Political Risk:
Moderate
Score:
58/100
Defence and Security Policy and Policy Transparency
Q1
75/100
Is there formal provision for effective and independent legislative scrutiny of defence policy?
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The Portuguese Parliament holds exclusive legislative powers on defence policy, as defined in Article 164, d) of the Constitution [1] and further specified in…
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There is evidence of parliamentary activity in the defence policy domain, both as a function of legislative output [1] and oversight of government [2,…
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There is no evidence that the Parliament is pressured by the executive or the military on any count. The minister of defence is held…
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Q2
40/100
Does the country have an identifiable and effective parliamentary defence and security committee (or similar such organisations) to exercise oversight?
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The National Defence Committee (NDC) is the parliamentary committee charged with oversight on defence issues. Its formal rights on oversight are limited [1], but…
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NDC members are not chosen according to expertise [1]. A survey of current (to April 2020) MPs serving as NDC members shows little expertise…
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There is evidence of oversight with regards to reviews of the Military Planning Act [1, 2, 3], emerging threats requiring armed forces intervention [4,…
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There is significant evidence of weekly meetings by the NDC [1, 2], as well as hearings [3, 4], but comparatively irregular recommendation issuance [5,…
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There is no evidence that either the NDC, the HNDC or the HMC conduct long-term oversight of defence planning and implementation beyond the scope…
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This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’, given that there is no evidence that the Committee issues any recommendations. For example, the NDC does not…
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Q3
44/100
Is the country’s national defence policy or national security strategy debated and publicly available?
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There is evidence of discussion of the National Strategic Defence Concept (NSDC) in the executive and legislative branches of government when its review is…
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Defence policy discussions tend to focus on three topics: defence spending [1, 2], armed forces participation in internal affairs [3, 4] and, from 2017,…
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The NSDC has been in force since 2013. It was reviewed by a government-nominated commission of well-known individuals based on individual merit [1], including…
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The core defence policy documents, including the Government Programme [1], the National Strategic Defence Concept (NSDC) [2], the SMC [3], the Military Planning Act…
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Q4
67/100
Do defence and security institutions have a policy, or evidence, of openness towards civil society organisations (CSOs) when dealing with issues of corruption?
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Defence and security institutions are mandated by the Portuguese Constitution [1] and the Law on Access to Administrative and Environmental Information [2] to provide…
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In 2020, Portugal ranked as a highly functional democracy in the influential V-Dem report [1]. However, this changed in 2021: it ranked as an…
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There is no engagement with civil society on matters of transparency, integrity or anti-corruption in the defence sector. The GDI 2015 results were met…
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Q5
75/100
Has the country signed up to the following international anti-corruption instruments: UNCAC and the OECD Convention?
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Portugal is a significant defence exporter, and has signed up to and ratified both the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) [1] and the…
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The most recent evaluation report on UNCAC compliance dates from 2018. The single evidentiary piece is the executive summary of Review Cycle II on…
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Q6
50/100
Is there evidence of regular, active public debate on issues of defence? If yes, does the government participate in this debate?
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Debate on defence policy increased in intensity during the Tancos weapon misplacement case [1], leading to some relevant articles in general media outlets [2,…
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The Ministry of Defence’s engagement with broader society has increased in recent years [1, 2], particularly since the current minister of defence entered office…
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Q7
0/100
Does the country have an openly stated and effectively implemented anti-corruption policy for the defence sector?
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As of March 2021, a national anti-corruption strategy was in its final drafting stages [1, 2] and was discussed [3]. There is no actual…
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This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’, since there is no anti-corruption policy that also applies to the defence sector. As of March 2021, the…
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Q8
75/100
Are there independent, well-resourced, and effective institutions within defence and security tasked with building integrity and countering corruption?
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The Inspectorate-General of National Defence (IGDN) is mandated to handle compliance and audit the national defence sector [1]. Its mandate does not specify ethics…
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The IGDN reports directly to the minister of defence [1]. The branch units report to single service chiefs.
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There is evidence that the IGND has implemented a defence-specific risk matrix [1] and built a corruption prevention plan which includes practical recommendations [2].…
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Q9
NS/100
Does the public trust the institutions of defence and security to tackle the issue of bribery and corruption in their establishments?
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This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. The latest Global Corruption Barometer does not provide specific information on perceptions of corruption…
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Q10
67/100
Are there regular assessments of the areas of greatest corruption risk for ministry and armed forces personnel, and are the findings used as inputs to the anti-corruption policy?
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Within the Ministry of Defence, the Secretariat-General of the Ministry of Defence (SGMoD) [1], the DGDR [2], the Directorate-General of Defence Resources (DGDP) [3],…
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Existing evidence shows that there is no set schedule for risk assessments. While the SGMoD [1], the DGDR [2], the DGDP [3], the IGND…
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Plans for the Prevention of Corruption Risks and Connected Violations are built, at their core, risk assessments. Evidence suggests that such plans (as detailed…
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Defence Budgets
Q11
58/100
Does the country have a process for acquisition planning that involves clear oversight, and is it publicly available?
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The Law on National Defence [1] defines the scope and depth of the minister of defence’s autonomy in defining acquisition planning, which is detailed…
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The process is well documented (refer to Q11A). However, there is scant information on process outputs and outcomes: reports on the Military Planning Act…
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Parliament is involved in the oversight of planning to the extent that the minister of defence is accountable to the National Defence Committee (NDC),…
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Q12
88/100
Is the defence budget transparent, showing key items of expenditure? And it is provided to the legislature in a timely fashion?
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The defence budget is detailed and includes items on personnel, including wages and allowances [1], defence-related R&D [2], procurement related to the Military Planning…
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According to the latest Budgetary Framework Law, the government is required to submit its budget proposal by October 10th [1], and the latest State…
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Q13
25/100
Is there a legislative committee (or other appropriate body) responsible for defence budget scrutiny and analysis in an effective way?
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Q14
92/100
Is the approved defence budget made publicly available? In practice, can citizens, civil society, and the media obtain detailed information on the defence budget?
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The defence budget is published in a timely manner in a disaggregated form [1, 2] and accompanied by an explanatory note [3]. While the…
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There is evidence that a large majority of the defence budget is comprehensively available to all individuals with an internet connection [1][2] and is…
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Access to information is regulated and encompasses defence institutions [1], but the Commission on Access to Administrative Information (CAAI) reports suggest some, albeit limited,…
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Q15
75/100
Are sources of defence income other than from central government allocation (from equipment sales or property disposal, for example) published and scrutinised?
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Sources of income amounts received and allocations are fully published according to prevailing budgetary norms across all programmes [1], including defence sector information [2,…
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Budgetary execution is scrutinised (refer to Q14B), albeit with some delay accounted for by the law [1], and scrutiny is documented across the Directorate-General…
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Scrutiny is limited to non-sectorial monitoring by the Portuguese Council of Public Finance [1]. The Open Budget Partnership also performs some scrutiny [2], but…
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Q16
44/100
Is there an effective internal audit process for defence ministry expenditure (that is, for example, transparent, conducted by appropriately skilled individuals, and subject to parliamentary oversight)?
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The Inspectorate-General of National Defence (IGND) is the internal audit unit of the MoD [1]. It is tasked with monitoring Ministry of Defence (MoD)…
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While Parliament is entitled to access within legal constraints, anecdotal evidence suggests that MPs are unlikely to receive IGND reports without requiring mediation by…
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The IGND reports directly to the minister of defence [1] and there are no provisions for external audit of its operations beyond legally mandated…
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Existing SAI reports suggest that IGND audits are not regularly taken into account by the Ministry of Defence [1, 2], while the IGND itself…
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Q17
69/100
Is there effective and transparent external auditing of military defence expenditure?
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As the Supreme Audit Institution (SAI), the Court of Accounts (CA) has the mandate to audit defence institutions. Its audit activities regarding defence institutions…
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An independent review found the CA operates independently from political constraints [1, 2, 3], and there is substantial evidence the CA operating and performing…
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There is extensive evidence of transparent reporting by the CA across multiple years, but supplementary materials (supporting documents, documentation on investigative work) is not…
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There is evidence that the CA finds some of its previous recommendations either untried or disregarded in the defence sector. The two most recent…
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Nexus of Defence and National Assets
Q18
67/100
Is there evidence that the country’s defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation and, if so, are these interests publicly stated and subject to scrutiny?
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There is no clear guidance on controlling interests by defence institutions in natural resource exploitation in the Portuguese Constitution [1], the National Defence Act…
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EMPORDEF is a public holding company in the defence sector and has no history of participation in natural resource exploitation [1]; furthermore, neither the…
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There is no evidence of defence personnel engaging in private involvement with businesses engaged in natural resource exploitation. Existing audit reports and risk assessments…
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This indicator is marked Not Applicable as there is no evidence of such interests. Neither the National Defence Committee (NDC) nor the Environmental Directive…
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This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’, as there is no evidence of defence institutions’ interests in controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with…
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Organised Crime
Q19
75/100
Is there evidence, for example through media investigations or prosecution reports, of a penetration of organised crime into the defence and security sector? If no, is there evidence that the government is alert and prepared for this risk?
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While the Tancos storehouse case generated discussion around organised crime [1] and the Attorney General’s Office clearly stated that organised crime and terrorism were…
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The Tancos storehouse case resulted in multiple resignations [1], including the former minister of defence [2], who was, as of May 2020, a defendant…
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Q20
67/100
Is there policing to investigate corruption and organised crime within the defence services and is there evidence of the effectiveness of this policing?
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The Polícia Judiciária (Criminal Investigation Police) polices all non-military defence institutions and personnel [1]. It operates a Corruption Fighting National Unit as part of…
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Recent years have shown stagnation in corruption-related criminal investigations [1]. According to the Ministry of Justice, the Criminal Investigation Police budget and staff have…
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Corruption-related cases are notorious in Portugal for their apparent extension and long-windedness [1]. The Tancos storehouse case is the most relevant recent case involving…
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Control of Intelligence Services
Q21
63/100
Are the policies, administration, and budgets of the intelligence services subject to effective and independent oversight?
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Intelligence services are subject to independent and partially effective oversight. The Portuguese Republic Intelligence System (PRIS) is overseen by the Oversight Council [1], while…
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There is evidence that the PRIS Oversight Council conducts extensive inspective activity [1], but there are no published reports on these activities. The PRIS…
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Q22
50/100
Are senior positions within the intelligence services filled on the basis of objective selection criteria, and are appointees subject to investigation of their suitability and prior conduct?
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Senior positions within the intelligence services include the secretary-general of the Portuguese Republic Intelligence System (PRIS) [1] and the directors-generals of the Security Intelligence…
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Individuals designated by the prime minister to the positions of Secretary-General of PRIS, SIS and SDIS are generally associated with connections to the ruling…
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Vetting involves a closed-door hearing at Parliament [1], but there is no legally mandated procedure, no formally established hiring panel with security clearance requirement…
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Export Controls
Q23
75/100
Does the government have a well-scrutinised process for arms export decisions that aligns with Articles 7.1.iv, 11.5, and 15.6 of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)?
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The Portuguese Republic has signed (in 2013) [1] and ratified (in 2014) [2] the Arms Trade Treaty.
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There is reported and up-to-date (as of 2019) evidence [1, 2] that Portugal complies with the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) reporting provisions. However, there…
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There is some evidence of plenary discussion on arms exports [1] and military planning [2], but those debates have no influence on policymaking. The…
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Lobbying in Defence
As of March 2021, there is no regulation of lobby activities, including access to the defence sector [1, 2]. However, Parliament approved three proposals…
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This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’, as there is no legislation regulating lobbying in the field of defence and security in Portugal. While existing…
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This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’, as Portugal has no legislation regulating lobbying and no lobbyist registration system. While existing proposals will likely result…
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This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’, as Portugal has no legislation regulating lobbying and no lobbyist registration system. While existing proposals will likely result…
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