Are private military contractors employed and if so, are they subject to a similar level of scrutiny as for the armed forces?
Argentina score: NS/100
The government imposes no restrictions on the use of private military contractors and intermediaries.
There are some controls over the use of private military contractors, but no clear policy. The legal standard applicable to PMCs varies considerably from standards applied to state representatives in the same roles. Corruption-related offences may be weak or poorly defined in relation to PMCs.
There is a policy on the use of private military contractors, but it does not specify particular preventive measures. The legal standard applicable to PMCs does not vary widely from standards applied to state representatives in the same roles, but corruption-related offences may be weak or poorly defined in relation to PMCs.
There is a clear policy on the use of private military contractors. The contracting state requires preventive measures whereby PMCs have anti-corruption programmes and training tailored to their role in operations. The legal standard applicable to PMCs does not vary widely from standards applied to state representatives in the same roles, and it criminalises corruption-related offences for PMCs.
The use of private military contractors is forbidden by law or the law may allow them to be employed in extremely limited circumstances which do not expose them to risk of corruption. The legal standard applicable to PMCs does not vary widely from standards applied to state representatives in the same roles, and it criminalises corruption-related offences for PMCs.
This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. In Argentina there is no evidence that there are private military contractors, nor that foreign companies operate in the country. In this sense, there is no specific policy or legislation in this area. However, it is worth mentioning that there is a National Necessity and Urgency Decree in relation to private security and custody services (Decree 1002/99) that is mainly within the framework of Internal Security and not Defence and that they even have the Argentine Chamber of Security and Research Companies.  Within the framework of the United Nations, the topic is addressed by the Working Group on the use of mercenaries in the orbit of the Human Rights Council,   where Argentina is one of the 47 members elected by the General Assembly and whose term ends in 2021. The international legal framework is the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing, and Training of Mercenaries that entered into force in 2001  and the Montreux Document, signed in 2008. Argentina has not joined them yet. 
 Servicios privados de seguridad y custodia. 1999. [Private security and custody services.] Número 1002, 10 septiembre, 1999.
 Naciones Unidas. 2018. “Mercenarism and private military and security companies.” Naciones Unidas, 2018, acceso el 26/06/2019, https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Mercenaries/WG/MercenarismandPrivateMilitarySecurityCompanies.pdf
 Grupo de trabajo sobre utilización de mercenarios. n.d. [Working Group on the utilisation of mercenaries.] Consejo de Derechos Humanos, Naciones Unidas, acceso 25/06/2019, https://www.ohchr.org/SP/Issues/Mercenaries/WGMercenaries/Pages/Members.aspx
 International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries. 1989. New York, 1989. Vigencia desde octubre de 2001, acceso 25/06/2019, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-6&chapter=18&clang=_en
 Cámara Argentina de Empresas de Seguridad e Investigación. n.d. [Argentinian Chamber of Security and Investigation Companies.] acceso 27/06/2019, http://www.caesi.org.ar/site/
Argentina score: NS/100
PMCs are not subject to any form of scrutiny.
There are no clear provisions for oversight of PMCs. PMCs may be subject to some scrutiny, but it is frequently weak.
Laws of the contracting state contains provisions for oversight of PMCs but these laws may be weak, or scrutiny is not undertaken in a meaningful way.
Laws of the contracting state contain clear provisions for oversight of PMCs. PMCs are subject to scrutiny but this may be reactive.
Laws of the contracting state contain clear provisions for oversight of PMCs. Active scrutiny is conducted by the relevant oversight bodies such as the parliament.
This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. There is only state supervision over private security companies, not private military contractors, although these are generally opaque and scrutiny is weak.  Regarding the former, each province has specific legislation applicable in the framework of Decree 1002 of 1999.  In turn, the aforementioned decree establishes as a screening authority the Ministry of Internal Security of the Ministry of Interior, keeping a record of these companies, costing compliance with staff requirements and granting credential.
 Noticia Baires. n.d. “Vago denuncia falta de transparencia en el funcionamiento de las empresas de seguridad privada.” [“Vago denounces a lack of transparency in the operation of private security companies.”] Acceso 12/9/2019, http://www.noticiabaires.com.ar/nota.php?Id=4460
 Decreto, Servicios privados de seguridad y custodia. 1999. [Private security and custody services decree.] Número 1002, 10 septiembre, 1999.
Argentina score: NS/100
Policies and laws on the use of private military contractors are regularly violated, with almost no sanctions applied.
Policies and laws on the use of PMCs are frequently violated, but sanctions are usually applied.
Policies and laws on the use of PMCs are occasionally violated, and when they are, sanctions are usually applied.
Policies and laws on the use of PMCs are rarely violated, but when they are, sanctions are usually applied.
Policies and laws on the use of PMCs are rarely violated, and when they are, sanctions are regularly applied.
This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. Lorenc Valcarse emphasises that, together with the development of private security companies, their instances of corporate representation were consolidated and an extensive state control system was put into operation that includes specific laws, control bodies, and articulation with the police force.  This is because the State recognises them as a “minor partner,” that is, complementary and subordinate to the tasks of the State Police. Supervision is at the provincial level as they are regulated frameworks according to autonomous legislation and there is no federal law. According to the Report of The Inter-American Dialogue, private security companies in Latin America are not adequately supervised nor do they proactively account for cases of irregularities, crimes, and corruption, although there are rules for licensing and registration. 
 Lorenc Valcarce, Federico. 2013. “Estado, policías y criminalidad: seguridad pública y seguridad privada en la argentina actual.” [“State, police, and criminality: public and private security in today’s Argentina.”] Revista de Reflexión y Análisis Político, vol. 18, núm. 1, pp. 11-49, abril, 2013, Buenos Aires, acceso 26/06/2019, http://www.redalyc.org/pdf/522/52235610001.pdf
 Kinosian, Sarah y James Bosworth. 2018. “Seguridad a la venta: Desafíos y Buenas Prácticas en la Regulación de Empresas Militares y de Seguridad Privadas en América Latina.” [“Security for sale: challenges and best practices in the regulation of military enterprises and private security in Latin America.”] Informe del programa de estado de derecho, El díalogo Interamericano, marzo, 2018, acceso 26/06/2019, https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Seguridad-a-la-Venta-del-Programa-Peter-D.-Bell-de-Estado-de-Derecho-del-Di%C3%A1logo-Interamericano-2018.pdf
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|Country||56a. Policies||56b. Scrutiny||56c. Enforcement|
|Bosnia and Herzegovina||NS||NS||NS|
|United Arab Emirates||NS||NS||NS|