Parliament is an essential component of civilian control. Its role is to debate, approve, adopt and monitor the implementation of laws and policies in the security sector and to ensure that they reflect and take into account the needs of the population. In accordance with the constitution of Benin, parliament exercises control over the execution of the budget and all public expenditure including that ofdefence through regulation law. First of all, control is done upstream through the budget projects submitted by ministerial authorities. Downstream in relation to budget execution. This budgetary control is carried out through reports from the finance committees. It is for this purpose that the Ministers of Defense, along with their counterparts from other ministries, present their draft budget to the parliament [1]. Each budget line is presented. This exercise, which takes the form of questions and answers, allows a comparison of previous budgets and, if necessary, to give reasons for possible changes. The details on secret items relating to national security and defense are discussed in a closed session of the the committee of Defense [2]. Generally even if the debate takes place in parliament, the legislative commission in Benin does not receive complete information on the expenditures of secret positions linked to national security and military intelligence [3].

The defence and security committees of the National Assembly and Senate, which represent the legislative power in this area, are never informed about spending under secret headings relating to national security and military intelligence. [1] [2] Military and intelligence budgets are not fully subject to parliamentary or civilian oversight. [3]

In Cameroon, the legislature receives only limited information on expenditures related to national security secret and military intelligence items. While the National Assembly may review the overall defence budget, detailed expenditures linked to classified operations and intelligence services are usually kept confidential.[1] This restricted access means that even specialised parliamentary committees do not have the full oversight needed to carefully assess these funds. As a result, the transparency around these items is minimal, hindering comprehensive parliamentary scrutiny. This gap can lead to financial opacity and heighten the risks of mismanagement and corruption, as restricted information reduces the legislature’s ability to hold defence and intelligence spending accountable.[2]

Members of Parliament receive little information in the budget on intelligence-related activities and no information on secret posts [2] [3]. None of the above-mentioned bodies are identified in the budget. The draft finance bill for the state budget for 2025 mentions 12 items relating to intelligence-related activities. Seven of these relate to the armed forces and the national gendarmerie: 1. “Implementing strategic intelligence policy”; 2. “Managing defence intelligence and strategic intelligence activities”; 3. “Managing the defence intelligence activities of the armed forces general staff”; 4. “Coordinate the intelligence activities of units attached to the national gendarmerie. 5. Coordinate and control the activities of the intelligence section (RGTS). 6. Implement intelligence policy within the national gendarmerie. 7 “Implement intelligence policy within the national gendarmerie”. [1]

The budget estimates submitted to the Parliamentary Committee on Defence and Interior do not specifically detail expenditures related to secret items. While this raises concern over the potential for unmonitored spending in areas critical to national security, it is argued that the sensitivity of some acquisitions makes it imperative to keep it as a secret. (1) (2)

The budget is a one-line item and there is no breakdown. Officially, it’s not known how much goes to confidential budgets [1]. In June 2024, the president was compelled to reduce the confidential budget allocation to his office by 50% due to ongoing protests against the financial bill. Responding to Gen-Z demands, he assured the country that “budgetary provisions for confidential budgets in various Executive offices, including his office, shall be removed” [2].
Unlike the issues surrounding the executive office, the matter of confidential budgets related to security hasn’t received widespread public debate. However, in response to public outcry, the president conceded to protesters’ demands to eliminate confidential budgets.

According to the Public Financial Management Law, the budget is supposed to be submitted to the legislature three months ahead of the next budget year. This timeline is designed to allow for sufficient review and consultation with the appropriate ministry, agency and commission of government. Some of the consultation require during the budget review concerns the defence sector because certain aspects of the budget otherwise termed as secret items are often labelled as covert. The covert item is designated as national security priorities for which too much scrutiny is restricted to anyone without the right clearance level. Also, details of the covert/secret items stipulated in the budget is not shared with the legislature. Some watchers of the national budget process are suspicious about the late submission of the budget and the passage of secret/covert items in it.[1][2][3]

Military intelligence falls almost exclusively within the prerogatives of the executive [1]. Thus, parliamentarians do not have access to information concerning expenditure relating to secret posts [2] [3].

Information on expenditures on secret posts or expenditures on secret posts is not only not broken down but is also not made available to the legislative branch, in particular the Defence, Security and Civil Protection Committee.[1][2] Furthermore, the Legislative Body’s Control still does not in fact extend to the intelligence services, which continues to create blatant opportunities for corruption.

The legislature is provided with no information on spending on secret items because the Information from the Defence and Security Forces to the Legislature does not address operational issues; protection of sources, means and methods of action; protection of third party privacy rights; or information provided by Foreign Intelligence Services [1]. The information provided by the Defence and Security Forces to the Assembly of the Republic, in general, or the Parliamentary Committee on Defence, Security and Public Order relates to general and non-operational matters [1]. In Parliament, the Minister of Defence makes interventions in the context of procedural hearings and government reports, in plenary sessions for general matters, and in the Parliamentary Committee on Defence, Order and Public Security for specific matters [2]: for example, in a plenary session in April 2024, the Minister of Defence explained the outlines of the financial issues being developed for the withdrawal of SADC forces in Cabo Delgado [3]; and in the parliamentary committee on Defence, Order and Public Security in March 2024, he explained the importance of the law on the use of drones and national security in Mozambique [4].

Before the military coup of July 26, 2023, Niger’s National Assembly had a Security and Defense Committee (Commission de la Défense et de la Sécurité), established at the beginning of each legislative cycle, as mandated by Article 30 of the National Assembly’s Internal Rules [1]. Composed of 24 members from various political parties, this committee was responsible for overseeing national defense and security policies, as well as scrutinizing the work of the Ministries of Defense and Security [1]. Its jurisdiction extended to defense organization, security cooperation, emergency declarations, military personnel status, national defense obligations, and military justice [1]. Under the formal rights of its mandate, the committee could be provided with full budgetary information, including spending on secret items related to national security and military intelligence. However, following the coup, the National Assembly was dissolved, effectively eliminating any legislative oversight over defense and intelligence expenditures [2]. With no parliamentary body in place to review classified spending, the level of transparency and accountability in this area has been completely eroded.

The legislature in Nigeria approves defence budget almost as presented but it is rarely provided with information on spending on secret items [1]. Depending on the nature of security challenges facing the country, the legislature occasionally interface with the leadership of the military and security agencies to discuss issues of national security but some top secret items are often not discussed. However, some secret issues could be discussed when they dissolve into closed-door session [2,3]. For some agencies of the nation’s defence intelligence community, such as the DSS, NIA and DIA, the House of Representatives Committee members usually do not look at the details of their budgets. As the Chairman of the Committee, Sha’ban Sharada, remarked in 2021, it is a “cherished established” tradition not to scrutinise budgetary allocations to intelligence agencies [4].

Information on the budget and the acquisition of top-secret military equipment by the army is not made available to the defence and security committee [1] The secret nature of certain types of weapon means that not everything can be made public and known to everyone [2] . In many countries in the world, this is the case for military expenditure. [3] . Senegal has also faced chronic delays in the formulation and approval of defence-related financial planning documents.

Sessions of the Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence (JSCI) are closed and insufficient information is publicly available to determine the extent to which the committee is provided full access to this information. [1] The JSCI’s report states that even the Inspector General of Intelligence was unable to examine spending on secret items. Recurrent complaints by the Auditor General on a lack of access to secret spending confirms that there is a challenge with constitutional oversight mechanisms accessing secret budgets.

The specialised Committee on Defence and Veteran Affairs in South Sudan’s National Legislative Assembly is provided with information on spending on secret items, but description of expenditures is generalised into categories, or some data is presented in a broader categorisation [1] [2]. For example, in page 439 of the 2023/2024 budget, the defence ministry budget is summarized into wages and salaries, use of goods and services, capital expenditures and areas. The budget is not broken into specifics. Specifically, secret expenditure does not feature in the budget estimates in detail. [2] Expenditure for sensitive operations, capital equipment and classified expenditures—are routinely withheld and are often justified under the umbrella of “classified expenditure” to prevent public oversight. For example, in the draft 2023/2024 budget SSP 143.26 billion was allocated to the Ministry of Defence, however only SSP 6.7 billion of this amount was specified as capital spending. The remaining amount was not publicly itemized, with officials citing confidentiality and security concerns [3].

The balance between transparency and national security is particularly evident in the parliamentary oversight of the Ministry of Defence and Veteran Affairs (MoDVA) budget. While Parliament holds the authority to approve the budget, the classified nature of certain expenditures inevitably limits the scope of public and legislative scrutiny. This limitation stems from the imperative to protect sensitive information that could compromise national security or ongoing military operations. For instance, the specifics of equipment deployed in regions like Somalia or the Democratic Republic of Congo, where the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) is active, are justifiably withheld [2]. The allocation of funds to intelligence agencies like the Internal Security Organisation (ISO) and the External Security Organisation (ESO) further illustrates this point. The UGX 42.9 billion allocated for recruiting security agents and the UGX 26.67 billion for new equipment used in classified special operations, as well as the UGX 28.88 billion for technical and transport equipment for the ESO are all deemed sensitive [1]. Providing detailed information about these expenditures to the entire legislature would risk exposing operational capabilities and strategic intentions, potentially jeopardising ongoing or future security efforts. Therefore, access to such sensitive information is restricted to authorised personnel with appropriate security clearance.[1].

While the Constitution of Zimbabwe allows parliament to have a committee which deals with specific issues on the defence sector, the Committee on Defence and Security [1], this is simply in theory as the committee and parliament lacks the power to force and summon the defence sector to testify and clarify any issues of interest to the public in parliament. The defence sector is protected by the Official Secrets Act not to divulge and or share information which is security sensitive with the public [2]. Thus, if the defence forces do not submit any required information to specialised committee on defence to present it to parliament, then even the Auditor General is left with nothing to present on defence and there is no information specific to the defence forces, but other government Ministries are reported by the Auditor General [3].