Political Risk:

Moderate

Score:

57/100

Defence and Security Policy and Policy Transparency

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Q1 67/100

Is there formal provision for effective and independent legislative scrutiny of defence policy?

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Formal rights Score: 100 / 100
All laws and main national policies, budgets, major arms procurements, and defence decisions are subject to evaluation by the two legislative chambers in Brazil.…
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Effectiveness Score: 50 / 100
There is a well-known lack of interest in defence policy from Brazilian legislators. Both the Senate Committee of Foreign Affairs and National Defence (CRE)…
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Independent legislature scrutiny Score: 50 / 100
The military has been exerting influence on the legislature through strong and traditional lobby activities within the legislature, through the military parliamentary assistance from…
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Q2 50/100

Does the country have an identifiable and effective parliamentary defence and security committee (or similar such organisations) to exercise oversight?

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Formal rights Score: 100 / 100
The Legislative Commissions on Defence have the power to discuss defence budgets and to amend the country’s Budgetary Plan [1]. In 2019, the Senate’s…
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Expertise Score: 50 / 100
Most members have little expertise in the defence sector [1, 2]. Regarding 2019, the president of the Chamber of Deputies’ Commission on Foreign Affairs…
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Responsive policymaking Score: 75 / 100
The Legislative Commission on Defence debate, amend and approve (or not) the defence policies of Brazil. The National Defence Policy states that they shall…
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Short-term oversight Score: 50 / 100
CREDN and CRE meet almost every week, sometimes having two meetings in one week – one ordinary and deliberative meeting, and another to discuss…
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Long-term oversight Score: 25 / 100
As stated above, CREDN and CRE meet almost every week, but not all of the meetings held by the CREDN are related to defence…
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Institutional outcomes Score: 0 / 100
The committee has the right to call for public and secret meetings with any official from the armed forces and any minister, and also…
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Q3 31/100

Is the country’s national defence policy or national security strategy debated and publicly available?

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Scope of involvement Score: 25 / 100
There have been no major institutional modifications on civilian participation in the Brazilian defence policies since the last edition of Transparency International’s Government Defence…
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Scope of debate Score: 0 / 100
The debates are extremely superficial. According to the transcription of the Senate’s voting of the last version of the defence policy documents, no single…
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Public consultations Score: 50 / 100
Brazilian defence policy documents were revised in 2016 and made public in May of 2017. The Ministry of Defence made a public consultation [1]…
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Transparency Score: 50 / 100
This type of policy cannot be enacted without legislative approval. The transparency system of the federal legislative branch is quite effective since it shows…
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Q4 17/100

Do defence and security institutions have a policy, or evidence, of openness towards civil society organisations (CSOs) when dealing with issues of corruption?

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Policy of openness Score: 0 / 100
There are no formal or informal procedures that require openness towards civil society organizations (CSOs), but there are few CSOs that proactively study defence…
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CSO protections Score: 50 / 100
There are plenty of different types of civil society organizations (CSOs) that can operate in Brazil. There are non-governmental organizations or CSOs, which are…
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Practice of openness Score: 0 / 100
There is no strong evidence of the involvement of CSOs on issues of corruption in defence [1]. The only strong evidence of engagement is…
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Q5 75/100

Has the country signed up to the following international anti-corruption instruments: UNCAC and the OECD Convention?

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Signatory and Ratification status Score: 100 / 100
Brazil has signed both the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) [1] and the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention [2]. Besides those two anti-corruption instruments, the…
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Compliance Score: 50 / 100
The 2017 ‘Follow-up to phase 3 report’, from the OECD Convention, stated enhancements in many areas, such as the enactment ‘of a new Corporate…
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Q6 50/100

Is there evidence of regular, active public debate on issues of defence? If yes, does the government participate in this debate?

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Public debate Score: 75 / 100
There is a high variation in participation among academia, the media, and CSOs regarding defence issues. The media is still distant from the debate,…
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Government engagement in public discourse Score: 25 / 100
In Brazil, only the presidency often uses media briefings to communicate with civil society. The most common means ministers use to communicate with civil…
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Q7 75/100

Does the country have an openly stated and effectively implemented anti-corruption policy for the defence sector?

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Anti-corruption policy Score: 100 / 100
An Integrity Plan was launched in 2018, it was created due to the Federal General Comptroller’s (CGU) request to follow international standards of anti-corruption…
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Effective implementation Score: 50 / 100
The Ministry of Defence (MoD) has an Integrity Plan that mandated by CGU, has to encompass an evaluation of weaknesses of the institution. The…
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Q8 83/100

Are there independent, well-resourced, and effective institutions within defence and security tasked with building integrity and countering corruption?

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Mandate and resources Score: 100 / 100
The Union Court of Auditors (Tribunal de Contas da União) (TCU) is an important institution of external control in Brazil that has powers to…
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Independence Score: 100 / 100
The TCU is independent of the three branches of government. Its independence is established by the Constitution [1].
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Effectiveness Score: 50 / 100
According to an interviewee [1], generally, the Military Justice and the Military Public Ministry tend to have a corporatist behaviour towards the armed forces,…
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Q9 NS/100

Does the public trust the institutions of defence and security to tackle the issue of bribery and corruption in their establishments?

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Score: NS / 100
This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. The public has high confidence in the integrity of the armed forces, evidenced the…
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Q10 38/100

Are there regular assessments of the areas of greatest corruption risk for ministry and armed forces personnel, and are the findings used as inputs to the anti-corruption policy?

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Risk assessments Score: 75 / 100
In comparison to the 2015 assessment, there were advances: the assessor found two audits related to projects of the armed forces on the Court…
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Regularity Score: 0 / 100
Decree 9.203/2017 [1] and the CGU’s internal regulation 1089/2018 [2] estimate that risk assessments should be reviewed periodically, but neither of these documents stipulates…
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Inputs to anti-corruption policy Score: NEI / 100
There is not enough information to score this indicator. Due to the very recent nature of the Integrity Action Plans, it is not possible…
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Defence Budgets

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Q11 75/100

Does the country have a process for acquisition planning that involves clear oversight, and is it publicly available?

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Acquisition planning process Score: 75 / 100
As the previous assessments pointed out, most of the defence acquisitions occur under the same Acquisitions Law (Law 8.666/1993) [1], which is a complex…
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Transparency Score: 75 / 100
All government acquisitions are registered and displayed on government websites – whether on Comprasnet (the federal government acquisition portal) [1, 2] or specific websites…
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External oversight Score: 75 / 100
The existing oversight functions assess performance and the country’s long-term acquisition plans, and they also assess the legitimacy of plans. The Court of Auditors…
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Q12 100/100

Is the defence budget transparent, showing key items of expenditure? And it is provided to the legislature in a timely fashion?

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Comprehensiveness Score: 100 / 100
Past budgets (already executed or in execution) can be found in the Transparency Portal [1]. However, to have access to the full budgetary planning…
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Timeliness Score: 100 / 100
The annual budgets take the form of the ‘Budget Guidelines Law’, which is elaborated by the Executive and has to be delivered to the…
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Q13 63/100

Is there a legislative committee (or other appropriate body) responsible for defence budget scrutiny and analysis in an effective way?

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Formal rights Score: 100 / 100
There are three defence committees with extensive formal rights of scrutiny of the defence budget: the budget committee (Comissão Mista de Orçamento) and the…
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Influence on decision-making Score: 25 / 100
The Legislative Commissions on defence have the power to discuss defence budgets and to amend the country’s Budgetary Plan [1]. This year, the Senate’s…
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Q14 67/100

Is the approved defence budget made publicly available? In practice, can citizens, civil society, and the media obtain detailed information on the defence budget?

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Proactive publication Score: 50 / 100
The legislative process surrounding the annual budget is well documented on the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate’s websites [1] [2], but in a…
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Comprehensiveness Score: 75 / 100
According to one military interviewee, most secret parts are contained within specific contracts, that may restrict access to specifics and quantities of the products…
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Response to information requests Score: 75 / 100
Brazil’s Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) works relatively well in the federal government, even for sensitive requests, the Ministry of Defence shows good and…
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Q15 58/100

Are sources of defence income other than from central government allocation (from equipment sales or property disposal, for example) published and scrutinised?

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Transparency Score: 100 / 100
The publication of additional resources (off national budget, but still from the central government) of income for Defence happens. From 2015 to 2018, PAC2…
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Institutional scrutiny Score: 75 / 100
Internal control institutions can audit all processes concerning other defence incomes. It should be noted that the internal control of the Ministry of Defence…
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Public scrutiny Score: 0 / 100
Brazilian media is historically uninterested in defence issues. Lately, military activities are gaining attention because of President Bolsonaro’s institutional alignment with the military. However,…
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Q16 100/100

Is there an effective internal audit process for defence ministry expenditure (that is, for example, transparent, conducted by appropriately skilled individuals, and subject to parliamentary oversight)?

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Activity Score: 100 / 100
The Federal General Comptroller (CGU) is not the organization responsible for the Ministry of Defence’s internal control within the federal government. For this sector,…
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Enabling oversight Score: 100 / 100
Legislative committees can have access to all the documents they want, and even when internal control reports are insufficient, they can ask for the…
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External scrutiny Score: 100 / 100
Available audits can be found in the Ministry of Defence website [1]. On this page, all accounts and administrative audits are available in pdf…
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Institutional outcomes Score: 100 / 100
The audit findings are valued and implemented by the minister of defence regularly. Firstly, because the internal control acts as a special advisor in…
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Q17 100/100

Is there effective and transparent external auditing of military defence expenditure?

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Activity Score: 100 / 100
The Court of Auditors (TCU) is the external control institution of the federal government, and it aims to assist the national congress in exerting…
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Independence Score: 100 / 100
The TCU’s independence is established by the Constitution, and among its competencies are: (a) to fiscalize the national accounts of supranational companies; (b) to…
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Transparency Score: 100 / 100
On the TCU’s website, there are two extensive assessments to projects of the armed forces. However, after an FOIA request, the TCU asserted that…
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Institutional outcomes Score: 100 / 100
If the Ministry of Defence or any of the branches of the armed forces fail to comply with the TCU’s recommendations, there could be…
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Nexus of Defence and National Assets

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Q18 70/100

Is there evidence that the country’s defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation and, if so, are these interests publicly stated and subject to scrutiny?

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Legal framework Score: 0 / 100
There is no explicit prohibition of defence institutions controlling financial or business-related to natural resource exploitation. However, there is no evidence that any defence…
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Defence institutions: Financial or controlling interests in practice Score: 50 / 100
There are few references in the media to royalties or financial interests of the armed forces in natural resources [1, 2]. However, draft bills…
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Individual defence personnel: Financial or controlling interests in practice Score: 100 / 100
The assessor found no evidence of involvement of military officials acting in companies that explore natural resources [1, 2].
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Transparency Score: 100 / 100
The assessor found very limited evidence of involvement of military officials acting in companies that explore natural resources. Their interests are related to having…
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Scrutiny Score: 100 / 100
In order for any military institution to have access to these royalties, the Parliament must approve it, and they denied access to the Army…
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Organised Crime

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Q19 38/100

Is there evidence, for example through media investigations or prosecution reports, of a penetration of organised crime into the defence and security sector? If no, is there evidence that the government is alert and prepared for this risk?

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Penetration of organised crime Score: 25 / 100
There is some evidence in the media of some level of organized crime penetration into the armed forces, such as the case of the…
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Government response Score: 50 / 100
The main fear of civil society is the contact of the military with organized crime during the deployment of the armed forces in public…
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Q20 42/100

Is there policing to investigate corruption and organised crime within the defence services and is there evidence of the effectiveness of this policing?

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Existence of policing function Score: 50 / 100
According to an interviewee, The Federal Police and even the state civilian police can investigate any relationship between organized crime and the armed forces,…
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Independence Score: 25 / 100
The Brazilian Federal Police is not subordinate to nor dependent on military institutions. It is under the auspices of the Ministry of Justice and…
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Effectiveness Score: 50 / 100
The assessor found no evidence of undue political influence in the media [1]. However, according to an interviewee, investigations are not always undertaken because…
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Control of Intelligence Services

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Q21 38/100

Are the policies, administration, and budgets of the intelligence services subject to effective and independent oversight?

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Independence Score: 75 / 100
The Committee for Intelligence Control (CCAI – Comissão de Controle das Atividades de Inteligência), created in 2013, has powers to exert oversight of any…
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Effectiveness Score: 0 / 100
Since 2015, seven public hearings occurred [1], and none of them occurred in 2018 or 2019. The complete content of the meetings is not…
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Q22 33/100

Are senior positions within the intelligence services filled on the basis of objective selection criteria, and are appointees subject to investigation of their suitability and prior conduct?

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Objective selection criteria Score: 0 / 100
In Brazil, there is the Brazilian Agency of Intelligence (ABIN), it is under the command of the Gabinete de Segurança Institucional da Presidência da…
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Selection bias Score: 50 / 100
Considering the selection process for the ABIN, since its chief is chosen by the president [1], the veto power from the Senate might suffer…
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Vetting process Score: 50 / 100
There are norms for vetting any military personnel from working in the intelligence system. The functions of these vetting mechanisms are similar in every…
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Export Controls

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Q23 33/100

Does the government have a well-scrutinised process for arms export decisions that aligns with Articles 7.1.iv, 11.5, and 15.6 of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)?

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Signatory and Ratification Score: 100 / 100
Brazil ratified the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) in August 2018 [1], the ratification included the whole Treaty (no articles were omitted from the ratification)…
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Compliance Score: 0 / 100
The ATT was ratified in 2018, and it was enacted by Decree 9.607/2018, in December 2018. This decree established the National Policy of Import…
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Parliamentary scrutiny Score: 0 / 100
One year after the enactment, the assessor could not find any assessments in the media nor any discussion in the legislature (both chambers) regarding…
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Lobbying in Defence

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Q76 0/100

Does the country regulate lobbying of defence institutions?

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Legal framework Score: 0 / 100
Lobbying regulations in Brazil has been debated for decades, but none of the draft bills was enacted. Pressures to regulate the activity are increasing,…
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Disclosure: Public officials Score: NA / 100
This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’ as Brazil does not have legislation that regulates lobbying [1].
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Lobbyist registration system Score: NA / 100
This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’ as Brazil does not have legislation that regulates lobbying [1].
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Oversight & enforcement Score: NA / 100
This indicator is marked ‘Not Applicable’ as Brazil does not have legislation that regulates lobbying [1].
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