Does the country have an openly stated and effectively implemented anti-corruption policy for the defence sector?
7a. Anti-corruption policy
Venezuela score: 25/100
There is no anti-corruption policy, or there is one but it explicitly does not apply to the defence sector.
There is an openly stated anti-corruption policy, but it is unclear if it applies to the defence sector or the government is in process of developing one that applies to the defence sector.
There is an openly stated anti-corruption policy that applies to the defence sector.
Venezuela does not have a public anti-corruption policy programme, nor do any specific plans exist in the defence sector. However, a legal framework for anti-corruption can be identified, as can short-term campaigns which have sought to address the problem as an emergency issue .
In 2014, a package of laws was passed through enabling act to initiate an anti-corruption operation, including a reform of the Anti-Corruption Law , the creation of the National Anti-Corruption Body, and reforms of the National Security Laws and the LOFANB . These changes in legislation did not create a specific anti-corruption policy, but rather focused on granting greater powers to security and intelligence forces to access information so as to address corruption as a national and transnational security factor [4, 5].
Lately, anti-corruption legislation has been affected by the political crisis within Venezuelan state institutions. In 2016, the NA approved a new reform to the Anti-Corruption Law that introduced definitions of corrupt behaviour such as conflict of interest and the use of public goods for personal benefit. It also introduced a “sworn statement of interests” and strengthened the responsibilities of the Comptroller’s Office . However, this law has not been implemented by the different entities of the state.
In 2018, in announcements made before beginning a new presidential term, Nicolás Maduro stressed that his government plan would include a National Anti-Corruption Plan, which so far has not been made public . In 2019, a draft bill was announced for presentation by the Supreme Court to the ANC for reform to the Anti-Corruption Law . This proposal to update the law is a Supreme Court initiative brought before the ANC, entirely ignoring the legislative functions of the National Assembly.
Despite this legislation and periodic anti-corruption plans, civil society organisations have criticised the inaction of these programmes, for which very few resources are allocated without evidence of action . In addition, specifically for the defence sector, experts have pointed to worsening levels of corruption due to a weakening of external controls  and a lack of interest in addressing corruption risks or clear cases of corruption .
 Romero-Castillo, E., “Venezuela:¿campaña anticorrupción con dobles intenciones?” (“Venezuela: anti-corruption campaign with ulterior motives?”), Deutsche Welle, 28 August 2013, https://www.dw.com/es/venezuela-campaña-anticorrupción-con-segundas-intenciones/a-17052517.
 National Assembly, “Ley Contra la Corrupción” (“Anti-corruption Law”), Oficial Gazette no. 6.155, 19 November 2014, http://www.cgr.gob.ve/site_content.php?Cod=015.
 TeleSur, “Venezuela: claves para entender las nuevas leyes anticorrupción” (“Venezuela: keys to understanding the new anti-corruption laws”), 20 November 2014, https://www.telesurtv.net/news/Venezuela-Claves-para-entender-las-nuevas-leyes-Anticorrupcion-20141120-0003.html.
 Presidency of the Republic, “Ley Orgánica de Seguridad de la Nación” (“Organic Law of National Security”), Official Gazette no. 6.156, 19 November 2014, https://www.controlciudadano.org/web/wp-content/uploads/Ley-Org%c3%a1nica-de-Seguridad-de-la-Naci%c3%b3n.pdf.
 Meza, A., “Maduro crea un megaorganismo para combatir la corrupción” (“Maduro creates a mega-agency to fight corruption”), El País, 19 November 2014, https://elpais.com/internacional/2014/11/20/actualidad/1416457562_662086.html.
 National Assembly, “Ley contra la Corrupción” (“Anti-corruption Law”), September 2016, https://observatorioplanificacion.cepal.org/sites/default/files/instrument/files/ley-contra-la-corrupcion-y-para-la-salvaguarda-del-patrimonio-publico.pdf.
 Bello, M., “Estas son las 3 claves del Plan Anticorrupción anunciando por el presidente de Venezuela” (“These are the 3 points of the Anti-corruption Plan announced by the President of Venezuela”), Notimérica, 28 December 2016, https://www.notimerica.com/politica/noticia-son-claves-plan-anticorrupcion-anunciado-presidente-venezuela-20181227174116.html.
 Agencia EFE, “Supremo venezolano entrega a Constituyente propuesta para la ley anticorrupción” (“Venezuelan Supreme Court delivers proposal to the Constituent Assembly for the Anti-corruption Law”), 19 February 2019, https://www.efe.com/efe/america/politica/el-supremo-venezolano-entrega-a-la-constituyente-propuestas-para-ley-anticorrupcion/20000035-3902757.
 Transparencia Venezuela, “En 2017 el Gobierno destinó el 0,003% del presupesto nacional a su organismo anticorrupción” (“In 2017 the Government allocated 0.003% of the national budget to its anti-corruption body”), September 2018, https://transparencia.org.ve/en-2017-gobierno-destino-el-0003-del-presupuesto-nacional-a-su-organismo-anticorrupcion/.
 del Rincón, F., “San Miguel: Plan Zamora es un marco propicio para crímines atroces en Venezuela” (San Miguel: the Zamora Plan is a conducive environment for atrocity crimes in Venezuela”), 18 May 2017, https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/video/cnnee-conclusiones-intvw-rocio-san-miguel-que-es-plan-zamora-venezuela/.
 Interviewee 1: Journalist with expertise in the Venezuelan defence sector, 25 April 2019, phone interview, Caracas.
7b. Effective implementation
Venezuela score: 0/100
There is no action plan to implement the policy, nor have any actions been taken.
There is an action plan at the ministry level but it is superficial, and does not address the institutional weaknesses in the system, OR there efforts to implement an action plan at the national level.
There is an action plan at the ministry level that reflects the institutional weaknesses in the system, but no actions have been taken to implement it.
There is an action plan at the ministry level that reflects the institutional weaknesses in the system. While steps have been taken to implement the plan, it is either behind schedule, or implementation is not addressing the priority items in the action plan.
The action plan at the ministry level reflects the institutional weaknesses in the system, and implementation has progressed according to the estimated timeline.
Although there is no public policy on anti-corruption, periodic plans and anti-corruption legislation are recorded; however, the application of this legislation is difficult to evaluate since detailed information on the anti-corruption plans is not recorded and the legislation is applied in a superficial and limited way by some State entities.
Especially since 2016, as the political crisis worsened with the suspension of the NA, the legislation and the few campaigns for which there are records have ceased to feature in the speeches of representatives of the regime, and are not applied to the open contraventions that have occurred through the implementation of resources without the legislative control required by the constitution. Within the framework of anti-corruption legislation – in which entities such as the National Anti-Corruption Body and local comptrollers were created to strengthen control in the management of public resources  – there is no evidence of concrete plans for the defence and security sector that go beyond demanding compliance with general regulations for contracting and managing public resources. The Comptroller General of the Republic (CGR) has not made any long-term anti-corruption policies public, but has restricted itself to announcing an increase in personnel for carrying out audits [2, 3].
Indeed, there is currently a reproduction in the legislation since the Anti-Corruption Law approved by the NA in 2016 introduced new obligations that are not being met by the public authorities. One example is the lack of forms for or mention of the sworn statement of interests introduced by the 2016 reform by the Comptroller’s Office, which only submits the forms and information for the sworn statement of assets .
 Presidency of the Republic, “Decreto de creación del Cuerpo Nacional Contra la Corrupción” (“Decree establishing the Nacional Anti-corruption Body”), Official Gazette no. 40.557, 8 December 2014, http://www.unif.gob.ve/wp-content/uploads/Marco_Legal_UNIF/GO_40557.pdf.
 Hernandez, D., “Contraloría General de la República se activará con plan anticorrupción propuesto por Maduro” (“Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic will be activated with anti-corruption plan proposed by Maduro”), 21 December 2018, http://www.radiomundial.com.ve/article/contralor%C3%ADa-general-de-la-rep%C3%BAblica-se-activar%C3%A1-con-plan-anticorrupci%C3%B3n-propuesto-por-maduro.
 Espacio Público, “Cuerpo anti-corrupción: una policía sin rostro” (“Anti-corruption body: a faceless police force”), 21 January 2015, http://espaciopublico.ong/cuerpo-anticorrupcion-policia-sin-rostro/#.XMsaPy3SGTd.
 Comptroller General of the Republic, “Declaración Jurada de Patrimonio” (“Affidavit of Assets”), no date (accessed June 2019), http://www.cgr.gob.ve/site_content.php?Cod=047.
Compare scores by country
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|Country||7a. Anti-corruption policy||7b. Effective implementation|
|Albania||75 / 100||25 / 100|
|Algeria||50 / 100||0 / 100|
|Angola||0 / 100||NA|
|Argentina||75 / 100||50 / 100|
|Armenia||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Australia||25 / 100||NA|
|Azerbaijan||50 / 100||25 / 100|
|Bahrain||50 / 100||NA|
|Bangladesh||0 / 100||NA|
|Belgium||50 / 100||0 / 100|
|Bosnia and Herzegovina||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Botswana||0 / 100||NA|
|Brazil||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Burkina Faso||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Cameroon||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Canada||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Chile||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|China||75 / 100||50 / 100|
|Colombia||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Cote d'Ivoire||100 / 100||0 / 100|
|Denmark||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Egypt||0 / 100||NA|
|Estonia||75 / 100||NA|
|Finland||25 / 100||NA|
|France||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Germany||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Ghana||50 / 100||25 / 100|
|Greece||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Hungary||75 / 100||50 / 100|
|India||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Indonesia||50 / 100||NA|
|Iran||50 / 100||NA|
|Iraq||25 / 100||0 / 100|
|Israel||50 / 100||75 / 100|
|Italy||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Japan||0 / 100||NA|
|Jordan||50 / 100||NEI|
|Kenya||50 / 100||0 / 100|
|Kosovo||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Kuwait||75 / 100||50 / 100|
|Latvia||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|Lebanon||50 / 100||NA|
|Lithuania||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Malaysia||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Mali||0 / 100||NA|
|Mexico||75 / 100||25 / 100|
|Montenegro||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Morocco||25 / 100||NA|
|Myanmar||0 / 100||NA|
|Netherlands||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|New Zealand||75 / 100||NEI|
|Niger||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Nigeria||50 / 100||25 / 100|
|North Macedonia||75 / 100||75 / 100|
|Norway||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Oman||0 / 100||NA|
|Palestine||0 / 100||NA|
|Philippines||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Poland||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Portugal||0 / 100||NA|
|Qatar||0 / 100||NA|
|Russia||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Saudi Arabia||25 / 100||0 / 100|
|Serbia||75 / 100||50 / 100|
|Singapore||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|South Africa||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|South Korea||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|South Sudan||50 / 100||0 / 100|
|Spain||50 / 100||25 / 100|
|Sudan||0 / 100||NA|
|Sweden||25 / 100||NA|
|Switzerland||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Taiwan||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|Tanzania||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Thailand||100 / 100||25 / 100|
|Tunisia||100 / 100||50 / 100|
|Turkey||0 / 100||NA|
|Uganda||50 / 100||0 / 100|
|Ukraine||100 / 100||75 / 100|
|United Arab Emirates||50 / 100||NA|
|United Kingdom||100 / 100||100 / 100|
|United States||25 / 100||NA|
|Venezuela||25 / 100||0 / 100|
|Zimbabwe||100 / 100||NEI|