since 2015, these being Papua New Guinea, Peru, and the UAE [2]. New Zealand’s 2019 ATT Annual report shows the largest recipient of New Zealand small arms and light weapons is China, however there is still minimal export of small arms and light weapons, and these are overwhelming restricted to shotguns and pistols [3]. New Zealand also voluntarily divulges information which it could restrict under Article 13.3 of the ATT [4]. New Zealand has robust import and export mechanisms of controlled chemicals and strategic goods (firearms, military goods and technologies, and goods and technologies that can be used in the production, development or delivery of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons), the trading of which is illegal under the Customs and Excise Act 2018 unless a permit is obtained from the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Trade [5]. This legislation meets the requirements of the ATT.

There is no evidence that the New Zealand Parliament has debated arms exports during the timeframe assessed for this iteration of the GDI. This may be of concern since six (or 41) Maverick missiles were sold to Peru in 2016 – though it is recognised that Peru is not a state-customer befitting concern and the sale fits with its military position and inventory.[1, 2, 3] The absence of debate is most likely due to the small number of exports, and those exports are almost exclusively limited to revolvers and pistols, rifles and carbines, and shotguns. Any brokering of weapons and dual-use items for military use, does however, require registration with the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and obtaining of a permit. [4, 5] However, the absence of debate surrounding exports to Peru and Papua New Guinea highlights serious gaps in parliamentaryscrutiny of exports, regardless of how irregular they are.

Niger ratified the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) on July 24, 2015 (1).

This indicator has not been assigned a score due to insufficient information or evidence.

Niger, which is not an arms exporter, has failed to comply with at least 2 ATT articles: submission of an initial assessment and an annual report for activities undertaken in 2016.  ATT states parties can demonstrate that their arms transfer decisions comply with their ATT obligations by providing an initial and an annual reports as stated in Art. 13 of the Treaty (1). States parties can decide to make their reports private or publicly available on the ATT Secretariat’s website. However, by October 2017, Niger has not submitted its first ATT annual report that was due by May 31, 2017 (2). The initial report has not been submitted (3).
Article 1 of the ATT explicitly mentions that the objective of the Treaty is to “prevent and eradicate the illicit trade in conventional arms and prevent their diversion”. Niger has also signed and ratified the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms, Light Weapons in 2006 (4, 5). Nevertheless, given the complicated geopolitical situation due to growing insecurity on its borders with Mali, Nigeria and Libya, the country is facing practical challenges in tackling illicit arms transfers. The difficulties in ensuring the systematic control in neighbouring border areas make the fight against trans-border insecurity challenging (6,7).

Niger has no domestic arms manufacturers and SIPRI has no record of arms exports from Niger (1). Therefore, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

SIPRI shows that Niger’s defence expenditure in constant USD has increased steadily:
2013: 88.6 million
2014: 122.8 million
2015: NA
2016: 166 million
2017: 198 million

Nigeria signed and ratified the treaty on August 12, 2013. However, the treaty must be confirmed in the National Assembly to become law. An attempt to pass the treaty into law failed [United Nations Convention on Arms Treaty Ratification and Enforcement Bill 2017 sponsored by Senator Lynda Chuba Ikpeazu] (1). This bill is currently at the first reading stage (2). Therefore, the treaty is not yet law in Nigeria, and its provisions cannot be implemented.

Nigeria signed and ratified the treaty on August 12, 2013. However, the treaty must be confirmed in the National Assembly to become law. An attempt to pass the treaty into law failed [United Nations Convention on Arms Treaty Ratification and Enforcement Bill 2017 sponsored by Senator Lynda Chuba Ikpeazu] (1). This bill is currently at the first reading stage (2). Therefore, the treaty is not yet law in Nigeria, and its provisions cannot be implemented. This indicator is scored Not Applicable.

Nigeria is primarily an importer and not an exporter of arms. As according to the ECOWAS Parliament-DCAF Guide for West African Parliamentarians: “The central law for the regulation of SALW in Nigeria is the Firearms Act of 1959, which makes provision for regulating the possession of and dealing in firearms and ammunition, including muzzle-loading firearms, and for matters ancillary thereto.” (1, pg118). With regards to arms exports, however, Parliament has no formal powers to scrutinise exports. Scrutiny is limited to retroactive questioning with regards to arms export licenses (1, 2).

Macedonia signed the Arms Trade Treaty on September 25, 2013. It was ratified on March 7, 2014 and entered into force on December 24, 2014 [1].

The Law on Production and Transfer of Weapons and Military Equipment complies with each of the three Arms Trade Treaty articles [1]. The North Macedonia has signed a number of other international treaties on armament, such as the European Code of Conduct on Arms Exports; and prepares yearly reports on arms trade and arms exports for the South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC) [2]. The 2016 SEESAC Regional Report on Arms Exports revealed disputable arms exports by West-Balkan countries to Saudi Arabia [3]. In particular, from the overall Balkan arms export in 2016 which was valued at 514.6m euros, Macedonia collected 1.21 million euros of arms sales. Of this, 3,471,000 euros came from a subsequent arm sales to Saudi Arabia [4]. Nonetheless, these arm sales were still legal since no arms embargo was enforced on the North Macedonia.

The North Macedonia is a minor arms exporter. Although this might explain, it does not justify the lack of parliamentary debate on the issues of arms exports; yet over the last two years, minutes from the Committee on Defence and Security meetings contain no evidence debates on this topic [1]. Moreover, there is no public evidence of any national debate on this issue. The arms exports are controlled by the Ministry of Defence or the Ministry of the Interior which issue licences for the import and export of weapons and military equipment [2]. Ultimately, the Ministry of the Economy controls the process by implementing the Law and controlling the export of goods and dual-use technologies [3]. Based on the Law on Trade, the Ministry of the Economy prepared a National Military List [1] which is adapted to the Common Military List of the European Union [4] and regulates trade and arms export.

Norway ratified the Arms Trade Treaty in February 2014 [1, 2]. ATT subsequently came into force in December of that year [3].

As stated in the Initial Report submitted 23 December 2015, Norway has complied with each of the 3 articles [1].

Upcoming arms exports are processed by the Foreign Ministry and the Norwegian Parliament may only debate general policy, based on an annually released white paper detailing arms exports that took place the previous year [1]. While agreeing that parliamentary scrutiny of the Foreign Ministry’s system of issuing arms export licenses in real time would be impractical, the opposition urged the government to present the annual white paper on arms exports as soon as possible and before the end of June of the following year at the latest [2]. Civil society has several times criticised Norway for continuing to export to authoritarian regimes and for not being able to guarantee that those arms would not be resold to a country outside of the Arms Trade Treaty. In 2018 the Norwegian National Human Rights Institution (NIM) issued an open comment to the 2017 White Paper on Arms Export and International Non-Proliferation Work [3]. NIM criticised the Government for continuing to export arms to the civil war-torn Yemen and argued that it could constitute violation of humanitarian law and breach of Norway’s obligations under Article 7 of the ATT. Moreover, NIM highlighted that the existing arms export regulation [4] was unclear and not readily available and that it was difficult to understand the Norwegian Government’s criteria for rejection and approval of export license applications.

Oman has not signed or ratified the Arms Trade Treaty according to the website of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (1). In GI 2015 Oman, a peer reviewer highlighted that two of the major exporters to Oman, the USA and UK, are signatories of the Arms Trade Treaty convention and this is important to highlight since Oman is ranked 16th in the world for importing weapons (2), (3).

Oman has not signed or ratified the Arms Trade Treaty according to the website of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (1), thus this indicator is marked Not Applicable. In GI 2015 Oman, a peer reviewer highlighted that two of the major exporters to Oman, the USA and UK, are signatories of the Arms Trade Treaty convention and this is important to highlight since Oman is ranked 16th in the world for importing weapons (2), (3).

The al-Shura Council does not discuss issues relating to defence or security (1). No information on the al-Shura website relates to either security or defence issues, including arms exports (2). No media report found discusses Oman’s arms exports (3). Although Oman is not a major arms exporter, according to the World Bank, Oman sold $7,000,000 of arms in 2017 (4). No further information is available such as what weapons were sold and to whom (most likely Yemen) (5), (6).

According to the ATT website (1), the Palestinian Authority has signed and acceeded to the ATT.

The Palestinian Authority does not produce any arms or weapons as agreed in the Oslo Accords. Thus, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

The Palestinian Authority does not produce any arms or weapons as agreed in the Oslo Accords. Thus, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

As there are no arms exports, there is no parliamentarian scrutiny. According to the ATT website, there is no information available on any scrutiny mechanisms.

The Philippines has signed the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) but has yet to ratify it [1]. To support the ratification process, the country has been conducting a review of its overall legislation and regulation over the trade in strategic goods. The executive’s accord for ATT ratification was forwarded to the Senate in early 2017 [2]. However, the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee that is discussing the ATT was nominated as the Philippines’ new Chief of Foreign Affairs. This has caused some delays in the process. In 2018, the Firearms and Ammunition Manufacturers of the Philippines advised the Senate not to ratify ATT because it is disadvantageous to the country’s arms industry [3]. Since 2019, ATT has been pending at the Foreign Relations Committee [4].

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’ as the Philippines has signed the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) but has yet to ratify it [1] [2].

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’ as the Philippines is not an arms exporter [1] [2].

Poland signed the ATT in 2013 and ratified it in December 2014 [1].

Poland implements the treaty in transparent way and the process for arms export decisions is well-scrutinised [1, 2, 3, 4, 5].
The country participates in the EU coordination mechanism based on Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment. [6] The common position also aims to improve the sharing of information between EU member states and to increase mutual understanding of their export control policies. Working Party on Conventional Arms Export (COARM) has been established by the EU Council to handle work concerning export controls. [7] Member States, including Poland, exchange and share information on COARM meetings, by the COARM online system and by contributions to annual reports [9].
To facilitate its implementation and coordination efforts, the COARM issued and periodically updates “User’s Guide”, intended for use primarily by export licensing officials. [8]
The COARM mechanism and the guide cover issues of organised crime, corruption, diversion and information sharing, as stated in ATT. [8, 9]
Poland is active participant in that control regime. [3]
The practical flow of the process is as follows:
In order to issue the export license, the relevant ministry (currently the Ministry of Development) requests consultation of several government bodies: the ministries of foreign affairs, of interior, of finance (custom service) and of intelligence and counter intelligence agencies. The scope of consultations includes if the arms transfer is consistent with the international obligations, including those of the ATT.
Exchange of information on international level occurs through multiple arms control mechanisms and initiatives. Poland is represented there by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. [10]

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and SIPRI reports are the main sources of information on the size of arms exports. The “Exports of armaments and military equipment from Poland, Report for 2017” was published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as part of their obligation to provide the public and the European External Action Service with a record of special turnover, including sales of weapons, ammunition, vehicles, aviation equipment and other military equipment. The report clearly shows that exports of arms and military equipment increased from 382.9 million euros in 2016 to 472.2 million euros in 2017 [1]. SIPRI did not include Poland in its 25 countries with the largest arms exports in 2013-2017 [2]. There are some examples that export issues were discussed in parliament [3]. However, arms exports are not subject to parliamentary approval.

The Portuguese Republic has signed (in 2013) [1] and ratified (in 2014) [2] the Arms Trade Treaty.

There is reported and up-to-date (as of 2019) evidence [1, 2] that Portugal complies with the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) reporting provisions. However, there is no evidence of internal auditing and the latest publicly available report on arms exports dates from 2014 [3].

There is some evidence of plenary discussion on arms exports [1] and military planning [2], but those debates have no influence on policymaking. The National Defence Committee (NDC) shows no evidence of discussion on exports in meetings or reports.

Qatar has neither signed nor ratified the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) [1,2].

This indicator is marked as Not Applicable, as Qatar has neither signed nor ratified the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) [1,2].

Upcoming arms exports are not debated by the Advisory Council, which functions as a semi- parliamentary body [1,2].

Russia has neither signed the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) [1], nor is it planning to do so in the near future. In 2017, acting Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations Mr Pyotr Ilyichev said the following at the Security Council meeting on small arms: ‘The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) is frankly a weak document that is not capable of fully enabling the implementation of its own provisions… we have been encouraged to accede to the ATT as soon as possible…[A]nd yet in practice we have been given to understand that those standards can be interpreted selectively’ [2].

This indicator is marked as Not Applicable as Russia has not signed the ATT.

The federal law ‘On Military and Technical Cooperation with Foreign States’ does not provide any opportunity for parlliamentary control or debate about arms control [1]. There are, however, some provisions for presidential and governmental control. The work of the limited liability company (LLC) RosOboronExport – the official state intermediary for arms imports and exports – is overseen by the president, the government, the Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation and the State Corporation for Assistance to Development, Production and Export of Advanced Technology Industrial Products (Rostech) [2]. Comment: the federal law ‘On Military and Technical Cooperation with Foreign States’ does not prevent parliamentary debate. In fact, it does not mention parliament in the list of decision-makers at all. According to Interviewee 1, the lack of parliamentary debate over arms exports is not surprising given the increased level of secrecy around the defence sector and the fact that the parliament gave up the control over defence policy [3].

The country is not a signatory to the ATT (1), Saudi Arabia is a major arms importer and does not thus far have a local arms export industry.

This sub-indicator is scored Not Applicable because the country is not a signatory to the ATT (1), Saudi Arabia is a major arms importer and does not thus far have a local arms export industry.

As there is no parliament in KSA, there are no measures or mechanisms to scrutinize any arms export or import process. As mentioned above, Saudi Arabia does not yet have a formalized arms exports industry. Furthermore, based on the modus operandi of the government in other areas of defence and security, it is unlikely that any future exports would be subject to scrutiny or oversight by independent bodies (1), (2), (3), (4).

Part of Mohammed bin Salman’s broad reform program includes localizing and expanding the domestic arms industry, with aims for half of the Saudi procurement to be done locally by 2030, up from approximately 2% today (5). According to the website of SAMI, the military industry body formed in May 2017, these goals include acting as a platform to provide “military products and services to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and its allies,” with the value of exports expected to be SAR 5 billion (approximately $1.3 billion) by 2030 (6). It is unclear whether Saudi Arabia has launched any formal processes for its intended arms export industry.

Additionally, Saudi Arabia has historically acted as a conduit for arms transfers by purchasing weapons on behalf of allied governments or groups that are unable to purchase the weapons themselves. Most recently, a report by UK-based investigative body Conflict Armament Research (CAR) documented arms provided by the US and Saudi Arabia to Syrian opposition groups active in that country’s civil war, which a substantial number of which regularly ended up in the hands of terrorist organization Islamic State. According to the report, a large number of these items were traced back to exports from Bulgaria to Saudi Arabia, which themselves were subject to non-retransfer clauses that in theory should have barred them from being supplied to parties in the Syrian war (7).

Serbia signed the Arms Trade Treaty and ratified it in December 2014 [1].

There was a case in 2016, which may suggest a breach of the ATT provisions. A group of investigative journalists exposed how weapons from Central and Eastern European countries (including Serbia) ended up in Syria and Yemen after being regularly exported to Saudi Arabia [1]. Bearing in mind the findings that arms diverted from the originally intended destination to the battlefields in the Middle East, such exports are concerning and disputable in terms of compliance with the ATT.

These is no robust scrutiny over upcoming arms exports either in the National Assembly plenary sessions or in the relevant committee sittings [1, 2].

Singapore signed the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) in December 2014 but has not yet ratified it. There is no evidence that arms exports have been subject to parliamentary debate and approval [1]. Singapore is not a participant in the Wassenaar Arrangement [2]. The country’s legal provisions in regards to arms transfers include The Strategic Goods (Control) Act [3], the Arms and Explosives Act [4], Arms and Explosives (Arms) Rules [5], and the Arms and Explosives (Explosives) Rules [6]. Singapore has yet to fully ratify the ATT, although it maintains the aforementioned legislation which underpins a robust arms control framework. There is also no evidence of non-compliance with the ATT’s anti-corruption provisions [6].

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable, as Singapore has not ratified the ATT [1].

Arms exports are sporadically debated in Parliament [1], but there is no evidence to suggest that it has exercised its powers to influence decision-making beyond perfunctory queries.

South Africa has signed and ratified the Arms Trade Treaty [1].

South Africa has signed and ratified the Arms Trade Treaty and is recorded by the Arms Trade Treaty Baseline Assessment Project as being in compliance [1].

While arms exports, in general, are debated each time the National Committee on Conventional Arms Control (NCACC) reports to Parliament’s Joint Standing Committee on Defence, these are only permits and exports already granted [1]. There is no legal provision for arms exports to be revealed to Parliament before they occur, nor is Parliament required to approve them [2].

According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, South Korea signed up to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) in June 2013 and ratified it in November 2016. It came into force in February 2017. [1]

Article 24.3 of the Foreign Trade Act prescribes that the government can revoke the export permission if changes arise in international situations, including war and terrorism, and concerns about the movement and diffusion of weapons of mass destruction, which aligns with Article of 7.1.iv. Article 11 of the Act also states that the government can restrict or ban exportation of goods to fulfil its obligations under treaties signed pursuant to the Constitution and generally accepted international laws and regulations, but it is not clear whether this includes the ATT. [1] There are no specific clauses to comply with the other two articles. Despite the existence of the law, it has a loophole, because many companies have exported strategic supplies to countries at risk of using weapons in terrorism, such as Syria. According to media coverage, 48 cases of illegal exports had been found being shipped without the government’s approval, as of 2017. [2]

Article 24.3 of the Foreign Trade Act prescribes that the government can revoke the export permission if changes arise in international situations, including war and terrorism, and concerns about the movement and diffusion of weapons of mass destruction, which aligns with Article of 7.1.iv. Article 11 of the Act also states that the government can restrict or ban exportation of goods to fulfil its obligations under treaties signed pursuant to the Constitution and generally accepted international laws and regulations, but it is not clear whether this includes the ATT. [1] There are no specific clauses to comply with the other two articles. Despite the existence of the law, it has a loophole, because many companies have exported strategic supplies to countries at risk of using weapons in terrorism, such as Syria. According to media coverage, 48 cases of illegal exports had been found being shipped without the government’s approval, as of 2017. [2]

South Sudan has yet to sign or ratify the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). [1]

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’ as South Sudan has yet to sign or ratify the ATT [1].

This indicator has been marked ‘Not Applicable’ as there is no manufacturing base in South Sudan, for anything, including arms. The country does not export arms; it imports all its arms from abroad. Countries from which it imports arms are Ukraine, Israel, UAE, and Uganda. [1]

Spain signed the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) on 3 June 2013, and ratified it on 2 April 2014 [1].

The minutes of the sessions by the Inter-ministerial Regulatory Junta of Foreign Trade of Defence and Double Use Material (Junta Interministerial Reguladora del Comercio Exterior de Material de Defensa y de Doble Uso, JIMDDU) are secret and the content confidential. Thus, it is not possible to know about the deliberation process that leads to authorisation [1].

Spain has failed to comply with Art. 15.6 as the case involving Defex proves. The State-owned (51% of shares) company DEFEX (Defex’s purpose is to promote the exports of Spanish defence material) has been involved in an alleged corruption scheme and payment of illegal commissions in arms sales contracts to Angola, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, Cameroon, and Egypt, totalling around €220M. These practices of corruption have been happening for 25 years, according to reports. If Defex is found guilty of these corruption crimes, it would be proved that illegal commissions have been used to secure the signing of arms export contracts. According to one expert [2], this practice has been facilitated by government opacity in the arms trade and the lack of controls on export promotion policy [3, 4, 5, 6].

Spain has not consulted with EU members regarding any country in the years 2017 and 2018 (last two years with figures available) [7]. Spain’s arms exports, are not aligned to Article 7.1. For example, in 2018 and 2019, the Spanish government allowed Spanish arms transfers to countries in armed conflict, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

Parliamentary scrutiny is carried out after exports have been authorised, limited to one annual appearance. The Defence Commission must submit a report with recommendations (Art. 16 Law 53/2007) [1]. The legislation does not recognise the possibility that the Congress of Deputies can veto a specific export or prohibit exports to certain countries. Parliamentary debate is not of much use either. The debate is often about general issues, largely because parliamentarians have no more information than the official statistics [2].

Annually the Defence Commission prepares a report that collects, among other data, the value of exports by destination countries and product categories. This report has been including more detailed information over the years. However, no data is collected on the essential question of what specific types of weapons are exported. Nor do official statistics include information on government policy to promote arms exports. The report shared with the Parliament includes information about the previous year (when decisions have already been made with no scrutiny), and the logic of the debate is to propose recommendations for the future, whilst it is up to the government to consider them.

Sudan has neither signed up to nor ratified the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) [1].

This indicator is marked Not Applicable as Sudan has neither signed up to nor ratified the ATT [1]. In a phone interview, an expert on Sudan’s security sector said that Sudan exports the third-most defence items of all African countries [2]. This could not be independently verified, despite searching the Small Arms Survey and Conflict Armament Research Center websites and attempting to contact staff there. It is unlikely that Sudan’s arms transfers are compliant with the ATT.

This indicator is marked Not Applicable as there is no evidence that Sudan exports arms [1].

Sweden has both signed and ratified the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) in 2014 [1].

The country has complied with each of the three ATT articles [1].

Upcoming arms export deals are not subject to parliamentary debate. The government agency Inspectorate of Strategic Products (ISP) is solely responsible for all export decisions [1]. ISP receives export requests from defence and security companies, reviews the products for sale in accordance with technical regulations such as the dual-use framework, assesses the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in buyer countries, and then makes the decision whether or not to grant the company an ‘export permit’. Permits are mandatory for all arms export deals. To enable ISP to conduct stricter assessments, the export regulation was updated in 2018 with a new ‘democracy critera’ [2]. However, this criteria has been heavily criticised as weak and ineffective, and called a ‘loophole’ [3] since the law is formulated in such a way that ISP ‘should’ (but ‘must’ not) take the buyer country’s democracy level into account when assessing export permits. For exports requests that are deemed potentially sensitive, ISP may forward cases to the Export Control Council (EKR) which consists of elected MPs as well as representatives from the SAF and/or FMV [4] [5]. Here, EKR may approve or block export requests, thereby giving the parlimant some insight into and control over potential arms deals. Their control is limited, however, since particularly sensitive export cases may be forwarded an additional step to the government’s Foreign Policy Committee [6] (Utrikesnämnden, not to be confused with the parliamentary Utrikesutskottet). If export deals are deemed by this committee to be in line with specific military, foreign policy or security interests, they may be approved despite being potentially in conflict with the law. In addition to EKR, the public-private organisation Business Sweden can consult ISP and exporting companies and review foreign markets [7], but cannot influence or block ISP’s decisions. In sum, the parliament has only limited control of arms export deals via the EKR, and despite the recent update of the legal framework, there is still large room for improvement with regards to transparency and oversight.

Switzerland actively participated in the negotiations of the Arms Trade Treaty [1] and is among the first signatories. It signed the treaty on 3 July 2014 and ratified it on 30 January 2015. The ATT entered into force on 30 April 2015 [2]. Switzerland asked from the beginning for speedy implantation and emphasized the importance of the treaty. It also advocated for Geneva to become the location for the secretariat [3].

Switzerland has a provision in its legislation to implement Article 7.1.b.iv, 11.5 and 15.6 of the Arms Trade Treaty. In its initial report to the Arms Trade Treaty Switzerland explicitly states to be bound by the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) and its Protocols and the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) when it comes to prohibition of exports [1]. The same report also notes that the enforcement of Article 15.6 is guaranteed through the Swiss Penal Code (Article 223 and following), which contains penalties against bribery and corruption [2]. As a member of theses conventions as well as a member of the Wassenaar Arrangement, Switzerland has committed to the sharing of relevant information like corruption through these instruments (for example UNCAC Article 61 of the UNTOC Article 28 [3] and Article 4 [4] of the Founding Document of the Wassenaar Arrangement [5]). However, assessing compliance beyond the existing legal implementation is difficult. Although Switzerland does deny requests for export licenses, the reasons for rejections are not public information [6].

The Federal Assembly is only involved in arms exports after the fact. It has a role in reviewing exports but no prospective power. Article 32 of Federal Act on War Material (War Material Act, WMA) states that “[t]he Federal Council shall report to the Control Committees of the Federal Parliament on the details relating to the export of war material” [1]. In its annual report, the Executive Commission of the Federal Assembly reviews discussions concerning granted licenses and other issues related to arms exports. It has done so in its two most recent reports, for example discussing an export to Russia which ended up in Venezuela in the 2019 report [2] as well as exports to Syria in its 2018 report [3]. Members of Parliament make regular use of instruments at their disposal to ask questions or make statements relative to specific exports. This includes a general question on potentially upcoming exports. A recent example is a question on the planned duration of the suspension of arms exports to Saudi Arabia following the murder of the journalist Jamal Kashoggi [4]. The Federal Assembly does thus exert limited influence and indirectly debate upcoming arms exports.

This indicator has been marked ‘Not Applicable’ as Taiwan is not currently a member state of the UN. Taiwan is therefore not entitled to sign up to the UN ATT, but nevertheless still establishes a well-scrutinised mechanism for arms trade [1].

This indicator has been marked ‘Not Applicable’ as Taiwan is not currently a member state of the UN and therefore cannot sign up to the ATT.

According to the “Regulations of Products selling by National Defence Technology Institutions”, Taiwan’s arms exports and trade do not require legislative review or approval [1, 2, 3].

Tanzania signed the ATT on June 3, 2013 but has not ratified it. [1]

This indicator is marked as ‘Not Applicable’. Tanzania has signed the ATT on 3 June 2013 but has not ratified it [1]

This indicator is scored ‘Not Applicable’. Tanzania is not an arms exporter. [1]

According to Thailand’s statement, which was delivered by Mr Woranut Khongmuang, Director of the Directorate of International Security, Office of the National Security Council, at the General Debate of the Fourth Conference of States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), as a signatory state, Thailand has reaffirmed its commitment to the ATT and continues to head towards ratification of the Treaty. The internal procedures require that all obligations under the Treaty are fully complied with and can be implemented within the framework of domestic legislations [1]. In Southeast Asia, the treaty was not only signed by Thailand but also by Cambodia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore; however, none of them have ratified it so far. Still, some ASEAN countries such as Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines have introduced new Strategic Trade Control (STC) systems over the last few years, using established EU systems and control lists as blueprints in order to widen the scope of control in compliance with the ATT [2].

Thailand has not ratified the ATT [1], so this indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’ .

There is no evidence of parliamentary debates on upcoming arms exports, despite the fact that Thailand exported arms to Malaysia in 2016 and 2017 [1].

Tunisia has not signed the ATT (1).

This indicator is marked Not Applicable as Tunisia has not signed the ATT (1).

This indicator is marked Not Applicable as Tunisia does not export any arms or military equipment (as shown through SIPRI data) (1) and there are no discussions on the topic.

Turkey signed and ratified the ATT in July 2013 [1].

As seen in the country profile on the ATT website [1], Turkey is compliant with Articles 7.1 iv, 11.5 and 15.6 of the ATT [2].

Interviewees 1 and 3 suggested that the only authority for Turkish firms to get permission for arms exports is the SSB as the executive oversight authority [1,2]. They both underlined that firms are not exposed to any parliamentary scrutiny before, during or after the arms/defence system export. Additionally, according to Presidential Decree No.7, the SSB is the only authority on government-to-government arm transfers [3]. The decree does not require parliamentary approval for arms transfers. The decree does not contain any articles about legislative oversight or parliamentary approval for defence exports.

For instance, in the past two years, the government has sold Turkish-made TB2 armed drones to Ukraine, Qatar, Libya and Azerbaijan and some MRAPs and armored vehicles to Oman, Qatar, Jordan and Malaysia, but the government did not ask for parliamentary approval for these exports. [4]

Uganda has neither signed up to nor ratified the ATT [1].

This indicator is marked Not Applicable as Uganda has neither signed up to nor ratified the ATT [1].

This indicator is marked Not Applicable as there is no evidence that Uganda exports arms [1]

Ukraine signed the ATT; however, it has not ratified it yet [1]. Ukraine is a major arms exporter [25] and has its own export control system. Some positive changes in the system since 2014 have taken place [32]; however, the export control system does not seem to be reformed in a way that allows that ensures that arms exports are due and there are no documents of guaranteed violations [43, 54]. One of the controlling bodies in the arms export control is the State Service of the Arms Export Control of Ukraine [6].

Ukraine signed the ATT; however, it has not ratified it, yet [1].

Upcoming arms exports are not debated in the VRU, although sometimes MPs touch on issues of arms export and export control [1, 2]. Some MPs provide comments on arms exports [3].

The UAE has signed up to the ATT, but has failed to ratify it. The country signed up to the ATT on July 9, 2013, but has not ratified it since its signature (1).

This indicator has been scored ‘Not Applicable’, as the UAE has not ratified the Arms Trade Treaty.

The FNC does not have any power to scrutinise matters related to the defence sector or the military as it is a consultative body and not a parliament (1), (2), (3). News reporting on the FNC demonstrates that most parliamentary debates focus on economic, cultural, environmental, health, communications and labour matters (4). There is no evidence at all to show that UAE arms exports are subject to any form of parliamentary scrutiny, as no defence matters are discussed within the FNC.

The UK has signed up to and ratified the ATT [1]. The Treaty was ratified in April 2014, and entered into force in December 2014 [2].

DESA follows the Government process for arms exports decisions which involves approval via an F680 for any assets that are classified OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE or higher. Approved export licence applications are required tp transfer assets from the UK MOD [1]. Failure to receive an approved export licence is an automatic clause in DESA contracts to cancel a sale. As part of this formalised arms export process, the UK has generally complied with Articles 7.1.b.iv, 11.5 and 15.6 of the ATT.

Nevertheless, since the ATT entered into force in 2014, the UK has had some issues of compliance with other articles of the treaty, including Article 7.1.b more broadly. Most notably, the UK Court of Appeal’s 2019 ruling against UK arms sales to Saudi Arabia points to breaches of at least two articles of the ATT (Article 6 and 7.1.b.i) in the context of the violations of international humanitarian law committed by the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen [2].

It is worth noting that the value of UK arms sold to the Saudi-led military coalition increased by 45 per cent over the past five years [3]. A 2016 report of the Quadripartite Committee of the UK Parliament states that ‘it is inexcusable that in 2015 and 2016 the UK did not report on the imports of arms covered by the Arms Trade Treaty, in clear violation of its treaty obligations in this regard’ [4]. This suggests the UK’s failure to comply with Article 8 of the Treaty. It is also worth mentioning recent developments, such as the UK’s continuing supply of weapons to Saudi despite the US freeze, these sales representing £1.4bn [5, 6].

The Government submits annual reports on the controls imposed on strategic exports to Parliament. The Committee on Arms Export Controls (CAEC) draws together four select committees – international trade, foreign affairs, international development and defence – to scrutinise UK arms export controls and policy [1]. Additionally,the Export Control Joint Unit has a role in granting Open General Export Licenses [2].

However, questions about CAEC’s accountability and effectiveness have been raised in recent years due to its inability to compel defence manufacturers such as Raytheon to explain their activities. Previously, British secretaries of state also failed to appear before the Committee, further strenghtening these concerns [3]. In short, while parliamentary scrutiny mechanisms over arms exports are in place, there are questions related to their effectiveness and accountability. Such issues can arise as a result of undue political influence from the executive and/or the military.

The US signed the Arms Trade Treaty in September 2013 under the Obama adminstration [1], however, it did not ratify the treaty. In April 2019, President Trump announced that he would be withdrawing from the ATT [2].

Given that the US has not ratified the treaty and is now withdrawing, this indicator is scored ‘Not Applicable’ [1,2].

Upcoming arms exports are legislated under the ‘Arms Export Control Act’ (AECA) [1]. According to Section 36(b), Congress must be formally notified 30 calendar days before the Administration can conclude either a government-to-government foreign military sale or a commercially licensed sale of major defence equipment valued at $14 million or more, defence articles or services valued at $50 million or more and design and construction services valued at $200 million or more. In the case of sales of these items to NATO member states, NATO, Australia, Israel, Japan, South Korea or New Zealand, Congress must be notified 15 days in advance. Finally, for commercially licensed arms sales involing defence articles that are firearms controlled under Category I of the United States Munitions List (USML) and valued at $1 million or more, the same rules apply. As such, Congress does not so much debate the export of arms, rather, they are given the opportunity to block or modify an arms sale, principally through a joint resolution of dispproval [2]. This has some limitations, however, as demonstrated in 2019, when President Trump used a declaration of national emergency to sell arms to Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The emergency provision is provided for in the AECA and allows the President to proceed with arms transfers without congressional oversight [3]. In response, a group of senators submitted 22 Joint Resolutions of Disapproval but, although they passed, President Trump vetoed the resolutions and was able to move forward with the sales [4,5].

The US restricts the export of defence articles, dual-use goods and technology, certain nuclear materials and technology and other items that would assist in the development of nuclear, chemical and/or biological weapons or the missile technology used to deliver them. A defence item is defined by regulation if it meets the criteria of the US Munitions List [6]. The President is authorised to dictate which items appear on this list and should periodically review which items appear on this list [7]. For example, in 2019, the Trump administration moved the export of certain semi-automatic firearms and their ammunition from the USML to the Commerce Control List, which does not require congressional notification [8,9]. All the same, there is evidence that Congress still scrutinises and blocks some arms exports [10].

Since the beginning of discussions for the proposal and signature of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), Venezuela has opposed signing. Initially, its opposition formed part of a bloc of countries that voted against the agreement. In voting rounds held in 2008, Venezuela continued its rejection of the treaty, but on that occasion also abstained from voting. It argued that the instrument affected the trade in small arms, which was not part of the central objective of ensuring international security, and that there was no balance between the responsibilities of importers and exporters [1]. Venezuela currently maintains this position, and it is unlikely that it will sign this treaty.

According to expert analysis, these decisions to reject the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) relate more to the positions of political allies like Russia, which is one of Venezuela’s main arms suppliers [2]. Venezuela’s refusal to sign this treaty may be associated with considerations in the ATT that would prohibit trade with countries where there are high risks of human rights violations, since this could hinder trade with Russia or even prevent technical-military assistance agreements. Experts and academics have pointed out that this is one of the main considerations keeping Russia and its allies out of the ATT [3]. Given the EU arms embargo on Venezuela [4], signing the treaty is not viable in the short term, as the Maduro regime would be uninterested in regulations that would further block its ability to acquire arms, ammunition, or military contracts.

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’. Venezuela has neither signed nor ratified the Arms Trade Treaty [1].

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’. Although Venezuela has revealed its intentions of creating an arms industry with export capacity by building Kalashnikov and CAVIM [1] rifle factories, there is no record of exports of military equipment or weapons systems [2]. The only record that has been made public by CAVIM relates to the export of chemical components for Emilitary equipment [3].

Zimbabwe signed the Arms Trade Treaty in December of 2014, but is yet to ratify the treaty [1].

This indicator is marked “Not Applicable,” as Zimbabwe has not ratified the Arms Trade Treaty [1].

This indicator is marked “Not Applicable,” as Zimbabwe does not export arms [1].

Country Sort by Country 23a. Signatory and Ratification Sort By Subindicator 23b. Compliance Sort By Subindicator 23c. Parliamentary scrutiny Sort By Subindicator
Albania 100 / 100 100 / 100 0 / 100
Algeria 0 / 100 NA NA
Angola 50 / 100 NA 25 / 100
Argentina 100 / 100 100 / 100 0 / 100
Armenia 0 / 100 NA 100 / 100
Australia 100 / 100 100 / 100 25 / 100
Azerbaijan 0 / 100 NA 0 / 100
Bahrain 50 / 100 NA NA
Bangladesh 50 / 100 NA NA
Belgium 100 / 100 100 / 100 50 / 100
Bosnia and Herzegovina 100 / 100 100 / 100 75 / 100
Botswana 100 / 100 NEI NA
Brazil 100 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Burkina Faso 100 / 100 NEI NA
Cameroon 100 / 100 NEI 0 / 100
Canada 100 / 100 75 / 100 25 / 100
Chile 100 / 100 100 / 100 0 / 100
China 100 / 100 NA 0 / 100
Colombia 50 / 100 NA
Cote d'Ivoire 100 / 100 25 / 100 NA
Denmark 100 / 100 75 / 100 0 / 100
Egypt 0 / 100 NA 0 / 100
Estonia 100 / 100 100 / 100 0 / 100
Finland 100 / 100 50 / 100 25 / 100
France 100 / 100 NEI 0 / 100
Germany 100 / 100 75 / 100 25 / 100
Ghana 100 / 100 NEI NA
Greece 100 / 100 100 / 100 25 / 100
Hungary 100 / 100 100 / 100 0 / 100
India 0 / 100 NA 0 / 100
Indonesia 0 / 100 NA 0 / 100
Iran 0 / 100 NA 0 / 100
Iraq 0 / 100 NA 0 / 100
Israel 50 / 100 NA 25 / 100
Italy 100 / 100 50 / 100 25 / 100
Japan 100 / 100 75 / 100 50 / 100
Jordan 0 / 100 NA 0 / 100
Kenya 0 / 100 NA NA
Kosovo 0 / 100 NA NA
Kuwait 0 / 100 NA NA
Latvia 100 / 100 100 / 100 NA
Lebanon 100 / 100 NA NA
Lithuania 100 / 100 50 / 100 0 / 100
Malaysia 50 / 100 NA NA
Mali 100 / 100 100 / 100 NA
Mexico 100 / 100 NEI 0 / 100
Montenegro 100 / 100 NEI NA
Morocco 0 / 100 NA NA
Myanmar 0 / 100 NA NA
Netherlands 100 / 100 100 / 100 25 / 100
New Zealand 100 / 100 100 / 100 0 / 100
Niger 100 / 100 NEI NA
Nigeria 100 / 100 NA NA
North Macedonia 100 / 100 100 / 100 0 / 100
Norway 100 / 100 100 / 100 0 / 100
Oman 0 / 100 NA 0 / 100
Palestine 100 / 100 NA NA
Philippines 50 / 100 NA NA
Poland 100 / 100 100 / 100 25 / 100
Portugal 100 / 100 100 / 100 25 / 100
Qatar 0 / 100 NA 0 / 100
Russia 0 / 100 NA 0 / 100
Saudi Arabia 0 / 100 NA 0 / 100
Serbia 100 / 100 75 / 100 0 / 100
Singapore 50 / 100 NA 25 / 100
South Africa 100 / 100 100 / 100 0 / 100
South Korea 100 / 100 50 / 100 50 / 100
South Sudan 0 / 100 NA NA
Spain 100 / 100 0 / 100 25 / 100
Sudan 0 / 100 NA NA
Sweden 100 / 100 100 / 100 25 / 100
Switzerland 100 / 100 100 / 100 25 / 100
Taiwan NA NA 0 / 100
Tanzania 50 / 100 NA NA
Thailand 50 / 100 NA 0 / 100
Tunisia 0 / 100 NA NA
Turkey 100 / 100 100 / 100 0 / 100
Uganda 0 / 100 NA NA
Ukraine 50 / 100 NA 0 / 100
United Arab Emirates 50 / 100 NA 0 / 100
United Kingdom 100 / 100 75 / 100 50 / 100
United States 50 / 100 NA 50 / 100
Venezuela 0 / 100 NA NA
Zimbabwe 50 / 100 NA NA

With thanks for support from the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs who have contributed to the Government Defence Integrity Index.

Transparency International Defence & Security is a global programme of Transparency International based within Transparency International UK.

Privacy Policy

UK Charity Number 1112842

All rights reserved Transparency International Defence & Security 2022