Q76.

Does the country regulate lobbying of defence institutions?

76a. Legal framework

Score

SCORE: 0/100

Assessor Explanation

Albania has no legislation on lobbying; however, political parties use part of their finances for lobbying activities aboard, mainly in the United States [1, 2]. Lobbyist activities in Albania in the defence sector are not subject to any regulatory regime [3].

Assessor Sources

(1. David Corn, Hannah Levintova and Dan Friedman, “How a Russian-Linked Shell Company Hired An Ex-Trump Aide to Boost Albania’s Right-Wing Party in DC,” March 6, 2018, https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2018/03/how-a-russian-linked-shell-company-hired-an-ex-trump-aide-to-boost-albanias-right-wing-party-in-dc/.
2.“Socialist Party Hires American Lobbying Firm With Close Ties to Trump”, Aleksandra Bogdani, (“Edhe PS me lobist në Amerikë, punëson kompaninë e afërt me Trump,”) BIRN, April 18, 2017, https://www.reporter.al/edhe-ps-me-lobist-ne-amerike-puneson-kompanine-e-afert-me-trump/.
3. Interview with Interviewee 9, Supreme State Audit Institution, 31 August 2018, Tirana.

76b. Disclosure: Public officials

Score

SCORE: NA/100

Assessor Explanation

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable. In the absence of any regulatory framework, no provisions exist on disclosures by public officials in defence institutions [1].

Assessor Sources

1. Interview with Interviewee 9, Supreme State Audit Institution, 31 August 2018, Tirana.

76c. Lobbyist registration system

Score

SCORE: NA/100

Assessor Explanation

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable. In the absence of any regulatory framework, no provisions exist on the registering of lobbyists [1].

Assessor Sources

1. Interview with Interviewee 9, Supreme State Audit Institution, 31 August 2018, Tirana.

76d. Oversight & enforcement

Score

SCORE: NA/100

Assessor Explanation

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable. In the absence of any regulatory framework, no provisions exist on oversight or the enforcement of lobbying legislation [1].

Assessor Sources

1. Interview with Interviewee 9, Supreme State Audit Institution, 31 August 2018, Tirana.

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Relevant comparisons

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable. In the absence of any regulatory framework, no provisions exist on disclosures by public officials in defence institutions [1].

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable. In the absence of any regulatory framework, no provisions exist on the registering of lobbyists [1].

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable. In the absence of any regulatory framework, no provisions exist on oversight or the enforcement of lobbying legislation [1].

No evidence could be found that law regulates the lobbying of defence institutions in Algeria. Research also did not find any general laws on lobbying. For example, a review of the official gazette since 2016 did not provide any evidence for such a regulation (1). Also, other laws related to the topic, such as the law on Public Procurement (2) or Anti-corruption (3), do not refer to any other legal regulations that might suggest that there is a regulation on lobbying. If lobbying of defence institutions takes place, likely, it does so in an informal way. For example, favouritism is believed to be common among public procurement officials (4).

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable because no evidence could be found that law regulates lobbying of defence institutions in Algeria, for example, in the official gazette (1), the Law on Public Procurement (2) or the Law on Anti-corruption (3), see the answer to question 76A.

There is no specific legal framework for regulating lobbying activity.

There is no specific legal framework for regulating lobbying activity. Thus, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

The country does not have an explicit legal framework that regulates lobbying activities. It only has a record of hearings for officials of the National Executive Power. The only relevant regulation that currently exists is in the framework of Decree number 1172/2003, which establishes the obligation for officials of the Executive Branch (where the Minister of Defence and Security is included) to record hearings with representatives of companies and organisations that have some type of interest or relationship with the State. [1] In September 2018, a new attempt was made in Congress to discuss various lobbying bills, but so far no progress has been made. [2] [3]

This indicator has been scored Not Applicable. Argentina does not have a specific legal framework that regulates lobbying activities. The EP has the obligation to register the interest management hearings in the “Single Register of Interest Management Hearings of the National Executive Power,” but it is not necessary to specify all the details as well as all the conflicts of interest that have been detected. [1] It contains general information such as people who attend, reason, date, etc. In the case of the defence jurisdiction, 340 hearings were registered from January 2016 to July 2019. [2] The President, Vice President, Chief of Cabinet of Ministers, Ministers, Secretaries and Undersecretaries, Federal Auditors, Higher Authorities of the agencies, entities, companies, societies, agencies, and any other entity operating under the jurisdiction of the EP are included.

This indicator has been scored Not Applicable. Argentina does not have a legal framework that regulates lobbying activities. The country does not yet have a register of lobbyists. Although it is contemplated in some of the projects presented in the Senate at the end of 2018, there is still no law that regulates all the activity as a whole. [1] [2]

This indicator has been scored Not Applicable.The country does not yet have legislation covering everything related to lobbying. There is only the obligation to record hearings, but only at the EP level. The debate on the regulation of this theme in Congress was postponed for the year 2019. [1] [2] [3] The Anti-Corruption Office has two mechanisms that help in this matter, but are not mandatory and are limited only to transparency by public officials, leaving out other actors involved in politics, as well as conflict of interests and gift registries. [4]

There is no regulation of lobbying activities in Armenia at all. [1]

There are two main legal and ethical frameworks around lobbying that apply to Defence personnel: the government-wide Lobbying Code of Conduct [1], Statement of Ministerial Standards [2], and narrow obligations rising from legislation [3]; and specific Defence Instructions applying mainly to Defence procurement officials [4, 5]. The Lobbying Code of Conduct and Statement of Ministerial Standards have been heavily criticised for containing excessively narrow definitions of lobbying, leading to a pervasive revolving door at both the ministerial and senior official level throughout government [6, 7]. A critical Senate Finance and Public Administration References Committee report on the movement of two former senior Ministers to lobbying positions pointed out that these “Ministerial standards are ethics, not laws. Their consequences are political, not legal,” yet compliance certainly falls short [8]. The Criminal Code Act 1995 [9] and Crime Act 1914 [10] include political corruption offences; however, these definitions are similarly narrow, leading to a situation where the Australian Public Service Commission admits: “Agencies may put in place broad policy guidelines…” but these guidelines and agreements with industry rely “of course, on the goodwill of parties and their perceptions of mutual benefit, and may well not be enforceable” [3]. Multiple senior ministers [11] and Defence officials [12] have used these weak lobbying regulations to secure lucrative contracts in the private sector, sometimes getting these jobs they were still working for government [13].

There is no national government requirement or Defence policy or requirement to provide information about lobbying meetings or public conflict of interest risks that have been identified, even at the ministerial level. A 2014 Parliament research paper indicated that, while lobbyists are required to register at the federal level, making ministerial diaries or other records of lobbying meetings available is not mandatory or practiced [1]. A 2018 performance audit into the management of the government’s Register of Lobbyists by the Australian National Audit Office came to the same conclusion [2], and both reports said this compared unfavourably to countries like the US, UK, and Canada, where lobbyists and/or government agencies are required to report at least some meetings on a regular basis. Senior government Ministers have repeatedly resisted attempts, including by other federal politicians, to use Freedom of Information Act mechanisms to gain access to Ministerial diaries which may contain insights into lobbying meetings, drawing out the process and racking up considerable expense to the extent that information finally publicly released is no longer relevant [3, 4]. Defence officials and service members are required under Defence Instructions to identify conflict of interest issues within their chain of command, however, this information does not have to be published outside of the organisation [5].

While Australia does have a lobbyist registration system, it includes only basic information about lobbyists, is complied with at only the most basic level, and has been marred by technical difficulties and inaccurate or misleading information. The compliance with and public release of a Register of Lobbyists is required by the Lobbying Code of Conduct [1]. The Register is maintained by the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C) [2] and published on the website of the Attorney-General’s Department [1, 3, 4] (media reports say that the Attorney-General’s Department have taken over responsibility for maintenance from PM&C in 2019 [3], though this could not be confirmed with official documents). According to the Lobbying Code of Conduct and confirmed by a search of records, the only information required to be provided and that is published in practice by lobbyists is the business registration details, names of persons employed, whether those persons are former government officials, and on whose behalf the lobbyist is being carried out [4]. Issue areas, targets, activities, and financial information are not required to be published in the Register of Lobbyists. Government officials do appear to have to confirm that lobbyists are on the Register before engaging them, though this is not explicitly stated in the Lobbying Code of Conduct (only that there shall be “no contact between government representatives and unregistered lobbyists”) [2]. A 2018 performance audit on management of the Register of Lobbyists by the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) revealed a “low level of compliance activity” by PM&C, which appears to have been a policy decision by government. The report explained that, while this meets the requirements of the Lobbying Code of Conduct, it does a disservice to meeting the stated objectives of the Code of Conduct [2]. Media reporting alleged that there was a systemic failure to faithfully report former government service by lobbyists [5], and that as recently as October 2019, technical issues led to months-long delays in publishing information on lobbyists which should have been updated in near real time [3].

There appears to be little compliance with lobbying legislation and policy, weak oversight and lack of communication about obligations within government, and no sanctions for violations of lobbying restrictions except for the most blatant cases of corruption. A 2018 Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) performance audit on the management of the Register of Lobbyists noted that compliance monitoring, performance measurement and reporting, risk assessment, and communication between government entities are all not carried out [1]. An article on the Register of Lobbyists in a major national newspaper alleged that the Lobbying Code of Conduct “is weak and rarely enforced, experts say. Even when it is enforced, the most severe punishment available is the removal of a lobbyist from the register. Critics say this simply pushes lobbying underground and out of sight of the public. The rules are not enforced by an independent agency. They are instead administered by a small number of public servants,” [2]. An academic who did research on the ‘revolving door’ between public service and industry in the alcohol, food, and gambling sector [3] stated to the national newspaper: “‘First of all you need actual, enforceable laws, with meaningful penalties… There’s no point in having a law if you don’t have a meaningful penalty. Then you’ve got to talk about who’s monitoring it, whose job it is. And making sure the law is actually enforceable, so people actually get the fines,'” [4], indicating serious oversight and enforcement shortcomings. There is no evidence that any individuals or companies have faced sanctions for violating lobbyist reporting and activity restrictions [5].

There is no legislation regulating lobbying activities in Azerbaijan. The Anti-Corruption Law (1) and the Law on Public Procurement (2) do not contain any text about lobbying activities. In general, lobbying activities in the country and beyond the country have not been forbidden.
In recent years, the press has written about a scandal involving the lobbying activities of the Azerbaijani authorities. It is alleged that the Azerbaijani authorities have given various gifts to various organizations, including representatives of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (3, 4, 5).

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable, as there is no legislation that regulates lobbying in the defence sector.

Bahrain does not have a legal framework to regulate lobbying activities. Lobbying activities usually happen at the royal level by foreign politicians, not from local organizations or individuals [1, 2]. After extensive online and offline research, no further information was found on this issue.

This indicator has been marked ‘Not Applicable’ because, as indicator 76A outlines, there is no legal framework to regulate lobbying activities in Bahrain. After an extensive online and offline research, no further information was found on this issue [1, 2].

The Bangladesh military has an old rule that regulates the defence procurement process. ‘Defence Purchase 35’, commonly known as ‘DP-35’, of 1961 is still used for defence purchases. Section 30 of DP-35 [1] indirectly disallows any lobbying or persuasion in any purchase that could result in the cancellation of the contract if proven. This section, however, does not provide a clear definition, nor is it comprehensive in its coverage, i.e. in terms of outlining types of lobbyists, means of communication or a registration system. The military’s preference for DP-35 over the Public Procurement Act is seen as ‘dual policy’ that contributes towards ‘loss of money’, at least where the military is involved in the work of the Road and Highways Department [2].

Public officials in defence institutions are not required to publish records of lobbying meetings or to publish any conflict of interest risks that have been identified [1].

Bangladesh does not have a registration system for lobbyists [1]. Public officials in defence institutions are not required to publish records of lobbying meetings or to publish any conflict of interest risks that have been identified.

There is not enough information to score this indicator. No publicly available data was found, through research, to establish the existence of an oversight body or examples of sanctions being applied in cases of breaches with regard to defence lobbying.

The framework for regulating lobbying acitivity in Belgium is weak. The Chamber of Representatives has accepted a proposition on a lobby registry [1, 2]. Lobby representatives are required to sign the registry. The proposition clearly but broadly defines lobbyists and their activities. The legislation does not exclude Belgian Defence. A code of conduct for lobbyists applies to all those who registered in the lobby register [3].

However, the registry only includes the Chamber and not the Cabinets. Moreover, it does not provide details on who lobbyists are meeting with or the topics up for discussion. Furthermore, some initiatives have been taken regarding defence specifically, but these have been rejected. By way of example, a legislative proposal on a transparancy registry of contacts with lobbyists in the context of military capability procurement was rejected in 2017.

Within Belgian Defence, there exists a registration process for lobbying meetings. A contact register keeps track of exchanges between Belgian Defence personnel and representatives of potential tenderers. This is elaborated on in the Code of Ethics in Public Procurement [1].

There is a registration lobby system operational in 2019 [1]. Even though it is mandatory, there were only 133 (17/09/20) companies in the register for the latest version from March 2020; there is no defence company registered to the register [2]. The table with the lists of organisations displays a) name of the organisation; b) person to contact; c) managed interest on the behalf of X; d) web addresses.

The lobbying register only applies for companies and organisations lobbying the Parliament, not for contacts with the government and its cabinets. The government has agreed to expand this lobbying register to the cabinets and government, but no such steps have taken place yet. The GRECO wrote in its last country report that “there are no rules governing the relationship between some PTEFs [persons entrusted with top executive functions] and lobbyists and other third parties seeking to influence their decisions” [4].

Registration of lobbyists by Parliament is incomplete and is not well enforced. Meetings are not registered nor are the topics of those meetings. Companies also don’t have to register, only umbrella organisations.

There is not enough information to score this indicator. There is no designated oversight entity with a clear and strong mandate for oversight of lobbying. However, in case of a misconduct in violation with the law, penal or civil sanctions can potentially be imposed by a court. In this case, sanctions will follow the penal code procedure [1].

Bosnia and Herzegovina has no legal framework regulating lobbying [1].

Bosnia and Herzegovina has no legal framework regulating lobbying [1], as such this indicator is marked Not Applicable.

Botswana does not have a legal framework to regulate lobbying activities [1,2]. Further, the country has not indicated whether it will enact a lobbying legislation.

Botswana does not have a legal framework to regulate lobbying in general, let alone, lobbying of defence institutions [1,2]. As such, this indicator is scored ‘Not Applicable’.

Lobbying regulations in Brazil has been debated for decades, but none of the draft bills was enacted. Pressures to regulate the activity are increasing, since with budget cuts in all areas, establishing a good relation with governments became essential. There is growing pressure from the lobbyists themselves, that seek regulation to be able to legitimize their activities and separate them from pure influence-peddling [1, 2].

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’ as Brazil does not have legislation that regulates lobbying [1].

Burkina Faso does not have legislation that regulates lobbying in the defence sector (1).

Cameroon has no framework for regulating lobbying activity.

Cameroon has no framework for regulating lobbying activity. Therefore, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

The Lobbying Act (2008) defines and bounds the activities of all lobbyists, requires their registration, forbids tying their remuneration to specific legislative outcomes, and creates a code of conduct. [1] It applies to the defence sector in the same way as it does to all sectors of government, ministries, and government agencies. The Commissioner of Lobbying is an independent agent of Parliament who has investigative powers in order to ensure lobbyists are in compliance with laws, and receives and can verify reports from lobbyists. [2]

Designated public officer holders (DPOH), which are senior civil servants and equivalents in all sectors, including defence, as well as members of the Upper and Lower Houses and their staffs, must report all contact with lobbyists to the Commissioner of Lobbying. [1] Lobbyists are forbidden from placing DPOHs in a ‘real or apparent conflict of interest’ through gifts, access, or political activities. Conflict of interest reporting is governed by the Federal Accountability Act (2006) and the Conflict of Interest Act (2007). The latter specifies all the forms of conflict of interest that must be reported by public officials, as well as the range of appropriate remediating acts, which range from simple disclosure, to recusal or divestment. [2]

Lobbyists must register with the Commissioner of Lobbying, and the publicly available registry includes information on the identity of lobbyists, the identify of clients, areas of lobbying activity, goals of lobbying activity, the extent to which they have received public funding, and the identity of any individuals, organisations, or subsidiaries with a direct interest in the outcome of the lobbying. They must also file monthly reports on lobbying activities undertaken. Designated Public Office Holders are obliged to report all contact with lobbyists after the fact, but not to confirm that a lobbyist is registered properly prior to meeting. [1] [2]

The Commissioner of Lobbying reports directly to Parliament, and is appointed by both houses for a term of seven years, ensuring independence. The Commissioner is empowered to review and investigate the activity of lobbyists to ensure compliance with the law and the Code of Conduct. [1] The Commissioner can bar individuals from lobbying if they have breached the Code of Conduct, and serious offenses are punishable by fines of up to C$200,000, prison terms of up to two years, or both. [2] The Commissioner releases annual reports, reports on investigations, and compliance statistics. However, a review of lobbying enforcement in practice suggests that too much emphasis is placed on onerous reporting requirements that accomplish little, at the expense of enforcing regulations around registration and activity reporting, which happens infrequently. [3] [4]

In March 2014, after ten years of the corruption scandals that gave rise to a political agreement to modernize the public administration and enhance transparency, legislation to regulate lobby was enacted [1]. The legislation sought to regulate lobbying and the procedures of particular interests before authorities and officials [2]. The framework defined lobbying as paid actions and activities that individuals or entities, Chilean or foreign, do to promote, or represent any particular interest or to influence decisions that some authorities and officials must adopt in the exercise of their functions. It distinguished between two key agents: “active subjects,” involving both professional lobbyists and in company lobbyists (“gestor de intereses”) and “passive subjects,” involving individuals who are the target of lobbying–a conceptual innovation in the Latin American context [3]. The regulation also established a public platform with the registry of lobbyists and private interest managers in state agencies [4]. Meetings or hearings whose publicity may affect national security could not be published but must be informed to the General Comptroller (CGR). In the defence sector, the Ministry of National Defence (MDN) publishes a registry of lobbyists and private interest managers through the Secretary for the Armed Forces. Hearings and meetings to communicate private concerns about legislation must be scheduled through an online form. The legislation applied to the defence sector; specifically to the minister of defence, the chief and commanders of the armed forces, the chief and vice-chief of El Estado Mayor Conjunto (EMCO), and the responsible for acquisitions within the Armed and Security Forces (Ley 20.730, Art. 4.4) a feature highlighted by scholars in comparative analyses [5].

The Chilean legislation is unique in the sense that it established not one but five registers to enhance transparency in public institutions signalled in the Law of Lobby:
1. Register of public agenda,
2. Register of audiences,
3. Register of donations,
4. Register of travels, and
5. Register of lobbyists and managers of private interests [1].

These registers must be maintained by the agencies of the respective “passive agents” that are the target of lobbying. In particular, the MDN established an online platform with the Registers of Public Audience, where all lobbying related activities and meetings are published (Ley 20.730 Art. 8). Registers include public officials and authorities that are considered “passive agents” according to the regulation. These agents must register their participation in meetings and hearings with private interests. Each meeting and hearing is identified with the date of the activity, the assistants, and the matters discussed. Registers must be updated monthly, which, in the Chilean case, is accomplished, something that is unique in the region [2, 3]. However, regardless of these registers, there is no evidence of awareness of conflicts of interest risks and the respective actions to mitigate them. Institutions regularly publish meeting and audience agendas, but no conflicts of interest, that could be involved in these activities.

According to the legislation, each institution where lobbying operates must generate a Register of Lobbyists and Managers of Private Interests [1]. Lobbyists, managers of private interests and the organisations they represent can register voluntarily in the institutions of interest. However, if they are not registered, and they held meetings with “passive subjects”, they will automatically be included in the Register the passive subject is in charge of the registration. Therefore, registration before meetings is voluntary, and only after the meeting has taken place does the registration become mandatory. Registration involves the person, organisation or entity with whom the hearing or meeting was held, on whose behalf particular interests are managed, the individualisation of the attendees or people present at the respective hearing or meeting, and information of remuneration received for these actions, the place and date of its completion and the specific matter discussed. In the defence sector, the MDN and the armed forces publish a list of registered lobbyists and private interests managers and the organisations they represent. Lobbyists and private interests managers are identified according to their name and their clients, in case they constitute a legal entity.

The Chilean legislation [1] has been deemed “exigent” due to its specific sanctions for faults and omissions [2]. However, some authors have highlighted the existence of comparatively low sanctions for lobbyists and “active” agents that may represent important business groups [3]. There are no criminal penalties but only fines. The General Comptroller is responsible for monitoring the compliance of these norms and the establishment of the respective administrative sanctions. In the case of the General Comptroller, the Chamber of Deputies is responsible for verifying compliance with the provisions of the law. For Congress, the Commissions of Ethics and Transparency act as an oversight. However, there is not a specific external entity in Congress in charge of the oversight. Sanctions involve fines and the publication of the identity of sanctioned individuals and entities as a dissuasive measure, notwithstanding possible criminal responsibilities.

China does not have a a framework to regulate lobbying in general and in the defence sector in particular. Lobbying takes place, involving both formal and informal tactics (public relations events, private meetings). [1] The Criminal Law (1979, 1997) and the National Supervision Law (2018) do not refer directly to lobbying activities.

This indicator is scored ‘Not Applicable’ as China does not have a framework to regulate lobbying.

There is no overarching legal framework governing lobbying in Colombia, although it is a practice that is carried out permanently in Congress of the Republic. The initiative to regulate lobbying is not new, from 2001 to 2018 a total of seven bills have been submitted that seek to regulate this practice, but none of them have managed to be approveded as a law. [1,2,3,4]

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable, as there is no legislation that regulates lobbying in the defence sector.

The legislative framework of Côte d’Ivoire does not contain explicit provisions regulating lobbying activity concerning public procurement contracts that apply directly to the defence and security sector.

According to the Code des Marchés Publics (Decree No. 2009-259 of 6 August 2009), which regulates all public procurement, including defence institutions, lobbying activity is not explicitly mentioned. However, Chapter 2 (On Penalties for violations committed by bidding parties), Article 187 (Acts of Corruption), Sections 1 and 2 list the types of illicit pressure (acts of corruption) that bidders (soumissionaires) can exert during a tender process. Though not referred to as “lobbying”, they include attempts by the bidder to influence a public official with a gift, bonus, commission or reward (1).

Article 187 (Acts of Corruption):
(1) “Without prejudice to the criminal penalties incurred, any attempt by a bidder to influence the evaluation of tenders or award decisions, including the offering of gifts, or any other benefit, shall entail…”
(2) “Any present, gratuity or commission, offered by the supplier, the contractor or the service provider, to induce a public official to do or to refrain from doing a particular action in the context of the contract or to reward him for having acted on the bidder’s behalf, is a reason for termination of the transaction” (1).

According to Order No. 202 of the Ministry of Economy and Finance (Arrêté No. 202 MEF/DGBF/DMP) of 21 April 2010, which regulates the terms of termination for public procurement contracts, Article 3.1.e states that a contract can be rescinded based on a bidder’s misconduct or fraud (“faute grave, fraude ou dol du titulaire”). However, there is no explicit mention of “lobbying” (offering gifts, bonuses, commissions or rewards to public officials) as constituting a form of misconduct (2).

According to the 2018 Africa Integrity Indicators (AII 2018) by Global Integrity, the Autorité Nationale de Régulation des Marchés Publics (ANRMP) has a publicly available “red list” (Liste Rouge) on its website of companies that have violated ANRMP and public procurement legislation (3). The latest red-listed company is Papici Top Buro, as per an ANRMP decision on August 27, 2018. The company is barred from bidding on public tenders until August 26, 2020 (4).

There is no regulation or legislation on lobbying in Denmark, neither generally or specifically covering the defence institutions [1]. From time to time this is raised as a critical issue in public debate [2, 3].

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable, as the country does not have legislation that regulates lobbying in the defence sector.

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable because, after reviewing the Constitution, all the relevant laws, by-laws strategies and media platforms, there is no evidence that there is a framework for regulating lobbying activity (1), (2). This was verified by our interviews (3), (4), (5), (6).

This sub-indicator was marked Not Applicable because no legislation regulates lobbying. However, for conflict of interest, Article 16 of Law no. 106 (2013) states that public officials are responsible for avoiding any form of conflict of interest even if they are not explicitly mentioned in the law and that whenever they have a suspicion that a situation of conflict of interest is arising, they must inform the committee for the prevention of corruption (1), (2), (3), (4).

This sub-indicator was marked Not Applicable because the country has no legislation that regulates lobbying in the defence sector (1), (2), (3), (4).

Lobbying is not regulated in Estonia – there is no legislation or any other kind of normative act regarding it. [1] The responsibility is placed on civil servants, based on the ethic code of civil servants, including those under the Ministry of Defence. A report by Transparency International in 2014 concluded that the public is also not engaged in a wider debate over the meaning of lobbying or ethical lobbying. [2] The report further concluded that the lack of public scrutiny over lobbying causes a lack of transparency in the relationship between the lobbyists and the legislators. The engagement practices by the Riigikogu are not regulated and the legislators are often not able to explain amendments to laws or why they took one opinion into consideration and not another.
Professional lobbying in the defence sector is rare. [3] Rather, the members of parliament encourage local companies in the defence sector to expand their activities: they visit companies and the Riigikogu’s support group was formed for local defence firms. On the other hand, there is some ongoing discussion about regulating lobbying. The Corruption Prevention Council under the Ministry of Justice, in their meeting on 9 May 2018, concluded that rules to regulate lobbying should be implemented. [4]

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable. Estonia does not regulate lobbying of defence institutions.

The country has not enacted regulation or any kind of general ethical guidance on lobbying. Regulation is based on the general legislative framework, for example, the criminal code, administrative law and regulation governing business activities. [1] Finland has signed and ratified the Council of Europe’s Criminal Law Convention on Corruption No. 173 in 2002, but made a reservation to it which currently is in force until 2021. [2] The reservation entails that the country has not had to enact legislation on lobbying. [3]

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’ as there is no legislation regulating lobbying of defence institutions in Finland. The country has not enacted regulation or any kind of general ethical guidance on lobbying.

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’ as Finland has no legislation regulating lobbying and no lobbyist registration system. Further, the country has not enacted regulation or any kind of general ethical guidance on lobbying. ProCom – the Finnish Association of Communications Professionals, however, maintains its own, voluntary register for lobbyists [1].

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’ as there is no legislation regulating lobbying of defence institutions in Finland.

Since the Sapin 2 law of 2016 on “Transparency, anti-corruption and modernisation of public life”, [1] some progress has been made. Lobbyists now have to declare their activities on a specific online official register, [2] the High Authority for Transparency of Public Life (HATVP).
By law, a lobbyist who doesn’t declare and publish their activities on the HATVP platform – of his own initiative or at the request of HATVP – can risk up to one year in prison and a fine of 15,000€. [3] The HATVP has the power to request information, documents, data, etc. from lobbying firms and can also go to the lobbying firm offices and oversee documents on site, although it has never done so since its creation in 2013.
In fact, not all lobbyists have registered on the platform, and according to a HATVP spokesperson [4] no sanctions have been taken so far.
The defence sector is not exempt from the obligation to declare conflicting interests, and some defence sector lobbying firms have registered on the HATVP platform. [5]

According to the “Law Sapin 2”, lobbyists have to declare themselves and their activities to the HATVP.
Since the inclusion of the Ethics law in public service of 2016 in the Defence Code (Articles L4122-1 to L4122-5), officials from defence institutions and military personnel also have obligations regarding conflicts of interests: [1] the possibility of holding multiple posts is restricted in order to avoid illegal conflicts of interest (article 432-12 of the Penal Code), and military personnel have the same ethical obligations as civil servants: “dignity, impartiality, integrity and probity”. The 2016 law also gives provisions for actions to be taken in the case of a conflict of interest. Finally, Article L4122-5 repeats Article 432-13 of the Penal Code, aiming to prevent the “illegal taking of interests” of soldiers leaving the Ministry for private companies.
The Military Ethics Committee examines the compatibility of the member’s future professional activities with the duties he or she performed in the department; this committee (articles R 4122-14 to R 4122-24-1 of the Defence Code) examines around 380 cases per year of soldiers in potentially exposed situations.

According to the Military Ethics Committee general rapporteur, [2] three types of declarative obligations (declaration of interests, management mandates and declarations of financial situations) are now provided for certain civilian and military officials of the Ministry to prevent conflicts of interest, and to compare the heritage situations between taking and leaving office:
> Article L 4122-6 which institutes “declarations of interests” according to the models of the HATVP, to be filled by future managers especially in the field of purchases or for senior officials, they are intended to prevent the potential for conflicts of interest; Article 4122-7 concerns “management mandates” for very high authorities that do not allow those concerned to be able to give management instructions concerning their stock market portfolio; Article 4122-8 concerns the declarations of patrimonial status addressed to the HATVP for senior ministry officials.
> The process went from a reporting mechanism related solely to the appointment of a senior official in the Council of Ministers (HATVP law) to an extensive system of patrimonial transparency concerning dozens of executives. [3] [4] [5]

However, public officials are not required to publish or update records of lobbying meetings. These can remain completely secret.

France has a mandatory registration system. Every lobbyist is compelled by law [1] to provide the HATVP with the following information: its identity (if it’s a physical person, i.e. an individual), the identity of its directors (if it is a moral person, i.e. a company), the field of its activities of interest representation, the actions undertaken to represent these interests and the amounts invested during the past year, the number of employees and past year benefits, and professional or union organisations it is in business with.
However, public officials do not need to confirm whether the lobbyist has been entered in the register of lobbyists before meeting them.

The HATVP is the oversight entity. A lobbyist who doesn’t declare and publish their activities on the HATVP platform – of their own initiative or at the request of HATVP – can face up to one year in prison and a fine of 15,000€. [1] The HATVP has the power to request information, documents, data, etc. from lobbying firms and can also go to the lobbying firm offices and oversee documents on site, although it has never done so since its creation in 2013.
If breaches of the law are noted, the HATVP will transfer the case to the judicial authorities for prosecution. It does not appear to have the mandate or resources to enforce the law itself. According to an interview with a HATVP spokesperson, [2] no lobbyist or lobbying company has yet been sentenced by the HATVP or by a judicial authority on behalf of the HATVP.

There is no legislation regulating lobbying in the defence/security sector in Germany. Lobbying is almost entirely unregulated in Germany. Regulations only refer to party financing and a voluntary registrar for associations. However, a 2019 report published by the Council of Europe’s Group Against Corruption (GRECO) reviews the progress made by Germany in implementing ten of its recommendations on transparency in party financing. The report’s conclusion is damning, expressing the body’s disappointment in ‘the low level of progress achieved’. It also states that the ‘system falls short of European standards’ and ascribes the lack of progress to ‘a clear lack of political will’. Transparency and controls on both party and individual candidate financing remain problematic [1].

If associations want to participate in hearings, they have to be listed in the register, but this does not apply to companies. Following a sentence in favour of watchdog groups in 2017 [2], the government committed to establishing a platform where the statements of lobbyists are published. Nothing has happened so far. Mandatory transparency is therefore restricted to tracking which associations have participated in which hearings. Some information can only be accessed via an official query under the Freedom of Information Act [3]. There is no disclosure of meetings, statements or any other contact between lobbyists and officials/politicians except from the disclosure of party contributions exceeding EUR 10,000 in the statement of accounts of parties. Contributions exceeding EUR 50,000 are published immediately by the administration of Parliament. However, about 75% of all donations remain anonymous [4].

Some ministries publish written statements of lobbyists on their website voluntarily, e.g. the Ministry for Justice and Consumer Protection. However, the Ministry of Defence does not publish statements on its website. There are several roundtables between the defence industry and the Ministry, e.g. with weapons exporters (‘Strategischer Industriedialog’) [5]. The frequency of these meetings is made public. However, the members of the roundtables, apart from the minister and the secretaries of state, are unknown [6,7,8]. In sum, there is currently a lack of appropriate regulation, which enables contributions (financial or in kind) to be used non-transparently as a tool for exerting influence on candidates and the policy process.

It should be noted that the Bundestag adopted a new law in April 2021, called the Act on the Introduction of a Lobby Register for the Representation of Interests to the German Bundestag and the Federal Government (Lobby Register Act – LobbyRG). This law will enter into force in January 2022 and will regulate the activities of lobbyists in Parliament and in all Federal ministries. Lobbyists will need to be recorded in the lobby register and must disclose their entry in the register during their activities. They must also adhere to a code of conduct. Interests may only be represented while complying with the principles of openness, transparency, honesty and integrity [9].

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’ as there is no legislation regulating lobbying in the defence/security sector in Germany. As the ‘Berateraffäre’ scandal has shown, public officials in defence institutions are not required to publish records of lobbying meetings or to publish any risks of conflicts of interest that have been identified [1]. ‘In some jurisdictions, such as the EU, Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) who are involved in drafting and negotiating legislation are required to disclose meetings with interest representatives, who are indexed in a transparency register. Commissioners, members of their cabinets, as well as Directors-General are supposed to make this information available as a matter of transparency policy. In Germany, the traditional practice of lobbying remains largely unregulated, beyond direct financial contributions and rules for follow-up employment for public servants. Based on a 1972 resolution, the President of Parliament does maintain a list in which “associations representing interests vis-à-vis the Federal Parliament or the Federal Government can be registered”. However, “no rights or duties are associated with registration” and “member associations of an already registered umbrella organisation as well as individual associations and companies” are specifically excluded’ [2,3]. In 2016, the common practice of issuing parliamentary access IDs to lobbyists was discontinued amid controversy over the unwillingness of political parties to make their lists of recipients public. This move showed a lack of commitment to transparency and was even questioned by some industry representatives. A new procedure stipulates that applications have to go to the President of the Bundestag. Passes are given on a much more restricted basis, normally not more than two per association or company [4].

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’ as there is no legislation regulating lobbying in the defence/security sector in Germany. The country has a voluntary registration system, however, this does not involve any specific requirements. Similarly, the committees of the German Bundestag are not bound to this list when extending invitations to hearings. However, it does provide more information. Public officials do not have to confirm whether a lobbyist has been entered in the register of lobbyists before meeting them. As the German Bundestag’s list of associations and other lobbyist registers have not contributed much to the regulation of lobbying so far, calls for a mandatory lobby register are increasing [1,2,3]. Furthermore, according to a 2014 report by Transparency International, ‘in order to achieve the aim of comprehensive listings, a hearing on mandatory registration was held in the German Bundestag’s Committee of Internal Affairs on 15 June 2009. The Deutsche Gesellschaft für Politikberatung (degepol) composed a framework paper on mandatory registration, stating the minimum requirements associated with mandatory registration: This obligation must apply to all persons and organisations representing interests to policymakers, and who contact officials and ministerial employees. It should also particularly apply to lawyers invoking the duty of non-disclosure associated with the Federal Lawyers Professional Code. This means that, in addition to advisors and agencies, lawyers, law firms, churches and civil society organisations also need to register. However, mandatory registration must include compulsory information open to the public. The framework paper calls for clients to be named and a code of conduct to be recognised. The compulsory information includes general structural details, staff numbers, subcontractors, and of course information on the financing of interest representation. This, along with the mandatory registration for lawyers, is the most controversial subject. The framework paper proposes a threshold value of 10,000 Euros per quarter, or more than 10 percent of a staff member’s working hours. Above this threshold, funds must be stated in stages (level 1: up to 100,000 Euros, level 2: 100,000 to 300,000 Euros; level 3: 300,000 Euros to 500,000 Euros; level 4: over 500,000 Euros). It is also important for the funds’ origins to be disclosed here. Register breaches should be sanctioned by the Bundestag administration managing the register. The framework paper also provides more specific suggestions in this respect: One form of sanction is to prohibit access to officials. Even more important is the regulation of lobbyist access to ministerial administrations. A lobby register would therefore not only have to be managed by the German Bundestag, but also by the Federal Government, as both institutions are strictly separate as a result of political division of power’ (see pages 27 and 41) [1].

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’ as there is no legislation regulating lobbying in the defence/security sector in Germany. There is only a weak and poorly resourced oversight entity. There is no institution that effectively monitors or sanctions lobbyism in Germany, except some NGOs such as LobbyControl, which try to raise awareness about power structures and influence strategies in Germany and the EU [1]. In general, ‘it is difficult to precisely define the scope and intensity of lobbying in Germany, as no reliable figures are available. One difficulty lies in the fact that there is still no clarification as to who can be called a lobbyist. This is the challenge faced by future legal regulations regarding the registration, transparency and codes of conduct for lobbyists’ [2]. Only party funding is monitored but this also entails a lot of loopholes, for example, many party donations are even not considered to be lobbying. In fact, there are not any lobbyists in Germany who have ever been prosecuted under criminal or civil law. Instead, the procedures referred to illegal funding. In addition, criminal proceedings against officials who have used their office for their personal benefit (e.g. Christian Wulff) are rarely made public. It is not clear how many criminal proceedings exist that are not made public [3,4].

In order to establish transparency, clarity and planning security in the armaments sector, a mechanism was initiated in 2014 in the form of a regularly convening Armaments Board. It is supposed to meet every six months. The goal of this Armaments Board, which is represented, in addition to the Minister, by four secretaries of state and relevant department heads with connections to the field of armaments, is to inform the Ministry of Defence about the most important armaments projects. Following the Armaments Board meetings, the Ministry regularly and proactively informs the Defence Committee and the Budget Committee of the German Bundestag about the situation in relevant armament projects in a ‘Report of the BMVg Federal Ministry of Defence on Armaments Affairs’ [5]. The Armaments Board is a forum for providing advice on selected major projects and, at the same time, it forms the basis for a newly aligned, improved mechanism for informing Parliament [6].

In Ghana, there is no legal framework in place to regulate lobbying activity. In 2013 the then minority party proposed, without success, a bill to the parliament to introduce a register for local and international lobbying organisations in Ghana (1). Interestingly, the current Minister of Defence, Dominic Nitiwul, who in the previous legislature was deputy minority leader was among the main proponents of the bill (2).

Since there is no legal framework in place to regulate lobbying activity, this indicator is scored Not Applicable.

Greece has no framework for regulating lobbying activity, since very few firms engage in such activity [1, 2]. Research could find no relevant legislation on this issue.
The Ministry of Interior in collaboration with the National Transparency Authority have developed a bill on “lobbying”, which is expected to be voted by the Greek Parliament by end July 2021. The main elements of this framework were presented by the Minister of Interior, Makis Voridis, on 20.05.2021 at the OECD Conference on Lobbying. [3]

This indicator is marked Not Applicable as there is no legislation regulating lobbying in the field of defence/security in Greece. Defence officials are not required to publish records of lobbying meetings. Also, they do not have to publish any conflicts of interest risks that have been identified.

This indicator is marked Not Applicable as Greece has no legislation regulating lobbying and no lobbyist registration system. There is no registration system for companies or individual engaging in lobbying of MOD or other relevant ministries.

This indicator is marked Not Applicable as there is no legislation regulating lobbying of defence institutions in Greece. There is no registration system for companies or individual engaging in lobbying of MOD or other relevant ministries.

Hungary had a Law On Lobbying Activity (Act XLIX/2006) [1], it was countermanded in 2010 by the incoming Orbán government [2]. The official comments were that the legal framework was unable to improve transparency and reduce corruption. Since then, NGOs have urged the government several times to regulate this field, without any success [3].

Given that Hungary has no legislation regulating lobbying, this indicator is scored Not Applicable. Hungary had a Law On Lobbying Activity (Act XLIX/2006) [1], it was countermanded in 2010 by the incoming Orbán government [2].

India has no framework for regulating lobbying activity. In August 2013, a press release was published by the government stating that at that point in time it was not considering any proposal to legalise lobbying by companies [1]. The aforementioned still prevails today.

Lobbying is not recognised in a statutory or non-statutory form [2]. The only law that has had relevance to lobbying is in Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, which makes it illegal for a public servant taking gratification other than legal remuneration in respect of an official Act [3]. As mentioned in Q.5, under the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act, 2018, the definition of criminal misconduct has now been widened to include the briber giver [4]. There are specific provisions regulating the conduct of, and laying down requirements for, commercial organisations carrying on business in India [5].

Lobbying activities do take place in India and have so for many years. These activities have been conducted by public relation firms and representatives from companies who make presentations to government officials. In 2013, Walmart found itself at the centre of controversy after a routine disclosure report to U.S. Congress which indicated the retailer had spent $25 million on lobbying activities in Washington over the past four years, including activities related to “enhanced market access for investment in India.” [6]. The Indian government launched an inquiry investigating these allegations [7].

In August 2017, business lobby U.S.-India Business Council (USIBC) wrote to India’s Defence Minister seeking a guarantee that U.S. firms would retain control over sensitive technology – even when joint venture junior partners [8]. Earlier that year, a USIBC led delegation attended Aero India 2017 in Bengaluru [9].

It is evident that lobbying does take place in India and the absence of regulatory framework creates an environment conducive for confusion and corruption.

This indicator has been scored Not Applicable, as country does not have legislation regulating lobbying in the defence sector [1].

Indonesia does not have legislation that regulates lobbying in the defence sector. [1]

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’, as Indonesia does not have legislation that regulates lobbying. [1]

Iran has no framework for regulating lobbying activity [1, 2].

This indicator is marked Not Applicable, as the country does not have legislation that regulates lobbying [1, 2].

No specific information came up in extensive online searches tying defence actors to lobbying efforts which is a clear indication that that type of activity is uncommon in Iraq and for which no legislation exists.

This indicator has been scored N/A as Iraq does not have legislation that regulates lobbying in the defence sector.

No lobbyist registration system is legislated nor exists.

Lobbying activities of the nature concerning the questions raised here are not common in Iraq, or its defence establishment.

In 2016, the Knesset approved Basic Law (amendment no. 41), which determines, among other things, that lobbyists who attend Knesset committee meetings will have to register beforehand and identify themselves (1). Furthermore it is written: “Professional lobbyists work for their employers to enlist the support of the members of Knesset (MKs). They act to influence MKs on matters relating to everything from bills, to secondary legislation, to plenum or committee decisions, to official appointments, and to the elections of people to official positions. Lobbyist actions are an integral part of the democratic process and allow for individuals and groups to express their positions and to participate in policymaking. Professional lobbyists are usually professionals in the field of public relations who represent interest groups. The organisation of professional lobbyist activity in the Knesset is grounded in the Knesset Law (amendment No. 25), 2008. According to the law, a professional lobbyist is only allowed to work in the Knesset with the permission of a committee chaired by the Knesset speaker. There are two deputies in the committee, one from the coalition and one from the opposition. A person who wants to be a professional lobbyist in the Knesset is asked to submit an application to the committee that contains their personal information, whether they are working for a corporation and the type of corporation, its name and number, the names of the employers who they want to represent in the Knesset and their type of business, as well as the names and business interests of everyone who has paid them money or given them benefits in connection to the professional lobbyist’s work in the Knesset. If the person applying is a member of the electoral committee of a party, they must write down the name of the party. The applicant must declare that they will act in accordance with the law.” (2) See also the list of lobbyists with clearance currently active in the Knesset (only Hebrew) (3). There is a paragraph related to lobbyism in the Knesset that describes: ” Section 13 A of the Knesset Members (Immunity, Rights and Duties) Replacement Law , 5711-1951 ‘ (hereinafter — the principa l Law) , shall be replaced by *•A” 1 0 ” the following: (…) (IV) appearance, representation, conduct of negotiations or lobbying before a governmental authority for monetary or other material gain” (4). These regulations apply to all lobbyists working in the Knesset, including those lobbying on defence legislation. However, according to the government, the regulation of lobbying within the government itself, including the MOD, is still a work in progress and no directive has yet been published on the issue (5).

In Israel, public officials in defence institutions are not required to publish or update records of lobbying meetings. Yet, they are required to publish any conflicts of interest risks that have been identified. In 2016, the Knesset passed into law legislation that requires lobbyists to come clean about the companies they are representing in committee meetings, even those held outside the parliament (1). Furtheremore, the Knesset regulations “allow for a member of Knesset who is not a minister or a deputy minister to form a Knesset lobby and be a member or chair of that lobby. The lobby operates during the term of the Knesset during which it was established. The MK who founds the lobby must inform the Knesset Secretary General of its establishment and provide a list of the MKs who are its members. The Secretary General must then publicise a list of the Knesset lobbies and their members on the Knesset’s website” (2).

Israel has a mandatory registration system that allows public disclosure of a lobbyist’s identity, their clients, issue areas, targets, activities and financial inform. Article 66a of the Knesset Law stipulates that a lobbyist may not operate within the Knesset, or at any parliamentary committee meeting which takes place outside of the Knesset, without being registered (1). A professional lobbyist who is in the Knesset building must wear a special identification tag obtained from the Knesset. The ID has the lobbyist’s name and, if they work for a corporation, the name of the corporation. The lobbyist must mention that they are a professional Knesset lobbyist and for whom they are working when addressing members of the Knesset, people who work for the MKs, Knesset employees, or Knesset committees (1). A professional lobbyist is not allowed to provide benefits for members of the Knesset and cannot attempt to foment a bias on any issue that is connected to the member of Knesset’s parliamentary activity. The lobbyist cannot use methods like pressure, threats, seduction or promises of benefits. He cannot obligate a member of Knesset to vote or act in a certain way. The committee chaired by the Knesset speaker is allowed to take away a professional lobbyist’s permission to act in the Knesset or even forbid him to enter the Knesset building if s/he breaks the law. If the lobbyist works for a corporation, the committee can take similar actions against other lobbyists who work for that corporation. According to the law, the Knesset must publish on its website the names of lobbyists who have received clearance to work in the Knesset and the details of their employers. For lobbyists who work for corporations, the Knesset must publish the particulars of the corporation. For lobbyists who are members of the electoral body of a party, the Knesset must publish the name of the party” Around 180 professional lobbyists work in the Knesset. “Among the bodies who make use of lobbyist services: The banks, the Contractors Association, the Board of Auditors, universities, clinics, radio and television stations and organisations who work for environmental protection.” (2) See also the list of lobbyists with clearance currently active in the Knesset (only Hebrew) (3)
However, the Israeli Democratic Institute has raised some concerns over how extensive information on the registration system is and recommended that the Knesset strengthens provisions related to lobbyists publicising which issues they are lobbying on (4).

Enforcement of lobbying regulations is the responsibility of the committee which grants lobbying permits. This committee has the right to suspend or revoke lobbyists’ permits and bar them from entering the parliament (1). The issue of the enforcement of these regulations has been debated by members of the Knesset with some parliamentarians requesting more transparency around lobbyist activities in Parliament (2). Moreover, according to the Israel Democracy Institute, the current enforcement of lobbying regulations is weak, particularly in relation to “in-house” lobbyists who are not subject to the same registration provisions as others (3). They recommend increased transparency surrounding lobyists’ activities and stronger enforcement powers, including increasing penalties for those found to have broken regulations by making them criminal offences and fining offenders (3) (4).

Italy has no legislation concerning lobbying, despite several attempt to legislate the sector. In April 2016, the Chamber of Deputies has issued internal rules of procedures concerning lobbying activity at glance in the Chamber of Deputy [1]. Moreover, in February 2017, the Chamber enacted a deliberation on the topic [2]. According to these documents, professional lobbyists, in order to perform their work, need to be listed in a register that is published on the website of the Chamber and to annually report their activities, under penalty of suspension [3]. Nonetheless, there are several problems with this system. Firstly, according to some public investigations, there is no clear and stringent oversight neither of the registers, nor of the accuracy of the available information [4]. Secondly, there is no correspondent regulation in the Senate of the Republic. This is particularly problematic given the Italian Perfect Bi-Cameral system. In the past years there have been several attempts to acheive a regulation of lobbyist activities even in the Senate, but with no success [5]. In May 2019 a legislative proposal has been presented to the President of the Senate, but it is still at the very beginning of the process [6].

As there is no national legislation on the issue, this indicator has been marked ‘Not Applicable’. There is no legal requirement on the publication of public officials’ records of lobbying meetings or of possible conflicts of interest risks. Nonetheless, it should be noted that rules of procedures adopted by the Chamber of Deputies (not national legislation) allow for the publication of annual report of lobbyists activities, under penalty of suspension [1].

As there is no national legislation on the issue, this indicator has been marked ‘Not Applicable’. No mandatory registration system exists. It should be noted that the rules of procedures adopted by the Chamber of Deputies (not national legislation) allow for the registration of lobbyists that intend to perform their work with deputies [1].

As there is no national legislation on the issue, this indicator has been marked ‘Not Applicable’. There is no oversight entity with a mandate for oversight of lobbying.

The Japan Business Federation, generally considered the most influential business federation in Japan, frequently writes in its newsletter Approaches to Current Issues that it will work to promote certain issues by “lobbying the government in various ways.” [1] There is, however, no registration requirement for lobbyists in Japan, according to one source on Japanese defence procurement legislation. [2] In addition, a University Professor who has published academic articles on Japanese defence procurement, said at interview that there is no regulation of lobbying in the defence sector in Japan. [3] Regarding restricting influence, Japan has annual donation limits for political campaigns. “Such limits depend on who is making the donation and who is receiving it. The law also provides spending limits, but these limits do not apply to all political activities. [Corporations] can donate only to political parties and political fund organisations … [not to] particular candidates.” [4] Furthermore, according to a law adopted in 2008, civil servants in the ministries are to register each time that they are contacted by a Diet member or a Diet member’s secretary. They are also to report to the Head of their Ministry if they are asked by such a person to render any service that is wrongful. [5] A core intention of this law is to make clear that civil servants should be devoted to working for the government in power. [6] However, when the Mainichi Newspaper requested information under Japan’s Freedom of Information Act on contacts made by politicians to the ministries, it received the answer that none of Japan’s eleven ministries had ever registered such a contact. [7] The Personnel Bureau of the Cabinet Secretariat, which has administrative responsibility for the matters that the law covers, interprets it as making registration mandatory only when politicians contact bureaucrats to make wrongful requests. [8] According to a circular notice [9] cited in the Compliance Guidance book for supervisors in the Self-Defence Force (SDF), including those working in the Ministry of Defence (MOD), [10] SDF personnel working in procurement must report to the Minister of Defence any attempts by business partners to influence procurement decisions that are illegal, unfair or biased.

Japan has no specific lobbying legislation and the legislation that exists on undue influence is interpreted in such a way that public officials in defence institutions are not required to publish or update records of lobbying meetings (see Q76A). This indicator is therefore marked Not Applicable.

It should be noted that civil servants, including those working in defence institutions, are obliged to report wrongful requests from politicians, [1] and SDF personnel, including those working with defence procurement in the MOD, are obliged to report wrongful requests from business partners. [2]

As Japan does not have legislation regulating lobbying and has no registration requirements for lobbyists, this indicator is marked Not Applicable. [1] However, Japan has a law according to which civil servants are to register contacts made by politicians (see Q76A & 76B). The law does not stipulate going so far as to make a list of politicians active in influencing the civil service. Furthermore, Japan’s civil servants have interpreted this law as only requiring them to register cases of politicians making contact to make wrongful requests, and in 2016, it was revealed that no such contacts had been registered. [2]

This indicator is marked Not Applicable as Japan does not have legislation that regulates lobbying in the defence sector. The only exception are rules for reporting wrongful requests from politicians or business partners that seldom apply (see Q76A) [1].

There is no framework for regulating lobbying activity in Jordan. In fact, research has demonstrated that there is no general framework regulating Government lobbying activities at all. In relation to lobbying, common understanding of lobbying in Jordan is in relation to civil society lobbying. Interestingly, the majority of news around lobbying in Jordan focuses on lobbying in relation to women’s rights and fundraising for charitable causes [1, 2]. There is no evidence to support the fact that Jordan has any lobbying regulations, other than those applied to CSOs and the third sector [3]. However, there is an informal lobbying strategy within the defence sector, that includes meetings with embassy officials and other diplomats in order to bring financial or military assistance [2].

This sub-indicator has been marked as Not Applicable, as Jordan does not have legislation that regulates lobbying in the defence sector, and thus assessing it is irrelevant within this context [1,2].

There is no framework to regulate lobbying activity in the defence sector. In the past, scholars have called for Parliament to enact laws to regulate lobbying and other issues related to conflicts of interest, misconduct, and abuse of power. However the country is yet to enact these regulations. [1]

There is no framework for lobbying activity in the defence sector. As such, this indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’.

Currently, the country does not have a legal framework for regulating lobbying activity [1].

This sub-indicator has been scored Not Applicable. Currently, the country does not have a legal framework for regulating lobbying activity [1].

The country has no legal framework to regulate lobbying, officials and activists said (1, 2, 3, 4 and 5).

This sub-indicator has been been marked Not Applicable because Kuwait does not have legislation that regulates lobbying in the defence sector.

This sub-indicator has been been marked Not Applicable because Kuwait does not have legislation that regulates lobbying in the defence sector (1) (2).

There is no legislation regulating lobbying generally and thus also no legislation regulating lobbying in defence institutions.
KNAB submitted a draft Lobbying openness law to the Cabinet of Ministers in 2012, however, the law did not receive the necessary support and therefore was not submitted to the parliament. In 2017, under the impulse of the President of Latvia, a public debate on the Necessity of lobbying legislation in Latvia was held, though no consensus was reached on a necessity of one; this does not mean, however, that risks related to lobbying are not considered, rather that approaches in tackling this issue do not rely only legal regulation; [1] For example, in 2008 the Cabinet of Ministers decided to support the determination of lobbying transparency basic principles in ethic codes and other legal acts of state and local government institutions. [2] There are several extra measures rather than a law on lobbying – for instance, the Association of Defence industry has its own Ethics Code which is observed by the Advisory Council consisting of representatives of the government and industry. [3] The Ethics Code of the MOD serves the same purpose. Besides, civil servants have to report on meetings with defence industry representatives. [4]

This indicator is marked Not Applicable as there is no legislation regulating lobbying generally and thus also no legislation regulating lobbying in defence institutions.

There is no framework regulating lobbying activity in Lebanon. No information was found on lobbying in the defence sector. A source confirmed there is no lobbying activity in the defence sector in Lebanon.

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable, as Lebanon does not have legislation that regulates lobbying in the defence sector.

Lithuania has adopted the Law on Lobbying Activities (last amended on 20 June 2017). It provides a definition of lobbying which (implicitly) covers all forms of influencing s and establishes an obligation for lobbyists to submit an electronic report on their activities within 7 days of commencing lobbying on a given issue (these declarations are available online at www.lobistai.lt). As defined by law, lobbying activities are ‘actions taken by a neutral person who, on behalf of the client of lobbying activities, seeks to influence lobbied persons so that legal acts or administrative decisions would be modified or repealed, or new legal acts or administrative decisions adopted or rejected’ [1]. A major shortfall of the law is that it fails to capture all parties with vested interests, such as business associations and NGOs. Therefore, many lobbying activities happen informally, increasing the risks of corruption [2]. The Chief Official Ethics Commission is tasked with supervising lobbying activities across the country, and maintains a register of lobbyists. Currently there are sixty-four registered lobbyists – a sharp jump since the new law on lobbying activities entered into force in September 2017 [3]. The defence sector is not exempt from this law.

There is no obligation for public officials to declare meetings with lobbyists. Public officials are obliged to declare their private interests when taking office and update the declaration within seven working days after new declarable interests arise. Public officials are also required to abstain from situations of conflict between public and private interests [1]. The defence sector is not exempt from this law.

Lithuania has a mandatory registration system where lobbyists are required to disclose their identity, their clients, issue areas, targets and activities. Financial information is not disclosed. Not all lobbyists disclose other information on top of that required [1, 2]. Public officials are allowed to meet with all interest groups without interdependence on the Registry of Lobbyists.

The Chief Official Ethics Committee is the oversight institution, however it is not adequately resourced to conduct oversight [1]. Its track record does not include any verdicts on illegal lobbying either. The institution is currently run by an acting Chairman, as the candidacy of the initial acting Chairman was not approved by Parliament. The sanctions for illegal lobbying vary from 100 to 300 EUR for the first time and, if continued, from 300 to 560 EUR [2]

There is no written law to regulate lobbying in defence institutions. [1] [2] There is also a lack of regulation and oversight on defence lobbying. There is no evidence that officials are educated on the costs and benefits of lobbying; lobbying is also not associated with corruption, and the use of middlemen and agents is quite common. Often, it is the norm to have a locally appointed middleman as an agent to broker deals. This can involve members of the royal family and private business individuals. [3]

This indicator is marked Not Applicable as Malaysia does not regulate the lobbying of defence institutions. [1] Most of the lobbying is done through unofficial channels. Political and royal connections also play a role. For instance, members of royal households may use their palace connections to lobby for defence-related projects. [2]

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable, as the country does not have legislation that regulates lobbying in the defence sector. Malaysia does not have the practice of regulating lobbying registrations. It would be difficult to institutionalise the practise since many companies or individuals involved in the industry are politically connected. These individuals or companies are also the unofficial major contributors to political parties’ activities. It is an open secret that some individuals are also financial contributors to the royal households. [1] [2]

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable, as the country does not have legislation that regulates lobbying in the defence sector

Mali has no framework for regulating lobbying activity of defence institutions.

Mali has no framework for regulating lobbying activity of defence institutions. Therefore, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

Lobbying activities in the defence sector are not regulated in Mexico. In this regard, both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate included in their respective regulations the definition of lobbying, the prohibition to the legislators to carry out this practice and to accept payments from people who do it, and the registration of lobbyists. [1] [2]

However, several sectors (CSOs, academia, and journalists) have called on the federal government to make lobbying regulation a priority issue on the public agenda in order to prevent acts of corruption at all levels of government. [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’ as Mexico does not have legislation that regulates lobbying activities in the defence sector. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]

The Law on Lobbying in Montenegro sets the framework for regulating lobbying activities: it ensures comprehensive coverage of the lobbying community through broad but clear definitions of lobbyists and their activities.
It specifies the types of organisations and lobbyists covered, the type of contact, the definition of lobbying and the exemptions. [1] However, there is no requirement for public officials to disclose form of communication or amount spent on lobbying activity. [2] Lobbying legislation applies to the defence sector. Lobbying is under the jurisdiction of Agency for Prevention of Corruption.

Public officials in defence institutions are required to regularly provide the authorities with records for each lobbying meeting by specifying the details and frequency of interactions with lobbyists, while institutions are responsible for publishing information about contacts with lobbyists on their websites. [1] These details include the names of the lobbyists and the purpose and target of the lobbying. [1]

Public officials are required to report possible conflicts of interest and obtain the opinion of the responsible authority. [2]

There is no requirement for public officials to disclose the form of communication or the amount spent on lobbying activity. [1]

In accordance with the Law on Lobbying, Montenegro has a mandatory registration system that allows public disclosure of a lobbyist’s identity, areas of interest, their clients, targets, activities or financial information. [1]

Lobbyists are required to present their licence while lobbying. [2] Public officials are not allowed to accept unlawful lobbying [3] The Law on Lobbying also stipulates that lobbyist are required to give information about their clients to the Agency for Corruption and to provide a yearly report with the following details: information about the entity that they’re lobbying for, area of lobbying and compensation received for their lobbying services.

According to the MoD, the Agency for Prevention of Corruption conducts oversight over lobbyist, with a clear and strong mandate for oversight of lobbying. Law on lobbying prescribes fines for violation of this Law.

The oversight entity is politically biased, weak and lacks results. [1] Sanctions do not include criminal offences, but there are financial fines of up to 20,000 euros. [2] However, sanctions are never enforced, because lobbying activities are carried out outside the legal framework. [1]

Law n° 06-99 on the freedom of pricing and concurrence dating from June 2000 outlines for the creation of a Concurrence Council (1). A first ruling was adopted in 2005, leading to the creation of the Council in 2008. However, the Council’s powers are limited and only lead to minor actions. The period from 2011 to 2014 was more active for the Council but since the Law n° 20-13 on the Concurrence Council that built on the Council’s powers, the latter has been rather inactive to date. Moreover, the powers of the Concurrence Council do not extend to the armed forces.

No mention was found of the necessity or the intention to create and maintain a legal framework for regulating lobbying activity of defence institutions among the stated mission and recommendations of official anti-corruption bodies (2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8).

No evidence was found in CSO reports of any legal framework for regulating lobbying activity of defence institutions.

As the country does not have legislation that regulates lobbying in the defence sector, this sub-indicator is marked as Not Applicable.

Myanmar lacks any legal framework for regulating lobbying activity [1]. Myanmar’s military usually conducts military contracts through unregistered brokers or lobbyists. Although there is the Military Misconduct Law, we cannot assess whether it includes any regulations regarding lobbyist activity as the law is not publicly available [2].

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’ as there is no legislation regulating lobbying in the field of defence/security in Myanmar.

Lobbying activity is not comprehensively or robustly regulated in the Netherlands and only limited mechanisms exist. The main rule impacting lobby activity is a ban on former cabinet members lobbying the ministry they were formerly a part of [1]. This rule extends to the Ministry of Defence but does not exclude former members of other ministries from lobbying with defence. Further, in 2016, the cabinet began publishing relevant agenda appointments with persons and/or subjects online [1].There is a public register available for lobbyists within the House of Representatives, but it is voluntary and the registration process does not cover forms of lobbying that do not include entering Parliament (e.g. emails, phone calls, (virtual) conferences and external events or meetings) [1,2].

Aside from these limited provisions, lobbying transparency and oversight are not regulated and the environment remains voluntary and ad hoc. There are no concrete definitions of lobbying, strict and public reporting systems or transparency measures [1]. Since the regulation of lobbying remains largely uncharted territory in the Dutch political landscape, lobbying is considered to be one of the biggest risk factors with regard to the undue influence or coercion of members of Parliament.

Limited mechanisms exist for public disclosure of lobby meetings. In 2016, the cabinet began publishing relevant agenda appointments with persons and/or subjects online [1]. Ministers themselves are meant to register meetings in the public ministerial online diary but this only covers in-person contact. There is a public register available for lobbyists within the House of Representatives, but it is voluntary and, again, it only covers in-person meetings held at Parliament [1,2]. The above-mentioned reporting mechanisms apply to elected officials, but there are no binding disclosure mechanisms in place for defence officials. The Code of Conduct for Defence contains guidance on contact with business communities – to prevent (the appearance of) entanglement – but the advice remains general and not specific to lobbying activity [3]. Furthermore, the onus is on defence personnel to evaluate if they have a conflict of interest and report it, seeking advice from superiors if they are unsure [4]. Such information on (possible) conflicts of interest is not publicly available.

There is a public register available for lobbyists within the House of Representatives, but it is voluntary and only covers in-person meetings held at Parliament [1,2]. Meetings held over the phone or at external events, for example, are not covered by the registration system. As the system is voluntary in nature, public officials are not obliged to check whether a lobbyist has registered prior to meeting them.

No oversight entity exists with a specific mandate to oversee lobbying activities. The Court of Audit and the Central Government Audit Service conduct accountability audits, but these are financial in nature and do not extend to the ‘grey-area’ influencing of decision-makers which is involved in lobbying [1]. The Central Defence Integrity Organisation (COID) does not regulate or oversee lobbying activities within defence, though it makes some mention of ‘business integrity’ in its annual report [2]. In September 2020, following years of pressure from GRECO, the European anti-corruption office, and civil society groups, the House of Representatives voted to introduce ‘the College of Investigation and Integrity’ [3]. Once this body is created and introduced, any individuals inside or outside Parliament can report MPs whom they suspect and the College can investigate possible violations of the Code of Conduct by MPs and propose sanctions if needed [4]. However, the College can only issue recommendations on penalties – corrective measures, reprimands and suspensions can only be decided upon by the House of Representatives itself. In addition, the College may have limited authority to access the evidence needed to prove an accusation as they are unable to seize evidentiary material against the will of the MP in question [4]. Details on the College still need to be discussed by the House and there has been resistance to the oversight, but it is expected that, following the introduction of the College of Investigation and Integrity, members of Parliament will have to adhere to tighter rules on lobbying. However, this proposed College only seeks to regulate lobbying activity with respect to elected officials, not all public officials, such as those in decision-making roles in defence.

There is no legislation regulating defence lobbying, nor is there any other overarching lobbying legislation. However lobbying activity is addressed in other official documents. According to the Government, the Cabinet Manual sets out guidance for members of Parliament in relation to lobbying. The Cabinet Manual states that care should be taken to avoid creating a perception that representatives or lobbyists from any one organisation or group enjoy an unfair advantage with the Government. It explicitly states (2.63) that Ministers must consider all types of interests, be they pecuniary/non-pecuniary, direct/indirect, when assessing whether any of their personal interests may conflict with or be perceived to conflict with their ministerial responsibilities. This includes pecuniary interests, family interests, or close associates interests. Ministers should also take care to ensure that they do not become associated with non-governmental organisations where they are a lobby group. If there is an actual or perceived conflict of interest, the member must declare it to Cabinet. They must then withdraw themselves from the discussion, and ensure they do not receive any relevant documentation on the issue, and then transfer their ministerial duties to another minister [1].

The Parliament’s Standing Orders and the Cabinet Manual (2.58, 2.84-2.93) require Members of Parliament to disclose to the Registrar of Pecuniary and Other Specified Interests of Members of Parliament any gifts received with an estimated market value of more than a prescribed amount and the name of the donor. This declaration includes hospitality and donations in cash or kind. Ministers who receive gifts worth more than the prescribed value must not only disclose them in their annual return to the Registrar and relinquish them, unless the Prime Minister grants permission otherwise [2, 3]. In their capacity as representatives of the government, Ministers often exchange gifts, however this is to the Office rather than the individual. To avoid creating or appearing to create an obligation, the Government insists that gifts in cash or kind are not to be solicited or accepted from a commercial enterprise or any other organisation, either in New Zealand or overseas. Payment for air travel or accommodation may constitute a gift and must be declared in the Minister’s annual report – the Minister of Defence has previously actively published expenses related to Ministerial air travel on the MoD’s website [4, 5, 6, 7, 8].

As to defence itself, all defence acquisition projects engage external probity advice and must have in place a probity register documenting any and all contact from potential suppliers during the formal procurement phase [9]. The Ministry of Defence has a conflicts of interest policy that requires ongoing declarations of actual and potential conflicts of interest by employees and members of capability project boards. The Ministry also has a sensitive expenditure and gifts policy that sets expectations for the giving and receiving of gifts and hospitality [10]. The Ministry of Defence and NZDF maintain gift registers ensure that there is a formalised process for recording gifts. Information from these registers is provided to the FADTC committee as part of the annual hearings and becomes publicly available [11, 12]. There is policy available internally on each agency’s respective intranets for all staff to see. Regular emails are circulated internally within the Ministry to remind staff of their responsibilities, including to update the Register, while the NZDF reminds staff through such channels as “Routine Orders” [13, 14]. Overall, the MoD, NZDF, and MPs are not technically directed by lobbying legislation but they are required to adhere to a number of ethical and best practice rules which undergo annual audits.

This indicator is scored Not Applicable as there is no legislation regulating defence lobbying.

The country has no framework for regulating lobbying activity that covers defence institutions.

The country has no framework for regulating lobbying activity that covers defence institutions. Therefore, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

Nigeria has no framework for regulating lobbying activity.

In October 2016 the Nigerian Senate approved the second reading of the Lobbying Disclosure Act Amendment Bill 2016 which seeks to introduce a register for the lobbying organisations, it requires lobbyists to disclose their sources of income and expenditure, introduce a code of conduct, establish oversight institutions and create a clearer legal framework (1). The proposal is currently before the Committee on Judiciary, Human Rights and Legal Matters.

Nigeria has no framework for regulating lobbying activity. Therefore, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

The country framework for regulating lobbying activity is the Law on Lobbying dating back to 2008 [1]. This Law defines the basic categories in the lobbying process, the principles of lobbying, conditions, required registration processes, rights and duties of the lobbyists as well as the oversight of the lobbying. The Law applies to the executive, legislature and local governing bodies. However, the Law does not provide proper guidance for implementation and enforcement, including the defence sector.

There is no requirement for defence officials to publish a record of lobbying meetings. However, they do publish a list of personnel assets for the Ministers and the Vice-Minister of the Ministry of Defence [1] as well as publishing top officials’ salaries from both Ministry of Defence and the Army [2].

The registration system for lobbyists is led by the General Secretary of the Parliament and remains public, according to Article 10 of the Law on Lobbying. [1]. Article 11 prescribes that basic the data of the lobbyists are logged (including name, identification number, address). Public officials do not have to confirm whether the lobbyist has been entered into the register of lobbyists before meeting with them.

The State Anti-Corruption Commission is the overseeing body (Article 24). It has a clear mandate but is under-resourced. The work of the Commission stalled as its members resigned due to issues of impartiality and excessive spending of the Commission [1]. With the adoption of the new Law of preventing corruption and conflict of interest [2] the State Commission for Corruption Prevention was reestablished in February 2019, its members were elected in a transparent public procedure and both its independence was strengthened. The 2019 EU Commission Report on North Macedonia notes strengthened legal framework in the fight against corruption and proactive steps taken by the new commission. [3]

Norway does not have any framework for regulating lobbying activity. This applies also to the defence sector [1]. A reference to lobbying activity may be found in the Defence Acquisition Regulation (ARF), which is an internal instruction for the Ministry of Defence and its agencies. The document stipulates that the procuring authority shall provide contractors, at the request for tender, with the guidelines on prudence, non-disclosure and conflict of interest. The guidelines specify that “the name of any lobbyist acting on behalf of the supplier must be reported to the Defence sector. If a supplier fails to act with openness and strict adherence to good business practices and high ethical standards, this may undermine trust in the relationship between the supplier and the defence sector, and potentially also the rating of the supplier’s bid in the final decision process” [2].

Given that there is no regulation of lobbying in the defence sector [1], this indicator has been marked as Not Applicable.

Given that there is no regulation of lobbying in the defence sector (1), this indicator has been marked as Not Applicable.

There is no legal framework for lobbying and lobbying groups activities. Oman is a major market for weapons due to its high expenditure on defence and security, with 16.7% of its annual GDP dedicated to the defence budget (1). It is not illegal to have lobbying groups, but there is no need to have them as the purchase is usually done at the political level. No explicit references are made to the lobbying of defence institutions by businesses on the MoD website nor on media outlets (2), (3). However, there are references to international meetings around defence purchases with US Secretary of State and UK officials (4), (5); meetings like these are difficult to separate from weapon procurement given Oman is a major weapons import market (6), (7).

This sub-indicator is marked Not Applicable because as described in sub-indicator 76A, there is no legal framework regulating lobbying in the defence sector.

The country has no framework for regulating lobbying activity.

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable, because the country has no framework for regulating lobbying activity (see Q76A).

Republic Act 1827, An Act to Regulate Lobbying in the Congress of the Philippines and in the Commission on Appointments defines lobbying as the practice of promoting or opposing the introduction or passage of legislation as well as the confirmation of any pending appointment [1]. It ensures coverage of the lobbying community but it is not comprehensive. Broadly speaking, lobbyists are any person of legal age with good moral character, who engages in the practice of lobbying for hire that include any officers, agents, attorneys or employees of any principal who are paid a regular salary. A principal could be any person, corporation, association, and any branch of the government and government-owned/controlled entities [1]. Every lobbyist is required to have his/her name entered on a docket that is kept by the Secretaries of both Houses in Congress or the Secretary of the Commission on Appointments [1].

As the Lobbying Law is poorly implemented, details of interactions by public officials or conflict of interests that have been identified are either not recorded or the information is missing [1]. According to a 2013 policy review research, the majority of lobbyists in the Senate and Congress are not registered but are allowed to participate in the legislative process; further, the record or list of registered lobbyists in the Senate seems to have been lost [2].

A lobbyist must register their name, the business address of their principal and the subject or subjects of legislation or pending appointment to which the employment relates. This is entered into a docket which is held by the Secretaries of both houses or the Secretary of the Commission on Appointments. Such a docket is a public record and open to the inspection of any citizen [1]. However, some exceptions are postulated in the Lobbying Law that makes the statutory language ambiguous. Although no person can practice as a lobbyist unless duly licensed, any person who limits their lobbying solely to ‘appearance’ before either the House of Congress or Commission on Appointments can do so without being licensed as a lobbyist as long as they registers their name on the records [2].

The legislation does not specifically identify an oversight entity. The individuals who control the records and lobbying activities are the Secretaries of the Houses and the Commission on Appointments. As noted in 76B, enforcement of the provisions has been weak as majority of lobbyists participating in legislative process are not registered [1] The absence of clear rules of the Lobbying Law have not curtailed efforts of highly paid lobbyists to influence the decision-making process in both the executive and legislative branches [2]. As such, sanctions that include a fine of between 500 to 20,000 pesos, disbarment for three years, or imprisonment for six months to two years [3]. Two legislative bills (Senate Bill No. 549 and Senate Bill No. 1716) have been proposed to increase sanctions and strengthen oversight. However, both bills are still pending, the latter since 2004 [4, 5].

Poland has a framework for regulating lobbying activity, namely The 2005 Lobbying Act (Journal of Laws of 2005 No. 169, item 1414, as amended). It applies to the defence sector too. The act only covers the lobbying for legislation, both in government and the parliament, when it is done in a professional (commercial) activity. It does not cover actions which aim to influence the other actions, policies, or decisions of public officials. It does not cover non-commercial lobbying, too, such as actions undertaken directly by interests group without commercial intermediaries, e.g. by sectoral chambers or associations of entrepreneurs.
Therefore, the current legal framework does not ensure coverage of the entire lobbying community, nor does it cover all types of activities. In 2017 the government published a bill on the transparency of public life which included a chapter with comprehensive lobbying regulation. However, since the spring of 2018, work on the bill has been stalled.

Public officials in defence institutions are not required to publish or update records of lobbying meetings. Individuals participating in the proceedings are required to make statements on the lack of conflicts of interest. There are various regulations in the Ministry of Defence, such as Decision 145/MON regulating contacts with contractors or conflicts of interest [1], or the Code of Ethics of Inspectorate of Armament’s Employees [2, 3]. However, these regulations do not require people to disclose meetings and conflicts of interests issues publicly. Some requirements to disclose relations causing conflicts of interests (big gifts, sponsored foreign travels, sponsoring of social activities etc.) are in place in an act on the limitation of commercial activities by public officials; however, it concerns only ministers and deputy ministers of defence.

Poland has a mandatory registration system. However, the narrow definition does not cover the activities of many individuals influencing state policy, and thus de facto engaging in lobbying activities. In turn, those who decide to register and officially appear as lobbyists often suffer negative consequences. For example, registered lobbyists can not take part in meetings of Sejm committees, although the members can invite “guests” and “experts.” Many of them are lobbyists conducting their activities legally, while they are not covered by the lobbying act [1, 2, 3, 4].

In practice, the lobbying act is not enforced even though the Ministry of Interior and Public Administration is entitled to oversee lobbying activities within a limited scope [1]. Registries of meetings with lobbyists are not verified. For example, the MoND published mandatory information for 2017 about these meetings, while at the same time declaring that there were no meetings with lobbyists in 2017 [2]. Additionally, the design of regulations encourages lobbyists to circumvent them. Experts, the media and NGOs have been reporting on the necessity to pass a new lobbying law for many years [3, 4, 5].

As of March 2021, there is no regulation of lobby activities, including access to the defence sector [1, 2]. However, Parliament approved three proposals on January 15th, which are likely to fill the gap [3] and apply to the defence sector.

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’, as there is no legislation regulating lobbying in the field of defence and security in Portugal. While existing proposals are now in the process of forcing disclosure [1], the level to which public officials will be obliged to remains, as of March 2021, undetermined.

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’, as Portugal has no legislation regulating lobbying and no lobbyist registration system. While existing proposals will likely result in a registration system of some form [1], its concrete conditions and requirements as of March 2021 remain undetermined.

There is no framework for regulating lobbying activity in Qatar. Research has demonstrated that there is no framework for regulating government lobbying activities at all. Most cases of lobbying in Qatar are civil society lobbying, with some political lobbying cases concerning foreign policy. [1, 2, 3]

This sub-indicator has been marked as Not Applicable, as Qatar does not have legislation that regulates lobbying in the defence sector.

There is no framework for regulating lobbying activity – neither generally nor in the defence sector [1,2]. However, the public, the media [3] and politicians [4] have been discussing the importance of creating one.

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’ because there is no law on lobbying in Russia.

Saudi Arabia has no framework governing lobbying activity of defence institutions. According to our sources, lobbying activities are done through personal connections and not organized bodies (1) (2). Lobbying does not form part of the political structure of the country, which is ruled as an absolute and autocratic monarchy. There is virtually no means for members of the public or groups to influence decision-making in Saudi Arabia concerning any state institution or sector.

As Saudi Arabia has no legislation regulating the defence sector (or any lobbying activities), this sub-indicator is marked as not applicable.

Saudi Arabia has no legislation regulating defence industry lobbying, therefore this sub-indicator is marked as not applicable.

The Law on Lobbying (1) has been in force since August 2018, but there are significant limitations. The law refers only to the influence of general legal acts and does not cover individual decisions. There are no restrictions on the direct influence of interested individuals, etc. Existing lobbying legislation applies to government bodies as a whole (including the defence sector, but not designed explicitly for it).

The Law on Lobbying (1) does not stipulate an obligation for public officials in defence institutions to register contacts with lobbyists.

The Law on Lobbying stipulates a mandatory registration system for lobbyists, however it is not clear whether it allows for public diclosure of a lobbyist’s identity (1). The approach to lobbying, in accordance with the Law, understands a confirmation that a lobbyist is registered and that there is a contract.

The Law on Lobbying (1) stipulates a strict oversight procedure that includes:
a. a mandated and well-resourced oversight entity for oversight of lobbying,
b. a strong verification mechanism,
c. regularly enforceable sanctions for misconduct,
d. sanctions include criminal offences for serious breaches of policies and procedures.

There is no direct legal framework governing lobbying activities in Singapore. Lobbying is indirectly regulated through the Political Donations Act (PDA) which provides for mandatory disclosure of donations and seeks to prevent foreign influence on local politics by prohibiting foreign donations. Summarily, only Singaporean individuals and Singapore-controlled companies are permissible donors as defined by Section 2 of the PDA. The government is also able to keep track of donations made by companies and individuals [1, 2].

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable, as there is no specific legislation for regulating lobbying in defence procurement, although the PDA requires all donations are covered government-wide under the PDA [1, 2]. There is no legislation in Singapore mandating recordkeeping and disclosure of communications with officials of the legislature or the executive. Besides mandatory annual donation reports, there is no compulsory registration or disclosure of lobbyists [3].

This indicator has been marked as Not Applicable, as Singapore does not have legislation that regulates lobbying in the defence sector. The PDA is the closest form of legislation regulating lobbying activities in Singapore, although there is no requirement for public disclosure [1, 2, 3]. There is no legislation in Singapore mandating recordkeeping and disclosure of communications with officials of the legislature or the executive. Besides mandatory annual donation reports, there is no compulsory registration or disclosure of lobbyists [3].

This indicator has been marked as Not Applicable, as Singapore does not have legislation that regulates lobbying in the defence sector. Besides internal audits, the AGO has the mandate to investigate malpractice across the government, and sanction individuals or groups found to have contravened regulations [1]. This includes enforcement of political donations. However, there is no specific legislation governing lobbying in the defence sector.

South Africa has no legislative framework for regulating lobbying activity. Formal ‘lobbying’ as it is recognised elsewhere in the world, is not a prevalent activity in South Africa.

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’ because the country does not have legislation that regulates lobbying in the defence sector.

South Korea has a legal framework that prohibits all types of lobbying, including in the defence sector, under the terms of the Attorney-At-Law Act. Article 111 of the Attorney-At-Law Act prohibits people from soliciting or providing benefits to officers related to his or her work, which makes third-party lobbying illegal. [1]_x000D_
_x000D_

This indicator is marked Not Applicable because lobbying in South Korea is completely prohibited. [1] [2] [3] [4]

This indicator is marked Not Applicable because lobbying in South Korea is legally prohibited. [1] [2]

This indicator is marked Not Applicable because lobbying in South Korea is illegal. [1]

There is no legal framework to regulate lobbying in the defence sector, as per the SPLA Act 2009 and the Civil Service Act 2011. [1] [2]

This indicator has been marked ‘Not Applicable’ as there is no legal framework to regulate lobbying in the defence sector, as per the SPLA Act 2009 and the Civil Service Act 2011. [1] [2]

Spain does not have a specific regulation for lobbying, and while several legislative initiatives have taken place in the last few decades, they proved fruitless. The last opportunity to include lobby regulations in Spain occurred when Law 19/2013 about transparency (LTBG) was processed. Article 6 of this Law [1] introduced the principle of active publicity that could be related to lobbyists’ activities. However, it was only in 2017 when a proposal of a law against corruption and to protect accusers was presented by a parliamentarian group [2]. It was followed by a Proposal to reform the Spanish congressional regulations to create lobbyist register in 2016 [3] and 2018 [4].

The last few years of political instability around the general elections and two terms in one year created an obstacle to the processing of the proposals of laws, such as the one for lobby regulation, which has finally been included in the governmental agreement between the two parties that form the current Spanish government (PSOE and Unidas Podemos) [5]. The only related existing, but indirect, regulation of lobbying is the Agreement of the Board of the Congress of Deputies, of 28 February 2019, by which the Code of Conduct of the Deputies was approved [6] to include meetings with lobbyists with members of the parliament, and a voluntary register of lobbyists of the National Commission for Markets and Competition (CNMC) [7].

As outlined in 76A, there is no legislation to regulate lobbying in the field of defence and security in Spain. Public officials in defence institutions are not required to publish any information related to lobbying. As such, this indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’.

As outlined in 76A, there is no legislation to regulate lobbying in the field of defence and security in Spain and therefore there is no system for registration. As such, this indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’.

As outlined in 76A, there is no legislation to regulate lobbying in the field of defence and security in Spain. As such, this indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’.

No evidence could be found that Sudan has a framework for regulating lobbying activity. However, Sudanese defence actors themselves are known to hire lobbyists to improve perceptions of the government, especially internationally. The Bashir regime hired a Washington lobbyist firm in 2017 in a bid to persuade the U.S. government to remove it from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, and the RSF Commander hired a Canadian lobbyist firm in 2019 [1,2].

This indicator is marked Not Applicable as there is no legislation regulating lobbying in the field of defence/security in Sudan. No evidence could be found that Sudan has a framework for regulating lobbying activity, including any requirement for public officials in defence institutions to publish records of lobbying meetings or publish any conflict of interest risks that have been identified. However, Sudanese defence actors themselves are known to hire lobbyists to improve perceptions of the government, especially internationally. The Bashir regime hired a Washington lobbyist firm in 2017 in a bid to persuade the U.S. government to remove it from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, and the RSF Commander hired a Canadian lobbyist firm in 2019 [1,2].

This indicator is marked Not Applicable as Sudan has no legislation regulating lobbying and no lobbyist registration system. No evidence could be found that Sudan has a framework for regulating lobbying activity, including any registration system for lobbyists. However, Sudanese defence actors themselves are known to hire lobbyists to improve perceptions of the government, especially internationally. The Bashir regime hired a Washington lobbyist firm in 2017 in a bid to persuade the U.S. government to remove it from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, and the RSF Commander hired a Canadian lobbyist firm in 2019 [1,2].

This indicator is marked Not Applicable as there is no legislation regulating lobbying of defence institutions in Sudan. No evidence could be found that Sudan has a framework for regulating lobbying activity, so there is no oversight or enforcement of any lobbying laws. However, Sudanese defence actors themselves are known to hire lobbyists to improve perceptions of the government, especially internationally. The Bashir regime hired a Washington lobbyist firm in 2017 in a bid to persuade the U.S. government to remove it from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, and the RSF Commander hired a Canadian lobbyist firm in 2019 [1,2].

The country has no framework for regulating lobbying activity. Companies can freely join defence industry associations such as the Swedish Security and Defence Industry Association (SOFF) [1] who may speak on their behalf and ‘promote the common interests of the … industry’ when organising regular meetings with decision makers and ministers in the defence and security area. The media [2], representatives from the political opposition [3], and scholars [4] have all heavily criticised not only the lack of regulation of lobbying in Sweden, but also the seeming unwillingness among politicians to develop this policy area by e.g. formulating parliamentary motions or appointing policy development commissions . Moreover, as also mentioned in Q37, no post-separation employment rules such as a formal ‘period of restraint’ for public officials are in place in the defence sector, enabling high-level civil servants to become key lobbyists in the defence industry [5].

Since Sweden has no framework for regulating lobbying activity [1] [2] [3], this indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’.

Switzerland does not have a federal lobbying regulation or similar regulation covering lobbying footprints (such as a mandatory register, disclosure obligations or rules on lobbying activities) [1]. There are no obligations on political parties to disclose donations or campaign finance information, where represented in the federal parliament or by committees in view of a federal referendum [2]. However, there is an initiative pending on the national level (“Transparenzinitiative” or “Transparency Initiative”) that aims at more transparency in Parliament and wants to require MPs to declare certain financial incomes and stop anonymity for donations above a certain amount [2]. There are rules on a cantonal level in three cantons (Geneva, Neuchâtel and Ticino) and some additional cantons such laws are in preparation [1]. Cantonal rules; however, have to be considered of only limited value for regulating lobbying in the defence sector.

Switzerland does not have legislation regulating the lobbying of defence institutions; as such, this indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’. There is no evidence for public records of lobbying meetings or interaction with lobbyists for defence officials could be found. Officials are bound by the code of conduct for federal employees if they work for the Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport (DDPS) [1]. The largely conscription-based system creates potential conflicts of interest. In 2017 producers of fighter jets were present at the biggest air show in Switzerland and sent out invitations at least to members of parliament working in relevant committees [2]. In 2019, newspaper reports uncovered that a pilot and high ranking officer was allegedly hired by Saab to lobby for the Gripen fighter jet Switzerland was considering buying. The officer was released of his duties as spokesperson of the “Patrouille Suisse” but remained at the DDPS in his role as Head of Special Staff Communication (Chef Fachstab Kommunikation) [3].

Switzerland does not have legislation regulating lobbying of defence institutions; as such, this indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’. However, Article 11 of ParlA requires assembly members when “assuming office and at the start of every year” to disclose potential conflicts of interest by declaring professional activities, business undertakings, activities as consultants, management or consultancy activities on behalf of interest groups and participation in “committees or other organs of the confederation” [1]. The Parliamentary Services maintain a register with that information [1, 2]. Lobbyists have two options for accessing the Federal Assembly directly: Either with a day pass or with a “permanent badge” (“Permanenter Ausweis”). Each member of the Federal Assembly can issue two of those badges [3]. There is currently no public register or accreditation process for those lobbyists beyond the checks done for issuing access badges. However, the creation of an accreditation process is currently in discussions triggered by a parliamentarian initiative [3, 4].

In the absence of a legal framework addressing lobbying, there is no oversight entity with an oversight mandate [1] [2]. As such, this indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’.

In Taiwan, the Lobbying Act is designed to regulate lobbying activity in the public sectors, including the MND and the military [1, 2]. The Lobbying Act has been in place in Taiwan for more than ten years [1, 2, 3].

Besides, Article 11 and 12 of the “Ethics Guidelines for Military Personnel”, “Regulations for the Executive Yuan and Sub-ordinate Agencies Entreating or Lobbying Registration and Investigation”, and Article 16 of the “Government Procurement Act” regulate the registration and investigation on entreating and lobbying. The Ethics Office of the MND reports the registration of entreating or lobbying in the “Reporting Meeting of Ethics” regularly. [6,7,8,9].

However, the framework for regulating lobbying activity orchestrated by the Lobbying Act is not regarded as comprehensive and does not cover all types of lobbying activities. Studies suggest that Taiwan should overhaul its legal framework for lobbying to correct current drawbacks. These include the over-regulation of lobbyists, the lack of a clear definition of who should be lobbied, the fact that government institutions have the power to deny lobbying, and the complexity of records which may make other approaches more attractive than lobbying [4, 5].

The MND has devised a scheme to implement the Lobbying Act by assigning specific officials to be in charge of lobbying projects and by disclosing “registered” lobbying cases within the public domain [1, 2]. Military officers and civilian officials in defence institutions are required to regularly publish and update records of lobbying meetings as required by the MND [1, 2].

In addition, the Ethics Office of the MND reports the records of entreating or lobbying in the “Reporting Meeting of Ethics” regularly. [4]

Only superficial information is disclosed and no significant lobbying projects had been identified when this report was written [3]. However, without specifying all the details or frequency of interactions with lobbyists, current systems are not regarded as effective [3].

The lobbyist registration system in Taiwan is complex and awkward, which deters potential lobbyists or lobbying groups from adapting “formal” and official mechanisms of persuasion under the Lobbying Act. Critics have urged the government to devise a less complex but more attractive lobbyist registration system [1, 2, 3]. Current lobbyist registration system in Taiwan’s defence sector and Military is well illustrated by the MND which include details of lobbying targets, interactions between MND personnel & lobbyists (time, frequency, venue, & location) [4]. It is not clear whether further details e.g. re financial details are included.
Before performing lobbying activities, lobbyist shall file registration with the lobbied government agency, which is checked by a designated unit.
Before commencing oral lobbying (during the approved lobbying period) the lobbyist sets out the lobbying timeline and location with the relevant government agency.
For face-to-face lobbying, the lobbyist shall present his (or her) personal ID card before lobbying processes at the designated time and location. The lobbying representatives who are commissioned by the legal person or organization shall submit the delegation letter.
The lobbied party or his (or her) designated person may reject lobbying when the lobbyist does not follow the the laid out rules. [5]

Oversight of Taiwan’s current Lobbying Act is currently under the authority of the Ministry of Interior, but is ineffective and with limited resources [1, 2]. Sanctions are weak with only minor financial penalties for violations or misconduct of lobbyists or of persons to be lobbied [3, 4].

There are 48 judgments about the breach of the “Lobbying Act” and none is related to the MND, as reported in the “Law and Regulations Retrieving System” [5]

No evidence of legislation in Tanzania to govern lobbying could be found in the public domain. [1]

This indicator is scored ‘Not Applicable’. There is no evidence of legislation in Tanzania that governs lobbying. [1]

Currently, Thailand does not have any formal legislation concerning lobbying [1]. The closest code of conduct would be the Regulations of the Ministry of Defence on Political Manners of Civil Servants 1956, Section 8(10), and the Civil Service Act, B.E. 2551 (2008), Section 82, which require state officials to be politically impartial in the performance of official duties and in other undertakings that involve the public; in other words, they are not allowed to perform or be involved in lobbying activities [2,3].

Thailand does not have any formal legislation concerning lobbying at the time of research [1]. As such, this indictor is marked ‘Not Applicable’.

According to our sources, there are no regulations or laws that regulate the work of lobbying organisations or lobbyists in Tunis. This is because of the very limited purchases of defence expenditure in the country and the limited need for a large number of defence items(1,2,3).

This indicator is marked Not Applicable, as there are no laws that regulate lobbying defence institutions, and so there is no public information published on the issue.

Interviewees 2 and 3 suggested that there is no lobbying tradition or any mechanisms/entities fulfilling this service in Turkey as it they do in the US. There is therefore no legal framework regulating lobbying activities in the defence/security sector [1,2]. Please note that all these foreign defence firms have representatives operating as consultancy firms in Turkey. The SSB, state-owned defence industry firms, such as MKEK, and private Turkish defence industry exporters have national and regional representatives operating in the exporting country as consultancy firms/agencies. Interviewee 6 suggested that these firms/agencies are providing their consultancy services and receive commission, bill and tax accordingly [3].

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’ because, as established in 76A, there is neither law nor regulation regulating lobbying in the field of defence and security in Turkey.

There is no law on lobbying. It is important to note that lobbying is widespread amongst the people who always get deals within the defence ministry/ sector. [1, 2].

This indicator is marked Not Applicable as there is no legislation regulating lobbying in Uganda that is also applicable to the field of defence/security[1, 2].

Ukraine failed to develop and to approve legislation on lobbying and the country does not regulate these kinds of activities. Several expert institutions in defence and speakers have openly addressed the government with evidence of illegal lobbying in the defence sector, manipulations and proposals to overcome these risks [6]. There were several attempts to introduce corresponding regulation by MPs [1, 2]. The Ministry of Justice set up a working group to develop the draft Law of Ukraine “On Lobbying” [3] and there are even private companies that are de facto conducting lobbying [4, 5]. However, the lobbying activities remain unregulated as of April 2018.

This indicator is marked Not Applicable given that lobbying is not regulated in Ukraine, and there is no requirement to disclose lobbyist meetings at all. At the same time, public officials are obliged by the Law Of Ukraine “On Prevention of Corruption” to prevent conflict of interest, to report it and not to take actions and not to make decisions in conditions of conflict of interests [1].

This indicator is marked Not Applicable given that Ukraine has neither has a legal framework for lobbying, nor any mandatory or voluntary registration system for lobbyists. Lobbyist organizations do not publish information on their own initiative [1].

This indicator is marked Not Applicable given that there is no legal framework regulating lobbyist activities and there is also no oversight entity in place authorised to oversee lobbyist organizations. At the same time, several expert institutions in the defence sphere and speakers provided the government with evidence of illegal lobbying in defence sector [1]. Moreover, in the new Anticorruption Strategy approved by the Cabinet of Ministers and transferred to the VRU, there is an attempt at lobby regulation according to the GRECO recommendations. There were strong discussions among MPs about the issue in of April 2018 [2].

The UAE does not have a legal framework for regulating lobbying activity concerning the defence sector. It has become clear throughout this assessment, that the UAE does not make any of its military laws publicly available. The defence sector is exempt from most federal government laws and regulations and is expected to have its own. Defence matters, as previously explained, are mostly dealt with confidentiality and secrecy. Research has revealed that the defence sector is exempt from the federal procurement regulations, and has its own regulations (1). These regulations which apply to the defence are mainly Federal Laws No. 6 and 7 of 2004, which specifically apply to the armed forces, clearly define bribery, and prohibit corruption within the defence sector (2), (3), (4). It is important to note that that UAE does not have any lobbying legislation, let alone one that applies to the defence (5), (6), (7). According to our sources, many lobbying activities are being conducted in the country at political, i.e. diplomatic/Embassy levels. Many weapon exporter countries try to get contracts with the UAE (8), (9).

This sub-indicator has been marked as Not Applicable, as the UAE does not have legislation that regulates lobbying in the defence sector (1).

The Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Act 2014 regulates lobbying activities, including within the defence sector [1]. However, the scope of the law is very limited with respect to the lobbyists and the lobbied, and the information lobbyists are required to disclose is very limited. There is also a lack of clarity over what constitutes contact [2]. Generally, it is also worth noting that studies have shown that the UK’s framework is quite weak in terms of lobbying regulations, when compared to other countries [3]. Lobbyists don’t need to disclose personal identities or the issue or bill they are lobbying on, gift giving is not prohibited nor are political contributions from lobbying companies and there is no requirement of a cooling off period for former legislators [3].

UK Government departments, including the Ministry of Defence, are required by the Ministerial Code to publish the details of Ministers’ meetings with external organisations quarterly [1]. This should cover all external meetings Ministers have whilst on official business. It does not include meetings Ministers have in their capacity as a member of a political party. Data for the Ministry of Defence show that this is for the most part implemented in practice, although, at the time of research (February 2020), the latest data on ministerial meetings covered the period until September 2019 [2]. The details of Ministers’ interactions only consist of stating the purpose of the meeting. The list of ministers’ interests is openly published [3]. Research has not identified public details of meetings and interests that apply to public officials in defence institutions beyond the Minister level [2, 3].

However, it is worth noting that the answer to this question very much depends on the interpretation of the term public officials. The OECD uses a wide definition: ‘[t]hese include people who hold a legislative, administrative or judicial office (either appointed or elected); any person exercising a public function, including for a public agency or a public enterprises (e.g. a state owned enterprise); any official or agent of a public international organisation’ [4]. Using the OECD definition the legislation does not apply to the majority of the legislature or any administrative officials beyond the permanent secretary. This is a risk in the context of defence procurement particularly.

It is also worth noting that criticisms have been expressed in relation to the definition of possible lobbying targets, according to the Lobbying Act: ‘[t]his is a wholly inadequate definition and there has been widespread criticism of this narrow remit. It does not apply to the lobbying of MPs or local councillors, the staff of regulatory bodies, private companies providing public services, or any but the most senior members of the civil service. The Lobbying Act therefore omits to regulate a large swathe of lobbying activity which targets other stages of the policy-making process or different types of decisions. Graham Allen MP, Chair of the Political and Constitutional Affairs Select Committee, suggested that this reflected an unrealistic view of policy making, arguing that: [p]eople who lobby the civil service do not go to the Permanent Secretary but talk to the desk officer or the director general. Those people are out with the concept of the Bill’ [5].

Part 1 of the Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Act 2014 makes an offence of consultant lobbying without prior registration, with some exceptions for specific circumstances, and in addition creates a “Registrar of Consultant Lobbyists” [1]. Section 1 states that “A person must not carry on the business of consultant lobbying unless the person is entered in the register of consultant lobbyists.” [1]. The registration system requires lobbyists to provide details about their identity, clients and code of conduct, however no information about issue areas, targets, activities and financial information is provided [2].

It is also worth mentioning the various flaws regarding the UK’s lobbyist registration system. For example, registration is mandatory if one is considered a lobbyist within the narrow legal framework. But, as TI states: ‘[m]any individuals and organisations that engage in lobbying activity do clearly not fall under its remit, including in-house lobbyists, NGOs, industry associations, trade unions and, potentially, professional service firms such as lawyers and management consultants. The APPC has estimated that its scope covers only around 1 per cent of those who engage in lobbying activity’ [3]. It is also worth noting that all lobbyists have to do is disclose a quarterly list of clients and excludes in-house lobbyists, which accounts for up to 85% of lobbying. The register also excludes many different types of engagement with government officials from registration (e.g. communication with special advisors and civil servants) [4].

There are two things to address here: the enforcement of the Ministerial code by the Cabinet Office Proprietary and Ethics team (and ultimately the PM), and the enforcement of the Transparency of Lobbying, Non-party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Act by the Lobbying Registrar (currently Harry Rich).

This fragmentation means that there is not a single organisation with strong and clear mandate for enforcement. Compliance with the Ministerial Code is overseen by the Propriety and Ethics Team in the Cabinet Office [1]. However, research was not able to identify any relevant information on its mandate and activities [1]. The Ministers interests are scrutinised by the Independent Adviser on Minister’s Interests [2]. All that the Ministerial Code says, regarding meetings with external organisations, is: ‘[m]inisters meet many people and organisations and consider a wide range of views as part of the formulation of Government policy. Meetings on official business should normally be arranged through Ministers’ departments. A private secretary or official should be present for all discussions relating to Government business. If a Minister meets an external organisation or individual and finds themselves discussing official business without an official present – for example at a social occasion or on holiday – any significant content should be passed back to the department as soon as possible after the event. Departments will publish quarterly, details of Ministers’ external meetings. Meetings with newspaper and other media proprietors, editors and senior executives will be published on a quarterly basis regardless of the purpose of the meeting’ [3].

The Lobbying Registrar has weak enforcement powers. The maximum penalty it can issue for non-compliance is a fine of £7500. Data shows it has issued 57 statutory notices since Jan 2016 – an average of 11 per year – with total financial penalties of £17000 – an average of £300 per infringement [4]. Its investigations are brief and limited, and they appear to be little more than email correspondence [5]. This is not surprising given the registrar’s annual budget of £144,000 – with staffing and shared services costs provided by the Cabinet Office – and staff count of 2 [6].

The Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) of 1995 regulates lobbying activity in the US [1] and enshrines the right to petition the government [2]. It applies to the whole government. The LDA was amended in 2007 with the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act (HLOGA) [2]. The HLOGA refined registration thresholds and definitions of activities as defined in the LDA [3].

Three main concerns remain around lobbying and disclosure, specifically regarding shadow lobbying, grassroots lobbying and the revolving door, which undermine the effectiveness of the current legislation [3]. There are also 24 exceptions to the LDS that permit lobbying-related activity to an agency under certain circumstances, which provides a loophole for lobbyists [4].

It does not seem that public officials in defence institutions or public officials in general, such as members of Congress, have to publish details on lobbying contacts. The only record of lobbying is the lobby register, as discussed in 76C. Given that the requirement to register as per the LDA falls on the lobbyist and not the government official, there is no requirement for officials to check whether a lobbyist is registered prior to meeting them [1].

According to the US Code, Title 2 § 1603, a lobbyist or the lobby organisation must be registered with the Secretary of the Senate and/or the Clerk of House of Representatives within 45 days after making a lobbying contact [1]. Once a lobbying relationship has been established, registered lobbyists must file a quarterly report on their lobbying activities. Under the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, lobbyists are required to file two forms, which are then released online. The forms include the lobbyist’s identity, the lobbyist’s former government position if applicable, the issues on which they lobby and financial details [2,3]. If a lobbyist has multiple clients, this should also be registered. Given that lobbyists can register up to 45 days after a contact is made, public officials are not required to confirm that the lobbyist is registered before meeting.

The Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) is enforced by the Secretary of the Senate and/or the Clerk of the House of Representatives, who can refer cases to the US Attorney Office. The Secretary of the Senate has referred a cumulative total of 22,158 cases of potential non-compliance to the Attorney, for example [1,2]. The first criminal violation of the LDA was prosecuted in June 2020 against a lobbyist who failed to register [3]. Beyond the US Attorney, there is no specific oversight body that enforces the LDA and lobby registration system.

Venezuela has no legislation regulating lobbying activity, and there are no draft laws seeking to introduce regulations for lobbying [1]. Within the current political crisis in Venezuela, a judicial order has sought to override the legislative branch and resources have not been granted for the operation of the National Assembly (AN). Given this context, legislation and citizen participation are being hampered as a result of the political emergency.

Prior to the overriding of the AN, the previous legislature (2011–2016) operated without lobbying regulations, indicating a high level of opacity in the functioning of the AN [2]. In terms of defence, the previous legislature’s control of the governing party hindered the participation of different civil society sectors. Even in the face of criticism of reforms to FANB laws, the AN disallowed the opening up of debate to critical sectors [3, 4].

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’. Venezuela has no legislation regulating lobbying activity, and there are no draft laws seeking to introduce regulations for lobbying [1]. As such, there are no regulations requiring or promoting the registration of lobbying meetings [2].

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’. Venezuela has no legislation regulating lobbying activity, and there are no draft laws seeking to introduce regulations for lobbying [1]. As such, there are no regulations that oblige or promote the registration of lobbyists [2].

This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’. Venezuela has no legislation regulating lobbying activity, and there are no draft laws seeking to introduce regulations for lobbying [1, 2].

The country has no framework for regulating lobbying activity [1, 2, 3].

This indicator is marked “Not Applicable,” as the country has no framework for regulating lobbying activity [1, 2, 3].

Select custom	Country	76a. Legal framework	76b. Disclosure: Public officials	76c. Lobbyist registration system	76d. Oversight & enforcement
Select	Albania	0 / 100	NA	NA	NA
Select	Algeria	0 / 100	NA	NA	NA
Select	Angola	0 / 100	NA	NA	NA
Select	Argentina	25 / 100	NA	NA	NA
Select	Armenia	0 / 100	NA	NA	NA
Select	Australia	50 / 100	0 / 100	50 / 100	0 / 100
Select	Azerbaijan	0 / 100	NA	NA	NA
Select	Bahrain	0 / 100	NA	NA	NA
Select	Bangladesh	50 / 100	0 / 100	0 / 100	NEI
Select	Belgium	50 / 100	50 / 100	50 / 100	NEI
Select	Bosnia and Herzegovina	0 / 100	NA	NA	NA
Select	Botswana	0 / 100	NA	NA	NA
Select	Brazil	0 / 100	NA	NA	NA
Select	Burkina Faso	0 / 100	NA	NA	NA
Select	Cameroon	0 / 100	NA	NA	NA
Select	Canada	100 / 100	100 / 100	50 / 100	75 / 100
Select	Chile	100 / 100	50 / 100	25 / 100	50 / 100
Select	China	0 / 100	NA	NA	NA
Select	Colombia	0 / 100	NA	NA	NA
Select	Cote d'Ivoire	0 / 100	NA	NA	NA
Select	Denmark	0 / 100	NA	NA	NA
Select	Egypt	0 / 100	NA	NA	NA
Select	Estonia	0 / 100	NA	NA	NA
Select	Finland	0 / 100	NA	NA	NA
Select	France	50 / 100	25 / 100	50 / 100	50 / 100
Select	Germany	0 / 100	NA	NA	NA
Select	Ghana	0 / 100	NA	NA	NA
Select	Greece	0 / 100	NA	NA	NA
Select	Hungary	0 / 100	NA	NA	NA
Select	India	0 / 100	NA	NA	NA
Select	Indonesia	0 / 100	NA	NA	NA
Select	Iran	0 / 100	NA	NA	NA
Select	Iraq	0 / 100	NA	NA	NA
Select	Israel	50 / 100	25 / 100	75 / 100	25 / 100
Select	Italy	0 / 100	NA	NA	NA
Select	Japan	0 / 100	NA	NA	NA
Select	Jordan	0 / 100	NA	NA	NA
Select	Kenya	0 / 100	NA	NA	NA
Select	Kosovo	0 / 100	NA	NA	NA
Select	Kuwait	0 / 100	NA	NA	NA
Select	Latvia	0 / 100	NA	NA	NA
Select	Lebanon	0 / 100	NA	NA	NA
Select	Lithuania	50 / 100	25 / 100	50 / 100	25 / 100
Select	Malaysia	0 / 100	NA	NA	NA
Select	Mali	0 / 100	NA	NA	NA
Select	Mexico	0 / 100	NA	NA	NA
Select	Montenegro	75 / 100	75 / 100	75 / 100	25 / 100
Select	Morocco	0 / 100	NA	NA	NA
Select	Myanmar	0 / 100	NA	NA	NA
Select	Netherlands	25 / 100	25 / 100	25 / 100	0 / 100
Select	New Zealand	0 / 100	NA	NA	NA
Select	Niger	0 / 100	NA	NA	NA
Select	Nigeria	0 / 100	NA	NA	NA
Select	North Macedonia	75 / 100	25 / 100	25 / 100	50 / 100
Select	Norway	0 / 100	NA	NA	NA
Select	Oman	0 / 100	NA	NA	NA
Select	Palestine	0 / 100	NA	NA	NA
Select	Philippines	50 / 100	0 / 100	50 / 100	0 / 100
Select	Poland	25 / 100	25 / 100	50 / 100	0 / 100
Select	Portugal	0 / 100	NA	NA	NA
Select	Qatar	0 / 100	NA	NA	NA
Select	Russia	0 / 100	NA	NA	NA
Select	Saudi Arabia	0 / 100	NA	NA	NA
Select	Serbia	50 / 100	0 / 100	50 / 100	100 / 100
Select	Singapore	0 / 100	NA	NA	NA
Select	South Africa	0 / 100	NA	NA	NA
Select	South Korea	100 / 100	NA	NA	NA
Select	South Sudan	0 / 100	NA	NA	NA
Select	Spain	0 / 100	NA	NA	NA
Select	Sudan	0 / 100	NA	NA	NA
Select	Sweden	0 / 100	NA	NA	NA
Select	Switzerland	0 / 100	NA	NA	NA
Select	Taiwan	50 / 100	50 / 100	75 / 100	50 / 100
Select	Tanzania	0 / 100	NA	NA	NA
Select	Thailand	0 / 100	NA	NA	NA
Select	Tunisia	0 / 100	NA	NA	NA
Select	Turkey	0 / 100	NA	NA	NA
Select	Uganda	0 / 100	NA	NA	NA
Select	Ukraine	0 / 100	NA	NA	NA
Select	United Arab Emirates	0 / 100	NA	NA	NA
Select	United Kingdom	25 / 100	25 / 100	50 / 100	25 / 100
Select	United States	75 / 100	0 / 100	75 / 100	75 / 100
Select	Venezuela	0 / 100	NA	NA	NA
Select	Zimbabwe	0 / 100	NA	NA	NA