Within the Beninese defence and security forces, there are identifiable structures whose mandate is to promote integrity and fight corruption. Among them, there is the General Inspectorate of the Armed Forces, whose role is to carry out inspection, control, verification, study, investigation and information missions in all units of the Beninese armed forces [1]. Within the Ministries of Defence and Security, two internal control structures have been set up: the Ministerial Committee for Risk Management (CMMR) and the Ministerial Committee for Internal Audit (CMAI). These two structures participate in actions to prevent and raise awareness against fraud, corruption and similar offences [2]. The ministers are responsible for providing the supervisory bodies with adequate human, material and financial resources for the implementation of their activities. The appropriations of the internal audit bodies shall be made available at the beginning of each financial year and shall be used in the light of the needs expressed and shall not be subject to any reduction [3]. But in practice, the amounts allocated to the control structures are sometimes limited;, which can limit their actions [4].

The General Inspectorate of the Armed Forces (IGA) is not part of the chain of command because it is placed under the direct authority of the Minister of Defense .[1][4] As far as the Ministerial Committee for Risk Management (CMMR) is concerned, it is chaired by the Ministry’s General Secretariat and is composed of the Ministry’s technical and central directors [2]. As for the Ministerial Committee for Internal Audit (CMAI), it is chaired by an external person appointed by the President of the Republic; a second external person appointed by the President of the Republic is a member. [3] [5]

The personnel of the Ministerial Committee for Risk Management (CMMR) and the Ministerial Committee for Internal Audit (CMAI) a priori understand the corruption risks specific to the army. They are able to manage risks independently and ensure that other units or departments deal with risks appropriately.They raise awareness and contribute to the training of staff in the ministry, units and barracks on the risk-based management approach, and on the risks related to corruption [2]. They share strategic guidelines from the regulations in force on corruption in Benin [1]. These actions include training and awareness-raising for armed forces personnel. The Beninese Armed Forces have set up a unit to promote integrity and combat corruption, which carries out this type of activity. There are also awareness-raising activities on accountability and transparency in management, to reduce abuses and other bad practices. The CMMR carries out follow-up and evaluation missions of these actions in the garrisons [3].

The Ministry of National Defence and Veterans has a national defence inspectorate. One of its tasks is to monitor positive values within the army and combat corrupt practices. The same applies to the National Defence Force General Staff, where there is a department responsible for troop morale and public relations. This department is also responsible for promoting positive values such as integrity within the defence sector. However, these departments have very little power, funding or expertise to fully carry out their missions. [1][2][3][4]

The above-mentioned departments, namely the Inspectorate General of the Ministry of National Defence and the Department of Troop Morale and Public Relations, are under the responsibility of the Minister of National Defence and the Chief of Staff respectively [1] [2]. They are therefore under the political control of these authorities, which can interrupt their work [1].

The members of these services are aware of their missions, but they recognise that they are not sufficiently equipped to play their role to the full. [1] [2]. Indeed, their role is limited to identifying corruption risks. They may even uncover cases of corruption but they cannot go beyond this to hold those guilty of acts of corruption accountable[2]. Their reports on cases and risks of corruption go unheeded [1]. Moreover, the public, including those in the army, fully understands corruption and knows it can be instrumentalised/leveraged when it suits those in power [3], as in a recent case brought up against the Governor of the Central Bank [4][5].

At MINDEF, there is an internal institutional service designed to strengthen integrity in the fight against corruption. The unit was created during the 2001 reforms of the defence forces. The Ministry of Defence has a “General Inspectorate of the Armed Forces,” which oversees all the bodies and reports to the Minister of Defence. There is also another institution, the “General Control of the Armed Forces”, located within the MINDEF and reporting to the Minister. Under the terms of article 12, the “General Control of the Armed Forces” has the task of verifying the application of laws, ordinances, decrees, regulations and ministerial decisions; noting and identifying irregularities, operational defects, and organisational shortcomings in administrative, financial or accounting matters; and ensuring that the rights of persons and interests of the Public Treasury are safeguarded.[1] This administration is under the authority of military auditors appointed by the President of the Republic. On 30 August 2023, the President appointed new Inspectors-General of the Armed Forces: Captain Ajeagah Njei Felix and Colonels Kamdom Lucas and Nguema Ondo Bertin Bourger [2]. Acting under the authority of the Minister, each inspection mission produces a detailed report for the Minister. The General Controller of the Armed Forces also reports his findings to the Minister and proposes measures to improve the organisation and operation of the service or to rectify any observed irregularities.[3] The main issue is that the institution faces challenges in staffing, funding and expertise. Some generals and colonels sometimes see working there as a kind of pre-retirement appointment. [4]

Regarding the independence of the general control of the armed forces, it is important to mention that it depends on the Ministry of Defence, as it is part of its institutional framework. In fact, it is a department within the central administration of the Ministry of Defence.[1] Since MINDEF reports directly to the Presidency of the Republic, this administration is not independent, but it cannot be dissolved by other defence and security institutions. In reality, it is the Head of State who determines the structure and organisation of the armed forces, establishes their missions and regulations, and governs the disciplinary code and the procurement of military equipment.[2] While this structure depends on MINDEF, it cannot be abolished solely by the will of the ministry’s senior management. Only the Head of State can disband the entire institutions of MINDEF. Furthermore, beyond regulation, the general inspectorate and general control are often viewed as areas for reassigning for officers and generals who have faced professional setbacks or are in disfavour.[4] Additionally, some officers approaching retirement are also assigned to these positions. It is noted that certain individual lack designated offices and must depend on the support of political figures, particularly the defence minister, from whom they obtain essential resources.

The ministry’s staff are aware that corruption is widespread within the organisation. This is why the Ministry’s inspection departments are collaborating with the country’s anti-corruption body to eliminate this scourge. This cooperation resulted in meetings between MINDEF and CONAC as part of the search for ways and means to prevent and combat corruption in Cameroon.[1]. However, Cameroon faces a lack of real accountability in the security sector and the impunity of corrupt soldiers in most cases.[2] Indeed, the primary priority for personnel within the “garage” is to facilitate their exit from this position. To achieve this goal, it is essential to maintain amicable relations with current officeholders, especially those who may be implicated in acts of corruption.[3]

Within the office of the Minister of Defence, there is a specialised unit responsible for monitoring and evaluation, as well as a unit dedicated to major reforms [1]. There is also an Investigation Commission within the Armed Forces of Côte d’Ivoire, which has disciplinary jurisdiction, in particular for the following offences: habitual misconduct: repeated offences that damage reputation and authority and are such as to justify sanctions such as suspension or permanent dismissal of the person concerned for serious misconduct in the performance of their duties, and dishonourable conduct, and a prison sentence without loss of rank, with or without a suspended sentence, which has become final. In addition, within the Armed Forces of Côte d’Ivoire (FACI), there is also a General Inspectorate of the Armed Forces [1], whose mission is to inspect all formations, structures and services of the general staff of the armed forces, the land forces, the air force, the navy, the special forces and the joint services, and to monitor their operational capacity. It is responsible for ensuring that the Armed Forces are able to carry out all the missions entrusted to them and for taking all necessary measures to this end. To this end, it may conduct studies or investigations, either on the orders of the Minister of Defence or on its own initiative. However, the IGA has no power to impose sanctions and its role is limited to making recommendations and contributing to the promotion of ethics and citizenship within the armed forces. [2] No information is available on the expertise of the staff. The budget of the Inspectorate General is included in the budget of the Ministry of Defence, but is classified. [3]

The specialised units responsible for monitoring and evaluation, major reforms and the Inspectorate General of the Armed Forces are placed under the authority of the Ministry of Defence, from which they receive their budget [1][2]. The legislation does not explicitly state that the IGA can be dissolved by the Ministry. However, under his prerogatives, the Minister of Defence has the power to propose structural reforms or reorganisations within the Ministry, including with regard to the IGA.

The effectiveness of these institutions is not supported by concrete results, probably due to their lack of independence from the military hierarchy. No information is available on staff awareness of corruption risks within the institution. [1] [2]

The Inspector General’s Department (IGD) of the Ghana Armed Forces, Stationed at the General headquarters was set up in 2012 to address issues relating to corruption and integrity within the Ghana Armed Forces. It is headed by a one-star general and reports directly to the Chief of Defence Staff. (1) (2) (3)
While the IGD’s existence demonstrates that a compliance and ethics mechanism is formally in place, there is no publicly available information on its staffing levels, professional expertise, or funding allocation. Ministry of Defence budget documents do not disaggregate funds for the IGD (4).

The Inspector General’s Department is situated within the Chain of Command. However, to provide some level of insulation from interference, it reports directly to the Chief of Defence Staff.

The Inspector General’s Department of the General Headquarters periodically inspects operational readiness and conducts training for units of the Ghana Armed Forces. These trainings are meant to sensitize personnel on corruption risks and other standard operating procedures for the execution of their mandate. (1) The IGD also liaises with other anti-corruption institutions such as the Office of the Special Prosecutor and the Economic and Organised Crime Office (EOCO) to foster operational collaboration.(2) (3)

There is evidence to suggest that the MoD actively engages with independent institutions with an anti-corruption mandate, specifically the Commission for Administrative Justice (CAJ) and the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC), to support their efforts. The CAJ is mandated under Article 59(4) of the Kenyan Constitution to address maladministration in the public service. In 2023, the Defence CS hosted the CAJ and suggested having a liaison officer from the CAJ within the ministry to facilitate access to information. He added that the two institutions should conduct joint training sessions and review legislation together. Recently, the CEO of EACC visited the CDF, where they discussed how KDF incorporates anti-corruption measures and maintains ethical standards. The two leaders acknowledged that these values are crucial for ensuring the military remains accountable and professional in fulfilling the KDF mandate. To strengthen existing ethics and anti-corruption measures, EACC was invited to work closely with KDF, particularly to prevent recruitment malpractices [1].
The Ministry of Defence collaborates closely with the CAJ and the EACC. The CAJ is mandated under Article 59(4) of the Kenyan Constitution to tackle maladministration in the public service. The Defence CS offered for the CAJ to have a liaison officer within the ministry to enable access to information. Recently, the CEO of EACC visited the CDF, where they discussed how KDF incorporates anti-corruption measures and maintains ethical standards. The two leaders acknowledged that these values are critical to ensuring the military remains accountable and professional in fulfilling the KDF mandate. To build on existing ethics and anti-corruption measures, EACC was invited to work closely with KDF, especially to curb recruitment malpractices [2].
However, a 2021 analysis found that the EACC frequently did not receive its full annual budget, limiting its investigative capacity. As a result, its ability to procure required resources, such as enough employees and information technologies, is limited. The study therefore recommended that the national assembly of Kenya should allocate more financial resources to EACC to enhance the capacity of the agencyin fighting corruption [3].

There are no independent, well-resourced, and effective institutions within defence and security tasked with building integrity and countering corruption. Instead, the MoD works closely with the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission to provide the requisite functions. Recently, the appointed CDF Gen. Charles Kahariri (2024) invited the Secretary and Chief Executive Officer of the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission, Mr. Twalib Mbarak, to discuss how EACC could support KDF in building on existing ethics and anti-corruption measures. The Kenyan Defence Force is interested in how EACC can support them to curb recruitment malpractices [1].
Section 3 of the Kenya Defence Forces Act outlines guiding principles for the Defence Forces, including the prevention of corruption and the promotion of transparency and accountability. Section 124 addresses corruption and economic crimes specifically: “Corruption and economic crimes: (1) A person subject to this Act who—
(a) engages in corruption, malpractices, or any act or omission while on duty for selfish purposes or gains; or
(b) causes loss through dereliction of duty, commits an offence and shall, upon conviction, be punished in accordance with the Penal Code (Cap. 63), the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, 2003 (No. 3 of 2003), the law relating to public procurement and disposal of public property, or any other written law, as circumstances may require [2]. The offence under subsection [1] shall be triable in the civil courts” [1].
In practice, EACC officials have publicly acknowledged corruption in the KDF and called for closer auditing of KDF accounts [3]. These interactions indicate engagement, but not full autonomy—defence issues remain shrouded in security exceptions that severely limit oversight.

There is evidence to suggest that staff within the unit are aware of corruption risks in the MoD since most have been publicised, including recruitment malpractice [1]. The Kenyan Defence Force has consistently struggled with recruitment malpractice, which has become endemic. It is unclear whether the KDF has implemented long-term measures to curb this issue, which persists despite many interventions coming out of KDF’s collaboration with the EACC [2].

The National Defense Act 2008, Chapter 8, Code of Conduct, states that all personnel of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) shall adhere to democratic values, and human rights and shall be non-partisan. To support these principles, the Ministry of National Defense is backed by administrative, human resources, finance and audit teams
Chapter 9 (National Defense Act 2008) outlines a credible system of auditing and accountability for all public property, including real property, including real property and funds under the AFL.[1] This framework is reinforced by the PFM Law [2] and by the Internal Audit Agency (IAA) and General Auditing Commission (GAC). The Internal Audit Agency (IAA) is an autonomous integrity institution established by an Act of Legislature with the mandate to establish, direct, and control internal audit functions across all branches of government, including the Executive government, Legislature, and Judiciary.
Within the security sector, the Inspector General, as specified under the NSA Act, is also mandated to lead financial audits of defence and security activities and report findings to the President or the Minister of Finance. Overall, the Defence and security units have an independent system in place and experts on finance, audit and human resources, integrity institutions such as IAA and GAC provide independent and external oversight.

There are some internal accountability structures outlined in Liberia’s defence and security legal framework. The National Defense Act of 2008 mandates the establishment of a credible system of auditing and accountability within the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL).[1] Similarly, the National Security Agency (NSA) Act provides for the appointment of an Inspector General (IG) responsible for leading financial audits and reporting findings to the President or the Minister of Finance. In cases of legal violations, the IG is required to report directly to the Minister of Justice.[2]
However, in practice, these mechanisms are largely weak. For instance, the IG’s role has been politicised, with little evidence of meaningful action. Many were unaware of the IG’s portfolio until 2024, when the new administration attempted to audit the NSA[3]. Rather than supporting accountability, the IG’s position was reportedly used to block the audit process. There are virtually no public reports of the IG referring violations to the Ministry of Justice, as mandated by law.
To strengthen internal oversight, the Internal Audit Agency (IAA) attempted to assign an internal auditor to the Ministry of National Defense. This effort was rejected by the ministry, despite the President’s intervention. While the ministry appeared to accept the proposal publicly, it was never implemented in practice.[4] As of now, the IAA has still not been able to deploy an auditor within the Ministry of National Defense.[5]
While the IAA has the authority to operate within the defence sector, actual implementation has been sporadic and dependent on the willingness of individual ministries to accommodate such oversight.[6]

Staff of the Defence sector are recruited with full knowledge of the risk of corruption. Accordingly, they are trained to minimise the risk through adherence to the PFM law and the strengthening of the internal control measures of the Ministry. In keeping with this law, there have been strong internal systems developed to ensure that the risk of corruption and other ethical breaches are minimised. However, the assessment of these units revealed that there are some weaknesses with the system. Some of these weaknesses have been identified to be staffing and failure to adequately adhere to PFM and other integrity related standards and law.[1][2]

Within the Ministry of Defense there is a Directorate in charge of Legal Affairs. Within this department there is an Ethics and Professional conduct Department and an Anti-Corruption unit.
The Anti-Corruption Unit has three divisions :
– The Prevention Division ensures activities linked to the popularization of texts relating to the fight against corruption within the Ministry and the Army, and activities related to appropriation by ministerial staff and by elements of the Army of values ​​linked to corruption. It is also meant to ensure the integrity and transparency of public services in order to prevent and reduce the risks of corruption. It further gives opinions and proposes to the competent authorities measures that could be taken to prevent acts of corruption.
– The Repression Division, in collaboration with the competent authorities, particularly BIANCO,is in charge of access to all documents and information relating to the implementation of the ministerial action plan to fight corruption,.iIt ensures the monitoring of the processing and the evolution, at the judicial, disciplinary and statutory level, of cases of corruption identified awithin the level of the Mministry and army, ensuring their processing at the Ajudicial, disciplinarmy, and statutory levels.
– The Monitoring and Evaluation Division monitors the concrete implementation of the ministerial action plan and all anti-corruption actions. It establishes periodic reports, and in particular an annual report on the implementation of the action plan on the fight against corruption in the defense sector, presenting the results of activities in the area as well as any proposals for improvement in the matter [1].
Regarding personnel and budget, the anti-corruption unit benefits from the budget of the Ministry of Defense [2]. Since the fight against corruption is a priority for the State, the department responsible for it also benefits from better treatment in terms of budget and staff training.

The institutions/ units are under political control or they are misused. The work of the institutions can be shut down by other defence and security institutions. As these institutions are services under the supervision of the legal affairs department, their staff is under the control of the director and therefore the minister. They are under political control. Moreover, the institutions in charge of the fight against corruption must first obtain an “authorization to prosecute” given by a hierarchical authority to prosecute a corrupt soldier [1]. This constitutes a significant difficulty in the fight against corruption within the defense forces [2].

Although they have not conducted a Corruption Risk Assessment, they are aware of the risks of corruption in the Armed Forces. The Ministry of the Armed Forces internal anti-corruption policy (PILCC) emphasizes on the first page that “An assessment of the implementation of the PILCC has been carried out after two years of implementation of this PILCC….” and on the second page “To ensure its effective implementation and a palpable decrease in cases of corruption in the Armed Forces,…”. This demonstrates their awareness of corruption risks in the sector, and some improvements have already been made to address the identified high-frequency risks [1].The institutions have clear missions in terms of prevention, repression and monitoring and evaluation, but this does not mean that their activities are really effective [2].

There is no evidence of such units existing or of any efforts to establish them.[1] However, the General Inspectorate of the Armed Forces and Services may, within its control, supervision, or verification missions, be interested in issues related to corruption, but it is not independent.[2][3]

There is no such unit within the institutional structure of the defence and security sector. It is the inspectorates that handle these matters, along with others. This indicator is marked as Not Applicable. [1][2][3]

There is no such unit within the institutional structure of the defence and security sector. It is the inspectorates that handle these matters, along with others. This indicator is marked as Not Applicable. [1][2][3]

In the Mozambican Armed Forces, there is the Inspectorate General of Defence, which is a unit responsible for monitoring compliance, ethics, integrity, and corruption in the Defence Sector [1], but there are weaknesses in terms of personnel, budget and expertise [6]. The Inspectorate General of Defence also has a mandate for inspection, supervision, and administrative and operational auditing [2]. Its resources are provided by the Ministry of National Defence [3]. In cases of corruption, it is guided by the Law on Combating Corruption [4] and the Strategy for Combating Corruption in Public Administration [5], where the Armed Forces are integrated by the Ministry of National Defence. Regarding this institution, there are some weaknesses in terms of qualified personnel to carry out inspections and checks and audits. Another is that the funding for the National Defence Inspectorate comes from the budget allocated to the Ministry of National Defence [6].

The Constitution of the Republic, the Defence Policy, and the ordinary laws of the Defence and Security Forces require that the Defence and Security Forces must pay special obedience to the President of the Republic, as Commander-in-Chief [1]. As the President of the Republic is the President of the Party that receives the most votes in the elections, there is likely a political influence on these units, due to the principle of obedience to the Commander-in-Chief [2]. The Inspector General and the Inspectors of the Branches of the Army, Air Force and Navy are appointed by the Ministry of Defence, and the budget for their operation comes from budgetary donations from the Ministry of National Defence [3]. The National Defence Inspectorate is part of the central structure of the Ministry of National Defence and the Armed Forces. It enjoys a certain degree of autonomy and independence in its internal oversight and scrutiny processes. However, its subordinate status makes it susceptible to influence from both the structures of the Ministry of National Defence and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces [4, 5]. Given its status and institutional situation, this body may be activated or deactivated, with greater powers granted or powers withdrawn, as occurred during the transformation of the Popular Forces for the Liberation of Mozambique into the Armed Forces for the Defence of Mozambique in 1994, and during the reforms of the internal structure of the Ministry of National Defence and the Armed Forces that took place in 2016, with the approval of Ministerial Decree No. 107/2016 of 30 December, which granted greater powers to the National Defence Inspectorate [5].

In terms of effectiveness, the staff of the Ministry of Defence and the Mozambican Armed Forces who deal with inspection, integrity, ethics, and anti-corruption understand the risks and dynamics of corruption [1, 2], but there is no technical preparation and effective action plan with specific and appropriate mitigation measures [3]. This is because there is a General Strategy to Combat Corruption in the Public Sector, but there is still no specific strategy for the Defence and Security Forces [4].

Niger’s defense and security services comprise several key institutions, each with distinct responsibilities. The Niger Armed Forces (FAN), operating under the Ministry of Defense, are tasked with ensuring external security and, in some regions, maintaining internal security. The Gendarmerie Nationale (GN), also under the Ministry of Defense, focuses primarily on rural security. The National Guard of Niger (GNN), reporting to the Ministry of the Interior, is responsible for domestic security, as well as the protection of high-ranking officials and government buildings. Lastly, the National Police, under the Ministry of Interior, handle urban law enforcement and public order [1]. Two key inspection bodies are tasked with promoting integrity and countering corruption within the defense and security sectors: the Inspection Générale des Armées et de la Gendarmerie Nationale (IGA/GN) and the Inspection Générale des Services de Sécurité (IGSS). The IGA/GN was established under Decree No. 2011-218/PRN/IGA/GN of July 26, 2011, and operates under the direct authority of the Chief of State. The body is led by the Inspector General of the Armies and the National Gendarmerie (IGAGN), who is appointed by the Chief of the State. The IGSS was created under Decree No. 2017-516/PRN/MI/SP/D/ACR/DGPN/DERPS/CT of June 16, 2017, to oversee the administrative and disciplinary activities of security services under the Ministry of Interior. Both IGA/GN and IGSS were maintained as institutions following the military coup of July 26, 2023. The IGA/GN is charged with ensuring that all relevant administrative, financial and budgetary rules and standards are applied and respected, and that public resources are managed in a transparent, efficient and cost-effective manner. The role of IGA/GN is to assess the operational readiness of the Nigerien Armed Forces and the National Gendarmerie. It has also ensured permanent inspections across all military and gendarmerie units, commands, and services, including central administrations like the Ministry of National Defense and the General Command of the National Gendarmerie [2]. The IGSS is directly supervised by the Minister of Interior and its responsibilities include oversight of the National Police, the National Guard of Niger, and Civil Protection services [2]. The IGSS has a comprehensive organizational structure that includes: Inspections and divisions for investigations and control and a mobile brigade for on-the-spot checks of operations and setups. Both bodies are constrained by their dependency on the budgets of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior, respectively. Resource allocation for specific missions or inspections is subject to the approval of their hierarchical authorities: the Chief of State for the IGA/GN and the Minister of Interior for the IGSS. This dependency limits their ability to independently allocate resources, which impacts the scope and effectiveness of their oversight activities. Therefore, the IGA/GN is mandated to ensure compliance with administrative, financial, and budgetary regulations across the Armed Forces and the Gendarmerie. However, the operational effectiveness of both bodies is severely constrained by financial dependency. Neither the IGA/GN nor the IGSS controls its own budget, with the IGA/GN requiring resource approvals from the Chief of State, and the IGSS dependsing on the Minister of Interior for mission funding. This dependence hampers their autonomy, limiting their ability to conduct investigations proactively or respond effectively to emerging corruption risks. Furthermore, no evidence suggests that findings from these inspections lead to consistent, transparent sanctions or systemic reforms.
This situation reflects broader patterns described by Reno (1998), who explains that in many West African states, formal institutions in the security sector are often maintained for appearances but lack real independence or enforcement power [3]. Oversight bodies exist structurally but are hollowed out in practice, serving more to legitimize executive power than to ensure genuine accountability.

The IGA reports directly to the Chief of State rather than falling under the chain of command of the Ministry of Defense, while the IGSS operates under the authority of the Ministry of Interior [1]. Both institutions rely on funding from their respective hierarchies to carry out evaluation and audit missions, limiting their operational independence. Neither the IGA nor the IGSS can be classified as fully independent agencies due to this financial dependency, which undermines their ability to function autonomously. Additionally, as the commander-in-chief of the Nigerien Armed Forces, the Chief of State and President of the CNSP holds the authority to shut down both units.
In the context of escalating insecurity, operational challenges within the defense and security forces, and the military’s heightened concern over its inability to effectively combat terrorism, the independence of the IGA and IGSS appears increasingly compromised [2].

While the IGA and IGSS demonstrate an awareness of corruption risks, such as those at road checkpoints, they lack the capacity to prepare and implement effective action plans with appropriate mitigation measures. Their inability to enforce sanctions further diminishes their effectiveness.The IGA conducts two types of audits: planned and unplanned [1]. Planned audits involve scheduled fact-finding visits intended to occur throughout the year, while unplanned audits respond to emerging needs. According to an interviewee, the majority of recent inspections have been unplanned [2]. These audits typically examine key aspects such as personnel, armament, ammunition, vehicles, fuel, food, and health services. Additionally, both the IGA and IGSS recognize corruption at road checkpoints as a significant driver of insecurity, reflecting an understanding of specific corruption risks within their institutions. In the past six months, several missions were conducted in the Tillabéry region, a hotspot of insecurity. However, the reports generated by both IGA and IGSS are not made public and are submitted exclusively to their respective hierarchies. Importantly, neither institution holds the authority to impose sanctions, further limiting their capacity to address corruption risks effectively [2].

There are identifiable compliance and ethics units within defence and security that are mandated to handle integrity and corruption in defence, but there are some weaknesses, especially regarding expertise and capacity to investigate issues relating to corruption in the armed forces of Nigeria. The task of handling corruption in the Ministry of Defence in Nigeria falls within the remit of the Ministry’s Anti-Corruption and Transparency Unit (ACTU) [1]. However, issues regarding corruption by military personnel have in the past been investigated by either the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) or the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). For instance, in September 2022, Mr Bolaji Owasanoye, ICPC chairman, disclosed that some former military and security personnel are being investigated by ICPC and a sister agency for embezzlement of funds allocated to security [2]. Similarly, the EFCC in November 2023 arrested one serving officer of the Nigerian Army and seven operatives of the Nigerian Air Force (NAF) allegedly linked to Internet-related fraud [3].

In 2003, the Federal government considered and approved the request of the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) to establish the Anti-Corruption and Transparency Units (ACTUs) in MDAs [1]. Within the Ministry of Defence, the institution tasked with building integrity and countering corruption is ACTU [2]. The ACTU serves as an in-house mechanism for corruption prevention within Ministries, Departments and Agencies. Hence, the ACTU is semi-autonomous to the Ministry of Defence, as it is a part of the ICPC. The Office of the Director is located within the Office of the Permanent Secretary, which is a civilian role.
In practice, however, ACTUs may lack investigative autonomy, lack of funding, undue interference, and weak institutional support have hampered its performance [3].

The Anti-Corruption and Transparency Units (ACTUs) is the institutions tasked with building integrity and countering corruption within the Ministry of Defence [1]. The ACTU is an initiative of the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) approved by the Federal Government to serve as an in-house mechanism for corruption prevention within Ministries, Departments and Agencies. Hence, the ACTU is semi-autonomous to the Ministry of Defence as it is a part of the ICPC. The Office of the Director is located within the Office of the Permanent Secretary, which is a civilian role. The ACTU has the responsibility of building strong institutions and entrenching principles of accountability and transparency in the MOD. In December 2023, for instance, the ACTU organised a two-day sensitization programme on anti-corruption for staff of the Ministry of Defence at Ship House, Abuja [2].
Beyond its role in the MoD, other security agencies, such as the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC), also operationalise dedicated ACTUs under the supervision of the ICPC. These ACTUs collaborate with civil society organizations to strengthen anti-corruption efforts by contributing to capacity-building in the anti-corruption areas.

In Senegal, there is no specific unit in charge of ethics or corruption in the Minsitry of Defence but some internal compliance and inspection elements exist. First, the Directorate of Military Justice is responsible for assisting the Minister of the Armed Forces in the exercise of his prosecutorial powers in matters of military justice. It is dispensed by specialised courts, usually military courts, which have jurisdiction over acts committed by military personnel in the performance of their duties, or by military personnel treated as such, such as corruption [1] . The Directorate is headed by the High Commander of the National Gendarmerie, who is assisted by the second-in-command of the National Gendarmerie, who holds the title of Deputy Director of Military Justice. [2] Second,the Brigade prévôtale (or provost brigade) is a unit of the Gendarmerie nationale whose main mission is military judicial policing. The provost marshal frequently intervenes in cases of breaches of the code of ethics, acts of physical violence between military personnel, and breaches of the instructions laid down in the base’s internal regulations. [3] In three years, Senegal has gone through a serious political crisis punctuated by several episodes of deadly violence, resulting in dozens of deaths, thousands of injuries, and hundreds of arbitrary arrests, most of which are attributed to the gendarmerie, which is a military force. However, in no case has the Provost Brigade been asked to shed light on this affair. [4] However this unit is wihtin ght chain of command of the gendarmerie. Third, some inspection departments, including the Internal Inspectorates, also have this status, even though the fight against corruption is not explicitly included in their remit, and they do not have sufficient expertise in anti-corruption prevention. [5] No evidence has been found on the funding of these units.

These institutions are part of the chain of command of the defence and security institutions that they oversee, but they have an independent status. Although they can sometimes be influenced by politicians, the latter cannot shut them down. [1] The various ministries responsible for one or more military and paramilitary corps are represented within the Directorate of Military Justice by an officer or a member of the corresponding hierarchy. The latter is the official correspondent of the Director of Military Justice and works in close collaboration with him. [2] . The Provost Brigade has the prerogative of ensuring prevention and investigations concerning the defence and security forces, as well as preventing and combating corruption. There are other comprehensive units, such as the Direction de l’Inspection des Services de Sécurité (coordination) and the Division des Investigations Criminelles, through its brigade économique et financière (investigations). [3]

Aware of the phenomenon of corruption within its units, the national gendarmerie, through its provost brigade, is working on ways of dematerialising fixed fines. The project is being carried out by the Ministry of the Armed Forces, to which the gendarmerie belongs, in coordination with the Ministry of Finance. However, the fact that the two departments are different may lead to delays in implementation. [1] The staff within the provost brigade unit understand the corruption risks specific to their institutions, but they face issues toin addressing some risks independently . [2][3] Some control departments, including the Internal Inspectorates, also have this status, even though the fight against corruption is not explicitly included in their remit, and they do not have sufficient expertise in anti-corruption prevention and do not have enought ressources to cover the whole country where defence and security force are likely to be corrupt . [4]

Within the Department of Defence, the Defence Inspectorate Division and its Directorate Anti-Corruption and Anti-Fraud are charged with investigating and preventing corruption within the Department. [1] Likewise, the Military Police and the Military Ombuds have roles in investigating corruption allegations, while the Internal Audit Committee has an important oversight role within the Department. [2] An Ethics Committee of the Department of Defence was established in 2021, and an Ethics Management Policy is in place. Ongoing challenges with irregular expenditure and corruption cases, however, reveal that these bodies are limited in their effectiveness and lack the necessary budget and personnel to effectively execute their functions within a broader context of Departmental budget constraints. [3]

In terms of the Military Ombud Act, the office is independent although its funding is reliant on transfers from the Department of Defence, creating a potential constraint on operational autonomy [2]. The Ombuds is appointed by the President and can only be removed by the President on the grounds of misconduct or incompetence, strengthening the independence of the office.[1] Similarly, in terms of the Act, the office can only be disestablished by an Act of Parliament [1].
The Defence Inspectorate Division, on the other hand, is not functionally independent. It operates within the SANDF chain of command and reports internally. Its oversight activities may be constrained by military hierarchy [2]. Despite legal frameworks suggesting autonomy, in practice, both bodies can be influenced by internal military structures and budget dependencies, limiting their ability to function independently.

Staff within the Military Ombud and the Military Police Division show awareness of corruption risks. The Ombud’s reports regularly include systemic recommendations on improving integrity in complaints handling and soldier conduct, indicating recognition of institutional risks [1].
Effectiveness of the relevant bodies is undermined by staffing and budgetary shortages in a broader context of a shrinking defence budget. Only 57 positions are filled out of the 89 on the establishment list for the Office of the Military Ombuds. [2] Likewise, the Military Police face severe skills shortages affecting their performance with a backlog of cases nearly three times the number of cases investigated annually. [2]

At the national level, there are institutions such as the National Audit Chamber (Article 186), Anti-Corruption Commission (Article 143 of the constitution) and other independent institutions such as the Human Rights Commission (Article 145) that are tasked with building integrity and fighting corruption across government ministries [1]. The Ministry of Defence and Veteran Affairs also has internal mechanisms, including a procurement, budget and audit offices at the defence headquarters. However, these institutions are weak due to inadequate resources, political interference, as well as inadequate staff [2].

With a focus on the institutions that audit the Ministry of Defence and Veteran Affairs, two main institutions come out. The Transitional Legislative Assembly and its Specialised Committee on Defence and Veteran Affairs [1] and internal audit units within the Ministry itself [2]. For the legislative committee, the political connection between the legislature and the executive makes it difficult to gauge whether the committee can independently and objectively counter corruption in the defence ministry. This is because the transitional assembly was a product of political agreement through the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) signed in 2018, and which saw the ruling party take more than half of the seats in the Assembly. [3] The dominance of the ruling party is further highlighted in the composition of specialised committees, in which the executive also has a majority share. [3] The control of the transitional assembly by the ruling party erodes its ability to independently oversight corruption in the executive. The challenge is that even though the Public Financial Management and Accountability Act 2011 attempts to address the unique nature of the defence ministry by prescribing other methods of oversight, the proposed entities are not independent either, just like the Defence and Veterans Affairs Committee. Section 24 (5) of the Public Financial Management and Accountability Act, 2011 states that ‘The Minister shall only avail details on classified expenditure items to the Speaker of the Assembly and the Chairpersons of the Standing Specialized Committees on Economy, Development & Finance, and Standing Specialized Committee on Security and Public Order’ [4]. Similarly, the internal audit units are placed within the ministry, making it difficult to establish their level of independence. In addition, the R-ARCSS has politicized the independent institutions as the members of these commissions were appointed not based on merits, credentials and experience but based on political affiliations through power-sharing arrangements in the R-ARCSS.

There is not enough evidence to score this indicator.
It is challenging to assess the effectiveness of institutions responsible for building integrity and countering corruption in South Sudan, particularly within the Ministry of Defence and Veteran Affairs. This difficulty arises from the lack of publicly available information on procurement and audit processes, as well as their outcomes. A review of media sources from 2020 to 2024 [1] revealed no relevant reports on the effectiveness of these institutions. Additionally, respondents contacted for insights on this matter could not provide any more information. [2] [3]

Among the institutions available is the Anti-Corruption Unit which is established within the Ministry of Defence and Veteran Affairs mainly meant to investigate and prevent corruption. Secondly, there is an internal audit unit which is under the ministry and the UPDF, and its purpose is to conduct audits and investigations. Third, the inspectorate of government is mandated by the law to investigate corruption in all sectors including defence and security and lastly, the Parliamentary Committee on Defence and Internal Affairs oversees the defence and security sector including corruption issues [1], [2].
Uganda has well-established anti-corruption agencies such as the office of the auditor-general and the Inspectorate of Government (IG). The UPDF has a Disciplinary Committee, the General Court Martial. However, the anti-corruption institutions are underfunded and do not capacity to effectively fight corruption. For example, speaking at the 12th CPA Economic recently, the Inspector General of the Government, that government money is stolen through taxation, including non-declaration, under-declaration, and falsification of information. She also mentioned losses through procurement by over-pricing goods, buying poor-quality goods at premium prices, under-delivery, air-purchase, poor-quality work, unfinished contracts, awarding contracts to undeserving suppliers, leaving out competent suppliers, and kickbacks [3].

The Anti-Corruption Division of the High Court in Uganda appears to function with a degree of judicial independence, operating within the established legal framework to adjudicate corruption cases. However, the operational landscape of anti-corruption agencies presents a complex picture of autonomy and executive influence. While these agencies are formally established to combat corruption, they directly report to the President, granting the executive significant oversight and the ability to sanction their activities. This direct reporting line creates an inherent tension, raising questions about the extent to which these agencies can independently pursue investigations or prosecutions that might implicate powerful political figures or their allies [1]. There is a lack of clarity surrounding this dual structure. The independence within the judiciary and direct reporting to the president make it difficult to definitively assess the agencies’ true operational autonomy.
Furthermore, the potential for executive intervention, or even closure, of these agencies remains a critical concern. While there may not be explicit legal provisions for immediate shutdown, the agencies’ dependence on presidential approval for their activities creates a vulnerability. If an agency’s investigations or actions are perceived as politically inconvenient or detrimental to the executive’s interests, its operations could be effectively curtailed through resource constraints, personnel changes, or other administrative measures.
The President’s caution to the Inspector General of Government (IGG) regarding the lifestyle audit campaign, while seemingly a warning to be “careful,” should be interpreted within the Ugandan political context [2]. The concern that “thieves might be prompted to invest the loot outside Uganda” can be seen as a form of indirect constraint. While not a direct order to cease investigations, it signals a preference for a cautious approach, potentially limiting the scope and intensity of the campaign. This caution can be perceived as a subtle form of interference, as it suggests a prioritisation of economic stability over aggressive anti-corruption measures. In a context where corruption is deeply entrenched, such cautions can be seen as discouraging the robust pursuit of high-profile cases, thereby perpetuating a climate of impunity. The significant financial losses attributed to corruption, as evidenced by the 2022 IGG report, further highlight the urgent need for genuine and unfettered anti-corruption efforts [3][4].

Uganda’s Ministry of Defence and Veterans Affairs hosts several internal oversight structures, such as the Anti-Corruption Unit and Internal Audit Unit, tasked with identifying and investigating corruption within the defence establishment. These teams recognize the specific vulnerabilities prevalent in the sector—such as procurement fraud, resource mismanagement, and bribery-related infractions. This is evidenced by recent trainings that explicitly focus on corruption risk awareness and building integrity among senior leaders [1] and protocols against corruption for officers [2]. For example, in October 2023, a “Building Integrity for Senior Leaders” program led by the UK Defence Academy engaged 14 senior officers with topics like corruption risks, procurement integrity, and ethical leadership [1].
Despite acknowledging these risks and taking initial steps to address them, internal units face significant constraints such as limited institutional capacity (monitoring and oversight) and authority prevent them from enforcing policy recommendations or compelling corrective action across departments. [3]

There are no specific units/institutions within the defence sector specifically tasked to deal with corruption and building integrity. However, there are units such as the military police, regimental police, special investigative branch and the military intelligence which in some cases are meant to instil discipline in the military, including investigations whenever a crime is committed within the forces [1]. These units focus on general military offenses, and corruption may fall under this category. These units are not specifically meant to deal with corruption. For example, the Zimbabwe Military Police and the Special Investigation Branch deal with military crimes and discipline [1]. However, they do not have a specific mandate on dealing with corruption, especially corruption involving Generals in the military [2]. Their resources are only meant for the day-to-day disciplining of soldiers, and their resources are limited to the latter.

The units are not perceived as independent, due to prominent allegations of corruption involving senior officers [1]. Although units such as the Military Intelligence and Military Police have the authority to investigate their commanders, in practice they are often reluctant to do so. Officers report that attempts to investigate senior commanders can lead to victimisation or retaliation, which discourages them from exercising this investigative mandate fully [2].

While there are units within the military tasked with addressing crimes, such as the Military Police, the Special Investigation Branch (SIB), the Special Air Service (SAS), and Military Intelligence, these units are not effective in tackling corruption in the defence and security sector, particularly when senior commanders, such as army generals, are involved. This ineffectiveness is attributed to fears of victimisation [1,2]. While there have been reports of three top army generals being dismissed due to housing corruption, these units are under-resourced and primarily focus on arresting and disciplining junior officers [2]. Although junior officers working as Special Investigation Officers (SIB) may be aware of corruption, they face significant challenges in investigating and arresting their senior commanders [2]