Q37.

Is special attention paid to the selection, time in post, and oversight of personnel in sensitive positions, including officials and personnel in defence procurement, contracting, financial management, and commercial management?

37a. Coverage of sensitive (higher-risk) positions

Score

SCORE: 0/100

Assessor Explanation

Assessor Sources

37b. Selection process

Score

SCORE: NA/100

Assessor Explanation

Assessor Sources

37c. Oversight

Score

SCORE: NA/100

Assessor Explanation

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Neither the Anti-Corruption Law (1) nor the Statute of Military Personnel (2) recognizes that certain positions may be more open to corruption opportunities than others. No further information could be found in this regard.

This sub-indicator has been scored Not Applicable because no evidence could be found that sensitive positions have been openly declared. There is no evidence on the Military’s website (1). Also, the Statute of Military Personnel does not stipulate that recruitments have to be open (2). There is a conflict of interest policy written in the Anti-Corruption Law of 2006 (3). However, the BTI notes that the anti-corruption legislation has not been implemented (4).

This sub-indicator has been scored Not Applicable because no evidence could be found in the Anti-Corruption Law (1) or the Statute of Military Personnel (2) that sensitive positions have to be scrutinized. Additionally, no evidence could be found that the parliament (3), (4) oversees the recruitment of these positions.

There is no evidence of any recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption opportunities than others.

There is no evidence of any recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption opportunities than others. Thus, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

The president has broad constitutional powers to appoint and dismiss senior officials of the military, police and intelligence services, and is required only to consult the National Security Council. Under Dos Santos, loyalty to the ruling party and the president were essential and conflict of interest procedures absent.

There is no evidence of any special scrutiny of personnel in sensitive positions, beyond considerations of loyalty to the president and/or ruling party. hus, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

According to an online literature review, evidence shows that no special attention is given to personnel in sensitive positions within the defence sector. The recruitment’s criteria for sensitive positions in the MoD is not publicly available (1), (2), (3). As per Article 52 of the Constitution, the President of Burkina Faso is the suprême Head of the National Armed Forces, and presides the Superior Council of the Defence. The president appoints the Major General Head of State of the Armies. Additionally, in Article 55, the president also appoints officers of the high civil and military administration. The president is given the power appointment these positions from the Constitution (4), (5).

Because there is no evidence that special attention is paid to high-risk positions, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

Because there is no evidence that special attention is paid to high-risk positions, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

Public contracts and procurement fall under the authority of the Ministry of Public Contracts. In 2002, in order to ensure and enhance effectiveness, a circular letter from the Presidency of the Republic moved the award of contracts, which until then had been under the Prime Ministry, to the Ministry of Public Procurement [1]. According to President Biya, the reforms “seeks to step up transparency in the sector, reduce the government procurement timeframe, and ensure more efficient control and the quality of works undertaken by the State and its components’’ [1]. However, this does not apply to defence and security procurement.

According to Interviewee 1, selection to strategic positions is based mainly on personal relationships [1]. However, according to Transparency International (2015), there is no information on whether attention is paid to time in post, and oversight of personnel in sensitive positions, including officials and personnel in defence procurement, contracting, financial management, and commercial management [2]. There has been no evidence of recent change with regard to this.

No evidence has been found to show that there is any internal scrutiny of the appointment or promotion of personnel in sensitive positions in the Ministry of Defence. The President of the Republic is the Commander-in- Chief of the Armed Forces; he makes appointments and transfers, and dismisses high ranking officers of the armed forces and security officers by decree without any oversight from Parliament. For example: “The President of the Republic His Excellency Paul BIYA signed several decrees on 17 February 2016 appointing senior officers to positions in the central, external and territorial command posts in the Ministry of Defence” [1].

Articles 30 and 31 of the Public Procurement Code stipulate that contracts pertaining to defence and security are of a special nature and are therefore not made open to the public. Consequently, there is no oversight body when it comes to defence and security procurement [2].

No evidence was found in the 2009 Public Procurement Code that special attention is paid to personnel tasked with covering sensitive or high-risk positions. The Code also does not contain provisions recognizing that some positions are more prone to corruption than others. Although a public official’s credentials and general qualifications are supposedly part of the criteria for selecting civil service personnel to cover a position involving procurement, contracting, financial and commercial management, no special provisions exist in the Public Procurement Code aimed at mitigating the risk of corruption at certain high-risk posts.

The Public Procurement Code (Code des marchés publics 2009, Decree No. 2009-259) has General Provisions describing the roles played by institutions tasked with public procurement (Articles 12-15), including the roles of civil service personnel. In the chapter dedicated to Persons in charge of procurement (Articles 35-41), the personnel include the contractor (autorité contractante), the client (maître d’ouvrage), the delegate project director (Maître d’ouvrage délégué) and the project manager (Maître d’œuvre). Articles 35-41 describe the roles of such personnel, including their decision-making power and management tasks, but not the criteria for selecting them to cover sensitive, high-risk positions (1). For example, Article 40 of the Public Procurement Code of 2009 describes the competencies and tasks of the project manager (maître d’oeuvre), as well as how he/she should be chosen. However, there is no mention of special attention to sensitive positions (1).
Section 3 of the Public Procurement Code (Autorités signataires et approbatrices), Articles 46 and 47, establishes the hierarchy of signatories to a public procurement project at the Ministry level. Though the Minister and those delegated by the Minister have preeminent rights to sign and authorize a procurement contract, there is no mention of criteria for selecting lower-ranking personnel (1). For example, Article 46, Section 2 states the following:

“Finally, Section 7 of the Public Procurement Code (Marchés de prestations intellectuelles), Article 100 (Modes de Sélection), establishes the criteria for candidates to a public procurement tender, including technical quality, cost and qualifications of the bidding candidate. But there is no provision that spells out the qualifications of the public official tasked with managing such contracts” (1).

The civil servants with autonomy and decision-making power to carry out transactions of public procurement, contracting, financial or commercial management on behalf of a ministry are not subject to special selection criteria.

As in 37A, the 2009 Code of Public Procurement does not recognize that certain ministerial positions are sensitive or especially prone to corruption. Therefore this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

As in 37A, the 2009 Code of Public Procurement does not recognize that certain ministerial positions are sensitive or especially prone to corruption. Therefore this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

There is no internal oversight at the MoD tasked with scrutiny in the appointment and promotion decisions of public officials in sensitive positions. The 2009 Public Procurement Code has established procurement bodies tasked with oversight of public contracts (organes chargés de la passation des marchés) in Section 2. However, the articles in that section are designed to monitor the quality of the bids to public tenders and not with overseeing the selection of public officials tasked with those transactions. For example, Articles 42 and 43 govern the procurement units and ministerial commissions that oversee the public tender process; there is no special scrutiny of personnel in sensitive positions by way of oversight units or commissions.

The government and the executive do not recognize that some posts are more open to corruption activities than others. Indeed, senior officers and senior positions are protected and have full immunity by the leadership (head of the state) who was am army officer too (1), (2), (3). In Egypt, senior officers in sensitive positions because of their seniority, instead of being subject to special attention, are granted very high levels of impunity. For example, Law no. 161 (2018) prohibits investigating any senior officers of the armed forces for any violation committed by them before the Parliament was appointed and during the time the Constitution was suspended except after obtaining the approval of the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) (4), (5). Other than officers in senior positions, officers and personnel in defence procurement, contracting and financial management are subject to very little external oversight so in that sense there is no special attention paid to them. For example, the Tenders Law in Article 77 exempts the MOD and MMP and allows them to conduct procurement through limited or local tenders, limited practices or direct contracting (6). Moreover, Law 147 (1964), exempts all arms contracts from taxes, fees, and most importantly from financial regulation and scrutiny and monitoring by both the CAA and the Ministry of Finance (7). As for internal mechanisms, Interviewee 2 suggested that holding people accountable is more likely to be the result of political considerations or personal feuds rather than genuine efforts to combat corruption (8).

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable because, as noted in 37A, there is no recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption than others. In this regard, this indicator is scored not applicable. Law no. 232 of 1959 sets out the general selection system for armed forces officers (1). Article 12 of the law sets the pools from which the officers are selected and it is normally from military colleges or graduates of civilian colleges who have completed some formal military education. Graduating from a military college guarantees the graduate a career as an officer in the armed forces at least until becoming a colonel (‘aaqid). However, according to the same article, the minister of defence and commander-in-chief have some discretionary authority to appoint others (unspecified in the law) into the service. However, there is no evidence that this has been widely used. Article 16 of the same law sets out the rules for appointing top senior positions, and gives the president of the republic the powers to appoint: a) the commander-in-chief (CIF) of the Armed Forces b) chiefs of staffs c) heads of armies. Positions B and C are proposed by the CIF to the president of the republic. Article 17 of the law sets out the rules for appointments of officers next in seniority. These officers are appointed by the CIF. In both systems, there is significant discretion employed in the recruitment and selection of personnel in sensitive positions, and open recruitment is not the standard operating procedure.

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable because as noted in 37A, there is no recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption than others. In this regard, this indicator is scored not applicable. It is worth noting that, according to our sources, there is neither internal no external oversight or scrutiny over any of the appointments of sensitive positions. The appointments of senior and sensitive positions are based on loyalty and capacity of obedience to the executives (1), (2), (3). External scrutiny of personnel in sensitive positions is severely limited by Article 77 of the Tenders Law which exempts the MOD and MMP and allows them to conduct procurement through limited or local tenders, limited practices or direct contracting (4). Moreover, Law 204 of 1957 amended by Law 147 of 1964 exempts all arms contracts from taxes, fees, and most importantly from financial regulation and scrutiny and monitoring by both the CAA and the Ministry of Finance (5). As for internal scrutiny, the Inspection Authority is entrusted with exercising scrutiny of personnel. However, relevant laws, academic and media reports barely mention the authority. The lack of information shows that the mandate of the Inspection Authority is very unclear. Despite Interviewee 2’s close interaction with defence issues and personnel in Egypt, they were not aware of any cases the authority has brought to the court, which for him meant that its operations are either highly secretive or simply non-existent (6). Interviewee 2 suggested that holding people accountable is more likely to be the result of political considerations or personal feuds rather than genuine efforts to combat corruption (6).

According to the information made publicly available by the MOD through public communications and documentation, no special attention is given to personnel in sensitive positions within the defence sector. The recruitment’s criteria for sensitive positions in the MOD is not made publicly available (1), (2), (3).

Because no special attention is given to personnel in sensitive positions within the defence sector, this score is marked Not Applicable.

Not all positions are openly advertised, and there are significant issues around unaddressed conflicts of interest (1), (2), (3).

According to the constitution, the president, in consultation with the Council of State appoints the senior positions within the defence and security institutions (4). This includes the heads of the intelligence agencies, the Chief of Defence Staff, and the Inspector-General of Police. However, significant discretion is employed in the recruitment and selection of personnel in sensitive positions. The members of the Council of State are also appointed by the president, in consultation with Parliament (5).

Furthermore, the mandate of the Parliamentary Appointments Committee (25 members), which is tasked with accepting or rejecting the nominees of the president in Ghana’s public institutions, doesn’t include personnel in sensitive positions within the defence sector (6), (7), (8). As a consequence, no open policy or procedure is set up to limit the possibility of conflicts of interest for these positions.

Because no special attention is given to personnel in sensitive positions within the defence sector, this score is marked Not Applicable.

If there are internal mechanisms of oversight in the MOD to scrutinise appointments and promotions decisions of personnel in sensitive positions, these are not publicly available. There is no mention on the MOD’s website or in major Ghanaian newspapers over the last two years. There are also no oversight body provisions for appointments in the Armed Forces Recruitment Act, 1962 (1). The Appointment Committee, which is the main external scrutiny institution, has no oversight power over these positions (2), (3), (4).

A report by the Baghdad-based Bayan Centre (1) offers in-depth commentary into the lackadaisical application of military laws. It raises the need “for parliament to consider the adoption of explicit legislation that criminalises proxy appointments”, which weakens the application of military legislation. Similarly, technical suitability of officers due to a patronage-oriented approach to military appointments, including posts sensitive to corruption overriding checks and balances is problematic. The Bayan Centre’s findings (1) reveal that “when a military division commander is Shia, his deputy is often Sunni” which speaks again to an erosion of formal laws. Iraq’s Military Service and Retirement Laws (2) make clear that army candidates must have clean criminal records, which has been overlooked and undermined due to ‘Damj’; a process of amalgamation of militias and federal security personnel into security structures (3). They do not refer to the penalisation of recruiters as far as high-risk posts matter. Currently, Baghdad is working towards reining in rogue militias guilty of war crimes, but the latest phase of protests (October 2019) infiltrated by snipers marks out future challenges(4). A tweet from opposition figure Moqtada al Sadr (5), who in the past commanded rogue militias, recently tweeted “no to secret voting, no to dividing booty, no to sectarian and ethnic quotas, no to old faces, no to foreign hegemony and no to corruption and the corrupt” condemning the corrupt system. To summarize, “Problems within the military in Iraq stem from the failure of commanders to anticipate crises, plan, allocate resources and legislate anti-corruption” (4). Corruption-risks are equally absent from logistical planning, contracting and decision-making.

As noted in 37A, there is no recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption than others. In this regard, this indicator is scored not applicable. Evidence of the existence of procurement terms of appointment within the MoD could not be found. The bureaucratic environment exacerbates reliance of informal selection processes based on political affinity and loyalty [1] — a practice whose rise corresponds with the political ascent of Iraq’s Dawa party. This problem combined with weak legislative checks on procurement appointments, fuels the problem of conformance in relation to contracting. Transparency, predictability and fairness undermine procurement practices, including selection.

As noted in 37A, there is no recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption than others. In this regard, this indicator is scored not applicable. There is no independent parliamentary oversight of procurement personnel, against what the constitution advises.. The political blocs that control of Iraq’s security and defence institutions, which remains pending as ministerial posts remain vacant, determine that staff that preside over financial administration and contractual deals and obligations. While senior and high-ranking defence officials require parliamentary approval, the criteria is opaque as is oversight. “Oversight” an Iraqi lawyer corroborates “is a pertinent challenge in procurement activities” [1]. Bureaucracy often stands in the way of transparency and oversight expectations which, as press coverage reveals, are not always met, whether it’s speed or the complete deliverance of a product or service. The latest BMI report places Iraq 26.2 out of 100 for its bureaucratic environment. Contractual agreements may suffer as a result of complicated bureacratic procedures and ineffeciently upheld laws [2].

The official webpage of the Jordanian Armed Forces includes some general information about the selection criteria for soldiers and officers [1], however, the website includes no information on attention being given to personnel in sensitive positions, such as those related to procurement, recruitment, contracting, financial and commercial management. There is also no evidence of any recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption than others. Nonetheless, all personnel within the defence sector, and that includes the General Intelligence Department, must obtain a security clearance and must not have been convicted with either criminal or civil offences [1, 2]. A document dating to 1999 includes some information on how the Jordanian Armed Forces prevent misadministration [3]. The document states that within the Jordanian Armed Forces some measures such as rotation, in terms of duration and location, for sensitive positions is a technique used to reduce chances of corruption. The rotation includes all units’ committees in the armed forces, including the financial and procurement department [4]. The selection of senior positions reflects the tribal society as well. Senior positions in the armed forces are distributed to keep the balance between tribes and powers within the kingdom [5].

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable because the selection process is not available to the public. The website of the Jordanian Armed Forces specifies the qualifications needed for soldiers and officers to join the army [1]. To join the intelligence directorate, for example, candidates must possess educational qualifications and must pass a security check [2]. However, the selections are based on two combined factors: the tribe and the merits. High ranks officers are selected based on their tribes, but must have a specific technical qualification to keep the professionalism of the armed forces [3,4,5].

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable because, as noted in 37A, there is no recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption than others. In this regard, this indicator is scored not applicable. There is some evidence that internal oversight takes place in relation to the rotation and appointment of personnel in high-risk positions. The oversight begins with the committee of promotions that propose several names and suggestions to the Commander-in-Chief, who selects which applicants will fill senior positions. They are selected in consultation with the Minister of Defence and the King’s office [1,2,3,4,5,6,7].

There is no legislation that shows that the Kuwaiti authorities recognise that more areas, especially sensitive ones like the ones in the arms procurement departments, might be more open to corruption, and there is no set criteria for these posts. Officials and activists say they are usually given to Government loyalists, and the CSC says it is often not given reasons even for civilian personnel hirings. A senior CSC official said that sometimes auditors do not even ask for reasons because they know they will not receive them (1, 2, 3, 4 and 5).

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable because there is no recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption than others. Virtually all sensitive positions are not openly declared and there is no legislation that explains the steps the ministries take to make sure that there is no conflict of interest, but articles 4, 5, 8 and 9 of the law to combat conflict of interest in the Government say that defence and security employees, like other Government employees, should never have a financial conflict interest that could benefit in any way from their work (1). Even the families of these officials cannot run or own a business that might benefit from their connection to the Government. The police law is especially specific about this, saying it would allow officers to run businesses so long as it is on behalf of first, second, third or fourth degree relatives — and the law against the conflict of interest narrows down the fields in which these businesses could be.

Those found guilty would receive a sentence of at least one year in prison, which can go up to five, along with a fine that cannot be less than about 1000 USD, according to article 11. The decision they benefited from is also automatically reneged.

The above process is carried out by public prosecutors.The conflict of interest act was passed in March 2018, so not much can be said about its efficacy at the moment.

There is no clear recruitment process for technical competencies, according to officials and an analyst focused on Kuwait (2, 3, 4).

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable because there is no recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption than others. However, there is an internal process that is carried out by the internal auditors of these institutions, according to state auditors and an analyst focused on Kuwait said (1, 2 and 3).

ACA and SAB officials say selections are made more based on political loyalties and less on merit. The finances of the candidates are superficially examined by internal auditors and often obvious points of conflict of interests are ignored.

The internal process is unreliable because the internal auditors are controlled by and dependent on the very security chiefs they should be investigating.

Attempts, by the ACA and SAB to examine these internal process often fail due to lack of cooperation from the side of the institutions and the political interference of the executive branch described in the answer to Q 25B.

The oversight agencies, along with Parliament, often fail to shame or pressure these organisations into cooperating, because they have the ear of the Emir who can dissolve both the Parliament and the Government, according to articles 107 and 56 of the constitution (5).

First and second-degree posts in the LAF are allocated on a sectarian basis (1). Although competencies are looked for when picking personnel for sensitive posts, sectarian issues play a fundamental role in the selection process (2). LAF Command and DMI consider positions with budgetary, procurement, and financial management prerogatives (such as J4) as sensitive posts (3), (4), (5). Thus, selections are carefully vetted internally (3), (4), (5). LAF Command adopts a “trust but verify” approach to the decisions related to officers in these positions (3), (4).

The sectarian element overrules competencies and is a precondition to an appointment (1). Heads of political parties are continuously involved in the nomination of military personnel to key posts that are allocated to their respective sect (2).

The Military Council is responsible for approving the promotion and appointments of military personnel before sending them to the minister of defence (1). High ranking appointments, such as that of the chief of staff, deputies to the CoS, and members of the Military Council are approved by the CoM in a form of decree based on the proposal of the defence minister (2). Although the CoM has to oversee and approve the appointment of highly sensitive posts, it is done based on political and sectarian considerations (3).

There is strong evidence showing that there is no recognition within the government that certain areas of the armed forces are more at risk of corruption than others. Rather than operating under even stricter conditions, military accountants are typically subject to fewer controls than their counterparts in other state departments.
For example, military accountants, unlike other public sector accountants, are not appointed by or with the agreement of the Minister of Economy and Finance and do not take a professional oath (as is required by the 1996 public accounting act for all other public sector accountants). They are thus not accountable to the Minister of Economy and Finance.²
Another weakness in the military sector is that accounting positions are not divided into principal and secondary accountants, as is the case in all other ministries. Instead, commanders of administrative centres have a dual role with implementation (authorisation of funds) and accounting functions similar to those of principal accountants in the civilian administration.² There is no evidence that the procedures have changed since the SIPRI study identified this weakness in 2006.
The prevalence of nepotism and political bias in public appointments in Mali encourages situations in which key technical decisions are informed by political interests that often contradict formal principles, planned budget objectives and accounting norms.²

Because no special attention is paid to personnel in high-risk positions, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

A defence attaché working in Bamako says that people are generally appointed to the appropriate positions according to their skills and qualifications,⁴ i.e. those with procurement training work in procurement positions. However, as a RAND study from 2017 emphasises “it is challenging to understand systems for promotion, salary payment, career management, and pension absent a developed human resources system”.¹ This assessment was confirmed by a security expert, who said that the human resources department within the armed forces is “very weak”.⁵ According to the source, staff databases are “outdated and incomplete”.⁵ EUTM is helping to introduce a biometric database for all military personnel, but it is not yet functional.
The widespread recruitment through patronage rather than a merit-based system throughout the public sector, including the armed forces, dominates concerns about corruption risks. TI’s report from 2016 notes that such recruitment practices undermine competence levels within the armed forces and contribute to “weaknesses such as patchy or non-existent management systems, frequent lack of basic provisions and delays in the payment of salaries”.² This confirms the findings of the SIPRI study that states that the prevalence of nepotism and political bias in public appointments in Mali encourages situations in which key technical decisions are informed by political interests that often contradict formal principles, planned budget objectives and accounting norms.³

Because no special attention is paid to personnel in high-risk positions, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

The appointment of Ibrahim Dahirou Dembélé as Inspector General of the Army in February 2018 illustrates the lack of external oversight in the selection process for critical defence roles (see Q41 for more information on this case). Dembélé, who was previously Chief of Staff under Captain Sanogo’s junta in 2012, was appointed despite the fact that he had been on probation and awaiting trial since March 2014 in connection with alleged assassinations that took place on Sanogo’s watch.¹ ⁴ ⁵
The appointment was made by the Council of Ministers, which accepted the nomination of the Minister of Defence.⁶ Dembélé was appointed a mere 15 days after a court in Bamako had lifted his probation status.¹ The assessor found no evidence to indicate that the controversial appointment was subject to any external scrutiny or parliamentary discussion despite the nomination being heavily politicised.¹ ⁴ ⁵
Similarly, there is little information available specifically detailing what kind of external scrutiny M’Bemba Moussa Keita was subject to when he was appointed the armed forces new chief of staff in 2017.² ³
Finally, when several officers spoke out against Captain Amadou Sanogo promotion to 4-star General without any clear process of approval or oversight in 2013, they were arrested.⁷

Interviewees argue that there is special attention paid to the selection, time in post, and oversight of personnel in sensitive positions, including officials and personnel in defence procurement, contracting, financial management, and commercial management. However this oversight is internal, non-transparent and subjective. It serves two objectives:
⁃ Prevent senior officers from gaining too much power and challenging the King’s legitimacy and authority, as happened during the 1971 and 1972 military coup attempts.
⁃ Ensure lower ranking officers do not personally benefit from corruption without the approval – and in some cases participation – of higher ranking officials (1)(2).

No evidence was found pointing to the recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption opportunities than others.

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable because, as noted in 37A, there is no recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption than others. Article 49 of the Constitution excludes the nomination of senior military personnel from holding the appointment powers of the Council of Ministers (1).
Article 53 states that « the King is the Supreme Leader of the Armed Royal Forces. He appoints military personnel and can delegate that right » (1).

No evidence of regulations was found in process of recruitment and selection of personnel in sensitive positions by the King or delegates (2). Due to lack of evidence and the lack of control exercised by counter powers over the King’s actions or decisions, it appears that open recruitment is not the standard operating procedure. There is no evidence of conflict of interest policies.

This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable because, as noted in 37A, there is no recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption than others. Interviewees argue that there is special scrutiny of personnel in sensitive positions, including officials and personnel in defence procurement, contracting, financial management, and commercial management. However this oversight is internal, non-transparent and subjective. It serves two objectives:
⁃ Prevent senior officers from gaining too much power and challenging the King’s legitimacy and authority, as happened during the 1971 and 1972 military coup attempts, as well as preventing collusion with the intelligence services of countries such as Algeria.
⁃ Ensure lower rank officers do not personally benefit from corruption without the approval – and in some cases participation – of higher ranking officials (1)(2).

Elements concur to show that there is no transparent and objective scrutiny of personnel in sensitive positions.

The assessor found no evidence of a clearly defined procedure in the military/defence establishment to select personnel covering higher-risk positions. According to conducted interviews, it seems there may be an implicit awareness that some positions are more sensitive than others (1,2).
Although outdated, the ICG Report on Niger from September 2013 (3) characterises the Nigerien Armed Forces (FAN) as favouring the ethnic Djerma population when recruiting. This is attributed to the top of the military hierarchy, according to that report. It also adds that the political connections to FAN by members of the government have been historically ‘clientelist’ in nature:
“Rather than ethnic criteria, it seems that more than anything, personal connections within the army strongly distort the procedure for promotion and provoke imbalances and frustration…As military interference is common in Nigerien politics, politicians have also sometimes managed to establish close clientelistic relationships with officers. Civilian governments must, therefore, take account of the security forces and have learned they sometimes need to form alliances with them…” (3).

No evidence was found regarding a clearly defined procedure in the military/defence establishment to select personnel covering higher-risk positions. Therefore this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

According to the World Bank public expenditure report from 2017 (1), the selection process for personnel in Niger’s security sector revealed that the country lacks a genuine sectoral strategy with clear priorities, among other staffing shortfalls. The report stated:
“Personnel expenditure continued to comprise a large portion of the budget that same year, while funding for operations was reduced. However, the public expenditure report found the accuracy of Niger’s security budgets to be precarious… Numerous supplementary budget laws since 2009 revealed a lack of spending predictability, although this is justified by the deteriorating security situation. Overall, the PER determined Niger lacked a genuine sectoral strategy that sets clear priorities… Among the particular shortcomings of the multiyear sectoral estimates were the failure to include appropriations to compensate increased staffing levels; the absence of a detailed, transparent breakdown of security sector spending; the multiplicity of objectives and lack of forecasting of total costs; and a disconnect between the armed forces’ estimates of their requirements and the formalized sector strategy” (1, p.34).

However, it should be noted that this quote refers to a 2013 World Bank report (p.34, p.59). As of August 2018, no more recent analysis was found by the assessor. It is likely that since 2013, Niger’s management of human resources has improved in the context of growing insecurity and the need to respond to the threat (2). There is also a clear formal framework for the recruitment process that is referred to in detail in question 42. Recent nominations on top management level (January 2018), also quoted in question 41, respond in general to technical competencies required for the positions (3). Therefore, it is difficult to assess with precision the extent to which the recruitment process is followed for technical competencies, especially when it comes to personnel in sensitive positions.

No evidence was found regarding a clearly defined procedure in the military/defence establishment to select personnel covering higher-risk positions. Therefore this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

Niger’s Ministry of Defence lacks an internal oversight body to scrutinise the appointment and promotion of officers. As per the Constitution of 2010, oversight could be qualified as tacit because the president is also the supreme commander of the armed forces. Furthermore, the Superior Council of National Defence can act as an advisory body in the appointment of high-ranking military positions and the promotion of officers.

Article 63 states, “the President of the Republic is the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.” While Article 64 states, “the Superior Council of National Defence advises on the appointment to high-ranking military positions and the promotion of officers, and any other military matter brought before it.”
(Consultant translation French to English)

No evidence shows that the selection process of personnel in sensitive positions, like procurement in the defence and security sectors, receives special attention. Although procurement is a high-risk area, the failure to fully implement the PPA 2007 suggests insufficient attention is paid to protect the selection process for its personnel. The failure to implement the Procurement Council sections of the act does not provide for an independent decision-making process concerning the procurement process. Other priorities, such as a relationship with the ruling party or ethnic background, are important in the selection process (1).

No evidence shows that special attention is paid to personnel in high-risk positions. Therefore this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

No evidence shows that special attention is paid to personnel in high-risk positions. Therefore this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.

There is no recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption opportunities than others when employed in the defence and security sectors. An officer or a senior commander may stay in his position for decades without change (1), (2). There are no details of clear structures within the Ministry of Defence, Royal Police of Oman, or the Royal Armed forces (3), (4), (5). The selection process of the minister responsible for defence affairs and head of the Internal Security Services is not transparent, and names are announced by the sultan through royal decrees, and there is no recognition of changeovers or limited terms of employment due to sensitivities around these jobs (6).

This indicator is marked Not Applicable because there is no recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption opportunities.

There is significant discretion in the recruitment procedure of sensitive positions or conflict of interest policies. The senior positions are filled based on loyalty to the sultan and the tribal connections. These positions are not advertised (1), (2). As discussed above career paths and job positions in the security and defence sectors are not publicly available on institutional websites, neither is the recruitment, selection or final candidates declared (3), (4), (5). Though there is an active job portal on the Ministry of Defence website currently advertising two pilot positions, no further explanation is available about the selection procedures or ranks within the ministry (6).

This indicator is marked Not Applicable because there is no recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption opportunities.

Sensitive positions in defence and security are not recognized externally, thus no special scrutiny system is in place. Scrutiny around procedures of selection, the time in the post, and oversight of personnel in this sector is not posted on institution websites (1). Moreover, the sultan has the sole power to appoint those in the highest ranks (and often those who are at the most at risk of corruption) and announces these appointments through royal decrees, which are then published in state media (2), (3). According to multiple sources, there is no special oversight or scrutiny over the appointments of senior commanders within the armed forces and the MoD (4), (5).

There is no recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption opportunities than others (1). Corruption in appointing personnel in sensitive positions is widespread. Criteria may include being loyal and being from the same region/city, or tribe (2). PA senior positions are based on political affiliation and loyalty to the executive (3).

As noted in 37A, there is no recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption than others. In this regard, this indicator is scored Not Applicable.

Open positions are filled by appointments, not through announced procedures or open competition (1). The standard way this is done is through nepotism and patrimonialism (2). Significant discretion is employed in the recruitment and selection of personnel in sensitive positions (3). Open recruitment is not the standard operating procedure, and conflict of interest policies are absent (4).

As noted in 37A, there is no recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption than others. In this regard, this indicator is scored Not Applicable.

The executive and commanders are usually powerful enough to block scrutiny over the appointment of personnel despite the presence of a law that administers the process (1), (2). Therefore, no oversight or scrutiny should be done by the PLC, SAAB, and ACC, as well as the military-intelligence apparatus (3).

There is no recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption opportunities than others within defence institutions. It is important to note here that, as a tribal country, Qatar’s political system is reliant on the most powerful families and tribes, and for this reason, the majority of senior positions are given to members of the most powerful families. Al-Thani has been the ruling family in Qatar since the 19th century, and members of the al-Thani family are often granted powerful ministerial positions in the country. [1] The al-Attiyah family, who are related to the al-Thani family, have also historically been granted positions within defence and security sectors. Most of these appointments are done through Emiri decrees. In 2016, ministers were shuffled through Emiri decree, making Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al-Thani Foreign Minister, and moving al-Attiyah, who was the Foreign Minister at that time, to the position of Minister of Defence Affairs. There is evidence that the culture of ‘wasta,’ or nepotism and favouritism, is prevalent in Qatar, particularly in relation to attaining positions within the government. [2,3]

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable, because there is no recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption opportunities than others (see Q37A).

Open recruitment is not the standard procedure, and conflict of interest policies are absent. As previously explained, appointments take place through Emiri decrees, and selection for senior positions is often based on family affiliation. [1] There is no evidence of there being a ‘fair’ and transparent process to recruit people within the defence sector. Qatar’s political system relies heavily on granting senior positions to members of the most powerful tribal families. In most cases, such positions within the defence sector are distributed to the most loyal. [2,3]

This indicator has been marked Not Applicable, because there is no recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption opportunities than others (see Q37A).

There seems to be very little, if any, oversight over the selection and appointment of personnel in sensitive positions within the defence sector. [1,2] The defence sector does not go through any type of scrutiny and/or oversight, as it falls under the direct command of the Emir. Senior positions are filled through Emiri decrees and the majority of these posts are granted to members of the most powerful tribes in Qatar. [1,3] There seems to be no special scrutiny of personnel in sensitive positions, and recruitment relies heavily on favouritism, nepotism and connections.

While the government does not make public its selection criteria for military or defence personnel, our sources confirm that authorities do not recognize the corruption risks inherent in certain positions. According to two senior sources, who work closely in the field, senior positions are held by people loyal to the royal family, and members of the royal family and their allies (4), (5). Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s arrest of the head of the Saudi Arabian National Guard in November 2017 on corruption charges appears to show some acknowledgement of the corruption risks evident for high-ranking officials in the defence procurement industry (1). However, there is no indication that any measures were subsequently implemented to insulate such positions from those risks.

According to Gulf security and military strategy expert David Roberts:
“Though it’s difficult to give a broad answer for all the Saudi military branches, the short answer is there is not much evidence that there’s a real prioritisation of a meritocratic rationale for the appointment of military personnel. The lack of evidence does not mean it’s not there, and you typically find a lot more meritocratic appointment in niche organisations like the special forces, etc. But with the general armed forces and air forces, I think there is less of a meritocratic system of appointment” (2). According to another Gulf affairs expert, “special attention is not paid to the selection, time in post, and oversight of personnel in sensitive positions in the defence sector. These considerations do not form part of HR policy” (3).

This sub-indicator is scored Not Applicable as there is no recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption opportunities than others.

According to our sources, there are no open calls for the recruitment of high-ranking positions. Nepotism and neopatrimonialism prevail in the process where allies and members of the royal family and tribes are appointed by royal decree (1), (2). Recruitment decisions for high-ranking or sensitive positions are, on the whole, made unilaterally by King Salman alongside his son, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who has been increasingly centralizing decision-making authority in all government sectors, including defence (3). There has also been an increasing trend by the king and crown prince appointing close allies to senior or sensitive positions, including in the military and security services. This has sometimes involved the appointment or promotion of allies who have relevant experience, for example, the appointment of Major General Ahmed al-Asiri as an advisor to the Office of the Minister of Defence in April 2017 (4). At other times, however, such appointments appear to be made with no consideration of merit or relevant experience. One example is Khaled bin Hussain al-Biyari being named as assistant defence minister in February 2018, Biyari spent his entire career in the telecommunications industry, most recently as CEO of the publicly-traded mobile and internet service provider Saudi Telecom Co (3). In February 2019, the brother of the crown prince, Khalid bin Salman, was reshuffled from his role as ambassador to the US to the deputy defence minister, he previously held roles in the military and Saudi defence sector, ultimately as a senior civilian advisor at the Ministry of Defence (5). Furthermore, other key institutions such as the Ministry of Interior and the Saudi Arabian National Guard have been handed to very young royals who owe their standing to Mohammed bin Salman and are deferent to him (6).

This sub-indicator is scored Not Applicable as there is no recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption opportunities than others.

According to our sources, there is no special scrutiny or oversight for personnel in sensitive positions; such mechanisms do not exist as the appointments are done by royal decree and not through administrative or meritocratic committees (1), (2). The government does not publicize details of the internal workings of its ministries, including that of the defence ministry.
According to an expert on Gulf affairs, “as minister of defence the crown prince, encouraged I believe by the Abu Dhabi crown prince and de facto ruler of the UAE Mohammed Bin Zayed, unilaterally took decisions, including to commence the Yemen war, without engaging the opinions of the military. Equally, with regard to the intelligence services, he has relied on loyal cronies like Saud Al Qahtani rather than the established structures to deliver his diktats. He has also hired retired intel officers from Egypt (reportedly on the suggestion of MBZ) both to advise him and to carry out actions such as the Ritz Carlton shakedown of senior royals and of members of the merchant elite” (3).

According to our sources, there is no formal recognition that some positions are more open than others, but it is known informally that some positions can be more open to corruption such as border control officers (1,2). Through a review of the legislation applicable to the Ministry of Defence personnel, evidence of special attention to personnel in sensitive positions could not be found (3). The Ministry of Defence did not communicate information about this issue on its website (4). Furthermore, media reports on the issue could not be found (5).

This indicator is marked Not Applicable because public recruitment is not the norm for sensitive and senior positions. Therefore the selection of personnel is usually the same in most cases (through promotions and appointments)(1,2). No public recognition that some positions are more vulnerable to corruption than others was found (3,4,5).

This indicator is marked Not Applicable because there is no recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption than others. According to our sources, there is no special scrutiny of personnel in sensitive positions. There are no mechanisms or regulations on this matter either (1,2,3).

As the UAE is a rentier state monarchy, sensitive positions are held by particular people who are loyal. However, there is no restriction on time of service too. Procurement is seen as a sensitive area, and therefore, almost all senior officers and officials in the department are Emirati and loyal to the Crown Prince (1), (2).

Open recruitment is not the standard operating procedure, even though conflict of interest policies are existent. As previously explained (Q37A), appointments and selection for senior positions take place through Emiri Decrees. There is no evidence of there being a ‘fair’ and transparent process about recruitment within the defence sector (1), (2), (3), (4).

There seems to be very little, if any independent oversight, over the selection and appointment of personnel in sensitive positions within the defence sector. The defence sector generally does not go through any type of scrutiny and/or oversight. The UAE president fills sensitive positions with royal Emirati Decrees. The Crown Prince is the Deputy Supreme Commander according to the Armed Forces Law 8, and therefore the highest military commander after the president, and his office proposes the names of people who will fill sensitive posts (1), (2).

Country Sort by Country 37a. Coverage of sensitive (higher-risk) positions Sort By Subindicator 37b. Selection process Sort By Subindicator 37c. Oversight Sort By Subindicator
Algeria 0 / 100 NA NA
Angola 0 / 100 NA NA
Burkina Faso 0 / 100 NA NA
Cameroon 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Cote d'Ivoire 0 / 100 NA NA
Egypt 0 / 100 NA NA
Ghana 0 / 100 NA NA
Iraq 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Jordan 0 / 100 NA NA
Kuwait 0 / 100 NA NA
Lebanon 50 / 100 0 / 100 50 / 100
Mali 0 / 100 NA NA
Morocco 0 / 100 NA NA
Niger 0 / 100 NA NA
Nigeria 0 / 100 NA NA
Oman 0 / 100 NA NA
Palestine 0 / 100 NA NA
Qatar 0 / 100 NA NA
Saudi Arabia 0 / 100 NA NA
Tunisia 0 / 100 NA NA
United Arab Emirates 0 / 100 NA NA

With thanks for support from the UK Department for International Development and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs who have contributed to the Government Defence Integrity Index.

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