Q42.

Are personnel promoted through an objective, meritocratic process? Such a process would include promotion boards outside of the command chain, strong formal appraisal processes, and independent oversight.

42a. Formal process

Score

SCORE: 25/100

Assessor Explanation

Assessor Sources

42b. Exceptions

Score

SCORE: 0/100

Assessor Explanation

Assessor Sources

42c. Comprehensiveness

Score

SCORE: 0/100

Assessor Explanation

Assessor Sources

42d. Frequency

Score

SCORE: NA/100

Assessor Explanation

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Relevant comparisons

Some regulations on the formal process of promotions within the Algerian armed forces could be found; however, there are robust indications that they are commonly undermined.

The General Statute of Military Personnel of 2006 provides some information on the promotion process. In Title II, Chapter I, the general hierarchical structure of the armed force is outlined, which includes a table in Art. 20 that lists the different grades and their respective age limits as well as the limit with regards to the overall length of service. For example, the age limit for a second lieutenant is 30 years old, and the time limit for the length of service is 8 years. The age limit for a colonel is 53 years old, while the length of service is 32 years. Art. 20 also sets forth the age limit and the length of service for female officers, which differ from male officers. In Chapter IV, further information on the promotion process is given. According to Art. 62, members of the armed forces are regularly assessed by their superiors to determine their professional potential. The assessment includes reviews of their: personality, level of competence, conduct, physical aptitude, and performance results from their employment. These elements constitute the criteria determining a soldier’s potential career in terms of promotions, employment, and training. There is no evidence that there is a system of independent scrutiny outside of the chain of command. According to Art. 66, the promotions within the military hierarchy, take place continuously from one rank to the next higher rank (1).

There are strong signs that the promotion process is dominated by nepotism, cronyism and clientelism within the PNA; see the last country assessment (2). As has been outlined in previous questions, the military, along with the intelligence service and the government has developed a system that promotes corruption and nepotism from which they profit (3). The current Vice Defence Minister Gaïd Salah is a case in point that demonstrates that the formal promotion procedures are not necessarily followed. He became the General of the Army Corps (i.e. Chief-of-Staff) in 2006, at the age of 66, although the formal age limit is 64. His promotion also did not comply with his length of service. He was recruited into the armed forces in 1957, which means that he had served in the armed forces for 49 years in 2006. The length of service for a general of the army corps according to the table provided under order No. 06-02 (2006) is 42 years (1), (4).

There is some information on regulations that limit the possible circumstances of promotions and also place specific requirements on further progression. However, given the high likelihood of cronyism and nepotism within the rank-and-file of the military, it is unclear to what extent they are applied in practice.

Art. 65 of Order No. 06-02 (2006) says that promotions can take place at discretion, for example for special merit to reward an act of brilliance, a feat of arms, or an act of bravery. Soldiers can also be rewarded posthumously, in recognition of their sacrifice. Moreover, Art. 68 states that no one may be promoted to a grade if he does not meet the conditions of the minimum length of service as outlined in 42A (1). Furthermore, according to Art. 21, no one may serve beyond the age limit of his rank in peacetime. However, this article also says that an age exemption may be granted by the President of the Republic to generals and superiors holding high positions in the military hierarchy (2). This regulation can open doors for favouritism.

No information could be found on whether postings and promotions are published. No information could be found on the website (1) or in the armed forces magazine (2). Postings on promotions might be published internally; however, the General Statute of Military Personnel of 2006 does not contain a rule that promotions have to be made public. The only article that references this issue is Art. 15, stipulating that appointments and promotions to the ranks of officers, and non-commissioned officers shall be made within the limit of the number of open posts (3). However, it does not say that these open posts have to be advertised.

This sub-indicator has been scored Not Applicable because no information could be found on whether postings and promotions are published. No information could be found on the website (1) or in the armed forces magazine (2). Postings on promotions might be published internally; however, the General Statute of Military Personnel of 2006 does not contain a rule that promotions have to be made public. The only article that references this issue is Art. 15, stipulating that appointments and promotions to the ranks of officers, and non-commissioned officers shall be made within the limit of the number of open posts (3). However, it does not say that these open posts have to be advertised.

In July 2018, the parliament eventually passed the Law on Military Careers in the Angolan Armed Forces (1). The comprehensive new law establishes rules and procedures for military careers in the Angolan Armed Forces and the auxiliary services of the president, in the sectors of defence, intelligence and military security, as well as military justice. It is yet to be published in the official gazette (1), (2).

For the National Police, the 2008 career regulations (currently being reviewed), provide for promotions and rank attributions to be approved – as it appears without independent oversight – as follows: by the president (commissioners), the interior minister (senior officers), respective commanders (junior officials and lower ranks).

The 2010 Constitution gives the president, who is commander-in-chief of the armed forces, broad powers to appoint, promote and dismiss senior officials of the armed forces and the police, without conditions beyond consultation of the Council of National Security (1). The procedures for promotion for lower-level officials are laid out in the recently passed Law on Military Careers (not available online).

Postings and promotions of senior officials by presidential decree are regularly published in the official gazette, though without much detail (1).

Postings and promotions of senior officials by presidential decree are regularly published in the official gazette, though without much detail (1).

According to Article 88 (1) of Law No. 038 (2016), there is an evaluation process for military personnel conducted by the soldier’s supervisor at least once a year (1). According to Article 89 promotions occur continuously in ranks and categories ordered by degrees or orders.
According to Article 93 the “promotion to a higher rank can be made normally or exceptionally.” To get a promotion, the officer should have their names listed on the promotion board ahead before the promotion decision, which is made based on the order of the list of the promotion board (1). However, as pointed out earlier, corruption is widespread almost in all professional areas in Burkina Faso (2), (3), (4), (5). The BTI report goes further by stating that, “there is evidence of nepotism and favouritism in broader government appointments and promotions” (3), (4). Therefore, formal processes are in place for the promotion of personnel, but they are regularly undermined by undue influence or inappropriate conduct.

An exception to the provisions of Articles 88; 89 and 93 of Law No. 038 (2016), on the general status of the National Armed Forces, providing normal promotion acquisition processes, exists. And this exception lies in Article 163 of Law No. 038 (2016) and is about the appointment to the rank of general. In fact, according to this article, the “appointment to the rank of general concerns officers with the rank of colonel holder of a diploma from a war school, or equivalent on the proposal of the defence minister, following the insight of a technical committee within the defence ministry.” However, the appointment to the rank of general has raised lots of issues recently; for example, former Prime Minister and Colonel Yacouba Isaac Zida got promoted to the rank of general at despite not holding the rank of major colonel. The legislation at that time allowed for a colonel can be appointed, in exceptional circumstances, as a general. Therefore, exceptions to the normal promotion path exist, and are used (1), (2), (3), (4).

According to Article 93 of Law 038 (2016), “perspective incumbents should have their names listed in the promotion board ahead prior to the promotion decision, which is made based on the order in of the list provided in the promotion board.” The list in the promotion board is published, and staff members can get a copy upon request, publication of the list is made in advance of their effective date, but there is no evidence that postings and promotions are available for the civil service (1), (2), (3).

According to Article 93 of the Law 038 -2016/AN of 30 December 2016, on the general status of the National Armed Forces, “perspective incumbents should have their names listed in the promotion board ahead prior to the promotion decision, which is made based on the order in of the list provided in the promotion board” The list in the promotion board is published, and staff members can get a copy upon request. and publication is made in advance of their effective date, but there is no evidence that postings and promotions are available for civil service [1] [2] [3].

The military has a procedure for career growth which is based on longevity in service, level of discipline and performance. However, often these criteria are overlooked and personnel are promoted based on tribal sentiments or ethnic affiliations [1] [2]. Some promotions within the ranks of the military are bought [2,3] [5]. However, it is important to note that some promotions come about solely through Presidential appointments. To get to the rank of General in the military in Cameroon does not depend on your adacemic or military training. Military generals are appointed at the discretion of the President of the Republic [1,2] [3].

A November 2016 report by the International Crisis Group points out that some soldiers posted in the Far North to fight Boko Haram “have seen their promotions effectively frozen because they are not free to take the required training courses, while those who have remained in Yaoundé have been promoted,” suggesting that some sort of formal process does exist, at least in terms of required training courses. The same report recommends that special measures be taken “to ensure fairness in the pay and promotion of soldiers, particularly those deployed to the front,” indicating that such fairness does not currently exist.

In addition, Cameroon Concord (Jan 2015) stated that “Police recruitment in Cameroon [is a] fiasco as many candidates are caught with fake university degrees and diplomas” [4].

No evidence could be found to point to the existence of regulations addressing exceptions. In addition, personnel are promoted based on tribal sentiments or ethnic affiliations. Some promotions within the ranks of the military are bought and some promotions come solely through Presidential appointments. [1,2] [3]. This indicates that there are no controls governing appointments that occur outside of the formal process.

Appointments and promotion to certain key positions are published on the website of the Presidency of Cameroon and in the Cameroon Tribune. Most appointments to administrative positions are broadcast on Cameroon Radio and Television, the national radio and television station [1]. While there is evidence that details of some promotions are published (including name, rank, new post and effective date) [1], there is no evidence that all promotions are published.

While there is evidence that details of some promotions are published (including name, rank, new post and effective date) [1], there is no evidence that all promotions are published. In addition, the information may not be published on an annual basis, and the details may not be published prior to the effective date. There is also no evidence to suggest that equivalent information is available on request for civil service counterparts.

There is a formal process for promoting military personnel. The promotions do not always follow the formal processes established by Law No. 2016-1109 and can be decided behind closed doors. Law No. 2016-1109 (Portant Code de la Fonction Militaire) of 16 February 2016 contains provisions regarding the system for promoting military personnel. This Law repealed the previous Act No. 095-695 (Portant Code de la Fonction Militaire) of 7 September 1995. As with sub-indicators 41A-C, the Law should be seen within the context of military reforms after the post-election crisis of 2010-2011. The provisions of Law No. 2016-1109 regulating the formal process of promoting military personnel are contained in Chapter 5 (Notation et avancement), Articles 74 to 78:

Art. 74 – “A promotion (avancement) is pronounced under the same conditions as an appointment, as follows: (1)
– by appointment, in the case of a change of rank;
– by a promotion, in the case of a change of rank within the same category.”
Art. 75 – “A promotion is the transition to a higher grade. It takes place either by choice or by seniority.”
Art. 77 – “Subject to operational requirements, the promotion to a rank lower than that of Major Colonel must be registered in the progress table established each year” (1).

Furthermore, Article 73 stipulates that military personnel must be evaluated on an annual basis and the evaluations are taken into account based on professional qualifications and the quality of the officer’s service. Article 73 states that the evaluation must be carried out in an objective fashion and excluding personal opinions, as well as philosophical, religious or political beliefs. In addition, the ethnic origin cannot be taken into account when promoting an officer. Finally, officers have a right of appeal if they disagree with an evaluation (1). Article 47 refers to the role of the Promotion Commission in promoting military officers based on the names officially registered on the Promotion Board. Art. 46 states, “the Promotion Commission formulates the appointments based on the Promotion Board (Tableau d’Aancements). It may also decide on the proposals for promotion on an exceptional basis.” Although the formal process is codified to be objective and meritocratic, individual promotions, especially for higher-ranking military personnel, sometimes do not take place as per Articles 74-78 of Law No. 2016-1009.

The provisions in Article 76 of Law No. 2016-1109 spell out the terms of promotion for military officers based on exceptional circumstances. Article 76 allows for acting rank and battlefield promotions, but also contains rules limiting this type of promotions such as the fact that in times of peace officers can only benefit from one exceptional promotion. Law No. 2016-1109 (Portant Code de la Fonction Militaire) of 16 February 2016, specifically Chapter 4 (Nomination), contains the provisions governing the exceptional promotion (avancement à titre exceptionnel) of military officers. Article 76 permits the awarding of battlefield promotions (services exceptionnels) or promotions based on heroic actions (actions d’éclat), but within certain limits and according to specific requirements (1).

Art. 76 – “Can benefit from a promotion in exceptional circumstances, the officer:
1. author of a heroic act or having performed exceptional services;
2. serious or fatal injury;
– either during law enforcement operations or operations within a war campaign;
– in the exercise of judicial police missions;
– even outside the service, by performing an act of bravery in the public interest, risking his life;
3. victim, because of his military status, attacks or acts of violence;
4. service requirements” (1).
In times of peace, no one can benefit from more than one promotion in exceptional circumstances. Promotions on an exceptional basis may be awarded posthumously to a member. There is no honorary promotion.

Promotions are made publicly available and in advance of their effective date. They are decided by a presidential decree based on the official Promotions Board (Tableau d’Avancement) for the following year. But the official announcements fail to include details about the reasons for the promotion or any other information other than the name and rank awarded. In an official government press release, the Presidential website announced the promotion of nine senior officers in the armed forces (Forces Armées de Côte d’Ivoire, FACI), the Gendarmerie and the national police for 2018. The promotions were announced in the context of the final meeting of the Council of Ministers in 2017. The procedure followed was for the president to sign the decrees and then to notify the Council of Ministers, which issued an official communiqué providing only the names and ranks of those promoted (1).

In December 2017, Infodrome.ci reported that President Ouattara had signed several presidential decrees promoting the senior officers. Among those promoted was Army Chief of Staff Toure Sekou who was promoted to General rank corps (Général Corps de l’Armée) and Kouakou Kouadio Nicolas, who was promoted to division general (Général de Division). Infodrome criticized the promotions arguing that it was an attempt by the executive to consolidate power ahead of the 2020 elections (2). Pressivoire noted that the military promotions announced by President Ouattara on December 19, 2017, took place following the last annual meeting of the Council of Ministers. At the same time, Pressivoire reported that the president had also signed several separate decrees to register senior officers in the armed forces, Gendarmerie and national police on the Promotions Board for the following year (3).

Promotions are made publicly available and in advance of their effective date. They are decided by a presidential decree based on the official Promotions Board (Tableau d’Avancement) for the following year (1).

According to our sources, some laws and regulations set the criteria, conditions, and requirements for promotions. However, these criteria are regularly bypassed and broken, especially at the middle level, exceptions do happen (1), (2), (3). Law no. 232 (1959) sets out the appointment and promotion systems for Armed Forces officers (4). Article 27 of the law sets seniority as the main criteria for promotion until the rank of lieutenant colonel. The other criteria, as set out by Article 23 of the same law are annual and bi-annual competency reports prepared by senior officials in the chain of command. However, for more senior, and therefore more crucial, positions are appointed either by the president of the republic for top senior positions or by the CIF for less senior positions. There is also a board called lagnit al-thobaat (The Officers’ Commission) within the MoD that is responsible for the promotion of officers until the rank of lieutenant colonel based on competency reports prepared by their superiors.

Article 30 of Law no. 232 allows for exceptions to the seniority rule for officers who “conduct glorious acts in the battlefield”. However, the law does not set out the person/entity responsible for making such decisions and whether it is based on objective criteria. And as discussed in 42A promotions for ranks above lieutenant colonel are largely based on discretion, and is not an almost automatic process like that for less senior officials.

Only postings and promotions of senior officials that are issued by a ministerial or presidential decree are public and its information available, such as with the presidential decree to promote Mahmoud Higazi to the rank of lieutenant general (1). There is no evidence that information on other postings and promotions has been ever made public.

Only postings and promotions of senior officials that are issued by a ministerial or presidential decree are public and its information available, such as with the presidential decree to promote Mahmoud Higazi to the rank of lieutenant general (1). There is no evidence that information on other postings and promotions has been ever made public.

Promotions follow a similar process as appointments, the president, who is also the Commander in Chief, promotes the military personnel based on the recommendations expressed by the Ghana Armed Forces Council (1).

Information about the promotions circulates in the media once these promotions have already entered into force.

No information is made publicly available by the MOD or the GAF regarding the existence of a regulation limiting the possibility of awarding ranks or earning promotions in the battlefield.

Little to no information is released about postings or the promotion cycle. The only information that is sometimes disclosed (i.e. CV, position, etc.) is occasionally published by the media after approval (1), (2).

Because little to no information is released about postings or the promotion cycle, this indicator is scored Not Applicable.

Processes underpinning personnel promotion over the past ten years are marked by political and informal biases. This is particularly noticeable through the rise of informal security institutions later absorbed into the official security apparatus (1). Rapid promotions of ideologically loyal volunteer units have both undermined the existence of meritocratic promotion criteria and an inclusive army culture. Political and ideational agendas are the greater force influencing promotion decisions, rather than governmental policies. The rise of a third security actor has opened up informal channels of recruitment, under which no criteria exist (2). An example that predates the PMF from 2006, when Maliki moved to incorporate militia units into the army, in what later became known as the Damej forces’ (3). Maliki placed close aides in high ranking positions, using the Office of the Commander and Chief to consolidate power and “bypass other state institutions” (4). Such undue-influence and unchecked authority sidelined the parliament’s involvement over the development of these disparate security forces (3). As one source identifies, 14,000 men were absorbed into the army every 5 weeks and “in 6 years” the army “quadrupled in size” (4). Widespread evidence of competing allegiances, bribes to secure positions, the absence of centralised formal process, implies that no formal processes driven by an objective rationale exist.

The sale of government positions is mirrored, but this increasingly used practice is not an exception prescribed in any national Iraqi laws (1), (2). A leaked recording scrutinised across local press outlets reveals a conversation lack of consensus over the suitability and credence of existing officers (3). An interview presented with the recording argues that “political patronage to either Iran or America means that any existing formal criteria based on meritocracy loses all relevance”. The transfer order of US-trained Abdul Wahab al Asaadi from Lieutenant General of the Counter-Terrorism Service to the MoD sparked outrange from high-ranking politicians including the former PM and members of Iraq’s parliamentary security committee. Opposition figure Ammar al Hakim stated that the decision “sends a false message regarding [an] existing appointment and transversal mechanisms”, particularly concerning the national security portfolio, but also across other sectors.

Accessible information on job promotions across Iraq’s military establishment is scattered. The Penal Code No. 19 discusses limited promotion opportunities for those found guilty of military offences. Looking into Iraq’s Military Service and Retirement Law, the absence of a meritocratic-process is seen and further coverage shows various attempts to amend the law. It emphasises that those due for promotions must be born to Iraqi parents and aged between 20 to 28 years to qualify for MoD posts (1). It offers a break down of the duration soldiers seeking promotions must wait (1). The law makes it clear that promotions must fulfil the conditions stipulated. However, political party quotas undercut any meritocratic criteria particularly in the context of parliamentary elections; a defective system that has stirred both coverage and controversy among the population and media (2). “National institutions are hostage to personal and political gain” one source notes “including job promotions”. Press outlets have underlined the above as causes that precipitated the speedy collapse of Iraq’s army (3), (4). Junior cadets have denounced the absence of a formalised appointment system which does not protect them against bribes. Available data places these bribes, for junior soldiers looking to secure a training post at military academies, anywhere from $3,000 (3) to $500 (5). The prevalence of ghost soldiers, as is widely reported, offers evidence of this, in addition to the political deadlock following last year’s elections, over key security appointments. The key problem, one source summarises, is that “political jockeying” over-sensitive security posts intensifies “as regional patrons were reluctant to allow key ministries to go to candidates backed by their rivals” (6). The system is thus compromised, as Iraqi analysts Renad Mansour (7) notes, by “sectarian or ethnic quotas, rather than on merit.” The final decision as a military expert told Transparency (8) rests with the commander-in-chief whose way out of the specified deadlock were more informal negotiations and attempts to skirt over parliamentary quorum which was unsuccessful”. In direct response to whether information promotion boards exist, none were discoverable or publicly accessible, but the decision must be approved by defence officials and the respective minister.

No information is available on postings and the promotion cycle.

Law No. 35 of the year 1966, Officers Service Law of the Armed Forces, issued in accordance with Article 126 of the Jordanian Constitution, clearly sets out a formal procedure for the promotion of officers. Interestingly, this law is made available via the website of the Jordanian civil defence [1]. The law sets out the formation of officers’ committees, constituted of independent personnel that are outside the chain of command and considered relatively independent. In relation to promotions, the committee convenes and consults the chain of command of each officer, whose performance it reviews. The criteria for promotions, however, as stipulated in the law, remains loose and lacking in clear procedures. Despite the existence of a promotion process, there is little information on whether this process is carried out objectively. This could especially be the case due to the culture of ‘wasta’ and using connections [2]. Promotions are conducted through formal appraisal processes, and there is an independent officers’ committee that makes decisions in relation to promotions. However, it is very likely that these promotions are influenced by tribal bias. In addition to that, senior positions within defence are granted through royal decrees and royal appointments, and do not go through the same promotion process as those in non-senior positions. The scoring also took into consideration the fact that it cannot be verified that this process is followed through.

The King, the Commander in Chief, and the Minister of Defence, can issue exceptions to decrees of promotions, and there are no regulations that restrict them from doing so. However, they make such exceptions by promoting their loyal subjects. They carefully select them to have the minimum qualifications to avoid public criticism and tribal anger [1,2]. According to Law No. 35 of the year 1966, Officers Service Law of the Armed Forces, issued in accordance with Article 126 of the Jordanian Constitution, the only exceptions to awarding ranks, other than the process explained above, are (1) in case an officer demonstrates exceptional excellence and competence, ranks may be awarded without taking the criteria into consideration, (2) through royal decrees in cases of war and mobilisation, and (3) the awarding of honorary military ranks [3]. The law shows that no force is exempt from these regulations and these exceptions are very limited in the first place.

Information about promotions in the defence forces are published periodically and have been made public since 2013. In addition to the promotions in 2016, an official copy of the list of promotions and retirements for 2015, 2013, and a partial list of the promotions for 2011, have also been published in the official gazette in hard copies only in Jordan [1,2,3]. The promotions of very senior posts are published in newspapers with name, rank, new post, and effective data, but without the promotion cycle.

Information about promotions in the defence forces are published periodically and have been made public since 2013. The list is published after its effective data but annually [1,2,3].

There is no indication of a formal process but appointments and promotions are subject to the scrutiny of the SAB, auditors said (1, 2 and 3).

The interior ministry, however, has a committee which evaluates hiring decisions, but it is inside the chain of command and its head is selected by the interior minister himself, according to article 8 of Law. 23 of 1967 for police affairs, and that provides the MOI with the semblance of internal oversight (4).

Article 72 of the police law and 73 of the military law allow the interior ministers, who already have the power to set the criteria for promotions according to article 60 of the police law and 59 of the military law, the power to promote any officer responsible for “excellent work or service” by one rank (1 and 2). There are no provisions to limit this power.

Some information on postings and promotions may be published from time to time, but rarely before their effective dates and they do not receive much media attention, officials said (1,2). For example, the recent decision to appoint three new assistant ministers in May 2017 (3). KUNA simply named the three new officials, Mohamed Youssef al-Sabah (from the royal family), Abdulla al-Mahna and Khaled al-Deyeen; and listed their new titles without offering any further details. The picture of the interior ministry is larger than the text announcing the appointments in the news story.

Some information on postings and promotions may be published from time to time, but rarely before their effective dates and they do not receive much media attention, officials said (1,2). For example, the recent decision to appoint three new assistant ministers in May 2017 (3). KUNA simply named the three new officials, Mohamed Youssef al-Sabah (from the royal family), Abdulla al-Mahna and Khaled al-Deyeen; and listed their new titles without offering any further details. The picture of the interior ministry is larger than the text announcing the appointments in the news story.

LAF personnel promotions are conducted through formal appraisal processes that are laid out by the National Defense Law (1). However, there is little independent scrutiny being paid for the promotion (1). For example, the Military Council, the LAF commander, minister of defence, the Council of Ministers, and the president, are involved in the approval of military personnel’s promotions and appointments, depending on the positions and ranks, are not independent observers (1). LAF’s officer corp maintains a 1:1 Christian Muslim parity which is integrated into the approval decisions for promotions (2).
There are few examples of promotions are publicized, mainly for the graduation of students officers from the Military Academy, who are promoted to second lieutenant (3), and appointments to senior positions where officers are automatically promoted (4). While the formal selection process for all personnel is not publicized, a source indicated that rules are followed with considerations to the sectarian composition of the forces (5).

In addition to the regular promotional progression, the National Defence Law (NDL) specifies exceptional cases for awarding ranks (1). The means, for instance, include, “performed admirable acts during military operations or operations for preserving security or interior armed engagement” (2). Martyrdom is also stated in the NDL as one of the exceptions for awarding a higher rank (2).

Depending on the ranks and positions of the promotions, information is published (1). For example, the appointment and promotion of senior ranking officers, such as Military Council members, are announced and published online (2). On the other hand, the promotion of lower-ranking officers names and new posts are not publicized when promoted (3).

Promotions, whether in routine or exceptional circumstances, are irregularly published. For example, the graduating officers from the military academy who are promoted to the rank of Second Lieutenant, have their names announced in a public ceremony that is aired on TV (1). However, the decree for promotion to the mentioned rank is rarely published (2). Senior ranking appointments, such as military council members, by default promotion, are announced and published media outlets (3). Exceptional promotions are rare when they occur they are published (4).

The LOPM, the government’s major programme of military reform that was adopted into law in 2015, contains provisions to improve the working environment and conditions for people serving in the armed forces. One media report suggested that the law provided a new framework for promotions within the army.¹ However, the fullest online version of the document available does not outline the criteria for promotion. It does say that it covers “grade-related evaluations”, providing no further details.² This suggests that a promotion framework does exist, but it is not made widely available.
Building on the LOPM, in May 2017, parliament approved a new general statute for the military that outlined clear criteria for promotions to various grades. For example, the statute stipulates that no person can rise to the level of General if they have not followed and completed a programme of higher military education, programmes focusing on the development of scientific and technical skills, and finally a postgraduate university degree.¹²
There are three categories of ranks within the Malian armed forces: Non-Commissioned ranks (Militaires de rang), Non-Commissioned Officers (Sous-Officiers) and Officers.¹³ Article 54 states that no person can become a non-commissioned career officer (sous-officier de carrière) unless they have completed 10 years of service, of which 5 years have been as a sous-officier.¹³ However, these additional conditions do not apply to non-commissioned officers in the gendarmerie. Such promotions are made by decree by the minister responsible for the armed forces, i.e. the President of the Republic. Article 55 indicates that the seniority of officers is determined by their previous activities. Finally, article 50 points out that nominations and promotions relating to general officers are made by decree by the Council of Ministers and by the President for all other officers.¹³
Furthermore, article 46 stipulates that career progression within the armed forces functions by being promoted from one grade to the grade immediately superior. The only exceptions to this rule are for promotions from:
– Corporal to Sergeant
– Chief Warrant Officer to Second Lieutenant
– Colonel to Brigadier.¹³
The introduction of this framework is a positive step for the country. Nevertheless, there are clear instances where promotions have been awarded for reasons other than military achievements and competency in recent years. In August 2013, shortly after the second round of the presidential election, the Council of Ministers promoted Captain Amadou Sanogo to a 4-star general without any clear process of approval or oversight. The nomination came in the wake of the 2012 military coup that Sanogo had himself orchestrated. The move angered human rights groups who alleged that Sanogo had a well-documented history of being responsible for “arbitrary detention, torture and enforced disappearances”.³ ⁴ ⁵ ⁶ Several officers who contested Sanogo’s appointment/promotion were arrested for their comments, indicating the state’s unwillingness to discuss promotion processes.⁷
Similarly, the double promotion of Ibrahim Dahirou Dembélé (see Q41 for more information) in February 2018 was also made in very opaque circumstances. Dembélé, who was previously Chief of Staff under Captain Sanogo’s junta in 2012, was promoted to Division General and to Inspector General of the Army. This was despite the fact that he had been on probation and awaiting trial since March 2014 in connection with the alleged abuses that took place on Sanogo’s watch.⁸ Dembélé currently stands accused of ‘passive complicity’ in the assassination in 2012 of 21 members of the red berets, a rival unit to that of Sanogo’s green berets. But Dembélé was appointed a mere 15 days after a court in Bamako had lifted his probation status.⁹ The assessor found no evidence to suggest that the promotion was awarded in respect of Dembélé’s achievement, but there are more convincing reasons that suggest it was a politically motivated promotion.¹⁰ ¹¹
According to one journalist, the hierarchy does not correspond to military competence and nine out of ten officers are sons of officers.¹⁴ A senior security governance professional told the assessor that the current system remains largely ‘dysfunctional’.¹⁵ The interviewee said that the recent updates to promotion criteria were an improvement, but “still fell short of what is needed”.¹⁵

The source said the government is yet to provide clear job descriptions and recruitment criteria, as well as deployment protocols.¹⁵ The interviewee noted that very few of the updated job descriptions and applications forms were used during the FAMa’s recruitment drive in 2018.¹⁵ According to the source, the government’s rationale for not using the new procedures was because the deteriorating security situation in the centre of the country was ‘too urgent’ and that the new forms/criteria will be used next time.¹⁵

Both the security governance expert and the defence attaché from a foreign embassy attested to fact that the promotions process is still riddled with corruption.¹⁵ ¹⁶ The defence attaché said that one FAMA soldier had told him that “if you don’t pay, you don’t advance even if you are good enough”.¹⁶ The source said that ability is still important, but paying remains a crucial, unofficial component.¹⁶

Article 51 of the general statute for the military (see Q42A for more details) stipulates that military appointments and promotions may, in exceptional cases, be made without conforming to the standard requirements. This provision exists to reward “remarkable deeds” and “outstanding service” without having to take into consideration the minimum period of service required to advance to the superior grade.[4]
However, the promotion of Ibrahim Dahirou Dembélé (see Q41 for more information) does not appear to have complied with these conditions. Dembélé was appointed a mere 15 days after a court in Bamako had lifted his probation status [1] in connection with a trial relating to the mass execution of members of a rival military division. The assessor found no evidence to suggest that the promotion was awarded in respect of Dembélé’s achievement, but there are more convincing reasons to suggest it was an overtly politically motivated promotion.[2,3]

High-level military appointments are commonly and widely reported in national media [2,3] The government typically publishes details of the military appointments it has made by decree in the Official Journal.[5] For example, in November 2016, the Official Journal recorded that the government had appointed:
– Army Commander Dassé Marico as the Deputy Director of Personnel Administration and Finance within the army’s commissariat.
– Airforce Lieutenant-Colonel Lassina Togola as the Deputy Chief of Staff for air force operations.
– Airforce Commander Yaya Traoré as a member of the Presidential Air Unit. Traoré left his role in the private staff of the president to take up the position.[5]
However, none of the decrees specified when each individual would assume his new position, making it very difficult to tell how much notice these announcements provided.[5] Hence, no evidence has been found that this information is being released before each actual appointment. Meanwhile, the official website of the FAMa does not post any information about regular promotions and posting cycles.[1]
Below these more influential appointments, there is much less information disclosed about the more routine promotions throughout the armed forces. That said, there are, sporadically, media articles focusing on individuals graduating from ‘l’Ecole militaire inter armées’. One such report from 2017 recorded that 36 people were graduating, having completed the standard training programme, while three others had finished a more specific course.[4]

High-level military appointments are commonly and widely reported in national media [2,3] The government typically publishes details of the military appointments it has made by decree in the Official Journal.[5] For example, in November 2016, the Official Journal recorded that the government had appointed:
– Army Commander Dassé Marico as the Deputy Director of Personnel Administration and Finance within the army’s commissariat.
– Airforce Lieutenant-Colonel Lassina Togola as the Deputy Chief of Staff for air force operations.
– Airforce Commander Yaya Traoré as a member of the Presidential Air Unit. Traoré left his role in the private staff of the president to take up the position.[5]
However, none of the decrees specified when each individual would assume his new position, making it very difficult to tell how much notice these announcements provided.[5] Hence, no evidence has been found that this information is being released before each actual appointment. Meanwhile, the official website of the FAMa does not post any information about regular promotions and posting cycles.[1]
Below these more influential appointments, there is much less information disclosed about the more routine promotions throughout the armed forces. That said, there are, sporadically, media articles focusing on individuals graduating from ‘l’Ecole militaire inter armées’. One such report from 2017 recorded that 36 people were graduating, having completed the standard training programme, while three others had finished a more specific course.[4]

The Regulations on General Discipline of the Royal Armed Forces (Règlement de discipline générale des forces armées royales) state the different distinctions and rewards military personnel can receive on the basis of their performances, but not the promotions available (1)(2). Therefore only elements pertaining to awards, and not promotions were found. No evidence was found of any formal processes, boards or oversight of the promotions process. In the absence of such a formal process, undue influence and inappropriate conduct in the promotions process may be widespread.

The Regulations on General Discipline of the Royal Armed Forces (Règlement de discipline générale des forces armées royales) state in article 62: « Exceptional awards: The King is the supreme chief of armed forces, as such he can promote any military man to the rank he wishes as a reward for exceptionally brave acts »(1).

No evidence of boards and oversight of the promotion process was found, which undermine its transparency and increases the risk of corruption.

In line with the powers granted to him by the Constitution, the King promotes officers regardless of any objective and meritocratic process, as well as in the absence of any external board (2).The Moroccan and foreign press reports (3), as well as official statements (4) illustrate the King’s power of promotion. There is therefore no limitation or regulation that limits the possible circumstances and replaces requirements on further progression.

No evidence was found in the local or foreign press that information is released about postings and promotion cycle (1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8)(9).

The press only refers to promotion of senior military personnel by the King, without mentioning the details of the promotion process, or the criteria on which they were promoted, as the article in Jeune Afrique shows. There is no systematic publication by the media of details regarding promotions (1).

The security sector human resources management has formal processes in place that are characterised by clearly defined personnel regulations, a competitive and transparent recruitment system, merit-based promotion and in-house training (1,2). There are two methods of promotion: by level and by grade. Level promotion within the same grade is automatic and linked to the length of service within a level and “good” performance. Grade promotion is from one grade to another within a corps, subject to good performance and the specified distribution of personnel by corps and by grade. Grade promotion is also conditional upon obtaining diplomas and accumulating a number of years of service. Within the officer corps, promotion requires studying at certain schools such as the War School (colonel) (3). The assessor found no evidence for whether personnel promotions followed formal appraisal processes.

The security sector human resources management is characterised by clear personnel regulations and a merit-based promotion system (1,2). At every stage, there is oversight bodies that manage promotions. However, the decisions of these oversight bodies cannot be challenged because there is no external accountability (3). Also, there is no evidence of whether or not these regulations are always followed in practice.

Personnel regulations, career management, and training are all governed by clear regulatory texts (1,2), but they are not available to public (3).

Personnel regulations, career management, and training are all governed by clear regulatory texts (1,2), but they are not available to public (3).

Promotions are also subject to the policy of Federal Character Principle (made based on political or ethnic considerations). Political influence does play a role and there are allegations of bias on ethnic grounds concerning some appointments (1). The Army Council recommends officers for promotion under Sections 10 (1) and 11(b) of the Armed Forces Act CAP A20 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004 (2).

Promotions are political at colonel-level and above and are completely within the purview of the Chief of Army Staff (COAS). An officer must spend a given amount of time in each grade before advancement to the next. Achievement in service may also determine the pace of promotion in the army (1). An officer who has made an indelible mark in the service through personal and team assignments may be considered for promotion. There is a subjective element in some aspects of the criteria for promotion and officers with political connections are promoted quickly (2).

Name, rank, new post and effective date are publicly declared at least one month ahead, but not for all officers above OF-4. Equivalent information is available on request for civil service counterparts. Details of postings are made at least annually (1). Quite detailed circulars on new postings are made internally, but that information is not made public, or at least not in such explicit detail.

Name, rank, new post and effective date are publicly declared at least one month ahead, but not for all officers above OF-4. Equivalent information is available on request for civil service counterparts. Details of postings are made at least annually (1). Quite detailed circulars on new postings are made internally, but that information is not made public, or at least not in such explicit detail.

Although no information is available on the formal structures or rules in the defence and security sector regarding promotions, our sources indicate that there is a formal process in place, but this process is usually distorted by political and tribal influences (1), (2). The Carnegie Endowment of International Peace, contrasts Oman to GCC monarchies due to the fact Sultan Qaboos has largely excluded his family from office; however, there are indications that merchant classes linked to the country’s natural resources are granted influence by the sultan (3). The formal process behind personnel promotion is unknown to the public. Reports by Carnegie and Middle East Institute emphasize how governance in Oman rests in the hands of the sultan, making Sultan Qaboos the appointer and decider or at least approver of all promotions (3), (4). No information was found in reports or in media outlets concerning defence specifically which is exempt from transparency guidelines by the government (5), (6), (7).

No information is available on the formal processes of promotions; it is normal to find exceptions to awarding promotions to personnel either through Sultani Decree or commanders who have the authority to promote personnel (1), (2). No regulations on promotions are stated on the Ministry of Defence or Royal Armed Forces websites (3), (4). As discussed in sub-indicator 37A-C, there is no sensitivity regarding time limitations of high-ranking job positions to reduce corruption risk.

There is no available information on promotion cycles. There are; however, as stated in sub-indicator 37B, sometimes job postings on the Ministry of Defence website, under careers, with the job title but no details about the application process (1). No reference is made to application processes, or formal procedures around promotions (1). Media reports on promotions of personnel are announced in royal decrees, lacking in description of the successful candidates’ accolades or formal procedures around job selection (2). No job descriptions with essential criteria or detailed procedures including application processing time, decision-making standards, formal appraisals and independent oversight procedures are detailed on the Ministry of Defence, the MoD secretary-general, or the Royal Armed Forces websites (3), (4), (5), (6).

This indicator is marked Not Applicable because there is no available information on promotion cycles. There are; however, as stated in sub-indicator 37B, sometimes job postings on the Ministry of Defence website, under careers, with the job title but no details about the application process (1). No reference is made to application processes, or formal procedures around promotions (1). Media reports on promotions of personnel are announced in royal decrees, lacking in description of the successful candidates’ accolades or formal procedures around job selection (2). No job descriptions with essential criteria or detailed procedures including application processing time, decision-making standards, formal appraisals and independent oversight procedures are detailed on the Ministry of Defence, the MoD secretary-general, or the Royal Armed Forces websites (3), (4), (5), (6).

There are formal written processes and procedure for promotions. However, this process is undermined by the influence of the executive or through politically-driven motivations. Promotion is different from appointing new solders as mentioned in Q41(1), (2).

The incomplete legislative system of some security agencies has contributed to the widening of the discretion granted to the officials of those agencies, which may open the way for the existence of mediation, favouritism and nepotism in making decisions related to the transfer of employees and their promotion (3).

The Law on Security Personnel provides mechanisms for granting special promotions to members of the security forces (1). However, these rules are not regularly applied in practice.

There is a mechanism that may hinder the decision of the executive concerning awarding ranks and promotions, but it is not usually used (2). The majority of the high-rank promotions occur because of political motives which explains why such a mechanism is not used (3).

Information is sporadically available in newspapers and websites (1). Two years ago, there was the official journal where annual promotions were published. However, since 2016, it has not been published and is not available to the public (2), (3).

Information is sporadically available in newspapers and websites (1). Two years ago, there was the official journal where annual promotions were published. However, since 2016, it has not been published and is not available to the public (2), (3).

Promotions of personnel do not always follow a defined mechanism based on meritocracy. In the majority of cases, promotions are based on nepotism, and new patrimonialism where tribal connections play a major role. There is an internal formal mechanism for promotions within the armed forces. [1,2]

There are no regulations or restrictions that can limit promotion or progression. Decrees of promotions by the Emir or the Minister of Defence have supreme power and cannot be altered. [1,2]

There is a general lack of information about the defence sector, and there is no information released about postings and promotion cycles. [1] As previously established, there is not little information available publicly about the defence sector, and the MoD does not have an online presence. Some information about defence may be found through news reporting and media, however, most of this lacks detail. [2,3] There is no evidence of information about postings and promotion cycles in the Qatari media.

This indicator has been marked as Not Applicable, as there is no information released about postings and promotion cycles. [1] As previously established, there is not little information available publicly about the defence sector, and the MoD does not have an online presence. Some information about defence may be found through news reporting and media, however, most of this lacks detail. [2,3] There is no evidence of information about postings and promotion cycles in the Qatari media.

According to our sources, there is a committee of appointments and promotions, especially for low-ranking positions. However, this committee is influenced by tribal and political decisions. This committee meets more than once a year and decides on promotions, that are due at the time, and proposes new promotions. This committee consists of members from the financial department, head of units and commanders. Each agency has a committee (1), (2).

There are no regulations that limit the possible circumstances in which ranks can be awarded at the discretion of Saudi authorities. For example, according to our sources, promotion decisions come from the crown prince on hundreds of soldiers and officers, no power could enforce any requirement to stop these decisions made by MBS (1), (2).

The government does not publish criteria relating to promotion, demotion, or the assignment of its military personnel, nor does it publicly clarify information about the promotion cycle (1), (2). Authorities do release information about high-ranking military appointments, terminations, and reshuffles (3). This information is published in an ad hoc manner; however and does not reflect a formal process whereby the government systemically provides detailed information to the public.

The government does not publish criteria relating to promotion, demotion, or the assignment of its military personnel, nor does it publicly clarify information about the promotion cycle (1), (2). Authorities do release information about high-ranking military appointments, terminations, and reshuffles (3). This information is published in an ad hoc manner; however and does not reflect a formal process whereby the government systemically provides detailed information to the public.

According to our sources, the process is semi-formalised, where a committee of senior officers propose and suggest promotions to the MoD. These committees are formed by a ministerial decree. The process itself is vague but it entails that there are criteria for promotions and appointments, mainly being expertise and relevant education(1,2). The majority of promotions are decided by the Minister of Defence (3). Senior military positions are appointed by the President of the Republic (4). There are advisory committees, whose members are also appointed by the Minister of Defence (5). The promotion process seems to be discretionary even though promotions of officers and commissioned officers are published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Tunisia (article 40 law n° 67-20, dated 31 May 1967, on General status of the military). Beyond these legislative documents, there were no substantial media articles or civil society reports that looked into the issue in detail, especially at how well these laws are implemented (6).

For acts of war or acts of heroism carried out during defence or homeland security operations, appointments and promotions to the next highest rank may take place, notwithstanding any statutory provisions in this area and, where applicable, posthumously. However, non-commissioned officers and soldiers may receive a promotion of two ranks. For these exceptional advancements, the condition of aptitude of the candidate to assume the responsibilities related to the new grade must be taken into consideration. These regulations are vargue because they can be used and interpreted by by the senior commanders and do not specifiy such cases accuratly and clearly.
An exceptional gratification may be granted, in the form of promotion or the form of advancement of one or more steps or the form of a global bonus, the amount of which is fixed case by case, to members who have achieved, in an exceptional way, a working method that has led to an improvement in the quality of operational activities or administrative services ,or that has led to savings in costs, or has performed an act that has avoided the national army or the State of serious injury, or have distinguished themselves by a high degree of perfection in the performance of their duties. The appointment, or the promotion and the exceptional gratuity, per the conditions mentioned above, are granted to the military by the President of the Republic Supreme Chief of the Armed Forces (1,2,3).

Promotions of officers and commissioned officers are published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Tunisia (article 40 law n° 67-20, dated 31 May 1967, on General status of military) (1). Top management positions (which are of the discretion of the President of the Republic) are published in the form of Decrees which mention the grade, name, new position, and effective date (2). Such information on civil servants is also available.

According to our sources, major postings and promotions of senior positions are published regularly ( annually or less). (1)

Research has revealed that the UAE has a formal process for promoting military personnel. Federal Law No. 6 of 2004, namely articles 13, 14, 16, 17, 18 and 19, stipulates the mechanism for selection, promotion, and movement of military personnel within the defence sector. Articles 13 and 14 of the same law call for the establishment of an ‘officers committee’, which is tasked with the Human Resources management of military officers. According to Article 12, this officers committee should prepare an annual confidential report assessing the abilities and achievements of military personnel with ranks up to brigadier general (1), relying on personnel’s chain of command. Even though the law describes the mechanism for the promotion of officers, it remains unclear whether these promotions follow a meritocratic process or whether military personnel are objectively promoted. In addition to that, the fact that nepotism and favouritism are common in the UAE, as established in Q41A, is indicative of there being undue influence in the promotion process (1), (2), (3). The majority of senior position holders in the defence sector are either royalty or are associated with the ruling families and tribes in the country. These processes are likely undermined by undue influence or inappropriate conduct (4), (5).

Federal Law No. 6 of 2004, as previously explained, places the responsibility of promotions in the hands of an ‘officers committee’, and explains that such promotions shall be made based on awarding ranks (1). Military personnel are promoted to higher-level ranks, based on the recommendations by the ‘officers committee’ and decisions must be approved by senior management such as ministers of chiefs of staff. As for promotions for the highest military positions, such as brigadier and higher, these should be done through a federal decree. Since the UAE is mainly ruled by the most powerful families, who remain in control of decision making according to the constitution, promotion decisions made by the Emirati rulers are not contestable (2).

There is little information released about postings and promotion cycles within the armed forces in the UAE. Information is not available on the official websites of either the ministry of defence or the UAE government portal. The only information available is related to employment laws and regulations, which apply to employees of the public sector, however, without specific reference to military personnel. However, the existence of Law No. 6 of 2004 demonstrates that there is little information available about promotion mechanisms but that law, as well as very few promotion announcements, are also only available via media outlets and not on the official webpages of the government (1), (2), (3), (4).

There is little information released about postings and promotion cycles within the armed forces in the UAE. Information is not available on the official websites of either the ministry of defence or the UAE government portal. The only information available is related to employment laws and regulations, which apply to employees of the public sector, however, without specific reference to military personnel. However, the existence of Law No. 6 of 2004 demonstrates that there is little information available about promotion mechanisms but that law, as well as very few promotion announcements, are also only available via media outlets and not on the official webpages of the government (1), (2), (3), (4).

Country Sort by Country 42a. Formal process Sort By Subindicator 42b. Exceptions Sort By Subindicator 42c. Comprehensiveness Sort By Subindicator 42d. Frequency Sort By Subindicator
Algeria 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 NA
Angola 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 50 / 100
Burkina Faso 25 / 100 0 / 100 50 / 100 50 / 100
Cameroon 25 / 100 0 / 100 50 / 100 50 / 100
Cote d'Ivoire 50 / 100 100 / 100 0 / 100 100 / 100
Egypt 25 / 100 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Ghana 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Iraq 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 NA
Jordan 50 / 100 0 / 100 75 / 100 75 / 100
Kuwait 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Lebanon 50 / 100 75 / 100 50 / 100 25 / 100
Mali 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Morocco 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Niger 50 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Nigeria 25 / 100 0 / 100 50 / 100 50 / 100
Oman 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 NA
Palestine 25 / 100 100 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Qatar 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 NA
Saudi Arabia 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100
Tunisia 25 / 100 50 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100
United Arab Emirates 25 / 100 0 / 100 0 / 100 NA

With thanks for support from the UK Department for International Development and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs who have contributed to the Government Defence Integrity Index.

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